THE EFFECTS OF LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

11 October 1960

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION--Rear Admiral G. Serpell Patrick, USN, Deputy Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces..... 1

SPEAKER--Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, USN, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Disarmament Affairs... 1

NOTICE

This is a transcript of material presented to the resident students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Members of the College may quote it only in student reports or publications for use within the College. Other persons may not quote or extract for publication, reproduce, or otherwise copy this material without specific permission from the author and from the Commandant, ICAF, in each case.

Publication No. L61-45

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, USN, Special Assistant to the JCS for Disarmament Affairs, was born in Oklahoma in 1904. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1926 and attained his present rank in 1954. Prior to 1944 he served in a variety of naval assignments including: destroyers; flying duty aboard aircraft carriers; test pilot; representative with industry (Boeing Aircraft); NAS, Norfolk and Pensacola; CO of a seaplane tender; and at the Navy Yard, Puget Sound. Since 1944 he has had duty in DCNO (Air), Strategic Plans, BUPERS, and, Aviation Training in OCNO; antisubmarine duty aboard the CARD (CVE-11); Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air; and as AC of S Plans, on Staff of CinC Atlantic fleet. He has commanded: Middle East Forces, Persian Gulf-Red Sea-Indian Ocean area; U.S. Carrier Division Eighteen, in the Atlantic; and the Anti-Submarine Task Force of the Sixth Fleet during the Suez Crisis. In 1957 he was on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS, and in 1959, he assumed his present position, as Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Disarmament Affairs. Since 1958 Admiral Dudley has had numerous duties in the field of international negotiations, including: discussions by the five Western and Five Communist nations in Geneva; Senior Military Adviser to the Secretary of State at the Western Minister's Conference in Paris and Washington; and, the Western Foreign Minister's negotiations on Berlin and Germany in 1959, in Geneva. He was the Senior U.S. Military Adviser, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Negotiations in March 1960, in Geneva. Admiral Dudley has been honored for his services with numerous American awards, commendations, and citations and also received the Order of Quissam Alaouite Cherifien (Commander) from French Morocco. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

THE EFFECTS OF LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

11 October 1960

ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Mundy and Gentlemen: Early in our course we heard talks on the background and technical aspects of armaments limitation. This morning our discussion of the disarmament problem deals with considerations of disarmament affairs which have had or may have an effect on our national policies and programs.

Our speaker has been working on problems involving international negotiations for the past four years. A good portion of that time has been spent in the area of disarmament. His current assignment as Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Disarmament Affairs brings him daily in touch with the problems and the national concepts, aims, and actions in this critical field of arms control among nations. Our speaker, Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, is therefore well qualified to discuss this subject for us today.

It is my real pleasure to welcome him to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces for the first time.

ADMIRAL DUDLEY: General Mundy, Members of the Faculty, Students, Gentlemen: As you know, arms control is today a matter of considerable interest to a great many people. Increased emphasis on the subject by the press and other news media is making a major contribution to the growing awareness of the "man-in-the-street" to the significant role that "arms control" has assumed in the international arena of world politics.

While we may question "John Q. Public's" degree of expertise on the subject, we certainly must recognize his awareness and interest, and therefore his ability, in a democracy, to influence the order of things. If this knowledge is limited to only a distorted impression of the nuclear aspects of armaments, his reasoning may become preoccupied with the "horrors of mass destruction" or be directed only to those facets that appeal to the moralistic or humanitarian side of our natures. In either case, the rationalization which follows may well become dangerous to the security of the Nation.

Unfortunately, many of our military people shy away from the subject of arms control and consequently have almost as little understanding as the general public of the fundamental issues at stake and of the need for a more positive approach to the whole matter.

This, of course, is not strange when we recognize that disarmament is, in fact, the antithesis of Armed Forces. Certainly it is a negative subject for the average military man. The nature of the world today, however, is such that we can no longer concern ourselves with just the military element of national power. In the interest of security, we are now required to deal competently with the political, economic, and psychosocial aspects as well.

Some feel that the matter of arms control is being overemphasized. It is not my purpose, this morning, to argue that point. I know only that the matter is substantive and of pressing concern to our military planners who are charged with insuring the security of the United States. Therefore, I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the effect of arms limitations on national policies and programs and more specifically with the impact of proposed measures on the strategic aspect of military programs as they are designed to support our foreign policy. Arms reductions have a very decided effect on all military programs.

We must emphasize here and now that the kinds of plans and programs that are suitable for insuring the security of this Nation are not based on philosophical or theoretical assumptions.

