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CURRENT NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Colonel William R. Kintner, USA

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Reviewed by: Tom W. Sills, Colonel, USA

Date: 22 September 1960

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2 September 1960

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Reviewed By: Col T. W. Sills, USA Date SEP 22 1960

Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

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DR. SANDERS: Gentlemen: So far in our study of combined war and strategic concepts we have reviewed the traditional global power series and the nature of conflict in modern warfare.

Today we look forward to a discussion of Current National Strategic Concepts. Today's speaker is not only a scholar and an author but a U. S. Army officer who has served with distinction on various planning assignments of increasing importance. He is presently assigned to the Army Research Office, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, and is working on a special project with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

I would call your attention to his latest volume, "Protracted Conflict," which has generated much discussion throughout the United States. If I may add a personal note, I have been associated with our speaker in his latest book, entitled "A Forward Strategy for America," over the past few years. I am sure that he will bring to this lecture the same sure grasp of the subject, an analytical talent which I have observed on many occasions.

This is our speaker's second lecture at the Industrial College.

It is a pleasure and a privilege to present to you Colonel William R. Kintner.

COLONEL KINTNER: General Mundy, Gentlemen:

Last week I happened to be out at the Commonwealth Club in California and I learned all about how this electronic monstrosity was developed. Billy Graham was giving a speech in the Commonwealth Studio, and the IBM group was present. Graham complained that there wasn't a decent podium in the country. Why he needs one, I don't know. Anyway, he made this complaint, and Mr. Watkins said, "What should be the elements of the podium?" Graham described it, so here it is.

Unfortunately, while talking there, I left my notes behind, so I have to draw on some other material for today. I hope I won't be in the position of the famous author who gave a talk to a group of literary critics at a sort of women's salon affair. After he had given his talk he waited with the hostess to receive the congratulations of the audience. He was receiving these with aplomb when a little boy came along in the lines for some reason or other, and he said, "You know, your speech was much too long." He took this in stride and shrugged his shoulders. After 10 or 20 other people filed by he saw this little apparition appear on the scene again. This time he said, "You didn't organize your speech very well." He took this all right. But a little while later when he saw this little boy again in the line he really shuddered. This time the little boy said, "You didn't say too much." Well, this time the hostess came to his rescue and said, "Don't worry about that little boy. He's not very smart. All he does is go around and say

what everyone else is saying."

Today I would like to very briefly outline some of our national policy objectives and some of the ways we are trying to achieve them, in relation, however, to our opposition, because policy and strategy at the national level by its very definition is a two-sided street, and we should see the two things in perspective.

The first point that I would like to make is that our national objectives are rather clear. I think there is universal agreement on them. The great controversy we have over how to attain our objectives can be traced directly to the Constitution. The Preamble provides for the common defense. This is the first point--our security. Second, we want to create a world environment in which a society such as ours can exist, thrive, and flourish.

Next, we wish to promote the economic well-being of our own country and in as much of the rest of the world as we can. And, finally, we hope to achieve over a long period of time a peaceful evolution of the Communist system, so that we can dwell in a more harmonious world than the one we are living in at the present moment.

These goals are in sharp distinction, but not too sharp, with the Communist goals. The great goal of communism is, oddly enough, world peace. They are quite certain about this and it is the one long-term attraction which they hold out to the rest of the world.

Their requirements for peace are somewhat different from ours.

Going back to their basic ideology, they assess that the greatest stumbling block to peace is the existence of the system of private property and the right to free exercise of it. They claim that possession of things, and property in particular, creates aggrandizing tendencies among people and leads them to quarrel among themselves, among small societies, and eventually among nations. Therefore, in order to achieve peace, the entire system of political order which is based on the free right of the use of private property must be destroyed. Therefore, their objective of peace requires our destruction.

How do they go about this? Briefly, we have tried to set forth some of these ideas in the study which Dr. Sanders mentioned, "Protracted Conflict," which sets forth how a weaker power, over time, gradually attains strength and displaces a stronger power. They have developed this doctrine over the course of the historical experience of a revolutionary movement over the past 100 years which Marx helped to codify and which Lenin later developed. Mao Tse-tung and Stalin have added to the doctrine.

In the application of this principle, you will note one thing that they have applied consistently--military organization and methodology--to the solution of their political problem. Their political problem is: How can a small, organized group gain and maintain control of a large mass of people, whether it be in a given country, in several countries,

or in the world? They decided this could be done only if they had a highly organized, disciplined organization, which is the Communist international structure. They have applied military methodology to the solution of their problem by using the standard military concepts--principles of war, if you will--in political problems: the concentration of force, the massing, the offensive. All these qualities are in there.

They have added another concept, and that is the ability to look at the entire world scene from a global point of view. Remember, their goal requires the destruction of all systems which are based on the right and exercise of the use of private property. This being their goal, as long as they do not achieve this on a global basis they will always be insecure.

In the doctrines of Lenin, time after time he states that the instinct toward ownership, toward capitalism, is a very strong force in human nature and it has to be eradicated wherever it appears.

