



COLD WAR

Honorable Henry M. Jackson

NOTICE

This lecture has not been edited by the speaker. It has been reproduced directly from the reporter's notes for the students and faculty for reference and study purposes.

No direct quotations are to be made either in written reports or in oral presentations based on this unedited copy.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1959-1960

COLD WAR

12 April 1960

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Lieutenant General George W. Mundy, USAF, Commandant, ICAF.....	1
SPEAKER-----Honorable Henry M. Jackson, United States Senator from Washington.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	16

Property of the Library
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE
ARMED FORCES

Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

Publication No. L60-173

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

COLD WAR

12 April 1960

GENERAL MUNDY: The title of our lecture this morning is Cold War. This is the first of the series of talks that are directly related to our final unit of instruction.

Our speaker, the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, is a United States Senator from the State of Washington. As you know from his biography, he is on many important committees in Congress. The one of special interest today is his membership on the Government Operations Committee, and particularly the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, of which he is the Chairman.

This committee has been asked to determine whether our Government is properly organized to deal successfully with the cold war that we are facing. He has been currently having hearings, and I am sure that you have read in the paper the testimony of the many very senior people who have testified before this committee.

Senator, it is a pleasure to welcome you back to this platform for your third talk. Gentlemen, Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: General Mundy, Faculty Members, Members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Guests:

I appreciate this opportunity to be with you again. In particular, I

look forward to the question period. I say that with sincerity, because I feel in coming down here that I have a chance to get sharpened up a bit. As a matter of fact, I am sure you will give me some good ideas as to how we can go after some of our witnesses. But it's nice to be on the receiving end once in a while, and I really look forward to that part of it so that I can be more helpful in getting all the facts out on the table up on the Hill.

Last April, I talked to the members of this College on the cold war. I said that, if we do what we ought to do militarily, we may not have a shooting war. In that case, the decisive struggle of our time will be fought on the battleground of the cold war. And that is where the Soviets think they can beat us, plan to beat us, and will beat us unless we get to work.

I said that we were now losing the cold war when we could be winning it--that our power as against that of the Communist bloc is in decline--in one field after another--military power, economic strength, scientific capability, political influence, and psychological impact.

The key issue of our time I said is this: Can a free society such as ours successfully organize itself to plan and carry out a national strategy for victory in the cold war?

My friends, in the year since that lecture nothing has happened to alter my estimate of our national situation.

Our own power, as against that of the Soviet Union, is still going

downhill.

The results of a continuation of this process are becoming clearer and clearer.

First, Soviet foreign policy is becoming bolder, more adventuresome, and more difficult to deal with. And Khrushchev and company will have more power, of every kind, for carrying out their plans in the years ahead unless we act to reverse the trend.

Second, our allies will become less and less willing to stand up to Communist pressure. There are some signs that this is already happening. They will be more and more tempted to make unwise concessions and deals.

Third, Soviet success will strongly influence the in-between nations and the backward peoples. Success exerts a powerful, attractive force. We politicians find that out at election time. At the same time, underdeveloped countries will increasingly be subject to Communist penetration through aid and trade.

Fourth, we shall be compelled to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of increasing weakness. President Eisenhower may not think the lags in missiles and space will affect his decisions at the forthcoming summit meeting. But Mr. Khrushchev, our allies, and the rest of the world are well aware of the impairment of our bargaining power.

Fifth, the cumulative effect of growing Communist power and weakening American power will mean a cumulative decline in our ability to influence events.

As a nation, we have still not begun to grasp the magnitude of our peril. Some spectacular Soviet advance, like the first Sputnik, occasionally jolts us. But that which was plain and clear in the hour of shock is soon forgotten. Our government officials issue elaborate apologies, proving that two and two did not really equal four after all.

My friends, what can we do about all this? Fundamentally, it would seem that the question is this: Can a free society generate and sustain the great national endeavor required to outperform tyranny? This indeed is the crucial question.

I believe we can. But to do it we shall have to fulfill some tough conditions.

We must understand, first of all, that the cold war is a contest-for-keeps, the outcome of which will be victory or defeat for the free way of life.

Second, we must understand that Soviet expansion will not be checked by military deterrents alone. We are making our big investment in defense in order to buy time to carry out a positive program for building a peaceful world. Assuming enough defense, our success or failure in the cold war will be the determining factor. The unfortunate aspect of the defense debate is that we have to have it at all. We should have what we need so that we could concentrate our attention on fighting the cold war.

The Kremlin knows that an aroused democracy, using its talents and resources to the full, would provide the toughest kind of competition. So

the Soviet strategy is designed to make sure that our free society is not putting its best into the struggle. In this race between the tortoise and the hare, it is the Russian rabbit that is wide awake and running while our American turtle is sleepy and over confident.

