

CIVIL DEFENSE AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL

18 March 1960

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Publication No. L60-154

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, USA (Ret), Director of the City of Milwaukee Civil Defense since 1954, was born in LaCrosse, Wisconsin in 1899. He served in the United States Army during World War I and completed his education after his return from the war. In 1921 he was commissioned in the cavalry of the Wisconsin National Guard and in 1923 he accepted a commission in the Regular Army. From 1923 to 1941 he served in cavalry posts in the United States and the Philippines. During World War II he served in the European Theater in various positions as Chief of Staff of the Third Division in Tunisia, Sicily, and Salerno, then with the Sixth Corps and later transferred to Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army in Italy. After the surrender of the German Army in May 1945 he was made Chief of Staff of the Third Army of Occupation in Germany. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

CIVIL DEFENSE AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL

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GENERAL HOUSEMAN: Gentlemen, despite the earlier cracks about the green look on the part of these pseudo-Irishmen, I was quite impressed with how many clear eyes I did see this morning in spite of the party last night which I thought was very good. I was glad that we were all able to get together.

This morning we are going to take up another extension of the subject of civil defense. As you know, we have talked about civil defense at the national level and at the State level. This morning we are going to extend this talk into the local area.

Our speaker this morning has been actively connected with civil defense in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, since 1954. He has built a fine reputation in this area.

We are particularly happy to have with us this morning Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, United States Army (Ret). General Carleton.

GENERAL CARLETON: Thank you, General. Good morning, Gentlemen. I didn't bring this book up here to read, but I will refer to it as we go along. As you know, this is a very frightening assignment, actually, because I never had the opportunity to attend this wonderful school, and I received this assignment with rather chilly feelings. However, ever since then I have been reminding myself that, in the Kingdom of the Blind, the one-eyed man is King.

It is not very often that we in civil defense are fortunate enough to have a sort of captive audience. We have to buttonhole them and hold them down to get our message across. It very often reminds me of that story about the Kentucky mountaineer who came down out of the hills with his rifle and his jug of corn liquor and journeyed along the path until he found a stranger. He stopped the stranger and sat the jug down and said, "Stranger, have a drink." The stranger shook his head and said, "I don't drink." The mountaineer backed off and cocked his rifle and said, "I said, stranger, have a drink." So the stranger thought better of his prohibitory instincts, and he took a drink. He sputtered and he blew, and tears came to his eyes and he set the jug down quickly. The mountaineer said, "Stranger, ain't that the most God-awful stuff you ever drank?" And the stranger said, "It sure is." So the mountaineer said, "Here. You take the gun now and hold it on me while I have a drink."

My assignment today was pretty well outlined for me, and I am going to try to stick as closely as I can to that outline. It is to discuss civil defense from the city or local level.

I took over as Civil Defense Director for the city of Milwaukee after I retired, in 1954 and for the next few years I thrashed around pretty much in a fog. I felt very often very much like that paratrooper that some of you, I am sure, remember, who was indoctrinated in the OSS during the war over in England, and was given a very careful school of instruction as to what he would do when he was dropped behind the lines to carry out his mission. He was told that it would be dark and that he would step out of the airplane and pull that first little ring. That would launch a parachute that would straighten him out in the air. Then he would count to five and he'd pull the next little ring, and that would launch the second parachute, which would let him down easily; and there would be a truck there waiting for him.

Well, he was pretty skeptical about the whole business. It didn't seem very firm to him, but nevertheless, he went through with the gimmick. He stepped out of the airplane in the dark one night over France. He pulled the first little ring and nothing happened. He counted to five and he pulled the second little ring, and nothing happened. And he said to himself, "I knew damn well this was a haywire outfit. I'll bet that truck won't be there, either."

That's very much the way I felt for a number of years in this civil defense business. I was having my first experience dealing with politicians, common councils, county councils, and State government officials; and I'm telling you, it was an experience that, if you haven't had it, you have something really in store for you.

There was no national plan and no State plan. Local plans, such as existed, were confusing and contradictory. Everyone in the civil defense business seemed to feel that everyone else was trying to steal the show; and all the oldtimers in government were quite certain that this civil defense was a useless boondoggle and that civil defense people were out to build an empire and would try to take over; and that in the event of an emergency the Army would move in, anyway.

Gradually, however, some basis for planning began to take shape. A few of us were invited out to witness tests in the South Pacific and at the Nevada Proving Grounds. The AEC published a book on the effects of atomic weapons, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration started survival plans and projects to help State and local governments to get some sort of coordinated plan under way. The Army said it wanted no

part of the business anyway, that it didn't have enough soldiers to do the job, and that, besides, it expected to be very busy about that time on other important work.

Finally, it was announced that civil defense was nothing more than normal government functioning in an emergency, and that civil defense people were planners and not commanders.

This made sense to me, as I well remembered Major Trudeau's parting talk with my class at Fort Leavenworth. "When you return to your stations," he said, "you will probably be placed on the General Staff. The insignia for the General Staff is a star. But, let me warn you, you'll wear it on your collar and not on your shoulder."

