


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COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES

16 March 1960

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Washington 25, D. C.

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16 March 1960

COLONEL SMITH: Gentlemen: Our speaker this morning is Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He is going to talk about the Communist China's International Objectives.

He needs no introduction to the subject, I am sure, and he needs no introduction to most of you.

Dr. Linebarger, it is my pleasure to introduce you to the Industrial College.

DR. LINEBARGER: Gentlemen: My presentation this morning is going to involve one of the most complicated subjects in the modern world-- the status of Mainland China under the Communist regime, with respect to other nations.

The Chinese Communists have come in as successors to other governments in China, and they are combining, quite obviously, their international Communist role with parts of the Chinese past which remain important. There are many misconceptions about China current in the West. One which I would like to touch on very briefly is on the sheer matter of age and civilization. If one takes civilization in a strict sociological and historical context as meaning variety, richness, and depth of culture, I don't think the Chinese have ever been as civilized at any time in their history as the white men have been at the same time.

There were elegant persons of our race, with fair or blonde or brown hair, our characteristic large noses, our cream and pink skins, living in magnificent palaces on the Mediterranean when Chinese as wild as Eskimos were drifting into China, 2,000 years before Christ. It is we who are the old people, and it is we who have had the civilization.

Chinese civilization is a slave of the Chinese language. They got, as we did, some stimulus from the great and varied thought of India, but they didn't get the stimulus of Egypt, of Judea, of Greece, of Rome. We are the people who are complicated, because most of us worship an Asiatic God, the Jehovah of the Old Testament, His Son, Christ, also an Asiatic of the New Testament, and a Holy Ghost, which may be European in origin, and we have a turbulence of languages, a complication, and a delicacy of thought which the Chinese have never understood and which they don't understand today.

We have both the Parthenon in our past and the Cathedral of Notre Dame. They've got nothing to compare with that span of artistic and cultural experience. Chinese art is wonderful, Chinese civilization is wonderful, and the Chinese past is long, but it is shallow compared to ours, it is short, compared to ours, and it is dreadfully monotonous. The choice the Chinese had to take got down in the last analysis to be a Methodist of some kind or other under Chiang Kai-shek or to be a Marxist under Mao Tse-tung. Notice that neither Methodism nor Marxism is a direct part of the Western main

shape. Neither one is Catholic nor Lutheran nor Anglican in the sense of old Europe. When you consider who Marx is, whatever he is, he is not Chinese. Marx himself mistrusted and hated Asia. He despised the Chinese as much as he despised the Jews, from whom he sprang. And Marx, himself, in describing the Asiatic mode of production, felt that China had no future at all, until Europe went in and awakened it. Marx's father was a bad Jew. He turned his back on Judaism and joined the Lutheran Church to become a phony Christian for the sake of making another fast buck. And Marx was a bad Lutheran who did not believe in his God or his Christ or his King. He lived in England 40 years, almost, without ever showing respect or love for the England of his adoption. He was not an Englishman; he was not a Prussian; he was not a Jew. He was an outcast, a brilliant, sensitive, genius of an outcast of our civilization.

The choice, therefore, that China faces is urbanization, industrialization, mass communications, and modernization, Washington's way or Moscow's way. Nobody in China and nobody in Formosa is trying very hard to keep China Chinese. That's the one thing they are sure they don't want. They want to become European. They are sick of their family systems; they are sick of themselves; they are tired of waiting; and an atmosphere of petulance, irritability, and enthusiasm, mixed together, marks the national mood on both sides.

The Chinese have the reputation of being the most peaceful nation on earth. They are also the most homicidal. The largest war of the 19th

century is probably not studied at West Point. I seriously doubt that West Point is ready to take on the subject. Yet that war could almost be described as the sperm and ovum, the "qui cidi," the Fascist and Communist words of our time. The great Peiping Rebellion, 1849-1865, in which the late A. Jack McNair of Chicago estimated that the direct casualties were 20 million and the indirect 80 million, was led by the younger brother of Jesus Christ, a Chinese psychotic who had had some contact with Christianity. He started with 2,000 men in October 1849 and ended with 120 million 20 months later, and then underwent a personal moral collapse and left some very able leaders to hang on to his empire for the remaining 13 years.

Again we see the contrast that the Chinese have often showed--a very high intellectual skill in manipulating other people, and yet I feel that one of the greatest blessings the United States has is Mr. Mao Tse-tung's clumsiness and awkwardness in dealing with the rest of Asia. There is no foreign policy error we could possibly commit as bad as the Communist errors of the past five years. The alienation of India, the frightening of Indonesia, the scaring of Burma, the insulting of Japan represent a catalog of diplomatic and psychological errors the like of which has not been seen in our time. The blundering Chinese have stumbled through, and the crafty Americans are reaping the reward.

Again one finds a high degree of Communist intellectuality in Mainland China, an intellectuality which is based on Leninism with some modification

by Mao. But the modifications are in the direction of orthodoxy. In a book--Linebarger, John, and Burgess--on "Governments and Politics" which I published in 1954--I will allow myself the pleasure of indicating-- I went on record, six years ago, stating that if China became a problem to Russia it would be because Russia was less orthodox than China and that China was more Stalinist and was apt to get even more so than Russia. If there is a break between Russia and China it will be Russia splitting away from China, and not China from Russia.

