

## THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A CIVIL DEFENSE EMERGENCY

25 March 1960

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GENERAL HOUSEMAN: This morning we are continuing our discussion of emergencies and civil defense for the civilian population, including some very fine presentations by representatives of the student body. Of course I will admit that we digressed a moment when we got talking about thin versus fat hair. But I think it was a very fine contribution to the overall subject.

Included in the questions which have been presented and brought up by the students here, and by others, has been the role of the military in this overall area, not only the problem of the military but also the whole problem of the Federal Government, the role the Federal Government and the military play in civil defense.

It is most appropriate that we asked one of those individuals who are primarily responsible for policymaking in this area to talk to us this morning.

So for that reason we are most happy to have the Honorable Stephen S. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve. Mr. Jackson.

MR. JACKSON: General Houseman and Gentlemen:

I am genuinely happy and honored to be here this morning to take part in your civil defense program.

Before speaking on the role of the military in a civil defense emergency, I might offer one qualification. While I was delighted to accept your kind invitation, it suddenly occurred to me that I had perhaps consented to do the impossible. For the most part, I am afraid that I am unable to predict with complete accuracy what the Armed Forces would do in a civil defense emergency.

So, in considering how I could extricate myself from such a distressing predicament, a classical military reply came to mind. And this permits me to say, somewhat prosaically, that the role of the military in a civil defense emergency will depend on the situation. That, as it happens, is certainly true. The ultimate answer will depend on

many, many imponderables. Therefore, I shall speak more in terms of possibilities than definite probabilities.

If my information is correct, this is the fourth and last of the lectures which you will receive on civil defense. Now that you are experts on the subject, my task is more difficult, and I must be guarded in what I say.

Nevertheless, I want to sincerely congratulate those who are responsible for the completeness of your civil defense course of study. It is Defense's policy, of course, to provide every feasible measure of support to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and this support is manifested in many different ways, as you will shortly observe. But it is significant that here, at the Industrial College, one of our finest educational institutions, the faculty includes an adviser, and a very fine one, from our defense partner. It seems to me that this in itself is an excellent example of the close working relationships which we maintain with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

On the policy level, the Secretary of Defense has made the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve responsible for all civil-military relations in civil defense. It is my privilege to assist Secretary Finucane in discharging this responsibility and, when he was regrettably unable to be here today, substitute for him. Mr. Finucane's staff includes the Office of Emergency Planning, and here you will find our experts. The Director of this Office, Mr. John Clear, and Lieutenant Colonel Connell are here to backstop me during the question period.

I was asked to discuss the considerations underlying Department of Defense policy on the role of the Armed Forces in a civil defense emergency, to provide a general description of our plans, and to comment on other matters pertinent to military support of civil defense. This I shall attempt to do.

I think it would be advisable to clarify the meaning of the term civil defense emergency at the outset. This, as you probably know, is a condition which exists when the President, by proclamation, or the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds that an attack upon the United States has occurred or is anticipated and that the national safety therefore requires an invocation of the provisions of Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, otherwise known as Public Law 920. Title III concerns emergency authorities for civil defense purposes, and includes the utilization of Federal departments and agencies. A civil defense emergency and a national emergency are essentially the same. Both require extraordinary measures to insure national safety and welfare.

In this framework there is no question what the Armed Forces would be doing. If an attack is anticipated, we would be getting ready for it. Numerous readiness measures would be implemented to insure optimum preparedness for military defense and the employment of our strategic retaliatory forces. Our civil defense activities would be very limited because we are not precommitted to the postattack civil defense mission. However, working relationships in the field would be intensified, specifically with respect to attack warning and the functions of the Regional Civil and Defense Mobilization Boards, which I will discuss in a few minutes.

After the attack we would be confronted with an entirely different situation, but again, the military mission would be paramount and would have priority over any other consideration. In such a critical emergency, the Armed Forces would be waging a grim struggle with the enemy and every resource would be committed to this mission. True, we might have to participate in some civil defense operations regardless of the criticality of the military mission. Indeed, the military mission might require it. But, regardless of eventualities, the point to remember is that civil defense is a civil responsibility and not a military one.

I believe that a few manpower statistics will illustrate our position. As of today, we have only about 1.5 million men on active duty in the Zone of the Interior. In comparison, the civilian labor force is approximately 70 million. Assuming equal proportionate losses resulting from a widespread attack on the country, the Armed Forces would possess only about 2 percent of the surviving manpower resources.

There are now about 7,300 military physicians on active duty in the country, including all residents and interns. The corresponding number in the civil economy is 249,000. Assuming the same survival rates as civilian physicians, we could expect that the Armed Forces would have less than 3 percent of the total surviving physicians.

Civil defense, therefore, must be ready, well organized, and trained to rescue and care for the victims, to save lives, reduce suffering, put out the fires, and restore the facilities. Ten million people were mobilized and ready for civil defense tasks during World War II, almost as many as were in uniform. Would 10 million do the job today? Probably not. The threat is so great that only by mobilizing and training a far greater percentage of the entire population can there be reasonable assurance of national survival.

Gentlemen, civil defense and defense mobilization--which I shall discuss later--are vital parts of the Nation's total defense. It would be unthinkable to neglect the civil defense mission because our total defense becomes incomplete and meaningless without a reliable and responsible home defense.

