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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE
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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Dr. Malcolm C. Moos

NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 13 October 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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26 August 1960

CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION--Rear Admiral G. Serpell Patrick, USN, Deputy Commandant, ICAF	1
SPEAKER--Dr. Malcolm C. Moos, Administrative Assistant to the President	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION	31

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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Mundy, Gentlemen: In our Foundations Unit we are examining all the elements that go to make up into the operation of our national economy.

Now, in examining the operation of our Federal Government, it is most important that you know and understand the Structure and the Functioning of the Executive Branch, which is our subject this afternoon.

Our speaker has been a consultant to the White House since 1957. He brings with him a wealth of experience in our field of interest. This includes his having been a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, an Associate Editor of the Baltimore Evening Sun, and many other prominent positions, as well as as being the author of many books on American government and American politics.

It is certainly my pleasure this afternoon to introduce Dr. Malcolm C. Moos, the Administrative Assistant to the President of the United States in this, his first appearance at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Dr. Moos.

DR. MOOS: Thank you, Admiral Patrick. General Mundy, General Houseman, Members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces: I am going to talk primarily this afternoon about the Office of the Presidency, the Executive, and perhaps take a peek at a few of the ramifications of the interrelations of this great office with different arms

of the Federal Government.

Before starting, however, I must say that I understand you have heard from a former colleague of mine this morning, Dick Scammon, from the University of Minnesota, and I think it would be only fair (maybe not fair in Dick's absence) to say a word about the last time I appeared with Dick on any public kind of forum. At that time we were students at the University of Minnesota, but he later went on to Michigan and I went to California. I had a fellow instructor named Hubert Humphrey who challenged me to a debate in 1940, and Dick agreed to referee the match. It was on a half-hour Statewide hookup. The question was: Should Mr. Roosevelt have a third term, or should we give Mr. Willkie a chance? It was agreed to be 30 minutes. Humphrey took Roosevelt and I took Willkie, and Humphrey took 27 minutes and left me 3.

I stayed out of public life for 17 years, and I am trying to get hold of Dick for a rematch.

Well, seriously, it has been a great experience for me to get a little bit away from the academic pastures and into a position close, perhaps, to the nerve center of the Federal Government and the White House. So I can caution you that the leap from the campus into the turbulence of public life and politics is always fraught with some hazards.

The day after I was sworn in by the President, in September 1958, in my present post, I went back with a warm glow to my new office in the White House and saw a nice stack of mail on my desk. I thought, "Hah,

this must be encouraging--messages from dear friends who are wishing me well." So I opened the first one, from Syracuse, New York, and it had one line: "Twenty thousand dollars a year for a professor. What a joke."

Now let's get on with it, gentlemen. On a warm spring day during the reign of Roosevelt, the Oyster Bay Roosevelt, a Congressional committee was agonizing over a perennial problem: How to find additional quarters for burgeoning government departments. Before the Congressional committee stood Colonel C. S. Bramwell, Executive Officer in Charge of Public Buildings. Finally, in a mood of quiet desperation, an idea occurred to one member: Why not use the old unsightly Pennsylvania Railway Station that had been abandoned a few months earlier.

"Impossible," snapped the Colonel. "I tore it down last summer." "Tore it down?" gasped the committee in unison, "Congress, and Congress alone, should have passed on thatquestion. Who gave you the authority?" "The President ordered it torn down," answered the unruffled Colonel. "He said it was in the way."

So we see here reflected one phase of the alternating moods of the American Presidency. Thirty years later Franklin Roosevelt clapped a judgment on his pressed predecessor that reflected another. "The only act of leadership he ever demonstrated," said F. D. R.,

"was to get the President three secretaries instead of one."

So over the years, as each of the 10 Chief Executives has passed in and out of the office, the President and the Presidency have each influenced and passed the strain of our national political life.

On Christmas Eve of 1929 a small fire broke out in the West Wing of the White House where the President's Office is located. For reasons not immediately available, the person discovering the fire did not turn in an alarm but instead went over to the Presidential living quarters where President Hoover was holding a small party for his Cabinet, and informed the chief usher of his discovery. The chief usher phoned the Fire Department at once, and managed to reprieve important papers from Mr. Hoover's desk while firemen put out the blaze. Then the chief usher sought to find out why an alarm had not been turned in immediately by the person discovering the fire. The an swer was simple. Forty-five years earlier the riotous Roosevelt children liked to provide a glorious entertainment for their young guests. Next to a rousing Sousa march played by the Marine Band, nothing could be contrived to make the young hearts skip faster than the District of Columbia horse-drawn fire brigade dashing through the gates of the White House, oilers steaming, and all Pennsylvania Avenue teeming with excitement. After a few of these whing ding performances an exasperated Theodore Roosevelt prescribed, not the big stick, but an order which declared that henceforth

fire alarms could be turned in only by the chief usher, an order first to be followed on Christmas Eve 1929.

If some institutional changes grind slowly in the Office of the President, others move more swiftly. This has always been so with American Presidents. Thirty years ago, the night of the fire in the White House, there were five on the White House staff. Mr. Hoover was trying to persuade Congress to give him two secretaries instead of one. Today the White House Office and its Special Projects personnel number 274.

During Franklin Roosevelt's tour of duty in the Presidency, an aide who had worked close to Presidents for 30 years estimated that Roosevelt signed his name 200 times a day on official documents, letters, pictures, and memorandums. By his own count, Harry Truman reports that he signed his name 600 times a day while in office. And today the average signature figure of President Eisenhower runs into several hundreds.