In the third place, we must have a national strategy for survival in freedom. No struggle, whatever its nature, can be won without a strategy for winning. Yet our leaders do not seem to know, and the people certainly do not know, what we intend to do or how we intend to do it. We don't know what is required of us--what is worse, we are told that we are doing enough.

It is far more difficult to sustain the long-drawn-out effort of a cold war than to perform the dramatic duties of a shooting war. All the more essential, therefore, is the development of a clear and convincing plan of action.

Fourth, we must bring up to date our organization for making and executing national strategy.

In my talk here last year I proposed that the Senate conduct a full-scale study of this problem. Shortly thereafter, in July, the Senate authorized the first such Congressional review of government methods for formulating and executing national policy in the cold war.

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, of which I have the honor to be Chairman, was directed to make a comprehensive study and to submit such proposals for reform as may be appropriate. Before the

Subcommittee began its task, the President gave me his assurance of cooperation, and the work is now being carried forward in a non-partisan spirit. The members of the Subcommittee have the common ambition of proposing constructive reforms which may be useful to the Democrat or Republican who becomes our next President in January.

Perhaps of decisive importance in the cold war is the wise determination of national security requirements and of the economic capabilities of our Nation to meet them. In the last 15 years a quantum jump has occurred in the demands which national security places upon the economy.

The list of urgent claims on our resources grows ever longer.

The problem is two-fold: to allocate a given quantity of resources wisely among competing programs, and to provide additional resources when and where they are truly needed.

The resource-allocating mechanism is the budget, which lies at the heart of national security planning and programming. Policies without dollars to back them up are nothing but a gleam in the NSC eye. Only when dollars become available does the gleam become something with a sting.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the budgetary process is one of the topics under study by our Subcommittee, and that we consider it of central importance. I want to direct my remaining remarks this morning to this area.

I have come to the conclusion that our present budgetary process is

archaic and dangerous; it neither assures the efficient allocation of what we spend nor meets the needs of survival in a dangerous world.

Above all, the budget as it is now, and as it has long been prepared, is not a persuasive document--and you need to be persuasive when you are asking for \$80 billion in taxes each year.

The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1960--usually called the FY 1961 Budget--is a forbidding document running 940 pages. It is about the size and shape of a big-city telephone directory, but, whereas a telephone directory provides the information you want, the budget seldom does. It is of almost no help in presenting a picture of our national goals and how we propose to achieve them. It does not reveal how shifts of policy are reflected in expenditures. It gives one very little confidence that more important items are being given priority over less important ones. It is written in a jargon that defies understanding.

In 1921 the Federal Government spent less than \$4 billion, which amounted to 5 percent of the gross national product. In the coming fiscal year the President has called for expenditures totaling almost \$80 billion, a sum representing approximately one-sixth of the GNP. It should not be surprising that procedures adequate for 1921 are obsolete today. Despite the reforms of 1949 and 1950, which were designed to make the budget more understandable by relating expenditures to the goals they were supposed to achieve, the budget remains a mystery to most people, including the Congress, the public, and even, I often suspect, its authors.

One of our foremost authorities on the federal budget, Dr. Arthur Smithies, who was formerly an official of the Bureau of the Budget, has written:

"... The Executive Budget, especially the defense budget, is not yet presented in a form that permits the Congress to make an intelligent appraisal of its program content."

As a member of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate who has earnestly tried to comprehend the defense budget, I can unhappily confirm Dr. Smithies' view.

In this as in so many other matters it is far easier, of course, to criticise than to suggest practical and constructive measures of reform. For this reason the Subcommittee expects to obtain^{help} from a committee of distinguished and experienced private citizens who are sufficiently concerned about the problem to be willing to devote their time and energies to a study to produce workable proposals for improvement.

Meanwhile, on the basis of the Subcommittee's work to date, certain areas of improvement almost suggest themselves. Let me relate some of them.

First, there is need for reform of the defense budget.

The section of the 1961 budget dealing with the Department of Defense occupies about 140 pages. The dry and complicated pages of data largely determine the degree of our preparedness. It is in these pages that the policy statements of the National Security Council are or are not translated

into action programs.

The chief fault of the defense budget is its failure to relate proposed expenditures to defense policies in a way which would enable Congress and the public to evaluate the adequacy or the inadequacy of the defense program.

In his revealing and greatly disturbing book, The Uncertain Trumpet, former Army Chief of Staff, General Taylor, writes: "It is no exaggeration to say that nobody knows what we are actually buying with any specific budget."

General Taylor is right. The present Budget throws almost no light on the readiness of the Armed Forces to perform their roles and missions. Suppose, for example, you are concerned about the balance between conventional and unconventional forces--surely one of the most momentous questions facing the United States. The President's last budget message has only this to say:

"Strategy and tactics of the United States military forces are now undergoing one of the trestest transitions in history. The change of emphasis from conventional-type to missile-type warfare must be made with care, mindful that the one type of warfare cannot be safely neglected in favor of the other. Our military forces must be capable of contending successfully with any contingency which may be forced upon us, from limited emergencies to all-out nuclear general war."

