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MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS

Rear Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 18 May 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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29 March 1960

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Reporter: Ralph W. Bennett

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ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Mundy, General Houseman, Gentlemen: We have all known through the years that Congress holds pretty much of a controlling hand over the capabilities of the Executive Department to carry out its function. This is principally done through their control of the budget, their power to legislate laws we must abide by, and their ability to investigate most anything they would like. It therefore follows that a very important function of our departments is to keep close liaison with the Congress.

It's my pleasure this morning to welcome Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., who is the Chief of Navy/Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. It is a great pleasure to welcome him to the College. He has been here once before, and we are glad to have him here again today. I know that we'll enjoy hearing from him.

Admiral McCain.

ADMIRAL McCAIN: General Mundy, Admiral Patrick, Gentlemen: The first thing I'd like to say is this: Unfortunately, during my naval career I have never had an opportunity to attend any school except the Submarine School of 1933, which is not presumably at the intellectual level of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. But if I had a choice, I can assure you that I would have chosen this course here, because it is my firm conviction from a look outside that you gentlemen are subjected to areas which are not normally accorded in the other schools; nor are

you apt to pick up the information in the normal processes of moving from one command to another. And I feel particularly privileged to come down here and address you on this important subject of relations between the Congress and the military.

And, believe me, it is an important subject, because it is the bread and butter of the armed services, and we owe an obligation individually and respectively to the Congressmen to keep them informed as to service and Department of Defense policy. In the last analysis--and it's just as simple as this--the relation between the military and the Congress is a human relations problem. And not only does that ^{stem} from your own individual contact with Congressmen, but also it stems from the business of appearing before committees on the Hill and the cross-examinations to which you will be subjected when you become a witness in the interest of the Department of Defense in some capacity.

Now, each and every person in the armed services has an obligation in this business of congressional relations; and I say this because every time you as a uniformed officer have a contact with a Congressman, you create an impression. If the impression is bad, it doesn't redound just to the dis favor of the Navy or the Army or the Air Force, but it redounds to the discredit of all of us, because I want to give you an example that in Congress they look on us as a unit to a great extent.

When the Air Force got into its difficulties with the investigations on the Manual, the first thing that I picked up on the Hill was a criticism of the entire military in this area. I just want to get this point across

to you. And I would like to add personally that I am strongly in favor of the Air Force's Manual. I think that there's got to be some sort of concerted effort on the part of the individuals of this country against Communism; and I think that there was a lot of truth and fact in that Manual which was good.

Now, Congress in the prosecution of its business takes charge of the military through two legal arms. The first, of course, is the business of the passage of appropriation bills; and the second is the enactment of enabling legislation. And you will find that in the relationships between the Department of Defense, the services, and the Congress that the organizations within the Department of Defense follow those two general lines. We have on the one hand the Comptroller, who has to do with all of the relations with the Appropriations Committee, all inquiries, and all investigations that fall within that area. The Offices of Legislative Liaison are directly concerned with all areas outside, and all committees, all investigations. And, furthermore, the Legislative Liaison shop is the one which takes the direct responsibility in connection with the individual contacts with all Congressmen, regardless of whether they are on the Appropriations Committee or not. And I can assure you that this business of individual contacts is not always pleasant. It has its very disagreeable aspects too.

As far as the Navy is concerned, our organization varies somewhat from the organization of the Department of Defense and the other two services. But since the functions performed by all services are necessarily

the same, I'm going to discuss briefly the organization within the Navy.

Now, the biggest difference between the Navy, for example, and the Department of Defense is that the Legislative Drafting Section of the Department of Defense is in the Office of the General Counsel and not in their Legislative Liaison Division. In the Department of the Navy the Legislative Drafting Section is a part of the Legislative Liaison Office; and I believe personally that it is a better way to do business, because the people who actually draft the legislation are then the people who are actually in contact with the committees on the Hill interested in that particular item; and you do not have interposed into the business a third party such as you have other places.

Now, in all of these organizations they have got to be centralized; and there has got to be a tight control over the relationships between the services and the Congress, because, believe me, with irresponsible individuals going over on the Hill, you can get into serious trouble as regards policy and other matters unless there is some coordinated method in which the proper approach is made up on the Hill.

We have, first, the Legislative Drafting Section, which I just mentioned, which does the drafting of legislation. It will take an idea from within any agency within the Navy Department which that agency thinks is necessary for the administration of the Department as a whole, and will put this in legal terms and have it set up for proper processing. And also this Drafting Section follows it as it goes through its tortuous course through the Department of Defense, the Administration, the committees

on the Hill, and the Congress itself, until it becomes law, and makes periodic reports on it.

Another very important set-up is the Investigating Division. This division follows all investigations on the Hill. There are two of them right now that are creating some disturbance. One of them, of course, as you know, is the Air Force Manual; and the second one is with the Navy in that tragic crash at Rio de Janiero where the bandsmen lost their lives. This is being conducted by Mr. Kilday, who is the head of the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee; and that investigation is just starting. Investigations of any sort take time, take care, and they take tact, and they take judgment in the handling.