All of you, I am sure, know that if you just sat down as an exercise and signed your name 200 times what a chunk out of the day it would take.

For two full days in 1956 a distinguished group of newspaper men, professors, legislators, and public administrators met in Philadelphia just to discuss the Presidency. When the smoke lifted from their exalted brooding, their erudition was gathered by the American Academy of Political and Social Science and published under the title, The Office of the American Presidency. The subject matter seemed as boundless

as the champion of the chosen titles well illustrates: The Art of the Presidency; The President Is Chief Legislator; The Modern President Is World Figure; The President and the Press; The President Is Commander in Chief; and many others.

Clearly the subject of the Presidency embraces an enormously complex and eternally effervescent problem. When Louie Brownlow wrote his book on the Presidency in 1949 he divided his material into seven Presidential roles. Seven years later Clifton Rossiter of Cornell University published his lively volume, The American Presidency, in which he described nine specific roles of the President. It is a book well worth reading, by the way.

It is by no means overstatement, therefore, to say that just to organize a book on the Presidency is a major methodological task. In training a lens on the Presidency, of course, skilled journalists and scholars make every effort to bring public opinion, politics, personalities, Congress, the Constitution Report, and tradition into focus. And yet we sometimes forget that as the office takes on new dimensions under changing circumstances of leadership, so also does our citizenry undergo profound changes in attitude.

Nobody apparently paid any attention to the fact that George Washington, before leaving for New York to be sworn in as our First President, borrowed 600 pounds to pay off personal debts and to help pay expenses for his trip

to the Inaugural. We might also note that, before leaving Springfield to be sworn in as our 16th President, Abraham Lincoln wrote the following note to a wholesale clothing merchant in Boston:

> "Your note of the first instantis, together with a very substantial and handsome overcoat which accompanied it by express, was duly received by me and would have been acknowledged sooner but for the multifarious demands upon my time and attention. Permit me to thank you now sincerely for your elegant and valuable gift and the many expressions of personal confidence and regard contained in your letter."

There is no evidence that Lincoln ever sent back the coat.

With singularly few exceptions, the estimates of the American Presidency as a repository of potential executive leadership have been high. Critics there have been--but it would be difficult to dredge up a remark about our own Presidential office comparable to the characterization Clemenceau applied to the French Presidency in the twilight of his career. "There are two things for which I have no other use whatsoever," he complained. "One is the French Presidency; the other is the prostate gland."

Yet one of our preeminent Presidents, a scholarly statesman, once took a very dim view of the American Presidency. While a student at Johns Hopkins University he wrote off the office as something of a nonentity in his doctoral dissertation, and declares the constitutional

position of our Presidents to be an impossible one. But, once President, Woodrow Wilson conducted the office in such a way as to demolish his earlier argument that the President was simply at the mercy of the Congressional checkrein. Even so, it ought to be remarked that Wilson never did lose his great admiration for the English parliamentary system. Twice in his Presidential career he actually contemplated resigning to carry his case to the people in case of the defeat in Congress of a major piece of legislation.

The American Presidency has always captured the imagination, from Thomas Jefferson's early feeling that the Presidency was a bad edition of a Polish King who held Laski's estimation of the President as both more and less than a king and both more and less than a prime minister.

Any meaningful discussion of the Presidency, really--and we haven't time for it this afternoon--probably should start with the selection process. I say this because leadership succession today has come to be a matter of where a man has to have the stamina of a water buffalo to even think about becoming a candidate. I might say that what you have to do, let's say, is travel 100,000 miles as John Kennedy did by December 1 in 1959 on the road to the Presidential nomination, and compare that with the 32,000 miles that Jim Farley traveled to help make Roosevelt the nominee in 1932. So you see already the magnitude of the burden it puts on the

would-be Presidential nominee and Presidential candidate. And I can illustrate ~~that~~ also some of the rigors of the modern campaign by just taking the State of Florida as an example and the Governors in Florida. Since 1936 three of Florida's Governors became gray-headed during the campaign; three were seriously ill while in office; and one died of a heart attack caused by the strain of his election campaign. So here is one factor that should be dealt with in discussing the road to the Presidency and not just the office itself.

Today we are going to concentrate on the office. Turning now to the Office of the Presidency itself, perhaps we can best set the scene for a discussion by trying on a pair of Presidential shoes. Picking a day at random and not to fit in any preconceived theory, I asked Tom Stevens, the President's Appointment Secretary, to give me some details on a typical President's schedule for a particular day.

As any house has a way of taking on the character of its occupants, so too does the White House day now differ from 24 hours in Taft's Administration. Yet the differences are probably what you might call differences in tendencies rather than in policies. From President Eisenhower's schedule we can at least approximate the physical demands of a modern American Presidency.

So I take as a typical day February 11, 1959. The President arrives at his office at 7:50 A.M. I believe he is almost always in his office by

that time. He then confers with his assistants, Hagerty, Merriam, and Stevens. From 8:45 to 9:15, a conference with Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the German Ambassador, and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. After that, for the next 50 minutes the President discusses with an administrative assistant two important speeches to be delivered that day. From 10:20 to 11:00 o'clock the President sees Charles E. Bohlen, U. S. Ambassador to the Phillipines (at that time). The Ambassador at that time was in Washington for consultation over what the press described as strained relations between the two countries. From 11:00 to 11:17 the President spends a few moments with an old Army friend. From 11:17 to 11:30 the President entertains a group of 12 explorer scouts. This is in connection with Boy Scout Week, and the newspapers tell us that the boys reported to the President on traffic outdoor and home safety campaigns that they undertook the year before at the President's suggestion. Thereafter the President spends a full hour in a meeting with his staff. Then he takes an hour for lunch and departs for the National Guard Armory to address the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Returning to the White House at 3:00 P.M., he meets with four staff members until 5:27, when he then takes up with an administrative assistant the speech he will make that evening at the Lincoln Sesquicentennial, and at 6:35 departs for the Statler Hotel to address the National Lincoln Sesquicentennial Dinner.

