

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SOVIET INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Dr. Henry L. Roberts

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Reviewed by: Colonel P. B. Klein, USAF

Date: 13 May 1960

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15 March 1960

CAPT. BURKY: General Mundy, General Houseman, and Gentlemen: In our lifetime we have watched communism mushroom from nothing up to a huge political system which now covers over a quarter of the globe and embraces about one-third of the world's people. And, of course, the core of this atheist empire is Soviet Russia. It therefore behooves us to study quite closely her political objectives and the methods which she will use to attain them.

For expert guidance in such a subject we have sought out a gentleman who is an Oxford scholar, who got some practical experience in the field of international politics working for the Office of Strategic Services and for the State Department. He is now spending full time unraveling the Russian enigma as Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

It's my pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Henry Roberts, who will speak to us on Soviet international objectives. Dr. Roberts.

DR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Captain Burky.

Gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be with you today. In a way I feel that I have already shot my bolt on this topic in the wrestling match I recently went through in preparing a study on the general subject of the Soviet Union for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. And in that study I developed in rather greater detail and certainly more methodically some views on the Soviet Union, its trends and their implications for the

United States, than I can do today. I also have that slightly drained feeling after one has put a study to bed, finding it hard to get back and think about it any more, even though this subject is one that none of us can leave alone for any length of time.

To introduce my remarks today I should like to take as a text a few statements that were made by Mr. Khrushchev in the course of the year 1958, that is, the year before his visit to the United States, but still fairly recently. These quotations are brief. I don't believe I will handle them unfairly pulling them out of context, but I think they may illustrate our problem for us.

In speaking in Budapest on April 9th, 1958, Mr. Khrushchev said: "We shall not foist our socialist system on other countries by force of arms. We are against interference by any country in the domestic affairs of other countries, but we are attacking capitalism from the flanks, from economic positions, from the positions of the advantages of our system. This will make certain the triumph of the working class, the triumph of communism."

On the following day, still in Hungary, at a meeting of delegates of the Iron and Steel Works in Budapest, he commented in passing that "the workers of all countries and nations are brothers, linked by bonds of class solidarity. They are the powerful army of the world proletariat endowed with the great historic mission of leading mankind to communism."

On June 9th, in speaking before the members of the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia, he stated: "We Communists

attach great importance to revolutionary theory, and we are achieving all our successes precisely because we are always guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching. The theory of Marxism-Leninism is our compass, our guiding star. The strength of Marxism-Leninism lies in its unbreakable bonds with life, with the processes of social development." Applause.

Speaking to the Socialist Unity Party in East Germany on July 11, 1958, at the time when the dispute with Tito was at a rather hot pitch, he stated: "What is the significance of holding aloof and ignoring the community of socialist countries in our day, when a fierce class struggle is being waged on a world scale? To real Communists, neutrality in conditions of sharp class struggle, means weakening the forces of the revolutionary movement, the forces of socialism. It means helping the enemies of the working class."

"Our state," he said further on in this speech, "is giving assistance to other countries, because we Communists, Marxists-Leninists, do not isolate ourselves within our own frontiers. We regard the cause of building socialism and communism as a great international cause."

Finally, in a speech at the Polish Embassy in Moscow on July 22, 1958: "We revolutionaries, followers of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, rejoice that the colonial peoples have risen in resolute struggle against their oppressors, against the colonialists, and that they wish to be masters of their own destiny. We hail their movement, sympathize with them in their liberation struggle, and want to do everything to help them achieve their legitimate and noble aim--the liberation of their countries and national

independence. We wish the people of these countries to be masters of their own national wealth, to insure for themselves a state structure in their own countries dictated by their national interests."

Now, I would have you observe that these speeches, though public, are addressed to party comrades in every case and are markedly different in tone and content from those that Mr. Khrushchev was making at the same time to visitors from Western Europe or the United States. I think this difference in address continues today. Indeed, I noticed in the New York Times this morning some complaints from the British stating that they wished Mr. Khrushchev would not say one thing to one audience, the West, and another to the audiences he was addressing in Asia.

Now, I think none of the remarks that Mr. Khrushchev made that I have just cited are in any way novel. All the traditional statements of Communist expectation and purpose are there except for the one matter of the use of military force to assist in the historical process. And I'm not sure how much consolation we should take from the absence of explicit passages on that rather delicate point. It would seem to me that the use of military power by the Soviets when deemed safe, prudent, and necessary, is certainly a permissible inference from the general views stated by Mr. Khrushchev in these remarks in 1958.

Now, the question that I think we've got to face right away is how seriously such statements should be taken. There has been quite a bit of discussion about that. At the very least, we can say that these are authoritative statements by the leading figure in the Soviet Union--state-

ments which the Russians have felt worth while having translated into English and being published.

It may be said, and I have heard it said in connection with this type of remark, that, after all, he is talking to the party faithful and that on such occasions one has to say such things. This could be, though I see no particular reason why Mr. Khrushchev should be more likely to reveal his mood and temper to a casual American visitor than to a party member from Bulgaria.

