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THE MILITARY OFFICER AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

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30 August 1960

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COLONEL HARVEY: General Mundy, Gentlemen: Over the past week you have had a rather intensive review of the American Government at all levels, including the Legislative and the Executive Branches and the influence of political parties on our system.

The matter the personnel is to enjoy in the review here is the role that the career military officer plays in the Federal Government and how he has continuously helped to establish national policy.

Only a few generations ago a military man could figuratively pick up his musket, pack up a couple of saddle bags, strap them on a horse, and he was in business.

The growing complexity of the world and the impact of two World Wars in this century have vastly changed this idyllic state of affairs. So this morning we will turn our attention to how and why these changes have occurred, how the military man has influenced and continues to influence national policy, and what might the future be in this field.

Our speaker this morning is eminently qualified to discuss this important subject. As you have noted from his biography, he is a distinguished educator and is the author of numerous publications in the military-civil relations field. His book, "The Soldier and the State," has become a standard reference book and, as you know, it has been

assigned as reference reading in this course.

The subject of the lecture this morning is "The Military Officer and the American Government."

I am pleased to present for his third lecture at the College Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Associate Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University. Dr. Huntington.

DR. HUNTINGTON: General Mundy, Admiral Patrick, Gentlemen: Let me get right down to brass tacks by laying out three general propositions about which I want to organize my remarks this morning.

First of all, if we look at the role of the military officer in the American Government over a period of time, it seems to me that this role has been shaped very largely by three factors:

First, the nature and importance of the issues of military policy at any one time.

Secondly, the eminence and prestige of individual military officers and their level within the Government.

Thirdly, the nature and form of the military institutions which existed, and their relations with the civilian institutions of government.

That is generalization No. 1. Generalization No. 2 is that, over the course of our history, the issues of military policy have gradually come to play a more and more important role. So that military policy which at one time, at least during most of the 19th century, was relatively

unimportant has now become terribly important. My third broad generalization is that the place of individual military officers and of military institutions in shaping military policy has tended to alternate in importance from one phase to the next. One time it will be individuals who play a major role in shaping military policy and in implementing national policy, and another time it will be military institutions. The grade of individuals will fade from the scene and the relationships and activities will become routinized and the institutions will play a more important role.

Let's just briefly go back for some historical background on this. It seems to me that a first phase in the evolution of the role of the military officer in American government can be said to last from the founding of the Republic down to about the Civil War or the years immediately after the Civil War.

Aside from the initial actions in organizing the military forces, the Militia Act of 1792 and the other initial measures in setting up our first military establishment, by and large military policy issues were relatively unimportant during this period. Also, military institutions were relatively primitive. You had no elaborate organizations in either the War Department or the Navy Department. The institutions of military leadership, education, and administration existed, but they all existed in fairly rudimentary form.

And, indeed, the great importance of the military during this period

was perhaps not directly related to problems of military policy, because this was the period in which the military played a great role in developing the country, in which West Point produced more railroad presidents and engineers than it did generals and colonels, and in which many of the most important activities of the military were devoted to building roads, bridges, and canals, making surveys, and aiding in the construction of such important transportation links as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Erie Railroad, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and other projects.

Also during this period the Army and the Navy played an important role in supporting science and in undertaking expeditions to various parts of the world in order to increase scientific knowledge. I think one can get some sort of perspective upon the role of the military officer during these years in our country by looking at the role which the military is playing today in many of the underdeveloped countries, where the military, as the one institution which is well organized and possesses some of the elements of discipline and leadership, plays a major role in developing the country, in organizing the population, and in carrying out governmental projects and responsibilities across a wide range of areas.

This was also the case in our early history. The relative absence of highly developed military institutions and the fact that it was not until after the Civil War that a real military profession, the profession of

officership, developed in this country meant that by and large those military officers who played a major role in the Government played a role as individuals. There was no sharp line between who was civilian and who was military.

The history of the period was filled with generals who became Presidents and political leaders who became generals. Indeed, a majority of the Army's generals in the pre-Civil-War years were appointed directly from civil life and did not come up through the ranks. Consequently, it was quite difficult to say who was military and who was civilian.

