Property of the Library
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE
ARMED FORCES

GLOBAL POWER PATTERN THEORIES

Dr. Harold J. Clem

NOTICE

This lecture has not been edited by the speaker. It has been reproduced directly from the reporter's notes for the students and faculty for reference and study purposes.

No direct quotations are to be made either in written reports or in oral presentations based on this unedited copy.

Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 21 September 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1960-1961

GLOBAL POWER PATTERN THEORIES

1 September 1960

CONTENTS

	Page
SPEAKER--Dr. Harold J. Clem, Member of the Faculty, ICAF	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION	24

NOTICE

This lecture has not been edited by the speaker. It has been reproduced directly from the reporter's notes for the students and faculty for reference and study purposes.

No direct quotations are to be made either in written reports or in oral presentations based on this unedited copy.

Reviewed by: [illegible] Date: SEP 21 1960

Reporter: Grace R. O'Neale

Publication No. L61-15

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

GLOBAL POWER PATTERN THEORIES

1 September 1960

DR. CLEM: Admiral Patrick, Gentlemen: With this lecture this morning I have the privilege of inaugurating that portion of your study in the Foundations Unit dealing with modern warfare and strategic concepts.

In doing this I make just this one observation--that the rather formidable title of this lecture, "Global Power Pattern Theories," should certainly dispel at the outset any preconceived notions that the study be approached necessarily with caution and restraint.

It is a very broad subject that I have undertaken for myself.

Men of my age were conditioned, back in our earlier student days, to regard the term "power politics" as a dirty word. A cruel war had just ended in 1918, a war which was to end all wars, and we could expect at any moment the advent of that utopian world in which a parliament of man, representing all of the world's peoples, would force nations to observe a code of morality similar to those rules and principles which had long related to individual and local morality.

But, faced with the stark realities of the year 1960, we see a political world still falling far short of our dream--still characterized largely by the multi-state system--a world divided into sovereign political communities,

each sending ambassadors to a United Nations, but each still inclined to insist on being the ultimate judge of what constitutes its vital interests and of what action will properly safeguard those interests. And so today it is primarily with national power that we are still concerned, and the relative power positions of nation-states in the world.

There are those students of international affairs who have sought to discover, in this confusion of sovereign state politics, some distinct and fixed global pattern of power, some clearly cut design in which the power relationships of nations have been operating, and to which nations are perhaps unconsciously conforming. And through an intensive study of geography, of history, and of man's intellectual and scientific progress, these students have evolved certain theories as to the course which international politics may take in the future, and as to what the ultimate outcome of the struggle between nations may be should that struggle be permitted to go on unbridled.

And so I propose this morning to examine briefly a few of these theories, more specifically, those of Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman, since these in particular have enjoyed wide interest and appeal over the past 60 years.

In discussing these theories, I am fully aware that it is customary today to regard them largely as dated and now a part of history. But the value of the work of these men lies not so much in the ultimate

conclusions reached by them but rather in their approach—an approach which at bottom challenged their grasp and understanding of the broader relationships of power factors in the world at large and is symbolic of the kind of synthesis demanded of every serious student of world-power relationships today. Further, each man may be said to have evolved his own philosophy of world history--something for which Americans, at least, never felt any great need as long as they could enjoy the luxury of splendid isolationism, but now mandatory of all free-world nations when confronted with the necessity of developing an effective global strategy.

And so first to Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer. For the average American, I suppose, mention of the name, Mahan, is likely to conjure up images of long, gray lines of battleships, surging forth on a sea of blue, bent on performing some mysterious naval maneuver. But an examination of Mahan's voluminous writings will reveal that, while naval tactics and operations received detailed treatment therein, he was equally concerned, and perhaps more concerned, with exploring the broad role of maritime power in world affairs. In fact, maritime power, rather than sea power, would have been a more appropriate term for him to have employed, as he later admitted, since much of his work deals with the broad relationships of the sea as a whole to national power.

Mahan interpreted world politics basically as a continuing struggle

for control of the seas. That nation which controls the pathways of seaborne commerce possesses the key to world power.