I recall from rather unpleasant personal experience at the end of the Second World War falling into precisely this trap, or feeling, when I spoke with party members that I met in Sicily, in Italy, and in the Balkans, that the view they were giving of the war, of imperialist America, et cetera, was rather out of date; that they were in something of a backwater and hadn't realized what was going on at the level of what we then called Big Three unity; and that consequently the local party men were behind the times. In retrospect I think it is evident that they weren't and that I was.

I am naturally rather reluctant to succumb to that particular error again, of assuming that one does not take these really very tough speeches within the party framework seriously; and the contrary impulse to hang one's hopes upon the observations and reports that we get when Mr. Khrushchev is either speaking to an American audience or to American visitors to the Soviet Union. It would seem to me that the burden of evidence is quite strongly the other way. Consequently I would conclude that such

statements as these are authoritative and mean what they say.

Now, a second reservation might be that these speeches were made in 1956, when the memories and the repercussions from the tumultuous year 1956 were fresh, when there was a renewed and very sharp argument with Tito over the purity of party doctrine, and that a good many of his statements of a very strong ideological sort were made in the context of this renewed conflict with Tito; and, finally, that these speeches were made before Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

It is true that Eastern Europe is quite a bit less tormented now than in '56-57; that the debate between the Yugoslavs and the Soviet bloc has abated, though it has not vanished; and that Khrushchev's speeches in the latter part of his trip to the United States, and indeed to domestic audiences on his return, are considerably more affable. I should not disregard these developments, but somehow I find it hard to believe that the events of two years and the American voyage should have had the impact upon Mr. Khrushchev that many give to it. It strikes me as neither psychologically nor politically plausible.

In any event, I think we can conclude that at a very recent date Mr. Khrushchev gave quite explicit formulation to a number of basic premises concerning Soviet foreign policy--premises which have been at the heart of our difficulties with the Soviet Union in the past and, if they continue, will probably be at the heart of our difficulties in the future.

I should like to turn now from the particular observation of Mr. Khrushchev to a few more general comments on the nature of Soviet moti-

vation and objective, both as they seem to be reflected in Khrushchev's statements and more broadly in Soviet history and in Marxist-Leninist theory.

Without going into the details of Marxism-Leninism, it is pretty clear, I think, what the Soviet view is regarding the course or the pattern of world history--first, very obviously, toward the continuing emergence, extension, expansion, and ultimate victory of socialist regimes on a worldwide scale, with these regimes ultimately moving on towards the higher stage which they call communism.

Reciprocally related to this drift of history is the sense of a capitalist world, marked at its height by the achievements of the United States, which at best is losing momentum or is static, and at worst is involved in crises and contradictions. It is definitely a dying horse.

Third, a world of very rapid change in the so-called colonial sphere, a change which is only beginning, which is expected to continue and to expand, and which today is probably less seen in Soviet eyes, for the short run at least, as an area for revolution and communization than for diplomatic reorientation, of denial of political and economic support for the Western powers.

All three of these general expectations, which in a sense are very broad, which do not require any terribly elaborate dialectical approach to appreciate, lie, obviously, very deeply in the pattern of expectations, the sense of history, of the political ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Beyond that it seems to me there's a good deal of apparent confirmation

in the actual course of history in the last decade or so which would give the Soviets from their perspective sufficient reason to feel that these expectations are not unsound. That is, they are supported by a good deal of apparent evidence.

Again, this is all quite obvious evidence. The Soviet rate of economic growth, its inherent expansion, its expansion as compared to the United States, which is still its benchmark for performance, its startling success in developing technology. Clearly this area of relative success is one of the strongest underpinnings for the Soviet sense of confidence and belief that the future lies on their side.

Secondly, of course, the continuing difficulties, problems, and conflicts in the non-Communist world, and especially the ferment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And, while they can hardly claim credit for these changes, their direction would certainly appear, it seems to me, from the Soviet point of view movements in the right direction. In other words, there is a combination of theory and apparent practical confirmation that together contributes very strongly to a sense of confidence with respect to the future.

Now, these general expectiations would be, if not particularly consoling to us, nothing that we could object to were Soviet policy limited to the belief that these things would happen inevitably, automatically, and of themselves. The trouble obviously comes from the Soviet sense not only that this is the course of history, but that the Soviet Union must actively help and promote it. This thread, I think, runs quite clearly

through Mr. Khrushchev's remarks. It is perhaps the most deeply rooted theme in Leninism as against earlier forms of Marxism--this sense of voluntaryism, of drive, of actively assisting history, as against the unraveling of an inevitable process. This element is, as I say, very deeply embedded in Soviet ideology, in the structure of Soviet institutions; and I see no evidence that it has been abandoned.

It is true that Mr. Khrushchev says that war is no longer fatalistically inevitable--a rather obscure term. But when we examine it, it seems to me to mean only that the earlier idea of capitalist encirclement has been dropped and has given way to the notion of two world systems in which it is doubtful as to who is encircling whom; and that this change in the balance of forces is, from the Soviet point of view, the encouraging fact that war may not be fatalistically inevitable.