I don't know how many of you who may be Roman Catholic by birth and who have ever had to have a ship trip with that unspeakable pest, the recently converted Roman Catholic, or whether any of you who might come from the Mormon country and be Latter Day Saints yourselves may have met a new Mormon. Old Mormons are all right, but, God save me from new Jehovah Witnesses, the new Mormons, the new Seventh Day Adventists, or the new Roman Catholics.

In China there are 650 million new Communists. I find the sight of Mr. Khrushchev yearning for the Folies Bergeres to be entirely comprehensible, if one considers that he has been dealing with the priggish, pharisaical, narrow-minded Chinese Communists. It would take very strong medicine to get over the extreme piety of those people.

Now I'd like to make seven main points about China today which are at the root of Chinese foreign policy. In the first place, in this area of China, the Chinese have a tradition of expansion, of spreading out, based on a

theory of international relationships which have no serious parallel in the European world, a theory of the permanent imbalance of power, that one nation can, should, and must predominate over all others, that, in other words, there are no equal nations, except for the inferior ones; that there is a father nation and a family around it. That is the Confucian family of nations, a family which Japan joined only once, which Korea belonged to for a thousand years, which Annam belonged to for well over a thousand years, which included Ceylon, which included Chinese East Africa, which included Kashmir, and quite a variety of other points--all based on the assumption that China was the hub and the others were the spokes. It is characteristic of the life of the Chinese Empire, something which Mr. Nehru is finding out, that the Chinese Communists should claim once again as Chinese everything that was ever Chinese. The Chinese territorial frontier on Communist maps includes the South China Sea as Mare Clausen, Closed Waters, and the actual water frontier of Wantung Province is drawn on those maps 12 English miles from this coast. Luzon is Chinese. Java and Sumatra are Chinese. All of Borneo, Malaya, and Thailand are Chinese. All three states of Indo-China, Burma, Nepal, Sinkiang, Bhutan, and Kashmir are Chinese. They are not talking much about it right now, but all Tartary, all of it, is Chinese. They claim from a naval landing that Somalia is Chinese as well. In other words, they've got their hands full just picking up the pieces they dropped.

I honestly believe that if Chiang Kai-shek were in Nanking instead of

Formosa, that Chiang Kai-shek's government would be following a foreign policy directed at about the same goals. He might be more peaceful about it, but in essence there is no difference between the Nationalists and the Communists. They both want a restoration of the Chinese world.

Now, a second model for them to follow is something that many Americans have forgotten, namely, the group of nations which the Japanese were trying to organize after Pearl Harbor. Chiang Kai-shek's people felt themselves to be the heirs and replacers of Japan when Japan fell. They had no intention that an outside power, particularly a power of the white race, should move in. The Chinese contempt for the Indians is almost as cruel and thoughtless as the American contempt for the Brazilians. We never paid the Brazilians the compliment of hating them. We just don't think about them as a great power. The Chinese attitude toward the Indians is almost equally thoughtless and heedless. I have been told by some pretty good demographers that Brazil is going to pass us in less than 120 years, and that, if the free world survives and doesn't speak Russian or Chinese, it may end up talking Portuguese in the end.

I suggest that we don't think about that, and the impression made by Nehru and by most Indians on the Chinese, whom I have known since I was a boy, is one of inexpressible comedy. I saw Chiang Kai-shek's staff just after he came back from India. His net impression was "funny," not "ha ha funny," but "deplorably odd and utterly incomprehensible and probably useless."

If a Chinese woman, by the way, should expose her anterior portion for purposes of convenience along the highway, no toilet being handy, it is after all perfectly natural. The Chinese don't much bother to look. For a pretty young Chinese mother to take her jacket off and unbutton to nurse her baby doesn't bother anybody. For a Chinese society woman to lift her skirt and slip and tuck them into her garter belt, and then walk around town in her hose, garter belt, and underpants doesn't cause anybody to look. But, if she unbuttons her collar and shows her naked neck, or if she takes off her shoes and shows her toes, that's different. I have seen Chinese troops break rank.

And Chiang Kai-shek went down where the Indians took their shoes off and, with indescribable obscenity, wiggled their toes at each other. So the Chinese may some day get a correct perspective on the Indians, but I don't think they have gotten it yet.

This expansionist tradition is flexible. There is no big hurry about it, because there is another point, a factor of time, which Chiang Kai-shek has expressed one way and which Mao Tse-tung has expressed another.

Do you realize, for example, that, if the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. abolish atomic weapons, the present military manpower of China is on the order of 150 million males between the ages of 15 and 49 inclusive? If you assume that half of them are syphilitic, lame, blind, or tubercular, that still leaves 75 million of them fit for military service; and 75 million

Chinese who are completely expendable could make quite an impact in a non-nuclear Russia and might have a very disturbing impression on the forces that try to resist them in Barcelona by the time they walked over there.