Slide No. 1

When he looked on a map of the world, it was not the land masses thereon which held his attention but rather the water area which surrounds the land--a vast plain unbroken by obstacles, crossed and criss-crossed by unmarked but heavily traveled highways affording man a transportation system which overland transportation could never equal, either commercially or strategically.

From earliest times to his own day, Mahan held, these water areas had served as the great medium which brought nations and civilizations into contact with each other, culturally, economically, and politically. Did not history reveal that early civilization expanded and flourished along the seashores of the world? The Mediterranean Sea was the true power center of the ancient world, and control of that sea was the key to power. Was it not Greek maritime power which triumphed over the Persian horde at Salamis? And was not the fate of Carthage sealed when she lost control of the sea to Rome in the First Punic War? And, in more modern times, didn't British control of the seas doom Napoleon's Continental System to failure and thus contrive his ultimate downfall? In brief, said Mahan, history reveals that the important political and military decisions go to the nation possessing control of the sea, because it offers a system of communication and mobility far

superior to that on land. Because of the sea, the maritime power has access to a greater portion of the world's resources, can concentrate superior political and economic influence, as well as military force, more easily and more economically than can any land power.

But the core of Mahan's thesis was his theory of insular dominance, developed largely from his study of the evolution of British maritime power from the 16th century up to his day. From this study he concluded that insularity is a priceless asset in the struggle to control the seas. No state with insecure land frontiers can hope to compete successfully for maritime supremacy, at least, with a relatively strong state that is insular, because the state with land frontiers must divert too great a portion of its resources to defend those frontiers. Therefore, no Eurasian power could challenge the position of England, or, that of the United States, which Mahan regarded as enjoying a position of continental insularity here in North America.

It is generally conceded that Mahan had a profound impact on the events of his day. For England he provided the philosophical foundation for a power which England had exercised on the seas for centuries, and so he strengthened her determination to remain dominant on the sea. Further, he gave impetus to Germany's interest in the sea in the days of William II, the Flottenverein, and Admiral von Tirpitz. Again, Mahan's picture of national power as something derived from a combination of colonies, overseas trade, and naval power encouraged, certainly,

the late 19th century revival of imperialism and colonialism, particularly in Africa. And, of course, by direct influence, and through the political power of his friends, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge (that's the old Henry Cabot Lodge), Mahan played a leading role in persuading the United States to pursue a larger destiny in the world in the opening years of the 20th century.

In the first decade of the 20th century, an Englishman (of all people) arose to challenge this concept of the supremacy of seapower. This was the pioneer Scottish geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder. His views are to be found in two notable treatises, one, his paper entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History," read to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904; the other, his booked entitled "Democratic Ideals and Reality," published on the eve of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, and representing an expansion of the ideas contained in his earlier article.

Mackinder believed that the opening of the 20th century marked the end of a great historic epoch. The period of geographical exploration, inaugurated by Christopher Columbus and Vasco de Gama, had come to a close, he felt, with the remotest portions of the world now explored and politically appropriated. From henceforth, Mackinder believed, we should have to deal with a closed political system of worldwide scope. As he put it, every explosion of social forces occurring in this world, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space

and barbaric chaos, would henceforth be sharply reechoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world would be shattered in consequence. (Not until 40 years later were the people of the United States beginning to discern the real implications in that observation.)

Further, in this closed political system, Mackinder saw no such thing as equality of opportunity for nations. Rather, he perceived what he called an uneven distribution of fertility and of strategical opportunity upon the face of the globe--an uneven distribution of these things--and he said this had been and would continue to be at the root of struggle between nations. And in these struggles, there was no assurance that the predominance of maritime power over continental land power, which prevailed in his day, was any more than a passing phase in the eternal struggle between the two. Maritime power, he contended, was dependent, in the last analysis, on the possession of secure and productive bases on land; and mobility on land he conceived as rapidly approaching mobility on the sea. He held further that the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways on the globe, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single empire. This empire would combine power on sea and power on land under one rule, and ultimately would extend its sway over all the lands and seas of the globe—unless man recognized these geographical realities and took steps to counter them. (I might mention that

Arnold Toynbee, the British historian, arrives at a similar conclusion through "A Study of History," and his idea of the gradual but persistent evolution of today's multi-state system toward the formation of one huge, global, political unity is the very essence of the thesis of the systemic world revolution propounded by Dr. Strausz-Hupe and his associates in the book entitled "The Protracted Conflict.")