The Information Division prepares a brief each day of the Congressional Record on matters of direct interest to that particular department and circulates ^{it}. And also in that daily paper there's a brief of the floor action which may have taken place either in the House or Senate in connection with legislation which is of interest to all of us.

The Inquiry Division answers all inquiries from individual Congressmen. Now, a constituent may not be important to you or me, but he is important to the Congressman and therefore he becomes very important to us in the pursuit of our business. And one of the things to remember above all else is the promptness with which a reply is gotten back to a Congressman asking this sort of thing, because, as you know, the constituent is the person who puts the Congressman on the Hill.

Furthermore, these inquiries are the things that generate the work

load. And this work load has grown appreciably in the last six years in all three of the services. A telephone call from a Congressman may generate inside that particular department as many as three or four telephone calls, and then a written reply to go back. And the same thing applies to letters coming over, and these things run into thousands per month.

Another division is the Special Projects Unit. This unit takes care of the arrangement of travel for Congressmen. Between sessions the House of Representatives and the Senate, the individual members of those two bodies, go off on many trips. They extend to world-wide exploration, including throughout the country. And a very exact and precise business is this thing of preparing for these trips, because there is nothing more irate than a Congressman who is off in some foreign country where your arrangement for his travel has broken down. This thing gets into this business of relations with the Congress.

Another set-up that is of importance in this thing, of course, is the Administrative Section, which in turn takes care of the internal administration of the department of legislative liaison itself.

Now, in the organizational work that goes on, it is predicated on one principle, and that is to create as favorable a climate as possible for the passage of that legislation which we in the armed services think is necessary for the proper performance of the roles and missions of the services. This falls into several categories--this type of liaison that I am talking about, of creating these favorable impressions.

For example, on these trips that the Congressmen take you send with them escort officers. And it's very easy to see that in the confines of a plane over a long trip you get to know these gentlemen well and personally, and they become close personal friends. These trips in themselves lend themselves particularly to the type of liaison that I'm talking about, in which it is very easy after a while to get across the proper attitude of the armed services and the DOD policy and such matters as that.

Furthermore, you have trips to the activation of various bases throughout the country, to war games, to tests, evaluations, to such places as Cape Canaveral, to the commission of submarines, and that sort of thing. All of these help in the integrated contact which must exist between the Congress of the United States and the Department of Defense if we are to have a proper Military Establishment.

Now, in the process of a bill as it goes through Congress, the first thing that happens, as I previously mentioned, is that it becomes drafted in this legislative department generally, our Legislative Drafting Department that I mentioned. From there it goes to the various boards, bureaus, and offices inside the Navy Department for clearance. After it has cleared there, it goes down to the Department of Defense level, where it is cleared by the Army and the Air Force. From there it goes over to the Bureau of the Budget for White House clearance. And in some instances it is sent personally to the White House for specific look-at over there. I have in mind, for example, the hub legislation last year which created such a set-up in the Navy, went to the White House, and was taken under direct personal

supervision over there of a couple of President Eisenhower's aides.

One thing about these laws that you've got to remember, a proposed bill, is that there is a lot of research work that goes into that business, because there have been embarrassing situations in the past where a new law, a new proposed law, has either canceled an old law that was already on the books, or has in some fashion or other changed an old law. Of course this is not good in the process of business.

Now, in the job of working on the Hill over there in connection with these things we then get to the justification of these bills; and this is probably the most important step that you can take. And some of the things that I'm going to talk about now were never told me until I got into this job; and they are things that should be put across to the armed services, because they directly affect you and me when we appear on the Hill. These are some of the cardinal points which apply to you yourself as you appear as a witness.

The first thing, of course, is that the witness should be well informed. He should be familiar with all of the details of the legislation which is before the committee. And, furthermore, he should also know about the related legislation and the historical background.

Now, before you go into a hearing, the authors in the Legislative Liaison Office and the counsel of the committee before which the bill is going to be presented get together. They sit down and they work out those areas which may create problems or which should be clarified before the committee, and they come up with the business of the questions and so forth

that you may be subjected to. So one of the things that this sort of thing can lead to, of course, is a murder board, which in turn helps the prospective witness who may be going over on the Hill to answer the types of questions that he can anticipate once he appears before this committee.

Not only should the individual going before the committee be well informed on all related legislation and so forth, but Congressmen have a trick of picking up the morning newspaper and taking from that newspaper an item that has come out concerning that service and asking a witness on the stand in the morning session as to what this is all about. So it is a good idea to be prepared as far as the daily news is concerned; and if you don't have time, get some subordinate to take a look at it.

