# THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
# ITS POLITICAL ASPECTS

10 March 1960

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# THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE: ITS POLITICAL ASPECTS

10 March 1960

COLONEL HAWKINS: Gentlemen, today we finally come face to face with the subject that many of our speakers have been referring to lately, that is the political integration of Western Europe.

We are approaching this subject today from the point of view of an historian, a man who has specialized in political science, as differentiated from a person who is in the day-to-day activity of the State Department or some other part of our Government.

Gentlemen, it's a pleasure to present to the class Professor Zurcher of New York University.

DR. ZURCHER: Thank you, Colonel.

Gentlemen, I have always gotten a good deal of satisfaction out of the title that Colonel Hawkins used just now in the introduction, namely, Professor. At any rate, such was the case until last week, when one of my students invited me to one of these little campus soirees with the invitation to make a few remarks. In introducing me she gave the definition of a professor. A professor is a man, she said, who, when quite young, in graduate school, swore that he would rather be dead than be a teacher and he has been both ever since. This young lady announced that I was an exception, but her voice did not carry any conviction. I relate the story in order to give you some idea of what you are up against despite the very generous introduction of Colonel Hawkins.

I suspect that few movements in history have been more fascinating to watch than the effort undertaken after World War II to unify Western Europe. I think in part the fascination lies in the fact that so much has been attempted in so short a time. And I think in part the fascination derives from the fact that the proponents of integration have persisted in moving forward with their plans despite the apparent lack of public support. Those who dare greatly are always fascinating. One might say that the proponents of integration have lived very fast, at least in an intellectual sense; and they have also lived very dangerously, at least as respects their reputation for political sagacity.

It is hardly surprising, that those who merely chronicle the evolution of the unity movement in Western Europe are a little breathless. They have not yet had time to reflect and appraise what has been happening. They are still not sure whether they are recording one of those major, irreversible movements in history, or recording just a series of events that may conceivably suggest a trend. And also, of course, there is always the danger that the trend, which may be suggested, is a trend down a blind alley.

For example, mindful of this difficulty, I sought, a couple of years ago, to play it safe when I tried to supplement the efforts of other chroniclers of this movement in Western Europe. I confess that in the little volume that I produced I may have let myself go. Once or twice, at any rate, in the context of that volume, I behaved more like an editorial writer than an historian. But I was quite conservative about the title of the book. The choice of the title was "The Struggle to Unite Europe." And whatever connotations the word "struggle" may have, it certainly makes no commitment as to the outcome of what is taking place in Western Europe. It is a neutral-enough word, I think, to keep any prophet from looking like a fool.

In 1960 the effort to unite Western Europe I think is still a struggle. One may be just as confident today as some of us were in 1957 that this is a movement which will not be denied. He may have the same hunch in 1960 as in 1957 that the events connected with the European movement are not mere episodes, but are the expression of an organic and inevitable historical process. I would say, in short, that he may be just as confident now as he was three years ago that this movement will not ultimately be denied. At the same time, it is becoming quite apparent that European unity can be detoured and delayed However certain the 1960 observer may be that integration is the wave of the future for Western Europe, the practical facts of political life make that observer somewhat less confident than three years ago that this wave will move in the next flood tide and overwhelm Western Europe's conventional institutional piling in the political and economic domain.

In order better to understand the stage we have now reached in this movement to unite Western Europe, I would like to review briefly--and identify--the major phases through which it has passed during its 15-year history, that is, since 1945.

The first years, between 1947 and 1953, marked what might be called the movement's romantic phase. It was a kind of halcyon period, when politicians still could be a bit irresponsible and poetic and dream

dreams. Those were the years when the United States of Europe was just around the corner, if you will permit me to use an American political direction, vintage 1932. The Congress of Europe at The Hague in 1948, like England in the spring, could have used a Wordsworth to do justice to the expectations of man.

Somewhat more than a whiff of realism came in 1949, when the mountain of talk about the United States of Europe produced the molehill at Strasbourg, that is, what we now call the Council of Europe.

A year later the romantics received a realistic jolt when Britain at Strasbourg made it clear that she was not interested in political integration, at least not integration of a sovereign nature. But the leaders who thought that they were on the verge of providing federal instrumentalities for Europe did not give up hope until August 1954, when, as a result of the action of the French Legislature, the European Defense Community and the so-called Political Community were defeated. These were both projects of an essentially federal nature, and they were finally abandoned in that year.

The year 1954, therefore, began what might be called the second phase of the movement to unite Europe. Now the prime aim became that of economic association and the establishment of common organs appropriate to such association. Whether such organs were to be supranational or not was, according to M. Paul Henri Spaak, purely academic. The culminating event of this phase of the movement was the signing of the treaties at Messina and at Rome in 1957--the treaties which produced the Common Market and the somewhat dubious European Atomic Energy Community. Political unity had not been rejected, but the time was considered unpropitious for the development of federal instrumentalities; and political unity was therefore moved pretty far back on the stove.

I think we are now in what might be described--for purposes, at any rate, of organizing our thought--the third phase of the movement. That begins with the advent of General DeGaulle to power in France. It is marked, also, by the growing influence upon the non-Communist world of the ideas of Premier Khrushchev. It is a period in which the movement for union in Western Europe has been caught between the forces of resurgent nationalism and the implications of Khrushchev's policy of coexistence. Two years after this phase began, we are beginning to feel somewhat more secure about the idea of having integration weather successfully the policy of "la gloire"; but we are only beginning to feel the real impact of the threat that is inherent in the Khrushchev policy of coexistence, and the corollary of that policy, which is neutralism.

Concurrently, partly because of the impact of nationalism, the European movement is suffering from a major schism. As we all know, this has produced two economic camps in Western Europe--the so-called Inner Six and the Outer Seven. The existence of this schism is in itself enough to cause apprehension about the movement's entire future.

Hence, as we move forward in 1960, it becomes apparent that European integration has reached another crisis in its fortunes. It may be a crisis which is even more serious than that which assailed the movement in 1954. In any case, we shall have to have somewhat more clear-cut evidence than we now possess as to the possible resolution of this crisis before we can determine whether this phase that I have called the third phase of the movement, is to mark the end of any effective effort to integrate Europe in this generation, or whether the concept of a union will move forward again.

It is my judgment which I have made apparent in the book that I cited earlier and which I shall probably make it apparent in these remarks--I'm afraid that I am one of those confirmed optimists--that there are unifying forces operating in Western Europe that, in the end, are not likely to be denied; and that optimism concerning the future of union in Western Europe is probably a more realistic view--a more realistic policy--than pessimism. Hence as I embark upon a more detailed examination of this mood of optimism, stressing especially the implications of the movement toward European integration for current American policy and the impact of the movemement on world politics which, I understand, is my assignment--I intend not merely to identify the dangers that stand in the way of integration, however serious they may be. I would like, also, to suggest some of those underlying forces, to which I alluded, that seem to me to imply the historical necessity, or may imply the inevitability, of union. If we are objective in the best historical sense, perhaps we can project what is involved in this movement not only for the short run but also for the long run. I am always in favor of the long run, even though I admit the validity of the observation that men, being mortal, are usually interested in the short run, since in the long run they are all likely to be dead.

