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MODERN WARFARE: ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT

Mr. Harlan Cleveland

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 7 November 1960

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


1960-1961

MODERN WARFARE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

14 October 1960

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Reporter: Ralph W. Bennett

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DR. KRESS: General Mundy, Ladies, and Gentlemen: Today we return to the work of the Foundations Unit to include a lecture that had to be postponed because of an attack of influenza.

Let me take a moment to re-set the scene in your memory. The Foundations Unit was divided into five sections, the third of which dealt with modern warfare and strategic concepts. You will remember that Dr. Clem spoke on global power pattern theory. Colonel Kintner discussed our political strategic concepts. General Loper dealt with the reduction and control of armament, Colonel Smith with the Sino-Soviet strategic concept, and Dr. Katzenback treated modern warfare and the nature and character of a limited and total war.

In contrast to Dr. Katzenback's treatment of a hot war situation, our speaker of this morning was to have dealt with the current or cold war situation under the title: "Modern Warfare: Economic and Political Conflict." So important does this College consider the topic that we tried and succeeded in rearranging the time for the talk. Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs in Syracuse University, has recovered his health and has set aside his academic duties long enough to talk to you this morning.

The background reading that you have received has given you an insight into his thinking about current public affairs.

Dean Cleveland, it is a pleasure to welcome you to this platform for your fifth appearance here and to present you to the Class of 1961.

MR. CLEVELAND: Thank you very much, Dr. Kress.

General, and Ladies and Gentlemen: Yesterday was a banner day, it seems, for the United States. Nikita Khrushchev went home. He left sort of a mess behind him, didn't he? Did he accomplish what he came over here to do? I think he did, because what he came over here to do, of course, didn't have anything to do with what he was saying in the U. N. or with those victories and defeats in the votes of the U. N. with which the press regaled us.

Khrushchev's purpose, as has been his purpose and Stalin's purpose before him, was to take our minds off our work. And I think it's fair to say that most of the hot war discussion over the last decade has from the Russian point of view been justified as a diversionary tactic. Even since the Second World War really, starting certainly with the Berlin airlift crisis, a prime tactic of Russian strategy has been to have one great, big, irrelevant bonfire burning at all times for us to look at.

I have a feeling that when the historians finally dig into the Kremlin's files, they will find a memorandum there, dated late 1949 or early 1950, in which some group of staff officers is advising the boss as to what ought to be done next and saying: "These Americans are getting dangerously practical and dangerously effective, with their Marshall Plan and their Point Four. They are managing to relate themselves effectively to large areas of the free world. We just can't let this go on. What

are we going to do about it? Obviously, the thing to do is to start a limited war off in some corner of the world where the danger of it spreading isn't too great. Well, where will that be? Korea looks like a pretty good place. Let's rumble some of our Russian-made tanks across the 38th parallel and see if we can stir things up a bit."

Well, they stirred things up quite a bit. And whether that was the reason for the Russian initiative in Korea, I think it's fair to say that the effect of it was to take our minds off our work. For ten years now we have tried to wrap American foreign policy in something called mutual security. We have tried to relate in our own thinking, in presentations by the Executive Branch to Congress, and in what is generally said in the political forums to the American people about American strategy and foreign policy, that the purpose of American foreign policy is to frustrate the Communists.

Nothing could suit the Communists better than for us to believe that this is the primary purpose of American policy, because as long as we have this mind set, then we will forget to do a lot of things that can't be automatically and easily related in our minds to something called the cold war or the frustration of the Communists.

And so, while we were mesmerized by the war in Korea, the war in Indo China, the Quemoy-Matsu affair in its earlier version--its earlier and somewhat less confused version--I want to return a little later to the current version--while we were mesmerized by these incidents, and then by the second Berlin crisis, by the disarmament talks, and by the prospect

of a meeting at the summit, the Russians and their Chinese partners were good and busy, weren't they--in Africa, in Latin America, and all through Asia.

From their point of view I think it's fair to say that the purpose of these big headline crises was to give us something to do while they went about the real work of the world, which was to subvert and undermine and prepare the way for taking over the under-developed areas of the world.

And so here we are once again, having spent most of our front page headline time, and a substantial part of the working time of our President, of our Secretary of State, and most of his top advisers dealing with Khrushchev's antics, all of us watching very carefully what the clown did in the center ring and forgetting that there were any other rings.

Well, it's not good enough, because the power structure of the world is not going to be changed by the threats we make at the Russians, or by the sweet nothings we whisper in their ears either, for that matter. It's really not going to be changed by dealing with the Russians at all.

It's going to be changed by whether we can produce in the rest of the world a situation that subverts the Russian system; whether we can create around the periphery of the Soviet world that contagious success, in terms of enabling people to work toward their own aspirations, which means in terms of political institutions and economic development. The power structure of the world depends on whether we can do these things effectively or not. If we do them effectively, ^{the} word of that success will seep in through the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, and it will be far more

subversive than the most eloquent letter to Khrushchev that we could possibly devise.

So the first thing I want to suggest to you this morning is that we mostly pay attention to the wrong subjects, because we get so hypnotized by the big crisis that, I think it's fair to say, over the last decade we have mostly been talking about subjects of the Russians' choosing rather than acting on subjects of our choosing.

Now, suppose we were to decide that this wasn't good enough, and that the problem really has to do with, How can we establish effective and relationships with this rest of the world--Europe, Asia, and Africa, /with Latin America? For the purpose of discussing it this morning I'd like to leave the European problem to one side, not because it isn't important and, indeed, crucial, but because it gets a good deal more attention and has historically, and because even the European security system will be deeply affected by whether we do or do not manage to find a way of dealing with the new problems of the newly developing areas of the world.

