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CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE UPON THE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Mr. Samuel W. Crosby

NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Colonel Thomas C. Keach, USAF

Date: 1 November 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
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10 October 1960

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Reviewed By: Col Thomas C Keach, USAF Date Nov 1960

Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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COLONEL KEACH: General Houseman, Gentlemen:

Prior to today we have heard speakers from the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the public opinion experts express their views on the factors that influence the formulation and implementation of national security policy.

This morning we are going to learn what Congress thinks about this subject. Our speaker is Mr. Samuel W. Crosby, the Principal Staff Assistant of the very powerful House Appropriations Committee. I know that many of you gentlemen have met him before, incidentally.

As you have noted in his biography, Mr. Crosby has been with this Committee for some seven years. His long experience with this Committee certainly qualifies him to talk on this very important subject.

Mr. Crosby, it is a privilege and a pleasure to welcome you to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and to introduce you to the Class of 1961. Mr. Crosby.

MR. CROSBY: General Houseman, Colonel Keach, Faculty Members and Students: I might say that I see a few familiar faces, so we'll consider ourselves old friends. It is a distinct honor for me to appear before such a hand-picked group of military brainpower and, I should say, civil service brainpower.

Ordinarily, congressional committee staff members, with a very few exceptions, are like the old saying about children, "seen but not heard." Whether we like it or not, we cultivate a passion for anonymity.

When Mr. Henkel invited me to come down here, he made it perfectly clear that he would have much preferred having one of my congressional bosses. I can say that I also would have preferred it that way, but they are out soliciting votes, and here I am.

As you know, the subject of my talk this morning was assigned to me. My instructions even go so far as to spell out the scope of the subject matter to be covered in the talk. However, General Mundy graciously instructed me to feel free to make such changes as I desire. Since you are here for a specific purpose and not just to be entertained, I will try to follow the instructions given and confine my remarks to the subject matter assigned.

Though the President as Head of the Executive Branch of the Government is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and commands the unquestioned loyalty of all military men, nevertheless, over the years there have also always been very close ties between the military and the Congress. This is as it should be. It is a part of the built-in safeguards of our democratic system. The Founding Fathers of this country apparently sensed a need for a very

close tie between the military and the Congress when they wrote into that section of the Constitution setting forth the powers of Congress the following:

"The Congress shall have power. . .; To declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies. . .; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and regulations of the Land and Naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; . . ."

It is on these provisions of the Constitution that the powers and responsibilities of the Congress rest, in regard to military affairs. Furthermore, the Congress is the branch of the Government which is closest to and most responsive to the immediate wishes of the people. If there appears to be anything wrong with our military preparedness the public generally expects the Congress to do something about it.

Aside from the powers and responsibilities assigned by the Constitution, there are other reasons for this close relationship between the military and the Congress. This is a personal relationship that makes it possible for military men to bring their problems to Congress which is not enjoyed by any other major segment of government officialdom or group. This personal relationship begins with the Congressional appointment of Cadets and Midshipmen to the respective academies, not to mention, of course, the continuing approval of officer appointments and promotions.

I have gone through this little exercise for the sole purpose of

establishing a feeling for the role and responsibility of the Congress for the adequate defense of this Nation. In addition, I wanted to make clear how close many individual members feel to the military establishment. I assume that you go along with me by accepting my statement that the Congress has a great responsibility and plays a great role in the area of national defense. Assuming this, let's move along to some of the more specific phases of this subject matter.

We are using the term, congressional, which obviously implies the complete body of the Congress, that is, both the House and the Senate. However, it should be made perfectly clear that the great bulk of the work, the actual legislative determinations, the digging and detailed preparation which precedes final action, is done not by the Congress as a whole but by little groups within Committees of the Congress especially assigned for that purpose. The specific Committees responsible for national defense policies and legislation are the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. Other Committees may become involved from time to time, but their work in each case at the time will be limited to a specific purpose.