Slide No. 2

In essence, going back now to Mackinder, he saw the ultimate pivot area of world politics as that region (shown here on this map in orange) stretching from the Volga River eastward to the Lena River Basin, and from Tibet northward to the Arctic Ocean. To Mackinder, this region, inaccessible to seapower and possessing vast size and resources, represented the greatest natural fortress on earth, and, if ever a single power were able to control this land mass effectively, it would be in a position to dominate the world. It was this region which Mackinder ultimately named the heartland of the world.

Slide No. 3

The rimland area (shown in yellow) surrounding this heartland Mackinder called the inner or marginal crescent, consisting of Western and Central Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and China--in other words all those continental states of Eurasia which have direct access to the sea, and which could therefore exercise power both on sea and on land.

Slide No. 4

An outer crescent (shown in green) Mackinder said consisted of all the outlying continents or islands (according to his concept), in which category you will notice he placed North and South America and Australia.

For years it was Mackinder's fear that some East European nation, such as Germany, with access to the sea, might get control of this heartland fortress and thereby pose a threat to England and all the nations of Europe. So this is the origin of his oft-quoted warning to the Versailles peacemakers in 1919:

> "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
> Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island
> Who rules the World Island commands the World."

Why did Mackinder attribute so much importance to this portion of the old Russian Empire of his day? He reasoned that the spaces within the Russian Empire were so vast and their potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals so great that it was inevitable that a vast economic world would develop there, inaccessible to ships.

In fact, he saw Russia occupying the central strategical position in the world at large. She could strike on all sides and, of course, be struck on all sides save the North. And Mackinder, looking at Russia in 1904, believed that the full development of her railway mobility

was merely a matter of time. Nor did he believe it likely (and this is interesting) that any possible social revolution would alter Russia's essential relations to the great geographical limits of her existence.

True, he recognized that in the circumstances of the balance of power then prevailing this pivot state, Russia, was not yet equivalent to the peripheral states. But an oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit it the use of the continent's vast resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This Mackinder believed might happen if Germany were to ally herswlf with Russia. Or, were the Chinese to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom, because thereby they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent.

Remember, gentlemen, these were Mackinder's observations, and his words, in fact, 56 years ago.

Mackinder lived to see his fundamental thesis incorporated into the "Geopolitik" of the German, Karl Haushofer. He lived long enough to see Germany, under Hitler, make a supreme effort to conquer this heartland and fail. But he also witnessed the rise of Russia, under Soviet rule, to the position of a world power. And, adding a final postscript to his thesis in 1943, Mackinder believed he saw his heartland garrisoned, for the first time in history, by a government and state

strong enough in military, economic, and political power to exploit its geographic position to the fullest.

Slide No. 5

There are those in this audience, I know, who will be quick to observe that it was a Mercator world map which served to support so well the logic of the heartland thesis, and that mobility by air now demands that we exchange Mercator for a polar projection in which the skyways of the Arctic give validity to a new way of regarding the geographical relationship of this heartland to the rest of the world. Now it is revealed all too clearly that North America is not an outer island, setting far off to one side, but is almost contiguous to this heartland. The heartland's defenses against conventional sea and land attack are now of little avail against attack from the air, and its vast resources and industry now stand exposed to the long-range air power of North America--and then suddenly we stop, realizing that such mobility provides a two-way street in the present context of things, and North America is also vulnerable.

On that evening in London back in 1904, when Mackinder concluded his lecture on the "Geographical Pivot of History" the meeting was thrown open for discussion and comment by the audience. In the record of these proceedings it is to be noted that one Mr. L. S. Amery, later to become First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for India,

arose and called attention to the fact that, while currently it might be valid to base a power-pattern thesis on the relative merits of mobility on land as against mobility on sea, might it not be anticipated that these two mobilities would be supplemented eventually by the air as a means of locomotion--and I am reading it right; he doesn't say "be supplanted eventually by the air" but "supplemented eventually by the air"--and in that event would not a great deal of geographical distribution lose its importance and the successful powers be those that have the greatest industrial basis? He concluded by asserting, "It will not matter whether they are in the centre of a continent, or on an island; those people who have the industrial power and the power of invention and of science will be able to defeat all others." (I think this observation is all the more remarkable in that it was made only a few weeks after the Wright Brothers had made their first flight.)