In this business of appearing before committees there are Congressmen who deliberately bait the witness. But this, on the other hand, is a one-way go. You represent your service up there, and you represent the Department of Defense, and you cannot show irritation or impatience. And, furthermore, you have got to assume, which many times is correct, that the individual who is asking the question which may rub you the wrong way is trying actively and honestly to clarify a point in connection with it.

Then there comes the matter of policy. You've got to be thoroughly informed on policy. There have been instances on the Hill up there where one officer has gotten up and made a statement on policy, which has been gainsaid by another officer, either through ignorance on the part of one or both. And, as you can see, that doesn't help our cause in the presentation of a point before the Hill.

Now, another thing is that frequently officers are asked to express their personal opinion up there. And you are to do such except that you are to point out clearly to the committee that it is a personal opinion. And, furthermore, it is wise at times to add to it the fact that this has not gotten the approval of the President, nor his broad perspective on the overall problem.

I want to tell you that this business of person^{al} opinions is important, because it is one thing that they drive at repeatedly on the Hill, particularly in a case that exists today, where you have a Democratic Congress and a Republican Administration.

There are two types of witnesses. There are principal witnesses and supporting witnesses. The principal witnesses, of course, as you would imagine, talk at the level of policy; and the supporting witnesses are there in case the committee wants to go into the details of the legislation.

In this connection, when a witness is up there, he should not be afraid to say, "I do not know." The worst thing you can do is to engage in evasiveness or half truth before a committee, because once you have destroyed their faith in your integrity, you might as well kiss your effectiveness good-bye; and, furthermore, it reflects unfavorably on the service that the man represents and all of us as members of the uniformed service of the country.

Now, in general these are some of the points that have got to be kept in mind when you go up before these committees.

In this business as it exists today--and we are having a particularly rough session, for several reasons. No. 1 is that it's a Presidential election

year; and, as you know, there are four Senators who are possible Presidential candidates. Another thing is that by virtue of the conventions which they are going to hold this summer, Congress is in a hurry. It wants to get out by July the 7th at the latest and possibly June the 30th.

Again I go back to the fact that we have a Democratic control in both the House and the Senate and a Republican Administration. Of course this creates an atmosphere in which you find the Democrats trying to break down the Republicans in regard to defense policy.

Since the first of January there has been a bigger load in this job than I have ever seen; and some of the old timers tell me they have never seen anything like it. The first hearings started out with Senator Johnson, with a combination of the Preparedness Committee and the Space Committee. They went into the military posture of the country as a whole. They started out with the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they finished up with Mr. Gates last Wednesday on the stand. And, of course, you have read in the newspapers that one of the points that was tried to play up in this business was the missile gap.

There have also been several other hearings going on concurrently. Previously, when you went to Congress, all you had to do was to go before an Appropriations Committee, ask for the money; and if they gave it to you, you were in a position to purchase the proper number of planes, ships, and weapons to do your job. Last year the Congress passed what is known as the Authorization Bill, in which now in order to get the number of planes, ships, and missiles that you need, you have to have this authorization bill

passed, and this means that there's another committee--two committees-- of Congress that you have to appear before outside the Appropriation Committee before you can get your necessary implement to do your business; and that is, of course, the House Armed Services Committee, under Chairman Vinson, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, under Senator Russell. These hearings were going on concurrently with Senator Johnson's committee hearings.

There were ^{the} posture statements ^{that were} going on in the ordinary pursuit of the business that happens every year. The House Space Science and Astronautic Committee is in the process, of course, of resolving the big problem of what the organization should be as regards the civilian and the military side of space.

So, as you can see, this has been a very busy year. And, furthermore, it has been compounded by many investigations--into single procurement, other areas of procurement, into single management. Then, of course, we have had the Hebert Committee hearings on conflict of interest. There has been the white charger legislation, and there have been many others that I could mention. All of this has been compressed into a relatively short period of time because the Congress wants to get out of here by June the 30th if possible. Last year Congress didn't go home till after Labor Day. So things were much more protracted and drawn out. And, again, of course, all of the Members of the House of Representatives are up for reelection this year, as are one third of the Senators; and this in turn compounds the issues that we deal with on the Hill.

In fact, I can say to you frankly that in the last two years of my naval career I have received a broader education than in any other commensurate period of my life. I found out something else too in this business that's very interesting to me, and that is that there are very few things done, of course, that don't have their political connotation. Things are not always decided on logic in this business as it goes through the various processes. Furthermore, a principal point is followed by the better politicians on the Hill, and that is ^{that} everything, generally speaking, is a compromise.

Now, there are a couple of things I would like to say at a little bit different level than I've been talking about. But I don't know the answer to these things, and I don't know whether they're good or bad, but they certainly bear a looking into at some time or other.

When the Constitution was created, the framers at that time, of course, were very apprehensive about the executive and the military. They had fresh in their minds King George the Third and the redcoats. The Constitution, as you all know, is a series of checks and counter-checks, balances and counter-balances, to make sure that the executive and the military at no time are ever in a position to take over all charge of the Government.