Therefore they look at the world scene as a whole and they call this the wider strategic vision. In time of peace they regard us as we would regard an avowed enemy in time of war. They think in terms of continents to be seized, areas of power to be outflanked, such as Western Europe or, eventually, the United States. They think in terms of competing economic systems, of taking from the free-world market economy and adding it to their own controlled, autarchy economy. They think in terms of carrying on cultural and phychological warfare, or conditioning,

against the enemy in peace, the same way that we would carry it on against an enemy in war. They think of operating against enemy economic systems the way we would conduct strategic bombing against enemy logistic systems in war.

Now, they have a number of tactical principles which they apply. Some of the more important are deception--deceiving as to their true strength at certain times--giving a false impression of their next maneuver; the concept of attrition; the concept of the cost of initiative. All Communists, wherever they are, are at war constantly. They don't take time off. They are always involved in a conflict relationship with us.

The strategy of the indirect approach is one of their favorites—operate through proxy, through neutrals, through fronts. Let someone else carry the ball. Do not get involved directly if you can possibly avoid it.

Next, they have a principle which we have called the principle of the inverted golden rule: Prevent others from doing unto you what you are doing unto them.

This is the operational principle behind the Iron Curtain. Behind the Iron Curtain they have what we call the peace zone, where all is progress, moving toward the creation of a new Soviet state and a new Soviet man. There there can be no outside interference, no free movement

of ideas or persons across the frontier. Outside of that territory is the war zone, which is the territory we influence and control. There is fair game. There is where the cold war has been fought. There the Communist agents, the Communist organizations, the Communist propaganda, the Communist arms, and the Communist economic maneuvers can take place. And they use the very legalities of our system to insure that they can take place. In other words, they want the game so defined that no action takes place inside their area and all action is confined to ours.

If you continue to play the game according to their rules, you are in the same position as the football team which voluntarily decides it will never carry the ball beyond the 50-yard line. They put up a whale of a defensive game but will never score a touchdown and will never win.

By applying these rules and by dint of their own hard work, the Communists have made a great deal of headway. They have essentially reversed what they used to describe as the capitalist encirclement of the socialist bloc. Starting in about 1955 they said this phase was over and that the socialist encirclement of the last remaining capitalist bastions in Western Europe and the United States had begun. Now they are beginning to plant their beach heads against the very frontiers of the capitalist bloc--i.e., Cuba, i.e., Guinea and other places in Africa.

So, consequently, in their terminology we are no longer containing them and they are beginning to contain us.

Now, there have been many questions raised in this country of whether or not the Communists are still serious in going through with this scheme of trying to gain some type of world hegemony. There is belief in Khrushchev's statement that they will bury us and recognition of the inescapable logic of the conflict between two systems, based on two different concepts of political and economic organization but also on two different concepts of what is man and what is he doing here on earth.

Though they have often stated these intentions to gradually displace us, or quickly if they can, they have also added a new factor, and that is the acquisition in their intercontinental ballistic missile of a thermonuclear warhead. This gives them a global weapon system which can support a global organization for gradual acquisition of power. We have seen many instances where this has been used via the nuclear blackmail route, starting with Suez and becoming more specific in the last few months when Khrushchev stated that he would, if necessary, use missiles against the United States to prevent any interference in the socialist developments in Cuba.

It might be interesting to know that this tactic was foreshadowed in a speech which he made on last January 14, which I think is a very important one, as it states their new strategic concept. They will work around the nuclear equation and utilize what they believe is an apparently advantageous position in missiles to impress upon us over the

next several years when they think they have this advantage and pick up a greater acquisition of strength and territory and influence.

This strategy of nuclear blackmail, however, has very dangerous connotations for them. In the first place, every time they make a serious advance in their protracted conflict they run the risk that the democratic powers may finally wake up and see what is going on and may take in time the actions which are necessary. Therefore they alternate their periods of tensions with their periods of coexistence.

Mr. Khrushchev has defined coexistence in many ways, but I think the significance of it is that he does not want to unnecessarily arouse us before we are in a position where, even if we are aroused, we cannot do very much about it. So every now and then the Communists have engaged in serious coexistence campaigns or peace campaigns. There have been 5 or 6 major ones since World War II, and after each period then they go in again to the offensive.

An example of this, I think, is, the previous major peace campaign was the one which culminated in the Summit Meeting of 1955. After there was a public detent established they really moved into the Middle East via the arms deal with Egypt. After you have gone through a period of this it takes a while for the democratic peoples to recognize the shift, and the will to meet the shift decreases. Then you go into a period of tension such as we are having now, after the last one ended with the Summit Meeting in 1960.

Following these periods of tension when they go into the next peace offensive, thus far it has seemed that more people in the West look more longingly toward the possibility of accommodation. This is an example of what you might call the Pavlavian conditioning which they practice on an international scale. They have put the needle into us; they have impressed us with the seriousness of their determination; the growing nuclear power they have paralyzes elements in the West; and the next time they ring the bell and say, "Peace is possible; let us work together," then more people come to their side.

Interestingly enough, Mr. Khrushchev, on the agenda for his United Nations appearance is going to, among other things, encourage the education of the youth of the world in the doctrine of coexistence. We shall see how successful he is on that.