My experience has been with the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Accordingly, my remarks and the examples which I may cite will be related to this experience. I want to make it clear that I am not trying to speak for the Congress--no one can speak

for the Congress--only final actions, coupled with the legislative histories of such actions, do that. Nor do I speak for the Appropriations Committee. These comments are necessarily, then, my own.

In the course of our annual review of the military budgets, it has become customary to explore in a fairly thorough manner the military policies and programs of the Administration and the Department of Defense. The extent of this annual examination and the actions finally taken thereon are limited by only three factors. These are the time we have to devote to it, the background knowledge, and the capacity to follow through and apply that knowledge. I believe that the Defense Subcommittee, with which I work, excels in all three respects. Certainly, the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee spends more time in reviewing the defense program, as expressed in the annual budget, by far, than any other Committee of Congress on either side of the Capitol.

In the process of this review, this Committee sits for a period of approximately 12 weeks, 5 days a week, with both morning and afternoon sessions every day. As a result of this review, over and over again, year in and year out, of the details of defense operations and programs, Members of this particular Subcommittee I believe have acquired a knowledge and a background pertaining to defense and national security affairs not attained by any other Members of the Congress.

On the third point, that is, the point of capacity, it must be recognized

that exercising a judgment in this respect becomes largely a matter of opinion. Actually, I expect that it has to be judged in terms of activity or usage and in this area again I am convinced that our Subcommittee excels.

We begin our hearings each year with top-level briefings on defense policies and programs as related to the background of the current international situation. The first order of business is a two-day off-the-record session with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reviewing the political and military situation throughout the world, and particularly the progress and activities of our most evident potential enemies.

Following this off-the-record review, we are given what amounts to an on-and-off-the-record briefing on the military requirements and programing for the United States by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These briefings, or presentations, are fairly comprehensive and lay out before the Committee in some detail the national security programs and policies of the Administration.

Our usual procedure is to follow these sessions with presentations by the respective service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff, breaking down into greater detail the application of programs and policies as they apply to the respective military services. This entire policy-level review takes about one month's time, and is followed by the detailed presentations in support of military appropriation requests.

The elements of national defense policy which receive the most consideration and the degree of interest in such matters within the Congress, which varies from year to year, depend upon a number of factors related to the international situation, primarily the status or degree of coolness in the cold war or other activity posing a threat to our national interests. The area of greatest interest might also depend to a certain extent upon what has happened during the budget preparation process to certain key programs or weapon systems. Of course, a chief factor which determines the annual areas of interest within the Congress on national security issues is the public reaction to these actions taken within the Executive Branch on these key programs. Stimulation of reaction and interest within the Congress is also frequently affected by the factor mentioned before, that is, the close personal relationship between individual Members of Congress and ranking personnel in the military services.

The degree of emphasis on a particular issue may very well be politically motivated. This, of course, is not necessarily bad, as people generally tend to think. On the contrary, it very frequently is all to the good. Let's explore this political motivation, briefly.

The usual political situation in this country is for the Congress to be under control of the same political party as the Administration. In such a case the Congress generally--that is, the majority in the Congress--can be expected to support the policies proposed and worked out by the

Administration. In this case, members of the opposition party, or the minority within the Congress, are the ones that challenge these policies and thereby really make the issues. They are usually the ones that create or stimulate an exploration of the differences which always lurk behind the scenes in connection with any major policy issue, and this may be done primarily because there is a chance of political gain.

There are always a number of factors which must be considered in arriving at a policy decision on almost any question other than the factors which are directly involved in any particular policy issue. For example, in the building and maintaining of a military force there is always the question of a balanced budget, pressures on the economy, how much can we do, and so forth, which must be considered aside from the strict military requirements of the moment. As a result, there is always room for a difference to develop, and consequently differences do develop. These differences are first debated within the Pentagon, but once they become known interested Members pick them up and they are also thrashed out within the Congress. The resulting pressures force Executive Branch decisions, frequently resulting in substantial changes in defense programs.