I think this is very obviously what could be called one of the livlier points of civil-military controversy during these years. This is, I think, not only one of the livlier but perhaps one of the lower points of civil-military relationship in the United States. This was the famous feud between Jefferson Davis, when he was Secretary of War in 1855, and Winfield Scott, who was the Commanding General of the Army.

They engaged in correspondence at that time over an issue which I think has few counterparts in the history of American public administration. Both men had very low boiling points. Davis at one point wrote to the Commanding General: "I leave unnoticed the exhibition of peevish temper in your reply to my last letter." Scott, however, was not going to be outdone in this way, and he replied to the Secretary of War that he would reject all communications of the Secretary, whether designed

as private and scurrilous or as public missives of arrogance and superciliousness. Davis in time wrote the Commanding General of the Army denouncing, "the gratuitous and monstrous calumnies" he had suffered from Scott, and went on to say to the Commanding General, "Your petulance, characteristic egotism, and recklessness of accusation have imposed on me the task of unveiling some of your deformities. Your military fame has been clouded by groveling vices and your career marked by carelessness, insubordination, greed of lucre, and want of truth." At which point the Commanding General wrote back to the Secretary, "Your new letter is a new example of chicanery. My silence under the new provocation has been the result first of pity and next of forgetfulness. Compassion is always due to an enraged imbecile who raves about him in blows which hurt only himself and who at the worst seeks to stifle his opponent by dint of naughty words."

We have had several civil-military controversies in recent years, but I doubt that many of them have quite reached this level. The fascinating thing about this, of course, is that that issue between the two men was not a major principle of public policy or a question of strategy. Rather, the immediate issue was the fact that Scott, as Commanding General of the Army, had granted a leave of absence to a Colonel Hitchcock, and the Secretary of War claimed that this was within the power of the Secretary.

The important thing here, however, is the fact that the responsibilities of the Secretary of War and of the Commanding General were not properly defined. This was part of the civil-military relations still being in a rudimentary state and the fact that they had overlapping responsibilities. And also, the important thing is that this could really hardly be called a civil-military controversy, because, after all, it was Scott, the Commanding General, not Davis, the Secretary of War, who had run for the Presidency in 1852, and it was conceded that he might do it again in 1856; and it was Davis, the Secretary, and not Scott, the General, who had graduated from West Point. In addition, of course, Davis had had a distinguished career in the regular army and then in the Mississippi Volunteers in the Mexican War.

The point is that you had here two individuals both of whom were part military and part political; there were no sharply dividing lines.

I think this phase came to an end in the post-Civil-War years, when the military profession developed in this country, when the professional organizations were created, and when, in the second phase, issues of military policy began to play a more important role.

By the end of the 19th century the chief issues of military policy were the expansion of the Navy and the creation of some sort of reserve system for the Army. On both of these matters, of course, there was relatively frequent legislation by Congress.

During this period the great tempestuous personalities like Scott

and Davis, and Andrew Jackson, and the rest of the pre-Civil-War cast began to disappear from the scene, and instead, relations of the military and the Government became regularized, with the development of the General Staff system and the creation of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915.

So this, I would say, was a period in which military issues, particularly after 1898, played an increasingly important role, and in which military individuals played a less important role and military institutions began to shape the role of the military officer in government.

Now this, of course, came to an end in World War II. It seems to me that the significant thing in the period since World War II has been not only the increased importance of issues of military policy but also a rather striking change in their character.

Previously, we usually used to think of the military as being concerned primarily with foreign policy. When one talked about civil-military relations or said that military policy had to reflect the political policy of the Government, one really meant that it had to reflect the foreign policy of the Government--that the military should have proper plans to implement the policies of the diplomats, that they should be prepared to develop the types of military forces required by the diplomats for their purposes, and that the diplomats on the other hand should know something about the military implications and the various actions which they might want to take.

The big questions were, generally--as is more true of European countries than of us: Do we go to war? Do we send forces here? Do we deploy other forces there? What would be the military results if we got into this type of war? They were questions of this nature. They dealt with military actions, primarily, in support of diplomatic foreign policy objectives rather than military programs directly.