Now, just very briefly--the Communists have a few aces in the hole in carrying through this strategy. The first is that they occupy geographically the famous heartland position which Mackinder described. The heartland of Eurasia, which they don't have quite complete control of, may not have all the advantages of 50 years ago, before the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile and manned aircraft. But it still represents the best geographical base on earth if you are going to carry through a global strategy.

In addition, they have economic resources which are beginning to reach the point where they can sustain over a long haul a major military

effort at least equivalent to that which we are running for at the present time.

Next, they have their aspirations to achieve technological supremacy. You are all familiar with the statistics that they are turning out three times as many technologically trained people, scientists, and engineers as we are--as many as all Western Europe combined. According to the trend experts, unless we make a greater effort in the West or somehow combine our resources with NATO, by about 1970 they should achieve a genuine technological supremacy. These are predictions made by people such as Mr. Teller, the father of the H-bomb.

This is important to realize, because the Communists are materialists. They believe that he who controls the superior mode of production, in the broad sense of the word, in the long run gains political supremacy. So this technological threat is something to take into account.

On the ideological front they have used ideology for the last 40-odd years to demonstrate to the rest of the world--at least to some elements of the rest of the world--that they have the system of the future. They may not have it at all, but they have been very successful in selling some of their ideas. Take Latin America, for example. At the current time we are regarded by many of the intellectuals, the opinion-forming groups down there, as imperialists. We are not imperialists by our standards, but, according to their definition of imperialism, he who has an economic

relationship with a capitalistic country is under imperialist domination. They have spread the word that trade between them and the friendly socialist states is paternal and beneficial, and the economic relations between us and our friends is obviously exploitation. Mr. Castro's view from Cuba, of course, holds this line, and he is helping the Communists spread it through Latin America.

So they have used this ideology of their position to help pull the rug out from underneath us in many parts of the world. Unfortunately for us, I don't think we have taken advantage of the fact that the Communist ideology is their weakest point. After 42 years in power their own internal domestic propaganda line often points out the shortcomings of their system.

There was an important ideological directive put out in January of this year where they stated:

"Our oral and printed propaganda still suffers from serious shortcomings. The advantages of socialism are poorly and sometimes unskillfully explained in ideological educational work and so forth. We must wage a relentless struggle against individual manifestations of political attitudes of nationalism and cosmopolitanism which still occur in our Soviet life. . ."

This is an area, I think, where we could do much more. I may have a chance to get back to that later.

Broadly speaking, how are we meeting this great challenge?

I think one, in looking at our policy, could say that we are still pursuing in very general terms the containment policy laid down by Mr. Kennan in his famous article in Foreign Affairs in 1947, where he put forth the thesis that, if we could hold the Communist system within its then existing orbit and frustrate them from further advance, in time the seeds of internal disillusionment would crop up and the system would modify itself and become more compatible and one we could live with. This in general has been the strategy of the West and of the United States in particular.

Unfortunately we have not done too well in implementing this strategy. We have not contained them. They have made serious advances since 1947. I can cite only the shift of China from the non-Communist world into their orbit as the major one. There have been other peripheral advances, plus a new historical fact--the significant penetration into the Middle East. After having been kept out of there for 200 years, they are in there. You can take the penetrations in Africa, and you can take some of the penetrations in Latin America, where they have broken entirely out of their orbit.

Therefore, the policy of containment, whether it is sound or not, has never really been tested, because we have not effectively carried it through.

Now, we don't state that our policy is that in our national security documents, but essentially our national security documents state something

like this: That we must maintain adequate military strength to meet the threat of both general and limited war, and use that strength when put to a test. We must promote economic growth throughout the free world. We must provide leadership for the free-world coalition, keeping our chickens together, so to speak, so that we deal with this more or less organized offensive of the Communist Bloc with some organic concepts of coordination and cooperation. Finally, we must engage in a peaceful contest with the Soviet Union.

Let's break this thing down to what we are trying to do and to the functional aspects of policy. On the political front we are trying to keep our alliance system in good shape, to keep it from deteriorating. We have had some fair success in this. I think our most importance alliance, NATO, has weathered many storms. Whether it is in as good shape now as we'd like to see is questionable. I think there are many divisive tendencies in NATO which we must somehow learn to counter if we are going to keep that in good shape.

We went after the Baghdad Pact, and we now have an organization called CENTRO, because Baghdad has slipped out of the previous organization. SEATO, I think, has done what it set out to do. It was never an alliance in which we were committed with forces, the way we were in NATO. But, whether the situation in Southeast Asia is any more favorable today than it was some years ago--I think in certain areas it is--or whether there are also some incipient dangers there is something

that can be left open for general discussion.

We are supposed to maintain our alliances not only for purposes of security but as an end in themselves, as an effort to assure these nations of the free world that we want to collaborate with them in economic, political, and cultural spheres, because we recognize that, unless we do that, the unity of the free world will never be achieved nor can we create conditions for favorable change inside the Communist Bloc.

In addition to our alliances we have other political problems, namely the question of dealing with the neutrals, the so-called uncommitted nations. We run into many snags along this line. For example, if we give assistance, as we did for a long time, to Mr. Nasser and neglect the Turks, who are one of our staunchest and most determined allies, we create dissension there. We run into problems in the Philippines. They say, "Well, if you are doing this in Indonesia, you are flirting openly with the Communists. Why don't you do more for us?"