Let us consider now the first of the two forces that I mentioned earlier that currently suggest a serious threat to the European movement; namely, Khrushchev's policy of coexistence. To the Russians European union foreshadows the eventual consolidation of at least the three major European nations of the West--Italy, France, and Germany; and for that reason it is about as dangerous a long-term development as the heirs of the Bolshevik revolution can contemplate. The contribution

which such unity could make to the administrative efficiency and economic strength of the West could overcome, or at least greatly reduce, the present advantage which the geographical extent of Russia and its administrative consolidation give the Soviet regime. Hence from the beginning of the European movement it has been the Soviet aim to discourage that movement by any means, overt or covert. Russia's struggle against NATO and against the European Defense Community, for example, is too well known to require recapitulation.

Currently, the Russian opposition to the European movement is somewhat less overt than in the past. That is because the movement has "shifted gears" and has gone into what we might call the "economic" phase. Russia apparently feels that she can afford not to allow her anxiety to show too plainly. She can be more suave about the whole matter. But the USSR is nonetheless active behind the scenes, if not in front of the scenes. On Berlin and the entire "summit" policy she has played her hand astutely in the past two years in trying to divide Britain and Germany. If she can now drive a wedge between Adenauer and DeGaulle, the Common Market would have real difficulty in surviving. During the next few weeks, especially during the Communist leader's visit to Paris, it will be interesting to watch Khrushchev's maneuvers in his effort to detach DeGaulle from his entente with the German leader and throw the West into confusion.

Earlier, Khrushchev sought to drive a wedge between Adenauer and the German industrialists. Well aware that the latter, riding the crest of the German boom, are only lukewarm toward the Common Market at the present time. Khrushchev and Mikoyan have not failed to impress upon them the advantages of dealing with Eastern markets unhampered by the restrictions that may be imposed by the Common Market. This intervention was symbolized recently by the birthday greetings or congratulations which Khrushchev sent, during his East German visit, to the head of the Krupp empire.

More recently still, Khrushchev has tried his hand at wooing away another member of the Community of the Six, namely, Italy. Using the occasion of President Gronchi's visit to Moscow, the Russians apparently sought to exploit the divisions that exist within the Christian Democrats, the only party capable of governing Italy. It is the Russians' obvious hope that the successors of the last Segni cabinet will have to move decisively toward the left of center and embrace Italian elements that are hostile to NATO and the European movement and favorable to the Russian theme of neutralism. This is a prospective political evolution which the West should watch with intense interest.

Russia has many plans for overcoming the non-Communist world, but her plan of plans as we all know is to disrupt every form of Western unity. If she can defeat European integration, she will have taken a major step in destroying the unity of NATO--her ultimate objective. Her weapon, it should be reiterated, is the policy of coexistence, and the alleged new face which this policy gives her diplomacy. Russia suggests to the West that she is housebroken and that her promises are to be taken at face value. The resulting spread of neutralism and the disruptive influence of the Khrushchev policy on Western leadership is to be discerned in every newspaper's headlines. It is to be hoped that historians will not have to record that it was Stalin's cold war policy that united the West, and that it was Khrushchev's coexistence policy that disrupted and eventually destroyed Western union.

I would like to turn now to the power which symbolizes resurgent nationalism--that other threat to European union in 1960 which I mentioned a little earlier. This, of course, is Gaullist France. And here we meet with a contradiction. Despite DeGaulle's well-advertised former opposition to Western unity, France under his control has been most zealous in carrying out her obligations under the Rome Treaty of 1957, the one that brought in the Market. Indeed, in undertaking responsibility for membership, no one of the six states of the Common Market has made more sacrifices, relatively, than Gaullist France. M. Pinay, whom DeGaulle entrusted with responsibility for carrying out the currency and economic reforms last December--especially the economic policy of deflation--which were required to inaugurate the Market in January a year ago--1959--is, as all of us know, a confirmed European.

Pinay's recent dismissal apparently signifies no real change in the French position toward the Market and all that concept implies. Speaking to the French Assembly in December, 1959, following the Little Summit Conference in Paris, the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, pointed out that France had not only carried out her commitments to the Common Market to the fullest extent, but was in a position at the end of 1959 to suggest to her five associates in the Market that the implementation of the Rome Treaty should be speeded up. Indeed, France appears willing to make reductions in tariffs more promptly than required by the Rome Treaty. As Couve de Murville said in his address, anyone who at the time the Rome Treaty was signed could have predicted such initiative on the part of France at the end of 1959--and this is his quotation--"would doubtless have met with a great deal of incredulity." This is a mild observation, to say the least.

The French Foreign Minister also stated that his government would be willing to elaborate closer political ties among the Six as they moved toward more effective and intimate economic collaboration. At the conclusion of this phase of his statement to the French National Assembly, the French Foreign Minister seized the opportunity to reaffirm France's loyalty to the European movement as a whole. I think this reaffirmation is even more significant than the specific observations on the Market. He formulated it in this surprising statement, and I quote again: "A strong and united Western Europe, particularly with France and Germany in close association, constitutes this factor of equilibrium without which our continent runs the risk of being submerged."

These are hardly nationalistic or jingoistic words. They are as generous in their import for Europe as any that might have been uttered by Paul Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet, or Robert Schuman. Such words lend credence to the assertion of DeGaulle's apologists, who insist that their leader is the most timely friend that European union could have acquired at this time; and that his seemingly nationalistic behavior is motivated solely by a desire to lift France out of the doldrums into which former regimes have placed her and restore her to a position of strength and dignity. Once that goal has been accomplished, say these apologists, DeGaulle may be expected gradually to forget or forego the peculiar sensitivity and nationalistic susceptibility he has been displaying to the world since he came to power and play his part as a loyal European.

Needless to say, the West wants to believe in the accuracy of this prediction. At the same time, Western leaders, mindful of their responsibilities, must continually remind themselves of the obverse of this coin regarding the European views of the President of the Fifth Republic. In the past DeGaulle has rejected emphatically any institution suggesting a supranational form of European organization. Before he came to power, his maximum idea of European integration was something that might be embraced by the kind of thing that exists at Strasbourg at the present time; namely, the Council of Europe. His Premier, Michel Debre, has also taken the opportunity on various occasions to declare to the world that the national state is the only broad community that can command men's loyalties. Others in the DeGaulle entourage have said the same thing. The new French Constitution, which is largely Debre's work, unlike that of the Fourth Republic, is wholly silent about the possibility of limiting French sovereignty to advance international cooperation.

Moreover, neither the Algerian War nor the exigencies of France's internal situation have convinced the world that France's policy regarding her land and naval forces in NATO, her insistence upon nuclear

experiments, and her unwillingness to allow the stocking of nuclear arms for American NATO planes are premised on anything lastingly fraternal in the way of European or international cooperation.