From here on, I think, we began to make a little progress. We set forth our mission during this interim period, between now and the outbreak of general war, or what is now called the normal readiness period, in these five statements. They are not listed in their order of importance but in their order of possible accomplishment. Our basic mission is, of course, to save as many lives as possible in time of war, emergency, or natural disaster, but, to accomplish this mission we had to develop the following capabilities:

1. To disperse people from areas of concentrated population prior to attack if time is available.
2. To disperse and safeguard essential equipment, personnel, and communications, to facilitate postattack mobilization.
3. To provide minimum shelter from radioactive fallout for the maximum number of people everywhere in our area of responsibility.
4. To provide minimum shelter from blast and thermal radiation within the target area.
5. (The most difficult.) To disperse permanently industry and urban population.

As we go along I will tell you what we have done to develop these five capabilities. But, first, we had to determine our area of responsibility.

Chart 1, page 4.--This is the metropolitan area of Milwaukee and its surrounding countries. The population of this area is about 1.5 million people, with 720,000 of them in the city itself. We developed a number of possible attack patterns, each of which we considered against the following assumed conditions.

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CHART 1




Chart 2, page 6.--First, little or no civil defense preparations; (second) the dispersal of 40 percent of the population, and fallout shelter for all. This dispersal, as I said, is on a time-available basis.

What would happen if we were able to disperse 75 percent of the population, with fallout shelter, and at least a 10 PSI blast and thermal protection within the target area?

Naturally, there could be a countless number of attack patterns and an equal number of possible conditions under which such an attack might take place, but, for the purpose of this discussion, I have chosen three.

Chart 3, page 7.--A 5-megaton strike over Mitchell Air Base and surrounding industry. We feel that this is a logical assumption, because, on Mitchell Field we have an interceptor group and a troop carrier command. But, of perhaps more importance is the great AC Spark Plug Electronics Division that is currently producing the inertial guidance equipment for our ICBM's. What damage would such a strike do to this area?

Chart 4, page 8.--This would be the area of total destruction with a rough circle 4.6 miles in diameter.

Chart 5, page 9.--Out to this area the damage would be severe, with buildings demolished, and only those in sturdy shelters could survive.

Chart 6, page 10.--Out to this area damage would begin to lessen, but most windows would be broken, light frame buildings demolished, and many fires started. People could survive in shelters and in basements--not, however, in the open.

Chart 7, page 11.--In this area and beyond, damage would be slight, with some windows broken, and severe thermal effects on persons in the open. However, a high level of radiation from immediate fallout could be expected throughout the area shortly after the blast.

Chart 8, page 12.--With this attack pattern, under condition A--little or no civil defense preparations--it is estimated that, on the basis of the population of the area affected, 199,790 people would perish from blast and thermal effects; 215,350 would be injured, but radiation effects would kill at least half of these within 90 days.

CHART 2

CONDITION A: LITTLE OR NO CIVIL DEFENSE
PREPARATIONS.

CONDITION B: DISPERSAL OF 40% OF THE
POPULATION AND FALLOUT
SHELTER FOR ALL.

CONDITION C: DISPERSAL OF 75% OF THE
POPULATION, FALLOUT SHELTER
AND 10 PSI BLAST AND
THERMAL PROTECTION IN THE
TARGET AREA.

CHART 3




CHART 4




CHART 5




CHART 6





CHART 7



SITUATION 1**MITCHELL FIELD & A.C. PLANT****DEAD****INJURED****A 199,790 215,350****B 110,330 118,020****C 37,720 40,320**

Under condition B--that is, dispersal of 40 percent of the population and rate F shelter--110,000 people would perish, and 118,000 would be injured.

Under condition C--dispersal of 75 percent of the population, and blast, thermal, and rate F shelter--57,880 people, according to our calculations, would be expected to die. This latter figure includes those destroyed by blast and thermal effects, as well as those who would later die from radioactive effects.

Chart 9, page 14.--Now, our second attack pattern visualizes an ICBM attack on this general area. We are informed by our highly classified information sources--I mean, the "New York Times"--that the Soviets have set aside five 5-megaton missiles for this area, to be fired from bases in the vicinity of Archangel. Taking into account the probable area inherent in such weapons, the strike, perhaps, could look like this.

Chart 10, page 15.--Using the same system of computation as attack pattern number one, we find under condition A--no civil defense--that we would suffer 1.05 million casualties. Under condition B--remember, dispersal of 40 percent, with fallout shelters--casualties would be 675,000. And, under condition C our losses would be reduced to the figure of about 204,600 people.

Chart 11, page 16.--Now, our third attack pattern visualizes a series of strikes on the city, and on Racine and Kenosha, in connection with a very accurate attack against the whole Milwaukee-Chicago complex. The pattern could look something like this.

Chart 12, page 17.--Under condition A, our total losses would be 1.144 million people; under condition B, 627,500; and, under condition C, 214,400.

Now, I am sure that anyone able to study these figures--and I assure you, gentlemen, that they are not pulled out of a hat; they have been worked out from the effects of atomic weapons by a group of well-trained engineers with all of the data available to them, such as updated census figures, and so forth, and the protections that could be made available to us with a little bit of effort--would no longer accuse civil defense of being a boondoggle.

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CHART 9




CHART 10

SITUATION 2**5 MISSILES ON THE MMTA**DEADINJURED

A 770,880 560,110

B 423,060 304,940

C 144,550 120,110

1930

CHART 11




CHART 12

SITUATION 3**STD. AIMING AREA ATTACK WITH ICBM'S**

	<u>DEAD</u>	<u>INJURED</u>
A	1,010,000	268,000
B	554,000	147,000
C	189,500	49,800

Chart 13, page 19. --Now, superimposing these attack patterns one over the other, we find that our metropolitan target area would have to look like this. So we concluded that this seven-county area was our area of responsibility and must be organized and coordinated under one plan. We called it the Milwaukee Metropolitan Target Area.

