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KENYA

Mr. Charles D. Withers

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Reviewed by: Dr. Marlin S. Reichley

Date: 2 December 1960

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
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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole



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DR. REICHLEY: This morning we are going to have what we call a lecture of opportunity. I know that the subject matter will be a little bit out of phase with the course of study that we are engaged in at the present time, but the gentleman concerned happened to be visiting Washington between a change of stations as a career Foreign Service Officer, and we were more than happy to take advantage of his willingness to come over here.

This all started, really, last summer when General Mundy took a group of the faculty, and in making a tour of Africa visited British East Africa. When we arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, we were met by the American Consul General, Mr. Withers, who took excellent care of us.

At first I was a little dubious of this, because we piled into British Land Rovers, and took out off over the countryside. General Mundy, Mr. Withers, and the guide for the Kenya Game Reserve were in the first car. Somehow or other they got word that a lion had just made a kill. When I say "take off over the countryside," I mean that's just what they did. It was pretty rough going. They finally found the lion beside a bush. I don't know if you are acquainted with the Land Rover, but you can stick your head up in the center and look around from the top.

So here were the two of them. One rolled the window down this way trying to get a shot, and another one up here was trying to get a shot, and at about that time the lion snarled a little, and you never saw windows close so fast.

Some of the films didn't come out so well, but we hope that we can get a shot of this, because I'd like to put it on the bulletin board to show you what the conditions were.

The next day, though, Mr. Withers made up for this and took excellent care of us. He impressed us not only with his understanding but with his capability of his presentation of the conditions in and the prospects for Kenya. As you know, Kenya comes under the British, and they have problems.

I think by concentrating on one area you can get some idea of how they are being handled and what the future will be.

Mr. Withers has just returned from this job. He got back in Washington Sunday and he is on his way to be a member of the Imperial Defense College in London.

I do want to tell him how much we appreciate his giving up some of his valuable leave time to come over here and tell us about Kenya, Africa.

Mr. Withers, it is a pleasure to introduce you to the Class of 1961.

MR. WITHERS: I might say, in that mad closing of windows in the Land Rover when the lion was about to spring, the windows were

plexi-glass. I only thought about that later. I wasn't thinking much when he started to spring.

I would like to address myself to Kenya alone during this talk. But, during the question period, if you have questions on Tanganyika or Uganda, both of which are part of East Africa, I will be delighted to attempt to answer them. I used to have Tanganyika and Uganda under my jurisdiction, but with our Parkinson expansion in the field, they removed them both from my jurisdiction early this year. So I am not too familiar with current events.

I would like to give you first a little background on Kenya. Let me say this--I would like to divide this into three parts: First, some background, secondly, the situation as I see it now, and thirdly, a prognostication of the future, which is quite dangerous, but we'll try it anyway.

I have discovered since I have been back that, with the exception of the people in the Bureau of African Affairs, there are many Americans who don't know where Kenya is. I think I had better point it out on the map and give you the surrounding country so that you will understand a little bit of the strategic problems involved.

This is Kenya (indicating on map), this is Tanganyika, and this is Uganda. This area labeled apparently Ruanda-Urundi is really the Congo. This is Ethiopia, and this is the new Republic of Somali, along the Horn.

Kenya is made up of three races--two besides the well known African. There are a little over 6 million Africans. There are 165,000 Asians, mixed between those of Indian origin and those of Pakistan origin. And there are about 65,000 Europeans. Those 65,000 Europeans are the crux of the problem in Kenya today.

We have to go back in this to examine the position just four years ago as far as political events are concerned. Before March of 1957 there were no African representative members of the Legislative Council. They had nominated members, nominated by the government, and there were 3 or 4 who sat in the Legislative Council. I might add that when the elections came along not one of them got back in. In March of 1957 they were working under a constitution which was imposed by the then Colonial Secretary, Sir Oliver Littleton. It called for six seats for Africans on a representative basis. Later two more were added, so that they came up with a total of eight in the Legislative Council for the first time in Kenya's history.

The Africans rejected this Lenox-Boyd constitution out of hand--this Littleton constitution. They said it was not representative, that they were 6-1/4 million people, and that they deserved more. They agitated constantly until the fall of 1957, when the next Colonial Secretary, Mr. Allen Lenox-Boyd, came down and had discussions with the people of Kenya. He tried to bring the three races together into some form of agreement. He failed utterly in this, because, as a lot of people

put it, of African intransigence.