Permit me, parenthetically, to refer to another little item on this less cooperative attitude of M. DeGaulle which came to my attention the other day. I have here the copy of a speech that General DeGaulle delivered in December to the Association of the Friends of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre. In it he makes some very interesting remarks about France's defense policy. He starts the speech by saying: "It is necessary that the defense of France"--this is my translation and I hope it is correct--"shall be French. It is a necessity which has been neglected somewhat in the course of the past years. I know that. But it is indispensable that it be revived. A country like France, if it is to make war, must make its own war. It is necessary that the effort be its own effort."

He goes on to say that undoubtedly it is necessary to act jointly with others, but there is no question at all that all decisions with regard to French participation must be French.

The speech is in that vein all the way through. It is perhaps controlled, or was controlled, somewhat by his audience. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that it may be the truer DeGaulle than some of the observations made by his Foreign Minister, which I quoted earlier.

These same realists insist that DeGaulle's unexpected fondness for the European Common Market is explained by the fact that it has given France a readymade and respectable avenue for the assertion of French leadership of Germany and Europe--a leadership facilitated by the complacency of the astute Adenauer and the British decision to stay out of the Market.

There is probably truth in these observations of the anti-DeGaulle realists. I think at the same time, in fairness to DeGaulle and to France, and in order to keep this analysis as objective as possible, it should be added that whatever DeGaulle's original ideas, he seems to have moved farther to the center during his year of power. He has become less doctrinaire and more pragmatic on the European issue. These conclusions are suggested by his modest course in respect of Algeria, his recent break with the extreme Right in France, his choice of administrators in the various domains that would directly affect the European issue, and, above all, by the policy he has been pursuing and continues to pursue toward European integration. It is indeed not impossible that

DeGaulle may yet be transformed from a liability into a hard asset. I expect the proper conclusion is a Gallic shrug as to just where our friend is going.

Let us here briefly consider the situation in the case of France's partners in the Six. Among the Low Countries there appears to be no likelihood of a failure to implement the Common Market Treaty, although issues have arisen which suggest that some of these states may not have wholly forsworn short-term advantages. Belgium, for example is worried about the coal glut, and appears to be unable to assert the kind of economic discipline that would help solve this question. Her Socialists especially, who incidentally, are strong supporters of Europe, seem to hesitate in supporting measures to deal effectively with this particular question. Holland has just recently suggested that the Common Market would necessarily require her to raise her tariffs--Holland is a low-tariff country--and thus conceivably jeopardize existing relations with both importers and exporters. The Dutch are probably going to have some trouble with their vested commercial interests.

As long as Adenauer is in command of the Federal Republic, there appears to be little reason to worry either about the benevolent intentions of the Germans toward the Common Market or their political capacity to execute pledges which the Germans have taken on its behalf. Erhard's supporters, especially the industrial leaders, may be somewhat lukewarm, but Adenauer has indicated the primacy of his diplomacy over vested private industry.

The situation might be changed if Ollenhauer's Socialists came to power, because, like their confreres elsewhere, their loyalty to European integration is still tempered by their unwillingness to accept the economic discipline of the Common Market. They are still worried about the idea of securing economies of scale and location and other ideas of economic efficiency, with their inevitable temporary displacement of labor. These ideas are implicit in the Market. But, as has just been suggested, Germany appears reasonably safe so long as Adenauer is in command.

For the moment the question mark among the allies of France and the Six, as I suggested earlier, is Italy. The recently resigned Segni cabinet, lacking an adequate Christian Democratic center, had moved farther to the Right, than any of its predecessors. It was dependent, as we know, for its effective majorities, upon Fascist and Nationalist deputies, as well as deputies of the Liberal Party. The extreme Italian Right is highly nationalistic and has no love for European cooperation.

But the chief weakness in Segni's cabinet was Segni's own Christian Democratic Left, which, having listened to the siren song of Khrushchev's coexistence theme, is or has been moving away from NATO and European union, and is seeking to embrace neutralism as a policy and associate with Nenni's pro-Communist Left. As suggested earlier in these remarks, Italy bears careful watching by those concerned with the cause of European union.

Nationalistic politics in France and elsewhere in Western Europe will undoubtedly continue to plague the European movement; and they may in the future jeopardize it in a serious way. But if this lengthy review of DeGaulle's behavior in France and the situation among France's allies in the Common Market is any guide, there is probably less to fear from the resurgence of nationalism in European politics than from the influence of those moves on the international chessboard inspired by Khrushchev's policy of coexistence. After all, even for DeGaulle there is still a Europe beyond France; but for Khrushchev there is no Europe beyond the USSR.

I would like now to direct attention for a few moments to the third set of circumstances which is currently exerting an adverse influence upon integration in Europe. This, of course, is the split among the European nations in OEEC, symbolized by the division between the Common Market of the Six and the group called the "Outer Seven."

This split has grown out of the unwillingness of the majority of the states in OEEC to accept the Rome Treaty and identify themselves with the Common Market of the Six. I think this point should be emphasized, for it is sometimes forgotten that those responsible for the Rome Treaty sought vigorously and sincerely for the participation in the Common Market of all of Western Europe. Moreover, that participation is still sought.

Clearly the leader, and probably the indispensable leader, of this movement away from the Rome Treaty and the establishment of a split in Western Europe has been the United Kingdom. Britain symbolizes this process of division in the organization of Western Europe quite as emphatically as DeGaulle symbolizes the forces of neo-nationalism and its impact upon European organization. If we have to call the Six "DeGaulle's Europe," the Seven are even more clearly "Britain's Europe."

One of the more interesting phenomena in international politics has been the evolution of the British attitude toward European unity. Since 1946 Britain has played just about every note in the scale of European integration, from sour bass notes to the most lyrical treble. Nevertheless, whenever

so-called sober second thought has taken over and British leaders have been called upon to give a realistic interpretation of some of their more generous oratorical periods in favor of Europe, all but a handful of mavericks, who had been infected by the federalistic virus, made it plain that European unity is really anathema to British policy. Official Britain thought it had won a great triumph when the plethora of talk about the United States of Europe in 1948 produced the Council of Europe at Strasbourg; and Britain felt it had registered another triumph when it prevented the Europeans at Strasbourg from giving that agency some teeth. I expect that Britain was as joyful as the Russians were in 1954 when the European Defense Community was finally obliterated.

The supranational trend in Continental thinking about unity has, of course, always been anathema to Great Britain. As I said, the British opposed the whole idea at Strasbourg. And then when Schuman succeeded with his Coal and Steel Community, they refused to join and established a link which they called an "association" to try to protect British interests. Subsequently British leaders used every resource at their command to scuttle further supranational communities; and they certainly helped scuttle EDC and EPC.

Finally, when the Common Market and the Euratom treaties came into being, Britain opposed them. And when opposition no longer paid dividends, she developed the abortive plan for a broad free-trade zone which would embrace the Common Market and other OEEC states.