The kinds of things that do constitute proper basis may be found in:

a. The nature of the Communist threat.

b. Their continuing objective of world domination.

c. Their miserable record of broken promises.

d. Their continued buildup in firepower, despite announced reductions in manpower.

e. Their growing arrogance.

These are not the characteristics of a nation genuinely interested in reducing tensions and creating a political atmosphere in which arms control measures can be usefully negotiated.

In fact, the Soviet Union has given us no reason to believe that it has varied from the course reportedly predicted in 1931 at the Lenin School of Political Warfare.

"War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. To win, we shall need the element of surprise. So, we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will be many electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions.

"The capitalistic countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fist."

These remarks were made by Dimitri Z. Manuilsky in a speech before the Lenin School of Political Warfare in 1931.

A more recent statement by Mr. Khrushchev in Vlore, Albania, 31 May 1959, indicates no change in Soviet aims:

"Communism is the cherished, long-awaited dream of the working people, the bright future of humanity. And no matter how decrepit capitalism tries to prolong its existence, it is doomed, for a new victorious system. Communism is coming along to take its place. This is life, Comrades. Everyone of you knows that however strong a man may be, in time he becomes senile, and his last day comes regardless what medicine he takes. No medicine will help a dying organism, thus no medicine will help capitalism. We must do everything not to delay it."

These are only a few of the factors that compel those responsible for the defense of the United States, to insist on concrete measures of detection, inspection, and verification, as the only acceptable basis for any arms control agreement under present conditions.

Some may be inclined to discount the problem of arms control--feeling that nothing will come of it anyway. The military planner cannot be so indulgent. He has to concern himself with--"Suppose it does come about."

The proposed measures must be examined then in the light of military requirements that are the result of political decisions, establishing our national policy.

We shall recognize that military power is no longer held in "cadre posture" to be expanded for commitment when all other instruments of national policy have failed. Operationally ready forces are now committed frequently in "show the flag" or "show of force" type operations. Sometimes the "show of force" is demonstrated in a most realistic manner!

This world condition, which we fashionably term Cold War, has been with us since soon after the end of World War II. It was brought about by the Soviet Union attempting to impose the Communist ideology and method of government upon the rest of the world. As a consequence, we find the United States allied politically, economically, and militarily, with other nations of the free world opposing this Communist threat. This, of course, results in the United States having a worldwide interest, and major military responsibilities as indicated.

Chart 1, page 5.--Here we see depicted the major alliances to which the United States is committed. You are familiar with all of them--none are new; all are important to world peace and to the security of the United States. In addition, we recall bilateral agreements with individual nations such as Canada, Turkey, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, the Philippines, and others. Actually, we are involved with approximately 50 different nations in treaties, alliances, and agreements related to military assistance programs and other mutual security matters.

Chart 2, page 6.--Here we see the Cold War has become quite warm in various parts of the globe and in some cases, has actually resulted in limited military actions. Some not so limited. You know them all--Berlin, Hungary, the Middle East, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Tibet, and the India-China border. More recently, in Africa--we have the Congo--with a big question mark for the rest of that vast area. For the future perhaps, on our very doorsteps, Cuba.

There have been some 24 instances of limited war since World War II in which military force has been employed either in a shooting role or in a backup or stabilizing role as in Lebanon.

Any examination of arms control impact on this Nation must recognize and consider the position of the United States relative to the political alliances, treaties, and agreements that impose definite operational requirements for the commitment of its military force. These requirements entail active participation in Cold War operations and at the same time, require an operational readiness posture adequate to win the Hot War that we must expect if we lose the Cold one.

CHART 1



CHART 2



Within this context, let us view the impact of current arms control proposals.

Chart 3, page 8.--Here we can see that proposed measures implicate the whole spectrum of national power; space, missiles, nuclear weapons, fissionable materials, production and storage of armaments, peace machinery and the international disarmament organization, we even include the amount of money that each nation may spend on armaments.

Arms control proposals currently advocated by the Soviet Union, ourselves, and our Allies, cover a wide range of restrictions on national power and even on national sovereignty. Proposals currently on the table include measures which would:

a. Numerically limit or demobilize all military manpower.

b. Numerically limit or destroy all armaments and warheads.

c. Restrict the deployment or readiness of military forces, their armaments and their warheads.

d. Restrict or halt the production of armaments and warheads.

e. Eliminate military staffs and military instruction.

f. Create an international organization to inspect and verify the implementation of arms control and disarmament measures.

g. Create an international organization to preserve world peace and enforce the carrying out of agreements.