This general type of issue or question of action decisions is still very important, but it seems to me that it has been eclipsed in significance in recent years by the rise of program decisions as being of key significance. This, it seems to me, is the natural result of a strategy of deterrence. The key relations now concern not so much the uses of military force--although this may be necessary in circumstances--but rather the maintenance of military forces. The effectiveness of deterrence depends upon the size and the nature of the forces of deterrence. And today, the success of foreign policy depends more on what military forces are maintained than upon how those military forces are used. Indeed, if the proper decisions are made with respect to the former question it may never be necessary to face the latter one.

This, it seems to me, adds an entirely new dimension to military policy. It means that the soldier has to be equally concerned with domestic policy as much as foreign policy. In a sense, what used to be a relatively simple relationship between the soldier and the diplomat has now become a triangular relationship between the soldier, the

diplomat, and the Bureau of the Budget or the other instrumentalities of government representing the claims of the domestic society. And this in a sense means that military policy has been pushed right into the center of national politics.

In 1952, just after he was elected, Eisenhower, you remember, on his way back from Korea, had a lengthy conference with his new advisers on the Cruiser Hornet, and the subject of this conference revolved primarily about what they called the great equation—the relationship of military strength to economic strength. And the great equation is the great issue in American politics now. Politics, as one distinguished political scientist, Harold Laswell, has said, deals with who gets what and when and how. This essentially, it seems to me, is what the most important aspects of military policy are concerned with.

Broadly speaking, I think one could say that our four major goals, which are in conflict now in national politics and policy, are, the goal of national security, which involves programs other than military programs but with respect to which, of course, the military programs are most important; the goal which, for lack of a better term, we can call domestic welfare, which involves the domestic programs of the Government; the goal of maximizing private consumption and investment which, so far as it relates to the Federal Government, means minimizing the tax burden on society; and, finally, the goal of maintaining fiscal integrity, a form of monetary stability, and avoiding inflation, which

again, so far as the Government is concerned, means primarily balancing the budget--at least it is interpreted to mean primarily balancing the budget.

The conflict among these four goals of security--security, welfare, private consumption, and investment and fiscal stability and integrity--it seems to me is the essence of national politics, and the military are right in the middle of it. The only way in which the conflict among these objectives, all of which are competing with each other, can be eased is of course by a very rapid expansion of the economy, which indeed is a reason why the question of economic growth has become so important in recent years. The faster our economy expands, the less will be the conflict among these four objectives.

Setting aside the economic growth, however, this conflict still goes on, although it may vary in intensity. Here, the needs of military programs, of the programs required for deterrence, have to be advanced politically in the domestic political arena, in conflict with these other objectives.

In order to give just briefly some idea of what this means, let us just look at these other objectives and the political forces which are involved with them.

First of all, the goal of fiscal integrity, or a balanced budget--this has been a primary goal of both the Truman and the Eisenhower

Administrations. The Democrats frequently talk inflation when they are out of office but, at least if the record of the Truman Administration is any example, they tend to be just as much devoted to a balanced budget when they are in office as the Republicans.

Mr. Forrestal in his diary at one point said that "Mr. Truman is a hard money man if ever I saw one." Mr. Forrestal knew because the balanced budget was largely at the expense of the Department of Defense budget. This inevitably will be a major goal of any Administration.

Secondly, there is the problem of taxes. We have never had a major tax increase in recent years without war, or in the absence of a war. Even lowering taxes, given the present balance of political-interest groups as reflected in the Revenue Code of 1954, would be a difficult task. Simply allocating who is going to get the benefits of a tax reduction and increasing taxes, of course, would be a much more difficult one.

Thirdly, the domestic programs of the Government either are supported by a large number of what one could call perhaps, in some cases, vested interested, well organized groups in agriculture, veterans' groups, and other groups who support existing programs and push for their expansion, or they reflect a wide range of new activities which the Government has had to undertake.

I think it is very interesting to note that from 1948 until 1955 the domestic spending of the Federal Government was virtually stationary, at about a little over $15 billion. Since 1955, with this whole wide range

of new domestic programs--education, highways, urban renewal, housing, increased social security--a great expansion has taken place, and now domestic expenditures are almost double what they were only 5 or 6 years ago.

This, of course, has taken place despite the fact that the Administration has not been in the forefront and pushing this expansion. Indeed, Mr. Eisenhower twice, both in 1953 and again after Sputnik in 1957, said, "Let's try to cut back domestic programs so that we can spend more on national security," but in each case the domestic pressures made it impossible for him to do so. And, as David Demarest Lloyd once said, "If George Humphrey can't cut government spending, who can?"