A strong civil defense program provides another definite deterrent. If a potential enemy has reason to believe that attack on this country would not be followed by panic, that fear would not supplant reason and chaos replace order, that, although reeling from the blow, we would rebound to launch a stunning offensive, then that knowledge would necessitate a longer and more critical look by any potential aggressor.

Let us not underestimate the importance of this. Those are the words of the Commander-in-Chief, who is also responsible for non-military defense. The President believes in a strong civil defense program, and so should we all. We not only need to believe in it, but we need to support it in every way.

Civil defense and military defense are interdependent. A weakness in one is a weakness in the other; a failure in one will lead inevitably to failure in the other.

Notable progress has been made in fortifying the home front, but the job is far from finished. There is certainly no room for complacency or indifference, but these attitudes are all too prevalent today and have been for some time. A study by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research found that about 60 percent of the United States adult population adopts an attitude which permits it to ignore civil defense and any involvement in it. Such an attitude unquestionably amounts to a decided national weakness, and might serve as an open invitation to surprise attack. Place this fact against the background of the Soviet threat and you can see why we view the present situation with concern. I cannot emphasize the importance of civil defense too strongly.

Has this always been the position of the military? It most certainly has, as a quick look at the record indicates.

Starting with World War I, the Secretary of War supervised what were referred to as civil defense functions. Early in World War II, the Secretaries of War and Navy served on the Civilian Defense Board which was established to handle civil defense programs. This agency was finally abolished in June 1945. Eighteen months later, starkly realizing

the requirement for civil defense in the United States, the Secretary of War established the War Department Civil Defense Board to study the problem of civil defense.

This Board was headed by Major General Harold R. Bull. In 1948, acting in accordance with the recommendations of the Bull Board, the Secretary of Defense established the Office of Civil Defense Planning, under the able leadership of Russell J. Hopley. This office was directed to initiate and conduct coordinated planning in this area of interest, and to submit to the Secretary of Defense a recommended program of civil defense for the United States.

The Office of Civil Defense Planning enlisted the skills and experience of hundreds of people and organizations in all parts of the country. It made extensive use of the findings of the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys which examined the experiences in England, Germany, and Japan in World War II. After six months of study, the Secretary of Defense received the report of this office, often referred to as the Hopley Report. As directed, the Board outlined and recommended for adoption a comprehensive plan for the organization of a national civil defense program.

Between 1945 and 1949 it was the military who conceived and prepared civil defense policy and programs. It was the military who drew up the studies and recommendations that recognized civil defense as a responsibility of civil government. It was the military who laid much of the groundwork for present day civil defense activities. Subsequently, the Congress enacted Public Law 920 to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. Since 1951, civil defense in the United States has been a function under civilian leadership and responsibility. Notwithstanding, the Department of Defense has continued to play a very important role in the civil defense mission.

Certain aspects of civil defense are generally considered to be collateral responsibilities of the Armed Forces. Annex 7, as you undoubtedly know, provides a general listing of our responsibilities with respect to contingency plans, attack warning, and reports of nuclear detonations, radiological fallout reports, and aerial reconnaissance, CONELRAD, and explosive ordnance disposal. There are many additional ways in which the military contributes to civil defense on a continuing basis. Collectively, they cover a broad spectrum of activities, as you will note.

We furnish the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization with as much information as possible on anticipated forms of attack, plus information on the effects of nuclear weapons and defensive procedures. This assistance includes guidance as to which areas of the country are most likely to be attacked. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has access to data on nuclear weapons effects not related directly to military operations. Direct liaison between the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and the Defense Atomic Support Agency facilitates the exchange of this type of information.

We provide technical advice and assistance to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in various facets of passive defense planning and in the development and testing of certain items of survival equipment, such as gas masks and protective clothing.

During the past two years, the Department has furnished significant assistance to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in the preparation of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization and its annexes, which are 39 in number. This support was in addition to the preparation of annex 7 itself.

You probably know that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has an emergency relocation site similar to our own, but you may not know that we keep a liaison officer there at all times. And, in the event of a national or civil defense emergency, approximately 30 high-ranking Defense personnel, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will proceed to that site to represent the Department of civil defense and defense mobilization matters, particularly in the area of emergency resource management. The Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps are providing outstanding support to this facility in such activities as construction, communications, and housekeeping.

Public Law 920 authorizes the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, to appoint such advisory committees as are deemed necessary--and there are quite a few in existence today--the membership of which usually includes the Department of Defense. Many of these committees function in specific areas, such as the Interagency Health Advisory Committee, which was established to advise and assist the Director on emergency medical-care planning.

These committees are essentially working groups of the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board, which has Governor Hoegh, the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, as its chairman. This

Board was established to tie together the civil defense capabilities of 20 Federal agencies and to coordinate their activities in this important area. The Secretary of Defense is a member of the Board. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has established similar boards in each of its eight regions. The membership of the regional boards is similar to that of the national board.

Under emergency conditions, the Director of OCDM and his Regional Directors will be responsible for the direction of civil defense operations and the coordination and direction of the management of the surviving resources of the Nation, other than those under military control. The Department of Defense will be a claimant for surviving resources, as will the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Additionally, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will adjudicate conflicting claims. Every effort is being made to determine our requirements for postattack resources so that requests can be submitted on a current and continuing basis to the Regional Directors as a Department of Defense claim.