Certainly those problems are much more relevant to the future of Europe than, let us say, a Paris summit meeting. After all, nothing was ever going to happen at the Paris summit meeting. The Berlin situation had been stuck for fifteen years. There was no indication in Russian policy or in our policy that there was going to be any retreat on either side. There was never the slightest possibility that there would be an accommodation at the summit on Berlin. The only question about the summit meeting was in what form nothing would happen.

Well, let us grant that Khrushchev found a rather interesting form for nothing to happen--with the U-2 affair. But it was always a phoney. It just was always a phoney. And how we ever got trapped into it is something that an outside observer finds very difficult to understand.

But let's leave Europe for a minute and look around at the rest of the world. We're used to the idea that we are deeply involved in the rest of the world, that our impact is very great. The last time I traveled through Asia I was struck by the fact that evidently the top of the popular song Hit Parade in India and Pakistan and Thailand and Viet Nam and all, was that old, haunting oriental memory "Rock Around the Clock"; and that the No. 2 tune, for some reason that our sociologists and anthropologists have yet to explain to me, was "Throw Mama from the Train." I don't know whether this was just the product of industrialization--you get trains and people get thrown off them--or what; or whether this is a natural hit cue for a matriarcal society. But we have this impact.

I was struck myself in the Middle East five years ago, on a trip which included a visit to Jerusalem, and as a Christian tourist must, I was walking up that narrow, winding, steep pathway called the "Via Dolorosa," following the stations of the cross. As I walked along, my head was bowed, not so much out of piety but because it's quite a steep hill and that's the way it is when you are climbing a steep hill. I tried to imagine how things must have been two thousand years ago--the noise, the smell, the confusion--there was a herd of sheep trying to get by me on the right--and suddenly I looked up on an inspiration. It was morning, so I'm afraid I didn't see the

Evening Star, but I saw something much more impressive. I saw a huge banner strung across between two buildings: "The Great Sioux Uprising" it said, "With Jeff Chandler."

Well, this is another measure of our impact. If you take separately each of the regions of the world, you find that more than half of all of the screen time in all movie houses is devoted to American films. Whether we're effectively using this extraordinary platform that we have for talking to the world is another question. But we have the platform. We have the impact. And if there is one cultural universal in this disunified world of ours, it is surely the adult Western, not only on our T.V. screens, but on movie screens all over the world.

I was told by a man who had spent a couple of years in an Indonesian village that the only real diversion outside of what the village developed for itself was to go a few miles away from time to time and see a cowboy picture. And is it surprising that when in Saigon they want to refer to juvenile delinquents, they are called "cowboys." So this is the kind of impact we are all so used to.

We are even used to the idea that our ideas are quite influential. A friend of mine, a lieutenant J.G. in the Navy, was assigned to OSS during the war. He found himself with 17 homesick enlisted men on the island of Cypress, then, of course, a British colony, on the 3rd day of July, 1944. Well, he thought he'd better do something for the morale of the troops. So he took his small band early on the morning of the 4th and went up to a nearby hill, and they shot off a few firecrackers; and then, when they ran

out of the firecrackers that their mothers sent them, they shot off a few rounds of ammunition. And after this small but noisy celebration, they went on down the path to the village in which they were billeted.

They were met on the path by a group of breathless Cypriots, leaders of the village in which they had been stationed, who wanted to know what had been going on up there on the hill. Well, the young lieutenant said: "Just a little celebration; that's all." "What were you celebrating?" they wanted to know. "Just the Fourth of July, one of our holidays." "Well, what's so special about the Fourth of July?" "Well, it's just our Independence day. That's all."

There was a long, pregnant silence. The village leaders looked at each other. Broad smiles crossed their faces. "Lieutenant," one of them said, "just who were you seeking your independence from?"

There was an even longer silence, and the young lieutenant shifted his feet, looked up at the sky, and finally said: "Look, fellows. It was a long, long time ago." Then he said: "It was--er--ah--independence from the British."

"Independence from the British!" And the village leaders rushed on down to the village, alerted the entire community; and the Americans, confined to their billets for the rest of the day, tried not to notice that the entire community was getting drunk celebrating our Fourth of July. Here, too, is a measure of our impact in the world.

And we're rather used to this idea too now. What we're not used to is the fact that we have operating fingers deep in the internal affairs of

virtually every country in the world that we can reach. And, indeed, we even manage, as demonstrated in the U-2 affair, to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kremlin from 65,000 feet up.

We have our fingers in the pie. We have economic and technical assistance programs. You scratch a typical technical assistance person and he will tell you that he's engaged in some technical enterprise. He's helping to build a network of rural health clinics, or a mass spraying program for the eradication of malaria, or an agricultural extension program. But in new areas where there aren't very many widespread organizations that work, and not very many people trained in the building of institutions, that is to say, trained in administration, the things that I've just mentioned are also political instruments, political machines.

← Today a political leader doesn't ride into power on a white horse any more. He rides into power on a network of rural health clinics, which can be a basis for a national political network as well.

And on the military side, scratch most of the leadership in most of our military assistance programs abroad, which I'm sure some of you have participated in, and you will similarly find a description of their function in technical terms. "Oh, we're helping people to understand the new-fangled weapons"--not awfully new-fangled; usually out of surplus, but new-fangled as far as the people who are taking the training is concerned--"and we're helping them to develop military organization and to understand about tactics, and so on."

But, of course, this really isn't what they are doing in most of the

countries in which we have MAAG's at all. What they're doing is training the next cabinet, but they don't know it. And we're not by and large yet sending into our MAAG's people who are any good at political advice. It's our military assistance missions that are on a first-name basis with the people who will be the colonels who will either take over themselves or be the power behind the next government.