This is the context in which the needs of military programs must be analyzed. In this competition for the governmental dollar, the military, representing as I say the major aspect of national security programs--although I well recognize the importance of foreign aid and other programs--suffers some peculiar disabilities when it comes to competing with these demands of the supporters of these other goals. Military groups are primarily executive. The Department of Defense doesn't have a constituency in the same sense in which the Department of Agriculture or the Vererans' Administration has a constituency. We heard a lot last year with the Hebert investigation about the munitions lobby. I think the significant thing is that munitions lobbyists, to the

extent that they exist, are competing with each other, primarily, over contracts. They are not united in support of a Defense Department program.

Secondly, the military, to a much greater extent than other agencies of government, are usually willing to accept budgetary limits. If one looks back over history since 1945, one sees continually that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military leaders--General Bradley, Admiral Radford, and others--have accepted, with maybe some resistance, but eventually have been persuaded of the great importance of economic goals, of keeping down expenditures in the expansion of the military program, and in particular the big expansion which was planned before the Korean War was the result initially of civilians, in the development of the policies in NSC-68 in the winter and spring of 1950. It was the State Department which took the lead, with the military tending to accept the ceilings which Louie Johnson had imposed upon them. They were unhappy with them, but they tended to accept them as given.

General Taylor, in his book, also gives several examples of this. One reason for this, of course, is that the military are often divided among themselves, so that, as General Taylor points out, instead of uniting and saying, "Look, we need more for our national defense," and presenting a united front to the civilians, simply, one service attacks another.

Then also, a third disability which the military work under is that

the consequences of slighting military needs are seldom concrete. National security expenditures are, in a sense, a form of insurance. One cannot say exactly what will happen if we do not spend $20 million more on this missile or on that, or if we do not have 2 or 3 more divisions in the Army to deal with limited-war contingencies.

The prophets of utter catastrophe, like the Alsops, are usually proven wrong. Catastrophe never quite comes, but we always seem on the verge of it. It is very hard to say just what difference a greater or lesser military force makes at any one time.

For instance, three years ago the Gaither Committee, if you will remember, made recommendations for a substantial expansion of our national security effort. The Administration did not accept the principal proposals of the Gaither Committee. What difference has this had on our policy? Would we have had a Berlin crisis? Would we have had the disruption of the Summit talks? Would we even have had a proposed Summit meeting if we had adopted the Gaither Committee recommendations? One can't say. This is an unanswerable question. So, consequently, since the results of lowering the military budget are hard to identify, it then becomes very difficult to build a case in support of military needs.

Now this, it seems to me, has been the main focus of military policy as an issue in the past 15 years. Throughout most of this period, military individuals have played a very important role in the determination of these policy issues. In the immediate postwar period, the Truman

Administration lacked trained and willing executives in many foreign-policy posts, and you had a great influx of high-ranking military officers into position in the State Department as ambassadors, and in other agencies. At the same time, of course, we were not only moving into the cold war but we were moving out of World War II, and the great military heroes and personalities of World War II--Marshall, Bradley, Eisenhower and, in a somewhat negative fashion, MacArthur--played a major role in shaping military policy. Politically, people like Marshall, Bradley, and Eisenhower were tremendously important to the Truman Administration because they could get the support from Congress which people like Dean Acheson could not.

In the Eisenhower Administration, the dominant factor, I think, with respect to military policy has been the fact that the President, himself, is a 5-star general. Necessarily, this has meant that the military institutions and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had to play a subordinate role. The President, himself, has been the key figure in resolving the issues of the great equation.

By and large I think one can say that the movement of military individuals, military officers, into civilian jobs, whether into the Presidency or into lower ranking jobs, has not helped the military in advancing their claim on resources and in presenting their needs to the Government. There is sort of an inverse relation here, almost, one could say. I would

not only cite the case of Mr. Eisenhower in this regard, who certainly has kept the military budget down in a way in which no civilian President could, but I would also point to General Marshall, when he was Secretary of State. Mr. Forrestal several times went to General Marshall trying to get his support for an increase in the Defense Department budget, but General Marshall was always much more concerned with the foreign-aid program, the Marshall Plan, and other needs. It wasn't until Dean Acheson came in, a civilian, with no military experience, that the State Department became a strong supporter of an expansion of the military effort.