I can find no record of Mackinder's reply to Amery at that time, nor does he furnish a reply in his book published in 1919. In fact, not until 1943, just four years before his death, and after having had some opportunity to observe air power in action in World War II, did he give his answer. It is contained in an article entitled "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," appearing in the July 1943 issue of Foreign Affairs. Here we find that Mackinder has greeted air mobility as the ally of land mobility and land power in this heartland. May I quote:

"I have no hesitation in saying that my concept of the Heartland is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago. . . It is true that the Arctic shore is no longer inaccessible in the absolute sense that held until a few years ago, but a hostile invasion across the vast area of circum-polar ice, and over the tundra and Targa forests of Northern Siberia, seems almost impossible in the face of Soviet land-based air defense.

(I wonder what he would think if he knew of submarines today going under that circumpolar ice.)

"Some persons today seem to dream of a global airpower which will liquidate fleets and armies. I am impressed, however, by the broad implications of the fact that air power depends absolutely on the efficiency of its ground organization."

Slide No. 6

Others have attacked Mackinder's heartland thesis by stressing the pivotal importance of the area which Mackinder had designated as rimland.

And here we return to Mahan. Today, certain serious students of Mahan, viewing his thesis within the context of the current East-West struggle, see him as the advocate of a global strategy based on rimland or peripheral control of Russia. They hold that, when one looks at the globe today, one still sees the vast water areas surrounding the land masses, stabbing deep into every continent. They point out that the

major centers of civilization are still concentrated in areas easily accessible from the sea. One is not to be unduly impressed by the size of this Asiatic hinterland. More impressive is the vast area and power potential of the other five-sixths of the globe. Compared to the power potential of the maritime world, that of this Asiatic heartland is still outclassed by a wide margin. In fact, does it deserve the name, heartland? Certainly, until land transportation in this Eurasian land mass becomes a network such as that in the United States, that area remains an island that can be contained, squeezed, and exhausted, provided enough patience is exercised, and provided that the water around and the air above the periphery are controlled. True, they say, today mobility by air has increased the vulnerability of sea transportation as well as land transportation. But land transportation systems are vulnerable to a greater degree than ships, which travel over a readymade highway system, requiring no bridges, no tunnels, no maintenance, no repairs. Rather, the advent of air mobility has enhanced the power of the sea, permitting it to extend its dominating influence over land areas previously denied to it, and to strike at great distances inland from the coast. And finally, if a nation gives serious thought to the potentialities in submarine mobility, it will find "no essential difference between the effectiveness of operating in the air or under the water."

This, it is argued, is Mahan today.

The most effective proponent of the rimland thesis was Dr. Nicholas J. Spykman, late Sterling Professor of International Relations at Yale University. In his book, "The Geography of the Peace," published in the closing year of World War II, Spykman dealt with the heartland and rimland concepts especially in the light of the advent of air mobility. First, he took to task those who proposed that the advent of air power had so completely changed the power relationships between the great states that no map other than a polar projection could adequately portray the world of today. He conceded the military importance of the polar region, but he reminded his readers that it was well to assess its importance in terms of the geography which conditions all exercise of power. And here he believed it more important to remember that the centers of power and communication are still in the middle latitudes of the Atlantic and Pacific areas--that it is no accident that the great masses of the world's population are concentrated in these lower latitudes instead of the inhospitable North. Thus, Spykman believed that it would always be the skyways and seaways of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that would most effectively carry our overall influence into the world.

Slide No. 7

And it was from this point of view that Spykman evolved his basic thesis that Mackinder's rimland of Eurasia is more important than his heartland. All this area here (in gray) he regarded as a buffer zone

between maritime power and continental land power, and he modified Mackinder's little jingle to read:

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the World."

And it was Spykman's belief that if a major maritime power, such as the United States, could unite the rimland and control the marginal seas around the heartland, then this heartland power could be confined to its inland fortress.