Thus ends one Presidential work-day. A day is perhaps typical when the President makes two speeches, yet is hardly more hectic than one on which he holds his weekly press conference, a legislative leaders' meeting, a National Security Council meeting, or a Cabinet meeting.

This example of a Presidential day also illustrates something of the diversity of Presidential duties. In this ordinary day --ordinary in that no one expected major crises to be raised or resolved--the President dealt with important national and international matters, as well as performed certain social and ceremonial duties. For partly political and partly historical reasons, the most important man in our country is also remarkably accessible. I think without doubt that, even with proper credentials, it is more difficult to get an audience with the head of one of our industrial giants and labor federations than it is to get one with the President of the United States.

Moreover, unlike most other nations, there is no figurehead king or president to relieve the working Chief of State from many tiring ceremonial functions. Yet the Presidential schedule that I gave you leaves out a great deal, much that history will never know unless all Presidential conversations are recorded for posterity.

For surely, Alexander Graham Bell played an ironic trick on the social scientists. Will we ever again find the sort of gold nuggets that can be uncovered in Lincoln's notes to Staunton and other members of

his Cabinet? If not, it is not because our Nation and its leaders have become more illiterate. Rather, in our age, from the historian's point of view, it is just too easy to pick up the telephone. Parenthetically, telephone conversations can be conveniently erased from history's slate.

In a supersonic world, time is too vital to wait for the courier. Foreign policy, for example, must frequently be discussed by the President's calling the Secretary of State and exchanging ideas. Neither has the time to await a messenger to bring him the other's response and reaction.

Incidentally, this is a little apart here, but this does pose, I think, a great question for the historians of the future. That is that so many important decisions are taken by telephone and by phone calls that there is no way of piecing these together. We have masses of documents and data to imbue the Presidential libraries, like the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, Harry Truman's Library at Independence, Missouri, and the library that is now being constructed at Abilene, Kansas, for President Eisenhower.

Yet, where will the historian find material on telephone conversations? This is going to pose, I think, a problem of how to fill in the gaps in a very meaningful way for the historians.

So, while a close look at a Presidential day, as we have had, gives us something of the scope of the Presidential duties, it is a very inadequate

profile of the office. The problem suggests a remark of the noted sculptor, Brantussi, made to a friend of mine, a newspaper man, when he told him he was a writer. He said, "I have never thought very much of that medium. You can't see it from every side."

So, in highlighting some major problems of the Presidency, we can say it is a gross but convenient simplification to say that the President's work is organized around four important events: The weekly meetings with Congressional leaders; the press conference; the National Security Council; and the Cabinet.

Therefore, let us now deal with certain Presidential relations as they occur in a Presidential week, starting with the role of the President in his relationship with the Congress. More than a century has passed since Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that the struggle between the President and the Legislature must always be an unequal one, since the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering in its plans.

In this instance, at least, history has proved the remarkably prophetic Frenchman wrong. Today, only the narrowest constitutionalist still regards the Congress as the policy formulator and the President solely as the administrator. Certainly, the actions of Lincoln, Cleveland, Wilson, the two Roosevelts, and Eisenhower have qualified the notion that the President's only role in the legislative process is either to sign or to veto. When one party controls both the White House and the Congress,

it's almost a certainty that the constitutional roles of the Legislative and the Executive Branches will be reversed; that the initial legislative sparks will come from the Executive while the Congressional function will be to approve or to reject. Even under the present mixed rule, with one party in control of the Executive and the other holding the Congressional majority, much of the major legislation that becomes law will be Presidentially inspired. This, of course, is indeed the purpose of the President's major messages to the Congress. In fact, it seems well acknowledged today that the citizen cares little for the President's executive function and votes for the office on the basis of a candidate's legislative position.

The implications of mixed rule, of course, are of particular importance at this time, for, not since January of 1955 has the President dealt with a Congress controlled by his own party. The length of time in which President Eisenhower has faced an opposition-controlled Congress in both Houses is far longer than any President in our history has had to work with a Legislature controlled by the opposition party.

Future historians, therefore, will have to judge these years by this new dimension, by different criteria than years of one party's executive-legislative rule. Today, of course, even a President faced by a Legislature overwhelmingly dominated by the opposition party holds a big enough stick to get judiciously firm control. Although patronage is a minor weapon in the Presidential arsenal, the powers of veto

automatically give the Chief Executive a legislative strength equal to one more than one-third of a forum of Senators or House Members.

The strongest Presidential influence over Congress, of course, is not written into the Constitution. In a sense it can be summed up by what a Congressional leader of many years' service has repeatedly told President Eisenhower: "Go ahead and attack as hard. For, whenever the Congress tangles with the Executive, we always lose." This is a bit of overstatement. Still, in the long pull, national leadership rests more and more with the President.