And while it is true that Mr. Khrushchev seems aware of some of the real dangers in our atomic age, I certainly doubt whether we should count on his being altogether unwilling to exert military pressure if he thought it was safe to do so.

In broad perspective, then, the objectives of the Soviet Union on the international scale would seem to me to be broadly the same as they have been, expressed certainly with more prudence, less violence of expression than the early days of the revolution, with perhaps greater confidence that time is on their side, as against the sense of imminent crisis that was felt in the early days of the struggling Soviet republic in the twenties, but still there, still, I think, in considerable vigor; and

that from that flow, if one had time to explore it, a great many of the particular features of Soviet foreign policy in the world at present.

Now, as against this basic stance, which seems to be essentially the one that we have had to face in the past, there are undoubtedly occurring changes, new problems, new questions which are hard to evaluate, but which may in time prove to be of considerable importance. I should like to list a few of these briefly and comment on them.

There is, of course, the matter of Mr. Khrushchev's personality itself. There is no question that the style of Soviet behavior has depended to an enormous degree upon the man who has been in control. Quite contrary to many of their philosophical views, the role of the personality has been of exceptional importance in the Soviet Union.

Clearly, Khrushchev's style is not identical with that of Stalin. On the whole he is a less awesome figure, a skilful politician, but also a man with a good deal of touchiness, a tendency to react swiftly to real or imagined offenses, and on occasion capable of sudden and abrupt decisions.

In a way he is an easier man to communicate with than Stalin, despite the fact that we have a sense of his being more completely within the frame of Leninist ideology, as a man in a sense of the second generation. His reflected responses seem to be entirely within the framework of this set of ideas, but despite that--and here I think it is a matter of personality--there is not that sense of distance, remoteness, trouble to get through to that one sensed in the figure of Stalin.

He is obviously a man to be handled with some circumspection, precisely because of the capacity to react violently. He is also, I should think, a person whom it is highly important from the point of view of the United States to keep in contact with, if only to avoid a breakdown of communication.

Connected, of course, with the personality of Khrushchev is the baffling matter of succession--succession to power in the Soviet Union--which comes up whenever he has a cold or is reported feeling poorly. This is obviously a topic of the greatest importance, but one about which it is hard to say anything very useful.

There is no clear line of succession in the Soviet Union. There has not as yet developed a clear way for any man to gain legitimation of his power. At that point in time whenKhrushchev passes from the scene there may well be another scramble for power, as there was after Stalin's death, with greater or less consequences as far as the internal and external policy of the Soviet Union is concerned. This seems to me at this point an absolutely unpredictable problem.

My general feeling would be that such periods of interregnum are probably more likely to be dangerous to us than beneficial, precisely because of the chances of erratic action--action taken not in its own terms but in the context of the struggle for political power in the upper reaches of the Communist elite.

I don't see any figures on the immediate horizon in the upper brackets who are likely to alter Soviet policy in a way beneficial to the United

States and the free world; and there certainly are some types who, if they came to power, might be quite unpleasant.

I also doubt if there is much point in our having favorite contenders to office, or in our trying to back them if and when such an occasion arises. I have the feeling that our intelligence would not be up to such a delicate game, and that such a game, if played badly, would probably be less than useful.

Certainly, however, the matter of personalities of successors can play an enormous role within the general limits of the system in the future. But beyond saying that, I'm afraid I have nothing more concrete to add.

Now, apart from the matter of personalities, there is the question of changes and evolution within the Soviet system itself within Russian society. I think there is no doubt that there is a certain flagging, and has been for some time, of the original revolutionary elan within the society itself.

There appeared recently--it appeared in the French edition in the fall--an article that purports to have been smuggled out of the Soviet Union. From all that I have been able to gather, it is an authentic though anonymous piece by a young Soviet writer. The subject of it is a literary one. It is called "On Socialist Realism." But inevitably he is discussing a great many political matters. If we can take this document to be authentic, it says, I think, some rather interesting things about the mood of Soviet society, or at least the articulate and more highly educated sector of

Soviet society at present. He stated:

"The death of Stalin inflicted an irreparable loss upon our religiously esthetic system. It cannot be resuscitated through the now-revived cult of Lenin. Lenin is too much like an ordinary man, and his image is too realistic--small, bald, dressed in civilian clothes. Stalin seemed to be specially made for the hyperboles that awaited him. Mysterious, omniscient, all-powerful, he was the living monument of our era and needed only one quality to become God--immortality. Ah, if only we had been intelligent enough to surround his death with miracles. We could have announced on the radio that he did not die but had risen to heaven, from where he continued to watch us in silence, no word emerging from beneath the mystic mustache.

"After the death of Stalin we entered upon a period of destruction and re-evaluation. It was a slow and inconsistent process, it lacked perspective, and the inertia of both past and future lie heavy upon it."

Now, this sense--and it seems to me there is evidence for it--that a certain magical quality--not a pleasant quality but a magical quality--that in a sense was felt by the people of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era, has left a serious sense of loss of direction as far as the older pressure regime is concerned. And yet I don't think we can conclude from that that these reactions are likely to turn necessarily in some of the directions we might expect to hope for.