Slide No. 8

Then Spykman concluded with a warning to the United States. He visualized the New World both as being surrounded by and as surrounding the land masses of Eurasia, Africa, and Australia. It must always be the objective of the United States, he held, both in peace and in war, to prevent a unification of heartland and rimland in the Old World. For, if this should happen, the Western Hemisphere center of power could be confronted by a combined Eurasian power potential possessing two-and-one-half times the area and ten times the population of the Americas. And even were the industrial productivity of the New World nevertheless to balance that of the Old, the United States would still find herself irresistibly encircled by a superior force.

The Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman theses are, to a large degree, variations of the same global concept. And their similarities to what we call containment are obvious. Especially does Spykman's view that the

pivotal area can be bottled up by a strong rimland crescent come close to our original concept of containment.

Slide No. 9

In fact, in terms of heartland and rimland the West, in evolving its system of military alliances, has adopted the rimland concept as a valid counter to the Soviet threat of expansion by armed aggression. This yellow ring here, depicting the free-world network of alliances, does not correspond exactly with the classic rimland of Mackinder, since parts of that rimland have already slipped into the heartland's orbit. Too, there are one or two glaring gaps in that ring, and even the yellow portions are subjected to periodic stresses and strains.

Containment has meant, first of all, stopping the Soviet Union's expansion into the rimland areas--a policy which was inaugurated officially back in 1947 with President Truman's plea for American aid to Greece and to Turkey down on that rimland. But the philosophical basis for the pursuit of such a policy has been cited as set forth in an article entitled, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," appearing in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, with the author at the time identified only as "X" but soon revealed to have been George F. Kennan, career foreign service officer and, I should say, a profound student of Russian history. Since there is considerable evidence that the views held by Mr. Kennan at that time have had no small impact on our own official

concept of the pattern of power in the world today, I would like to examine them briefly.

Mr. Kennan's original thesis rested first on the premise that there are two basic facts of geography and history which have determined the nature of Russian national character and governmental institutions throughout modern history, irrespective of the ideology prevailing there at any given time. The first of these facts is that the Russians live in a vast, defenseless plain, where they have always been surrounded by hostile forces. The second fact is that their society and culture have ever been weak, disorganized, and primitive, judged by Western standards. As a result Kennan contended that the Russians have traditionally suffered from a sense of insecurity and their rulers from an inferiority complex. They have always been consumed by fear--fear of foreign penetration, fear of direct contact between the Western World and their own, fear of what would happen if the Russian people learned the truth about the world outside, or if foreigners learned the awful truth about the world inside. Thus, Russia's rulers have learned to seek security only in waging a patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

The advent of Marxism in Russia, Kennan held, and the Marxist doctrine of the irrepressible conflict between Marxism and capitalism, is just a convenient vehicle serving only to enhance still further the concept of Mother Russia encircled on all sides by hostile forces. It

has provided Russia's rulers with a more plausible apology and justification for the exercise of autocratic power and with a more intense faith in the ultimate triumph of Russia's cause, without the urgency of adhering to any fixed timetable to insure success.

And so Russia's political behavior under Soviet rulers, as under the Czars, is a matter of persistently and patiently applying pressure on the outside world. Its main concern is to fill every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But Russian rulers have always been very realistic in evaluating the odds against them. If they find dangerous or unassailable barriers in their path, they accept them and accommodate themselves to them and patiently await the opportunity to advance at a later date. But their main concern is that there be increasing, constant pressure toward the desired goal, and this need not be reached at any given time.

This, in essence, was Mr. Kennan's diagnosis of the problem faced by the United States and the free world after World War II. But what was his solution? What could be done in the face of such persistence? He contended that verbal arguments will never be of any avail. Russian pressure cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. Russian rulers see the world as they want to see it, and the vast fund of objective fact about human society is drawn on only when it serves to bolster an outlook already preconceived. Further, the Soviet ability to lay out and follow consistently a long-range plan, retreating when necessary but

advancing at the first sign of weakness in the enemy lines, makes short and sporadic acts of resistance futile. No, to Kennan the most effective policy for the West would be a long-range containment effort, pursued as steadily, patiently, and resourcefully as the policy pursued by the Russians. This would involve the diligent application of Western power at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. The West must confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every such point. More important (and this is a fact which is often overlooked in Kennan's treatise) Kennan believed that the United States must demonstrate to the world that it is capable of dealing successfully with its own internal problems, that it is a country which knows what it wants, and that it possesses a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.