We have never yet resolved this dilemma. We don't want to ignore the neutrals. We have to deal with them, yet within the limits of funds and budgets and efforts. If we don't take care of our allies more favorably than we take care of the neutrals, then we create a tendency for people to move into the neutralist camp.

In dealing with the Communist Bloc we also run into problems. One of the devices used to detach, or at least to orient, certain members

of the bloc away is to deal with them on a cultural and an economic basis. I don't know the exact figures, but I would suspect that, over the course of 3 or 4 years, we have given economic assistance of one sort or another to Poland probably in the neighborhood of $300 to $400 million in goods and services.

I was in Panama a couple weeks ago and I noticed that this fact was quoted in the local papers: "If you can do so much for the Communist Bloc, why can't you do more for your Latin American friends down here?" This strategy may or may not make sense. I am not talking about the hopes of this effort with Poland. But it makes a terrific political problem in dealing with the rest of the world. We say, "You people must not get too involved with communism." They see our efforts, which have desirable ends in purpose, in which we are up to our necks with the Communist Bloc directly, except for Communist China.

We have another problem in dealing with the underdeveloped areas, the new nations, in that we have not yet found a formula to promote their peaceful evolution into countries which can run themselves. Most of these new countries are nations by definition only, as you can see in the case of the Congo. We have not been willing to throw aside our doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. This I think for public purposes is a good doctrine. But, if we allow ourselves to be taken over by it perpetually, we fail to play the game as it is being played.

We are interfering up to our necks in about 40 different countries around the world. This interference is desirable if it leads to the mutual well-being of the country involved and to the general security of the free world. We have often failed to take the steps in advance which would lead in this direction.

Last summer I happened to be in the Congo and talked to both the Belgian officials and some of the nationalist leaders down there. The development of the anarchy which exists there was quite predictable, and many people did predict it. The Western world lacked the will or the ability to act in concert before this thing took place, and we are going to have a mess on our hands for a long time to come for that very reason. The Belgians had reached the point where the problems of control were getting too much for them. They couldn't handle them with their own framework, their own strength and power, and no one else was willing to form another method of handling it and so consequently they abandoned the whole show, with the results that are only too obvious.

Now, in another functional field of intelligence we obviously stand at a great disadvantage with the Communists. We have the open society and they are free to come around and find out what we are doing and what our strengths are; and we have very severe restrictions in dealing with them. We have to work hard on this problem. Mr. Eisenhower stated very clearly what the problem was in the U-2 incident, that we, in the thermonuclear age, cannot tolerate the preparation in secrecy of power

which can destroy us. We have to use every possible device to break down the Iron Curtain. The fact that there are no walls in space may in time give us the means of breaking down the Iron Curtain not only for military security reasons but for political reasons. But we do have a handicap in dealing with the Communist Bloc on just what we know about what is going on.

We do not have the same handicap in the non-Communist world but there is a question whether we have acted on the intelligence that we have had. I cite the Congo as one example, or as another Mr. Castro's involvement with the Communist movement. This was well known before he seized power there, but whether we acted intelligently on this information is a question which I think one has to dispute.

In the psychological field we have some advantages and some disadvantages. As the top dog in the free world, we are always going to be on the chopping block. People like to see the big boy stub his toes. Every time we make a mistake even our closest friends and allies, such as the Canadians, sometimes get a kick out of the fact that Uncle Sam stumbled at that particular time.

We have also, as I have indicated, not taken enough account of the ideological factor. I'll cite one example from history: When King Henry VIII decided he wanted to get married--I forget which time—he couldn't quite do it within the bounds of the Catholic Church, so he

pulled out, but he didn't pull out on an ideological basis. It was a power dispute between Rome and London. When Martin Luther decided to pull out, he tacked the 92 Theses on the wall of the church at Wittenberg. This created an ideological cleavage which split the Catholic world in two and resulted in the Reformation.

So this ideological attack, which I mentioned we have not done much with, is an area of further exploration. Additionally, on the psychological side, we have failed to take into account the importance of the dramatic use of technological success. We ignored for a long time the psychological potential of the race for space. I quote from a speech which Mr. Allen of the USIA made last December:

"The latest two dramatic and successful Soviet moon shots followed by the failure of our own have now tipped world opinion solidly in the direction of Russia. Many say that our space program may be considered as a major element of our vitality and our ability to compete with a formidable rival. It is a criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy of emulation by other people."

Things are not all to the bad on the psychological side, however, There is a tremendous reservoir of affection, good will, and understanding of the U. S. in almost every country outside the Iron Curtain, and a good deal of it inside. Witness the reception Mr. Nixon had when he visited Poland a year ago. The Communists are working night and day to destroy this reservoir. It is in our interest to maintain every effort we

can to make certain that we will be assured of the support of peoples as well as governments in these countries that we must be associated with.

On the technological side, on balance, I still think the United States is ahead. We have a much more mature economic base and industrial base. Whether we have ourselves organized as well as we might in this field, and whether we are making every effort we can are matters open to question.