I sometimes wonder who is crazier, Khrushchev or us, when we talk about throwing away the only effective weapon systems that might stop these hordes of excellent military material. I can't imagine anything more utterly delightful than the sight of the disarmament conference right now as reported to the Cabinet in Peking, the idea that the two big white nations, both of which are arrogant and both of which are wrong and both of which are fundamentally intolerable in a civilized world--but the Russians are, after all, a little bit better because they are Communists--^{either} will/wipe each other out in a war--which would be very much to the Chinese advantage--or, alternatively, just agree each other out of existence. Either way the Chinese get it.

If Mao Tse-tung is sure of taking over the world, he doesn't have to be in much of a hurry. The Americans and the Russians are going to make him take it one way or the other. I am not saying that I, Paul Linebarger, think so, but I think that they often underestimate our own crookedness, and I strongly suspect that, if we and the Russians disarm, the Russians will need to have brains enough to tuck away a little mad purse, as it were, just a few megaton bombs here and there, for relaxation and health, in case they ever need them. And if we disarm, if there are Americans who are

stupid enough to obey the law of Congress and destroy all weapons, I hope they are court-martialed some day. And I trust that when we gather our atomic weapons of various kinds there will be some Americans patriotic enough to forget a few dozen of them somewhere. I don't see how else the thing could be sane. You can't expect a great power to go down to a boy-scout level of staves and pikes to defend itself. And there are the 75 million Chinese that somebody might start marching. We and the Russians both have got to tuck away a few little things for emergencies.

Here is an idea, for example: America and Russia and a lot of other countries will all abolish atomic weapons, and then, at an unspecified time-- it might be the year 1975 or it might be as far off as 2115, for all I know-- the Chinese might decide to move. And the Russians, in relative good faith, might inform Washington: "It seems we have some antique experimental atomic bombs that didn't matter much, which we were keeping purely for museum purposes. Do you mind if we happen to use them on the Chinese?" And the Americans might say, "Sure. We have some in the Smithsonian ourselves. We'll lend them to you."

Another important thing about Communist China is that it is militarist. It is militarized and it is militarist, both. When I say it is militarized, I mean literally that the Mainland of China is following the course set by the Kingdom of Prussia 250 years ago. I have noticed in talking to American military audiences very often that there is a tendency to deprecate the value of the military in our own civilization, and that the military,

although their work in combat is appreciated, although their profession is esteemed, are not properly regarded as a part of our own dynamic. And yet it is the Western military tradition, in all its forms, which, along with religion, logic, and the scientific method, forms part of the backbone of our civilization. We have long since given up the election of military officers by combat units in the field. We have established pretty plain principles of command, subordination, management, principles involving the handling and support of personnel and their movement, principles involving the application of doctrines of responsibility, which we, because we are in it, fail to appreciate as in some ways being the clear part of our civilization.

In other words, it takes a lot more work to make a man into a Presbyterian or a Methodist or an Episcopalian or a Baptist, it takes more work to make him into a Communist or a Democratic Socialist, than it does to make a sergeant out of him. And when he does become a sergeant he is something. He is modern. He has learned something. If he is in a modern army he is learning hygiene; he is learning weapons; he is learning a respect for vehicles; he is learning maintenance; he is learning a balanced diet. There, the differences between the Red Air Force and the American Air Force, the Red Army and the American Army, and the Red Navy and the American Navy are pretty slight. We both follow military doctrines which are neither Communist nor anti-Communist but which

have been developed by our own race and which everyone in the world has copied.

When we are faced with disaster in our own country, the first thing we do is turn to the military. Earthquakes, floods, and plague involve martial law, involve the National Guard, involve the suspension of the profit motive, the suspension of the democratic process, and the return to the most reliable thing we've got on earth, military command. It may make mistakes but it makes fewer mistakes and it gets more done than any other known method.

Now, if that is true to us Americans in a rich, complicated, and very beautiful civilization, it is a thousand times more true to the bewildered Chinese whose economic structure has collapsed, whose social system itself is in convulsions, whose religious principles have disappeared, and who have practically nothing else to go on. The military reach down to the commune, they reach down to the 2,000 chien, or counties, of China, and, in the pleasure of being soldiers, in the honor of being soldiers, in the glory of being armed men, the Chinese Communists give the Chinese people a blessing which is pretty welcome.

I have heard it said over and over again that Chinese don't like military service, and I have seen over and over again, myself, Americans of college training resisting the draft. I have seen those Americans a year or two later, after they have been in the armed services.

The Mainland of China today is more militarist than Japan was in the thirties. Effective control is in the hands of people who are both party and military men, and they have whole herds of generals surplus from the Chinese War against Chiang Kai-shek and America and from the Korean War against Singman Rhee and America. These generals are used as ambassadors, Cabinet ministers, and the like. They are political generals, but they are generals. Whereas the old Empire under the Empress Dowager, 60 years ago, rotten though that Empire was, sent elegant diplomats to the four corners of the world, Chinese diplomats who, as soon as they learned French or English, held their own with the best diplomats of Europe, the record of Chinese Communist diplomacy is one of vulgarity and ineptitude.

It is almost 10 years now since their missions went forth and yet not a single Chinese Communist ambassador has become a figure of international renown, the subject of amiable stories, or the object of admiration. We are dealing with a country which is a War Lord China today, but, instead of being scattered war lords, fighting each other hopelessly in blind wars in the provinces, these war lords are glued together by the fanaticism of communism, and they are working as a team.