We then set up a planning commission to prepare a Metropolitan Target Area Plan. Here it is--a little document I brought up with me a while ago. I am not going to read it, but I will leave it for your library. This is a plan:

To organize the facilities of local governments throughout the seven-county area in Southeastern Wisconsin to meet emergencies, either natural or caused by war;

To establish a communications system that could be expected to function under any emergency situation;

To establish the means whereby the governments of the municipalities of the area may continue to function during disaster situations;

To facilitate the dispersal of people from congested areas to dispersed reception areas where shelter can be provided; and


To provide the mobilization and direction of resources of the seven-county area following attack.

This last, I want to reemphasize, is probably the most difficult and most important function of all in this plan--to mobilize and provide for the capability of directing the resources of the seven-county area after a disaster of any proportion; to provide for the special and unusual requirements for meeting war and natural emergencies, such as radiological defense, ration control, economic controls of finance, production, and so forth.

This plan had to visualize what would be done under a variety of assumptions. These are probably familiar to you from the gentlemen you have heard on this subject before, but I must repeat them.

The strategic alert, a condition that would exist when the seriousness of the probability of war appeared so great that the President would warn the Nation to undertake preliminary protective measures.

CHART 13



The mobilization of the civilian components of the Armed Forces might be a good example of this, even though the President did not so announce.

The tactical alert, a situation that would exist when we received word from NAWAS, the National Air Warning System, that an enemy attack was under way. An attack against any part of the United States or its allies, sufficient to trigger our retaliatory force, would also constitute a tactical alert.

Then we have the take-cover situation. This stems from a NAWAS warning that attack is imminent and there is sufficient time only to take the best cover available.

Fourth, there is postattack mobilization and rehabilitation.

Fifth, we have long-range protective measures.

These were the objectives and assumptions on which this plan was based. However, it was no simple task to organize the police and the sheriffs' departments, the fire departments, the public works and the county road commissions, as well as the medical and the welfare--I repeat, the medical--you fellows that have to do with the doctors realize the difficulty organizing those fellows--into vertical organizations on a seven-county area basis, and to obtain agreements on how things were going to be done, and who was going to be the boss. Boy, the jealousies and the suspicions that exist between cities and counties and between rural counties and urban counties are difficult to overcome.

Local politicians, like some military officers, often wear their rank and prerogatives around their waists like rubber balloons, and you should see how they will twist and dodge to keep them from being punctured. Let one be touched and it goes off with a hell of a bang, and it is most difficult to repair.

However, by having county and urban representation on the Planning Commission, they soon came to realize that this was an area-like problem and that each of their municipalities would probably want help and would be expected to give help in times of emergency.

So the emergency services, consisting of the police, fire, rescue, medical, engineering, welfare, and communications services agreed to a vertical organization for each service under an MMTA Director.

Then a new State law had to be formulated, and it was finally jockeyed through the legislature, it authorized the State, county, and municipal governments to function at emergency or alternate locations. It granted broad powers to the governors and the heads of the local governments to act in emergencies. I didn't fool when I said it was jockeyed through the legislature. It was about as difficult to get that bill through as anything we have experienced.

A communication network was established, based on a combination of interlocking wire, radio, and radio teletype, which we believe has an excellent chance of surviving any pattern of destruction. The alternate headquarters and communications are installed in 6x6 semitrailers. They are kept stored at widely separated places some 20 to 30 miles from the target city.

In short, we think our MMTA plan will work. So far, tests have indicated that it will work. However, it is under continuous study and revision.

Chart 14, page 22.--As a part of our MMTA plan, it was necessary to develop a reception area plan. If there was time to disperse, people had to know where they were going to go and how they were going to get there. This is a reception area surrounding the MMTA. You will note that we could not go south, because of Chicago, and our movement west was somewhat limited by the city of Madison. It's the State capital and the location of Truex Field, where exists the control center for the Air Defense Command for this five-State region. It is also, as you well know, a target. So our main movement for dispersal had to be north and west.

This is a copy of what we call our Site to Site Dispersal Plan. It is part of our MMTA plan. This is the complete dispersal plan, but I have distributed to your seats a sort of condensation of this that was published in the "Milwaukee Journal," which has a circulation of almost a half million. This is just as a matter of interest. You can study it later. Basically in this plan each school district in the city or the suburbs outside the city had been designated a reception area.

Chart 15, page 23.--Studies have indicated that a designated reception area can afford refuge to all or any part of the population assigned to it. The routes from the sectors to the city have been marked with large blue reflecting signs, so that people will know how to get there. This plan was published in detail, as I said, by the "Milwaukee Journal."

CHART 14




CHART 15



We also had to devise a plan to capture the fluid transportation that exists throughout the metropolitan target area in time of emergency. After about two years' study we came up with a plan that is outlined in this little pamphlet which I will leave for your library, with the idea that when the sirens sound the alert every truck driver, bus driver, and taxi driver has an idea of where he should go from wherever he may happen to be.

Thus, the schools could be provided with extra transportation, hospitals could be provided with trucks, and they could lash their stacking litters on these trucks and get people out of the area quickly.