These claims are submitted to the Regional Directors through the service representatives and the principal Defense representative, in order to establish a priority for and a preattack allocation of estimated surviving Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization resources. The Department of the Army provides the principal Defense representative on these boards. An emergency would catapult the regional boards into responsibilities of tremendous importance, and their operations would cover a multiplicity of problems in both civil defense and defense mobilization.

Of key importance to civil defense is the existence of an effective airattack warning system. It is our responsibility to trigger the warning. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization attackwarning officers are stationed with the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs for this specific purpose.

As you know, military installations distributed throughout the United States often have common problems of defense and protection with adjacent communities under civil government. Coordination of planning, for protective measures before attack and recovery measures after attack, between civil authorities and the military services is imperatively necessary to avoid conflicts. Moreover, since military planners are exceptionally well qualified in passive defense planning and training, valuable assistance is provided local authorities in these areas as well.

Military assistance in peacetime disasters involves no conjecture, and the facts are very impressive. The military services have a remarkable record of cooperation with civil authorities in peacetime disasters. History is replete with evidence of our ability and our willingness to react promptly in the face of violence in nature and in man. Compelling humanitarian requirements inevitably put the military relief machinery, which is organized and mobile, in action the moment disaster strikes.

While disaster relief by the Armed Forces generally is limited to the emergency period, you may be surprised to hear that, following the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906, military control of the area was necessary for 10 months, until civil officials were ready to reassume their responsibilities. We are justly proud of the manner in which the military has responded to calls of help when communities have been striken by hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, and fires. Of course, natural disaster relief and rehabilitation operations provide a realistic and beneficial test of our domestic emergency plans and procedures.

Unfortunately, the record of accomplishments during natural disasters has given many the impression that our resources are unlimited to meet any domestic emergency, and that in war those resources will be available without limit for nonmilitary tasks. Both ideas are incorrect, of course, and we earnestly solicit your aid in dispelling such thinking.

We will, of course, do everything in our power to assist civil authorities in case of a direct attack on this country. The one qualification, as I have mentioned, is the priority claim on military resources for military purposes. This in turn prevents commitment of any of our resources for nonmilitary purposes prior to their actual need. This qualification, I might add, was inserted in the basic statute itself, Public Law 920.

And this is the implication of what was referred to at the beginning, of depending on the circumstances.

It is difficult for me to discuss policy matters without repeating to some extent the contents of annex 7. Accordingly, I wish to mention only two general policies. First, the primary responsibility for coordinating the planning and rendering of military assistance to civil authorities in domestic emergencies is that of the Department of the Army.

The Departments of the Navy and the Air Force will be responsible for rendering such assistance, consistent with the requirements of their primary mission, as may be deemed necessary by the ZI Army Commander. This responsibility was assigned to the Army because it was recognized that military participation in civil defense emergencies is basically a ground operation.

The other policy, one I consider extremely important, is this: The responsibility for providing assistance initially to civil authorities in domestic emergencies is that of the military service having available resources nearest the afflicted area. This policy says, in effect, that the local commander, irrespective of service, will render assistance to stricken communities, provided such assistance does not interfere with his primary mission.

Consider for a moment, if you will, a city or community reeling from a nuclear attack. Assume you are the commander of the military installation some miles away that escaped the major effects of the attack. You have implemented your war plans and essential military operations are underway. All the resources at your disposal are completely committed to the military mission. At this time you receive a call from one of the local civil defense officials. He needs military assistance desperately. What would you do?

This is the type of thing that might be taking place all over the country. Hundreds of commanders would be involved, each one confronted with different problems of unprecedented magnitude and importance. Each would have to make his own decision--perhaps ruthlessly at times--weighing humanitarian instincts against his military duties and responsibilities.

It is not accurate to conclude, however, that the decision will rest solely with the local commander. Instead, the problem will require the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense, and all other commanders down through the military chain of command. The initial decision will rest upon the local commander, because he is the military authority nearest to the disaster. The decision will require a thorough estimate of the situation and knowledge of the laws, plans, policies, and directives governing the employment of military forces. If military support is feasible, it will be consistent with the limitations imposed by the Commander's primary mission. If, in the Commander's judgment, it is not considered feasible, I think higher authorities would be reluctant to interfere with his decision. To do so might conceivably jeopardize the conduct of his military mission, for which he, and he alone, is responsible.

By far the wisest solution is for civil government to be prepared to do its job in an emergency. We may not be able to help. So we say to them: "When you plan, plan for the successful accomplishment of your job with your own resources. Do not count on any other help."

As we see it, it is the duty of civil defense officials everywhere to provide such an effective civil defense organization and workable plans that they will not, when the chips are down, feel compelled to surrender their responsibility to the military or to immobilize the military to do their job.

By Executive order, each Federal department and agency must prepare plans for providing its personnel, material, facilities, and services to civil authorities in civil defense emergencies. The Executive order implements the basic statutory authority and directive set forth in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920.