So here too we're deeply involved in the political future of dozens of countries. But still we describe this process to ourselves in such technical language that we obscure from ourselves that we are deeply involved in the internal affairs and the domestic politics of other countries.

Indeed, we go around telling ourselves and everybody else that we're not. Hardly a week goes by but what somebody in authority in Washington will announce that we're practicing non-interference in the internal affairs of other people. This principle--let us at least say it among ourselves in this kind of a situation--is for the birds. It has already been jettisoned by the experience of the world in which we are now engaged.

So we have our fingers in the pie. We don't know how to wiggle these fingers yet. We're not at all sure that it's ethical to wiggle them at all. But what I say to you this morning is that we are partly responsible for the political development in every country of the free world, whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not. The question is not whether we will get involved. The question is whether we will use the involvement we already have rationally and consciously, or whether we will blunder around in other people's domestic affairs preaching non-interference.

So this is one fact of life in these areas--that we are deeply involved,

and that we have yet to develop the instruments, the theories, the doctrine, the ethics for operating rationally in this world.

But you do have to add another factor, which can only be expressed in what has almost become a *chic*h--that we live in an era of rapid change. We say this to ourselves all the time, but this one we really don't believe. We have yet to build into American foreign policy an assumption of rapid political change, rapid social change, in other parts of the world.

The evidences of our lack in this respect are all around us, of course. But first let's look at the fact itself. Charles Frankel, the professor of philosophy at Columbia, has put this very well. He says: "It took mankind 475,000 years to get to the agricultural revolution. Then it took us 25,000 years to get to the industrial revolution. And then it took us 150 years to get to the space age." He says: "We don't know where we're going next, but we do know one thing and that is that we're going there fast." It's the accelerating rate of change that is, along with our deep involvement, the extraordinary fact of our time.

Now, what does this mean for American policy? It means that for an American in the 1960's the art of diplomacy is not primarily getting along with the present government. The art of diplomacy is primarily getting along with the next government. And this we haven't learned how to do.

We don't have to look very far for an example. We propped up General Batista in Cuba with military aid and other kinds of support. We sent down ambassadors who all but got in bed with the general. And

we largely ignored this young bearded fellow who was up in the mountains making a lot of noise and who didn't seem to have very many troops.

When from time to time somebody from American society at large, like Herbert Matthews of the New York Times, went down there and interviewed him and published interviews about Castro, this was a matter of some embarrassment to the Government, and to right-thinking people everywhere. We were reluctant to deal with this new force until it became the respectable force of having governmental power.

Well, there were some folks who weren't so reluctant to deal with Castro, who sent in advisers and helpers, and who helped to train Castro in civil government, which we should have been doing. And the Communists, who were not so reluctant, managed his training program evidently sufficiently effectively so that when he came into power, was it any wonder that he felt that it was the Americans who had been against him? They had been supporting the government that he was trying to overthrow. And the Communists had been helping him and pushing him along and giving him support. This is not to be wondered at.

And, indeed, I wonder if we can really blame what has happened in Cuba entirely on Castro or entirely on the Communists, or whether we don't have to say that part of it was ^{that} we really didn't use the extraordinary power, after all, that we have, and the variety of different instruments that we could have employed, in that little island off the coast of Florida.

Walt Kelly, the creator of Pogo, has a peroration in the preface of one of his collections of cartoons; and he said something there which I

constantly go back to when I think of Cuba. He said: "Let us sally forth with tiny blasts on tinny trumpets and meet the enemy. And may he not only be ours. He may be us." Well, he may be us in this situation. The enemy may be our own mythology, our own way of looking at the world.

We have an incomparable advantage in this business of effective intervention in the internal affairs of other societies. And that advantage is that we have what the political scientists are always calling a pluralistic society; ^{that} not everything is run by the Government, and not everybody who goes abroad has to be over there representing the State Department.

How great an advantage this is was illustrated for us, paradoxically, by something that Khrushchev said, when he turned up at the Leipsig fair, a trade fair, some two years ago. He made an opening speech at the Leipsig trade fair, an Eastern Germany trade fair, and he said: "I do not come representing the government of the USSR. I come representing business circles in the Soviet Union."

Now, doesn't he wish, you see, that he could go in at several levels? Doesn't he wish that there were some business circles that weren't the government? But with us we have this. We have any number of different levels at which we can go in.

Indeed, the essence of international relations now is not these arms-length negotiations between representatives of foreign ministries, but it is the intermixture of whole societies with each other, the interaction of whole societies. And this is a very important fact of our time, to which we have already referred.

So we have the opportunity of using other agencies of government, other than the diplomatic establishment as such, of using the economic and technical aid program and the military assistance program, and the various clandestine arrangements, and the presence in foreign countries of private relief programs, and the presence in foreign countries of private business. And all of those, all that growing category of so-called private enterprise, which is in fact working for the Government already. Close to half of the ICA program is now, in its overseas aspects, on a contract basis, that is to say, private organizations working for the Government under contract. We don't call it socialized business, because that would get all sorts of people into trouble. But just as my friends at the Atomic Energy Division of General Electric don't like for me to say out loud: "Hi, Joe. How's your socialized industry getting along?" But these are instruments of the Government. Well, we're not yet using them. We've got all these fingers in the pie, but we haven't learned how to wiggle them.

This is partly, obviously, a question of organization. It's a fact that we haven't yet realized that all of these instruments that we have inside of any foreign country ought to be treated as a single organ and not as a whole lot of different pianos. But it isn't wholly a question of organization. It isn't just a question of an executive order making sure that the ambassador has some real jurisdiction over what goes on inside the country to which he is accredited; and the even more important fact of getting some ambassadors who understand that this is the purpose of the exercise and

who are the executive type to be able to handle this responsibility, because, of course, we haven't been training ambassadors for this purpose; and it's no wonder that most of them wouldn't be very good at this even if they had clear instructions to do it.