This idea is gradually sinking into the background as the possibility of warning time becomes less and less. However, 20,000 of these booklets have been printed and distributed.

Then we had to develop a city plan. If we were going to implement the MMTA plan, the State plan, and the national plan, we had to boil this down to our own city. What was everybody going to do? How were they going to be organized? And, generally, how would the city maintain itself? This had to be a plan for city, county, or township, and for all government employees, from the top to the bottom, to be thoroughly briefed in this operation. This is a copy of the basic city of Milwaukee plan. I will leave it for your library as a matter of interest. However, it will be much thicker than this when the annexes are attached, which are now in the works.

The mission of this plan is to provide for the full utilization and control of all the resources of the city government in emergencies. Specifically, it provides for the following:

1. Lines of succession of authority in all departments of government.
2. Preservation of essential records by microfilming, duplicating, and so forth, and safe storage.
3. Phased dispersal of essential personnel and equipment at an alternate seat of government.
4. Emergency assignments for all city employees as a condition of employment, and provision for each employee to take the training necessary to carry out his emergency assignment.

We have some 10,000 employees in the city of Milwaukee. They must all carry a card which gives their emergency assignment. They must know where that assignment is to be carried out. And they must all take the necessary training to carry that out. In addition to that we have as basic training for those employees first aid and basic civil defense. They all take that, regardless. But in addition they must take their special assignment for their emergency mission.

Then there is augmentation of regular city services by the employment of trained volunteers. May I say that again--the augmentation of regular city services by the employment of trained volunteers. Civil defense is not a volunteer movement. Civil defense is a movement of the various levels of government to be able to function in emergency, and we seek only to augment those departments of government at each level by volunteers where some comparable service is not available. We have to augment our welfare department to a great extent. Radiological monitors are assigned to the Public Health. They can only do the training. They must have a large number of city employees as well as volunteers to carry that plan out.

This plan had to be sold to the city departments first, and it had to be sold to the Common Council and be made into an ordinance, as you will see on the fly leaf, by the approval of the Council, before it could become effective.

When I proposed that every city employee had to spend all this time away from work to take this training for civil defense, believe you me, it raised a lot of eyebrows. It took a lot of doing to get it across, but this action was greatly helped by our Mayor of Milwaukee, Mayor Frank P. Zeidler, who has always been a strong supporter of civil defense.

In my own mind two different problems appeared. While city and municipal law has to be adjusted to make implementation possible, each city and municipality thinks its people alone will have the problem. Also one discovers that others are out of sympathy with any change.

For example, in the last two years we have striven to develop a fallout shelter program in our area. We determined that large city area shelters must have dual-purpose use so as to justify the expenditure of sufficient funds for education as to shelter, and that dual-purpose use must be compatible with the use of urban shelters in an emergency. We found that this is contrary to State and local feeling.

A man now finds it is contrary to the code to construct a basement shelter or a room that is intended to be used as living quarters. In time

he can build such a shelter. I remember reading about 10 days ago that you had some trouble here in Washington. Someone wanted to construct a shelter and found that he ran afoul of the building code. We can do it a lot faster.

These laws have been on the books for many years, and a law that has been on the books for many years is really difficult to alter. The greatest problem in program implementation stems from the lack of Federal support. When the Federal Civil Defense budget is cut, local governments tend to follow suit. The greatest blow dealt to local civil defense efforts since the war occurred last year when Congress refused to appropriate matching funds for administrative civil defense expenses for local and State governments, in spite of the fact that they had previously passed the civil defense law calling for such support. The logical reaction at the local level is, "If the Federal Government is not concerned, why should we be?"

I might point out that a good example was the city of Detroit, which cut its budget for civil defense exactly in half when that occurred in the Congress last year.

There appear to be several factors that bring about this apparent indifference. One is the fact that many, and perhaps the majority, of the legislatures have convinced themselves that there is no political capital in civil defense. Second, so many in Congress and in the State legislatures come from rural areas where they have happily told themselves that perhaps the cities are in danger but their areas are not affected; and they are not greatly concerned. Third, the Military Establishment has forcefully reiterated this line in the past: "Give us the funds that we require and we will deter war," it makes little sense for local areas to get all steamed up over civil defense. Then there are those who say nuclear war is just too horrible to think about.

However, the larger cities, such as Milwaukee, realizing how vulnerable they are to attack, are generally more concerned and are taking steps for their own protection. A good example of this is, while the annual budget for the city and county of Milwaukee amounts to about \$350, 000, the State Civil Defense Director has a hard time getting \$47, 000.

But, in civil defense channels, throughout local, State and Federal agencies, there has been very little difference of opinion on what should be done or how. We have our council and we convene, region by region, and in national councils, and we discuss things with State directors and

their councils, so we have pretty much of a unanimity of opinion on the direction and the general policies that civil defense should take.

Of course each lower echelon feels that the upper one doesn't understand the local problem--this ivory tower business. And, of course, each upper level feels that the lower level just can't get the big picture. But, by and large, we do stay on speaking terms.

Now, we find that public awareness and willingness to participate in civil defense are in direct proportion to the effort that is made to tell them what to do. In the target cities, civil defense is like motherhood. Most everyone is in favor of the idea, but no one does much about it until the situation is brought sharply and inescapably to his attention.