That is the extent of the discussion, if discussion is the right word. The

statement leaves us completely in the dark. It provides no guidance to anyone who wishes to know what shifts in military spending are called for in coping with "one of the greatest transitions in history."

Serious consideration must be given, I believe, to a truly functional defense budget, with budgeting being done not by services but by functions-- such as atomic deterrence, limited or brush-fire warfare, continental air defense, air-sea defense, and so on.

Such a defense budget would clearly reveal shifts of emphasis corresponding to changes in the military contingencies we face. If this were supplemented by a detailed explanation by the President of why the shifts are necessary, Congress and the public would have a sound basis, which they do not now have, for evaluating the defense program. Without such a statement by the President, Congress must act largely in the dark in playing its constitutional role, namely, to bring its judgment to bear on the problem of the common defense.

Second, there is need to relate more closely the national security planning process and the budget process so that the budget will reflect the basic strategic decisions.

As things now work, the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not play the role one would expect them to play in this budgetary process. One would suppose that this process would begin with a consideration by the NSC, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the basic policy choices. Once the President had determined, in light of this

consideration, what shifts in emphasis were necessary, budgetary guidelines could be prepared for use in budget planning.

At present, however, the budgetary process and the national security planning process follow different paths and involve, to some extent, different people. All too often, it appears, strategy now follows the budget.

Third, there is room for reform in the way budgetary goals are established and used.

For example, there is considerable evidence that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget have excessive influence in setting the budgetary ceiling for national security programs in comparison with those who speak for the country's needs.

In recent testimony before our Subcommittee, former Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, spoke of "the importance of having the budgetary goals determined from the outset by a great concern for a system of priority of national need and not have them too greatly influenced by the officials of the Bureau of the Budget itself." I certainly heartily endorse this point of view.

The Department heads having key responsibilities for national security--namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense--certainly should participate fully in the initial establishment of budgetary goals for national security programs. Yet this is not now the case.

It may be that the NSC, including the Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense, should

be used to advise the President on the initial budget goal.

No budget goal, of course, should be rigid. On the contrary, it should be a guideline for planning. Adjustments in the goals should be made when circumstances so require.

It may be that the NSC should be used also to advise the President on the need to adjust the overall budget goal in light of requests for increases by individual departments. It would probably be wise to include the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the group in order to obtain his expert advice on the effect of the country's economic growth on our ability to support proposed expenditures.

Fourth, it is extremely important to find some way to shorten the budget cycle.

As things now stand, an officer responsible for preparing a particular program budget must begin his work at least two years ahead of the fiscal year for which he is budgeting--in mid-1958, for example, in the case of the fiscal year 1961 budget. Yet, in mid-1958 he does not yet know whether he will be permitted to use fiscal year 1959 funds as he thinks best, and he also does not know what his budget for fiscal year 1960 will be.

With the pace of change constantly accelerating, especially in defense matters, the assumptions on which he bases his planning in 1958 for a period two to three years ahead may become obsolete. One result is that the actual allotment of dollars to particular spending programs does not take place in accordance with the budget estimates but with a separate

budget process known as the "funding program." I am sure you are all familiar with that.

According to Dr. Smithies, "The connection between a budget estimate and the dollars actually received may be so slight as to be of little consequence." In effect, therefore, the time-consuming, costly process of preparing the budget in the Executive Branch and of considering it in the Congress is somewhat academic.

I am well aware that the institution of reforms in this area would require some adjustments by Congress, for the procedures now employed reflect to some extent demands by members of Congress for budgets prepared in the old familiar way inherited from the past.

Fifth, ways must be found to permit the appropriation of funds for more than one year at a time in cases where intelligent and economical planning require it.

In his testimony before our Subcommittee, Mr. Lovett spoke eloquently of the inadequacies of our annual or one-year budget system:

"One of the most painful things that the Executive goes through in the government departments is the change of program while you are right in the middle of it. . . . So I would say we need some form of budgeting for a period certainly half of the period of gestation of any new weapon, which used to be in the order of five, six or seven years, but five years on the low side. That would mean, say two to three years of funding for some experimental and research purpose."

Those of us who have worked closely with men in charge of research and development programs know how warmly they applaud Mr. Lovett's point of view. Their major criticisms are often directed less to the size of their appropriations than to a budgetary system which makes it impossible to plan ahead with confidence more than a year at a time and which makes it necessary for them to spend endless amounts of time on the red-tape aspects of their jobs.

We should be adaptable enough to arrange budgeting for several years in cases--and they are not limited to research and development programs--where the present one-year budget system is clearly detrimental to effective policy.

Sixth, there is an urgent need to clarify the relation of the budget to the Nation's future economic growth.