As Sidney Hyman commented recently: "We may be witnessing such a profound shift in the division of Presidential and Congressional power that in the future any Presidential incumbent, no matter how strong or weak he is, can prevail in a test of will."

Congress, therefore, is an abstract. The President is one man. And today the mass media have given the man an opportunity to speak out in a way an abstract cannot. So in a show-down public opinion most often can be rallied to the side of the man in the White House.

Another development that may work to enhance the prestige of the Presidency is an apparent increase in militancy on the part of pressure groups—for our system of lobbies, representing the plurality of our society, focuses most of its attention on the Congress. Congress is recognized as representing all interests. It is only the President who is elected to represent all people.

This change of pressure-group action might be stated as a new law of lobbying. A group increases in militancy in direct proportion to its decline in numbers. Or, stated otherwise, the more a group loses its natural advantages, economic or otherwise, the more it petitions the Government for favors, and the greater appeal it makes to the Government the more elaborate mechanism it must create for lobbying purposes.

This has certainly been the case with agriculture. As the farmers declined in numbers their power grew by leaps and bounds. The farmers, with continuing demands for higher price supports, sometimes no doubt justified morally on the ground that these subsidies are kind of a delayed kickback to justify earlier years of exploitation and hardship, have been keeping the Nation in the situation where we pay a billion dollars a year just to handle the storage and interest charges of our surplus.

Now, of course, the organized labor force is also in a relative decline in terms of the total number of employed in the United States. Will it grow stronger as its percentage of gainfully employed decreases? I think history suggests that this may well be the case.

Turning now to the stated purpose of using the President's weekly function to review some of the inherent problems, let us focus briefly on the Presidential press conference. We started with the Tuesday morning meeting with the leadership Members of Congress. Wednesday is the day for the press conference and the question of press relations.

It was sound impulse on the part of Theodore Roosevelt, who really gave us the genesis of the press conference, that all this could provide a public pronouncement of some sort on Monday morning; and the introduction of the modern press conference under Woodrow Wilson is a direct result of the new importance of the Presidential office in the present century.

The English scholar, Professor Goodheart, in a recent BBC broadcast, says this about the American press conference:

> "It is significant that this meeting with the journalists is called a conference, because that word represents the spirit in which it is held. It is a place where the President and the reporters can talk with each other."

Now, I think this is phrased a little too gently for American taste. It is certainly true that these weekly sessions of press and President can resemble more the fierce banter of equals than a question and answer period between an English master and his pupils, as Franklin Roosevelt once suggested when he introduced the reporters to Winston Churchill as "My beloved wolves."

It is undoubtedly for this reason that the press conference dominates Wednesday mornings at the White House, starting at 7:30 when Jim Hagerty gathers the President's top staff members to try to anticipate some of the questions that might be asked the President at 10:30. Here, of course, one of the functions of the staff is to organize statistical material and other

material to help brief the President. An outline is often prepared, I might suggest here informally, of the kind of issues and questions that can be anticipated--taking again a page out of history: The labor bill, the President's reaction to the Senate version; the stories on the delay in appointing Secretary Herter as the successor to John Foster Dulles; the May 27 deadline on Berlin, and high-level flights; Prime Minister Nehru's statement on Tibet; the Gaither Committee recommendations on mutual security; the nomination of Lewis Strauss as Secretary of Commerce; and the nomination of Claire Booth Luce to be Ambassador to Brazil.

These are the kinds of anticipatory questions on which you can gather material on the press conference day. This list is expanded and arrives on the President's desk at least an hour before he meets the press in the Indian Room, or the Cupid Room, as it is sometimes referred to because of the bronze angels which support the lighting fixtures.

Several innovations have been added to the press conference under the Eisenhower Administration. The entire sessions are now taped, recorded, and filmned. This has raised radio and television to a co-equal position with the press as conveyors of these news events. Also for the first time a private stenotypist produces a transcript of the conference within less than three hours for sale to interested parties.

This has facilitated the publication of the complete record in many of the major morning newspapers. One result of this innovation is that

the reporter is no longer the only witness authority on what is said and his copy must jibe with the exact text found elsewhere in the paper.

Whenever problems of news gathering in Washington are editorialized, almost invariably the first gripe deals with classified material or, as it is less elegantly referred to, censorship. Secrecy in handouts have become editorial efforts frequently directed at Capital news sources. Without being an advocate of unnecessary withholding of information or wishing to minimize its inherent dangers, one may still share the skepticism of Douglas Cator on this subject. This writer explains in his recent book, "The Fourth Branch of Government," that the experienced reporter takes obstacles in his stride, applies pressure at the proper places, and usually comes up with his story.

Turning now to the Cabinet, mention of the Cabinet always brings to mind the deceptively simple question: Who is a member of the President's Cabinet? The instinctive reply is, "Why, the heads of the Executive departments. They are members by tradition." Yet those most closely associated with Cabinet affairs at the White House tell us that the correct definition of a Cabinet member is anyone the President regularly invites.

Thus, under President Harding, the Vice President became a member of the Cabinet, and still is. This raises one question that I might digress on just for a moment here. That is, it has been customary to invite the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to Cabinet meetings. This has

persisted ever since the time that Charles Dawes became the first Director of the Bureau of the Budget when it was established, in 1921. Louis Brownlow doesn't comment on this in his book on the Presidency, but he does make the point that after two meetings at Cabinet sessions during the Harding Administration Charles Dawes told President Harding that henceforth he was not going to attend Cabinet meetings, for the reason that inevitably, in a Cabinet meeting, there were cross pressures. Every department, of course, has its own problem. Every department feels it has certain claims upon the budget that are more compelling than those of other departments. It was Dawes' position that this put the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in a difficult spot where he was really required to umpire all the departments and keep things within bounds, and that you couldn't conduct this kind of infighting in a kind of public session--you had to do this quietly with the President, with the Budget Director and the President working hand in glove to handle this particular kind of problem.