The same author makes a rather interesting statement with respect to the original revolution itself. "We live between past and future," he

"between the revolution and communism, and if communism, promising us golden mountains and representing the inevitable but logical outcome of all human history imperiously pulls us forward, the past, the revolutionary past, pushes us in the back. For it was we who accomplished the revolution. How then can we blame it or blaspheme against it? We are caught in a psychological squeeze. Initself we may like it or not, but both before us and behind us stand temples so splendid that we could not dare to attack them. And when we remember that should our enemies win, they would make us return to the pre-revolutionary mode of life, or incorporate us in Western democracy--it hardly matters--then I am sure we will start once more from where we started. We will start from the revolution."

This whole article is most interesting through the views which are probably too individual to be very representative, but the clear ambiguity in feelings toward the regime that are reflected through it. But certainly it does reflect doubt, self-questioning about the purposes, the nature, of the regime as a whole. This, I think, is evident and exists in the Soviet system.

To some extent connected with that and much commented upon is the development of a large bureaucracy, the establishment over time of vested interests. Certainly such a development has occurred. The regime has been aware of it and has taken actions to check it.

My own view is that it probably will not through itself become massive enough to become the guiding force in Soviet society as against the objectives

of the party.

On the other hand, the developing tastes, interests, attitudes of this ruling elite, which includes the bureaucracy, the top stratum of the party, is certainly of very great importance. It is probably continuing to color the views, possibly increase the sense of prudence of the regime, and certainly for the future will be one of the sectors of Soviet society we ought to scrutinize continually and very carefully.

Related to this is the rise of consumer demands, the expectation that some have expressed that we will have a consumer-conscious society, and that this in turn will have the effect of modifying and reducing some of the more formidable drives externally. It is true that the appetite does grow with eating, that there is a great deal of consumer concern in the Soviet Union these days.

On the whole, however, I would imagine that it can be controlled, in the sense that with the expansion of the Soviet economy, there can be a sufficient increase in consumer goods and services to maintain and measure up to the expectations of the population without markedly dragging the Soviet Union from its main lines of policy or continuing its heavy emphasis upon industry.

Finally, in the field of education, the statement has been made that with the growth and expansion and improvement of education, the Soviet Union is clearly not a society of illiterate peasants, but that the elements of rationality, of criticism, of insight are growing apace; and that such a society simply will not put up with some of the older practices.

I suppose we have to be warned by the experience of Nazi Germany in this regard. And even if we don't take that unpleasant example as a warning, I think at the very best this is a very double-edged type of proposition. When I was in the Soviet Union last summer, I was much struck by some of the younger men that I met in some of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences in the particular fields of politics, international affairs, and economics, which are my own concern.

These young men, mostly trained, with older experience in the postwar years, were a very bright and attractive lot on the whole--serious, well informed, having reached the stage in the education and research system that they had their hands on all the necessary materials. They knew what was coming out of the United States. They were up to date on all our books and publications in this field. They reflected a slight dissatisfaction with the pressures on them. They had a great deal of interest in coming to the United States.

On the one hand, this group could be a fairly troublesome and possibly unruly crowd as far as the older generation of the party is concerned. On the other hand, so long as this group is effectively working in the interest of the regime, they have some very good people on tap. And on the whole my feeling was that these people from our perspective represent more of a strength to the Soviet Union than a weakness.

In other words, there are in these matters of revolutionary zeal, consumer demands, education, development of interest groups, certainly changes, important changes. I don't feel that the evidence yet permits us

to conclude that they will markedly alter the purposes of the society, and particularly alter within any usefully predictable future the general direction of its foreign goals.

In the foreign field, the continuing problem of atomic energy, atomic weapons, obviously is having an impact, it seems to me, on Soviet thinking as against the Stalin era. It seems, further, that we do have some objective common interest with the Soviet Union--a fairly simple one--that both sides not be destroyed, not just one; that an accidental war not start; and perhaps that it would not be desirable for too many other powers to get into the atomic picture.

It seems to me that here the real question at the diplomatic level is whether these interests, which I would take to be real, perhaps by definition, can in fact be translated into negotiable arrangements where the Soviets will not be tempted or able to take advantage of them for their own purposes.

Also in the foreign field there is the China problem, which I clearly can't go into in any detail at all except to state that in my view over time there is a good likelihood that the relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China will get touchy and will be difficult, despite the interests and intentions of both sides.

There are some very tough problems between them, emerging, I think, essentially from the fact that for the first time we have two coordinate centers of Communist power rather than a hierarchic relationship; and, despite the fact that all the advantages are for the two powers to work

together, and that this probably is their intention, this problem does seem to me to lie in the background and is not easily to be removed.

But even if that is so, I would not conclude that somehow this will necessarily drive the Soviet Union towards collaboration with the Western powers, toward harmony with the United States, in meeting this looming menace from the East. It seems to me that on the same expectation of trouble, the Soviets might well conclude that hasty actions in strengthening themselves on the European Continent before the Chinese become a present danger, that is, movement into Western Europe to gather resources and manpower to meet this enormous looming power from the East, is something that one could as readily derive from an expectation of ultimate Soviet-Chinese Communist conflict.