The humanitarians will be sorry to hear this. Liberals will not believe it. A check of the Chinese Communist government's personnel list would demonstrate what I mean. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists don't have much else to go to. They have rejected age by itself. They have rejected scholarship by itself. They have a large and expanding country,

a country which has probably about 650 million people in it now. They need quick and ad hoc momentum to move toward the Detroit-Moscow pattern. Mind you, I am emphasizing again and again, at the risk of repetition, that what they are aiming at is to become us. Communism is just a way of doing it. If you go to the absolute end of the road you are going to find a Ford Galaxie there. I find it rather depressing sometimes. If you can imagine 1,200,000 Chinese, each one of whom has two cars, the thought of Chinese traffic 75 years from now is utterly appalling.

They are not going to make it. These people should be using their brains, should be devising a new urban civilization, new ways of doing things. But, instead, they are moving rapidly into a coal, petroleum, and steel civilization. They are following every mistake the West made plus every mistake Stalin made. They are increasing the number of people. They are increasing the size of cities. This is fundamentally popular, although the tactics of the commune and the tactics of this and that may not be popular. But the goal is to become modern, and in that goal the factor of militarism and military command remains paramount. In other words, they are military, not because they are going to fight anybody at all but because being military is the only way they can handle their own country, and it would be cheaper to have an army of 100 million to keep control of China and just manage things than it would be not to have an army of 100 million, if you count reserves.

Chiang Kai-shek's reserves themselves reached a paper count in a

much poorer China, 20 years ago, of 28 million men. I should estimate a reserve force of 100 million or more trained soldiers as being a routine municipal labor force, a sanitary force, a police force, a traffic and emergency control force, a civil defense force, a factory discipline force, and the like, quite apart from its foreign consequences. The possession of that kind of an army, however, necessarily gives a country a greater negotiating capacity than it would have without it.

Now, the pressure on China is a pressure from the Communist point of view to move ahead. I, myself, hoped the family system would hold out longer than it did, but I have seen repeatedly that the Chinese family system is in collapse. It is in collapse almost in the way that our marital system is with the pressure of divorce against it. It is nice enough to talk about marital fidelity but, if someone were to get passed a constitutional amendment in this country making all marriages final and no divorce whatever permitted, my guess is that the people in the United States themselves would shy away from that as they did from prohibition. In other words, we may want to have final marriage, and we may approve of it as ideal, but the consequence would be immorality, suicide, and murders, and insanity. I don't think we'd pay the price of abolishing divorce. Divorce may be unhappy, but it is a convenience.

Similarly, the Chinese never say they are against the family system, except in very limited terms, and yet even Chiang Kai-shek, it is important to notice, married a brilliant Chinese woman, a childless woman, from her

brilliant family, and put away his wife to do it. It is important to notice that the family was collapsing in Nationalist China, that the laws were withdrawing the guarantees of the family, and, if I, myself, were a skilled Chinese machinist, I would feel so much freer on a 29-day month in a factory, living in a dormitory with 40 other men, than I would back home with my father, mumbling and telling me what to do, my mother picking on my wife, my mother's mother picking on my mother, my father's great aunt and my father's great aunt's retired butler, all of them, sitting there and telling me what to do every time I stuck my damn nose into my own front door.

A Communist prison camp would be such an exhilarating freedom compared to that that we mustn't assume that all Chinese love their dear old family system. Large numbers of them are sick to death of it. Getting rid of their old people, getting rid of being nagged, bossed, and picked on is actually quite a liberation.

I remember seeing some puny Nationalist troops. They were hungry. You could smell them, their bodies stank so, from malnutrition, disease, and lack of washing. There they sat. They looked like the saddest bunch of TB cases you ever saw in uniform, in 1943. One Chinese there had a face that was lit up like a searchlight with a smile. Everybody else was gloomy and passive. That guy was radiantly happy. I was a First Lieutenant in the American Army in China then. I went up to him, and I said to him, "Eek ziyen kwy la?" He was so astonished to hear me speak

Chinese he didn't recognize it until I repeated it some times-- "Why are you happy?" At that point he got quite communicative. He told me a little bit about where he came from and about his family. Then he said, "Do you know what I would be doing?" I said, "No." He said, "I would be doing this: (plowing). That is a plow. I follow a plow. My father followed a plow, my grandfather followed a plow, my great grandfather followed a plow. When you follow a plow, what do you look at?" That man felt that getting into a starved, abused, and neglected army was a real treat.

In conclusion I'd like to point out that this expansionist, overpopulated, militarist China, with a tradition of conquest and contraction, is led by 3-1/2 men of very major importance. They've got three men at the top of Chinese communism who may some day emerge as the greatest team of the 20th century. As individuals they are certainly surpassed by Ghandi, because Ghandi of India has become a part of the spiritual heritage of mankind, along with the great religious founders and the secondary ones, such as Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, Calvin, and the rest.