At present, neither in the budget document nor in any other published document are present and future spending related to present and future economic capabilities of this Nation.

In this unfortunate, even perilous, situation, I have suggested that the President might submit to Congress either a new kind of budget document or a major new annual report which might be called the President's Requirements and Resources Report. The purpose would be to provide Congress and the public with an explanation by the President of our strategy, of the relation between our needs and our economic abilities to meet them, and of policies to assure that the resources needed for survival will be

available. Although this step might be taken by the President on his own initiative, it is possible that legislation indicating the desire of Congress for such a report might be desirable.

However it may be met, the principal need is for a budget which will help to develop informed discussion and debate about national security policy and related policies in Congress and the public. We face a long-drawn-out contest with the Soviet Union, a contest of a kind that puts unusually difficult strains on a democratic society. If Congress and the public are to support over the long haul the expenditures necessary for survival, it is essential that we achieve the understanding of our problems which emerges from informed discussion and debate. Our present budget does not meet this crucial test. It is for this reason that reform of our budgetary processes and documents may be a key to national security.

In closing, let me say simply this:

If we had all the time in the world to work things out, a complacent, government-as-usual approach might see us through. But we don't have time and it can't be bought, not even with lives.

We are blessed with ample resources--human and material.

Behind us is the most potent idea in history--the idea of freedom.

Overall, the power of the nations allied with us still tips the scales against the power and resources of the Communist world. The means to survive and build a better world lie at hand. But we are barely using them. We have tied our hands behind our backs before stepping into the ring.

Granted, this is a contest to strain our abilities to the limit. But surely this is a worthy test of our national quality. A better and a stronger America can emerge from this straggle.

If we really believe in the cause of freedom, let us proclaim it, live it, and protect it--for humanity's future depends upon it.

COLONEL REID: Senator Jackson has asked me to tell you that you don't necessarily need to limit your questions to today's subject. If you want to cover the field, he will be willing.

QUESTION: Sir, with regard to your investigations into the operations of the National Security Council, I wonder if you will discuss with us what you have found to date as to decision-making and as to the operations of carrying out the strategies that may have been formulated by the National Security Council, and just how they reflect what our goals should be.

SENATOR JACKSON: First I want to say that our undertaking is a study and not an investigation. There are those who may dissent from that point of view. In connection with the National Security Council, as I mentioned in my remarks, I had an exchange of letters with the President. We agreed that all testimony in connection with the NSC would be taken in executive sessions. Second, we agreed that we would not get into any substantive matter in connection with the NSC.

Now, I can best give my comments in general on this problem by

referring you to the testimony of Mr. Robert Lovett, a former Secretary of Defense. He testified on this specific subject in executive session. One of the main points that he made was that the NSC should be a very small body of just the top cabinet and advisers to the President.

What has happened is that the NSC has been growing by leaps and bounds. The result in general has been that you lose that intimacy and free and frank discussion that comes with a small, limited group of top advisers to the President.

The tendency has been in the NSC in recent years to do two things: One is to turn out a paper on every subject. The paper in most instances, so we are informed unofficially, represents sort of mish-mash. There are no real sharp and hard alternatives presented to the President. Compromise has become a key guideline in working out these papers.

I think, therefore, that it is important that the size of the Council be limited in its participation. Second, matters that come before the Council should be presented with sharp edges, so that the President can make decisions based on sharp alternatives presented to him. They should be thoroughly debated. Then the President can discharge his constitutional duties.

I think the tendency is that there are people around the NSC who like to think that their job is to take the load off the President. I don't think this is the function of the NSC. It is not achieved by bringing to him papers that are completely compromised, papers that represent the

performance of his constitutional duties by other people. The President is never too busy to pass on the crucial questions that must be presented to him.

The last point has been answered by my last comment. I think we ought to keep out all these endless problems and limit the presentation before the NSC to the critical and crucial questions.

QUESTION: Sir, while not disputing the need for organizational rearrangements, one point of view has been that the most crucial problem facing the Government is the division of the executive and the legislative parts of the Government between the two parties. In other words, I have heard it said by responsible people that this division is probably more crucial than any element that could be reorganized. The Democrats have the Congress and the executives have the Presidency now, and it is this sort of division. If it continues, it will be much more serious than any needed change in organization within the Government. Could you comment on that?

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, I don't know. A lot of people said, you know, that this defense debate is wrecking the country, and the defense debate has become too partisan. I think there has been at times too much partisanship in the defense debate. I have always felt that the best politics in the world, when you are talking about defense, is to be nonpartisan.

The four witnesses that we called before our committee could hardly be accused of being partisan. I called four leading Republicans. They

are men that are unassailable, aren't they? They are Robert Lovett, Robert Sprague of the Gaither Committee, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Boston, Dr. Finney Baxter, Head of Williams College, and Thomas Watson, Jr., President of IBM. They are not radical New Dealers, you understand.

