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WELCOMING ADDRESS

Lieutenant General George W Mundy, USAF

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
WASHINGTON, D C

1960-1961

**WELCOMING ADDRESS**

**19 August 1960**

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**Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole**

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**INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES**

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## WELCOMING ADDRESS

19 August 1960

**GENERAL MUNDY:** On behalf of the Industrial College, we all extend to each of you a cordial welcome, a welcome to this course of instruction which I am sure that in your later life you are going to look back on as a highlight of your professional career. I say this whether you come to us from the military side of the family or the civilian side.

This Class of 1960 is the first class to start the new academic year in this building. This is not our first official use of the building, since the last class graduated in it, but it did so before the building was finished and without the benefit of air conditioning. We moved into the building only at the end of July or the first of August, and we are still in the process of accepting the building. So I think you will have to bear with us as we do this. We want to make sure that the contractors and the services make good on the guarantees that all the equipment and so forth will work properly.

As you can probably guess, this building is the culmination of a 10-year dream for the Industrial College. It is very closely associated in every alumnus's mind with the prestige and the morale of the College, and we are very happy to be here. In a way--and I don't say this to have it hang against you as a class--it is too bad that you didn't have a chance to serve in the old building, so that you could appreciate this one.

Your selection to come to this academic environment where you are free of all administrative responsibilities is, I think, a recognition of your capabilities and your professional competence. This is an assignment, however, that imposes a substantial cost on the Government and on the taxpayer. This cost is measured not only in terms of your salary while you are here as a student and the cost of building and operating and running this College, but also the cost that is involved in your loss from operational duties for the 10 months' period.

So you can see that attendance at ICAF is not only a privilege but a responsibility as well. It is a responsibility of taking advantage of this extraordinary opportunity that has been afforded you to come here. This is an opportunity that will enable you to enhance your capabilities to serve your country.

Speaking to the military members of the Class--since I worked with and for civilians, you will remember, so many years of my service-- I would like to point out that the civilians make a very distinct and unique contribution to our course. They do quite a bit to give us the breadth and depth that we want here. It has been my experience that civilian members of the Government are hardworking, intelligent people, and that devotion to duty, love of national conditions, fighting spirit, and fierce dedication to everything our country stands for are not attributes that are applicable exclusively to those of us who wear the uniform.

appreciation of the interrelationships and the interdependence of the military, the logistical, the political, the economic, the administrative, the scientific, and the social factors pertaining to national and international affairs.

This term, national security, as we use it here, pertains to the world that we are living in, to the threat of a hot war, and to the cold war, the economic war, that we are <sup>actually.</sup> fighting. In your Final Problem you as a class are charged with keeping the entire situation in mind and with making an assessment of the situation. But, to give you a specialized effort, keeping the whole threat in mind, a third of you will work on the General War Problem, the all-out war. First you will make an assessment as to whether our deterrent is adequate today and tomorrow, and then, making the assumption that it is not, you will decide whether our plan for withstanding an all-out bombing attack is adequate, and, if not, what should we do about it. A third of the Class will work in the Limited War Field, determining how adequate is our program to be sure that the limited-war capability is sufficient to keep it from going into general war and that we can prevail. Then a third of the Class will work on the Cold War, <sup>particularly</sup> the economic-war phase. It has been our experience that this is a very realistic and a very interesting Final Problem.

It has been said that we teach here the nonmilitary aspects of national security, and that these nonmilitary aspects, if war has evolved,

have become more important to the whole. I will agree with this if you define nonmilitary aspects as those things other than the employment of military forces directly. We study the military. The chiefs of all the services talk to us, and many of the specialized commanders, the unified commanders, talk to us. But, in a broad sense we do stress the nonmilitary aspects of national security. I think it has become increasingly clear to everyone that these aspects are becoming more important to the whole.

In this connection--and I am prompted to say this from the questionnaire that we put out to the students--this is a military college--there is no doubt about it. It is funded for and operates within the Department of Defense. Our immediate superior is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the purpose of this College is not to teach the employment of military forces. The purpose of the College is to recognize the need that military people have of broadening their scope, their horizons. Another purpose is so that the military can work more closely with the civilian agencies of the Government. This we try to do by bringing in civilian students from all agencies to where you can live and work together and where each of you teaches the other. So in one sense you might say it is a military college, but don't overlook what our mission is when you say it is a military college. We are not like any other military college because our mission is unique.

While our curriculum will be familiar to some of you, it will be for most of you an almost entirely new experience. For some it is going to be a period of frustration, bewilderment, and exasperation before you become accustomed to it. Let me explain to you why this is so.