But it isn't only a question of organization. I think it's even more deeply and importantly a question of doctrine, of mythology, of attitude, of mind-set. It's a question that we have to tackle at the level of general public discussion first. We have to find the words to say in public what I'm saying . . . perhaps too clearly in this restricted society here.

We don't have the words to talk about intervention in other people's affairs without using words that have bad connotations. We haven't found the word for dealing with the next government openly. We deal a little bit with the next government through clandestine channels. But we have got to begin to talk and think in terms of dealing with the next government openly if, as I believe, we have now reached the era in which the one thing that is absolutely certain is that all of the political "ins" are on their way out.

This is true by constitutional amendment in our country and by constitutional processes in many different societies. But in most of the societies of the world, things aren't quite that orderly. But it's just as inevitable that there will be change--sometimes sooner because of the lack of constitutional processes. And this isn't just in the under-developed areas either, as those extraordinarily dramatic pictures in yesterday's newspapers, of the happenings on a Japanese speaker platform, would

illustrate.

Well, for the kind of world that I'm trying to describe here, we are, of course, very badly prepared as Americans. We are badly prepared because of the mythology with which we approach the matter, because of the mind-set, which I have already discussed. But we are also badly prepared because we're not used to thinking of the rest of the world in the rest of the world's terms.

For example, we tend to think that the most important thing going on in the rest of the world is that they're watching with bated breath this struggle of ours with the Russians. They're doing nothing of the sort, I assure you. Most of the time most of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are bored to tears with our arguments with the Russians. From time to time they begin to get scared that we may throw a bomb at each other, and this would be rather uncomofrable for all concerned. But all of this talk and all of this disarmament discussion and so on bores them. That's not what they're interested in. What they're interested in is our relationship to them. And they're interested in their own desire to achieve a sense of welfare and a sense of justice and equity and a sense of achievenent, and a sense of participation in decisions that affect their own destiny.

These are the aspirations. This is the triple revolution of rising expectations, of rising resentment against inequality, of rising determination to be free and independent of ancient masters. These are the things that send the articulate leadership and some of the follow^{er}/_{ship} of the under-

developed areas. And they want to know what we're going to do about it.

And what we're going to do about it depends on whether we train ourselves for the job. And I don't mean just train a few operatives abroad for the job, although that's important. I mean, train ourselves as a society to think about this whole problem in realistic terms.

We're not, for example, used to our cultural exchange. That's what we call it. But our cultural exchange is mostly a one-way street, isn't it? We have all these movies going abroad. We emit every day from one to two million words in the rapid communications media, wire services, and so on, for foreign consumption, and all that. But how many foreign films did you see last year? How many times last year did you read a news dispatch about something that was happening abroad that had not been screened through one of our own ethnocentric news agencies and acquired an American point of view about the happening abroad along the way? How often did you turn on your short-wave radio and listen to what other people are saying--what they're really saying; not what some American says they're saying. Not very often, I would wager.

We're not yet trained to think about the other fellow's problem in his own terms. We still regard the American way as the standard. We haven't yet learned the lesson of cultural empathy, of that art and skill of seeing how the other fellow thinks, plus the restraint not to judge it as bad just because it's different from our way of thinking.

I was struck in Japan with the fact that the Japanese, when they number the houses on their streets, which seems to be infrequently, seem to

number them in what seems to us a very curious way. We have a very logical way of numbering houses on a street. We number them from one end to the other. We then obscure the numbers with ivy, which makes it very difficult to find the house. But underneath the shrubbery there's a certain logic to our system. In Japan, when they do it at all, the oldest house seems to be No. 1, and the newest house seems to be the highest number. This also makes it very hard to find the house. But, since they don't find houses by numbers, but sort of the way we find houses in the rural area--you know, you go to the aluminum barn and turn left, and go for two miles and find a dirt road and it's up there on the hill--that kind of system--it doesn't bother them that the numbers are not for the purpose of finding the house. Cultural empathy is the skill to see the inner logic and coherence of that way of thinking and the restraint not to judge it as bad just because it's different from our way.

For me the best way of saying this that has ever been invented was the story that John Coates, the fellow who brought the Bali dancers to this country, brought back with him. He said, in describing an argument between a British colonial administrator named Sir Hugh Clifford and an old Malay as to whether you should use your hands or knives, forks, and spoons to eat with. And the old Malay produced the clinching argument. He said: "What you don't understand, Sir Hugh, is this: I'm sure that my fingers haven't been in anybody's mouth; but I'm not so sure about your spoons." You just have to look at it from his point of view, you see, for a minute. And sometimes, after all, things are not quite as different

as they seem, anyway.

The first book on personnel administration of which I'm aware, a book called "Study of Human Abilities," by Lu Chou, written in the third century A.D. in China, had a very perceptive remark. They were talking about interviewing. It said: "You can't recognize in others qualities that you don't have yourself." I think this is true of our international relations too.--that we can recognize what makes other people tick when we see what makes us tick ourselves.

One of the historians in our school has developed a long article describing the situation of a newly developing under-developed, newly independent country; and he has managed to do this for pages and pages in a way that would make it sound just like the Congo, or just like any of the countries of Asia, Africa, or Latin America almost; and he reveals in the last paragraph that the leader he's talking about was named George Washington and the country is the United States of America. We've been through some of this experience. It wasn't as rapid and it wasn't as difficult, but we ought to be able to understand this a little bit.