In the studies which we are doing in conjunction with the book which Dr. Sanders mentioned, we have established to the best of our ability the fact that there is no real inventory of the United States technological capabilities. The Government doesn't have it, and the National Science Foundation doesn't have it. We have a general haphazard inventory. If you wanted to know tomorrow what we can do in the technological field, we would have to do a lot of scratching to find out.

I also would like to call to your attention the numerous studies made by groups, such as the Rockefeller Study, the Gaither Report, and so forth, which indicate on the whole, in the judgment of men who should know, that the effort we have put into winning the technological race has not been sufficient to meet the oncoming thrust of the Soviet challenge.

In the economic field we, on the whole, have put in a very creditable performance. We have done far more than any other nation in history has done. We have tried to help other peoples solve their economic problems.

The biggest complaint you can make against our program is that it has been in many cases scattered, and it is inevitable that to a certain degree it would be, because everyone is a claimant on it. But we have not yet learned to pinpoint our efforts as specially as we should. I think there is an effort in this direction.

We have sometimes also been confused by the dilemma, in that there is a dichotomy between economic aid and military assistance. In many of the threatened areas of the world these two policies, or two programs, are not in conflict but are interrelated. In those cases, can economic assistance be substituted for appropriate security arrangements? If you lack the ability to maintain order or to defend the country from external intrusion, no type of economic development per se will do that particular country any good.

Now let's turn to the next facet of our problem, the final facet, and that is our military posture. I am of the conviction that the United States can cope with any combination of Communist threats as long as our military posture is adequate to deal with any military thrust that they may make.

You may have all had a chance to listen to Mr. Lippman's television program a couple months ago, when he stated quite categorically that for our own interest and for the interest of the peace of the world there should be never any question about the American military posture and

power. One can argue whether we have sufficient forces or not. This has been the great debate that has been going on in Washington for the past 2 or 3 years. I think you can conclude, however, that our forces have been calculated on a somewhat narrow margin. The important thing is that, whether we think we have enough or not, it is being questioned in the rest of the world whether we have enough or whether we don't. That influences our diplomacy and our psychological position, particularly in an era where the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack makes a one-to-one force ratio, such as we do have, far from satisfactory, because this ratio can be cut in half in about 15 minutes' time.

This is an area where I think we are likely to see some changes as a new team takes over, regardless of which party should win the election.

Another factor that we have to take into account is the shift in our position with the advent of something called the delicate balance of terror, the Soviet nuclear parity, or what have you. I'd like to make it clear that I don't believe in any such thing as a static balance of terror. We are in a very dynamic technological race where the change in a few parameters of a few weapons--the CEP or the reliability factor--could almost instantly change the strategic equation. But the Soviet thrust in this field has changed our strategic position very, very seriously.

It has changed it particularly with respect to Europe, where the Europeans doubt our commitment to defend them with a thermonuclear

exchange if a Soviet thrust takes place in a vital area, such as Berlin, or any other part of the NATO alliance. They reason this way: Why should the United States exchange New York and Washington, say, for Berlin? Will they do it? This is despite the fact that the NATO treaty says that an attack against one is an attack against all. Because of the Soviet advances in nuclear war, one of the main desires of our allies in Europe and elsewhere is to avoid a nuclear war at almost all costs. This, of course, leads to policies in various fields which tend toward hoping for some type of accommodation rather than standing up against an extreme threat.

In addition to the problems that have been created by the Soviet advance in what you might call the strategic exchange ratio, we still have the fact that the Soviet forces in the conventional-capability field in general, particularly around the periphery, have been maintained at a much higher degree or level of effectiveness than ours have. Up to the present time we have not reinforced the capability of our conventional forces with adequate airlift and sealift to really be able to get into a place in a hurry. We have been threatened in the past by local situations and we probably will be in the future, and we will have difficulty in handling them rapidly--and we must handle them rapidly for political reasons--unless we put more effort into this field.

We are also dealing on a new phenomenon, but a phenomenon which is going to require greater attention. That is the Communist use of

guerrilla warfare to move into a country to destroy the political regime. Castro's example in Cuba is a honey in this connection. There was an excellent study made by Che Guevara, who is the bete noire of the Castro regime, on guerrilla warfare, based on Mao Tse-tung's book on the protracted conflict. This thing has just been published within the last year. It explains how they hope to use the very favorable terrain of Latin America, favorable terrain in the geographical and physical sense as well as sociological sense, to conduct other guerrilla operations which will topple regimes now committed to us and spread communism throughout Latin America. This is a subject which I think requires increasing attention.

Now, one other major factor which ties all these things together is our organizational structure for dealing with the type of conflict posed by the Communists. At the very beginning we are faced by one fact, that the Communist leadership group, by very definition, are experts in conflict. They had to be in order to get to where they are on top in the Soviet system. They had to claw their way up. They understand basically the integration of psychological, political, military warfare, because they often start out as prop people; they then move into the military through the political commissar route; and they are trained in infighting almost from the cradle. So the people who sit on top of this system are conflict managers. Whereas in our system the man who achieves power and dominance often is a man who is an expert at

compromise and at finding the middle way--the balanced approach, and so forth. The people who are responsible for conflict--and many of the members of this room are in conflict agencies--are generally down about in the third or fourth level of the machine.