If you read their testimony, I think you could say that this division of government has been a healthy thing in getting the right kind of debate to get at the truth. This is really the value of a free society. This is what we set up as opposed to a totalitarian setup, where you don't have an opportunity to have free discussion with good ideas and bad ideas coming to the common market place of ideas. In the end, you know, the good ideas win out over the bad.

Now, let's examine your question specifically. Some of us have been laboring for several years to suggest that one of the key problems that we need to face up to is to have a deterrent force that is survivable. It's very simple. We get statements that SAC is an awesome force. I agree. But it's not so awesome if you assume that the enemy strikes first in a surprise attack. Therefore, some of us have suggested that we need to plow more money into survivable retaliatory strategic missile systems. We don't need just more missiles. What good does that do, if they can be destroyed. The enemy is turning them out, and he has the advantage of striking first.

I note with interest that, as a result of this debate, the President

has agreed that certain changes should be made. I would say that there is a fine result of what could come from a constructive defense debate. Isn't the national survival the most important thing facing this country? Shouldn't we debate, as long as we have a free society, how we do it? Isn't it good to have a little competition between the Executive and the Legislative? It hasn't been so long, when Roosevelt was in office, that the feeling was that the Legislative Branch had disappeared. Now I think there may be a feeling that Congressional elections are bad because they are going Democrat. No offense. I merely make the point.

Well, I shouldn't have talked so long in response to your question. I merely want to say: One, as long as you have the kind of debate that results in constructive criticism in defense, it's good. When it degenerates into petty partisanship on either side, it's bad. I think the American public has a way of discriminating. I would say that, by and large, the defense debate has been good.

QUESTION: Senator, one of the things that worry us here is the indifference or lack of awareness of the American people as a whole to the great danger they are in--the fact that the penalty for losing the cold war in the end will be just about the same as losing a hot war. I wonder if you could give us an appraisal of how many members of the Congress of the United States are as aware as you are of this danger.

SENATOR JACKSON: That's a tough question to answer. Certainly the members who are on the key committees--Foreign Relations, Armed

Services, Atomic Energy, Space, and the Appropriations Subcommittees dealing with defense--are aware. Others on those committees are more aware than some other members because they might be--you know--very much interested in this problem.

This is one of the really difficult things that we have in a free society, namely, how you sustain public interest in this problem over a long period of years. As I mentioned in my remarks, the Soviets are counting on our inability to sustain this long-term unusual type of conflict, called the cold war.

Mao Tse-tung has made reference to this problem by referring to it, I believe, as a doctrine of the protracted conflict. This is a doctrine under which, over a long period of time, the stronger powers get weaker and the weaker powers get stronger, because strong, free societies that are both rich and a bit slaphappy have a tendency to avoid the real problem that is presented.

I can't give you any specific answer other than to say that the encouragement of public discussion and debate, led by a strong President, is absolutely indispensable. There is no one simple solution to the problem. It must start in our schools. It must be the kind of tradition that the British, I think, developed in the 19th century. I alluded to that example in my remarks to the National War College last April, a year ago. In England, young men and women growing up in the country understood what was required of them to maintain the Empire. They understood that free trade

was indispensable to the maintenance of the island kingdom.

There is no one simple answer to the problem.

QUESTION: Senator Jackson, I interpret your comments to mean that we do not have a strategy for survival and freedom. I think you will agree with me that the main theme of our current national policy is a sort of twin feature--containment and deterrence. Essentially, I believe this is negative. Is it possible that one of the reasons why we need a national strategy for survival and do not have one is the fact that we cannot base a cold war effort on a negative policy and that we need something positive as a basis for motivation?

SENATOR JACKSON: Our strategy, when we do get a long-range strategy, should be a positive one. It seems to me that one should ask one's self this question: How does one conduct one's self in this world of ours when you are 8 percent of the world's population and you are one of 8 rich people in this world community?

I think, therefore, that what we need to do is to do those things as though the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese government did not exist. I think we should do these things for other countries--share our resources to the extent feasible--as though the Soviets were not around.

One has to be a little subtle about this. We have the tendency, you know, to announce that we are moving in this area or that area because of the Communist threat. This is not very smart. Too much of our effort in the various fields of endeavor are predicated on that assumption.

I therefore agree that our program should be positive. We should at all times keep in mind: How does a rich man living in a poor community conduct himself? I think that we need to be humble. I think we have to insist that we have no right to expect that other people be made over in our image. I don't think we can go around throwing our weight this way and that way. Humility should be the hallmark of our approach, and we should insist on only one thing. That is that we ask of other countries that they be just as free and independent of us as they are of Moscow.