So I suggest to you certain principles or attitudes about foreign policy. I wrote them down here just to be sure that I get them right. And I'd like to try these out on you as a summary really of what I've been saying, because I've come more and more to the belief that to be effective in the so-called political and economic conflict, which is not so much a conflict with the Russians as a problem of how we relate ourselves to the under-developed areas, how we produce a contagious success there, paradoxically

we'll be more effective anti-Communists if we talk about it less and do more in the non-Communist areas of the world--and that what holds us back is not resources, it's not instruments. If we had to invent levers for intervention in other people's societies, we could hardly invent anything more potentially effective than an economic development aid program and a military aid program. It's not lack of instruments and lack of resources. It's lack of attitude and people who have thought and are trained realistically with respect to the nature of the problem as it really exists.

So in conclusion let me suggest these four kinds of actions or attitudes on an agenda for peace:

First, we can't afford to be unimaginatively preoccupied with our relations with the Russians and the Chinese at the expense of our relations with the rest of the world. Given the slightest encouragement during the question period, I'll relate this to the current political debate, if you like. If we allow ourselves to become mesmerized by the Kremlin's antics, we find ourselves spending precious time talking about the subjects of the Kremlin's choosing, rather than acting on subjects chosen by the free nations for action.

Secondly, we need to build into our foreign policy a basic assumption of rapid political and social change in every foreign country, as well as in our own. We are still tempted to refer to our international goals with words like "survival" and "stability"--static, stagnant words, which imply that the best we can hope for is ^a slow deterioration of the world we like to live in. Seeing ourselves among the world's conservatives, we

have tried to conserve old regimes and reactionary strong men that are destined to be swept away by man's scientific inventiveness and his aspirations for equality and freedom. It is, of course, a lost cause. Radical change is in the air. The question that faces Americans is whether we're going to sniff the new wind or suffocate in our own air-conditioned corner of the world.

Third, we need to build the kinds of strength, concentrated at the point of sale in each developing country, that can most directly be converted into governmental institutions staffed with people who know, or at least are trying to learn, how to govern. This means a new look at our U. S. military and economic aid programs, and at the multilateral aid programs in which we provide so large an amount of the resources, and better ways of pulling them together in each country, that is, at the point of sale, to make sure that they pay off in viable government and growing participation by the people in their own government. The world power structure will change in freedom's favor as we act to make freedom worth while in the areas we can reach.

The word about how successful free institutions can be, ^{the} ^ word about how we're doing, will seep through soon enough. Liberation will come not by roll back, but by making the free world hum with expanding opportunity and growing hope, sort of revolutionary sound of success.

And, finally, we need to cure ourselves of talking about international peace as if it were merely a goal or objective, rather than a long, difficult, exciting, and never-ending task of building international and regional insti-

tutions for cooperative action.

Peace as a goal has been such a large tent over the last decade that under it a Khrushchev could snuggle comfortably up to an Eisenhower. A practical peace policy will think of peace not merely as law, but as institutions--a collective security force in Korea, an OAS resolution on Castro, a force of thousands under United Nations command in the Congo, a common attack on poverty through technical aid, a world bank for large-scale investment, and a U. N. special fund for pre-investment financing, a technical conference with nuclear powers about bomb testing, a mass-education movement among illiterate people, a European Common Market or a Jordan Valley Authority or a Regional Development Bank.

While our national political conventions were in progress last July, some 80 different public international councils, commissions, committees, or conferences were going on at the same time. Another 80 private international groups were meeting on every conceivable subject, from irrigation to linguistics. These, together with the institutions of free government inside of each county, are the building blocks of international communities. A sense of community cannot be prefabricated at a summit conference.

For Americans, whose forefathers brought forth on a new continent a nation built more on action than on political theory, it shouldn't be too hard to get used to an operational way of thinking about foreign policy. On the record we have discussed in 1960 more our national purpose than our national action. And yet all those writers in Life Magazine and the New York Times about our national purpose seem to be saying, in one way or another, that there isn't anything wrong with our national purpose that

acting on it with imagination and vigor would not cure. And yet here we are, still tackling twenty-year problems with five-year plans, manned by two-year personnel, working with one-year appropriations. And it's just not good enough.

Thank you.

DR. KRESS: Mr. Cleveland is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Would you care to address yourself further to the subject of what the Russians were accomplishing while they were pursuing this tactic of diverting our attention from our work, that you mentioned?

MR. CLEVELAND: Entirely too much. In the first place, they started copying our Point Four Program. They didn't really do it awfully well; that is, they didn't do it any better than we did. As a matter of fact, I could ^{trace} for you the proposition that they made all the same mistakes that we made in our technical assistance program, in the same order, on about the same time schedule, about four or five years later than we did. They went through the period of building what used to be called monuments-- great, big things that everybody could see, with a big plaque on it saying, you know, "Gift of the people of the United States"--that kind of thing. This turned out to be really a very bad technique, because the gratitude had all worn off by the time the thing got built. This is what I came to call the "Orphan Annie" period of foreign aid.

But this the Russians went through. In fact, they had quite a time in Burma, as some of you probably know. They imported a lot of cement into Burma for the purposes of building a sports stadium and other things.

It was apparently the wrong kind of cement, and it all kind of froze up in the warehouses, and I am told that they still have in Rangoon harbor some warehouses full of hardened cement that they can't figure out how to do anything with.

But on the whole, though they were not very much more successful at developing political credit for foreign aid than we have been--which is quite difficult to do--nevertheless, they did, through the building of steel mills and the development of trade programs and aid programs and so on, manage to find channels of relationship with most of the major countries that they were interested in subverting in Asia.

They managed, as you know, in Egypt to convert a promising situation into a major embarrassment for the West. They managed to stir up Lebanon, so that after several years of trying to sit that one out, we, of course, had to over-compensate with some Marines flocking ashore on the shores not of Tripoli but of Lebanon. They managed to get much closer to the next government of Iraq than we did.