I think this is probably a fairly perceptive observation. I might say that this view has not prevailed, because the Director of the Budget does go to the Cabinet meetings. But it is an observation by a man who is a pretty acute observer of the Presidential, the Congressional, and in fact the entire political scene.

I am only sorry that all of you will probably not have an opportunity to meet Louis Brownlow. I think he is now about 80. He is still quite

active in Washington. He was a member of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia in Woodrow Wilson's time, and he tells how his career started, in a fabulous way. He was a reporter down in Nashville, Tennessee, at the age of 21, with another colleague of about the same age. At the end of two weeks the editor called them in and told them that their copy was pedestrian and unacceptable, and that unless there was great improvement both cub reporters would be fired in the next two weeks. Brownlow was covering sports and his friend was covering the Court House and local politics. So they went out to a local tavern to commiserate, and they finally decided that things were so bad that they couldn't be any worse if they traded subjects. So that henceforth Brownlow would take politics and government and his friend would take sports. And as Louie tells us, "You know, Grantland Rice did pretty well." That's a fact.

During the Second World War Franklin Roosevelt's Cabinet meetings grew so large with the inclusion of war agency heads that F. D. R. is reported to have said, "Every time I come to the Friday meeting I feel like I am addressing either a Town Meeting in New England or a Camp Meeting in Georgia."

Today, under President Eisenhower, our representative at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, is a member of the Cabinet, as was Harold Stassen when he was an adviser on disarmament.

Students of public administration will also be interested in following the fairly recent development in the organization of the Cabinet, the Cabinet Secretariat. This agency, which President Eisenhower established, prepares agendas, circulates papers in advance, and keeps track of decisions made at the Cabinet level.

Since the Cabinet is not even mentioned in the Constitution, in any law, or in any Executive Order, but is really a creature of custom designed to furnish advice to the President, it naturally raises the question of how the Chief Executive can get the best advice possible.

The ability of the choice of Presidential advisers has been very much in the news as well as an issue in the United States Senate. Perhaps one cloud has obstructed what should be a basic factor. To carry out the incredible responsibilities of the office, the President must have a sizable group of top aides of his own choosing in whom he has implicit trust and confidence. In any case, the office of the Presidency has come a long way since the mid-19th century, when a President had to pay his private secretary out of his own pocket. In fact, today a building that once housed the entire State Department, War Department, and Navy Department is completely occupied by the Executive Office of the President.

At the present there are about 35 people on the President's White House staff who can be considered to have some policy responsibility. The problem in high-echelon staffing is no longer one of shielding the

President from the multitude of office-seekers as we read was the case in Lincoln's time. Today it is a matter of convincing and often employing men of ability temporarily to leave high-salaried jobs outside of government to serve their country at a financial loss.

If we remind ourselves that the President's Cabinet meetings fall on Friday, we might conclude that the Presidential work week is now over. Yet, if President Eisenhower goes to his Gettysburg farm for the weekend, problems of the Presidency travel with him. A Presidential vacation is very different from what we normally consider a vacation to be. For example, when the President went to Denver for eight weeks in 1954, he worked at his temporary office 37 days from 8:00 until 1:00 o'clock. He was visited by 225 persons, an average of 6 each day. He delivered 17 speeches; made 4 business trips; appeared on radio and TV 3 times; considered 513 bills, approving 488 and vetoing 25; signed 420 official papers; sent 35 of what we call Presidentials each day--these are letters that must be done by the President, obviously; there are hundreds of others, but these 35 are letters that must have the President's personal attention. The President issued 160 press releases; and, on the private teletype circuit between Denver and Washington, a total of 250,000 words were transmitted, or a daily average of 4500 words. This is hardly the kind of vacation I like to think of when I sneak off into the Minnesota woods for 3 or 4 weeks.

One major role of the President which we have not discussed and which I want to look at briefly is his role as party leader or spiritual guardian here of some 170,000 precincts--kind of the earthy substructure of American political life.

Our parties, and you heard about them this morning, are a bundle of localisms and they cannot be dictated to centrally. Yet they can be energized and charged up, though the basic mechanism to do this job is faulty.

The National Committee is kind of an impotent sector, and its whole organization is, I think, no longer realistically attuned to the times. The basic idea of the National Committee--one man and one woman from each State--was that they were to do two things. They were to make recommendations on patronage, office-seekers, and they were to be wealthy and finance the party. Today there is no longer any patronage, and, of course, the idea that they are going to finance the party is gone, because we've put limitations on expenditures.

I think one thing which the President might take leadership on here would be to recommend that the whole structure of the party organization be changed and have the State central chairmen be the National Committee, or be reconstituted as the National Committee, because they are more closely in tune with the realities of American politics than are the National Committee men or women. This also, I think, would give a little better chain of command between the Presidency and the States.

Another question that arises when we are talking about Presidential leadership, party leadership, is what to do with defeated Presidential candidates. Harry Truman, in his new book, "Mr. Citizen," has again revived this idea that they be given seats in the United States Senate--nonvoting seats.