But, on the other hand, Ju Dah, the Communist Chinese Commander in Chief, was described by an unfortunate Marine General, Evans Carlson, who died in time to avoid Congressional investigation as a possible Communist, and who said that Ju Dah has the best features of Jesus Christ, Abraham Lincoln, and George Washington. Coming from an American Marine, that is strong language. And yet I can see why. I have met Ju Dah. Ju Dah is one of the most relaxed, brave, good men I have ever met in the world.

I don't know where I could find an American like him. He was a war lord's son. He had a handful of concubines, unlimited credit at the local gambling houses, and the morphine habit. One day he looked at his rotten life, his rotten father, and his rotten family, and he walked out of his house with nothing in his pockets. He hitchhiked his way 2,000 miles across the starving China and bummed his way to Europe, working as a stoker and a handy man on the ship. He wanted to be well, but more than being well he wanted to live for something, and he met the Communists in Paris and joined them.

He is the only Communist living on earth today who thinks that Karl Marx is funny. He kids about communism; he's not afraid of anybody; he likes everybody. He would cut the throat of every gentleman in this room individually if military circumstances required it, but, if he did so, he would do so with a really brotherly attitude that would make you appreciate it.

Mao Tse-tung, the Stalin of China, is a much bigger man than Stalin. George Petty, who is a first-class expert on Stalin, the Deputy Director of ORO, out here, and who has studied Lenin for many years, once stated in a House of Representatives report on China, which he wrote, that Mao had the freshest new mind in communism in 50 years. I'd agree with that completely. Mao is a philosopher of the first order, a very major strategist, a doctrinaire in the good sense of the term, of creating new doctrines. I had a 20-minute appointment with him to pay my respects when I was in the

Stillwell Headquarters and went up to Communist China. It turned into a 3-hour bull session, in which I tried to persuade him that he was not a Communist. General Stillwell's staff was saying that Chinese Communists weren't Communists. That annoyed me so much I thought I'd try it out on Mao Tse-tung, himself. I had taught the graduate course on 19th century political theory at Duke just the year before the war, so I knew my doctrines and my references. I confess, gentlemen, I have never met a quicker mind than his. I'd like to see that man pitted against an IBM machine. He seemed to know everything he had ever read at any time in his life. There was no flexibility, no curiosity, and very little humor, but there was tremendous knowledge and a tremendous command of itself.

The third of those great leaders--Ju Dah, the military leader, Mao Tse-tung, the political leader--is Chou En lai. Chou En lai charmed General Stillwell, he charmed General Marshall, and at one time he charmed Nehru, too. He's a nice man. If you found yourself hit by a car in a strange city and Chou En lai came along, it would take you just a few seconds to realize that this was the man you wanted for help, that you wanted him to hold your wallet for you or take care of your children. He looks dependable and honorable, and he is, in the service of communism. And, as far as he can manage it within communism, he follows that.

These men are up with the top, the very top, of any revolution. They go along with Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, and they are superior to the leaders of the French Revolution. Russia hasn't got anything like them.

They beat the Lenin-Trotsky team by far.

And yet, the fourth man, or the 3-1/2-point man, is a man who is now President of Red China. He was put there by Mao. Mao apparently has put him in office to make sure that he doesn't steal the government from the older men. I hope I am not offending religious sensibilities when I say that this man, Lu Chow Chi, the President of the People's Government of China, reminds me of the evangelist, Oral Roberts, at his worst. The man is a speech obsessive. He has logorrhea, which can be defined as an interminable running of words through the mouth. If you had the most voluptuous woman on earth looking at Mr. Lu with appealing eyes there and a microphone here, he would take the microphone and make a three-hour speech.

The guy is stupid. Within very narrow limits he is bright. He is bright on the problems of individual conscience under communism, and he can spend 3-1/2 hours describing: How does a Communist enjoy command? What are his responsibilities when he receives the command? What are his responsibilities when he gives a command? Three hours long that turtle egg can talk on that subject--a turtle egg being the Chinese equivalent of a canine ancestor in the maternal line. There is no limit to the amount of talking he will do. He goes off on mountain tops and writes seminar speeches and then gives them.

Gentlemen, the danger we face is not from Communist brains. The danger we face is from Communist stupidity. A bright man will see his way

through deterrence. A stupid man will not be deterred. As long as the three great leaders of Red China live at the top, Mao Tse tung, Ju Dah, and Chou En lai, I feel fairly safe. If they take any risks, they will be well calculated risks. I feel that plus and minus 10 years from now the world is going to face a period of genuine crisis, when the second generation of leaders takes over. The heritage runs full way. When militarist China is taken over by its own Communist Generals, and when the real revolutionaries are dead or retired, that, gentlemen, is a time of peril for the world, for China, and for us.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Dr. Linebarger, Guy Parker, writing in the April issue of World Politics, thinks it will be a miracle indeed if all of Southeast Asia is not under Communist domination in the next 10 years. Do you subscribe to that?