We don't look at the problem as one of conflict. This gives the Communists an immense advantage to start with. Secondly, our national security organization has been pretty well worked over by a lot of people, including the Jackson Committee in the Senate, and so forth. It does not produce an integrated approach to many of these problems, because, even our basic national security policy is the result of compromise of many points of view between the sovereign departments in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government and many different concepts as to how we should approach these problems.

I'll pass over that one, but I think that in this area we are going to have to organize our structure in a systematic way to deal more effectively with the integrated challenge presented by the Communists.

I have no time now to run over the situation as I see it in various parts of the world. I would like to indicate, though, that I feel that the next 2 or 3 years coming up are going to be extremely critical ones, because, whether or not the Communists enjoy a strategic superiority, they may think that they do and they may be willing to play the game as if they did. So you have a greater aggressive posture on the part of the Communists, I think very likely. In addition, you have the divisive factors

in Africa and the Communist penetration in Latin America going at a very fast rate.

So, whatever happens in the next 2 or 3 years, I think we are in for a very active period of pressure along the line. The Communists, in dealing with these threats, or in dealing with these opportunities, I think, are going to be torn between two major dilemmas, particularly in the possibility of using thermonuclear war. If they think they have a decisive advantage, they will be torn between their doctrine that they should never risk the base of world revolution in one throw of the dice, and there are still so many improbabilities and imponderables about this type of war that they may not be willing to use it. On the other hand, if history should demonstrate that they have a unique opportunity to advance communism and fail to do it, the man in charge would not only be regarded as stupid but would be regarded as treasonous to communism itself. If he should take the risk and win, Mr. Khrushchev would go down in history far beyond Alexander, or Caesar, or Napoleon, or anyone else.

We often say that the Communists are long-term people and their descendants carry on the movement. Mr. Khrushchev in his speeches in Vienna just a few months ago mentioned that he was getting to be an old man, and he would like to see some of these things happen in his lifetime. This is just another psychological factor we should take into account.

In sum, I believe that we are in a period of extraordinary danger. One of the chief reasons for that is that few of us are willing to recognize the seriousness of the Communist advance and the importance of the adverse trends working against us.

In addition, as a nation which is still committed to the status quo, because the status quo does favor us, we find difficulty in recognizing that we are dealing with a revolutionary power that is determined to destroy the status quo. Marx put it very well 100 years ago: "I do not want to reform the world, but I want to change it fundamentally."

We must realize that in a situation like this no great nation, no great society, and no great civilization dies in a moment. The only possibility of changing that truism is perhaps the thermonuclear bomb. But it dies piecemeal, and the inability to respond energetically to crises as they arise characterizes its decline. It is the slow erosion, the slow concession, the slow adjustment, and the willingness to say, "This isn't too bad; maybe we can live with this; maybe we can be a second-rate power," which you see described occasionally in the American press and literature, which is symptomatic of the type of trend of which I am speaking.

Under these circumstances, the willingness to accept conflict, to recognize that we have implacable enemies, to recognize that we must treat them as such, just as they treat us, is a very difficult thing for peoples in our society to accept. The free world is still immeasurably

stronger in all the basic indeces of power than the Communist Bloc, but, unless this power is mobilized and used, then the existence of it will be a transitory thing.

We face another fact that, in our governmental structure people in top places often consider that their chief role in life is to administer things rather than to think through the critical problems confronting us. Strategy they leave in the hands of someone at the second or third level. They are occasionally interested in his ideas, but they are not living constantly trying to see their own position vis-a-vis that of our enemy, trying to see how we can exploit his weaknesses as well as to develop our strength.

Fundamentally it takes two to make a peace as well as two to make a war. We have been trying to make a peace with these people while they have been trying to carry on a struggle which will lead to our destruction.

Under these circumstances, aspirations for survival and objectives, assurance of continuation of our way of life, to me make very little sense. I think what does make sense is to recognize that over the long run the two systems that we are dealing with are incompatible, and that we must make our goal as definitive as they make theirs--namely, the extension of freedom—so that our grandchildren and their grandchildren live under a free society rather than that our descendants, jointly and

collectively, live under communism.

To do this, we must have the will to meet them and eventually the will to thrust them back. We must have not only the power that we need but the willingness to use it. If we don't have that power, then all the talk about American leadership is just pure rhetoric.

Eventually, what we must do if we are to succeed in this thing is what Mr. Malik has often suggested--push them back by just one inch.

Thank you.

DR. SANDERS: Gentlemen, Colonel Kintner is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: We have been interested in your peace-zone-war-zone theory. We are curious to know how furthering the development of the peace zone, war zone, based on the facts that you claim, will maintain the established status quo in development. I don't know how we can end up with anything but a peace zone behind their line with a general containment on our side of the line. It is inevitable on the basis of policy.

COLONEL KINTNER: If you adopt the containment thesis I would assume that it would be more or less inevitable. On the other hand there were different endeavors made to change that thesis. I think the national security policy, NSC-68, which was published in 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, did state the most positive view of American policy since the war, and then it stated that our long-range goal was to essentially

eliminate the Communist control inside the Soviet Bloc. Since that time our policy has gone more and more toward some hopeful belief that over time an accommodation can be reached. This may be, under conditions of thermonuclear war, the best we can do.