When I was out in Laos back in the fall of 1955 when those Haffit Lao forces were operating, I went in with our Ambassador to talk to the Defense Minister. I thought it might be wise to be just open and frank with him, and I made this comment. I said, "Don't get any illusions that we are giving you aid just to give it." I said, "Actually, all we want is for you to build up your country so that you can be strong and hard and tough. We want you to be free and independent. We would like for you to be a hard neutral and not a soft neutral." I said, "It is in our national interest for you to be independent and free, just as free of us as you would be of the Chinese Communists or the Soviets. If the rest of the world is made up of free and independent states, we can live in this world community without fear."

QUESTION: Senator, I wonder if you could give us your opinion on the effectiveness of that part of our Foreign Aid Program which is devoted to the underdeveloped and uncommitted countries.

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, I frankly don't have much information based on personal knowledge. I feel in general from what I have read-- I have seen a little bit of it--that it is the most important program of all. I feel that it is a wise approach to the problem in underdeveloped countries. I think one of the biggest problems we face in trying to aid underdeveloped countries is the effort sometimes on the part of local leaders, and on the part of our own people, to move too fast. More often than not the first thing some of these leaders want is an atomic reactor, even though they don't have a soul in the country who can run it. More often than not they want a lot of dams in their country, even though they have not built up the industry and the technology to receive that power and to use it.

Therefore, I think that our approach in connection with technical aid is wise, where we can restrain the local leaders from moving too fast and to do one thing at a time. I think it is important that we don't upset their culture, and that we move slowly. It gets back to my point. I said a moment ago that we have no right to expect that they be made over in our image. I think there is a tendency on the part of Americans to go too fast. We are eager beavers and want to solve the problem immediately.

About 3 or 4 years ago, during a campaign--I wasn't running, but I was making a few nonpartisan Democratic speeches--I was away out in the sticks, and I was talking about the Russian threat and so on. This fellow got me after the meeting and he said, "Senator, you've been talking

about this problem for so long that I want you, when you go back in January, to introduce a resolution to end the Russian problem.

I think we are such eager beavers at times that we don't want to take the slow approach to these things, the gradual approach. We want to move into a country, solve the problem, and get out. Nothing works that way. In general I think the Technical Aid Program is excellent. It affords an opportunity for our people to work very closely with local citizens. It has been a most successful program, and I am all in favor of pushing it wherever it is feasible.

QUESTION: Senator, you mentioned the possibility of getting a distinguished group of civilians to advise the group. I am reminded of the fact that we have had two Hoover Commissions that looked into this area generally and a Cooper Committee which advised the Secretary of Defense on things he could do to improve the overall approach, including budgeting.

The difficulty appears to be, however, that these fine recommendations must be implemented by a bureaucracy--the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense. Inevitably we appear to run into foot-dragging, adding complexities to the point that when it reaches the man at the bottom of the totem pole the thing has been completely torn apart from the original concept laid down. How do you propose to overcome this mixed bureaucracy strength?

SENATOR JACKSON: Let me amplify my comments in my remarks in chief here this morning. We are trying to divide our study this year into

two areas--the discussions that will be less provocative of partisan debate prior to the election. That is why very shortly we are going into the problem of science and technology in relation to world power. The other side of the problem--we must be honest about it--will be provocative of partisan debate. I am referring specifically to the budget problem, the question whether we are capable of carrying a heavier defense load, for example.

Therefore, what we are trying to do in connection with that phase of our study is to obtain the advice and counsel of men from the business community who are conservative and who have had association and experience with large corporations--investment bankers. By the way, I am all for investment bankers over industrial operators. Investment bankers have to have imagination. Men like Robert Lovett make great Secretaries of Defense, because they can see the whole problem and they are not afraid of big challenges.

We want to get these people together to help us and to advise us and assist us. In this way we will come up, first of all, with, I think, sound, sane, sensible, and therefore feasible solutions which can be supported in the Congress. I am not suggesting for one moment that what we have in mind will simply involve revisions of internal policy in the Executive Branch. I think it is inevitable that we come up with some statutory revisions which the Congress must make.

Therefore, we want our recommendations to be supported and corroborated by witnesses that are unimpeachable. This is not another Hoover

Commission deal. The Hoover Commission never got into this confined area. They were dealing with the whole apparatus of the budget process. We are now engaged in survival. If we are going to survive we have to lick this problem. You folks can be down here working on strategy and the Joint Chiefs can work on strategy, and NSC can work on strategy. But, brother, unless you can implement it, you might as well forget about it.

That's why I thought today we should talk about this central problem. Without a decision in this area we are through. I mean, we are really not getting into what the Hoover Commission tried to do. They covered the machinery and they tried to do an effective job without the emphasis being placed on the relationship between the budget and ultimate decisions bearing on national strategy for survival.

QUESTION: Sir, there has been a lot of discussion in the press of the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get together, so that they have to go a step higher to get decisions made. There has also been talk of a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Would you give us your views on such a setup?