Just as in other areas, we continually strive to reach as many people as possible with the facts about atomic weapons, delivery systems, radiological defense, civil defense plans. We use radio, television, newspapers. We have what we call our Home Defense Corps. We use first aid, home nursing, welfare, auxiliary police, fire, and rescue courses to teach these things.

During a period such as the Lebanon crisis we had to hold classes in the parks and in the neighborhood block areas, so great was the demand for information on civil defense. But, now that the spirit of Camp David has set in, the supply somewhat exceeds the demand.

Now, a few words about our relations with the military at the local level. Unfortunately for both of us, these leave much to be desired. Military cooperation in civil defense planning appears to be pretty much a one-way street. Oh, we have close liaison. Each month an officer of the military area comes to my office to find out what our plans are and what we intend to do. He says that this is so that the military can coordinate its plans with ours. But the reverse is not so, because in the military area all such plans are classified. I believe that this is a mistake. To the best of my memory, information is released on a need-to-know basis. It seems just as important to me that we should understand military plans in our area as it is that they should understand ours.

We not only stand in great need for military cooperation in planning for civil defense but we need to know what support the local military will be able to give us in emergencies, and where and how it is to be coordinated. It is not enough to say that the military will render such support to local civil defense operations as it can without jeopardizing

its primary mission. We, of course, would not dream of blocking this primary mission in any way, but, in order that we understand how to work together when it is practical, we must understand each other now.

We believe that we are just as important to the Military Establishment as the Military Establishment is to us. I believe that we can deter war, but I do not believe that the military power can do it alone. Apparently Russia does not think so, either. I believe we can deter war by working together as a team for the complete defense of our country.

If the people of the Nation are organized for nonmilitary defense, the military will have a strong base from which to operate. This will increase our military potential manyfold. It will increase civilian understanding and support of the needs of the military, as well as civil defense. Mutual confidence and support are essential.

A few years ago I got an unauthorized peek at an Army mobilization plan that had to do with the possible assistance to civil authorities in time of disaster. It was classified confidential. In the opening paragraph it stated: "This document will not be shown to civil defense authorities on the ground that, if they are aware of the military plans for their assistance, they will do nothing to help themselves."

We are all in this business together. It is our national defense. It is our Nation, and it is our survival that is at stake. Further, national defense, both military and civil, must be legitimately and inherently concerned with the development of the ideological strength of our people and with relating this clearly to the national defense effort.

This is, admittedly, an elusive and a somewhat intangible responsibility to grasp. It is basic, however, to both the strength of our own motivation for self-defense and our capacity for long-range survival as a nation. We must be able to accept the challenge and not only survive but win. The great national effort that will be required must be dedicated to something of real value, an existence of far greater worth than that represented by communism.

Every aspect of our national defense effort must be consistently and informatively tied to this national justification for being. There is much evidence in our American life today that we do not clearly understand, or at least do not actively support, what we are fighting for. Defection to the Communists of the young soldiers of Korea still stands as a tragic lesson in vulnerability which results from stress, from confusion, or from lack of guiding principles.

I believe that together we can correct this. We can develop a new and meaningful concept of loyalty and patriotism. Remember that we in civil defense are in contact with youth long before the military can exert much influence. We can reach them in the homes and in the schools. You've got to wait until they are 18 years of age.

In our basic ideological struggle with communism, our ultimate strength as a people is the force of our democratic ideals. This is the real power of purpose behind our military might--our civilian defenses, our warning systems, our bomb shelters, and our dispersal plans. If together we strive in all our contacts with people to clarify this purpose and these principles, and to identify them inseparably with the daily lives of our citizens, it will make both national defense and military and civil a force of conviction and vigilance for the preservation of our own liberties and of the enduring principles of world peace.

Thank you very much.

COLONEL HARVEY: Questions, gentlemen?

QUESTION: General, I noticed that during your excellent presentation nowhere did you mention OCDM. I was wondering if you did that purposely. Do you work with Governor Hoegh and his group? Do you go to them for help and do they come to you? What were your relations with them during the time you prepared the excellent program you have?

GENERAL CARLETON: Very close, sir. We have consulted with the Governor. I have been to the courses at Battle Creek. I have taken several courses there. We consult with them very frequently. I think the Federal Government, the OCDM, has accepted our plan. As a matter of fact, I was told that the Milwaukee plan is being used as a text at the training school in Brooklyn.

QUESTION: Sir, my question has to do with the status of your shelter program today. You mentioned a couple areas in the five-point program. Could you give us an indication of the number of people in your area that have adequate shelter today, or what you consider to be adequate shelter? And when do you expect that your program might be complete in this regard?

GENERAL CARLETON: There are very few fallout shelters even in the city of Milwaukee, as hard as our program has been to develop them. I mentioned in my talk some of the legal difficulties that exist in building such shelters. I am having quite a go-around right now in building a prototype, with Federal Government assistance, in the home

of one individual, because of all the legal requirements of our building codes, and so forth,

I do know, however, that quite a large number have been built by people themselves on their own, but people are funny. They don't like to tell other people that they are building shelters in their basements at this stage of the game, because somebody might accuse them of being a little bit silly or of being frightened, and the brave thing is to go out and stand and say, "I'll beat my breast, or when I get knocked down I'll get up fighting."