I don't think it was African intransigence. I think it was that the Africans knew what they were going to get, so they were obstinate. In any event, as a result of Mr. Lenox-Boyd's discussion, he imposed another constitution which called for an additional six seats in the Legislative Council for Africans. The Africans, of course, refused to agree to the Lenox-Boyd constitution—all except the six seats. They took those.

The Africans continued to agitate against the Lenox-Boyd constitution. They used slogans, such as "Down with the Lenox-Boyd Constitution," "Lenox-Boyd Go Home," and so forth. This agitation continued, and we really had what I would call a crisis in the early part of 1959. It looked like the lid was going to blow off.

There were two things that saved it. One, the Colonial Secretary announced that there would be a round-table conference on constitutional matters in, as he put it, the very near future. This took some of the steam out of the African arguments. The second thing, I think, that saved the situation, strangely enough, was the visit of the Queen Mother from the U. K. The Africans attempted to boycott her visit. At least they called for a boycott, and it backfired. The Africans filled the streets when the Queen Mother drove by.

The conference which they had promised was actually held the beginning of this year, in January and February, at a place in London

called Lancaster House. By that time they had a new Colonial Secretary, Mr. E. M. McLeod. McLeod's problems were the same as those of his predecessors, trying to bring the three communities together into some form of agreement. It looked at first as if he were going to fail miserably also, but somehow he beat the opposition into submission. He announced at the very outset of the conference two very important things: One, he said that the ultimate aim for Kenya was independence under a parliamentary type of government. The second thing he said, which I think was even more important so far as the psychology was concerned, was that anyone would have rocks in his head if he didn't think the Africans were going to be in the majority in the future government of Kenya.

The net result of this was to shake the complacency of the Europeans. The Africans were secretly elated, but they uttered that parrot cry, "It's not enough. It's not enough." In any event, they came to some sort of agreement and they all signed this document. The majority of seats in the next Legislative Council will be African. There are 65 seats in the Legislative Council, and it is a very complicated little constitution, but basically the 33 open seats will be filled by Africans. They will not have a majority in the Council of Ministers, but they do, for the first time, have the majority in the Legislative Council.

The progress, as you can see, in four years has been quite rapid. African nationalism in Kenya is no less strong than it is in any other part of Africa, from North to South. It got a late start compared to

Nigeria or Ghana, simply because the British were out in Kenya really for only 60 years. A lot of people say they dragged their feet in bringing the African along politically. That is entirely possible, but they still brought them along during those 60 years at a quite rapid pace.

The European complacency that I mentioned as being shaken by McLeod and the other, actually was shaken during the Mau Mau rebellion. Before that time Europeans were thinking in terms of colonialism in perpetuity. It just didn't work. The Mau Mau showed that African nationalism was a strong factor and that they were going to have to take it into account.

The Mau Mau emergency lasted from 1952 until January of this year. The Mau Mau itself had been finished by 1956 or early in 1957. I won't go into the Mau Mau, because, if you want to learn more about it, you can buy any book on Mau Mau and you can get maybe several versions, but at least you'll have the background.

As far as the present condition is concerned, the place when I left it was quite peaceful. I understand from my people in the Department of State that nothing has happened since I left, so I presume it is still peaceful. But they are in the throes of an election campaign. The elections are scheduled to be held in February, and we are going through that period in Kenya which we are going through right now--charges and countercharges, statements which some people may believe and some

people may not believe.

The Africans, of course, are the prime movers in making inflammatory speeches, but the Europeans themselves are split reasonably widely. I'll get back to that later. They, too, are making charges and countercharges against each other.

There is one interesting factor in this new constitution which is going into effect which affects the Europeans and which I think I should bring out. The constitution calls for a general election with a common roll, with the exception of 12 seats. These 12 are filled with four Africans, four Asians, and four Europeans by the Legislative Council sitting as an electoral college. There are 20 seats that are communal. These, too, will be elected on the common roll. You can see in advance the problem.

The constitution writers said that the Europeans and Asians who decided to run for seats in the Legislative Council, the reserved seats, had to obtain 25 percent of the votes of their communities in a primary. If a European or an Asian received 25 percent of his community's vote, he would then be certified for the general election. If you get two Europeans in one constituency, one liberal to moderate and the other a right-wing, so-called settler type, and the Africans are in on the vote, it stands to reason that the moderate or liberal is going to get in. It has caused a great deal of complaint on the part of the European community, particularly the right-wing community.