Finally, I must say that I see very little chance--and I suppose it's implicit in what I've said thus far--of upheavals or revolutionary disturbances in the Soviet Union. I don't think everybody is happy there. There is discontent. It seems to me, though, that there is a sufficient combination of power, performance, promise, and partial identification at least between the citizenry and the achievements of the regime to keep things on an even keel, at least unless the problem of a succession of crises breaks the picture open.

Nor do I anticipate--though this is an area very dangerous to predict in--the further upheavals in the immediate future in the satellite area in eastern Europe. It is always possible. I have the impression that the Hungarian experience of 1956 has affected everyone's outlook on this point--

ours, the Russians', and the Eastern Europeans' themselves.

To conclude, two processes--to simplify greatly--are going on simultaneously--on the one hand, certain modifications in the structure of Soviet society and outlook towards a more rational, less Stalinist system, though still totalitarian and Communist, and against that an enormous and rapid expansion of power and potential.

On the whole, the latter seems to me to be increasing faster than the former is declining, which, I suppose, means a tough problem for the United States in the future, though not necessarily in some of the brutal and direct and obvious forms of the past. We will increasingly be confronting a very impressive system, that is treading on our heels and has every intention of catching up and surpassing us. And with all that, we have this ideological drive that has made it and continues to make it so hard to solve any of the other problems.

As to the chances for reduction of that quality of the Soviet outlook, what we can do about it, I can only cite a remark by Professor Rosinsky of Harvard in a recent book that, if possible, the ideology must be deprived of both victories and enemies. And this is a paradoxical and difficult task, since achieving the one may appear to be the creating or increasing of the other.

Thank you very much.

CAPT. BURKY: Gentlemen, Dr. Roberts is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: You mentioned this problem of replacing Khrushchev. Would you say a little bit about what part the army plays in this? I under-

stand that they don't control the succession. Are they going to be a decisive factor in who succeeds him?

DR. ROBERTS: I'd like to know definitely on that. I think there is some external evidence that one gets, at least, outside of closed intelligence, that the army, or at least if one can track it in the case of Zhukov, was quite important to Khrushchev in the debate or the conflict with Malenkov and in the crisis in the summer of 1957.

I think that on the whole, though, our experience has been that, while in '54 and '55 we rather thought of the army as a tremendous center of power in the Soviet Union which might well become decisive, the general drift has been toward the reestablishment of the party as the central authority. This partly because of its traditional role, and partly because the party does infiltrate army commands and everything else.

I would think it more likely that, if one could follow closely a succession crisis, following the placement of men around the secretariat of the party and their linkages would probably be the place you would be looking for clues as to who was going to come out on top. At least this has been the case in the few samples that we have had now in Soviet history of the succession to power. It has been the party man who has run the tremendous network of party positions who has come out on top. And I don't at the moment see anything that would give the army a greater position than it had, say, three or four years ago, when it did lose out.

QUESTION: A previous distinguished speaker advanced the thesis that our enemy was really Russian nationalism and Chinese nationalism

and that the creed of communism was just a tool of convenience for these two national powers; and he proved his point supposedly by showing that they use it flexibly. Sometimes they adhere to it and sometimes they don't. Sometimes they change it. He also said that the Communist Party in other countries was just a tool of convenience to stir up unrest and create embarrassing situations for the West. Can you subscribe to any part of that?

DR. ROBERTS: I'm afraid not. It's a favorite subject for debate, but to start off I would disagree fairly strongly.

It's a hard thing to nail down and prove or disprove, because, obviously, the Soviet Union is operating on the same territorial base and its movements have to be in certain directions that historically Russian movements took place. I mean, just the fact of geography would suggest a certain identification.

There is also no question but that Soviet communism is profoundly flavored by Russian history. You can trace it in certain ideas that Lenin picked up, which are not from Marx, but are from Russian populism. The revolutionary tactics were developed in a Russian setting. There is all that. But to move from that point to say that we can disregard the Communist or Bolshevik component in Soviet foreign policy and assume that we are working with a streamlined car I think in a way could be consoling, but I think it's wrong.

I think there are a few places where you could make a test of this in recent history. If you take Czechoslovakia in 1948, Czech foreign

policy was totally geared to the Soviet Union. Under Masarek they obviously liked the West, the non-Communists; but diplomatically they were tied to it. There were no problems in terms of traditional foreign policy. This obviously was not adequate for the Soviet regime.

Take Tito in 1948. Tito was being a very strong supporter of the Soviet bloc in 1948. The fight that arose came out of the peculiar problems of power within a Communist type of society; and here you've got an ally that you drive into outer darkness and finally, against his own will initially, being obliged to turn to the West.

Now, I can't find that type of action and motivation explained by traditional national lines. This action is running against what you might call national interest. If you look at it in terms of the problem of the organization of Communist power at home and abroad, it makes perfectly good sense. So I think we do have some test cases where the Russian national element simply doesn't explain some of the events that happened.