This in turn is intended to create a gap between the legislative and the executive; and though sometimes it's not apparent, it's there. And this thing is particularly aggravated in years in which you have, for example, the Democrats in control of the Congress and a Republican Administration.

There is a suspicion sometimes on the part of the Congress that the witnesses which appear before the Congress are not being absolutely frank in telling all, and this is indicated in the questions that they ask.

Now, another thing last year which aggravated this situation was that Mr. Stans, who, as you know, is the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, got out a directive in which he stated explicitly that by virtue of an act which was passed in 1921, all people appearing on the Hill in support of the President's budget will support that budget. And, of course, this was picked up by the press and so forth as another one of these things in which they were trying to throttle the military in their testimony on the Hill, and it created quite a furore.

But there is this gap that does exist, and perhaps it is a good thing that it is there, or it may be a bad thing. I don't know, but sometimes it leads to some very disagreeable situations--that people at the level of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been very much embarrassed by some of the questions which have been posed to them by Members of Congress in the hearings that have occurred up there.

Now, another thing is that in the old days a weapon system consisted of ball, powder, and a musket. Today, as you know, a weapon system is a very complex set-up. And when you take into consideration the contractor and the hundreds of subcontractors, the effect on the economy of the country of a weapon system can be many fold. It can extend all the way from Maine to California.

So when you institute a new weapon system of some complexity, or

cancel one, you get into three areas immediately, particularly when you cancel. One is economics, two is political, and the third is the military.

Economics--of course you have changed the budget structure when you cancel out a weapon system. You have sent a lot of men home from work. There are instances right now in which that is so. The Navy had trouble in the cancellation of the Sea Master program and the Regulus program two years ago. One of the impacts of the cancellation of the Bomark program, of course, is going to be its effect on the aircraft-manufacturing company in that instance. And these people are all constituents of Congressmen on the Hill, and they in turn communicate with their Congressmen when these things happen; and thus you have the political thing. And, of course, there's a military effect involved in this, because you are actually changing the structure of the Defense Establishment itself.

Now, the military, for the first time in the history of this country, have not only moved deeply into the economy of this country, but also it is an integrated part of national and international policy; and you cannot affect one of the three, that is military or national or international policy, without affecting the other two.

Another thing is that the military, of course, is directly involved in such organizations and treaties as SEATO and NATO. This country is operating in effect on a basis of one foot on a wartime basis and the other foot on a peacetime basis. We are in a unique period of history in which the complexity, size, and diversity of the Defense Establishment is something that we have never had to put up with before in the past.

On the other hand, to offset some of these problems, on the part of Congress there is a growing expertise on the part of Congressmen in the areas in which the American people and the Congress are more interested than they have ever been before in the past, and, of course, that is the defense of the nation. And when I speak of this growing expertise and knowledge, I am thinking principally of men like Congressman Vinson, Congressman Shepherd, Congressman Mahon, Congressman Kilday, and others on the House side; and on the Senate side Senator Russell, Senator Johnson, Senator Bridges, Senator Symington, and others. And those gentlemen, by virtue of long years of association with the military questions know many times as much as, if not more than, some of the experts that the military departments send up there to testify; and they are in a position where they can ask searching and incisive questions on these matters which pertain to our defense. So in one sense this tends to close the gap in the business.

Now, those are some of the going problems under the circumstances and study under which we live today. And it would be well worth the time/of some individual some day to look into this thing, because it's going to become of increasing importance as time goes on.

Now, I have been particularly privileged and honored to be able to address you gentlemen on this subject, and I want to thank you for your attention.

CAPT. HYDE: Gentlemen, Admiral McCain is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Admiral, I understand that there is a certain group that do lobbying for the services on the Hill. Do they coordinate with the Legislative Liaison, or do they free-wheel? Would you care to say something about their operations?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: This business of lobbying is a very serious question. As far as lobbying itself is concerned, it's a matter of definition. With the majority of the outfits that go over and lobby on the Hill, in the course of that definition they always have something to give to the Congress. You have probably read in the papers, for example, that Jimmy Hoffa here about two or three weeks ago had 69 Congressmen and Senators that he was going to have defeated, and so forth. I went to a Touchdown Club luncheon or dinner here last year, and I sat next to a congressional liaison man from the United Steel Workers, and he told me that in the manner in which they execute their business on the Hill they will send somebody up to deal with a specific Congressman or Senator; and if this particular individual doesn't get along with that Senator or Congressman, they'll send somebody else up in which there's more coordination as far as hearings are concerned and so forth. Now, I call that sort of stuff actual lobbying.

Now, getting back to the military services, you have the Association of the Army, the Air Force Association, and the Navy League. To the best of my knowledge, from the standpoint of those organizations actually operating on the Hill, I have seen no evidence of it at any time.