As I see it, the Communists want an accommodation also. They want an accommodation from us to them. I want the accommodation the other way, and I think this can be achieved, if we want to restore our power position so that there is no question of where we stand in the world, so that we can handle any type of threat thrown at us, and then, over time, we can conduct a very vigorous political and economic offensive toward them. The offensive doesn't have to be conducted offensively. The culture-exchange program can be used for this method and many other methods can be employed. We can tackle them, as well as tackle the problems of getting the underdeveloped world on our side of the fence.

QUESTION: In listening to your talk and to some of the previous ones we hear much on the policy of containment. More and more it begins to remind me of some of the GAO investigations to which we have been exposed. The least you can score is zero, and from there you go down. Is there nothing stronger or more dynamic through which our country can rise than this?

COLONEL KINTNER: I believe there is. I was very impressed by Mr. Nixon's statement in his acceptance speech that our goal must

be the extension of freedom. If you carry through what is involved in that you will not accept containment. You will have to move directly toward the Communist Bloc through all kinds of methods so that eventually they get the open society rubbed at them from every possible point of view. If you do that and take advantage of the windfalls as they arise, and take the risks that are involved in this type of policy, I think you may be able in time to bring them to a state where they will be willing to make a genuine accommodation with the West. They are never going to make that accommodation, though, until such an array of power and strength is posed against them that there is no alternative. I think if we ever succeed in doing that and if we believe in the values of our system I think we will in the long run triumph. It is a long, complicated, and arduous prospect.

QUESTION: We have been hearing about the conflict between the Russians and the Chinese, and as of yesterday there was a little article on China's going it alone, as a warning to Russia. What do you see in this?

COLONEL KINTNER: There is apparently a very serious ideological dispute going on between Russia and China, and over a period of time this might become very critical. I think the basic factors are these: That China cannot play an independent power position in the world until she succeeds in becoming a modern industrialized state. Projections range

anywhere from 20 to 30 years before she reaches that state of development. She may get the atomic bomb--according to the latest information--in the next 2 or 3 years--a kitchen model, Nagasaki type, so to speak. Sophisticated systems, and so forth, will come much more in the future. Until China has a basic power position which is far superior to what she has now I think the necessity of staying in harness with the Soviet Union will dominate over a lot of very significant irritations under the surface.

The major issue, apparently, in the conflict relates to their doctrine of war. They both agree in certain fundamental concepts. By defining wars as just wars--and all their wars are just wars--they agree on these three: Wars of perennial liberation, such as Cuba; wars to destroy reactionary regimes, such as the coup d'etat in Iraq; and wars between imperialist powers, such as at Suez. They also agree that there will be conflict between the Communist Bloc and the non-Communist world before the final takeover succeeds.

The issue is over the degree of violence to be employed. Apparently the Russians, as far as you can gather, are more reluctant to plunge into a third World War of the thermonuclear type than are the Chinese. In fact many Chinese see this as the great opportunity for them. They say that World War I led to communism in the Soviet Union, World War II led to communism in China, and World War III will lead to the spread of it throughout the earth. They are also attracted particularly by the idea that if a serious war took place between the Soviet Union and the United

States, and even if China took some of the spillover, if the Soviet Union and the United States knocked each other out, and if maybe a couple hundred million Chinamen were left when this thing took place, they would be in the most dominant position on earth. Because they are less developed technologically and they are a vegetable society, almost, and live close to the ground and reproduce like grass, they will be willing to take a greater risk. In addition, the Soviets are a "have" society now, the second industrial power on earth, and the Chinese are a "have not" society. I think what the Russians are concerned about is that, because the present group in China are the first generation of revolutionaries, very aggressive, with probably a dynamic need for expansion in order to deal with their food problem, the Chinese might be able to trigger a war of miscalculation between ourselves and the Russians.

So you have some factors of a serious tangible nature between the two powers. Another factor is, if and when China attains this power position that I mentioned earlier, the nationalistic conflicts between Russia and China are greater than between any other two countries on earch. They have the 4000-mile border. There is the fact that a great deal of Soviet expansion into East Asia was at the expense of territories which were once considered to be under the general sphere of influence of China, or territories which once at a time belonged outright to China.

So I think you have a potential problem there which will be a significant

factor in the world power struggle over the next 2 or 3 years. Or whether it will take some time to mature I don't think anyone can say today.

QUESTION: We have the problem of keeping communism out of the Americas. Now, in spite of our Monroe Doctrine, we have allowed communism to move into Cuba. What do you suggest we do to drive this out so that we can maintain a free hemisphere?

COLONEL KINTNER: I would like to first state the things which I don't think are going to work. I don't think we can solve the problem economically. We made a suggestion about 3 or 4 months ago that we have a stepped-up aid or assistance bill for Latin America. Assume that $500 million is put forth. That is what is suggested now. Divide that by 20 parts and what do you get? You get approximately $25 million per country. Mr. Castro is not going to be tempted by $25 million. He has already picked up close to a billion through confiscation in Cuba. If I were running the Kremlin I would pay him another billion dollars in arms and in assistance of all kinds, oil, and anything to keep that base in operation.