My editor, Mr. Mencken, when I was on the Baltimore Sun, proposed that all unsuccessful Presidential candidates be quietly hanged--for a very interesting reason: lest the sight of their grief have a very evil effect upon the young.

I think here again we aren't making the best use of our resources. I an not sure at all about the advisability of a nonvoting Senate seat. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Hoover. He thought it was a good idea, he said, until he was 75. Then he found that the Senate chairs would be too high and too stiff to sit on. But it would seem that one way of enhancing the clarity of a party's position on major issues so that you might have perhaps a more unified course would be to have the defeated Presidential candidate become the Chairman of the National Committee for the next two years after an election. We have always called a defeated candidate a titular leader, and yet it is a very hollow term.

It would seem that a person who accepts the highest honor, to be a Presidential nominee, if he doesn't win, at least could take the next two years to help knit the party together. Then if he wanted again to be a candidate he ought to resign.

We have been searching for a half-century, at least, in this country for some way of helping the party out of power to have a more unified voice in speaking to the public. This is difficult because it has been the Congressional wing of the party that speaks, and the Congressional wing does not speak with a unified voice, because there are so many voices that you can't have a single kind of command as you do in the case of the party in power.

Now I would mention one informal kind of a semi-institutional development that is appearing on the American political scene, that I think relates closely to the Presidency, and particularly to the Presidential transitions in American politics.

You gentlemen are mightily concerned with the little interrelationships here as well as the major ones, of course, between industry and between our whole economic complex and our military power. For the first time in the history of this country the word, Commander-in-Chief, has a completely different meaning than it had 20 years ago. In an age of nuclear-tipped weapons, you know so much better than I do the instantaneous responsibility that evolves upon the President to take quick decisions.

This does suggest to us the importance of our sympathetic attention to compensatory institutional devices that build up in American public life to help us over some of the gaps, over some of the rough terrain that we have to travel. One interesting development in this endless quest for kind of regularizing a kind of leadership succession is, I think,

the establishment, by the informal group in the Democratic Party, of the Democratic National Committee, or the Advisory Council. This is not an idea that is new with the Democratic Party. As a matter of fact it was first done by the Republican Party back in 1919; a group was started at that time and it held together a few months and then fell apart. Another one was tried in 1937. But the Democratic Party one has held together now for a period of about 3 or 4 years, and it suggests, these new advisory councils suggest, a kind of faint--what I would call--institutionalization of the shadow Cabinet which we know in Great Britain.

This is the British idea of the loyal opposition, or the idea that the duty of the opposition is to oppose. Specifically, for example, if you look at the Democratic Party, they seem to have a shadow council or a shadow cabinet of economic advisers, with men like John Galbraith, Leon Keyserling, and others in the economy. And in the Democratic Party there is a kind of shadow National Security Council, or a policy planning staff for possible succession in the State Department in the policy planning staff, should there be a Democratic President elected.

Here you've got men like Paul Mitchell and Charles Marshall and Jim Keene, and there are several others, who have rather consistently taken a certain position policy here.

How well and how responsibly these little advisory councils will

perform, of course, is still a matter of conjecture. Yet there is strong reason to believe that this kind of shadow boxing in American public life, as we seek to hammer out truth on the anvil of public debate, can lead to greater illumination of the issues.

Finally turning now to the last topic of my agenda this afternoon, just a word about an institutional arrangement, and that is the 22d Amendment. Most students of government initially felt that writing "No Third Term" into the Constitution would cripple the Chief Executive during the last two years of his second term. Stripped of the promise of succeeding himself, he could command no loyalty from his party, no obedience, and no voice as a leader among nations.

President Eisenhower is the first man to be bound by this provision. It is still too early to make an evaluation. Also, since Mr. Eisenhower will be 70 next year or this year, it can be contended that the amendment puts no additional handcuffs on him, since he probably would not run again anyway. Yet unmistakably a preliminary estimation of the 22d Amendment is that it has not created an ineffective lame-duck President as I think so many of us anticipated it would.

In fact, it may be that through the 22d Amendment the President can gain support for his policies because he can convince the people that he has nothing to gain personally. The amendment thus eliminates self-interest.

I must say I opposed this amendment very strongly and I wrote many

articles and editorials against it, because it did seem to me a good tradition wisely left in trust by the American people for a two-year term. But I would say in terms of watching the effect of the amendment thus far that we should not be hasty in repealing it. I at the moment agree with the Washington Post editorial on this, that this thing ought to be studied for a while before we rush in headlong to repeal it.

Another reason why the 22d Amendment has not had the undesirable effect many people predicted, that is, the weakening of Executive leadership, is institutional rather than personal. Simply stated, the Office of the American Presidency has so overshadowed the Congress that the President's power cannot be dulled simply by limiting his tenure.

Inescapably, in assessing the Presidency in mid-passage of the 20th century, we are driven to the conclusion that it has become the great gyroscope of our society, bearing unbelievably heavy burdens in spite of our efforts to reduce some of the load by prudent delegation. Under the McCormack Act, we have divested the President of many of his responsibilities, and we shall continue to do so. None the less, such duties as requiring Presidential approval of the itinerary for the Marine Band, or the promulgation of laws on narcotics, when they are discovered to be narcotics, are still the kind of things that we want to relieve the President of, which we think are very definitely matters that can be delegated without in any way weakening the Presidential responsibility.