I think that the business that I have to do on the Hill falls within the

purview of a direct obligation of a man in uniform to a duly elected representative of the country to do the best job that he can. If there is any sort of lobbying going on in these other services, I mean, these other organizations that I have just mentioned, I don't know about it; and they certainly don't come to my office for the thing; and I don't think it is a particularly good thing to get into that sort of business.

QUESTION: Admiral, in my limited jobs that I've had I've had the privilege of being low down on the totem pole in some of these representations to Congress; and my question has to do with the division between the money end of things and your particular function. At least in my feeling, there was this division which actually hurt the Navy's case on the Hill, because the comptroller type were a little impatient with the people who were technically and operationally interested in their jobs, while you were kept out ^{of} the act on the budget end of the thing. Do you think this division is a good one on this?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: Well, this exists in all three of the services. I was talking with General Fisher last year-- it's General Musgrave this year--and General Fitch on this subject. Inside the Navy Department there has grown up in the past two years an effort on my part and Admiral Beardsley, who is the counsel, to do this, to make sure that there is a very close coordination across the board, which there should be, because you cannot on the Hill specifically state, for example, that one particular problem applies only to the Appropriation Committee, because in the military matters you have the House Armed Services Committee, which is just

as interested in those things; and you've got to have this coordination across the board. And I think, generally speaking of the services today, it's much better set up than it was in the time that you are talking about

I have no trouble at all on the schedule now. One of the things that you have to be very careful about in doing this sort of thing is that I do not want to represent myself to the members of the Appropriation Committee, however, as an expert on comptroller matters, because, as you know, in the first place, this business of the Comptroller's job is a very complex and intricate thing, and it takes long years of work and effort to become an expert. But I agree with you thoroughly that it is not good to have any sort of division of this sort, regardless of where it is.

Now, another point that I could make about this business of difference of organization between the Department of the Navy and, for example, the Air Force is this: In the Navy there is a more decentralized set-up than we have in the Air Force. The Air Force is more concentrated under General Musgrave, where in my instance a lot of the work is done by the individual bureaus. I am talking there principally about answering correspondence and that sort of thing.

Now, I have to be very particular to make sure that these bureau people don't go over on the Hill unilaterally where it's the job of the Office of Legislative Liaison to do just that. So the point I want to make in this thing is that this not only applies between the Comptroller and myself, but it applies other places too. And as a matter of second-hand directive, the Office of Legislative Liaison--that's me--I am charged with the full

responsibility for any activities on the Hill outside of this appropriation business that I mentioned.

QUESTION: Recently there has been quite a controversy between the Executive and the Congress with reference to the question of the Constitution because the Congress has the responsibility of raising money for the support of the Army and the Navy. A Democratic Congress has consistently appropriated more funds for national defense than the President has asked for. What is the feeling in the Congress on this matter at the present time?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: Of course, one thing in connection with this, as I go back to the business of politics, is that it's raising political issues on the thing too. But when I brought up this business of the gap between the legislative and the executive, with the Democratic Congress and the Republican Administration--all these problems begin to take the shape and form that you are talking about.

You take a man of the caliber of Senator Johnson, for example, who conducted a hearing, as he did, this winter on the business of the defense of the nation, there isn't any question about that man's sincerity in trying to get to the facts of it, and so forth. And this appropriation of funds over and above what the President has approved of is a distinct feeling amongst the leaders on the Hill that something more should be done in the defense of this nation.

Now, one thing that is going on at the present time is that Mr. Mendall Rivers, from South Carolina, is the head of a subcommittee of the House

Armed Services Committee that is investigating airlift. And, of course, this Port of Pines operation is going on now or just concluded--I don't know which--in which they took 20,000 or 23,000 troops down there--this committee went down last week to observe that operation.

There isn't any doubt that this committee is going to come up with a recommendation that there be more money put into transport aircraft and that we get more modern equipment on it. And that committee honestly and sincerely believes that, and I think there's probably good reason for their stand on it. And that will be over and above what the President has thought to be necessary for the defense of the nation.

QUESTION: Admiral, may we continue just a little farther along the line that you have just spoken. I've been up on the Hill many times and it bothers me a great deal that you do go, sell a bill of goods, do a good job in your testimony, and ultimately the Congress appropriates more money than actually you asked for or was in the budget. That money is authorized and appropriated, but you never see it, in spite of the fact that the words are in there that say that this will be used for this and this. It has happened to every one of us. Then the next year you go back again, with relatively the same people sitting on the committee, and they say: "Admiral" or "Doctor, how did it work out with that money that we gave you?" What in the world do you say and how do you get out of the middle of this thing?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: You have asked a sixty-four-dollar question. For example, last year the Congress appropriated 35 million dollars for the long-lead-time items^{of the}/carrier; and, as you can well imagine, Admiral

Burke has been embarrassed by just that type of question that you're talking about on the Hill, as to why the Administration in effect impounded those funds and didn't use them. And the only recourse that Admiral Burke has got in this matter is the fact that the Administration felt that we needed a conventional-type carrier, and the conventional-type carrier is in the appropriation bill this year as against the 35 million dollars for the long-lead-time items.