Proposals such as those I've just mentioned are complex even when presented in summary form. When examined in detail, the complexities and implications for U.S. National Security become even more apparent. I'll mention only a few of the problems which must be considered with respect to the various types of current proposals:

a. What definition of military manpower would ensure that all such personnel are accounted for? Can Soviet KGB/MVD security forces be included without also including the U.S. FBI, Coast Guard, and State Police? How should civilians employed by the Armed Forces directly, or through contract, be accounted for?

CHART 3

PROPOSED DISARMAMENT MEASURES



SPACE, MISSILES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS & FISSIONABLE MATERIALS



PRODUCTION & STORAGE OF ARMAMENTS

PEACE MACHINERY AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATION

BUDGETS & FORCE LEVELS

b. What should be done about existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, for which no adequate means of detection has been discovered? Should the United States ever agree to eliminate such weapons?

c. When, in an arms control program, should the development and production of armaments and weapons be brought under control?

d. What effect would reductions in military manpower have on the deployment of U.S. forces, armaments, and weapons?

e. Should we ever accept any restrictions on the right of the United States to maintain the combat readiness of its forces and armaments?

f. Should the United States accept restrictions on the rights of its citizens which might be required to permit effective and reciprocal inspection and verification of arms control measures?

g. Should the United States agree to the creation and expansion of an international force to preserve world peace as national military establishments are reduced? Should the U.S. military establishment ever be reduced to the point that the only guarantee of U.S. national security would be an international force? What aspects of national sovereignty would have to be surrendered to permit an international force to be effective?

These are only a few of the questions which arise in the field of arms control. I don't propose to try here to answer these questions. However, I will describe and compare current governmental proposals and permit you to judge for youself how the Soviet Union and the United States have dealt with these problems.

Chart 4, page 10.--The current U.S. plan, is arranged in three stages. Measures in each stage are to be preceded by international studies to design suitable systems for verification and inspection. The program as a whole is to be carried out in such a manner that no State, whether or not a party to the agreement, obtains military advantage over other States as a result of the program. Also the three stages contain balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures, each of which is to be carried out in an agreed period of time, but without advance commitment as to the period for accomplishing the overall program. Implementation of the program would be under the supervision of an international disarmament control organization which would establish the necessary inspection and verification system for each measure before initiating implementation of the measure under consideration.

CHART 4

STAGE ONE

IMMEDIATE INITIAL MEASURES BY THE TEN NATIONS;

ADDITIONAL INITIAL MEASURES WHEN AGREED BY ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT NATIONS.

STAGE TWO

PROGRESSIVE REDUCTIONS OF ALL NATIONAL ARMED FORCES, ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONS;

CREATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE.

STAGE THREE

FINAL REDUCTIONS OF ALL NATIONAL ARMED FORCES, ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONS.

The United States would not negotiate on the second and third stage until agreement had been reached on the first stage, and would not carry out the second and third stages until the first stage had been completed and verified. Also, all nations would have to participate in the second and third stage measures before they could be undertaken by the United States. Otherwise, U.S. national security would be jeopardized.

Transition from one stage to the next would be dependent upon agreement by the U.N. Security Council, that all measures in preceding stages had been implemented and verified, and that verification arrangements necessary for the next stage were installed and operating effectively.

Measures in stage one include two categories of initial steps: First, those which must be undertaken by the Big Four (U.S., France, U.K., and U.S.S.R) before other major nations join the program; second, those additional initial steps which could be undertaken by the Big Four only after remaining militarily significant nations accede to the agreement.

In the first category, stage one measures are:

a. The establishment of an international disarmament control organization which would be expanded as required to accomplish inspection and verification of each agreed arms control measure.

b. The prohibition of the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of mass destruction.

c. Inspection measures to reduce the possibility of surprise attack or war by accident or miscalculation.

d. Initial limitation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. force levels to 2.5 million each and initial limits on force levels of the other States of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee.

e. The placing of agreed types and quantities of armaments in depots under international supervision pending their final disposition.

f. Collection of data pertaining to military budgets and expenditures.

The second category of stage one measures includes the following:

a. Initial force level ceilings for other militarily significant States.

b. Reduction of force levels of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to 2.1 million each and to agreed levels for other militarily significant States.

c. Further deposits of armaments under international supervision.

d. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons when the foregoing reductions in force levels have been completed and verified.

e. Transfers of agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production to peaceful uses when the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has occurred and has been verified.

Stage two provides for additional reductions in Armed Forces and armaments, following agreement by all nations in a worldwide conference. Stage two also provides for the creation of an International peace force, and its progressive expansion, to maintain peace as national military establishments are further reduced.