Contingency plans developed by the military departments derive from and support the basic policy guidance and instructions contained in various Department of Defense documents. The plans are detailed, but flexible, so that they will be effective in any type of domestic emergency. At this point I should like to give you a general description of these plans.

The planning base or conceptual approach provides for two possible tasks. First, support to civil authorities while they are still functioning; and, secondly, maintain and/or support the reestablishment of law and order and protect life and property in the event civil control of leadership is overwhelmed or destroyed. Priority will be given to the first task if at all possible, that is, to support the civil authorities while they are still functioning. Otherwise, we could be faced with the impossible task of assuming the total responsibility.

Military assistance in civil defense operations will normally include such emergency services as medical, water purification, mass feeding, radiological monitoring, rescue and fire fighting, communications, maintenance of law and order, protection of national defense facilities, and air and ground transportation.

Skilled personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, within designated target areas, are organized into teams or cadres, composed of or containing, where practicable, personnel whose military specialty is usable in or in supervision of civil defense operations.

The organized military cadres will assemble and direct civilian resources until civil authority is reestablished. The Zone of Interior Army Commanders will coordinate and control the forces committed, but the nonarmy units will retain their own chain of command. The forces which can be made temporarily available for civil defense purposes are clearly identified in support plans and have been predesignated for commitment to target complexes. A target complex comprises all the territory surrounding a probable target city, extending out to the distance necessary to encompass enough civilian resources to cope with the disaster inflicted upon that city.

Each Zone of Interior Army is responsible for civil defense planning for those target complexes located in its area of jurisdiction. The cities of Baltimore and Washington, and the surrounding area, comprise a target complex. New York is one, Boston another.

Training in domestic emergency operations is designed to provide for prompt assembly and employment of forces in an emergency operation. A major objective is to improve the procedures by which military skills can best be employed in the emergency. Generally the skills available within the services are well suited to disaster operations, and frequently training is necessary only as an extension to that received for the basic skill possessed by the individual. However, personnel are given basic indoctrination in atomic, biological, and chemical warfare, and the characteristics and effects of natural disasters. When team members require training for specialized tasks, they are, of course, given such training. The workability of our plans has been well demonstrated in past disasters, as I have indicated.

I can assure you that there is excellent cooperation and coordination between the services at all levels.

The use of Reserve components in domestic emergency operations is governed by the same basic principles that apply to our regular forces. It is the mission of the Reserve to provide trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Armed Forces whenever necessary to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces of the United States in excess of those of the regular components.

The Reserve Force structure is barely adequate to meet the minimum requirements of the joint strategic war plans. The first source for augmentation is, of course, the Ready Reserve, now totalling about 2.5 million. They are expected to be trained and available for immediate

mobilization, and we are spending over \$1 billion on them each year for this specific purpose.

The Ready Reserve serves as the primary backup force, and its employment in civil defense operations would unacceptably lower the capabilities of the Reserve Force to complement and reinforce the Active Forces. The Standby Reserve must be processed for availability, of course, by Selective Service, with due regard for the needs of the civil economy. For this reason, the Standby Reserve is an uncertain potential.

Of course, we encourage retired members of the regular establishment, retired reservists, and retired civilian employees of the Department of Defense to participate actively in civil defense programs.

Under current mobilization plans and procedures, the immediate availability of Reserves during a Presidential emergency is limited to 1 million members of the Ready Reserve. In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, an unlimited number of members of the Reserve--Ready, Standby, or Retired--may be utilized.

Military resources remain adjustable for application under either conditions of a sudden, all-out attack, devastating much of this country, or the alternative of limited war, which may or may not result in attack on this country. In the event of strategic warning, it is possible that sizable numbers of Reserves would be mobilized and deployed prior to the outbreak of war. This, too, is a factor which must be considered in our domestic emergency planning.

I approach the next subject with some misgivings, because it is fraught with numerous hazards and pitfalls and is a vexatious subject among many experts. I refer to martial law, or, as it is often termed, martial rule. It has been said that the intervention of military forces in civil affairs, even as an aid to overburdened or possibly overwhelmed civilian agencies of law enforcement or relief, is a subject possessing a very delicate balance in American government. To this I can certainly agree.

As stated in annex 7, martial law will not be imposed, except when the agencies of the civil law have been paralyzed, overthrown, or over-powered and are unable to operate and function adequately. In areas where martial law has been declared by the President, military authorities may perform all acts reasonably necessary for the restoration and

maintenance of public order until such time as it is determined by the President that the appropriate civil authorities are able to operate and to function adequately.

When he acts at the expressed command of the President, a local military commander may enforce martial law in a particular area. In the absence of martial law proclamation, a military commander will assume control in a civil emergency only when it is necessary because civil authority is unable to perform its normal function. When intervention with Federal troops has taken place, the military commander will be governed by the necessities of the military situation. Under extreme conditions, military necessity might require complete military control, but this action would be taken only as a last resort.

While the military must be prepared for prompt and vigorous action in the event civil law enforcement agencies are unable to cope with the emergency, it will, indeed, be a black day for the Nation when it falls to the Armed Forces to restore law and order. This lamentable situation would compound the gravity of the emergency and prejudice the successful performance of vital military operations.

And now, Gentlemen, I should like briefly to conclude these remarks. First, let me say that it has been, as I have indicated, a genuine privilege to be here with you this morning, and I hope to be able to answer--or at least my staff will--any questions that might be in your minds.