As a matter of fact, we had a student over there on a Fulbright who spoke Arabic, and he was working on a post-doctoral research job that involved him with seeing Kassim and his followers almost every day. And he was appalled at how little contact there was by relevant Americans. There was quite a little contact by military aid people, but they weren't talking about anything very relevant. They were talking about weapons and stuff.

So about ten days before the assassination of the king and the prime

minister, this young fellow, along with the other Americans in the community, were called into the American embassy for a briefing, he says, and an intelligence officer briefed them and included in his briefing the following statement: "These Iraqis are different. They are congenitally incapable of assassinating their leader." Ten days later, blood was flowing in the streets.

In Cuba they managed, while we were being hypnotized by large questions of policy in Berlin--they were busy in the hills or Orienta Province. And they have been quite busy in other parts of Latin America, as we will probably learn before many years are out.

And, of course, in Africa they were beginning a process, that has only been going on now for four or five years, because they really weren't involved in relating themselves to African leaders until quite recently. In Ghana, as of three or four years ago, their chief agent there really was one professor of anthropology. But now they've got quite a lot more.

So they have been engaged in practical programs in trying to relate themselves to the future leadership of the under-developed areas; and we have not to nearly the same extent. And this is what I mean by saying that they are using the time and we are not.

QUESTION: You spoke of diversionary tactics and mentioned that one of them was Matsu and Quemoy. Do you think that that is nothing more than a diversionary problem? How about the recognition of Red China?

MR. CLEVELAND: I was trying to stay within the time in talking about that. Let me go back a little bit on it.

In my mind, Berlin and the summit meeting are in a sense the prime example of our ability to get hypnotized by the unchanging factors in the situation and therefore take our attention off the changing factors in the situation. But the recognition of Red China and the admission of Red China into the U.N. and in general our relations with Red China constitute another good example of this.

Before a general audience in the United States you can hardly talk about foreign policy without being asked during the question period whether we should recognize Red China or not. I have never been able to get excited about this problem, because the Chinese obviously aren't ready to recognize us; and if they want it very badly, presumably they will eventually come to the point where we can get something for it. Until then I feel quite relaxed with the present situation.

But this is a subject that has preoccupied our internal political discussion. So that whenever you mention China, the thing that immediately comes to mind is the problem of admission to the U.N. and recognition. And yet we can't be said to have recognized what's going on in China until we're doing something much more active around the periphery--Japan, India, Southeast Asia--in the developing of successful societies there.

Now, Quemoy and Matsu is another one like this. The question of whether we defend those rocks or not isn't really central to the problem. The problem really is, What is going to be the future of Formosa and the Pescadores? That's a subject that we haven't been working on, partly because we're embarrassed in the situation where both Chinas agree on

one proposition with which we are eventually going to have to disagree, namely, that Formosa is part of China. We're going to have to come to the point of saying, in words of one syllable, that Formosa isn't part of China, because when, as, and if the Chinese Communists do get into the U.N., we don't want them to get in at the expense of the government of Formosa.

So that I'm distressed myself at the fact that this particular problem becomes the main thing that is discussed about Far Eastern policy in the political campaign. This is because it's another one of these wonderful but largely irrelevant bonfires.

I am distressed also by the specific way in which it has come up. That is, before last night at least, both candidates had gone beyond existing American policy on the subject. Both had made their policy more rigid than the present situation. And the one thing that a President can't afford to do to answer hypothetical questions, to say what he would do in some set of circumstances that haven't yet developed, and the thing that is relatively sophisticated, considering our history in these matters, about the Formosa resolution under which we're now living, is that it's very flexible. It leaves to the President a certain discretion as to whether the attack on the islands is part of an attack on Formosa or not. It gives him the option of getting out or staying in.

I happen to think myself that it was a great mistake not to get out while the getting was good, because it's a pretty silly military position to be in. But having gotten into this situation, and having gotten it frozen

into legislation, I think that both candidates should have said that the problem was to keep it flexible, and should therefore have ruled it off the course. Unfortunately, neither one of them did; and I'm sure that each of them thought that if he ruled it off the course, it would be taken as an inability to address himself to the problem.

Last night it seemed to me that the situation was marginally improved by the fact that Nixon started climbing back off that long limb that he had gotten himself on--that he was going to defend those rocks with the last drop of our blood as a matter of principle. He's obviously going to do nothing of the sort. And if he got to be President, I'm sure that he and he would be advised to be a good deal more flexible about this situation and more sophisticated than standing on principle on every rock and rill.

But I think that Kennedy didn't indicate in the first exchange about this a week or more ago too great a sophistication either, because he said: "Well, why don't we write them off?" Last night it seemed to me that Kennedy described very accurately the problem with which the President was and would be confronted, and managed to relate what he had been saying to the present position of the President and of military leaders who have expressed themselves on the subject, pretty effectively. But it took a week of staff work to get it right.

But my most vigorous feeling about the whole issue is that if this is all we've got to talk about in Far Eastern policy in the national political campaign, it's a hell of a note.

QUESTION: With regard to the changing world situation, which you

described so well, proving something to somebody and the intention to do something about it are two entirely different things. The news media, editorials, and writers, it seems to me, are proving this point, of our need to get into this world situation very well, but I don't see a great deal of evidence that they are suggesting that the American people do anything about it. Would you care to discuss what we should and could do ourselves to convince ourselves to get on with it?

MR. CLEVELAND: I don't think I would agree with the premise. I don't think the news media really are doing very well about this.