Furthermore, in answering a question of that nature before a committee, you can always resort to this business of a personal opinion, which whether he says so or not, is still apt to get him into trouble on the thing, any way you look at it. It's one of the biggest jobs of walking a tightrope I know of over on the Hill, as to how to answer some of these questions.

This answer that I told you about on the conventional-type carrier is the stand that he took, and with the point that he made, that, of course, we could do with the conventional-type carrier what we could do with the nuclear-powered carrier; and on the other hand we would save something in the neighborhood of 130 million dollars on it. So that's the stand he took.

But where we get in trouble on this thing--for example, we have got a letter over there in my office right now from Chairman Vinson, in which, as you know, we have taken out the DDR surface ships in the seaward extensions of the DEW Line. The question posed by Mr. Vinson is just exactly why we did it.

Well, the big reason that it was done, without any question or equivocation, was because we don't have enough money to do all of the things

that the Navy feels that it should do. And this applies to all the services in the manner in which they do things. But, on the other hand, we are somewhat constrained by virtue of our support of the President's budget, and that letter that Stans wrote two years ago, that I just mentioned, and that we cannot get up and bluntly make such a statement as that.

Well, there are other reasons why the DDR's are pulling out, one of them being, of course, that there is being a greater concentration on the part of Russia on missiles and so forth, as against aircraft; and that the ships in this DEW Line are ineffective against that type of weapon.

Furthermore, the Navy is in a position where it had to save personnel and had to save ships, and as far as M & O money is concerned, it had to conserve on that. But those are some of the reasons that we're going to give tomorrow.

Each one of these problems as they appear has got to be played by ear, and I can't make any sort of overall statement as to how it goes.

QUESTION: Admiral, just as we sometimes have a personal versus an official opinion such as you have mentioned, it seems to me that maybe the ^{sometimes} Congress has an equivalent position. You haven't touched on that. I wonder if you would extend your remarks a little bit. Occasionally you get not the Congressional committee, ^{some} not/what seems to be a well-organized or well-represented attack on what you are doing, but you get these sort of personal kind of things coming after you; and if you trace it down, you may discover that he is a partner in business with Joe Blough, whose contract you've just canceled, or some little not so nice operation seems

to be going on. Will you speak as to how we can defend ourselves or how we can answer those questions, or how we can avoid letting a Congressman use ICAF to write his books?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: This is a hard subject to discuss. In the first place, you've got to remember that Congress is in a different situation than we are. They are elected representatives. They are free agents. This is a very good thing as far as the Government is concerned--that they are free agents and that they can do these many different things as they line up.

Now, in connection with replying to these people and what you do, I went up on a hearing one time with Admiral Burke. As soon as he got through with his statement, one of the committee members slammed the thing down on the table and says: "This is the god damndest bunch of hog wash I've ever seen" and he took off on it. And there was only one thing to do and he did it--only one thing that he could do under circumstances like that, and that was, he kept himself under control and said "Yes, sir" and "No, sir" and so forth; and that's the way the clock finally ran down on him.

But those things do happen up there, and the biggest point that I know of is in the first place, under circumstances like that, it is a one-way show; and a military man appearing on the stand has got to control his feelings, and he cannot afford to show irritation under those circumstances.

QUESTION: I had in mind not so much the testimony, but when they come after you by telephone or things of that sort. Is your office prepared

to help out when a situation like this seems to be going on?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: Yes. In effect we act ~~as the lawyer in a~~ ^{as the lawyer in a} court.

When I took this job over--and I mentioned it here last year, because the thing stands out in my mind as being one of the first things that happened--Congressman Walter ^{had} appointed a kid to the United States Naval Academy; and for reasons which I have been unable to determine to this date, two years later, this kid was informed that he had passed all the examinations and he was going to go to the Naval Academy. Then the next thing that happened was that while the celebration party was going in Pennsylvania, the boy gets informed that he isn't going to the Naval Academy after all. Well, of course, the family got in touch with Congressman Walter right away. Well, I had a one-way conversation on this subject--that's all it was--and I took the brunt for the Navy Department on the thing; and that's my job. Congressman Walter, and properly so, terminated by saying to me: "I hope some day you're dependent on constituents too."

QUESTION: Admiral, many of us have had field commands where we have had considerable congressional contact through telephone and correspondence. What guidance or control do you furnish to your field agencies in the Navy?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: We make no specific effort in that direction whatsoever. The only thing is that when a problem becomes truly difficult, where it becomes a problem broader than some local set-up can handle, then it's time for the Secretary of the Navy's Office to step into the thing. We couldn't begin to control all this.