Stage three includes the final reductions of national Armed Forces and armaments to levels required for internal security, plus forces required to maintain international peace; destruction of all armaments except those required by agreed remaining national military forces and by the international peace force; cessation of production of armaments except for agreed types and quantities for use by remaining national military forces and by the international peace force.

Throughout the plan, provision is made for agreement upon, and installation and effective operation of, the necessary verification and inspection arrangements prior to initiating the implementation of any given measure. Also, the U.S. plan requires that verification and inspection be adequate both to confirm that agreed measures are being carried out, and more importantly, to detect violations or evasions. In fact, this is the key issue between ourselves and the Soviets on control arrangements: The Soviets state a willingness for verification to confirm that a given number of aircraft, for example, are destroyed, but refuse to accept verification which could assure that remaining numbers of aircraft, are within agreed limits. We are more concerned with what is left.

Our Allies generally support the current U.S. proposals. At times there are, of course, differences of opinions among us; however, this is readily understandable when we consider that several democracies are

operating in accord with their nation's best interests in this highly complex politico-military area. You can be sure that when differences of opinions do arise, a hard look is given to all of the factors affecting each of our partner's national and international objectives in order to arrive at the best common position.

The current Soviet proposals made last month (September 1960) by Khrushchev, differs considerably from those of the United States. I mentioned the basic difference on the question of inspection and verification. The Soviets reject inspection and verification, or "control" as some call it, until after agreed disarmament measures are implemented, and even then restrict inspection to the observation of the demobilizing of manpower, the destruction of armaments, and the cessation of armaments production in those plants formerly engaged in such production.

With respect to the timing and scope of specific measures, the differences between the United States and the Soviets also are great:

a. In stage one, the Soviets propose that:

(1) Means for delivery of nuclear weapons would be eliminated and their production stopped as the first measure.

(2) Force levels would be reduced to 1.7 million men each for the United States and the U.S.S.R. and to fixed levels for all other States. Conventional weapons and munitions thus released would be destroyed immediately.

(3) All troops would be withdrawn from foreign territories.

(4) No "special" devices would be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space; no warships would leave their territorial waters; no military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction would leave the limits of their national territory.

(5) Missile launchings would be exclusively for peaceful purposes.

(6) There be no transfers of nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture; no production of nuclear weapons by States not already possessing them.

b. In stage two, the Soviets propose:

(1) A complete prohibition on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; cessation of manufacture of such weapons; the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons.

(2) Further reductions in force levels, armaments, and military expenditures.

c. In stage three, the Soviets propose:

(1) The abolition of Armed Forces.

(2) Destruction of all remaining armaments and ammunition.

(3) Cessation of all military productions.

(4) Abolition of all war ministries, general staffs, military service, military training, and military and paramilitary organizations.

It is important to note also that the Soviets insist that each stage and the complete disarmament program are to be carried out in a specified period of time and suggest that four years should be sufficient.

These comments are intended to demonstrate the answers--or lack of answers--to the questions I posed earlier, which are contained in current disarmament proposals. Also, I have described the proposals to illustrate some of the basic differences between us and the Soviets, the most important of which are:

a. Timing and scope of inspection and verification.

b. The balancing of measures pertaining to force levels and various types of armaments and warheads.

c. The ultimate levels, if any, of national military forces and armaments.

d. The timing of the program as a whole.

In considering the impact of current disarmament proposals, it will help keep this discussion within reasonable bounds if we concentrate on one type of measure which has been included in all proposed programs, the manpower and armaments measure.

Chart 5, page 16.--Everyone appears to have a view on this one, and I believe a discussion of it will reflect the impact pattern of other measures. This measure begins in stage one with the establishment of force levels of 2.5 million for the United States and U.S.S.R., and the storage of some armaments. Subsequently in stage one, after other nations, especially Red China, have become parties to the agreement, the forces of the United States, U.S.S.R., and Red China would be reduced to 2.1 million each and additional quantities and types of armaments would be limited numercially. Corresponding limits would also be established for other participating nations.

Appropriate inspection and verification measures are to be installed at the time agreement is reached on the 2.1 million force levels and operating effectively before the reductions from 2.5 to 2.1 levels are begun.

Let us examine a force reduction from 2.5 million to 2.1 million. That, of course, is 400,000 men or almost one-sixth of our own current active military manpower.

The first thing we must do is define "Armed Forces."

We have not only our Allies, but also the Soviet bloc to consider in reaching agreement on this seemingly small matter. Any change in our own definition would automatically throw out completely the original 2.5 figure as a point of departure.