The fact that the political party in control of Congress has been different from that in control of the Administration for the past six years has had a tremendous impact on the approach taken to these fundamental issues surrounding defense policy. I don't believe that there

has been another period in history like the one of the past six years where there has been a division in Congressional and Executive control between the parties in power for such a long period of time; and yet over these particular years this has not necessarily proven to be a bad situation. I think from the standpoint of defense it has been good. I believe that we are stronger today because of the position taken by a Congress under leadership other than that of the Administration. I do not, of course, advocate this as a continuing arrangement. It may not work with changed personalities.

What I have said so far has dealt more or less with the general aspect of the subject. Now I would like to get down to a few specific examples which will show that the Congress does have some influence in this regard. Let's take the current fiscal year. In the budget as presented for this year, the Congress was dissatisfied with a number of program proposals in that budget. For example, the Army National Guard and Reserve strength, Modernization of Army equipment, the Airlift Capability in support of the Army, the Airborne Alert capability of SAC, Anti-Submarine Warfare preparations, the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System, the Air Force ICBM programs, including BMEWS, the B-70 program, and a number of space projects were the areas where increased funds above the budget were voted by the Congress.

Offsetting these increases at least in part, the Congress made a number of decreases pertaining to such items as travel, communications,

departmental administration, aircraft procurement--in a minor way-- air defense, primarily of course the Bomarc, and a general economy reduction for all procurement items to reflect dissatisfaction with present procurement and contracting practices within the Department of Defense.

The increases provided by the Congress totaled nearly \$2 billion, or \$1, 921, 500 exactly. The decreases totaled \$1, 259, 900, or about \$662 million less than the increases. Stating it the other way, the Congress added to the budget this year nearly \$662 million above the total requested by the Administration, but made program increases of nearly \$2 billion.

Why was this done? The answer is not a simple one, but I will try to state it for you as clearly as I can. It was partly done because the Congress was under the control of a political party other than that of the Administration. Politics did have some influence but, despite the fact of political reality, nothing was done which might in the least detract from the military strength of this Nation, even by the reductions. That's a statement of opinion, of course. The primary fact, however, was that the majority in Congress just did not go along with the so-called hard decisions which had been made within the Administration pertaining to a number of defense programs. The Congress did not feel that the Administration was pushing for progress in certain weapon systems fast enough.

For example, there was the B-70. The Administration had decided

that, in view of the fact that we were shifting so much of our strategic reliance to long-range missiles, the B-70 would be cut back from a major aircraft program involving the procurement of a number of bombers, along with a concurrent weapons system, to the development of an aircraft capability in this area by the production of what amounted to only two prototype aircraft without weapon system backup. This appeared to the Congress to be nothing more than perhaps the development of a plane that might be used for commercial purposes. The Congress did not buy this proposal, and accordingly increased appropriations for the B-70 to provide for the development of a complete weapon system. It is understood that the Administration is at least in part going along with this decision, as it is in part with most of the program changes made by the Congress in Defense programs this year.

Another area which the Congress has emphasized is the Polaris fleet ballistic missile system. Now, this emphasis, as well as the development of the missile, of course, goes back a number of years. Prior to 1955--and I am speaking of calendar year 1955--the Navy was working with the Army on the development of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that might be used aboard ship, such as the Army Jupiter missile. About this time, however, the Navy concluded that liquid propellants were too dangerous and complex to handle aboard ship, and, therefore, if they were to have a successful fleet ballistic

missile system, it would be necessary to develop a solid propellant type missile. Thus, the Polaris project was born. This was done early in the fiscal year 1956, but, after action had been completed on Navy appropriations for that year and certain funds available for other purposes that year were reprogramed, Navy was able to get started on the fleet ballistic missile system.

During the succeeding years--that is, fiscal years 1957 and 1958--funds were requested from the Congress and approved to continue this work. After the launching of Sputniks I and II, in October 1957, considerable interest developed in the Polaris weapon system, and it became quite evident at that time that it had a very good chance of being successful. Accordingly, in January 1958, the Department of Defense transmitted a supplemental request to get started on the first three submarines capable of launching Polaris missiles.