QUESTION: Mr. Khrushchev defines his "We will bury you" statement as economic, intellectual, and several other things. For several months now we have been assured that the Russian economy is growing at, say, an 8 percent per year rate, as compared with 3 or 4 percent in this country. Just a few days ago I read an article, I believe in Fortune Magazine, that debunked this Russian growth and said it was somewhere around 2 to 3 percent. If this is so, it would certainly curb Russia's international aims pretty strongly. Would you comment on this?

DR. ROBERTS: Well, as a non-economist I certainly could not

argue the matter in great detail. I have followed this debate over the last four or five years fairly closely, and it has been a continuing argument among some very able economists.

I could only say that my own judgment on reading these materials, and also watching these revisions upward and downward of Soviet growth rates, as against the time I really began following it rather closely, say, in '53 and '54, is that on the whole I think their rates are high; I mean, that this low figure is false comfort for us.

It seems to me on the whole that the picture is as alarming as Mr. Allan Dulles' statement to the Senate some months ago, which you have undoubtedly read, which is a pretty grim picture. I know that there are several very well-known American economists who feel that this is still an inflated one. I am inclined to subscribe to it, however. I think they are growing very fast indeed. I think this is going to be in a matter of absolute terms in ten or fifteen years a tough problem, and in anticipation of it it is obviously getting to be a tough problem already.

CAPT. BURKY: Ordinarily I'm not permitted to insert a question, but I'd like to extend that, if I may. I read recently of a British study which indicated that the growth rates which the Russians advertise are true, but that that same growth rate has existed for almost two decades before they took over in Russia. Is there any truth to that, do you know?

DR. ROBERTS: There is no question, I think, from studies that Grayson at Harvard has done that Russia was obviously getting lined up before the revolution for a burst into industrialization of the same type

that Bismarck in Germany or the United States in the 70's went through. All the components of industrialization were shaping up. And, consequently, while working at a fairly low base, there is, I think, adequate evidence that the economy was on its way.

I don't know that we can tell what Russia would have done had there not been a Soviet regime. This is an awfully tough thing to do.

But on the whole it seems to me the continuation of the curve and the absence of the flattening out that we have constantly anticipated, or appreciable flattening out, so that whatever leveling seems to be still at a growth rate appreciably higher than our own, seems to me still is an alarming fact.

So I don't know. This is a tough question. It's also a tough question because of our own reaction to it. The thing I suppose that worries me is that if we say the Russians really are not doing very well at all, there is enormous pressure on our side to say: "Well, dandy. This takes care of our problems." Now, obviously, we don't want to falsify the picture or make it worse than it is, but I am very much alarmed by the fact that this is far and away the easiest answer for it and that there's a great temptation to use it.

I think, too, that in some cases the statistical measurements that have been used, particularly the time lag--that they are now where we were in 1916, etc.--is a very misleading comparison, precisely because of the telescoping of time through industrial innovation and the fact that we are all now working in a perfectly incredible period of industrial expan-

sion, the full implications of which, it seems to me, none of us fully realize yet.

QUESTION: I'd like to bring up the subject of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, in which he down-graded Stalin. This kind of shook up many of the foreign Communist leaders, the ones who believed in Stalin. Would you talk about the impact of that on the formulation of their foreign policy?

DR. ROBERTS: I think it shook up things at home. And, in fact, looking back on it, I think I could say that this was a mistake, in a way. It was part of a series of steps of trying, I think, primarily for the benefit of the inner and ruling group, to get out from some of these very tough situations that even the most favored were encountering in the last years of Stalin; that this moved on apace toward certain relaxation; that this actually overshot the mark and particularly set considerable vibrations going within the Soviet Union, and then clearly had an absolutely catastrophic effect from the Communist point of view in Eastern Europe.

The relation of the secret speech to difficulties in, say, the Hungarian party when it began really losing all sense of control in the summer of '56, is fairly obvious, I think; and can be documented. They overshot the mark, but I don't think it was necessarily intended for or had anything to do with foreign policy. He was not, as I recall, criticizing Stalin's foreign policy at all, except for a failure to be prepared for the German attack in 1941. There was no criticism of the take-over of Eastern Europe in 1945. Nothing of that was touched on in his speech, at least in that part of the speech

that has come to us.

QUESTION: I would appreciate it if you would contrast the viewpoint of the Russian people that you obtained from personal contact with the sort of man on the street--contrast that with what you got from the Soviet leaders, and whether or not you consider the viewpoint of the man on the street of any significance.

DR. ROBERTS: I can't say that I met a great many men on the street. I had a little trouble getting off of red carpets when I was there. So that my report would be from a little personal evidence and from a number of people who have been moving in and out in somewhat more relaxed situations in the last year or two than I. Obviously there's an enormous difference. In the public image it's a pure picture of a Utopia, with some shortcomings such as in housing, etc.