Now, I have talked to some editors and TV people and so on and they say: "After all, what can we do? The Secretary of State and the President can dominate the news if they want to. And if all they talk about is the summit, you can't blame us for talking about the summit all the time and putting it on our front page all the time. And if Khrushchev comes to New York and wants to appear on a balcony, obviously we've got to assign our best men to cover him and not the Congo."

This doesn't seem to be as obvious to me as it does to them, because I think they have a responsibility for trying to decide what's important and not just try to decide between clowns and Sputniks. So I'm not sure that I would agree with you that we've been getting it straight from the news media.

By and large it seems to me that most of the mass media have been giving us a re-play of governmental priorities. I think that there's a way of changing it, but it's not probably going to start with the responsibility

of the free press. It's going to start with a change in the sense of governmental priorities.

The President and the Secretary of State, and to a lesser extent other officials of the Government, are able to dominate our sense of priorities. I'll give you one example. In the '40's the objective situation in Europe was dreadful. The Communist threat was considerable. The threat of economic collapse was very great. But in early 1947 we couldn't care less, we Americans. But by a series of acts of leadership that came to be known as the Marshall Plan, acts of domestic political leadership here, that objective situation was converted into a crisis for us.

What I am saying is that crises are created by acts of leadership that draw attention to them. They are not created by the objective situation itself. We have been letting Khrushchev create the crises by acts of political leadership, many of which are irrelevant to the most important problems. We have just been following around, like Pavlov's dog. We have not, by and large, since the Korean War been ourselves--you notice I don't take a political date of 1953; I just want to bring that to your attention--for the last couple of years of the Truman Administration, with which I was and for which I worked--we have not been taking the acts of political leadership that would give the American people the sense that the crisis in Africa in the Congo, or the crisis in land reform in Latin America pre-Castro, was critical and was a crisis that was on a par with Berlin or on a par with Quemoy and Matsu.

Our acts of political leadership have been reactions. We announce

a Marshall Plan for Latin America after Castro gets in. Who gets the credit for our sudden interest in land reform in Latin America? Castro does, not Secretary Herter or Secretary Dillon.

Who gets credit for our sudden interest in African troubles, which has now become an issue in the campaign, when we don't act until there's a sudden threat in the Congo? In so many different cases we have been reacting to a Communist initiative, rather than acting and making a crisis ourselves by our own act. And this is really the problem.

So I would be inclined to say that the press will play this game if they are given the leadership. But the leadership in matters of national policy has to come from national politicians. And this is what we haven't been getting, I think, since the Korean War. This is what we are not getting yet in the campaign from either candidate, in my judgment, because both candidates feel that they have to talk to us where we are. So they have to talk to us about national prestige. We understand that. They're not going to talk to us about some of these other matters that I've been discussing, because, well, after all, you know, you can't make a -- I talked to one of the chief advisers to one of the candidates, who said: "After all, you can't make an educational thing out of this. This is a political campaign--practical problems."

But this is the time for greatness. This is the time for going beyond where we all are and pulling us along, as Roosevelt did, let us say, with land-lease and the first destroyer deal. This was an act of political leadership. It dramatized that we weren't yet where we ought to be in connec-

tion with the world situation. We haven't had one of those for quite a while.

QUESTION: You said you have to lead into this, not push into it. How are you going to get the people to follow the leaders?

MR. CLEVELAND: This is the way society works. Obviously, you can't have great leadership without great followership too. Unless we're a great people, able to rise to gigantic challenges, no leader in the world can possibly be a great leader of American society. But I think we are a great people, and I think we have demonstrated repeatedly in our history that when somebody really raps us on the head and says: "Hey, now, look. We've really got a problem here. We've got to concentrate on it," we heave a sigh of "Well, all right. We'll go in and take care of it." We'll go in and take care of this European war. We'll go in and take care of this European recovery problem." But we haven't said yet: "All right. Let's go in and take care of this African problem." We haven't said that yet, and nobody has told us that it's important yet.

QUESTION: A few years ago, when Dr. John Moore Cabot was Assistant Secretary of State, having served in Latin America, he pointed out that the choice in foreign affairs for the policy maker very often is not between what is good and what is bad, but between what is bad and what is worse. I wonder if you would care to comment, in the light of Dr. Cabot's statement, first, what we might have done in connection with Cuba; and also the relevance of that statement to our present policy toward Trujillo.

MR. CLEVELAND: Well, first of all, I don't much like the statement. I think that there is often a tendency, particularly on the part of people who are long enmeshed in a problem, to feel that things really can't be considerably better than they are, and to feel that the problem is to prevent disaster from overtaking us.

I see this in all kinds of different careers. I see this in the career of being a professor. I mean, coming to it laterally and looking around at my colleagues, they find it hard to believe that the conditions of faculty life can really be very much better. But they can be quite a lot better and in a hurry. Over the last four years I think we have demonstrated that in our particular school, beyond the feeling that the faculty had before about what could be done. And I think in diplomacy too there is a tendency to believe that you sort of have to take them as they come, and you always to be making choices of evils, and so on.

I think in a sense that that is what is wrong with the mood at the moment; that the mood is that, you know, we never had it so good and that our problem is to defend what we've got. These words "survival of stability"--you can't pick up any statement by any leader hardly that doesn't say that the purpose of the exercise is survival. Now, that's a pretty sodden purpose, isn't it, for mankind? So I don't like the tone of voice of that kind of analysis as you describe it.

Now, in the Cuban case, I don't know either Cuba or the Dominican Republic from personal experience. But in the Cuban case I find it impossible to believe that the people who did know Cuba--using now our hindsight--

thought that Batista would last forever. And yet we were virtually acting in our national policy as if he was going to last forever.