At the same time, there are limits to what you can do. As rapidly

as we relieve the Presidents of the burdens of yesterday, new ones arrive to overtake the old ones. Foreign affairs are no longer foreign affairs, but world affairs, as man reaches for the stars. Today the President must give sustained leadership amidst the welter of conflicts that range from whether we should spend more on buscuits and less on bayonets in our overriding aim to build a durable peace, to arguments that insist that what we need is more arithmetic and less adjustments if we are to effectively meet the challenge of the Soviet.

In a climate of challenging response, the Presidency has written many shining hours. Admittedly the existing party system and structure which our Presidents head is disorderly and party discipline does not even meet the test of a loosely administered parole system. But with all of its imperfections there is real vitality in our amiable constitutional system of counting heads rather than breaking them.

All of us should remember that the politics of the Presidency and Presidential leadership is not an easy profession. Part of his occupational hazard reminds me of an anecdote of Madame Sans Superie, the wife of the French writer. After World War II she told an American friend of her late husband that there were plans to raise a monument to the memory of this French writer and flyer who flew off on a mission to Africa never to be found. Impressed, remarked the American to Madam Superie, "You will never have stones enough to raise monuments to the memory of your great men." "Well," she sighed, "there will always be plenty to throw at them

while they are still alive."

Thank you.

CAPTAIN MARZETTA: Prior to the question period Dr. Moos would like to present certain problem areas which he believes will generate more discussion within the group.

DR. MOOS: I think I have already overburdened you gentlemen with a little longer formal remarks than I intended, but all professors can be forgiven as they think of their return to the academic pastures.

What are the problems that bubble up here that you would really like to get your fingers on? Many of these problems are so complex that they are as difficult as trying to get a hold of a peeled grape or trying to put your finger on a piece of mercury on a smooth table top.

But I would like to go over just a couple things and then take any questions that you would like to throw, about some areas that you will be mightily concerned with and that any future President is going to have to be able to get on top of--but nobody is going to be able to get completely on top of them.

I think that here are some of the major areas. First there is the question of informing the President--both the formal and the informal communication system with which the President functions. In a staff system, as you so well know, certain people are delegated specific responsibilities, yet inevitably, in a position of power, you will get a situation where somebody has finished what his specific task is—I don't

care whether it is a question of Congressional liaison with the White House involving particular bills on rivers or harbors or involves assistance on getting some facts together for a speech—and there are temptations to inform the President in an area that is not particularly within your domain.

This is both bad and good. It is the kind of thing where just as some person has gone in to see the President specifically on a thing this one goes out and says, "Mr. President, I have a letter here from the Governor of Montana that I think is very important, regarding Indian affairs." It is bad in a sense that you never know then what is getting in to the Chief Executive. On the other hand, is it good in a democratic society not to have some kind of an informal communication system where information reaches him, not through the formal one that is set up? This is a question in an area that plagues me a great deal.

Another area is: What is the effect of the destruction of privacy on the President? It happens to kings, popes, movie stars. Toynbee tells us that privacy is essential, that is, a withdrawal and a return to society, to making the correct responses to challenges. Toynbee, in his magnificent six-volume work, says that the great leaders who have not had a chance to withdraw and return have not been able to make the correct responses to challenges. And yet we know very little about this effect of the destruction of privacy.

I sometimes think of a story illustrating this. The last time Jimmie Walker ran for Mayor of New York he ran against LaGuardia. He didn't make a single campaign speech until three nights before the election, when he walked out before a huge audience in New York City and said, "What was my opponent doing in Bridgeport on the night of July 2, 1929?" Well, LaGuardia--if some of you remember the colorful Mayor--sputtered and he was indignant. But he didn't get any place. So he finally gave an elaborate documentation on where he was, giving a speech for charity, and he got witnesses and everything. Mayor Walker gave one more talk. He walked out on the stage and said, "My opponent says he was in such and such a place," and walked off. Well, Walker won the election.

I use this because nobody can say this about the President of the United States, by law. He can never be alone. Somebody is always following him. Somebody is with him.

Another area that I think should be a challenging one here is the area of crisis. Each crisis in the world gets focused today on the President, and immediately, whether it is in Tibet or Cuba or the Congo. What ideas can we develop in a general way about crisis management? This to me is a very important area.

Another topic would be the channels through which frustrations and aggressions reach the President. I am really talking in a lodge here, and I don't want to crawl out publicly. These are things I'd like

to share with you as we think about the problems in a very unpartisan way. The channels through which frustrations and aggressions reach the President bear directly on the decision-making process. The Church, as you know, establishes a devil's advocate. John Stuart Mill told us that truth needs air and to show it off. Parliamentary tradition rests on the functions of the loyal opposition.

How does this function take place in the Presidency? To what extent is it conscious? Is there anything we can do to kind of have an informal system here seeing that these frustrations and aggressions reach the President, whether they are dissatisfactions with particular leadership in a particular department or not?

Another topic is: How do you teach a new President, without experience in using complex staffs, to use the staff with optimum effect? This problem is complicated by the case of the disappearing White House, the fact that the Presidency disappears with each incumbent. Mrs. Roosevelt, I think, had 72 hours to get everything of Franklin Roosevelt's cleared out when he died. Harry Truman started from scratch, without a file, without anything. This is par for the course in the White House.

There is another fact that complicates this. That is, in our system of American politics we have what we might call a loyal bias. That is, law has been traditionally the way into politics, and lawyers have not been particularly noted for familiarity with the staff system and how to use it.

Another topic--the logistical problem of getting to the White House everything that is needed in policy formation in time to get it included in the policy-statement edition.