In sum, Kennan believed that such a program of continuous pressure, applied from the outside, if vigorously pursued for a period of 10 to 15 years, would so frustrate and disillusion Russia's leaders as to result in either a genuine mellowing of Soviet power or in its complete breakup. For, as he put it, no mystical Messianic movement can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

But, you ask, does Mr. Kennan himself still adhere to his original thesis? Could it be that some 11 years later he came to the conclusion

that the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union in the interim had not found its match in adequate counterpressure from the West? And thus, convinced of the bankruptcy of containment, does he now suggest that we rapidly disengage ourselves both territorially and emotionally from the Russians in an effort to avoid an awful showdown?

Of course the controversy which has arisen over Mr. Kennan's suggestions on military disengagement has served merely to underscore the prevalence of a wide difference of opinion as to what the exact nature of the Soviet threat is--military or political. And when I say "political" I use that term in its broadest sense--to embrace the economic and psychological aspects of the threat. Until recently, I think, and in spite of the Marshall Plan and the array of economic aid and economic defense programs instituted since 1947, there has been a distinct tendency in our country to view the Soviet threat largely in terms of its military implications. In reading Mr. Kennan's works, both past and present, I find that he has adhered rather consistently to the concept of the totality of the threat which we face. In his six lectures on "Russia, the Atom, and the West," delivered over the BBC in England in the latter part of 1957, Mr. Kennan summed up his views as follows:

"The Soviet threat, as I have had occasion to say before, is a combined military-political threat, <u>with the accent on the political</u>. . . It cannot be too often reiterated that our contest with Soviet Power is of so pervasive and subtle a nature that our purpose cannot be served by

any single agency of policy, such as the military. It is the sum total of our performance that counts; our effort must embrace all facets of our national behavior. Moscow fights with all the political and psychological means at hand."

To Mr. Kennan, therefore, I find, containment has been as much a matter of achieving a healthy internal life in each country of the free world as that of applying military counterpressure at every point on this rimland of Russia. To him the real struggle between East and West is a struggle for men's minds, the struggle to influence the deeper convictions of men. And the outcome may depend less on the vigor with which each--the United States and the Soviet Union--pursues foreign policy programs deliberately designed to achieve its objectives than on the example which each is able to present to the rest of the world through the successful solution of its own internal problems. This, to Mr. Kennan, has constituted the real challenge.

But there is still a second major issue which the controversy over disengagement has served to highlight, I think. It is the question of the actual end in view in pursuing a policy of containment. What is the objective? Has this buildup of Western counterforce since 1957 had as its ultimate objective the achievement of a political and military posture so powerful that Soviet power would just disintegrate before it, and thus assure that our problems in Europe and Asia would be solved automatically on our own terms? Or was its purpose to create bargaining power

with a view to the eventual compromise of differences between East and West? I find that Mr. Kennan is of this latter view. In an article appearing in the January 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs, defending his stand in military disengagement in Europe, he writes:

"There were those of us who, in the inspiring days of the birth of the Marshall Plan and NATO, conceived that the purpose of the cultivation of Western strength was to place the West in a position where it would some day be able to negotiate the liquidation of the vast misunderstanding represented in the division of the continent. What loomed to us at the end of this road we were entering upon was not the crushing of Soviet power by the force of our actions but compromise--compromise on terms more favorable to ourselves than the conditions of that day would have permitted. Here lay the connection, which many have found it so hard to discern, between containment and disengagement. . . It did not occur to us that there was to be, in the institutional and particularly military devices which we were then creating, anything so sacrosanct that these devices could not one day be modified or exchanged in favor of ones with a wider range of relevance and acceptance. There were others, we must now conclude, who saw these things quite differently."

Gentlemen, you may be inclined to regard much of what I have had to say here this morning as of purely academic interest. But I submit that this question of whether we rigidly contain or whether we steer a

course looking forward ultimately to some kind of accommodation with the Russians is not. Certainly it poses a question of crucial significance to all of us. And for those of us who may be unrelenting in our support of a vigorous policy of containment and who may at the same time accept the thesis that the world is now in the crucial stages of a persistent systemic revolution, the question looms large as to whether containment, viewed from the standpoint of certain of its connotations, is a strategy adequate to assure a future world made basically in the image of freedom.