Most of you have come to us from an assignment that is essentially operational in nature. There you had concrete problems to deal with, problems that demanded solutions and answers reasonably free from qualifications. There, such solutions and answers were usually possible. But here it is very often the case in some of our problems that you will be dealing with situations that are not amenable to this sort of treatment. These situations will contain more intangibles than tangibles, more variables than constants. You will study here often in fields where the abstract is more common than the concrete.

Some of you may encounter difficulties in trying to live with problems of this nature. Their very vagueness and their ambiguity may tend to discourage you. However, you should keep in mind that this state of affairs is inherent in some of the problems with which you will be working because the problems with which you will be working are at the top level of government.

Much of our course falls in the area of the social and behavioral sciences. These sciences, as you know, don't lend themselves to the precise methods of the physical sciences with which most of us are

familiar.

This is contrary to the heritage of most military people, at least. We are usually impatient with anything less than a complete solution. We like to plunge into a problem, tear it to pieces, fix it, and go on to something else. We are not conditioned to the notion of having to live for a long period of time with major problems that have only partial and incomplete answers. The extent to which this is done in high levels of government, at both the national and the international levels, may come as something of a surprise to you, depending on where you have worked, or it may not be a surprise to you.

What can you reasonably expect to accomplish in these 10 months that have been given to you? I'd like to suggest a few things to you. First, you've got an opportunity to widen your outlook, your horizon, and to gain the kind of perspective that is rarely possible under the pressure of daily duties. Second, you've got the opportunity to escape from the preconceptions, the prejudices, and the viewpoints associated with the necessarily limited scope of virtually all operating jobs. Third, you've got an opportunity to advance in knowledge and understanding of the many great and complex problems facing this Nation today and in the future and to see these problems not in the needs and interests of a particular service or agency but in the needs of the Government and the Nation as a whole.

To sum this up, here you will have the opportunity to broaden your intellectual horizon, to escape from the limitations of professional prejudices and interests, and to gain an understanding of the many difficult and complex problems facing this Nation today and in the years ahead.

I would like to put this even a little differently. The advantages of being here stem first from the joint nature of the College. We not only have four services here but we have operating types, combat types, and you might say logistical, staff, and technical, as well, within these four services. We also have civilians from many departments of government. You come to us at approximately the same age level and the same experience level and, in your 10 months of association here together, you will unconsciously use each other as a yardstick to measure your own individual progress to the group as a whole. You will also, during this 10 months, gain an insight and a knowledge of the other services which I don't think you would gain in many other assignments other than in such a joint institution as this.

It has been said that the desired degree of unification within the Department of Defense will rest on the graduates of the joint colleges. There are three, as you know--this one, the War College, and the Staff College.

Next, you have been provided 10 months of time free from heavy

pressure in numerous periods of crisis. There is no overtime here. There is no telephone ringing at 10 o'clock at night or 2:30 in the morning. The significance of this may not strike you at first, but sooner or later it will.

Most of you finished college and started to work immediately to make a living, and business circumstances since that time have bound you very closely to your job and to your service and party line. Some of you, in effect, have been wearing blinders, if past experience means anything. You will find it a little difficult at first to remove them. It will take you a little while to become a free-thinking student again, but the time that is afforded you here will let you do this, and your thinking will become far less restricted and pinched. Your horizons will undoubtedly be broadened by this academic opportunity that lies ahead of you. I might say that we in the faculty really enjoy seeing this when the Class comes in. It is a pleasure to see people take hold and develop. From the faculty viewpoint, we can see it. It is a real pleasure.

Lastly, still speaking of advantages, there is the content of the curriculum itself. This is a very broad and a very deep curriculum. It is a well-thought-out curriculum, in our opinion, because a lot of hard work has gone into it. We don't think it is perfect. We expect you to help us improve it. But we still think it is a very good curriculum.

So these are the advantages, I think, that you have in being here.

As far as the curriculum is concerned, I'll touch a little bit more on it later.

Now, why do we have an Industrial College of the Armed Forces? I am sure that this is a question that you might have raised with yourselves. Why does an institution such as this get support from the Department of Defense and the other agencies of the Government who send you here as students and who furnish lecturers, panel members, seminar leaders, and what not, as our program unfolds?

Well, we get a good part of the answer to this question by contributing still another question: What was the basis of the Allied superiority in World War II and in Korea? Was it the personal bravery, the fighting spirit, and the ability and leadership of our Armed Forces? Certainly it was, to a degree, because, if we hadn't had those things the outcome could have been completely different. But I don't think we won because we had these things and our enemy didn't possess them. Some of the factors that clearly put us head and shoulders above our enemy were the global concepts of the combined staffs--the world outlook--the relative priorities assigned to the widespread combat areas; the mature, farseeing wisdom of our planners that rose above the narrow, parochial viewpoints; our capacity for organizing and managing vast complexes of men, materials, and skill; and the ability to mobilize all these things in support not only of our own forces but those of our allies as well. In the opinion of these allies, and virtually in the opinion

give us a first-rank capability or some measure of protection in the event of a surprise nuclear attack. This in turn could affect any military policy that we have as a nation.