During consideration of this supplemental request, the Congress--and I mean the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee--was very much interested in the potential of this weapon system, and became convinced that it should be pushed even faster than was being proposed by the Administration in the 1958 supplemental budget request. I happen to know that this proposal was discussed with the then Secretary of Defense and he requested an opportunity to give the matter further study before Congress took action to give further support for this program. His request was granted and honored during consideration of the

supplemental and, as a result, the Department proposed an amendment to the budget for fiscal year 1959 requesting funds for additional submarines not included in the original 1959 budget request. This was in the spring of 1958.

However, the Committee did not feel that even these additional funds were sufficient to accelerate this important deterrent weapon system as fast as it should be accelerated, or as fast as we had the capability to accelerate it, and accordingly added \$609 million to the budget for fiscal year 1959 for the Polaris program. Additional funds were again added above the budget request for fiscal year 1961.

Any number of examples could be cited where the Congress has provided additional funds to accelerate defense programs. I have given you only 2 or 3. However, the mere addition of money is not the only way in which the Congress exercises an influence on defense budgets and national security programs. I am sure that a major factor in the consideration of any defense budget, or any other budget in the Government, for that matter, is: Will the Congress go along with these proposals? This consideration would also be true of any legislative request made to the Congress affecting national defense, and in this respect Congress exercises influence in the initial planning stages, simply by being a major factor in the final approval for processing of any legislative or budgetary request. It is evident that the very existence of Congress does exercise influence.

It is also evident that the influence which Congress exerts on every phase of Executive activity is considerable. Such influence is brought to bear by various techniques used in prodding or goading the Executive Branch into action, or in blocking action. These techniques are as multiple as there are Members of Congress who take a direct interest in given matters, and can be open and direct or implied and subtle, depending upon the purpose to be accomplished, and the individual involved. The techniques involve personal contacts, letters, speeches, investigations, reports, threats, and denunciations. They may involve giving witnesses a hard time in hearings. The results, of course, vary. But results are obtained, and the influence of Congress is often thus brought to bear without direct Congressional action by way of legislation.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that Congressional pressure has produced action resulting in numerous defense program changes. The program for air defense is a prime example. Last year, the threat of Congressional action brought about a reevaluation of air defense plans. This was when the Secretary of Defense told a Committee of Congress that holding his feet to the fire was the way to get action. Congressional pressure or the anticipation of Congressional action has brought about revisions in defense budgets after they were submitted to Congress every year for the past several years. These revisions have taken the form, in some cases, of formal budget amendments, and in other cases of rather informal or semi-official budget amendments.

Another notable action brought about by pressure from our Committee was the change effected last year in the participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization in the budgetary review process. Prior to that time, this top military policy group had remained aloof from the annual budgetary process. After several years of prodding by our Committee in the hearings and in reports the Joint Chiefs of Staff got into the budget making process with very beneficial results. I believe that we can expect this top planning group to have more and more to say about the respective military service budgets as time goes on. What has been done so far is, in my opinion, merely the opening wedge.

While these pressures are brought by the Congress, the issues on which they are based are not always originated by the Congress. As a matter of fact, very few of the issues really originate with the Congress. More likely than not, the issues on defense first developed as differences among military planners or between military services, and after such differences developed the losing side usually leaked the issue to the press or to their favorite Member of Congress. The Congress then serves its major function by forcing a decision on the issue. Congress does not really make decisions. It more likely could be said that it resolves the issues so that decisions become possible and acceptable.

I have placed the accent in my discussion largely on the positive

side of Congressional action or pressure, and yet the traditional role of Congress has been a negative one. This is especially true of the Appropriations Committee of the House. There is an old saying that the Executive proposes and the Congress disposes. Contrary to the concept of original innocence assumed by our courts, the assumption here is that an Executive proposal is guilty until supporting witnesses prove it to be not guilty. The burden of proof rests with the Executive. The Executive is the planner and the performer. He should originate and he should sell.