So having military officers in high civilian positions, I think, on the whole tends to be disadvantageous to the military viewpoint.

Well, it is quite obvious now that we are moving into a phase in which, although the issues of the great equation remain generally the same, the role of military individuals in determining these issues will tend to decrease. I think when Mr. Eisenhower retires as President next January, this will in a sense mark the end of the post-World-War-II era. The great age of the military heroes will be gone. The officers who head up the Joint Chiefs of Staff will undoubtedly be just as able and as dedicated as their predecessors, but they will be much less public personalities. I doubt now that one citizen in 100--one citizen in 500—could name the four chief members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now.

The individual military officers simply will not have the political prestige which they once did have. In a sense they will be the product of the postwar institutions of civil-military relations.

On the other hand, whether Mr. Nixon or Mr. Kennedy is elected, the new President will have much less assurance in the military area than Mr. Eisenhower has had. All of this, it seems to me, means that military institutions, the corporate voice of the military, as reflected primarily in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will play a much more important role--although the individual officers who make up the Joint Chiefs at any one time will probably be hardly known at all to the general public.

In this situation it seems to me that three institutional relationships are extremely important. First of all there are the intra-military institutional relations. Interservice conflict was in many respects a dominant feature of the scene in the immediate postwar period. In a sense, interservice conflict, as I indicated earlier, replaced or substituted for tension between the military leaders and the political leaders of the Government.

When the budget was reduced, this generally meant that the services fought each other more intensively rather than fighting the civilians, and it always meant that the Administration, whether it was Truman, back in 1948 or 1949, or the Eisenhower Administration of a couple years ago, could pick and choose among its military advice and choose those

strategic concepts and ideas which fitted in best with its own goals, or which each could reconcile most easily with these other objectives of welfare, expansion of the private sector, and balancing the budget.

I think this was very clearly seen back in 1958 and 1959 when the Army and the Navy were struggling with the Air Force over the issue as to whether to increase limited-war forces or to maintain as a matter of policy a counterforce strategy, which the Army and the Navy claimed simply meant an overkill capability. In effect, what the Administration did here was to adopt the Army and the Navy view on strategic retaliation and to adopt the Air Force view on limited war. The net result was that the opposition of the services cancelled each other out and weakened the general military structure.

In the future I do not think interservice conflict will be as vicious and as vigorous as it has been in times of the past. In a sense one can say that we are moving toward a greater degree of unification by a pluralization of conflict. As the unified and specified commands play a more important role, as being the combat forces of the services, it seems to me that will have a very complex pattern in which strategic concepts and strategic ideas do not necessarily coincide with service boundaries. And in a sense unification will come from this pluralization of conflict.

At the same time it seems to me that in this situation the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may come to play an increasingly important institutional role. This I think could give them

an opportunity to escape from the three-service rivalry which effectively limited the role of the joint-service organization in the early postwar period.

A second key aspect of future institutional relations will be the intra-executive relations of the military. Here I think the most important point deals with the relationship of the military leaders to the State Department. The problem here is much more on the State Department side, I think, than it is on the military side, because the State Department traditionally has not thought in terms of programs and force levels.

General Taylor, for instance, describes the State Department attitude in 1956-57 on the problems of force levels as one of curious detachment. "It was as if they felt that the conflicts in the Pentagon," he says, "were what the Japanese call a fire on the other side of the river."

This, to a very large extent, except during Mr. Acheson's tenure, has been the general attitude of the State Department. I think one of the most important things here is the development of a closer relationship between the State Department and the military with respect to decisions on programs and force levels. This is something which Senator Jackson's subcommittee has been very much concerned with in its work.

Finally, the third key institutional relationship will be the relation between the military and Congress. This, of course, is a continuing problem. I think the military now recognize that by and large Congress does not ever cut the military budget significantly and that Congressmen

generally are sympathetic to military needs. I think it is also necessary to recognize that Congress is usually friendly to the military simply because Congress does not have the power to decide these issues. The basic issues are resolved by the Executive Branch in the framework of the budgetary process and the National Security Council, and Congress, in a sense, is on the outside. None the less, the competence and the attitude of Congress with respect to military affairs have changed greatly in the recent years and the Congressmen now have a sophistication with respect to military affairs which completely belies, I think, the old stereotypes we used to have about Congressmen. People like Senator Jackson, Senator Symington, and others have developed a very great knowledge about the military and can bring a very broad view to military problems.