This deep-seated British antipathy to supranational or federal communities was rather frankly explained in 1953 by Sir Robert Boothby, at the time the French Assembly was considering EDC. Sir Robert, as we all know, is another Britisher who suffers from that peculiar dichotomy about integration, which may be described as thinking generously about it, but feeling strongly isolationist and anti-European at the same time. Late in 1953 Sir Robert, in a rather frank outburst, declared that the effort to go farther with what he called "this supranational stuff" and seek adoption of the then-proposed European Political Community along with EDC would simply aggravate the division of the Continent and would lead to "an intensive struggle for markets between the Continental community and Great Britain, and thus constitute a potential economic threat to this country."

Sir Robert's voice, was, of course, the authentic 19th century voice of Great Britain. Britain's strategic policy toward the Continent has always been "divide et impera." According to Sir Robert, "divide et impera" is also Britain's economic policy toward the Continent, or at least it was in 1953.

For a time early in 1958, after the advent of DeGaulle in France, this whole issue of a more federalistic type of European union, and particularly the issue posed by the latest example of this kind of union, that is, the Common Market, seemed to have become an academic issue for Britain. At the time British leadership felt pretty certain that DeGaulle would soon relieve it of the embarrasing issue of the Common Market by simply interring it along with other aspects of Western European supranationalism. But, as we now know, Britain reckoned without the French disdain of romantic love as the basis of marriage. The unpredictable French leader, who had already said far worse things about European union and supranationalism than Sir Robert Boothby or any other Britisher, even in their franker moments, suddenly found that the Common Market was a fine device to use against British continental policy and British competition; and to the dismay of the British, DeGaulle and Adenauer began to act as if they couldn't see enough of each other. In any event, the Common Market was very much alive again, as vigorous an institutional idea in post-DeGaulle Europe as it had been in pre-DeGaulle Europe; and the British were up against that "supranational stuff" once more.

I reminded you earlier that Britain met the new state of affairs in the summer of 1958 with a proposal of a broad free trade zone which would embrace the Common Market as an entity. By the end of 1959, as you know, she and other OEEC states received some rather considerable concessions from the Common Market, particularly from France--unexpected concessions. But DeGaulle and his associates in the Six have insisted upon maintaining the distinction between the concessions being arranged within the Market and the concessions given to the OEEC; and the distinction has been favorable to the Common Market.

It was in this extremity that the British experts came up with the idea of the Outer Seven--a group of like-minded OEEC states who, for political as well as economic reasons, fear too close ties with the Common Market. Britian has been their leader and their spokesman. Besides establishing free trade in nonagricultural goods among themselves, the object of the Outer Seven, as we have been assured, is to secure an extension to themselves of as many of the intramural concessions made within the Common Market as possible, and preserve at the same time national autonomy for each of the seven states toward the rest of the world.

And this is about where we are presently on this issue of the split in Western Europe. There is evidence, however, of a changing temper on the part of British economists and British politicans. In its 13 February 1960 issue, about a month ago, the "London Economist" makes this interesting observation, and I quote from the "London Economist:"

"In forming the European Free Trade Association, Britain has made the problem of neutrality (Swedish, Swiss, and Austrian particularly) its own. Has it by that fact made it more difficult for itself to take the plunge when the plunge--to put it crudely--joining the Common Market, becomes possible?"

An interesting aspect of this quotation in this respected journal is its implication that Britain is in rather embarrassing company, and that joining the Six is inevitable for Britain. The reasons for this new realism are perhaps twofold: (1) failure to obtain the advantage of free trade in Europe without some sacrifice of British discretion in formulating of commercial policy toward the rest of the world; and (2) an understanding that the commercial and economic position of Britain will ultimately be injured by staying out of the continental association.

Britain really fears the production and distribution advantages which the Common Market countries can develop against her in time, because they are united. She is not sure any more that Commonwealth ties are more important than continental ties. Like the mythical British Ambassador in Allan Drury's "Advise and Consent," some Britishers think that the Commonwealth "is the best of a bad bargain, and a bad bargain is all we can get in this happy era." The mythical British Ambassador's wife in Mr. Drury's little book, you may recall, had some even less flattering comments about the Commonwealth Empire.

Thus Britain is in something of a quandary about European union. She has softened her attitude on the Common Market. Even so, it is unlikely that the British Government will give up its present leadership of the Outer Seven, or officially shift the order of priority traditionally accorded Commonwealth and Continent. Britain is likely to grow more certain, however, that her present situation is untenable and that if she persists in her isolationism, her situation may grow worse rather than better.

Indeed, a new official note of accommodation was apparent in Selwyn Lloyd's address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe last January (1960). He insisted that Britain's commitments to the Commonwealth and the Atlantic Community were not incompatible with her attachment to Europe. He admitted that Britain had made a mistake in not joining the Schuman Plan; and I believe this is the first time that this has been officially conceded by any British statesman. He also declared that the "Six" was a good thing, that is, that the Community of the Six, the Common Market, was a good thing, provided it did not

develop into a narrow bloc. He warned the Six that if they developed a common diplomacy without consulting others, they would jeopardize association with Britain in that special organization known as Western European Union. But he declared himself satisfied that the new trend, brought about by initiative which Mr. Douglas Dillon has just taken in Paris, would eventually heal the breach and prevent lasting division in Western Europe.

Out of this condition, which has led Britain into a sort of blind alley on the issue of Europe, and at least temporarily brought the European movement to a virtual standstill, there has come this initiative of Mr. Dillon to which I have just referred. This promises much for the future if it is followed up with vigor and imagination. To heal the developing schism within Western Europe and give the European movement greater strength, Mr. Dillon and his advisers have suggested a formula for bringing the United States more directly into association with the European movement instead of having her sit on the sidelines, as she has during the past 15 years (although it must be admitted that, though on the sidelines, the United States has behaved a bit like a traditional Dodger fan at Ebbets Field, trying to help the umpire make decisions). As you will recall, this would be achieved by transforming the OEEC or its successor into an organization in which the United States and Canada would be full-fledged rather than associate members. Thus joined with the states which are members of both the Six and the Seven, America would be in a special, but nonetheless acknowledged position to exercise benevolent diplomatic initiative in fostering the European movement and healing breaches. America's voice will be more acceptable, because she will be a full-fledged member of the broad European organization, which then will have become transatlantic.

If this initiative succeeds, it may well be one of the major developments of postwar diplomacy. The Dillon Plan will provide a kind of three-level association--Inner Six, Outer Seven, and, of course, an enlarged OEEC. The possibility of applying transatlantic influence is apparent. So, too, is the likelihood that this broad type of association will make it easier for the British to move forward toward eventual association with the Common Market, or break down some of the barriers, if that becomes practicable for her.