Our situation in civil defense today and in our overall national defense is best illustrated by a statement I once heard quoted on the subject by a prominent speaker. He said: "We are all in it together and we must all learn to help ourselves and to help each other . . . ."

The Department of Defense believes that the civil defense structure which we now have in this country is basically sound. Its system of organization and its guiding precepts are sound.

We also believe that it will not be improved merely by the passage of more laws, more edicts, or more reorganizing. It will be improved only by the hard and determined effort of all concerned, from the city residential block to the highest levels of the Government, and by bringing the issues of defense and survival constantly to the public consciousness.

An effective civil defense is an essential requirement both to deterrence and to national survival if the deterrence fails.

We have in the past and will in the future provide every feasible measure of support to civil authorities in domestic emergencies consistent with the limitations imposed by the military mission. The more help we give today, the less help will be required tomorrow.

The objective which we all seek is a strong and secure America. We have made tremendous strides in the past few years, but we can afford neither complacency nor overoptimism.

We must look continually, today and tomorrow, to our essential strength, for on that strength depends our best hope of achieving peace that will endure.

Above all, we must persevere in the performance of our duties, recognizing that we all have a job to do in helping in the defense of this country.

Thank you, very much.

MR. PULVER: Mr. Jackson is ready for questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Jackson, high OCDM officials have indicated from this platform that primary responsibility during the first two weeks after attack rests with the individual. Under those circumstances, I am wondering what the Department of Defense is doing in terms of the problem posed by military personnel and their families. As everyone knows, we move around a great deal. One of the primary ways of saving yourself is to have a shelter, but are we expected to put up a shelter every time we make a move? So I am wondering if the Department of Defense is planning any help to get shelters built wherever these families want to be? I guess that's it.

MR. JACKSON: As I understand it, your question seems to be, are we going to provide or require a shelter for each home where military families live? I see no possibility of that at all. The Federal Government has undertaken steps to assist each American to prepare himself to meet a possible emergency. In other words, to survive a nuclear attack. These steps include leadership and example. I think you will agree that Federal example is a very important element of the national program, which, by the way, specifically rules out a massive Federally-financed shelter construction program. To foster the

concept of Federal example, we are now considering the possibility of incorporating some type of fallout shelters in new Capehart housing. This would be a modest program, and when considered in the light of Federal example, not inconsistent with the basic principle that protection is an individual responsibility. You may be assured that we are trying to cooperate in every way with civil defense programs, but with respect to shelters, we can only proceed within the framework of the national shelter policy. At this time, I am unable to say what our ultimate plans and programs will be, but a decision should be forthcoming in the near future.

QUESTION: Sir, you stated in your address that the responsibility for military cooperation with civil defense lies primarily with the Department of the Army, the chain of command being the Army commanders. Now, we have three Army area headquarters located in three of the primary targets in the United States--New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. Why do we keep these headquarters in these primary targets where, if there is a sudden strike, the Army commanders and their staffs, which consist of about 1 percent of the total number of officers we have, are not going to be any help to anybody?

MR. JACKSON: Would you suggest putting them somewhere else?

STUDENT: Yes, sir.

MR. JACKSON: Where?

STUDENT: I'd find some locations outside the major target areas. There are locations outside the target areas where these headquarters could be placed.

MR. JACKSON: Well, let's take your question one point at a time. As to military cooperation with civil defense, I believe I said the primary responsibility for coordinating the planning and rendering of military assistance to civil authorities in domestic emergencies is that of the Department of the Army. When military assistance is required, it may be provided by the Army, or the Navy, or the Air Force, or all three services. The conditions resulting from nuclear attack may very well inhibit centralized control and direction, which is still another reason why the local commander is empowered to act on his own authority.

Important military installations will always be attractive targets to the enemy. You say New York, Chicago, and San Francisco are primary targets. They could be. I think you could name hundreds of military installations that are located in or near large population centers, and the listing would include SAC bases and major headquarters. In many cases, population centers are possible targets solely because of the neighboring military installation. Where this is true, and it could be true with New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, and other cities too numerous to mention, what do you gain by relocating the military installation? You can't hide it, you can't make it invulnerable, and I don't think the enemy would give it a lower priority. So, it seems to me, if it was a target before, it will remain a target even after relocation. What about Washington? Would you say that those Army headquarters are more vital than the Pentagon headquarters? Or other Federal installations or activities at the seat of government? You see, we are anchored to certain locations whether we like it or not. Cognizant of the grave problems we face, our continuity of operations planning emphasizes mobility and flexibility. We must be prepared to cope with every possible contingency, and I am completely confident our emergency plans reflect that requirement. John, could you add anything?

MR. CLEAR: Steve, I might add that in addition to everything else, there is always the question of money. When something is desirable, it is not always feasible, so we must be satisfied with what we can afford. This matter is difficult to discuss without getting into classified information, but I think I can say without equivocation that major headquarters have excellent backup capabilities.

QUESTION: Sir, to carry the first question further, I am still a little confused. I haven't been able to pin this down. With regard to shelters, which everybody seems to be driving toward as being the most single thing that would be the most beneficial and save the greatest number of people, could you tell me what the Department of Defense policy is with regard to shelters for military or Department of Defense personnel, either on or adjacent to military installations? If there is a policy, what is the status of it, or the status of any building that might be going on?