The important thing to recognize here, however, is that the Congressmen and Senators can be sympathetic observers and supporters for the military but they can never really make the decisions. It will always be the President who decides what funds are going to be spent for what.

Thus, it seems to me, the role of the military officer in the American Government in the future will be in a sense less pervasive than it has been in the past. We have a new generation of political leaders, not only in our two Presidential candidates but also in their supporters and followers, and these will take over many of the responsibilities

and roles which in the post-World-War-II period were performed by the military.

To a certain extent this may be counterbalanced by the fact that we will have an increasing number of military officers, about your rank, retiring after 20 years of service, and it is possible that these officers may play an important role in the middle levels of the Executive Branch in civilian capacity, although this will require some legislation from Congress, and this, too, is a subject which Senator Jackson's committee is very much concerned with.

By and large the role of the military officer will reflect the institutional positions within the military establishment--not individual prestige. This I think is probably on the whole a good thing. This means, however, that the military officers who leave the military establishment must take the responsibility for advancing their claims in the field of domestic politics. This, it seems to me, is inevitable and necessary. National security requires that they do this.

On the other hand, the problem, of course, is that, as Theodore Roosevelt said, about 50 years ago, "The great thing about an Army officer is that he does what you tell him to do." Despite the major changes in the military profession, there is probably still some grain of truth in this remark, and I think it would be a great shame if this characteristic were lost by the leaders of the military institutions. The traditional military values of discipline, loyalty, obedience, and

patriotism are obviously the ones which we need today.

On the other hand, however, the military must play an important role in advancing their own interests in the competition of domestic politics. American politics, like American business, operates on the individual-enterprise principle, and the military must play this active role.

The great problem for the military leaders is to balance this new role, the product of the cold war, with the old and traditional military virtues and habits which I am afraid are no less necessary in this period.

Thank you.

COLONEL HARVEY: Dr. Huntington is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: You indicated that there was some sort of difference in opinion as to military policy between the State and Defense Departments or some difference as to the way the policy could be carried out. Could you go into this just a little bit further and explain how you would improve this situation?

DR. HUNTINGTON: I think it is not so much a question of the difference in policy attitudes as it is a question of a difference in policy interests and concerns. The diplomat has always been much more concerned with the possible uses of military forces in complex situations in the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere. This is his primary concern.

To a very large extent I think one can contrast the Administration of

Mr. Dulles, I would say, with that of Mr. Acheson in this regard. There was this traditional concern which was uppermost in Mr. Dulles's mind. In a sense he developed what one might call the diplomacy deterrence, where Mr. Acheson, as Secretary of State, spent much more time in Washington and was more concerned with the programs for deterrence and much less with the active frontsmanship which I think is necessary and on which Mr. Dulles, by and large, did a very good job.

Both are necessary as elements of the State Department's interests but it seems to me that the concern of the State Department with military programs and the interest in military programs has been too little in recent years, and that a closer working relationship ought to be established between the military and the State Department in terms of making decisions on military programs and types of forces, and things of this nature.

The Jackson Subcommittee has considered various proposals along this line, including middle-level joint staffs in the State Department and the Defense Department, being an expansion of the staff of the National Security Council. I think this will help to a certain extent. I think also, as my reference to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dulles indicates, that it will also to a large extent reflect the personalities and interests of the Secretary of State. I think if you could wrap up Acheson and Dulles into the same man you would have the ideal Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Dr. Huntington, you suggested that military men should play a more active role in politics. I wonder if you would elaborate a little further on that and give some specific examples or ideas of exactly what military people should be doing.

DR. HUNTINGTON: I think the military should play a more active role, and I think they will have to play a more active role in advancing military needs. The best way in which this can be done is to have a more integrated set of military requirements.

As I indicated, one of the great difficulties in the past has been the division among the military. At no time have the military ever had a truly joint program. Outside of the period after World War II, the irreducible minimum program for all the service programs were 70 wings in the Air Force, or 114 wings, or 12 divisions for the Army, or 24 divisons, and so forth.