We shall get a better idea of what this all means when the Committee of Three, appointed by the Dillon group, reports some time in April. However, it is already apparent that a new spirit of accommodation has come into being in the wake of Mr. Dillon's recent "swing around Western Europe." Within the past few days, and pursuant to the French

suggestion made in December of 1959, that free trade within the Six should be speeded up, a practical plan for accelerating that objective has been suggested by the Common Market Executive. More important still is the fact that while the Six are trying to reach free trade and create a common external tariff against the rest of the world, they are also willing to lower at once the proposed rates of the external tariff by 20 percent for those nations who reciprocate. They are also talking of other external concessions in the case of the rates of the Community's two high-tariff members, namely, Italy and France. This trend will surely hasten the solution of the problem of the split between the Six and the Seven.

It should be added that if America is to be successful in the role which Secretary Dillon appears to have assigned her in this new phase of the European movement, she will have to forswear some of the policies and attitudes as respects the European movement which have governed her behavior up to now. Justly or unjustly, Europe, and particularly France, has in the past tended to regard the United States as a kind of lobbyist, using its power to push for intimate military and political association in Western Europe in order thereby to assist American policy. America's activity in this respect has given Europeans the impression that we viewed integration primarily as a military objective, in contradistinction to the European view, which has always stressed the economic gains and high living standards that are implicit in such a development.

At the moment there is danger that Europeans will regard Mr. Dillon's initiative as a continuation of past American behavior--as just another American means of serving a too obvious and selfish American policy. I refer especially to the thought back of the Dillon initiative that Europe should assist us in an organized way in carrying the burden of grants and loans to underdeveloped countries; and that Europe should introduce some more liberal trade policies and mitigate the severity of the current debit balance in America's foreign international payments. Also involved in Mr. Dillon's motivation or suspected motivation is a desire to prevent discrimination against American trade by any combination of European states.

I think these are laudable and patriotic objectives on the part of the State Department. Obviously they are. But we had better be a bit reticent about them if we do not want another European reaction comparable to the one we received on EDC. Neither should we be too insistent upon any of our economic objectives, whether they involve our trade or financial-aid policies. For the long-range aim of the Dillon initiative for America--the one nonexpendable aim of that initiative--

must be the unity of the Western World. And the key to that unity is the unity and the solidarity of the states of Western Europe.

(The following material was not presented orally due to the time limitation.)

The fact is that if the United States is sagacious about the present state of the European movement and takes a long-range view of the potential benefits of that movement to American diplomacy and economic policy, America and the free world are likely to be most generously rewarded. If the movement can weather the contemporary setbacks as outlined earlier, it has a real hope of achieving its long-range objectives. The basic reason is the growing understanding in Europe of the material advantages of such an experiment as that of the Six. European entrepreneurship is unquestionably fascinated by the mass market andby the profit possibility of large volume and small markup.

Thanks in part to the exposure of the European entrepreneur to American managerial methods, an exposure which began in earnest with the Marshall Plan, European management is becoming less authoritarian in its sturcture, more democratic in its internal discipline, and more market- and public-relations conscious. Entrepreneurs with such ideals appear to be springing up everywhere, especially in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Consumers, too, are being conditioned to a mass market by the same devices which have proved so effective in America, that is, aggressive salesmanship, advertising, and installment selling. Even labor is being weaned away from its traditional view that it must exert political pressure to increase its share of the "cake." Instead, here and there European labor seems to be coming around to the view that cooperation with a dynamic, distribution-minded private management may yield larger returns for it as well as for others.

It is this growing modernization of Europe's production and distribution methods and goals that has supplied the economic integrationists with their opportunity, especially those of the Six. It has given them assurance that their revolutionary program is in harmony with historical trends. To succeed, their revolution requires the more spacious institutional concepts of their community. It requires the Common Market that transcends the national boundaries of six nations.

Through such a market, the integrationists hope to overcome artificial public limitations and discourage artificial private barriers such as cartelism and monoply practices, at the same time encouraging concentration of investment and management. Through the new supranational institutions they also hope to make capital and labor more mobile

and provide more stable investment opportunities, thereby attracting capital and increasing the rate of investment.

In short, they hope, by means of their new institutions, to magnify the area of a free and uniform market and encourage what are called "economies of scale." The latter are likely to arise from large concentrations of capital, which are also efficient, from maximum exploitation of weapons of research and technical development, and from the exploitation of comparative advantages of production. The end result, they insist, will be to facilitate and extend mass production and the mass market, both of which have come so far in Western Europe since the war.

The political implications of such economic developments are obvious both to the friends and enemies of freedom. Nothing could be more valuable to the Western Alliance than an economically stronger and more unified Europe; and for America this is the great long-range advantage.

It is the economic promise of the Market that underscores the relevance of some recent French allusions to Britain's attitude toward European integration. They were made by the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, whom I quoted earlier. Commenting on the conversations he had with Selwyn Lloyd in November, 1959, the French leader declared that Lloyd had requested that France, in her leadership of the Six, avoid any policy which might result in a British break with the Continent or result in unfavorable treatment for British trade.

M. Couve de Murville assured Selwyn Lloyd that nothing was further from true French policy than the thought of alienating Britain politically from the Continent. As respects trade, he reminded Lloyd that France was pledged not to discriminate. Couve de Murville continued as follows: "But in our opinion, the solution will depend on the extent to which we will . . . have the means and the desire to practice a liberal trade policy in matters of foreign trade. To the extent that the barriers--whether in the form of quotas or of tariffs--are lowered, the existing problems will become less acute and our closest neighbors will be able to say that they are satisfied. In other words, we find here again the same problems as those which we encountered concerning the Common Market itself. Everything becomes possible when our economy and our currency revive and as long as they remain sound. Should we run into trouble or uncertainty in this field, then any European policy worthy of the name would be out of the question for us."

In other words, "Vive la prosperite." If the Common Market prospers, if its formula of more liberal trade and more efficient production can be extended in Western Europe, and if national economies remain sound, there are few limits to European accommodation to British and American desires if they are legitimate. The future of integration in Europe and its potential contribution to the political unification of the free world obviously depend in great measure upon the maintenance of a high level of economic prosperity and upon the conviction that such institutions as the Common Market contribute to that prosperity.

. . . . . .

I think that I would prefer to bring this discussion to a halt at this point and perhaps elaborate more extensively in the informal "give-and-take" of the question hour. I would like, however, to put a period to this talk. Every lecturer is entitled to put a period to his talk. So I will take just another couple of minutes for that and then I will desist.

Despite all the setbacks, including current disappointments, we have come a long way since the Hague Congress of Europe in 1948 in developing the unity of Western Europe. We are far enough ahead so that America can afford to make many concessions to maintain that unity and push it beyond the obstacles that currently threaten it and give it the position of one of our major international objectives.

I think America can do this, moreover, confident that underneath the surface manifestations of division and despite the surge of nationalism symbolized by General DeGaulle, there is broad acceptance, albeit grudging acceptance, of the necessity of integrating policy and action, both Western European and transatlantic.