We certainly were not effectively related to Castro. And yet we have shown ourselves possible to become effectively related to a new leader. Occasionally we manage it. We managed to be pretty effectively related to Chiang Kai-shek in the '20's when he was a new leader. And there are other situations around the world where it hasn't worked too badly. But I think that in this one, Fidel Castro needed some education in civil government while he was a revolutionary. We should have been providing that education. We didn't provide it.

Now, whether he was a pathological case and it wouldn't have worked anyway, I don't know. But we probably will never know, because we never really tried.

In the case of the Dominican Republic, that old man isn't going to last forever. What's going to be the situation post-Trujillo? We need, it seems to me, to be actively involved in developing a post-Trujillo situation. How you do that in the Dominican Republic I don't know.

In Ethiopia, just to take a place where I have been, briefly at least, there again we've got an emperor who's getting along in years. He has already passed the academic retirement age. They don't retire emperors quite as fast as they do professors, but he won't last forever either. His son is said to be a weak person, who won't be able to maintain the empire form probably. So who's going to take over?

Well, whoever takes over is going to be dependent on the army to keep the streets of Addis Ababa clear. The Middle Eastern--and this

is a Middle Eastern people, you know--pattern is that most of the political power has to do with the streets of the capital city. Well, who's going to keep the streets clear in Addis Ababa? The army. Some of your colleagues are on a first-name basis with the army. Talking about what? Not about battles. They probably regard themselves as estopped from Pentagon policy from talking about such a subject as that. That's the State Department's responsibility.

When you talk to the Ambassador in Ethiopia, who at the time I was there, Don Lynch, was an excellent fellow, he would say: "Yes. These are very important political problems, but it's the military who are on the first-name basis, and I don't have the jurisdiction to tell them what to say to those people."

Well, we're not serious, you see, about these things, about getting along with these next governments. And yet it is possible to identify in most situations who the comers are. Other countries are not embarrassed to be related to the comers in our own politics. You know, Rockefeller has had a lot of visitors and Kennedy and others. We should be doing the same in the even more difficult and turbulent situations abroad. My complaint is that we're not working at it.

How we work at it in each country is a matter for expertise and staff work and operations. But the first thing is to have an attitude that foreign policy is operational. It isn't negotiating and reporting. It's operational. And this is what we haven't learned. We haven't developed the administrative machinery.

QUESTION: I want to think back to this pluralistic element in our personnel in foreign countries. How can we effectively give them objective guidance by governmental direction without hamstringing the democratic element? How can we interfere in their business by telling them what to do?

MR. CLEVELAND: That's a very good question. I don't mean to imply that we should put everybody on the Government payroll, secretly or otherwise. But I've talked to an awful lot of overseas Americans in the last four years, in the course of a research program that has led to a book, which I suppose I really ought to advertise, called "The Overseas American," which came out this summer as the result of a long study of the overseas American. McGraw Hill, 1960. And so I've talked to quite a lot of people abroad in the last four years, and I'm impressed by the fact that this question that's in your mind doesn't bother most of them. What bothers most of them is that they can't figure out how on earth to relate themselves to American foreign policy. I mean, they can't figure out what it is, or what our objectives are, or what we're trying to do.

Most business men will not say to you: "We're afraid that the embassy is going to intervene in our business." They'll say to you: "We want to be helpful in American policy, but we can't get anybody to tell us how to be helpful." There is a lack of leadership in the field on this kind of issue, again, because of our mythology, because our mythology is that we don't do this.

Our mythology is that there is a very big black line between some-

thing called "public" and something called "private," just as the mythology of a very clear distinction between military and civil, which works well in our constitutional set-up, but isn't really relevant in the Congo. It gets in our way when military people go abroad and try to apply that distinction between military and civil in a wholly different situation. Well, similarly here.

This distinction between public and private has broken down quite a lot in our own society; much more than we recognize. And that same distinction is much more broken down in most of the under-developed areas, where so much of the economic initiative has to be by public agencies, or by private organizations that are established by public agencies and subsidized by public funds, just as at the margin of our own economy most of the real advances in American industry these days are partly or wholly subsidized by the Government. You know, ^{more than half of} all of our research and development expenditures are public expenditures. Atomic energy, and new housing starts, and a lot of other things are the result of Government initiative, or the result of private enterprise bringing the Government into its affairs as a risk-taking partner, which amounts to the same thing.

So what I perceive is that there is a lack of a sense that all the Americans are working along the same general lines toward this narrow objective, because we think that somehow it's undemocratic for us all to be working at the same objective. But I think that if the Government were to give more leadership, if the Government were to have a kind of feel for what kind of a post-Haile Selassie situation it was working toward

in Ethiopia, such American businessmen as there are in Ethiopia would cooperate.

I have a feeling that there are a good many places where businessmen are better political agents than Government people. But they can't make up their own foreign policy as they go along. They have got to be given some guide lines. And they will welcome these guide lines and not regard them as a threat to private enterprise. I base this on talking to a lot of American businessmen abroad.

Even missionaries, even some of the relief agency people, have this same feeling--that somehow if we could get on the same wave length--if the Government could tell what wave length they were broadcasting on--we could fit in. But we just don't know how to do it, because by and large, and political affairs have come to be regarded as a specialty/ not to be regarded as the pervasive problem.

You know how it is. You get economic affairs, information affairs, military affairs, and political affairs becomes a section just like the others. And so there isn't anybody worrying about the situation as a whole. Political affairs became a specialty. But it isn't a specialty. It's the general subject of which all these are a part. We're not yet treating it that way administratively even within the Government, let alone treating the whole of our impact abroad as a subject for as coordinated an attack as we can make.

And I repeat again that the great advantage we have is that we can go in at many levels, but we're not yet using this advantage rationally.

DR. KRESS: Mr. Cleveland, on behalf of all of us, thank you
very much.

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