SENATOR JACKSON: I haven't come to any final view on the subject. I am convinced, as we get into our study--and up to now, at least, I feel I can see it coming--that, unless we solve the Pentagon problem we can't solve the problem of our study. That is: Can a free society such as ours so organize itself as to be able to outplan, outperform, and outthink

a totalitarian society? I am completely convinced that there is going to have to be a radical shakeup in the whole approach to working out a defense budget that will fit in with our national strategy. I am therefore reserving judgment on the subject. I am convinced, however, that the approach of each individual service in coming up with requirements to meet, we'll say, an overall strategy will not work.

I can give you example after example of it. The service is going to look after its own immediate situation. It is not going to look at that overall proposition up on the blackboard that they are all supposed to support. Well, I had an example the other day--Bomarc, being shifted around. I didn't get up and scream like I customarily do. Fifteen thousand people are affected in my state. But I can assure you that, when the people who testified before our Subcommittee on military construction, under oath, said that we couldn't go below 16 bases--they have cut them from 32 to 16-- I'll want a lot of explaining. I want explaining, not on the basis of any politics. I want to really understand how they arrived at this conclusion.

I am sure of one thing, that General Kuter, who has the overall operational responsibility at NORAD, was not consulted. I know he is not consulted in making up the budget, even though he has the operational responsibility. I say that's one fine way to run a railroad.

This goes on all the time. You know why the decision was made. It was made because the Bureau of the Budget gave guidelines to what the Air Force could spend. The Air Force decided that the only way they

could get more money for the building up of their ICBM effort was to take it away from something in the department. They are told, "If you want to shift around, fine. This is all you get." This is even though the strategy supposedly requires more.

Well, I say that system is not going to work. It is not working. The same thing can be cited in connection with the Navy's Polaris. It has to compete, even though it is a wonderful strategic weapon system. I was out over the weekend on The George Washington, up at Groton. Here's a wonderful survivable deterrent. Yet it has to compete with aircraft carriers; it's got to compete with airstrips; it's got to compete with everything. Why? Because Chief of Naval Operations has a day-to-day responsibility to maintain his forces in being to deal with a situation such as we had in Lebanon, in the Taiwan Straits, and so on.

The result is that, here is a wonderful strategic deterrent force that could survive. It was neglected prior to Sputnik because it had to compete with everything under the sun. So they are going to get some more long lead items--how? Well, certainly not by solving the ASW problem, because they are told they've got to pull out two attack submarines. You Navy experts know that the best way to get a submarine--one of the best ways--is to get another, nuclear-powered, submarine. It's a pretty good weapon system once you have identified the target. That's a minor problem. I mean it's detection and identification. Excuse me.

QUESTION: Senator, you directed most of your remarks toward the

budget. While we might have a perfect budget and while Congress might appropriate all the money asked for in the budgets, unless something is done about this apportionment process, the Congress will never know that the money is going to get where it wants it to get. Does your study include a revision of the apportionment process?

SENATOR JACKSON: In my remarks I tried to hit that pretty hard-- the funding or apportionment process. I think this whole business is ridiculous. We do have constitutional problems. I want to make that clear. We who appropriate and are responsible for getting the money are not sure when, where, or if it will ever be used, or how it's going to be used. The President, under the Constitution, has the full authority to withhold funds. I hope that by January we will be able to make some suggestions to the new President in this budget area by high-class people that I referred to earlier here in my comments, that will convince him of the need to make changes. I think the present system is absolutely impossible.

Can I give you an example, not just of apportionment, but of the delay, the lag time. I remember back in 1955--I was interested in this nuclear sub program a long time ago--I had a problem with the Navy. They had prepared their budget for submarines almost two years prior to 1955-- the usual cycle problem. Here they were in for six conventional subs, still pushing them, even though the Nautilus had made its successful trial. They were decent enough to admit, of course, that the budget had been

prepared without regard to what had happened in regard to Nautilus.

Here they were going along on this treadmill without any real, thorough reflection on what was happening. Those who were following this program were able to get the Chief of Naval Operations up there, and he revised his budget to include nuclear-powered submarines.

I was checking over the weekend and found that all the nuclear-powered submarines that we've got are now in operation, and they are still working on the conventional subs. They are not ready yet.

You see the lag? This goes on. It's impossible. Then, why should the Executive Branch of the Government responsible for a given program, after having presented to the Congress, we'll say, in June serious requirements for a given weapon system, and having said, "We must push forward right away on this. May we give it the money?" then have to go back and start all over again and get the money for it? They have a long-drawn-out battle trying to get the money, when we are told when they come up and testify that this is urgent and they need it right away. When we come back six months later they haven't even received the funds.

Well, now, you know, there's another way of doing this, surely.

I agree with you, as you can probably gather.

QUESTION: Sir, a representative of a foreign government recently told us that the nations in Southeast Asia would rather deal with the United States, but that, whereas they might negotiate a loan with the Russians in a week, it sometimes took 3 or 4 years to deal with us. While I agree

with you that we have eager beavers, I don't think the machinery of government as it regards coordination, budget process, or the Congressional portion of the budget process could ever be described as jackrabbitty.