In that remarkable work of fiction from which I quoted a little earlier, Mr. Drury's "Advise and Consent," the author sums up the situation admirably, this time through his mythical French Ambassador. He is wholly Gallic--the French Ambassador--both with respect to the correctness of his logic and as respects the error of his premise. I quote again from the inimitable volume:

"After all these years"--says the French Ambassador--"of telling us that we all survive or go down together, they have finally created a situation in which it is true. We didn't want it to be that way, but they fought for us and aided us and told us what was best for backward peoples whose progress didn't match theirs, and lectured at us and negotiated with us and prayed over us until it came true. Now we are stuck with them. If they go, we go. We all go."

End of quote and end of the period.

COLONEL HAWKINS: I hesitate to use this title, but Professor Zurcher is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: You didn't mention the unification of Germany as a factor in the overall integration of Europe. Would you comment on that briefly?

DR. ZURCHER: Yes, but I expect that any comment I might make on that theme would parallel your own. It has been pointed out again and again that so far as DeGaulle is concerned, the reason why he is so strongely wedded to the notion of an alliance with Western Germany is his belief that there is no likelihood that the Germans will be able to achieve that strength that comes from unification; and that consequently Germany is manageable.

It strikes me that the maintenance of the division of Germany is pretty much an essential at this time for the preservation of the concept of European unity as long at least as DeGaulle is in power in France. I expect it's probably essential if any French leader is to take seriously the idea of something a little bit more sophisticated than Strasbourg--than the Council of Europe.

In a sense it seems to me the division of Germany has assisted the evolution of a more vigorous type of international association in Western Europe; and this has never been more obvious, at least to me, than since DeGaulle came to power. I am sure he would not have made that marriage of convenience if Germany had been potentially as powerful as a united Germany would be. I think he probably is beginning to be a bit worried even now.

That is my feeling about the division of Germany. In a kind of left-handed way, it has made a contribution to the maintenance of the association of that part of Europe that remains free.

QUESTION: I would like to look at this from a purely U.S. nationalistic standpoint. One of the ideas is to get Europe unified. The other is that, when unified, it should be on our side. It seems that Britain plays the key role in this. If they go in and have a strong enough voice, we have reasonable assurance that as a unit Europe will tend toward our side. Now, the real question is the tactics to be used. In trying to induce Great Britain to take the lead, should we be doing what Mr. Dillon has been doing, that is, doing the thing ourselves?

DR. ZURCHER: I think your're quite right; that Britain is the key.

One of the reasons why I think Great Britain is a key is because she is not only involved in Europe--and, I think, ultimately in a much more intimate way than she has been willing to admit up to now--but she is, of course, also an imperial nation and has, through her Commonwealth, contact with the rest of the world, including our hemisphere. That means, of course, ourselves and Canada. I think she's a bridge in that sense and is therefore the indispensable bridge in the maintenance of a unification of Western Europe that will be friendly as far as the United States is concerned.

I think that so far as solid, durable European organization goes, it will come about only when the British finally make up their minds as to what the formula shall be as regards their relationship to the Continent. That formula, I believe, will eventually be much more intimate than it is now. I don't believe we're going to be able to push that, because my feeling is that the British are going to go into this on the basis of self-interest, particularly the kind of self-interest which was revealed by the quotation from the "London Economist" which I gave you a while ago. At the same time I don't see any particular reason--I don't think these are mutually exclusive procedures--that of waiting until Britain is convinced on Europe and the initiative inaugurated by Secretary Dillon--I don't see any reason why we shouldn't build some sort of a structure in which we foresee the association that may exist between ourselves and Britain and the European movement ultimately. And this, it seems to me, is the kind of structure that is being built.

We're going to run into an awful lot of difficulty, particularly on trade matters, in the evolution of this structure. There's no question about that. We haven't faced up to this problem of what the implications are of our full association in the Organization of European Economic Cooperation. Nevertheless, I think that this is the organizational chart of the future and that it is not too bad an idea to project this organizational chart and then gradually, because we're convinced that it is going to be the picture of the future, try to work out the necessary interrelationships intramurally within that chart as time goes on.

That is the reason why I think this is a wise idea. I know there are a great many people who feel that we ought to stay on the sidelines, as we have. I don't believe we can. If we're going to achieve the sort of thing that you had in mind in making your observation, it seems to me that this is the policy we're going to pursue.

QUESTION: Dr. Zurcher, you said that the integration of Europe is having a little difficulty now. I'd like to ask you what effect you think an economic recession would have on the chances of integrating Europe, where you might have an increase of unemployment.

DR. ZURCHER: The worst possible thing that could happen to the European movement, to our relations with our allies, and to the whole structure of the free world would, of course, be anything in the nature of a serious economic decline.

I was impressed the other day with the importance of maintaining a relatively high level of prosperity when I read the comment, quoted to you earlier which Couve de Murville made to Selwyn Lloyd when Lloyd raised the question of whether France would pursue a sort of benevolent economic policy toward Britain despite the fact that she has gone ahead with a somewhat selfish--from a British point of view--association in the Common Market. You recall that Couve de Murville's response to that question was that as long as it is possible for France to maintain a relatively high level of prosperity and the curve is up, there isn't any question whatsoever that France can afford to be generous. If, on the other hand, there is a decline in the economic level of production within France and trade, then all bets are off. I'm sure that he got his finger on one of the most important of all conditions regarding the maintenance of the integrity of this movement, and that is the maintenance of economic health.

QUESTION: Last July I went to a celebration of the Battle of Minden back in the old days, and there were a lot of foreign dignitaries. Pratically all the NATO nations were represented there. The British bands came out and the American bands and the French bands and the crowds chipped at it and so forth. All of a sudden the German band came out of the south end of the field and as those trumpets sounded and the band started going back and forth and that ripple of gray came across the field, you could feel the cold frost of fear all around the place. My question really is: This temporary business of France and Germany being so close together now--isn't it really the fact that the American Armed Forces are there to prevent trouble or the fear that France has? If we withdrew tomorrow, would they still have that feeling whether Germany were divided or not?

DR. ZURCHER: I think if the American Armed Forces were withdrawn, and the integration that has taken place in the security forces typified by NATO, if that were all withdrawn now, then I'm sure that there would be a very serious schism between France and Germany.

But I don't think the present policy as regards the relation of France and Germany on the market is dictated solely by the existence of American forces. I think there is an influence on French policy, and on German policy too; but it's basically an industrial influence as opposed to a diplomatic influence. I don't believe the Common Market is purely a diplomatic game by the political leaders. I think it has flowed out of an economic development--of very considerable proportions that is being played up today in all our periodicals--Fortune, for example,--and in our newspapers. I think this is an important consideration in the maintenance of the integrity of the association in Western Europe. This concept that you're not going to achieve the values that are implicit or inherent in modern technology and large-scale organization unless you are able to achieve some sort of political framework that will permit this thing to happen, or at least a political framework which will be benevolent in fact, as opposed to the lack of benevolence that is implicit in mere internationalism as a basis of organization--I think this is a factor in the French view.

I think another factor, which is more political, is the one I mentioned a moment ago--the fact that Germany looks to be a bit more manageable so far as France is concerned.