I think if the military are going to play a more effective role in advancing their legitimate plans--and as I say this is a necessary responsibility which they have--it will be necessary to develop an integrated military program. Then the politicking on behalf of this program will have to be largely within the Executive Branch of the Government. This is the arena in which these decisions are made. To a certain extent this can be supplemented by the testimony before Congressional committees.

But again, I think, it is necessary for all concerned to recognize that Congress does not in effect make these decisions. The President

and his advisers make the decisions. Congress can influence them, but cannot decide them. So, when I say that the military should play a more active political role I am not using "political" with reference to partisan politics; I am using it with reference to the big issues of national policy, and, necessarily, these issues are fought out within the Executive Branch, and it is within the Executive Branch that the military leaders will have to advance their claims.

I think, as I said, that the next President, whoever he is, will be much more willing to listen, or will feel compelled to listen much more, to what the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to say. Mr. Eisenhower didn't have to, but Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Nixon will have to, and this will be the place where I think the new political role of the military will manifest itself primarily.

QUESTION: Dr. Huntington, after World War II we heard a lot about the morale of the officers in the armed services. Officers were referred to as second-class citizens. There seemed to be a period there where we were whipping boys, particularly general officers and flag officers, in Congress, and we lost a lot of our fringe benefits. Was this, do you think, a result of of the fact that because the military had increased in importance we were now part of the commonplace and had lost our small clique, or was it just a case of looking at the good old days and the grass is greener on the other side of the fence?

DR. HUNTINGTON: I think that both factors played a role. I think primarily this was a continuation over into the new period of the cold war or the traditional American attitudes toward the military. The prominent role which military officers played in so many governmental agencies during the Truman Administration certainly perhaps tended to exacerbate this situation.

I remember that Hanson Baldwin and other teachers were writing articles called "The Military Moved In," and others along this line. But I think this was primarily simply a lag in the adjustment of popular and Congressional attitudes toward our new military requirements. I think to a very large extent this lag has now disappeared, is even eliminated completely. I think there is a much better understanding now of the need for a continuing strong military force, and a need for a professional career service in the military.

When you look at the changes that have taken place in the American military establishment in a relatively short time, you see they really are fantastic. Nobody in 1945, at the end of the war, had any idea or conceived of a military force such as we had 10 years later, in 1955, or of the military problems we would be dealing with then.

If you look at the postwar plans of the services which were blown up at the end of the war, they were essentially looking back toward a continuation on an altered, but not substantially altered, basis of

military concepts, programs, and activities which had existed before World War II.

In a decade the leaders of the military made a remarkable change, and I think now other groups in the American society are catching up. But inevitably this revolution takes a while to work itself out.

QUESTION: Dr. Huntington, I have the impression that the military didn't really assist in shaping foreign policy but actually overshadowed the State Department during the latter half of World War II. Would you care to comment on the truth or falsity of this idea?

DR. HUNTINGTON: This is a much debated point among the historians of World War II. The larger number, I think, would support your view that the military played a very important role. Others argue that actually FDR was running the show all the time, and I must say that I would tend probably to agree more with the latter than with the former. Certainly, the big decisions in World War II were made by the President and his military adviser, General Marshall, primarily, with very little participation by the Secretary of State who, for a large portion of the world, was away out in left field so far as the big issues were concerned, and with very little participation by the civilian Secretaries of the three services.

In this sense the military occupied a role which they had never occupied at any other time in American history. But I think in occupying this role the policies which were adopted, the decisions which were made, or the decisions which were postponed--which were the really important

decisions with respect to postwar issues--reflected a viewpoint which was general in the Government, which everybody assumed, that in an unconditional surrender we should postpone the major issues until after the war, and so forth. On the big decisions I don't think there was any disagreement between the Chiefs of Staff who talked with the President several times a week and the Secretary of State who saw him maybe once a month, if that. So that, although the military were in on the big decisions, I don't think that they would have been any different, really, if the civilian leaders, and particularly if the leaders of the State Department, had played a bigger role.

COLONEL HARVEY: Dr. Huntington, on behalf of your audience, I should like to express our appreciation for your very information and interesting lecture and your very fine responsive question period. Thank you very much, sir.