MR. JACKSON: Going back to the National Policy, which was promulgated by the National Security Council, the Federal program includes provision of fallout shelters in new Federal buildings designed for civilian use. Let me repeat--in new Federal buildings designed for

civilian use. Reasonable doubt exists whether we could properly undertake a shelter construction program within the fundamental guidelines of the national charter, but as I said before, we are giving attention to the practical aspects of a fallout shelter construction program for military personnel and their dependents. To what extent such a program could be implemented by the services, assuming we had a green light, would depend largely on the availability of resources as weighed against necessary operational requirements. As it relates solely to personnel protection, our general policy is to provide for a level of protection comparable to that established for industrial workers and the general populace by the National Policy. Shelter construction activities of the Department of Defense have been and are today directed mainly to measures designed to protect active military facilities and personnel engaged in operational-type missions. In general, our objective has been to achieve the same level of protection for each element of a weapon system, thus assuring that no weak link will render an entire system inoperative as a result of damage to equipment or incapacitation of personnel. This objective complements and supports other protective measures, such as dispersal, alert, duplication, and camouflage. Would you care to amplify on that, John?

MR. CLEAR: As Mr. Jackson pointed out, our policy is to protect vital operations. When it comes to an extension of that policy to dependents or people living on or near military installations, about all we can say now is that we shall follow whatever the general program is for the country at large. In other words, we don't think we should give our dependents preferential treatment over the rest of the public. So, up to the present time, there has been no shelter program for dependents. If we do construct some shelters in the future, it will be done on a very minor scale, I believe, more or less with the idea of setting an example for the rest of the country. Before we leave this subject, it just occurred to me that some of you may not be familiar with the National Shelter Plan. If so, I would like to suggest that you review annex 10 of the National Plan.

STUDENT: I didn't mean to include dependents in this. I was asking only in regard to military personnel. If you accept the concept that shelters provide the greatest means of giving the most protection to people, something must be done to protect military personnel so they can get the job done after attack. Otherwise, what good are our plans? What I am primarily driving at is that we say we follow OCDM's example. All the examples out now are that we should have shelters. So I am trying to pin down what the DOD action is with regard to shelters to protect their resources.

MR. CLEAR: There again we go back to our policy to protect the most vital resources, the most vital operations. This is the point Mr. Jackson and I have tried to clarify in our other comments.

STUDENT: Do you mean hardware?

MR. CLEAR: In a sense, yes, but it is more than that. I would call it end operations. The priority by which protective construction projects are approved and carried out depends upon the strategic importance of the operational mission which is protected. The highest priority items, obviously, are the elements of the retaliatory force, with comparable or lower priority on command centers, vital communications, active defense aircraft and missiles, and so on. In short, the purpose of protective construction is to assure that the weapon, the total weapon, can carry out its wartime mission.

QUESTION: Sir, you quoted from the President that civil defense was an essential part of our deterrent policy. You also quoted some figures that something like 60 percent of the American people will have nothing to do with civil defense. We know that the National Plan turns over the first two weeks of survival to the people themselves, individually. This means shelters. We know that there are no shelters to speak of in the country, even though the atom bomb has been in the hands of the Russians for over 10 years, and the nuclear bomb for 7 years.

It would appear that some sort of shock treatment from the President is going to be required to get these shelters built. My question is: How can the President say that we have adequate deterrent posture in this country and at the same time say that an essential part of our deterrent posture has got to be civil defense, without taking action to get these shelters into being? Maybe you don't know the answer to that.

MR. JACKSON: If you are saying the President has not taken action to get shelters built, then I don't agree with you. He has. Not only that, but on many occasions he has made it unmistakably clear that he desires to improve the deterrent features of a proper civil defense program, not just shelters, but the whole program that you have been listening to in the lectures here. The program cannot be successful without the wholehearted support and backing of the entire Nation. This is true of the military programs as well. Indeed, understanding the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the people have demanded and provided at enormous cost military forces second to none.

Now the difficulty in getting or applying some sort of shock treatment as a civil defense sales gimmick is that it is not nearly as dramatic to talk about cinder blocks in the cellar, or similar passive measures, as it is to talk about improving missiles and a deterrent which would be more affirmative. I am not an expert on the administration of shock, but it could be a difficult technique to control on a nationwide basis. We know that humans react differently and the results might range from one extreme to another. Psychological approaches tend to boomerang at times and one ends up doing more harm than good. Too much shock is apt to create attitudes of despair and hopelessness, which in turn leads to indifference, complacency, and apathy--the very things that public officials everywhere are trying to overcome. If civil defense is suffering from various ailments, my prescription would caution against the use of shock action as a panacea because I am just not convinced that the President or anyone else has to resort to such a measure to get the job done. You may not agree with me, but frankly, I do not consider shock treatment a magic elixir, and its indiscriminate use could be extremely prejudicial to that which we seek to achieve.