So the economic approach I think is doomed to failure. I think we are going to have to use subtle means of cutting the umbilical cord between Red China and the Chinese who are in Cuba pretty extensively and between the Soviet Union and the satellites. There are ways and means of doing this--by taking advantage of our command at sea and

our command in the air around the area. There are nice tactical ways in which you can explain what you are doing to the rest of the world in terms that will be meaningfully understood in the Kremlin. At the same time, if you get appropriate support from the OAS states I think you can get away with it.

Another way of doing it is to assist somebody to do what Castro did against Mr. Batista. Take into account that Castro has about 4,000 or 5,000 political prisoners holed up in the Isle of Pines living in the same type of concentration camps that Mr. Stalin used to have and there is a potential there that can be used. It is going to be in those areas.

I think the Soviet scheme is quite obvious that they have already taken Cuba out of economic relations with most of the Western world and into new deals with the satellites or with China. They are going to debase the standard of living for a long time to come and blame that on us. Then, whether Castro himself is an out-and-out Communist or not, whoever takes over will go more in that direction. They have also been in there long enough to destroy completely the old bureaucracy. The old Army is gone and almost all the political opposition is eliminated. So in my mind it is an act of surgery that is required.

QUESTION: Colonel, you mentioned in your talk the necessity for a better integrated government to deal more effectively with the Communist challenge. Governor Rockefeller suggested in a bill which was submitted to Congress the creation of a First Secretary to be the President's

chief aide and to coordinate activities of the government departments in dealing with the administration of the cold war activities. Do you think that this is a good idea? What other ideas do you suggest for better integrated activities of the Government in the cold war?

COLONEL KINTNER: In general I believe there has to be better integration of our activities. I had the pleasure of working for Mr. Rockefeller when he was Special Assistant to the President and it was a problem that he wrestled with there. You have the dilemma in our governmental structure that the State Department, by law, prerogative, and everything else is the first department in foreign affairs. The thing the parliament deals with as a function is diplomacy, namely, a representation abroad, government-to-government conduct, and so forth.

You can solve the problem in one of two ways: Either the State Department can sit on top and fundamentally coordinate the political implementation of our military policy, our economic policy, information, and so forth, or it has to be done in the Executive Office directly by the President.

I personally don't think it makes a great deal of difference how it is done; but it must be done. I know there are members from the State Department here, but I don't think the State Department has ever wanted to take on this very irksome task of daily coordination of an awful lot of things. It would be an entirely different department if it did so.

On the other hand, because of its primacy in foreign affairs, I think the State Department has resisted efforts toward greater centralization in the Office of the President. But I think the trend is in that direction. Not only has Mr. Rockefeller made that suggestion but Mr. Nixon has made such a suggestion, too, and from what I know of some of the people around Mr. Kennedy I think that there will be a greater role played by the Presidency in some type of directing staff operating through the Presidency in the conduct of our foreign affairs. I think the trend is all in that direction.

QUESTION: I understand that Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that they have tended to adopt capitalistic policies whereas we have tended to adopt socialistic policies. Is this true? If it is true, do you think there is any significance in it?

COLONEL KINTNER: I think it is true. The Soviet economy is essentially a form of state capitalism. When they took over power in Russia they didn't know what model to follow. The one they followed was the war-mobilization scheme of the Germans in World War I. They have since elaborated on that. When they first took over power, though, they were very egalitarian in their concepts. That is, everybody was to be alike, get the same pay, wear the same uniform, and so forth and so on. Since that time they have become genuinely capitalistic. The top boys in their society are equivalent to the so-called robber barons of our great

great expansion—the Goulds and the Harrimans, and so forth, of the late 19th century.

To illustrate--the top man in their society is the equivalent of being a four-star general, an American millionaire, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and a screen star, all wrapped up into one. He has his doctor, and he has all the things that he needs. He is an out-and-out capitalist from that point of view. And the incentive system is a very compelling incentive system.

What they have done, oddly enough, in operations against us, is to, through propaganda and anything else, cut down our incentive system. For example, they constantly work against piecework in the capitalist system, and the whole Stakinov movement inside the Soviet Union is a piecework productivity. You get your pay and you are advanced by what you turn out--whereas we have many restrictive practices in the United States that stemmed originally from some of their negative doctrines which are used when you try to take over a society to undermine its efficiency.

I'll give you another example. In the ideological directive that I mentioned they had this statement: "We must encourage support for this basic socialist doctrine that he who does not work shall not eat." As you know, this comes from Captain John Smith in the Virginia Colony in 1620.

But in this country we are getting away from that basic doctrine.

They are following it. It is a technique they use all over the world. It is the technique of weakening by concepts and beliefs the opposing society and strengthening your own society by proven methods of organization and economic incentive. In that sense they have become a capitalist system. In a contrary sense we have become less capitalistic and, I think, less effective.

DR. SANDERS: Thank you very much, Colonel Kintner. The school appreciates that you have brought to us the greatest thing we look for, and that is new ideas. Thank you very much.