There are many ramifications to a discussion of this type which could be explored and many additional examples of action which I could cite. However, I believe that I have made my point that Congress does have some influence on national defense programs. Perhaps more can be brought out during the question period.

MR. HENKEL: I am sure you have a lot of good questions for Mr. Crosby. He is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: You mentioned the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in appropriations matters. What do you see is the ultimate role of the Joint Staff in budgetary matters?

MR. CROSBY: Well, I think the primary role of the Joint Staff in such matters will be in settling differences between the services on weapon systems and eliminating the duplication, or the tendency to try

to duplicate each other in newer fields. We have one, I think, that is coming up, the TBM, the tactical ballistic missile. Right now there is a controversy between Army and Navy as to whether the Polaris or the Pershing--the advanced or longer-range version of the Pershing--should be the missile that will go to NATO. The Air Force also wants money right now to develop a TBM missile along the lines of the Minute Man. Sometimes a duplication in the development or competition between services is good, but it can be expensive from the standpoint of the taxpayer.

QUESTION: Sir, our reading of the Jackson Subcommittee hearings has pointed out the undesirable effects of the Secretaries and officers from the Department of Defense having to come up and testify repeatedly before several committees or subcommittees. The suggestion has been made that there should be some consolidation of these hearings. Can you tell us of any efforts being made along these lines to consolidate the hearings?

MR. CROSBY: On the contrary, I think the trend is in the other direction. Beginning next January, with the authorization procedures that are being set out by the Armed Forces Committee of the House and Senate, covering the missiles, aircraft, kits, and so forth, there is likely to be a longer period of such appearances than there has been in the past, when these committees have merely gotten into the annual

budgetary program review, from the standpoint of what they called posture hearings, top-level briefings for a matter of a few days.

QUESTION: Mr. Crosby, you commented on the Congress's stress of certain programs by adding over and above the budget. Would you care to comment on the current negation of this process by the Bureau of the Budget apportionment methods?

MR. CROSBY: Well, this is a delicate subject. You have a representative from the Bureau of the Budget here. Maybe I should ask him to speak on this. There is no question that the Bureau of the Budget exercises a great power in this respect. This is recognized on the Hill and they are criticized severely. Of course they are subjected in turn to some of the pressures that apply to the Department of Defense and the military, the pressures I was talking about, pressures of personal contact with the Director and others, and of course the pressure of public opinion. I think it does have some effect, even if they are bureaucrats and more or less immune to politics.

The powers of the Bureau of the Budget are granted by two sources-- Executive Order and, of course, legislation. If the Congress doesn't like what they do, and if they get too powerful, then I am sure Congress also has the power to take some of that power away. There obviously are many people in Congress who feel that such a restraining influence on the Executive is good.

QUESTION: In adjusting the budget, at times you are dealing with

policy decisions and other times, when it comes to weapon systems, particularly, Congress gets into the area of looking at technical questions. Isn't there a danger in actually trying to pick between competing weapon systems on technical stuff? How do they actually consider these technical problems?

MR. CROSBY: I think that there is a danger in Congress's trying to deal with technical matters. But this rarely happens. It has happened recently in connection with, let's say, the Bomarc. But generally Congress backs away from this sort of thing. In the case of Bomarc, there was a feeling that, like other weapon systems, there had been sufficient delays and failures, and so forth, and that, with the decreasing emphasis on air defense, it could be safely cancelled out. This is a fairly rare sort of thing. It doesn't happen too often.

QUESTION: Mr. Crosby, previous speakers have pointed out that the annual budget cycle has some inhibiting effects on research and development programs. Do you think it possible that Congress will consider budgets on a longer basis than annually?

MR. CROSBY: The appropriations for the military on research and development are what are called no-year funds now, and this is what amounts to a long-term appropriation. That is, appropriations are made available until expended. Programing, of course, is somewhat annual. These appropriations, in the neighborhood of a billion dollars for each of the services, are of a fairly general nature. The language

is very broad. In the supporting details, that go when they are presented to the Congress or to the Bureau of the Budget for the review process, they do have it pretty well broken down by projects. But they are not held to this. We have a procedure in which they can reprogram within the money which is made available each year to almost any extent that they want to, and to any extent that they can justify.