Presumably, much remains to be accomplished, but if our deterrence is to be effective--and it must be--it must carry certain convictions for the Soviets. It must be made crystal clear to them that we are not only prepared to fight but have the firm resolve to fight, if that is necessary, to protect our national interests. The Soviets must be further convinced that we will not initiate war ourselves, but if they attacked, they would suffer unacceptable damage. If we can ever get this kind of message across to them, our deterrence becomes a stronger power for peace.

If I may digress for a moment, I have been very much interested in learning about civil defense programs in the Soviet Union. The facts are rather enlightening. I don't know whether any of the other speakers got into this. I hope they did, because we cannot afford to disregard what the Soviets are doing to shore up and fortify their home front.

I would not criticize, if you will, what the President has done or said with regard to our civil defense program. He has given the keynote. I think it is for the people--for all of us--to bring the message home graphically and dramatically to carry out and build up an adequate defense program. He can't do it. This goes down to every individual in whatever walk of life.

That's about all I can say on that, Captain.

QUESTION: Sir, if we can return to construction again. Individual installation commanders have certain leeways with their funds in the repair and utilities area, and we have military construction programs in the various services. I believe there is now a policy out which states that all new construction of the Government will be reviewed to see if shelters cannot be built into it at some acceptable incremental increase in cost. Is DOD reviewing new construction overall to see that these shelters get put in? And, number two, what would be the reaction to a repair and utilities project which was forwarded to modify existing construction within funds available to an installation commander, to improve shelters and improvise shelters on his post within the limits of the latitude allowed to him?

MR. JACKSON: You must be talking about the national policy again. Yes, the Federal program includes the incorporation of fallout shelters in new Federal buildings. I thought we had clarified that point for you, but apparently some question remains. I don't have any specifics on your second question. John, could you say anything more without being too repetitious?

MR. CLEAR: If you will examine the policy you will find that it excludes military buildings. I can't be too specific, but the point to keep in mind is that we are talking about Federal buildings--new ones--designed for civilian use. I do know, however, in the case of major construction projects in presumed target areas, protective construction is entering into the picture now. For example, we thought at one time--six months or so ago--that we had authority to build some new headquarters here in Washington, and shelter provision was a definite part of the proposed construction program.

Your second question is more difficult, but I would think that if a project for modification of existing construction to improve or improvise shelters qualifies under the regulations issued by the services to implement O & M legislation, there would probably be no objection by the reviewing service echelons to accomplishing the project, provided further that it is considered a valid requirement and the O & M funds necessary would not cut into the funds necessary for normal repair and maintenance at the particular installation.

QUESTION: Referring to the Colonel's question on funds, does the Department of Defense break out its budget into a civil defense

category, and if so, how much money are we talking about, and what do you plan to use this money for? Do you have a budget entry for civil defense for the Department of Defense, sir, or is it covered in other areas? If so, how much money is it?

MR. JACKSON: We have no line item that I know of directed toward civil defense or OCDM, but this is somewhat out of my field. Many of the functions that I have been talking about, however, involving personnel and the like, are provided for, but there is nothing specific in the budget line. Is there, John?

MR. CLEAR: I think you could find it if you really looked hard. Of course, as you are well aware, when you discuss the budget, you get into a subject of tremendous scope and complexity. Civil defense requirements involve the Department of Defense in a broad and diversified program, which includes support activities in specialized or technical areas, such as communications. Many of the projects we fund are classified. While I could give you some of the details, I am not prepared to enlighten you on costs.

QUESTION: Sir, we recently had a speaker here, a retired general, who is civil defense director for one of the big metropolitan areas, and he sort of shocked us by saying that the local Reserves and National Guard had plans for assembly, but they were marked Confidential, and he was not allowed to see them. Finally, through a legal device, and surreptitiously, he got a look at the plan, and found that the place where the National Guard and the Reserves were going to assemble was also the place where he was going to put in a hospital and other installations vital to his civil defense plan. There is a conflict that seems to me to be the fault of the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Army, or someone down the line, because we won't let him see the plan for assembly of the Reserve forces in the event of emergency.

Along the same line, I can understand why we can't promise the civil defense officials help from the Reserves and the National Guard in the event of attack, because the situation might be built up gradually and they might be gone; they might be in Alabama instead of in Chicago or Milwaukee. Then we would have a plan based on resources that would not be there.

On the other hand, I can see the possibility of a sudden attack, without warning, or a 15-minute warning, and under those conditions,

I can't see where the Department of Defense would have any use for those Reserves and the National Guard for two or three weeks. They couldn't call them together; they couldn't even have transportation to get them together. And, under those conditions, the local communities could well use them. They could use the communications they have, the organization, the uniforms, and the equipment. And, unless we plan to use this now, it will be a wasted resource. I wonder why we don't, under those particular conditions of say, a sudden, all-out attack, tell the local people they can use the facilities of the Reserves and plan for it accordingly?

MR. JACKSON: I don't think I know the answer to the retired general who got classified information surreptitiously. As far as we are concerned, and you will find this in annex 7 to the National Plan, planning and operational liaison between appropriate local military commanders and State and local civil defense directors provides the necessary coordination between military and civil authorities for pre-attack planning and cooperation during an actual emergency. We have directed, also, that military domestic emergency plans at appropriate levels of command be coordinated as necessary with State and local civil defense plans to a degree consistent with military security. Close working relationships between military and civil defense authorities are of the utmost importance. The problem you cited should be avoided and can be avoided by proper coordination.