Of course, another factor, political also, is the willingness on the part of France to use Germany vis-a-vis England in this relationship at the moment.

These are temporary factors. I do feel, however, that the other one that I mentioned--the economic one--is a much more permanent thing. Whether it will eventually become strong enough to maintain the association when, let us say, the American investment in Germany is relaxed somewhat is a question. I think it is strong enough to survive if the American investment, manpowerwise and otherwise is reduced provided we're there long enough. There's such a thing as a habit of association, and I think this is one of the great things that have transpired since the end of the war--this habit of association in the West. Through all these various forms of association with which you are as familiar as I, that resulting habit, I think, is important. It tempers pure nationalism.

QUESTION: You partially answered my question in your last comment. But in the previous reference to this general problem of the unification of Europe, we all seem to have taken a basic premise that we're all adults now and let's let bygones be bygones and let's be practical in dealing with these economic and political and so forth considerations. But it seems to be true that there still exists in Europe basic

hatred among the people who lost their sons in Dachau or elsewhere. Would you completely disregard the emotional aspects, or at what level would you consider them?

DR. ZURCHER: Of course the last part of your question is awfully difficult to answer. This is a matter of opinion with individuals.

I certainly do not discount the emotions, or the existence of these emotional resistive forces on the European Continent. They're there. What is surprising about what has happened since the end of the war is that despite these resistive emotional factors, we have been able to achieve as much as we have achieved.

I'm sure I'm being optimistic and probably foolish about this. But in view of what has transpired since the end of the war, and in view of what is implicit in our modern science and technology, our system of communications, and all the other factors, economic and sociological, that seem to stress the forces of unification, I cannot avoid the conclusion that if the expectations of men come to be achieved--and I'm not thinking only of security expectations--it will be almost impossible to stop this type of thing in Western Europe.

I do agree with you that we have an extremely difficult opposition to overcome--the opposition of vested emotional points of view that usually come up under the term "nationalism," but which certainly are broader than that. And they're much more personal too, as you've just indicated.

As I say, this is largely in the area of opinion. It's awfully hard to measure this kind of thing. But I doubt very much that anyone who is seriously concerned about this would reject or disregard what you've just said. On the contrary, this is a great block.

QUESTION: A previous speaker has indicated that the attitude of the United Kingdom toward the Inner Six at the present time is one of watchful waiting; that they don't really believe that it's going to work. With regard to the present cooperation between France and Germany, he said it depends largely upon two strong personalities, neither of them boys really. Have you any thoughts on this matter of what might happen if one or the other or both of these men should depart the scene?

DR. ZURCHER: That could be a very serious factor indeed in the evolution of the association between France and Germany. If Adenauer goes and anything in the nature of the problem that has come to being in

Italy comes to being in Germany; in other words, if the German Government goes toward the Left--if they can't produce the same strength in the way of a governing coalition that Adenauer has been able to produce within his Christian Democrat Union--it seems to me that that would definitely affect German policy and it would affect German policy detrimentaly as regards the Common Market. If it became likely, as a result of Adenauer's departure, that the Erhard faction should gain control of the German Government, if, for example, the sort of thing that was suggested here not very long ago--that Adenauer should be drawn into the presidency and be "kicked upstairs" and Erhard become prime minister or chancellor--if such an event should take place, I have little doubt that the German attitude toward the Common Market would undergo something of a change. This would result from the confidence that has been generated on the part of the German industrialists by the extraordinary prosperity which has been achieved in Germany since 1954. I think the German industrialists are not sold on the Market in the same sense that Adenauer is sold. Adenauer is sold for political reasons. They're not as sold as he is on the necessity and inevitability of moving forward with the Market.

I think the British attitude toward this question will hinge entirely upon what happens during the course of 1960. If in July, or around that time of the year, the 20 percent reduction in the intramural tariffs of the Six takes place, and if at the same time the Executive Commission of the Six is able to arrange even one reciprocal relationship tariffwise with an outside area, the United States for example, on the basis of the proposed 20 percent cut that I mentioned a moment ago, then I think a very serious step will have been taken to push the Common Market into the realm of reality.

We haven't gotten to that point yet. We've only made, as you know, the 10 percent reduction. They have been studying the problem of the internal tariff. They have come up, I understand, with more than 300 different schedules for a common tariff. They are trying to reconcile, as you know, the low-tariff states with the high-tariff states, France and Italy on the one hand with Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and Holland on the other. These are the low-tariff areas. France and Italy are the high-tariff areas. They're going to have to find some sort of a middle ground between these, and I understand that very serious effort has been made during the course of the past six months to develop tentative schedules that reach this middle ground in the internal tariff. If we reach that middle ground in the internal tariffs, if we take the step that is being proposed now by the French--though they seem to be pulling back this morning--and reduce the internal tariff by 20 percent, that

being another major step in the direction of achieving a common internal tariff; and if during the course of this year any kind of treaty arrangement is made with an outside group vis-a-vis the Six as a unit on this policy of a 20 percent reciprocal reduction of the common tariffs against any outside state, then I would say that this thing is achieving a vitality and a life of its own. And when it does, the somewhat hesitant views of the British may change.

QUESTION: Doctor, with respect to your comments on the unity of Western Europe in the future, could you possibly anticipate that with the consummation of this union it might develop into a neutralist group that might hold the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States?

DR. ZURCHER: There certainly is that possibility; and it is one of the dangers that union in Western Europe holds for American policy. That is the danger in the diplomatic area. The danger in the economic area, of course, is pretty much apparent. There are some of our industrialists who fear that it will be extremely difficult for them to get over a possible tariff wall that might be erected over a tremendous, self-contained area such as this might be. Those are the two major problems for us.

I think that this is one of the reasons why the kind of initiative that has been taken by the State Department last year is so important. Implied in that initiative of Mr. Dillon, at least for me, is the establishment of a relationship and an administrative structure which can assist in avoiding the kind of schism which you have suggested might arise.

If as a result of our encouragement of European unity we should develop a great power bloc on the European Continent, it might be inimical to us let us say, or at any rate it might develop into a neutralist bloc as between the two great power antagonists--the Soviet Union and the United States. There has been more than one expression of this kind of hope by Europeans. It hasn't been too clearly expressed, but it's there. I'm referring, for example, to the kind of thing that you hear every once in a while from practically any European leader, including our friend Adenauer, who is probably the last man to expect to be neutralist in Europe. Still only two months ago he suggested that this merging of power in Europe is absolutely essential if Europe is to maintain a voice in the world community; that it's no longer possible to maintain that voice in isolated national fashion; that the Suez imbroglio or fiasco made very clear that if Europe is going to maintain a voice in world councils, she will have to unite. This kind of thing is said again

and again by European leaders. Well, this could apply, of course, to the development of an autonomous policy and the development of an autonomous policy could be extremely dangerous potentially to the sort of thing that you mentioned a moment ago.

I think that probably one of the finest things that we have done is this business of trying to supplement what we might call sentiment and common interest with some sort of formal arrangement such as that which is implicit in the OEEC.