On the whole my sense as far as the man on the street goes is that there is a combination of pride and discontent, which can, curiously, be combined into the same thing. There is, I think, real pride in what the system has done, in a way, combined frequently with real hostility to the guys on top. This isn't quite the tidiest image from our point of view. We'd like to have them think one or the other, but I think in fact there is a combination. I have the impression that these much-advertised achievements in Sputnik et cetera--this was something that they participated in. They say, "We did it."

On the other hand, some of the American students, who probably had the best chance of any Americans I know of--the ones who were in

Moscow and Leningrad for a whole year last year--some of them really got quite deeply into the society, and they found, particularly among working class groups, realy irritation and discontent related to things like housing particularly. This is a constant source of irritation. When the vodka ration was going down, there were apparently great mutterings in the working groups in Moscow. In the outlying areas, in Central Asia and some of the nationalities, there is undoubtedly a great deal more discontent and unhappiness.

But I would say that it is an ambiguous picture as far as the Russians themselves are concerned. Certainly you can't take the public image of the regime, for example. I haven't run across anybody who has been there in the last couple of years who found sort of an explosive potential residing in popular opinions. I've been rather startled at finding really nobody who has come back with that impression.

QUESTION: Doctor Roberts, it has been suggested that perhaps the Soviets might accept a reunified but demilitarized Germany as a lesser threat to themselves than a strong NATO including a strong West Germany. I wonder if you would comment on that.

DR. ROBERTS: I suppose it depends on the nature of the reunification of Germany. I don't think there is any evidence that the Soviets would accept a reunified Germany in which the social order and the control of the Communist Party in the eastern half was lost. I think Khrushchev has been perfectly explicit on that--that there's no condition in anything he has said that he would accept a unification of Germany that would really

mean a plebiscite where people could decide how Germany should be brought together. The farthest he will go is the suggestion that two independent states negotiate and form a kind of rough confederation, with an agreed line on foreign policy and certain areas of domestic policy, but nothing else. I am very doubtful whether anything we could say on our side regarding the disarmament of Germany or its relation to NATO would cause them to make any concession on that one point.

QUESTION: Khrushchev has mentioned that they're going to go into the economic field worldwide. In one of our seminars I noticed it was brought out that there is a considerable reduction in the number of people reaching 18 years old of, I think, some four or five million in the next six or seven years. Would that have any impact on the demand for more consumer goods to lessen his ability to carry out this economic warfare?

DR. ROBERTS: You mean the population losses during the war coming up now?

QUESTION: Yes. Their ability to produce more goods. If they are going to go into the international field, it's going to mean less at home unless they can get more workers into the economy.

DR. ROBERTS: This would be a very complicated equation. It would partly depend on to what extent they may be able to divert some of the manpower from the military, and I have no idea how substantial that figure might be. The other would be the extent to which increasing rationalization of industrial processes can compensate for the falling off of manpower. On the whole my sense is that this is not likely to be a

terribly restrictive effect. I think they will be in a position, having increasing elbow room, for whatever type of foreign economic activity they want to take.

QUESTION: Sir, on this question of world disarmament, Khrushchev, of course, has been making some pronouncements that the Russians want to disarm everybody in the whole world. In your talk you have apparently come to the conclusion that we can't believe anything that he says that's nice and everything he says that is not nice is probably true. I wonder how you feel on this question of disarmament. Is there any truth in what he's saying? Is that what they may want?

DR. ROBERTS: Wouldn't we have to break this down into the whole range of possibilities, from the extreme statement such as he made at the U.N. about total disarmament, which is, as you know, not a new statement in Soviet policy. It was very close to what Litvinov said in 1927 and 1932. As a matter of fact, one of my graduate students, who was over in Russia last year, is doing a doctoral dissertation on disarmament at the very opening phase when the Russians were moving from this immediate sense of revolution that they had in 1919 and '20 up to the discussion of this question in 1922. In those days they were fairly frank about matters, at least frank in written materials, than they have been. This picture of total disarmament proposal is really not a device that you expect to be accepted at all. I think there's a very long history.

Now, apart from that proposal, which doesn't mean that we can avoid meeting it somehow or have something to say about it, there is this whole

area of arms control, where I would say there is a more more likely area of possible interest--in this field of taking steps together to avoid things that demonstrably neither side would like to have happen. And I would think there that one can think of cases, as I mentioned, that presumably neither side would like to have a war set off accidentally.

Now, the question is, Is there, if you take that as a starting point, are there actions in the field of arms control and mutual communication to prevent accidental triggerings and so forth--is there anything there that can be developed as a negotiable proposition? This seems to me to be far and away the most interesting area. But on the whole I would think you would try to proceed from those regions where you assume that there is demonstrable Soviet interest in having something come out of it.

Now, this may well be true in certain savings that could be achieved on the reduction of arms. But I would think that the total disarmament proposal is about the toughest one to try to get anywhere on as far as negotiating with them is concerned.

QUESTION: Doctor, my question deals with your comment on the lagging revolutionary elan in Russia. Do you think it will be a very important point if all the people in Russia who had any experience in the revolution die and there isn't anybody left in the country who has lived through that revolutionary experience? Will this have an effect on the success of what they are trying to do?