Most of the justification, I think, goes to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Comptroller of the Department of Defense and to other offices in the Department of Defense that may have an interest in this matter. We have now set up a procedure whereby the committee gets into this to the extent of being notified of the actions taken. Under this procedure it is assumed, of course, that we have a veto power, which we seldom have to exercise. So far we haven't done that in any case, except to indicate informally, in one or two cases, the question as to whether certain things should be done, on a personal basis, between the staffs and not on a formal basis before the committee.

I don't see how, as far as the Congress is concerned, you could give them much more leeway than we now are giving and still fail to exercise any degree of control whatsoever.

I might just say this one thing. If there is a complaint in this respect, and men like General Medaris and others have voiced it, they are voicing it primarily at the processes within the Department of Defense and the Executive Branch.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the Executive privilege of imparting information to the General Accounting Office and to Members of Congress?

MR. CROSBY: I think there should be an exercise of Executive privilege in certain types of information, and our Committee has generally recognized this. We usually get what we want and what we need by merely asking for it. There have been one or two cases when the staff members have asked for reports or documents that haven't cleared through channels and are not official, and I have been able to do that myself. We hear about a report that is in the making or has recently been worked out by a group and we want to know what it contains when it hasn't gone far enough along to become official policy, so they ask us to hold off until a decision is made on it. I generally accept that.

QUESTION: Mr. Crosby, you touched on the point that a good many times individual Congressmen's interest in the military system may be politically motivated. As these new systems become more and more complex and involve more and more of the population or the populace--one particular system involves 2400 small business concerns--how much greater in importance do you think this political interest will be in working such major cures?

MR. CROSBY: My reference in regard to political influence or the political side of issues was not so much directed the way you seem to imply. I was thinking more or less in terms of the opposition party

wanting to make a showing. There is some political motivation there and there is always, naturally. You can't escape that sort of thing. There is, of course, continuing political interest from individual Members of Congress on particular weapon systems, and occasionally elections hinge on the fact that maybe a particular contract in a man's district has been cancelled. We always have a lot of pressure from that standpoint. But it doesn't usually have much influence--not with the House Appropriations Committee.

QUESTION: To preface my question I would like to relate that it has been my experience that the General Accounting Office reports do not necessarily reflect an objective analysis of a situation which they have reported. My question is: How much consideration is given by the Subcommittee to the numerous GA reports? Will you cite recent specific instances in which such reports have significantly affected the Subcommittee's actions?

MR. CROSBY: That's a pretty difficult thing to do. I receive these reports. If I read them all I don't think I would do much else. They are voluminous, and there are a lot of them, particularly on defense. So I can't say that they really have too much influence. Maybe I shouldn't be stating this publicly, but individual Members occasionally are interested in a particular report, because they do go to the Members, and they are read either by staff people on the Member's payroll or by the Member himself at times, depending on whether he might have an interest

in the matter. I have one Member in my Subcommittee with whom I work. He reads a large number of GAO reports. He happens to be an accountant and he is interested in this sort of thing. He has also previously served on the Government Operations Committee, and he works very closely with the General Accounting Office in such matters.

We find, though, that most of the facts that they reveal in these reports are so far back that they are not too much use to us in a current situation. If we raise a question with the military department or service, they always point out that the situation has been corrected. So what can we do about it then? We could, of course, call people in, and we have threatened to do this in a few cases where there might be justification for it, if there is an appearance of collusion on the part of the contracting officer and the contractor, or something of the sort. Then we <sup>could</sup> try to make an example of them. We haven't done it yet.

**QUESTION:** We frequently hear about the disproportionate amount of money that we as a country are willing to spend, or to ask for, for that matter, for nonmilitary defense, as compared to military defense expenditures. Do you see any likelihood of this imbalance's being corrected, without encroaching upon legitimate military requirements?

**MR. CROSBY:** I am not quite sure that I fully understand what you mean by nonmilitary expenditures. Can you give me an example of what you are thinking about?