SENATOR JACKSON: I didn't mean to infer that the eager beavers were in the Bureau of the Budget.

STUDENT: How specifically in foreign aid could we become more timely in dealing with packages, and in fact become competitive with the Communists in this area?

SENATOR JACKSON: You've raised a question that presents another speech. First, let's face it--we need to get better people in the Government. That's one thing. I mean, there is no substitute for good people. This is one of the areas that we are going to get into, and we are now into it. Our hearings will touch that subject before long. When you have good people you can decentralize a lot of your authority. One of the real problems of decentralization is to make sure that the person who is going to be responsible, who is going to be given this authority, is a capable individual.

I think the question you have posed applies equally to the development of crucial weapon systems. I believe that, for example, if you want to develop a good weapon system, you ought to put a good man in charge and give him full authority and make him fully responsible--avoid all this business of having to go through 101 committees and go through a bunch of assistant secretaries in the Pentagon who have been there for 18

months and the first 12 months have been spent in briefing them on what their job is, and who then come up on the Hill and testify as experts. I am more worried about a civilian general staff than I am about a military one.

So in this area that you mentioned, I think I agree that we are losing some wonderful opportunities to act decisively. As to the question you posed, I saw it happen. I came out of the Soviet Union in September of 1956 by way of Tashkent, Smarkand, and Termez, and then came into Kabul, in Afghanistan. We wandered around there. The Afghans wanted the streets of Kabul paved. They wanted a granary and a little oil refinery. The "papa-knows-best" approach applied in large part. We did out there what we have done in our area of the country very successfully, built a lot of dams. But we flooded out a lot of people and made them mad. And all they wanted was the expenditure of about \$3 million. We couldn't agree. We knew what was best. Debating was going on. In the meantime, the Russians came in for a weekend and agreed to pave the streets and put in the oil refinery. They've got the thing all lit up so that they can all see it. And they built the granary. Then, of course, they did the next step. They made a military-aid agreement, so that they are getting into the army pretty well. They are doing pretty well in Afghanistan, thanks to our indecision.

This is one of the real weaknesses in our foreign aid program. I submit that we are going to have to get good people, and we are going to

have to delegate responsibility so that they can make decisions based on well-thought-out and well-reasoned positions.

QUESTION: Sir, I would like to refer back to the statement you made in the early part of your talk. You said that you mentioned last year that we were losing the cold war and that you have no reason to change your mind today. Many people who have spoken here before have said that the nation-state today cannot survive by itself under modern terms. I am thinking, then, of Western Europe. If we look back 10 years we can conclude that maybe we haven't lost the cold war in that area. I was wondering, since that particular area is significant militarily, economically, and politically, if you care to comment on their part with regard to winning or losing the cold war.

SENATOR JACKSON: You mean, how can they aid in our effort to help other countries worldwide?

STUDENT: Yes, sir. You talked mostly about the United States and agreed that there are a lot of things we can do, but I think we have rather ignored the fact that there is a very powerful potential there.

SENATOR JACKSON: I agree with you. I am one who has thought very strongly about the importance of our close association with Western Europe. I sponsored back in 1956, prior to Sputnik, a program of fellowships in the area of science and technology within the NATO organization,

as part of our NATO effort. I feel that here we have the industrial heart of the world, along with our own great industrial combine. I believe that, by working closer together and in concert one with the other, we can do much to help the underdeveloped areas of the world.

I certainly agree with the President's position that many of the countries in Western Europe can now make a meaningful contribution. This is particularly true of Western Germany. They are getting on their feet. I talked with some people who came back just recently from there. There are indications that they really do want to help.

I think it is far more effective for the other free countries that are in a position to do so to do an increasing share of this job, and not leave it all to us. Otherwise, we are suspect. If other countries, working together, participate, it is far more effective. I feel that our progress in Western Europe, despite ups and downs, has been tremendous.

When you look around in other parts of the world and you see how fast the Soviets are moving and how fast the Chinese Communists are moving, and the deterioration that is now occurring in Africa and in other parts of the world as a whole, we are up against a pretty rough situation. It will require the best and the closest collaboration with our industrial allies within the North Atlantic Community.

COLONEL REID: Senator Jackson, on behalf of the Commandant, the faculty, and the class, we have been certainly very happy to have you sort of open up and tell us what your views are on various things, including,

of course, the subject which we asked you to speak on. We appreciate it very much.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Colonel Reid. I want to say that when I was coming down I discovered we were in a university together back during the depression. It has been a real pleasure to be here and to be with you. I sincerely mean what I said at the outset, that it is very helpful for me to come down here and to be interrogated by some very sharp, thoughtful, and responsible people. Thank you.

Property of the Library
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE
ARMED FORCES