This campaign that is going on is a really bitter one among the Africans themselves and among the Europeans, as I said.

There has been a revival of what the government calls Mau-Mau type activities--illegal oaths. Just before I left there was one cattle slashing which they hadn't pinned down to Mau Mau. The lifting of the emergency in January allowed the Kikuyu tribesmen, the ones who were primarily mixed up in Mau Mau, to wander all over the colony at will. Before that they were bound by pass-books and permits. They have been able to move over the colony. Some of them are unregenerate. They had 80,000, mostly Kikuyu, in detention camps during the emergency. The government people, some of them, have told me that the first 10,000 who were released from these detention camps were really rehabilitated and went back to normal civilian life. They say that the other 70,000 they question, and certainly the last 15,000 that went through the camps are still Mau Mau. They have returned home. They have no jobs. They have no land. They figure that the best way to earn a living is to administer oaths and charge 5 to 6 shillings apiece. Some of them are making a killing up there.

However, the British scotched this. They ran an operation a couple months ago with a very appropriate name, Operation Milltown. I should say that the intelligence sources there are much better than they were before Mau Mau. They had a list of 96 names of oath administrators, and

when Operation Milltown was through they had picked up 76 of them. After that they got another 2 or 3. There is still another dozen at large. But they broke the back of this real Mau Mau revival. If they hadn't, it might have gotten out of hand.

One of the factors at the present time, speaking of Mau Mau, and I mentioned that Mau Mau was primarily a Kikuyu organization, the Kikuyu being the principal tribe there--it's a million and one-half out of six million, roughly--is that tribalism, I would say, is a strong element in Kenya and Uganda as it is in the Congo. The difference is that you have a thicker veneer of civilization in Uganda and Kenya than you did in the Congo, but down deep tribalism is just as strong. It is something that is worrying the British for the future of Kenya.

I mentioned that African nationalism is very strong. The pressures of the African nationalists have been steady ever since the early 1930's, when Jomo Kenyata started out. Kenyata returned to Kenya in 1947 and the pressure has been kept up steadily ever since, although Kenyata himself was put into a detention camp. The pressures from within are terrific, primarily because they are Africans and they see other Africans in surrounding countries getting their independence and progressing constitutionally.

The pressures from outside, such as that, are really terrific. They have seen the French turn over all of their colonies, retaining only their overseas province, Algeria. They have seen the Belgians

turn over the Congo at a time when the Kenya African thinks that the Congolese are not ready, ironically enough. Closer to home they have seen Tanganyika achieve responsible government. Just this month they speeded it up and they swore in the ministers in September. But Tanganyika has responsible government. The Kenya African rightly says, "That boy over across the border there is no better than I am. If he can govern himself, I can, too," particularly when the man across the border is of the same tribe and of the same relative standing.

The British government, after the war, adopted a policy, and I suppose the British are partially correct in saying that Mr. Roosevelt had a great deal to do with British colonial policy. After the war there was a change in British policy. They became not anti-colonial but they decided at that time that they would divest themselves of their colonial responsibilities as rapidly as was practicable. What was practicable in 1946 is impracticable in 1950 or 1960, because they have turned over most of it by now, the principal ones being the three African territories.

As far as the situation at present is concerned, I think we are going to see over the next couple of months before these elections this bickering and backbiting in both the British community and the African community. I say in passing that you will notice I haven't mentioned the Indian community, except in population figures. As a political factor they are not very high in the scale. They are a bit wishy washy.

Going from the background into the present position, what probably

is more interesting to you is the future of this territory of Kenya. I might say that it is properly called the colony and protectorate of Kenya. One of the problems which I will get to later is the problem of what is called the coastal strip. It is a 10-mile strip in from the coast, running from the Somali border down to Tanganyika, which is owned by the Sultan of Zanzibar. The British government pays 17,000 pounds a year to the Sultan for the use of the 10-mile strip. This is going to be a problem.

To go from the least important to the most important of the communities, I would start with the Indian community, which I mentioned earlier. You have splits within the Indian community two ways. In the first place you have the Moslem-Hindu split. All of you are familiar with the arguments that have gone on between India and Pakistan over this one and that one. The same thing is true in Kenya in the Asian population. However, they are far enough away from India and Pakistan so that there is somewhat of a dissipation of the feeling, and you see Hindus mingling with the Asians freely.