DR. LINEBARGER: That assumes a continuation of an American deteriorating posture. It assumes, in other words, that we will not only^{not} do anything but we will guarantee not doing anything. I don't know. Speaking as an extreme left-wing Dixiecrat, I confess generally I found it easier, as a registered southern Democrat, to support the Republicans than the liberal Democrats, but I don't think any candidate for our Presidency is that bad. And I think Parker is crazy, if he is silly enough to assume the U. S. doesn't exist. It wouldn't take 10 years—they would be down there in about 4 or 5

months if the U. S. ceased to exist. The only thing deterring them is the U. S. A. The only thing that will deter them is the U. S. A. The only thing that can deter them is the U. S. A. A discussion of any of this stuff is just poppycock, if you leave the U. S. A. out of it. The Chinese already have armed forces which probably in 1951 and 1952 were not much behind the level of the American Expeditionary Force under Pershing as to equipment and general standards of health.

I have been told that now the Chinese armed forces are above the equivalent of MacArthur's forces during during the war against Japan--that is a degree of modernization, mobility, and supply. If they are expanded they will certainly weaken. In other words, the bigger the force the more backward it is as a sheer supply-to-manpower ratio. There is not a military force in that area that could stop them. They've got thousands of Diesel motor-driven junks that they could use. They could drive the Filipinos into the hills in a matter of weeks--if there were no U. S. A. The Filipinos can't stop them--that large a country and that many people.

Parker I respect as far as I can respect a college professor. But I think a lot of nonsense is written which makes one or two very big assumptions which aren't discussed. If we are in there to stop them I don't think they are going to advance an inch in 10 years anywhere. The reason is, we'll stop them. If we don't stop them, they will advance right away. So it depends on what candidate you think is going to be elected President and what he is going to do about it here.

We are the doubtful issue--not the Communists. They will push if they can. If we let them, they'll go ahead. I, for one, feel a confidence in the American people, in the probable leader they select. I feel that between us and Russia, neither one of us expects to have military expansion. A genuine Communist Cuba would exhilarate and please me so much I wouldn't know what to do, because, if they actually got a Soviet rocket base in Cuba you would really get Congress voting defense funds.

So that, if they get Indonesia, if they get Cuba, and if they get these other places by subversion, God bless them. It's the only thing that will wake up America, and I find that delightful. Furthermore, if they are far away, they can't hold them. If you were a Russian planner, would you put \$5 billion worth of hardware, manpower, and technicians into a place somebody might snatch from under you with a coup d'etat? If you don't support it, it may go under anyhow. They've got policy headaches, too.

I find it quite important that the Communist world has added nothing since the first Geneva Conference, in which we sliced up Indo-China. Since then they have lost in Malaya, their threat in the Phillipines has genuinely diminished to almost a vanishing point, and we have two separate worlds with a fairly definite frontier. I don't particularly think that it is to the Russian interest, as Russians, to see communism expand right now, because the Communist doctrine is essentially based on the assumption that they can expand and will expand when we get into trouble. But we haven't got into enough trouble yet of our own at home to warrant that.

So I'd say that Parker isn't right or wrong. I'd say he is so utterly beside the point that he is not talking about anything.

QUESTION: You mentioned the terrific leaders that the Red Chinese have. If they are so terrific, how do they make such tremendous blunders as you mentioned?

DR. LINEBARGER: I was challenged on that in the corridor the moment I got outside. I am glad to repeat my answer. Roughly, from 1920 to 1950, 30 years, these men and a few others like them led, organized, and hung on to the most dogged revolution in modern history. I was once told by Chou En lai's assistant, a very bright man about my own age, that the Russians didn't have to fight for their Communist revolution, that they never had one. The country collapsed and the Party took over without trouble. He said, "We Chinese Communists have fought 25 years, fought and died, and learned how to fight." That was their attitude. But that was all in China. They saw very few Japanese, very few Americans, and very few Russians, really, very few. The Chinese in Russia got pretty badly out of contact with the Soviet Revolution in China, particularly, say, in 1926 to 1934. They used their brains and their capacities against Chinese culture and the Chinese people. It was an internal war at which they did superbly. By the time they had to deal with foreigners they were, all of them, old men. They were brilliant men set in their ways. And they have a crop of pretty third-rate assistants and deputies, men brought up in the orthodoxy of Chinese communism, which is narrow, unimaginative, intolerant, and often

quite stupid.

So, when these men handle something themselves and give it personal attention, it is pretty good. But Ju Dah, the great military genius, isn't doing anything at all except serving as a figurehead, very much in the way General Pershing did under Hoover and Roosevelt, where he was a source of wisdom. He helped pick Marshall and the others, but he certainly didn't exercise command. Mao Tse-tung is increasingly the voice of the prophet on the mountain. He comes down with the occasional word. The man has added about 25 pounds' weight since he got loose in the Peking restaurants. He seems to have a pretty vivid sex life. He has had four wives. They all got worn out or got shot, or something. He keeps going. But I mean, he is not exerting himself too much. It is the same problem of age which I would be rude to mention in the Western countries. But, if you take the number of leaders in the world today who are old men, it's rather impressive. They are all pretty old.

Chou En lai is the most agile in the bunch. But he is always the daring one, and he doesn't necessarily take the Party with him all the way through. There we've got an awful lot of wonderful second-rate people in this country before we get down to our third-raters. The Chinese Communists are distinguished by a real shortage of people who know the West, or who even know Russia. An American trained or a Russian trained Chinese--it doesn't matter whether he is trained in Chicago or trained in Moscow--is generally under suspicion in Peking. So that the men who came back from Russia to

Red China expecting to be really big shots in the Chinese Communist movement have been sent off to study committees or told to write strategic plans. And they are still writing them 10 years later.