To consider this matter further, let us just assume for the moment that we do get agreement on the U.S. definition.

Chart 6, page 17.--Here we see our major force deployments, not all, but major. Where shall we effect the reduction? Shall we reduce in NATO? Shall we withdraw forces from the Far East? Or will we absorb the reduction here at home?

A substantial reduction in NATO could conceivably bring about its collapse an objective long sought by the Soviet Union.

CHART 5

- REDUCTION OF FORCES
- STORAGE OF ARMAMENTS

In the Far East, Red China exerts continuous pressure on adjoining nations, Tibet, Laos, India, and the off-shore Islands. During the last flare-up in the Taiwan Straits Units were moved rapidly from Japan and from the United States to this area. This, of course, was in accordance with our agreement, and announced intention, to defend the Nationalist Republic of China. Tremendous tonnages and hundreds of U.S. military personnel were airlifted from Far East stations, to new positions prescribed in plans for just such an emergency.

An additional problem is that of deciding how the reduction should be made relative to individual Services. Some quite readily suggest an equal reduction; others suggest a proportional scale down. Our planners wish it were that easy. Actually, the need for a highly mobile force with the flexibility to react immediately to various kinds of actions throughout the world, indicates that the required balance of forces does not remain the same under all circumstances. For example, the Berlin Airlift saw the transport aircraft as the only air power element capable of meeting the requirement.

Let us test, for a moment, an approach to disarmament that seems to intrigue some. This I call the " one for one" system.

Current U.S. position prescribes that prior to a reduction to 2.1 million, it is necessary that the agreed upon force levels of other militarily significant states be verified along with the 2.5 million level of the United States and U.S.S.R. No reduction to the 2.1 figure by the United States is to be made until Red China agrees to reduce to this figure, along with the United States and the U.S.S.R, and all other militarily significant nations have accepted agreed ceilings on their forces.

We note the absence of any requirement on the part of our various Allies to commit their Armed Forces in other than times and places specified in the particular agreement or treaty entered into. The U.S.S.R. is not troubled by this problem.

This fact alone suggests the complications involved in balancing force levels to meet all conditions. Added to this is the lack of firm figures concerning force levels of other militarily significant States, as well as the question of their ultimate affiliations, East or West.

These conditions and others indicate that reliance on our Allies to equal the force levels of the Soviet Satellites is in itself an optimistic

assumption. Even so, and with the U.S.S.R. and the United States force levels matched at 2.1 million, we still have Red China with another 2.1 million man force to be reckoned with.

I believe that it is quite apparent without my going any further that the one-for-one system has already become seriously unbalanced. The disparity is even greater when we consider the scattered deployments of the forces of the Western Big Three.

In the armament portion of the proposal, we find an equally perlexing problem. Again, we must first define the terms, and now the word is "armaments." The definition may be as restrictive as "guns and ammunition," or it may include delivery vehicles. It could conceivably include even more. Even after this matter is settled, and negotiations begin, how do we equate armaments as to location? For example, if hostilities break out in Europe, is one tank located in the United States equal to one tank in Russia? Obviously, the answer is "no." How do we equate, regardless of location, the value of a submarine as opposed to some other delivery vehicle, such as an airplane? Since current thinking does not anticipate identical force structures, we can certainly look forward to wrestling with both of these matters.

Now this brings me to another concern of our military planner; that is, the possibility of erosion of our position at the conference table.

For example, let us look at the Conference on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviets have been meeting on this matter, with occasional recess, since the Fall of 1958. In the beginning, the United States declared a one-year moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. A year later, following meager progress, an extension period was declared. At the end of this period, the moratorium was not restated.

But even so, no United States nuclear detonations have been made since October 1958. I say United States because we certainly do not know that the Soviets have not exploded nuclear weapons during the same period.

Whatever the ultimate outcome of the Conference for a weapons test ban, as of the moment, the Soviets have attained a temporary test ban on their own terms, "good faith." This undesirable precedent must not be permitted to influence the outcome of future negotiations.

Some feel that our military planners are "set in concrete" with reference to their attitude toward disarmament. This is not so. They will not deny, however, that they are "set in concrete" with reference to their attitude toward the security of the United States.

We rely upon armaments for national security. In the event of disarmament, we must have an adequate substitute if our security is to remain unimpaired.

Lacking political agreements which would lead to a reduction in world tensions, lacking conduct, on the part of the potential enemy, which would demonstrate his willingness to abandon his aggressive course, the United States has no alternative, in considering disarmament, but to insist on an iron-clad system of detection, inspection, and control.

(14 Nov 1960--5,000)bn:msr