The second type of split is, of course, what I would call the bandwagon split. There are those who want to jump-on the bandwagon and those who want to stay off the bandwagon until they see what is going to happen. I am afraid the second ones are in the majority. There has been one recent Asian party formed, called the Kenya Freedom Party. The leader of it has publicly stated to all and sundry that the Indians

should throw in their lot with the Africans, that this is the time, and that if they don't want to get clobbered after independence they had better do it now. He has been repudiated by both the two largest Asian groups, the Moslem League, and the Hindu or Kenya Indian Congress. They are saying that he is not a spokesman. Frankly, I think he is actually the most realistic of the whole lot. But, nevertheless, he has this opposition, and the Asian community is split in that way.

I feel sorry for the Asian community, frankly, in a future Kenya. I think they are going to suffer. I think they will be the community that suffers the most. One reason is they are the next step up the ladder and they are within reach of the Africans. We thought it was going to break out back in December of last year, when an Asian ran over a small African child and killed him. Within about three minutes we had 3,000 or 4,000 Africans around stoning his car and all Asians in sight. They slashed it for about a month, and then the campaign sort of died down, and everything is calm between the communities. But the African has an animosity toward the Asian which is very deepseated, for two reasons. The first is that the Asian, in the so-called bush, has had a very firm grip on the small retail trade. You go through the countryside in Kenya and you come across a little store by the side of the road, and the chances are 99 out of 100--or have been until recently--that that is an Asian, as they call it, dhuko. The African, in order to buy his produce, or

his consumer goods, like kerosene, lanterns, and so forth, has had to trade with that Asian or walk five miles to the next store. The choice is obvious. The African has felt, rightly or wrongly--and I suspect rightly more than wrongly--that the Asian has cheated him from time immemorial. But, having a monopoly on the trade like that, it would stand to reason that the Asian shopkeeper will try to make as much as he can out of the deal.

The second reason for this animosity is that the Asians have had a firm grip on the artisan class, the skilled and semi-skilled workers. They are the carpenters and the bricklayers and the plumbers. Sometimes they are not very good, but they are the artisans, anyway. The African has felt for several years that he is in a position to take over those jobs and he has accused the Asians of not cooperating by training him.

So that there are those things, and there are several others. One I should mention, I guess, is, strangely enough, the color bar. The Indian thinks he is far superior to the African and has never failed to show it. Until very recently there was very little social intercourse between the Asian and the African. That's the third reason, and it is a very strong one, too.

As I say, I feel sorry for them, because I have a feeling that there is going to be an economic squeeze on the Asians as soon as the Africans

are in control. It stands to reason that more and more Africans are going to get into the retail trade. We have seen this trade boycott in Uganda. It just really finished in the last month or so. It lasted 15 months, and it ruined a lot of the Asians up there who were in the small retail trade. I suspect that the same thing is possible in Kenya. Furthermore, I think that, if it is not a deliberate attempt, and not a campaign, it certainly will be on a voluntary basis. The African would rather trade with an African than with an Asian. By the same token I think he would rather trade with a European than with an African. But that's neither here nor there.

The Indian community has suffered these splits and at the present time they are not a very potent force. They outnumber the Europeans about 3 to 1. We understand that the Asians are sending money out of Kenya into India or Pakistan as rapidly as they can lay hands on it, as a form of insurance. We also understood just before I left that the Asians were applying for British passports in vast quantities. The Immigration people told me that they thought this was insurance again. They want to get that passport and put it in the safe with all the money, and when the time comes they are ready to go.

Now we'll take up the British, or the European, community. We are all called out there Europeans. The principal fear of the British at the present time, aside from the Africans' taking over the government, is the future of the land. The white highlands of Kenya are the economic

backbone of the country, and those white highlands, as the name implies, are reserved for white settlers. The African has resented this for years and there have been campaigns for the last 20 years--speeches to the effect that the Europeans came in and took over the land. Who is right I don't know. The impression I get is that some of the white highlands were actually not occupied by tribes at the time the British came. Some of the tribes did occupy land, but a lot of it was taken.

The other thing, so far as the highlands are concerned, is that there is more African land in the highlands than there is European land. That is lost sight of quite frequently. It's an emotional question, it's a political question. Any spot that is reserved for European settlers is an anathema to the African, and this can be easily understood.