What new plans can we make? What can we afford? What can we expect to achieve politically? As you know, the situation has changed and it is still changing rapidly. If atomic war comes, there is no appreciable time, or no time at all, to mobilize resources either to defend ourselves or to counterattack. We are absolutely dependent on the forces in being. But, if this war doesn't come, the United States can't rest secure on our past position of productive, technical, and scientific superiority. This is so because the balance of power has been altered. It is gradually shifting from us.

The Soviet Bloc has improved in its capability tremendously. It is of vital concern to us to know where they will be 2 years from now, 5 years from now, 10 years, 20 years, or 40 years. Where will we be relative to their position?

The economy and the technical proficiency of the Soviet Union, as I just said, have been expanding and developing at a phenomenal rate during the same postwar years when we have been developing our economy. There are many people who no longer wonder whether the Soviets will equal us or surpass us--it is only when they will do it. In certain areas, as you well know, they have already overtaken us--for instance, in the boosts to get out into space. In the coming years, then, our relative

strength vis-a-vis our potential enemy may depend less and less on our technical and productive skill--and I am not belittling these at all--but more and more on our wisdom in understanding the essential nature of the threat; on understanding our own imperfections and how to correct or surmount them; and on our genius for organizing ourselves, our allies, friendly neutrals, and perhaps some of our enemies into a pattern of living that is acceptable and desirable both to them and to us. It is also dependent on our own ability to peer into the future and make estimates of the situation.

As I say, these aptitudes may be more important than our technical and productive superiority or our ability to outmaneuver our enemies politically, economically, or psychologically. The threat of the improving Soviet technology and production, the stirring of the Chinese giant, the emergence of the new independent nations in Asia and Africa, the growing responsibilities of the United States as the leader of the Free World, and the increasing interdependence of the Defense Establishment and the American economy have created conditions and problems that are unprecedented in military history.

Almost overnight the military services have found themselves engaged in economic, financial, technical, and scientific enterprises on a scale that was once beyond the wildest dreams of our most responsible planners.

The curriculum at ICAF covers this range of subjects. It is a broad

and a deep curriculum and it is unique. In my opinion there is no more important course offered in the Government or in any other place than the course that you are getting here. I say this whether you come to us as a staff officer, a technical officer, or a line officer, or a civilian.

In my experience in the Pentagon it seemed that the people over there needed to know the subjects that we teach here. In this connection during these past several years I have attended the Quantico Conferences down at Quantico--the Secretary of Defense Conferences. These conferences, as you know, are attended by the President, often, by the Vice President, the Cabinet Members, the Secretaries, and the Under Secretaries within the military establishment. From the very first I have been impressed with the way they conduct this conference and what they discuss there. Everything that has been discussed has been on our agenda, and very often the speaker there has been our speaker here.

This is true with one exception. In the last conference there they stated some aspects of disarmament from the military viewpoint, and I think this is good, so we are putting that into our course this year.

It must be obvious that these subjects and that method of presenting them to that group of people are important to them, and certainly they are important to you in the jobs you are expected to go to.

This cold-war threat presents a challenge of special significance

to an institution such as ICAF which is concerned with the economics of our national security. The economic implications of the cold war are many and varied, and are perhaps basic in a conflict of this nature. In other words, the economic phase of the cold war I think is the most important part of it. The existing bipolarity of the great powers in the political and military fields is in a large sense the result of this bipolar-economicity in the fields of economics and/philosophy. Economic sanctions and economic pressures will become important weapons in the East-West conflict. They are exercising a major influence in the shifting pattern of contemporary international politics.

In fact, there are many who believe that these, rather than military action, will be decisive in the ultimate resolution of the basic differences between the two power blocs.

Therefore, here at this College, and since it is our assigned mission by the Joint Chiefs, also, we put our main emphasis in our program on the economic, industrial, and related aspects of national security. I would like to emphasize that we don't do this out of context. To do so would be a very fatal mistake. I think you have to study the political, the social, the psychological, and the military along with the economic and the industrial aspects to get the right answer.

To put it a little differently and in the enemy's words, Khrushchev has stated--you have probably read this many times--that they will win

by an economic war; that they will bury us; that they see no necessity for fighting a hot war. There is some possibility that the Russians and the Red Chinese are at loggerheads on this. They have suggested that the ICBM isn't our greatest danger.