**STUDENT:** Well, to put it sort of bluntly, they say that OCDM asks

for X million dollars, and on the other side of the river the Department of Defense asks for and gets so many billion dollars. That really is the issue. Can you do both?

MR. CROSBY: Are you talking about civil defense?

STUDENT: Primarily, yes.

MR. CROSBY: I really don't know what the answer is. Civil defense has never been a popular issue on the Hill. They have never really taken any great interest in it. Why, I don't know. I believe that a proper preparation for the protection of the civilian population, especially in case of nuclear war, would be a prime requisite for winning the war, or for surviving it, certainly--I don't think there will be any winners in such a war. Perhaps some day they will be frightened into doing something about it. Again, I believe this is a matter of selling the process, and I don't think the agency has been too effective in selling it, on the Hill or to the people.

QUESTION: Would you comment briefly on the role of the professional or permanent staff of the Subcommittee and their work, and to what extent, if any, they influence the decisions of the Subcommittee?

MR. CROSBY: I suppose they have an influence. The role, of course, is primarily that of any staff people. They make the arrangements for the hearings, they dig through the justifications, they prepare questions, they edit the remarks of the Members--and the Members also do some of that--some of them rely exclusively on the staff, to see that they don't

get themselves into trouble or say things that oughtn't to be said on the printed record. The staff prepares recommendations for final action, always, and these recommendations are considered. They are presented by the staff to the Committee. Sometimes the recommendations are presented through a particular Member. If we have a Member who is very much interested in a project and we have a recommendation on it, we get further with it if we present it to the Member than if we present it to the staff.

As to how much influence we have, I don't know. This is something I should not really comment on, except to say it can't be measured, any more than you can measure how much influence any staff man has on his boss. It depends a lot on the staff man as to how much confidence the boss has in him, and also, generally, whether he is right or not in his recommendation.

On the other hand, the Members, if they buy our proposals, they may have proposals themselves. So I don't really know.

**QUESTION:** Do these Congressional Members assume, in making the additions to the military programs every year, that they know more about what is good for the country regarding these programs than does the Secretary of Defense?

**MR. CROSBY:** Yes, I believe that they do assume that, when they take that kind of action. This has to be it. But it is based always on the background of testimony by military people. The Committee itself

doesn't act without having some basis for action. I can say this frankly: Members of the Committee, working with this year in and year out, have a great deal of background knowledge on defense matters, as much as the Secretary of Defense does, and maybe more, going back into history. The Secretary, of course, has many more staff people serving him, and he has the advantage of analysis from various sides. The Committee Members never act except on the advice of very competent military people.

QUESTION: Mr. Crosby, I have been forced in Committee hearings into thin-air stuff, of the stop-beat ing-your-wife kind, where you are guilty no matter what you answer, and where they bring out only one side of the picture. It seems to me that, if hearings are to be fair and accurate, and are to bring out the facts, there should be some way that the person being questioned should have a chance for rebuttal or something. Why can't you have some process like this?

MR. CROSBY: I don't think it is practical to have a rebuttal. I suspect that our Subcommittee has probably been as fair as any committee on the Hill in this respect. It is primarily due to the Chairman. He is a very considerate person. Anyone who has appeared before the Committee I think has always been treated with respect by him. There are other committees, I know, that take a primarily negative approach. I mentioned that the traditional role of the Appropriations Committee and even that of Congress is negative. They have to say no until they are sold on whatever is being proposed.

I don't think there is any answer to what you brought out. It is a matter of personalities of the people who control the membership in Congress. Each Member is an entity unto himself. Nobody else has anything to say about what he might question. A Chairman can control things in a hearing. If a Member gets abusive or out of line in questioning he can call him down or cut him off, if he wants to exercise that kind of control. That's the only answer, as far as I can say.

**MR. HENKEL:** Mr. Crosby, I am sure that all of us have a better understanding of the many problems that Congress is faced with. You have given us an excellent presentation. Thank you very much.