This shelter program has a long way to go. We have surveyed the buildings of our city to determine the amount of radioactive protection the present structures afford. We have found that quite a large protective factor is existent in the buildings in our city, because practically all of them have basements, for example, and a large percentage of them are of heavy construction--stone, and stoned-lined, and so forth--and the multiple story ones all provide greater protection than the lower buildings do.

So that we have determined what protection we have to offer and we are showing them by every means possible. I had, for example, 300,000 copies of a little booklet on "How to Build Your Home Shelter" taken home by the kids on 7 December of this last year. We got innumerable questions, phone calls, questions about costs, and so forth. I have an engineering department in my staff, and they will go out and give these people a hand and try to get something done. So I know a lot is going on, but it is not generally published, and I couldn't give you a figure.

QUESTION: General, in connection with the shelter program, I wonder if the fact that you give people the alternative of moving out of the city in the event of disaster doesn't detract from the impetus to build their own shelters in their own basements.

GENERAL CARLETON: No, I don't think it does. We have emphasized right along, and our whole civil defense program is based on, the idea of developing a capability to do the most we possibly can when the emergency occurs. If we have time to disperse, I would recommend dispersal, regardless of whether they have shelters or not. If there is no time to disperse, they certainly are going to feel an awful lot better if they have the shelters.

So far we have emphasized only the idea of fallout shelters. Yet we know that our city is a prime target. We've got a type of industry and a concentration of population there that makes it a target. According

to the estimates of the planners here in Washington, the G-2 boys, we are number 27 on the list of targets. When they started to put Bong Field down there between Milwaukee and Chicago, we suddenly jumped to number three on the list. We were very happy when they decided to discontinue Bong Field.

What we are talking about is a dispersal, just as you do on a battlefield--you disperse your troops so that, regardless of where it hits, a lesser number would be destroyed. Counting the center of the city as a target, just to have a bull's eye, we would disperse from that area to the reception area, and thin out the population, if we have time to do it. If we don't have time, the best shelter available, even if it's only a ditch, will be used.

Did I answer that partly? There is no alternative. People have accepted it as an alternative. It is not. There is no competition between shelter and dispersal. They are merely different means of carrying out a protective measure.

QUESTION: Sir, I would like to rise to the defense of that local commander who won't show you his plans. My last job was a similar job. I was commander of about four-fifths of New York State. I had to deal with your counterparts in Buffalo, Schenectady, Syracuse, and Rochester. If I had given the plan--which in effect I did--it would not have done them any good. I can tell you, it is only a plan for getting the people together. It's a means of communication to tell them to come to a point and the designation of assembly points, and the means to get them their equipment, and to tell them to await their further orders. What the further orders are, neither your local commander nor I had any idea.

So it seems to me that the problem is not settled, and the only way we can get any good out of this thing is for a national level decision to be made as to the conditions under which the military will be available to assist you and the conditions under which they will not. If they make that clear to you and to the local commander, then you would have a basis for planning. Until that is done, regardless of how anxious he is to coordinate with you, as I was in my area, he just can't do much. I couldn't offer them anything concrete about where we could work together. Maybe you can tell me how I could have.

GENERAL CARLETON: No doubt your plans were classified, too.

STUDENT: They were. I ran into the classification business. You have to tell certain of these reservists what the plans are. So we put civil defense directors, in most cases, into the jobs. They were mostly reservists, and we put them into a place where they had to know what the plans are.

GENERAL CARLETON: That's right. That's how I saw what they are. We have three on my staff. The point is there is a field in which the military definitely will coordinate. I might say that this problem is being resolved. Studies are under way to see where the reserve will work into the picture prior to the time the reservists may be called, if we get a sudden attack and they are available. However, we cannot plan in a vacuum. You can't plan over here the same thing that I am planning over there. We have to get together.

Just a typical, very small example--I found that the National Guard had a rendezvous point in Watertown, in a nice little university there. It was a swell place, a nice place to hole up, and a lot of buildings. You could put everybody in there, and you could have offices and everything else, as an alternate headquarters. We are putting a hospital in there.

There are thousands of things like that that will occur. We just have to sit down and work the problem out together. It is not enough to send some captain because you are too busy to go yourself, to tell him to go down and see what civil defense is doing and bring you back a report. That's the extent of the communications right now. We try to give him everything. But it isn't like sitting down around the table and saying, "This is the way we are going to work. This is the way we are going to do it." We may be willing to close a road and have it all going one way, when the military has decided they want to come down the other way.

QUESTION: General, on this shelter business again--I think this intrigues us all--you mentioned that you were planning on fallout shelters in schools and public buildings, did you not?

GENERAL CARLETON: Yes, sir.

STUDENT: I'd like to know a little bit about the mechanics. I can see a fallout shelter in a home, even though I don't have one, and I don't have the two weeks' food, and all that. A fallout shelter is a protection from the fallout, and you've got to stay there for a while. How does this work in schools, or how do you envisage this working in schools or public buildings, with the lack of all the facilities which you would need to keep people there for some time? Is the city of Milwaukee, in the City Hall,

going to provide a kitchen, and canned foods, water, and sanitary facilities? If not, what good are fallout shelters under those circumstances?

GENERAL CARLETON: There are a countless number of situations where shelters would be no good at all. On the other hand there could be a situation where staying in a shelter for 36 to 48 hours would permit the kids to come and go home. That is a possibility. On the other hand, I visualize, if we can get shelter areas established in these buildings, business will gradually stock them.