So that the British settler--and I use the word "settler" to denote those 3, 4, or 5,000 farms and their occupants in the white highlands--is the most reactionary in the whole British community. The fear of the settlers is that as soon as an African government comes in their land is gone. They have been asking for safeguards, and the Africans have said, "All right. We'll write safeguards into the bill of rights which will be attached to the constitution." The Europeans point to Ghana and say, "Look at what happened to the bill of rights in Ghana. How can we depend on this?"

They are also seeking an assurance of compensation from the British government in case these lands are confiscated. The British

are too smart to give way on that. Their attitude is that, if they promise to compensate these British settlers, it will be an Open Sesame to the African when he gets into power. He can very easily confiscate everything in sight and say, "Her Majesty's government is going to pay for it. We don't have to bear the burden." So that the British have deliberately withheld any sort of promise of compensation. They have gone so far as to set up a stabilization fund . They promised 5,000,000 pounds. The total value of the white farms in the highlands is supposed to be about 30 million pounds, so that the 5 million wouldn't go very far so far as compensation is concerned.

The present attitude of both the British government and the Kenya government is to try to stabilize the land values so that there will be a feeling of confidence among the British settlers and so that in turn they will stay on in Kenya, because the threat of dire consequence is always there if the British farmer should leave. He runs the sizable plantation, the ranch, the wheat farm--the exportable products which Kenya lives on.

The business community, by and large, up until the last month or so, has been less anxious than the settlers, the farmers. They have said that there will be a period of adjustment for a year or two, but they feel that business will be good in the colony after that period, and those who are financially able intend to sit it out.

They were quite optimistic. I think some of that optimism has dropped, because there have been rumors of an outflow of capital from

Kenya. Obviously you can't get the figures. The Treasury will not give you the figures on the outflow of capital. They give you some, but they secretly admit that they are not quite correct. They say they can't give you the true ones, in other words. But they have, by and large, not been anxious about the future in the colony.

One of the things that we have seen in this, parenthetically, is a drop in construction. There was a lot of construction going on while the group was out in Nairobi early this year, and it looked quite prosperous and quite promising. The truth of the matter is, there are no more plans coming off the drawing boards. When these buildings presently under construction are finished, the architects and contractors are not quite sure where the next meal is coming from.

The European community, like the Asian community, is split. They are not split on religious grounds but they are split on political grounds. You have varying shades of opinion out there. You have the liberal element--call it moderate or liberal--led by a man named Michael Blundell, of whom you might have heard. Blundell is a farmer who went out to Kenya about 40 years ago. He started out as an apprentice on a farm and he has risen to prominence. He now has a 1300-acre farm. He was Minister of Agriculture. He is a widely respected person. He has what he calls a New Kenya Group. The New Kenya Group believes not in multi-racialism but in non-racialism. Their thesis is that anyone who deserves a job should get it--black, white, brown, or

yellow.

The second major political group is one called the United Party. This is led by a man named Briggs, a retired group captain. Their thesis is that they need another 50 years in Kenya before the Africans are really ready for independence. You can imagine how well that sets with the Africans. They are the really reactionary element.

Unfortunately, at the present time, because of the Lancaster House conference and promises that have been made, the Briggs group has attracted most of the Europeans and their support. Blundell, to whom I talked just before I left Nairobi, is optimistic that the Europeans will go back to his banner when they see the facts of life. After the elections he suspects that a lot of them will come back. I hope he is right, because, as far as the Europeans are concerned, I think he represents the best hope--either he or his followers.

You have these divergencies in the European community, and they are deep. Generally over the land question there is unanimity, but on the question of political advance they come to grips.

The Briggs group, right after the Lancaster House conference, made speeches, saying, "It's time to man the barricades." The trouble is there are no barricades, and no one to barricade themselves against. There are no wandering bands of Africans saying, "Now that we are promised our independence, this is our farm." So that the steam has been taken out of their argument, and the panic has subsided to a certain

extent.

After the Lancaster House conference, however, some of the Europeans were complacent. They said, "This is fine. It will take us about a year to prepare for the elections, and then the Legislative Council will sit." The normal time for the Legislative Council out there is four years. In Britain, as you know, it is five year. In Kenya it is four. So they said, "That gives us five years."