QUESTION: In the late forties there was a great to-do in this country-- and it still crops up once in a while--on the supposition that through mismanagement of our foreign policy we lost China. I wonder if you subscribe to this or whether you consider the present course of events to be almost inevitable?

DR. LINEBARGER: There was a great deal of lying in classified U. S. documents which I, myself, saw and took part in. I was in the Pentagon in G-2, China Theater Headquarters. I saw Davies, Service, and the other State Department liberals falsify reports against Chiang Kai-shek. I saw Davies come away from Communist Headquarters, where I, myself, was his No. 3 alternate, his face smiling from ear to ear because the Japanese were beating up Chiang Kai-shek's troops in 1944. This meant that the democratic forces in China were going to get ahead if Chiang Kai-shek did just get hurt enough.

We had people like that, who passed up no opportunity at all to attack anyone who said the Communists were Communists or who said that Chiang Kai-shek was not corrupt. There was a lot of corruption, but they followed the basic line--"Chiang Kai-shek is rotten. A democratic government (meaning a Communist government) has got to take over."

It's funny that the Eisenhower Administration still keeps classified--

I don't know why they do it--the U. S. naval intelligence and military intelligence data which would show the dollar value of Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists. When I was last on active duty I managed to get a little of that through channels, quite properly, released to a House of Representatives committee in 1946. The Russians gave the Chinese Communists about \$4 billion worth of equipment, the replacement cost. We gave Chiang Kai-shek, according to the bitter paper written for Mr. Acheson, which Mr. Acheson signed, the so-called White Paper on China, \$2 billion worth. Acheson says that Chiang Kai-shek wasted it in great part. Of the \$2 billion in that statement, \$600 million was the United States Government charge to recharge the Nationalists for removing the Japanese, who might have kept the economic and political system going. They had to have the Japanese managers and technicians. We took them out. That was not a Peking mistake; it was not a Communist mistake. It was an American mistake, fully participated in by General MacArthur on one side and General Wedemeyer on the other, neither one of whom is a liberal. And yet, in that spectacular goof, as it were, where we stripped China on the free side of the only technicians that could keep the complicated system going, then we defamed and slandered Chiang Kai-shek with an official U. S. Government document stating that he had wasted the money we had charged him for wrecking his government.

I think we've got quite a bit that we ought to forget. I certainly don't think witch hunts today, or pestering people for the mistakes they made 15

years ago, are the things to do. What matters is the future and our capacity to get along with each other and to face it. But, in terms of losing China, I say in summary that I asked a very wise American, Professor Maurice Boudreau of the University of Missouri, who for 20 years was publicity adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and at the same time a very sensitive and very patriotic American, a question. I said, "Mo, would you say that 50 percent of the Communist victory in China was Communist brains, 25 percent Chiang-Kai-shek's mistakes, and 25 percent America's betrayal of Nationalist China?" He said, "These are intangibles, Paul, but I think I'd raise it. Sixty percent was just sheer luck for the Communists; 20 percent was Chiang Kai-shek's mistake; and 20 percent ours."

No one can measure these things, but I go along with that hunch.

QUESTION: Doctor, one of the amazing things about China to me is, or was, at least, the lack of communications. What have they done about that, to get the word to the small towns there? There were no telephones, no wireless, no roads, no bridges, no railroads. What have they done in order to get this cohesive force they have in the country?

DR. LINEBARGER: Their line communication was getting pretty good when I left. I left in January 1945. In free China the amount of jeep trails we had was surprising. If you were willing to put a jeep on a bamboo raft and have men pull it across, you could cover parts of China which I, as a boy in Shanghai in the early twenties, never thought I'd see accessible by vehicles. The Communists have filled in a rail network; they have

expanded the road network. China is certainly not behind India today at all in land communications. Furthermore, radios are extremely common. My own hunch is that the communications to the Chinese people may be the best in Asia today, outside of Formosa, which is a small place, or Israel, which is very modern. *

There is a combination of discipline in getting the Party to get the people to the radio and then programing the important announcements to the people, by the use of loud speakers, with one master radio for a commune, and 30 or 40 loud speakers in the whole center, plus use of the evening hours. My guess is that the China radio audience as a percentage of China is probably larger than the American radio audience. There is an element of compulsion.

I am not trying to be a pro-Communist or an anti-Communist, but a lot of people here make out that the people oppose this. My feeling is that this is a sense of participation. Furthermore, it is a fact that China has been at peace, except for the Korean War, and this has done a great deal to make the Chinese government acceptable to the people. In other words, this is the first peace they have had in 120 years, actual peace, with a real government.

If Chiang Kai-shek had had it, he would have benefited from it. But he lost before the peace started. And the people are having the thrill of working together and doing things. A lot of them are discontented but an awful lot of the younger ones are not. I honestly believe that, if there could be a

plebiscite in China, a real, open election, the Communists would be thrown out, because I think there are enough people by now who are Chinese enough to say, "While it was good, we have had enough of it." But there is no chance of any such election.