QUESTION: You mentioned that we should keep a critical eye on Italy. A group of us is scheduled to visit Italy this summer. We had a representative from the Ambassador's office down here talking to us. He pointed out that 99 percent of the Italians are Catholic, that 20 percent of them voted for the Communist Party, and there was a very low birth rate in Italy; and he explained this by saying that the Italians are, first of all, very practical people and the Italian Government has fallen by the very impractical thing of the Liberals withdrawing when they knew full well that this would push the government farther to the Left. Do you have any explanation of how something like that can take place?

DR. ZURCHER: The only explanation that I have is that the politicians are rather small gauge. I'm afraid that that's true so far as the people you mentioned a moment ago are concerned--those who were responsible for catapulting the Segni government. I imagine that if you were to investigate what has transpired and the motives that are responsible for it, particularly on the part of the Liberal leaders in Italy, you would find that it was largely an attempt to secure certain personal advantages in the great game of politics, and that one sacrificed what might be called national policy and national advantages to this sort of thing. That happens all the time, I'm not too sure about this. It certainly is not exclusively Italian. Italy doesn't have a monopoly on it.

I do think, however, that there is a clear reflection in this action, in these tactics of the Liberal Party, of the essential weakness of the Italian political framework--the democratic Italian political framework. I tried to bring that out in the remarks that I made earlier, referring particularly to the weakness that exists within the structure of the Christian Democratic Party, the party that Segni led in the government. That is, as you know, a vertical arrangement, socially, economically, and otherwise; and it has all the weaknesses of that kind of party arrangement, the hierarchical, vertical arrangement. You get all sorts of social elements involved. The crystallization of the Left in the Italian Christian Democratic Party is probably a more serious thing as respects

the threat to cabinet stability than the tactics of small groups, like the Liberals on the Right.

If Christian Democracy were a real, solid force, ably led and strongly disciplined within the Italian political picture, I wouldn't be too worried about the situation, because I think that kind of a force would necessarily attract enough fringe support to keep going. And it could dominate any fringe support that was brought under its shadow, whether Left or Right. But if the Center itself is riven with division, as I'm afraid the Italian Center is riven with division, then we have a serious situation.

This is the basic interpretation of the Italian picture. I think the matter that you referred to is pretty much a matter of personal tactics and hardly much more.

QUESTION: We have had several speakers on Germany, who went back into history after World War I and also World War II, and who have strongly suggested that this must not be allowed to happen again--the German nation rising up to attempt to rule the world. However, I have visited recently industrial establishments in England, France, Germany, and Switzerland, and I can't help but feel that these people are the hardest working people over there. It's very difficult for me to see that this unity that is being established will not end up in their hands; that if you take the middle position between the short and long run, probably, no matter what happens, even Western Germany is going to come out on top. Now, is this worse than having Eastern Europe, Russia, come out on top? And is it possible to have any balance of power at all in the world if we drive these people by armed force or pressure into that other camp? Is there any possibility of a strong Central Europe left with Germany gone into the eastern camp?

DR. ZURCHER: I think there are several questions there. As far as number one is concerned, I have a very definite opinion on that. I don't say it would be worse. I'd hate to envision the kind of domination that you have suggested of Germany over the West similar, let us say, to that of Germany pre-Hitler. But I think I would probably accept that, if I had to, of the two alternatives. I don't believe that it would be as bad.

I suppose the reason why I don't think it's as bad is because, although I think it's inevitable that there is going to be a real preponderance of German strength even with Germany divided in the Western Europe community, the very association, especially in the economic sphere, that involves more or less common investment policies and common policies

with regard to the disposition of resources--all of this, it seems to me, is going to do two things. It's going to build up economically the areas around Germany to a level comparable to what goes on within Germany. Secondly, it's going to make the German economic machine in a sense dependent upon the rest of Western Europe for its own success. This strikes me as being a little bit different from a regime of German dominance under pure nationalism, with separate tariffs and commercial policies, such as have existed up to now. And that would be the answer that I would make to your first observation.

As to the second one, I don't think I'm competent to answer that one. I don't think that what I would have to say would be of any value in any case on that. It certainly is an important consideration, but I have nothing to add to what you have just said.

QUESTION: Previous speakers, as well as yourself, sir, have emphasized the criticality of DeGaulle's attitude on these things; and you mentioned just a bit ago his moderate policy in Algeria. Last night I got home and had a chance to scan this week's "Time Magazine" and a long report on his recent tour in Algeria, in which he has been lecturing all the army units that moderation is impossible; that the French must press the war in Algeria and end with victory; that this is the only possible course. Now, if this report is true, it's quite obviously a reversal of his previous stand; and I would think it would have some effect on the overall picture as you have presented it. Would you comment on that?

DR. ZURCHER: Well, all I can say in answer to the point that you have just made is that I'm worried, just as you are. I think everybody is who has been following what has happened to DeGaulle in the course of the last two weeks.

It would strike me, in the first place, that DeGaulle is perhaps in large measure making what might be called a political concession to the needs of the hour, and that that political concession is essential in view of what has happened in the case of the Algerian revolt not long ago and the slapping down of the army on his part in Algiers. I think it was necessary to reestablish equilibrium and he probably had to make concessions in order to get the army behind him. What I'm trying to say is that I believe that what he promised or what he said on this particular safari is perhaps a little more extreme than what he believes.

The second point is that, as far as I can see, DeGaulle has not yet rejected the idea of successful negotiations provided the rebels meet certain terms. Nor has he rejected the idea of establishing a political or constitutional solution for Algeria which could presumably be

accepted by the Algerian rebels. The formula, as I understand it is the establishment of an autonomous community and federation of those communities and a tie-in of those communities with the French overall community--a new thing that the French Constitution provides. This is not impossible as a practical political expedient, either for the French or for the Algerians. Consequently, I'm not sure that DeGaulle has moved as far to the Right as some people have suggested in view of the recent speech that he made.

Of course, one has great difficulty in being an apologist for DeGaulle. As I indicated in reading that little speech that he delivered to the Friends of the Superior War College in December, that is one of the most nationalistic and jingoistic speeches that I have read. There is no sign of any kind of capitulation on the part of DeGaulle as regards the integration of forces within NATO or within the Western European community, none whatsoever. The only way you can explain that is that he was talking to military men, that he was talking to his brethern within the confines of the school, and that therefore he was perhaps carried away a little bit, as he may conceivably have been in Algiers this last week. Even DeGaulle can be carried away.

COLONEL HAWKINS: Sir, you realize that we are having a seminar on this very subject this afternoon, and you have given us a lot to think about. It was a very fine lecture, sir, with a lot of meat in it; and I think that we will be remembering this for some time. Thank you.

DR. ZURCHER: Colonel Hawkins, may I say that I have greatly enjoyed this visit. It has been a very real privilege to meet with you here and exchange comments and pleasantries during the course of the last hour and a half. It's been a most enjoyable experience, and I thank you very much.

(8 Feb 1961--5,000)B/mr/bn