One other and then I'll stop. I think a pretty fertile topic for examination would be the unintended consequences of random Presidential acts. Things done in one area for one purpose may have extensive consequences or undreamed of repercussions in other areas. This is something that we are always constantly, I suppose, terrorized by as we work in an area where, as I said, every crisis in the world seems to get focused immediately on the President.

CAPTAIN MARZETTA: Dr. Moos is ready for questions, gentlemen.

QUESTION: With respect to the Presidential staff, which you touched on, can you tell us a little bit of the actual mechanics of how that staff is organized? Does he have, for example, the Chief of Staff type of coordinated staff?

DR. MOOS: As to the staff, itself, I think you would find this: You would not find any blueprint. Newspapers are always asking for even a list of officers, and where the staff is actually located, so that they can figure out this complex. I might say also that it is somewhat different since General Persons has become the Assistant to the President than it was under Governor Adams when he was the Assistant to the President. I think just a quick title rundown might give you an idea of this, and then I will tell you about the coordination.

As you know, on the staff we have a Press Secretary, which is pretty well institutionalized now under the last three Presidents. We have a Legal Counsel to the President who advises on legislation and prepares veto messages--this sort of function. We have an Economic Adviser to the President, and we have a Congressional liaison man, one on the House, one on the Senate, and one in charge of all Congressional relations. Then we have a position which you might call an Interagency Coordinator. This is a person who attempts to take care of all the trouble spots, where departments get bruised, where they collide with one another, or where there is conflicting jurisdiction or overlapping problems. This I think is a very critical post in terms of trying to oversee competently the management of this vast, sprawling Executive, with 67 different departments and agencies.

As far as the staff, itself, is concerned, under Governor Adams I think we had far more and frequent full-staff meetings--although we have regular staff meetings now. Sometimes they are posponed during t remendously busy times for a while. But there was a stricter attempt, I think, at a kind of continual effort at discussion for solving problems. Now I think we split up more in terms of kinds of functional problems on the thing. I don't think there is a moment of eternal truth in which method is preferable. I think that sometimes vast amounts of energy and time can be wasted by staff meetings or committee meetings, where many of the things that are under discussion are not perticularly germane

to what your responsibility is.

I am certain that two things will probably leave some imprint on the Office of the Presidency. I think the Secretariat which was established under this Administration will persist no matter who is elected President. This is an idea that has been gestating ever since Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management was organized in 1937. It is borrowed from the idea of the British Cabinet to have a Secretariat that prepares papers on positions taken by the Cabinet, keeps records, and does a little more on the follow-up, to see what is done.

QUESTION: Dr. Moos, one of the problem areas that you mentioned was the management of crises. We are all concerned with the decision-making machinery and with ways and means by which the decision-making machinery can be made more responsive to crises and to other matters, so that the end result would be action instead of reaction, which on occasion does occur. If we concede the premise that we want to keep the current concepts of separation of powers, checks and balances, and so on, are you able to address yourself to the question of what particular steps might be taken to improve the existing capacity for decision-making and acting instead of reacting to something which happens externally?

DR. MOOS: Well, I've got a few ideas on this. I am not certain that I ought to air them right here, but let me put it in a little larger perspective here. I mentioned the whole question today of the respective

positions of the Legislature versus the Executive. In the current issue of the London Economist there is an interesting series of articles running on the decline of Parliament, not in terms of contemporary personnel but in terms of the larger problem of whether the ascendancy of Parliamentary institutions, which was certainly a feature of the 19th century, has run full cycle--and in the nature of crises management and the kind of crises world that we live in today, together with the development of nuclear weaponry--and that the major role of our parliamentary institutions, like Parliament in England and the Congress in the United States, is to dramatize and to debate the public issues and to get the truth brought to the surface.

Now, I have great faith in the American Congress. I know that sometimes we look at the debate on the floor and we get discouraged, but the real work and the only work is done at the subcommittee level, in quite an unpartisan way, I think, where decisions are taken. I do feel, none the less, that in the Congress, if you take from World War II on and look at the hearings on foreign affairs and on weaponry, there is a lot of nonsense, and yet, if you look systematically through all of the hearings and the reports in Congress, it is the way we get aired out in the public forum the kind of information that is needed, I think, to take decisions. It takes a long time.

I have changed my mind a little bit, in response to your question, Captain, about the area of foreign policy. I used to think that, under

Franklin Roosevelt, it must have been an impossible business to have been Secretary of State Cordell Hull, where, when Roosevelt wanted to, he would go around and use Harry Hopkins, one of his White House advisers, and Hull wouldn't know about it. So, how could you really be Secretary of State?

I am told this is one of the major factors in Secretary Dulles's posture here of insisting that this kind of thing never existed while he was Secretary of State. That is, nobody in the White House could be the voice on foreign policy through which the State Department or the Secretary had to work.

Yet, inevitably, where we are talking about crises, where things come in on an eyes-only basis, and come in quickly, and have to go to the President immediately, I think all of us would agree, there may be a real reason for having somebody in the White House who will work hand-in-glove with the State Department and with the Department of Defense, so that we can see that certain bugs don't get into the communication line here, to have the kind of reaction instead of the kind of concert of effort that we would like to see.

I rather think that the President is going to have something to say about this subject before the year is out. I won't say more on it.

CAPTAIN MARZETTA: Dr. Moos, I know your car is waiting and you have to hustle back for a program with the President. On behalf of the Commandant, the faculty, and the students, thank you very much for a very interesting and informative talk. Thank you.