I should feel in general that the Chinese government is more popular with its people than the Russian government is with its people, based in a great part with the radio. The telephone system is very bad, I agree, sir, but radio is an overwhelming thing. There are these lamp radios, silver power radios, crystal sets, farm radios. A radio here with a dependable audience of 1,000 persons for one receiver is almost unheard of in America, unless it might be a radio attached to a prison public-address system, where you have a literally captive audience. But one receiver with 1,000 people listening to it on a commune is quite imaginable on the Mainland. They don't show much trouble in organizing these tremendous responses.

QUESTION: Sir, I wonder if you will discuss recognition of China, and your position on it.

DR. LINEBARGER: Well, sir, it is almost like being asked the price for having one's grandmother raped. I mean, somebody comes along and says \$5,000, and every honorable man will say, no. But, if he said \$20 billion payable in gold, then the thing to do would be to ask grandmother. I think we ought to recognize Red China when we can really get something out of it, get a definite, hard bargain, where we actually get what we bargain for; we get it physically; we don't trust anybody; we don't wait for anybody;

it is a definite deal. I would certainly trade recognition of Red China this minute for the abandonment of the GDR, the German Democratic Republic, by the U. S. S. R. I am not sure whether I would throw Formosa in or not. That's another thing. But again, it is sort of like grandma. If they raise the price enough I am willing to see what they have to offer.

But just to recognize them--here, again, is where you find most of the college professors in this country so woolly-headed that they just should not be listened to. I think an actual majority of most American college professors in the Far Eastern field want to recognize Red China just out of a sheer itch to do something, which I think is as stupid as hell. If we recognize them, let's get something for it. We can't recognize them twice. It's like chastity--once you give it away, it's gone.

QUESTION: Would you care to discuss the Harrison Salisbury recent writings on the possibility of growing differences between Red China and Russia?

DR. LINEBARGER: I feel in general that the Swiss and Scottish relationship which George Petty pointed out--this is not my idea; it is his, but I quote it very happily and very respectfully--is worth noting. Scotland has become a Swiss dependency, ecclesiastically, for the last 400 years. No Swiss army ever forced Presbyterianism on Scotland. It was done by subversion of the Catholic Church in Scotland by intellectual means and very few foreign agents. The Swiss had practically nothing to do with it. The Scots subverted themselves, and stayed subverted. They are still not

Roman Catholic; they are still Presbyterian. So you've got Calvinism in Switzerland, in Geneva, and you've got Calvinism in Edinburgh. Now, in terms of China and Russia, ideologically, the Chinese have a capacity, which I think Mr. Salisbury underestimates, for double talk in their language, so that a Chinese can state an absolutely unchangeable, immutable principle, believe it heart and soul, and then violate it 10 times in the next two months, and still believe in the principle completely.

Chiang Kai-shek believes heart and soul in democracy. I think he probably believes in it more than Eisenhower does. But he wouldn't think of applying it. He just believes in it. I think that Chinese capacity to believe something and say, "Look, we've got it," and also the Chinese feeling that the Russians are just a wee bit vulgar, they are not quite civilized, and they are possibly a little bit funny and sort of childlike, means that they don't have to break; there is no necessary break. They are sharing a religion. The Chinese have improved the religion beyond that of the Russians. Their communism is better than Russian communism. It's up to them to show, inside the camp of peace, as they call it, that China is really the world's leading power. In that sense they may break,

But I would see it more as a Russian break from China, Russia drifting back to the West--unless, let us say, these old men die, and you get a real Chinese boob, like President Lu Chow Chi, the present President, taking over. There you've got something which I can't even describe. I mean, to say that the man has

and
the egotism of Huey Long, /the stupidity of President Harding, would be only a partial proximation of it. And, as I said before, I am not afraid of brains, but, when you get articulate, busy stupidity, polished, hard-working stupidity, you've really got something that our National Security Council and our Joint Chiefs had better watch. There it is not a case of Russia and China coming to a break but the Chinese booting the Russians out of the Communist world and saying, "Look, you bastards, you are heretics. Come on back and obey us." It's that sort of thing.

I don't see it now, but I can imagine it for the future. I don't think it is anything we should count on, and I feel essentially that the Russian Communists, as they look at the world longer, and longer, are going to realize that, if they had really understood human affairs in 1945, if they could have foreseen the future, which they didn't, if they had realized that China was a large, fermenting garbage can of insoluble problems, with a rapidly growing population sort of yeasting out over the can, things would be different. The triumphant Russians snatched that garbage can from us and put it in their living room. And they have it. Just imagine what they would give to give it back to us, if they knew how.

Therefore, the more solid the Sino-Soviet Bloc stays, the worse off they are going to be. If the Russians start getting a little civilized, the Chinese will be brutal. If the Russians make a little economic advance, the Chinese will say, "We are sorry. We seem to have 300 million more people than we thought. Could we have a little food fats, please?" The

Russians face a prospect of Marshall Plans to the tenth and the hundredth power, pouring down into China, and every time they will put in a Marshall Plan they will get more Chinese.

Mind you, I love China, and China was my home. But now and then I sort of hug myself and say, "My God, we got Formosa, and they got China!"

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MARSHALL PLAN
BUREAU OF THE TUPWA