Now with regard to the Reserves participating in civil defense operations in the event of attack, I hope you have not gotten the impression that such participation is forbidden or precluded. Nothing I said would convey that idea. What I said was that they are not specifically committed. Their primary mission is the military one and they must fulfill it as expeditiously and as effectively as possible. But I also said that we can envisage situations in which we might have to participate in some civil defense operations to further the military mission. To be realistic about this thing, unless reservists are able to move out of their homes and cities, they will, in most cases, be unable to report for military duty. In this situation, they would not only be expected but required to help the civil defense effort. That, however, would be limited again to the extent that such service did not interfere with the overriding military claim.

There has been a good deal of talk about the Reserves in civil defense. I think there are some varied opinions on the subject, and perhaps there are some changing opinions. I think there is a growing feeling

that both the Guard and the Reserves may well be required--I don't say by order, but by necessity--to participate in civil defense operations, if for no other reason than to facilitate the accomplishment of their mission. But, nobody that I know of has suggested that the Guard or the Reserves be turned into a civil defense force for home guard operations. I believe there is an area in which they can be extremely valuable, even to the extent of accelerating and making possible the carrying out of their military responsibilities.

QUESTION: Sir, in the portion of your prepared text where you discussed martial law or rules, you considered two situations. The first was where martial law was declared by the President and later lifted by the President when civil authorities were able to cope with the problem. In the second situation, as I understood it, the local military commander assumed martial control in a situation where civil lawmaking or law enforcement agencies were unable to perform their normal functions. What is the legal status of a local military commander to the civil population when he has assumed military control, lacking Presidential authority?

MR. JACKSON: In the absence of a martial law proclamation, a military commander will intervene with Federal troops only when it is absolutely necessary. Only when there is a complete breakdown of civilian authority, and only to the extent and for the time and the area required.

Now, as to his legal authority under those conditions, I do not believe that the absence of Presidential declaration would invalidate or make legal his actions in assuming control when civil law enforcement agencies are unable to cope with the emergency.

Some of the lawyers here can probably pick that one up, but I don't speak for the legal profession at the moment.

QUESTION: Sir, it seems that the military are falling back on this thing of saying that we are going to have other missions and other important things to do and that we can't take part in this. Actually, most of our troops are overseas and they are going to fight a pretty bad war, and that's all they are going to have for some time--what's already there. I submit, Sir, that there are active forces in the United States in addition to the Reserves and the National Guard, who are not going to have anywhere to go for the first few days of the war. They are not going to have any trains to go to the ports, and they are not going to have any ships at the ports. It seems to me that our plans should call

for utilizing those nonessential forces. We are not going to have airplanes to take them out, either. Maybe our plans should call for using these forces along with civil defense forces for at least the first two or three weeks. They are not going to be going anywhere.

I don't think there is any talk of using these people. Ten years from now, if we have adequate air defense and we have adequate civil defense, maybe it will be a different story. But, if the United States is bombed tomorrow, there is no question in my mind that the President would expect the military forces here in the United States to have as their first job the act of pulling us out of the mess.

Do you care to comment on that, sir:

MR. JACKSON: I wouldn't conclude that all the military won't be moving for two or three days. I don't think General LeMay would agree with you as far as the Air Force goes. I think if the situation is such that they can't get to the fulfillment of their planned objectives under the war plans because of postattack conditions, what you say is probably true. I think I have said that several times. There certainly is no prohibition against it. It is part of an essential effort. The local commander is authorized and expected to render whatever assistance is possible consistent with the requirements of his military mission. We have said repeatedly that military support to civil defense is an emergency task of all military forces, active and reserve alike. That is the reason why the military departments have developed the contingency plans which I discussed in my talk. These plans are flexible and adaptable to either a natural disaster or civil defense emergency. The entire Defense Establishment exists for one purpose--military operations against the enemy. I think the task will be great enough without precommitting personnel and other resources to civil defense operations.

STUDENT: Yes, sir. But my point is that there are some units like SAC and STRAC that are earmarked to go instantly somewhere, and we hope and assume they can go. But there are a lot of military units whose mission is to train and do a lot of things. My point is, if the local commander knew that outside of his town there are trained troops and he wouldn't be getting any in to train for some time, they could correlate their plans. In other words, I keep my plans and missions pretty secret from the civil defense people.

MR. JACKSON: I am not commenting on the last observation. I would say that as to the hypothesis you present of the training outfit which has nobody to train, if the community needs their assistance because of the attack, there is no question about what they are supposed to do. They are supposed to lend full support. I presume there might be some things they would have to do in preparation, but the final decision depends on the military mission. If that is not interfered with, then they can, they should, and they undoubtedly will assist the community in many instances. If such a thing should ever happen, a situation where we are attacked, this type of military unit would be one of the most valuable sources of assistance. But the point we are trying to make is don't depend on it because it may not be there if fighting the enemy required a higher priority. It will be so much the better if you can augment what is there with trained people. But to rely on it, and then not have it available, would be unfortunate.

MR. PULVER: Mr. Jackson, on behalf of the Commandant and the student body, I want to thank you for coming down here and discussing these difficult problems.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you. It has been a pleasure.

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