So this brings about a situation where, even if we are successful in deterring a hot war, we aren't without a danger. In saying this, don't think for a minute that I am belittling the need for having a military capability to deter war. I'm not. It's got to have priority, but concurrent with it we've got to be able to wage this cold war, this economic war, because the cold war and the hot war are equally dangerous and, if you think about it a minute, you will realize that the economy of this country is the keystone of our national policy.

Our country occupies the position of leadership in the Free World. We didn't want it, necessarily, but we've got to face up to the responsibility that this leadership entails. We've got a crucial role to play in the United Nations. I think that current events in Africa are illustrating this at the moment. These responsibilities are both economic and military, as well as political, and they weigh upon the services and agencies dedicated to national defense no less than upon those concerned with the conduct of our foreign affairs.

In today's world military isolation/<sup>ism</sup> has become for the United States as obsolete as the political isolationism was in the pre-World-War years.

**For the military and the civilian services this has brought about a revolution of educational preparation of those who are expected to go into higher assignments. This new requirement of national security demands of our senior officers and civilians in all services a very broad understanding of the world that we are living in.**

**The fact of the matter is that there is no longer any such thing as an economic solution, a political solution, or a military solution, and anyone who thinks there is is going to get a wrong answer. To treat these things as though they were independent entities is just making the worst mistake that you could make.**

**As senior officers and civilians after you graduate, you will one day have much to do with shaping the policies of this Nation and the decisions whose impact will be felt by millions of people. In the years to come your official acts could spell the difference between our survival and disaster for this Nation or for the Free World as we know it. This is why your Government has selected you to come to this school, and this is the goal for which you are being prepared.**

**Our experience with previous classes indicates that you have become fully aware of the real value of these studies only after you have left us and perhaps not until several years later. This shouldn't come as a surprise to you when you consider the breadth and depth of the course we offer here.**

**It is not our purpose in presenting this course to prepare you for**

the performance of a specific job anywhere. For example, we are not going to train you to be a base commander or a procurement officer or a military attache or an intelligence officer, or anything of the like. Our purpose is simply education in the broadest sense. We propose to provide you with a background of knowledge in the problems of national security, and we propose to sharpen and develop whatever creative, imaginative, and analytical qualities of mind that you may possess. We hope to prepare you psychologically and intellectually progressively to greater responsibilities.

I would like to repeat that we are not concerned with training. We are not a training school, though we are concerned with broad education for the long haul.

I think you will be pleased to hear this: In evaluating your work here at the College we don't give each student a grade in the ordinary sense of the term. We don't evaluate each student against each other, and we don't post lists periodically showing how you stand in any class. Our only official evaluation that we make of you while you are here is a descriptive characterization of such qualities as attitude, cooperation, and judgment as they relate to your general performance, interest, and work within the class itself. We believe that these are the qualities which it is most important to evaluate on a graduate-level academic institution such as ICAF.

In order to arrive at this evaluation, we strive to develop a very

close relationship between the students and the faculty. The faculty, at the end of each major unit of the course, will make an evaluation of your work in that course. At the end of the year an overall evaluation is made, and we submit it to your department or agency. This is a requirement on us.

I am sure that all of you realize that, if you put forth the necessary effort to get out of this course all that is possible for you to get, you will return to your department better equipped to turn in a superior performance of duty. I think you realize the importance of this to your service, to your country, and, for that matter, to mankind.

I dare say that while you realize all these things in the broadest degree you also speculate as to what effect this course is going to have on your own career, or, to put it a little bit more bluntly, as to just how it is going to affect your chances for promotion.

It has been my experience, based on my years in the service, that there is no pat, sure-fire, royal road to flag rank in the Navy, to general officer rank in the Marines, Army, or Air Force, or to a super grade in the civil service. The surest way to the top is still through competence and merit. It still lies in doing every job you tackle just a little bit better than anyone else and in having the wherewithal and the will to produce superior results.

But, because your status here will vastly increase your ability to realize your own potential, it can mean selection to flag rank. The mere fact that you graduate from this institution, or from any other institution,

as far as that goes, will neither add to nor detract from your chances of promotion. What you do with your opportunity here and after you leave will in the long term determine what happens to you.

I would like to assure you that your selection to come here is a compliment to you. It means that you are doing very well at this stage of the game and that you are considered a very likely prospect for promotion. But I would also like to assure you that being graduated and elected is not going to be enough in itself. It is what you do with what you get here after you leave that is really going to count.

In conclusion I'd like to commend to you the resolution to put into this effort your very best. Only in this way can you live up to your own highest ideals and justify the confidence that your superiors have reposed in you.

Thank you and let me again extend to you a most cordial welcome to the Industrial College.