As you know, all these field installations in all the services are visited continuously by Congressmen, and all sorts of problems are generated from that. For example, at the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard there is a great deal of interest in that shipyard at all times by the New England delegation, because this has to do with the economy of that section of the country and that sort of thing. And there are lots of inquiries that go on between these congressional delegations and the New York shipbuilding yards which under no circumstances can I follow or keep track of. The only thing that you've got to do is to trust your subordinates that they have the judgment and the tact and the sense of proportion to handle these things right. It would be too massive a job to try to concentrate all of this into one section. And, furthermore, decentralization through the proper kind of people operating is a much better set-up in this sort of thing than it would be to have a centralized control.

QUESTION: Admiral, prior to a hearing or inquiry, just how much feed-back and cooperation do you get from these various committees and subcommittees? In other words, do they try to get the Navy's story across? Do they come to you and solicit possible points of view that you'd like to get to the public?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: The coordination between the committees and the Department of the Navy on matters of this sort is generally kept very objective. And what is done actually is that the areas that the committee may want to explore are passed on to the Department of the Navy, so that you can properly line up the witnesses. They don't tell you on the staff

of that committee what questions they're going to ask, or anything of that sort. You have yourself to make a guess at that sort of thing.

The committees have to be objective, and they have to keep themselves in touch pretty closely to things. For example, on this business of Rio, where the Navy band crash happened, the committee hasn't come to us on this thing yet actually except for some statistical information-- the names of the people, the numbers involved, and that sort of thing. How much further the committee will go with us as this thing progresses I don't know. But it's something that you have to handle with some tact and judgment.

For example, it wouldn't be appropriate for me to become suddenly real intimate with Mr. Kilday, the Chairman of this damn thing, and that sort of thing.

There is information that the committee will ask for through its staff members, and which you pass on to them. And, of course, you have to be careful as to what sort of questions you answer at the level that I work at, particularly if it gets into the area of policy, because then we get to this point again of where you may be speaking out of turn as far as the budget is concerned or something like that. But we do get written questions from the Hill raising a point which was previously raised here this morning, as to why, once you are given the 45 million dollars, "Why don't you give more money to this or that area?" or "Why didn't you do so-and-so?"

As to all of these things, the only thing I can say about this business

of congressional liaison is that the problems are so many and so varied that you cannot live by rule of thumb in this business, and you have to meet each situation as an individual case.

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if you would give us an idea of how many people it takes in the Navy Department to handle this legislative liaison, and compare that with the other services and the Department of Defense.

ADMIRAL McCAIN: All I can tell you is how many I've got. I've got about 70^{officers} working for me. I can tell you moneywise that the Air Force is about equal to the sum of what the Army and the Navy have. But there is a difference in method by which we do business in these organizations. Again I go back to the fact that the Navy is more decentralized than the Air Force.

It is my understanding, for example, that all letters that go from the Department of the Air Force to the Congress--and I may be wrong on this--go through General Musgrave's office. There are a lot of letters in the Department of the Navy that don't go through me but go direct from a bureau chief, for example, to some Congressman. So those are the differences.

The actual allocation of money across the board, I think, is 2.1 million dollars to all three of the services, of which the Navy gets about \$456,000, the Army, I think, about \$600,000, and the Air Force gets some place in the neighborhood of \$1,200,000. So you can see it's a hard subject to discuss, as a matter of fact. I've got some feelings on it too.

QUESTION: My question concerns the Hebert Committee that is investigating right now. It seems to me that the Regular Army is already discriminated against, because we can't take a job when we complete our service, as can the Reserve officers who take twenty years active duty and can take a job with the Government. And now they're trying to pass a law that because we're Regular officers, we can't work for certain companies. To me this sounds like discrimination and putting us in the role of second-class citizens. Do the seventy officers in your staff contact individual Congressmen and explain that this might not be such a good law?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: No, they don't, because a great number of those officers don't go over on the Hill at all. There are part of them in this Legislative Drafting Section. Others do this work on this inquiry business, and that sort of thing.

I get your point on it, and very much so; but, in the first place, the first bill that came out of the Hebert Committee had attached to it certain penalties-- if you worked for some damn firm that had contracts with the Government. In the full committee hearings these penalties were pulled out. And the principal point with the report now, the proposed legislation that is supposed to go to the floor of the House sometime next week, is that there is a two-year cooling-off period in this thing, in which you cannot get into any selling job, and so forth.

As far as going over on the Hill directly when some sort of a problem like this comes up and immediately beginning to circulate and talk about it,

there you are beginning to border in effect on the lobbying business, and I don't think it's right. I think it is up to the committee itself in these hearings to produce these things which in turn lead them to take certain action. And that is, generally speaking, the way this Hebert Committee, followed by the full committee, action on this thing was handled by the Department of Defense--was that Mr. Finucane went over there and took representatives from the services and hearings were heard. They had all sorts of people there--retired officers from all three of the services. They also had other people. Admiral Rickover, even, was one of the witnesses before this committee.