Thank you.

COLONEL SILLS: Gentlemen, Dr. Clem is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: I appreciated very much your summary at the end when you indicated some of the problems that are contained in policy growing out of some of these other theories that are not necessarily solved. Yesterday and on several other occasions the problem has been described as the battle for men's minds. I am particularly concerned with the fact that in the Communist orbit today is found 40 percent of the land area of the world and over 50 percent of the population of the world, and it doesn't seem to me that we dealt yesterday nor as yet today with the question of what our approach is in this policy of containment for the battle of men's minds within the Communist orbit today. Is it enough to deal with the battle for men's minds in the rimland or in the outer circle, and where does this kind of policy lead us in terms of the battle for men's minds

in this equally significant 50 percent of the world's population?

DR. CLEM: That's a pretty broad question. Certainly containment has come to mean much more than merely a containment of Soviet or Communist World military expansion on the peripheral areas. Containment has come to mean--shall I use this term?--containment of men's minds all over the world, or winning of men's minds to the West.

I wouldn't dare tackle that problem now as to how perhaps we should do it. I can, however, think of some things we could do to improve on containment as it has been prosecuted so far. For one thing, I think the people of our country have got to recognize that we are already in World War III and abandon this idea that this is basically a period of peace in which we can just conduct business as usual. As someone has said, the Communists may win World War III simply because they know they are in it. We have to recognize the true nature of this Soviet threat--its totality--and be agreed as to its nature. And here again I am impressed that even the various arms of our own Government are not agreed on this threat. I think here is where we've got to begin.

From that point perhaps you can evolve , once you've got that agreement, a unified theory of conflict and a unified strategic policy to prosecute that conflict, with a military engagement viewed as just one aspect, or with the military view as just one aspect.

A corallary of this may be the need to evolve a central government agency which can effectively coordinate and implement a strategy of

global and total conflict. You are going to study about the National Security Council and so on, and its handling of the grave decisions here, in the next unit. This I feel is one thing that is called for before we can even think about what we are going to do out here in carrying on a policy of containment in people's minds.

I often think that perhaps we will have to be prepared to adjust our institutions, perhaps our governmental processes, and our free-enterprise system to enable us to conduct the conflict effectively. In other words, it may require a regimentation of our economic life and a considerable streamlining of our democratic decision-making process. You may say, "In pursuing such a policy and in taking such steps we are going to violate the very ideals for which we stand, and we are going to dissipate the very system which we are trying to preserve." My answer to that is that it is becoming more and more a case of survival. I think I would rather see a regimented West win this struggle than a regimented Eastern world, because, even with the West regimented, I know that there is a liberal tradition there, and I could hope that this would not fail to come out in the end and that this period of regimentation would be a fairly temporary affair. But in the East there is no hope of a liberal tradition--as I see it--coming out.

QUESTION: I fail to see how you can accomplish containment by disengagement.

DR. CLEM: Captain, I must tell you that it is not clear in my own

mind as to whether Mr. Kennan views disengagement as a mere tactic in achieving a further containment of the Soviet Union or as a step toward relaxing tensions—something perhaps he hopes for--preparatory to achieving some kind of permanent accommodation with Russia. As I say, I am not clear in my own mind whether he regards this just as a tactic to push the Russians backwards.

Have you read the disengagement treatise? Are you acquainted with it? It applies largely to Eastern Europe. The proposal which he has made--and which others have made, such as Rapocki, the Prime Minister in Poland--is that we agree with Russia to just pull our forces out of Central Europe. Say perhaps we agree to pull our forces back to France, or perhaps pull them out of Europe altogether--he is not clear on this, either--and in return they agree to pull their forces out of Eastern Europe.

As I say, I don't know whether he regards this as a tactic in trying to contain the Russians or push them back further, or as a means of relaxing tensions preparatory to going on to define some kind of permanent accommodation with the Russians. I am not sure about this.

COLONEL SILLS: Dr. Clem, on behalf of the faculty and the students, thank you for a very fine lecture and for helping us to get on with our studies.