I have a typical example. I had a big fight with the school board on a certain high school that was built, a beautiful building, on which \$4 million was spent. They found it was cheaper to excavate by having the trucks get down in this hollow and excavate this area entirely than it was to just partially excavate. So they excavated a tremendous area and under this building they had concrete floors and ceilings and walls and everything else. It was beautiful. They had an attenuation factor of over 1 to 5,000. But there was only one little door to get in there so that the janitor could go in and take care of the heat pipes and facilities that are in there. They had not planned that as a shelter. Had it been planned for shelter purposes they could have put the cafeteria down there; they could have put a place for food storage. They could have these lunch programs and they could stock up on surplus food, so that it would be easy if you had the shelter available. It made common sense to the principal of that school. It wouldn't take long for the PTA to get behind the deal. They'd make sure their kids had a place to go and they wouldn't starve to death in the first week they were there.

Did I answer that question?

STUDENT: A very good answer.

QUESTION: General, in the event of a hasty evacuation, I am sure that your exit roads would be heavily congested. Does your plan contemplate any evacuation by water to other lake ports?

GENERAL CARLETON: I always get that question from the Navy or the Marines. We have a pretty good port in Milwaukee. The shipping there is so variable from day to day that we may have 15, 16, or 17 ships at dock on one day and only one the next day. So it has been practically impossible to work out any sort of plan where you could say you could take care of any definite group of people, say, down in the heart of the city, around the congested industrial area, to get them away by ships. If it were possible and the ships were there, we would certainly do it.

On the other hand, we run into another problem. The harbor area is on a river and crossing that river are innumerable bridges. People would also be wanting to get across those bridges in cars. So, frankly, sir, we have discounted to a large extent the possibility of moving people by water.

Our plans indicate that we could move about 50 percent of our people out of the area in four hours, and in eight hours we can move as many as want to go. We don't figure that would be 100 percent, by any means. However, I want to say again that the idea of a tactical evacuation of a congested area must be deemphasized gradually as we go along in this period of intercontinental missiles and supersonic bombers. While I have been there the warning time has been shortened. It was six hours, and now we will be lucky if we get 30 minutes, depending on what might happen. So where is this tactical alert? But we are hoping that the conditions will be such that we can maybe take the bit in our own teeth and get these people started to filtrate out of the city, if they've got a place to go to. We are lucky again, because over 50 percent or 75 percent of the people who said they would get out have a place to go, out in the country, to friends, or summer homes, or places like that, where they are already planning to go in case of emergency. It will be a more orderly arrangement, you see.

STUDENT: I actually was thinking more, General, about power squadrons or local recreational crafts, and whether or not you included them in your plans.

GENERAL CARLETON: They are very closely included. We work with the Coast Guard, and people like that.

STUDENT: How about privately-owned recreational craft? I am sure there must be lots of those in the Milwaukee area.

GENERAL CARLETON: There are, but most of them are run by outboard motors, and I don't know that they would add much. We are on the rough side of the lake. there is only a little indentation. There is the harbor, and we have two yacht clubs. But it's not like you have here.

QUESTION: Sir, we have had many distinguished speakers on civil defense, and almost entirely they have concentrated on passive defense measures, such as you have--evacuation, shelter, et cetera. Do you care to discuss the aftermath of an attack and what you propose to do in relation to rescue and salvage work?

GENERAL CARLETON: Yes, sir. I reemphasized during my talk--you remember I went over it a couple of times--developing the capability of mobilizing and directing the forces that may still exist following an attack. Our whole communications system and our whole organization and plans are set up on the basis that as soon as an attack occurred we would immediately have what we call a damage assessment, but it is not to find out how many people have been lost or how much has been destroyed; it is to find out how much is still left and available for us. As soon as the situation becomes known and this information pours into the control center, then we begin our operation of rescue and attempt to open things up so that people can be taken care of.

We have one great weakness at the present time. We've got our hospital situation very well organized. Our welfare to take care of people is pretty well organized, and it has a lot to be said for it. But the first aid is not organized. It apparently will have to be done on an on-the-spot basis. I think something in the neighborhood of 14,000 people have been trained in first aid in the last two years and up to date in the city. We are training them at about the rate of 4,000 to 5,000 a year. I am hoping that somehow or other I'll come up with a gimmick that will get a sense of organization into the first aid pattern so that people can be taken care of as they are moved out to hospitals. We've got some 37 packaged hospitals in the area that can be set up in schools and public buildings, or in even a group of ordinary buildings such as in a small town. The hospitals are very well organized. We have 27 hospitals in our town. Each has an alternate site. They know where they are going to go. They have gone out and walked the course and figured out who will go first and how they will set up hospitals in this area--each of these 27 hospitals.

Something else--we have developed this engineering force from top to bottom, with a director at the MMTA level, so that all engineering equipment that exists in the seven-county area is being inventoried. We will be able to get an immediate report--I say immediate--probably within a day or so after an attack--as to what engineering equipment is still available. Then we will have the capability of directing that to the points where it is needed.

Communications, of course, are the heart and soul of the whole deal, and they are our biggest problem. When we superimpose a civil defense communications system, which we have to do, over and above what we already have, it becomes a little bit of a task. We found our greatest profit in radio teletype. It gets through very often and gives us a good

service, whereas voice radio is inclined to fall down because of the incapability of the operators on each end. Radio teletype has worked very well.