If a man like Mr. Hebert should ask me how I felt about this thing personally, I would tell him. But I would not go out of my way to tell him such things about this unless I knew the man real well and personally, because I think I might offend him, in that he might feel that he was supposed to be in an impartial position as a judge in court is, judging the material that is formally presented to him by the services themselves.

QUESTION: I noticed by the morning paper that the Navy expects to get another 52 million dollars to put into this Polaris program. It also appears, sir, that as these successful tests go on, a lot more good support is going to be generated for the Polaris system. Is that money for the support of that system going to have to be taken out of the hide of the rest of the Navy? Or does it appear that additional funds might be forthcoming from the Administration side? ~~And the second question, six~~

ADMIRAL McCAIN: The 52 million dollars is coming out of the

hide of the United States Navy. That's exactly what it amounts to. There is not going to be any increase in the Presidential budget. I'm just as sure of that as that there's a sun in the sky. There will be no increase in the 1960; nor will there be any increase in the fiscal 61 budget, which is coming up right now.

QUESTION: Admiral, what sort of direction or control or coordination do you get from the Department of Defense legislative liaison?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: It's a decentralized operation. That's what it amounts to. For example, each year between sessions of Congress each service sits down and gets together those items of legislation which it would like to take over to the Hill for that year. It is sent down to the Department of Defense for coordination.

There are certain items of legislation which are applicable across the board to all three of the services. The Department of Defense then allocates to each service those bills which apply to that particular service, and then breaks down ^{into} thirds the remaining bills that apply to all three of the services. And when you get the responsibility for one of these DOD-level bills, then it is up to you to process that thing through Congress just exactly as if it were your own piece of legislation. That's one form of coordination that comes up.

To give you another example. If we are going to deactivate or reduce an installation somewhere in the country, one of the places that we have to clear that is down at the Office of Legislative Liaison at the DOD level, and they in turn clear it with the White House. There are many other examples like that.

The Office of Legislative Liaison at the DOD level operates in
in
reference to Mr. Gates/very much the same way in which I operate in
reference to Mr. Frank. There have been movements afoot, as there
have been also in the public relations area, to put all of these legislative
liaison offices in one office. But then you run into the big problem, and
that is that the Congressman is going to go to the service anyway, if he
feels like it, to get his information. You're not going to confine the Con-
gress to going through a central office in the Department of Defense. They
don't even restrict themselves, for example, within the Navy to coming
to me. They may call up the chief of the bureau direct and that sort of
thing. There is such a vast amount of work involved in this thing, and
there are so many and varied problems, that to date the decentralization
factor has worked out, and it's more on the basis of the type of coordina-
tion which I mentioned than anything else. There's no specific line of
command involved.

QUESTION: It looks like Congress in recent years has been trying
to set up its own bureau of the budget instead of the General Accounting
Office. They are doing more and more probing and post-audit. I wonder
if you would talk about the future as far as the service ^{relationships} are concerned.

ADMIRAL McCAIN: That gets into the business of privileged docu-
ments and everything else. The General Accounting Office is an agent of
the Congress and it does do its investigating. And one of the things about
it is that the General Accounting Office, having been here for several years,
to say the least, has got its contacts. And one of the things about govern-

ment is that there are contacts at two levels. You have the official contact at the highest level, between the heads of agencies. Then you have contact at lower levels, between the individual in one shop who gets to know the individual in another shop, and that sort of thing.

The General Accounting Office is very much in the business of all the services, and it has means and methods by which it gains a lot of the information, which it is able to accumulate for the Congress in the investigations that take place. Where we have trouble with the General Accounting Office more than anything else--and also the Air Force had the same trouble in the last few months--is in the business of what do we let the General Accounting Office look at? How far do we let them go in this thing? And when the General Accounting Office goes back to the Congress and says: "The Navy won't let us take a look at this", Congress immediately raises the issue and gets into rough language on this subject and that sort of thing.

The General Accounting Office is here to stay and it's going to be right with us. I don't know that the General Accounting Office is getting more into the business than it's been in the past. There has been no change in the two years that I've had this job, and I would think we would have it all the time. It's very much like the Bureau of the Budget--the manner in which they operate too.

QUESTION: Admiral, are all Congressmen and Senators automatically eligible to receive classified information? Or can a witness refuse to divulge classified information on a "no need to know" basis?

ADMIRAL McCAIN: All Representatives and all Senators can receive any type of classified information that there is. The staff members have got to be cleared, just like you and I. In committee hearings, when classified material is raised, it is incumbent on the witness to make sure that that point is clearly put to the committee itself. In my short experience in this business, every time classified information does come up in these things, they go to closed hearings if they want to get the information. There's been no transgression on that sort of thing. Congress is very cooperative on it.

CAPT. HYDE: Admiral McCain, I certainly want to thank you on behalf of everybody here for being so willing to be perfectly frank and straightforward in talking to us. Thank you very much.

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