DR. ROBERTS: I think it would help. I assume it would. I think the movement of generations does have a curious and intangible effect

upon a thing like this.

When one goes back to the speeches and writings and temper, say, of the Bolshevik leaders in the early 20's and compares them with today, there really is an enormous difference, partly because there was this imminent expectation that the great new order was about to burst upon them, that it may be delayed a couple of years, maybe a decade, their time scale expanded; but there was this sense that they had really brought off something against incredible odds and it was going to roll on.

Now, obviously, two generations, 40 years time, with the passing of the people who had experienced that, does something to the flavor of the ideology. I don't think it means a denial of it or a weakening of it in the sense of disbelief.

It would seem to me, if one could take the analogy of this difference in temper between, say, the early Christian fathers, with their expectation of the last days, and, say, the enormously powerful medieval Church, where here we've got a millenium of time behind it, you certainly could not say that the medieval Church in 1200 was lacking impetus. On the other hand, it was a quite different type of social body than had existed a thousand years before. Now, this is a very rough analogy, but I think it may suggest what you could have with the passage of generations.

I think one feels already in Khrushchev that, when you read Lenin, you have the sense of the man hammering out the theory himself--tremendous intellectual muscularity in taking over Marx, beating him into shape for use in the Russian revolution. In Stalin you have still,

I think, the most mysterious of all the leaders--a man who is in a sense manipulating that for his own rather unfathomable purposes, still in a sense outside it. In Khrushchev you've got a sense of the guy who's in it, for these slogans have been in his life blood for years. He thinks in these terms.

QUESTION: You cited the instance of Yugoslavia as being an example where communism took preference over nationalism. Would you care to comment on the possibility that nationalism might predominate over communism in the cases of Russia and China?

DR. ROBERTS: My example of Yugoslavia--in talking about that I was speaking of it from the point of view of Russia, not of Yugoslavia. My point was that Soviet behavior in 1948 toward Yugoslavia was hard to explain as a national reaction, but seemed to me was to be explained because of party demands.

Now, I don't know. Probably we get in trouble by setting up nationalism and the ideology as being entirely different. What I would think in the case of the Soviet Union is that the Soviet Union and the Russian people as having had the wit, energy, and good fortune to have taken on this splendid new social order, in a sense are an embodiment of it; and that, consequently, by definition there can't be a conflict between the two; that what is good for the Soviet Union is good for the Communist world and vice versa. And there has been a fairly complete identification really since the middle of the Stalin era.

QUESTION: You spoke of possible friction btweeen Moscow and

Peiping. Is there anything that the U.S. can do now to hasten this friction?

DR. ROBERTS: I doubt it. These are very tricky things, but it seems to me that both sides are working against this happening. If they get into a real hassle, it obviously at this point is to their mutual disadvantage. They can do so many useful things if they are working together.

Now, I would consequently assume that if a break occurs, it will be sort of against their wishes and against their intentions. It will be concealed as long as possible.

For us to be able to move in on a thing like that would seem to me to require incredibly better intelligence than we probably have; an extraordinary sense of timing; and a realization that if you're off track on that, you might merely produce the counter reaction that can be identified as American provocation etc. and you would be doing yourself more damage than good.

For example, Harrison Salzburg has just come out with a book on his last travels in the Soviet Union. He was there last summer. He was in Outer Mongolia. He is firmly persuaded that Mongolia and the Mongol peoples on both sides of the line are an area of enormous friction between the Chinese and the Russians; and that this very likely will become a center of conflict.

I'm not sure he's right. I think there may well be friction. I think both sides would be foolish to let this rather desolate area destroy the perfectly marvelous opportunities for combined action in some rather more important parts of the world. Still, it is quite possible that, given the way

these system work, there could be issues that they can't resolve--points of prestige, pride, and so forth--that could disrupt.

How the United States could move in on that I don't know. And, of course, you would want, before moving at all, to be pretty sure how you wanted this thing to come out, what side you were going to side with, and so on. On the whole I'm fairly skeptical that this would be the kind of water that we could fish in very usefully.

QUESTION: We have a small neighbor to the south where there's been a certain amount of difficulty in recent months. I wonder if the Communists have any real objectives in this area, as far as you know.

DR. ROBERTS: Well, I would say, Yes. I think they have real objectives. I don't think that their philosophy is limited to the eastern hemisphere by any formulation I have ever seen.

I must say that I have not been pursuing the details of this closely enough to say anything particularly useful, except that there is some evidence of Latin America becoming in Soviet publications a rather more interesting area than it has been in the past. I think the Mikoyan visits and so forth indicate a certain concern there.

I think this is a vulnerable and very dangerous area, in which the order of problems is very much like those that have appeared in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and rather close to home. But I would think that from the Soviet perspective this part of the same area that is striving to liberate itself from imperialist and colonial shackles. I see no distinction that I am aware of that this is in a sense off limits.

CAPT. BURKY: Dr. Roberts, on behalf of the Commandant and the entire faculty and student body, I want to thank you very much for coming down here and giving us your interesting views on Soviet objectives. I am sure we can use this in our studies from now on to the end of the year.

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