So we have a duplication of systems. We have a teletype system in our police net that covers the entire seven-county area. It is sort of circuitously routed so that, regardless of what area may be knocked out, the net will still work.

I am trying to think of the various angles you brought out. Believe you me, our whole plan is based on capturing and directing the resources of each of these seven counties following an attack, as soon as it is radiologically possible to go ahead with the work.

I know that is not a very complete answer.

QUESTION: General, how big is your permanent staff, and is your staff typical of other areas in the United States?

GENERAL CARLETON: I won't say it is very typical. I have 18 people, a regular paid staff. However, it varies a great deal throughout. The law of the State of Wisconsin says that every city, town, and village will have a civil defense director. But it further states that if they haven't anyone else the mayor can also wear the hat of the civil defense director. Unfortunately, he usually passes that hat to a county sheriff or to a police chief, or someone like that who gives only partial attention to it.

But, rapidly, as time goes on, more and more of these counties are beginning to hire a full-time director. Once you get a director, he's got to have somebody to work for him, or he's helpless. You well know that. It's working. I won't say we are typical. In the United States we probably are in about 20th or 30th place, so far as a paid staff in a principal target city goes.

QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss your degree of coordination with major metropolitan areas to the south, particularly below the State line?

GENERAL CARLETON: That is a State problem. We are very unhappy with it. But I think things are moving in that direction. We feel that we are not in a position to coordinate at our level with Chicago, for example. We do have conflict. For instance in our Conelrad radio setup, where we broadcast to the people, when you get down near that

border you find Chicago and Milwaukee both broadcasting on the same frequency, so that some of the people in the area get nothing over 640. We are developing a new concept and we are able to get away with that. But, of course it hasn't been as good as it should be.

Again, I am down at a very low level in this business, and we don't feel that the topside understands us. Perhaps they are doing an awful lot more than I realize.

QUESTION: Sir, you didn't dwell too much on any exercising that you have done that has involved, say, the general public, as opposed to the officials of your city government. We know there have been some, in New York, for example.

GENERAL CARLETON: That's right down my alley. I used to be a plans and training officer, and I go in for that quite a lot. We have, of course, conducted several command post exercises. We do those frequently, with each of the services throughout the area. Annually we participate in the alert exercises nationwide. We have to divide the national exercises really in two parts. One is the public participation part of it, and the other is the part that deals with civil defense operations. For the part that you are probably thinking about, the public participation, we have worked out various gimmicks. Last year for example, we had a take-cover exercise, in which the public was asked to get off the streets and take cover when the sirens blew the take-cover signal. I watched the exercise from a helicopter over the city and it was quite an amazing sight. This was the first time we tried it, and everybody thought that we would probably fall on our faces. But that is exactly what prompted me to say in my talk that the reaction of the public is in direct proportion to the effort you make to tell them what to do. They had been told what the signal was and what they were expected to do. When that signal went off, the streets were cleared as if by magic. Within 30 or 40 seconds you could have shot a cannon up Wisconsin Avenue and you wouldn't have hit a thing. Everything pulled off the streets. The people evacuated the cars, buses, and what not, and got indoors.

As to how much good that would have done, your guess is as good as mine. It would depend entirely on how far away a hit would be as to whether they would survive or perish under those circumstances. But certainly a lot of them would have been saved who would have been caught out in the open.

We are having a similar exercise in May, Opal 60. We are carrying on quite an elaborate setup. Boys have been working since the first of the year writing the exercise for Opal 60 so that we can bring into this picture all the police out in the rural areas, all the volunteer fire departments, the little township engineers, and all those people, because they will be in it and available. At 10 o'clock on the morning of 3 May, for example, they will open an envelope and will read: "This is the situation as of this moment." We'll give them a story as to what they are confronted with. So they've got to stop and think what the devil they will do.

We do it as frequently as we can, yes, sir.

QUESTION: What are the chances, General, that you and your staff will be in a safe place with, say, only 20 minutes' warning? Do you locate your office downtown, or are you out in the boondocks somewhere?

GENERAL CARLETON: I have a control center at 88th and Lisbon. It's about 80 blocks from the downtown area. My administrative headquarters is downtown. Otherwise I'd be too far removed from things that were going on, and I wouldn't know what was happening. I couldn't get any of these measures put through if I wasn't there to talk to people. When they call for me, if it takes an hour to get there, I might as well not come. We do have a control center, however, still within the city, underground, a concrete control center underneath the fire house. It has its own water, light, and a wonderful communications setup. We planned that we would man that control center as soon as we could. Perhaps all of us wouldn't get there, but some of us would, and whoever did get there would have the responsibility of carrying on from that control center.

If the control center stays alive and communications exist we can continue to operate. If it doesn't then immediately one of our alternate control centers will have to take over. As I told you, the alternate is 30 miles out. It has these communication vans. It can set up communications. If it is not possible where they are located now, they can move to a place where it is possible.

So what is important is the establishment of the facilities that have the communications and not the personnel who are going to operate them. Personnel know where they are supposed to go, and they will try to get there. We hope everybody will. But just because somebody doesn't make it doesn't mean that the operation will stop.

COLONEL HARVEY: General Carleton, we regret the blackout. I am sure you understand that we couldn't help it. On behalf of the Commandant and the College, I would like to express our appreciation for your very able talk on the local aspects of civil defense. Thank you very much, sir.

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