Well, a gentleman by the name of Thomas Joseph Mboya destroyed that complacency in one sentence. He stepped off the aircraft in Nairobi and he said, "Anyone who thinks that this constitution is going to last five years is crazy. If it lasts one year I'll be surprised."

So the panic rose again in the European community. I suspected Mboya was pretty close to being right. I think it will last two years instead of one.

Most of the African leaders that you find out there are much more moderate than they are painted overseas. I am speaking again of Kenya itself. Mboya himself has a terrible reputation for rabid nationalism but, when you get Mboya quietly in a corner and talk to him about the future of Kenya, you find him a very moderate person. He believes in a form of socialism which almost approaches that which we have in the United States. He says that they do not want to nationalize industry, that they want to have government assistance to those industries that

are reluctant to come in. But he is not really a real socialist in the true sense of the word.

The issue as far as the Africans are concerned is not only the land question but the question of Jomo Kenyata and his future. I might say that in discussions with the Africans when they are candid with you and speak in confidence, you find that they, too, are worried about the future of Kenya if Kenyata is released.

I would like to touch later on on Mr. Kenyata himself, to sort of draw him out. But, to go back, leaving Kenyata aside for the moment, after the Lancaster House conference the Africans made attempts to unify. The Lancaster House conference more or less promised that they would have national political parties for the first time since the emergency was put into effect in 1952. Before that they could form only district associations and then under license. But the Colonial Secretary and the government of Kenya promised that they would have national parties.

There was a terrific attempt at unification of the Africans. We soon found that they themselves were split. There are two major African parties at the present time. One is the Kenya African National Union, of which Tom MBoya is a member, and the other is a thing called the Kenya African Democratic Union. It is quite confusing. We call it KANU and KADU, which is even more confusing. The KANU, the African National Union, is made up primarily of members of the

Kikuyu tribe, the ones who were mixed up with Mau Mau, and the second largest tribe, which is called the Luo, which comes over from the Lake Victoria area. When that was formed and the officers were named, most of them were from the Kikuyu and Luo tribes. There was a tremendous amount of anxiety on the part of the smaller tribes—some of them the warrior tribes, like the Masai, the Nongi, the Sukh, and the Wacomba. This anxiety became quite evident, and they formed their own little associations on a tribal basis first. Then, later on, they amalgamated into the Kenya African Democratic Union.

Their platform is democracy in Kenya. I might say that the Propaganda Secretary of the Kenya African Democratic Union came into the USIS the other day and asked if we had a book on democracy. Maybe they will pattern it.

In any event you've got these two parties, the one with Mboya and the principal African leaders, the other with some of the other members of the Legislative Council. They have been at it hammer and tongs. I have the feeling that Mboya's group is going to win the majority of the 33 seats in the Legislative Council in February.

On Mboya, I suppose you have all seen the Time cover and have read about Mboya for the last 2 or 3 years. I think it might be a good idea to go over Mr. Mboya for you very briefly and give you my impressions of him. I know him quite well, as well, I suppose, as any European could know him. Mboya, as I mentioned before, is a quite moderate

man. He comes into your office and he sits in your leather chair and throws one leg over the arm, and he sort of half closes his eyes, and he talks man to man. He's the most moderate person you ever heard.

However, I must say that while Mboya is basically pro-Western at the present time, because of his connections with the AFL/CIO and with an outfit here in New York called the American Committee on Africa, I suspect that if that support stops Mr. Mboya will stop being pro-United States.

He has two advantages politically. One, he has more political savvy than all the rest of them put together, and, two, he's ruthless. He's made a lot of enemies along the way. I mentioned the formation of the Kenya African Democratic Union. The reason for the formation of that was Mboya. One of the leaders told us that the day Mboya was elected the General Secretary of the KANU the idea germinated for the formation of the KADU. He is probably the most hated, yet most feared, African in Kenya today, with the possible exception of Kenyatta, who is still an unknown quantity because he is under restriction.

The money that Mboya has gotten from sources in the United States has actually done him a certain amount of harm, because it provides a lever for his enemies. He has one, a man with the very improbable name of Ogingo Dinga. Mr. Ogingo Dinga, trying to emulate the Mboya technique of traveling all over, everywhere, has decided he will do a

little traveling. Unfortunately, he has traveled in the wrong direction. He has been to Peking and Moscow and Prague, and so forth. He is their boy. He has been bought. He is a bitter enemy of Mboya. As I say, Mboya has a lot of enemies. There are more ex-deputy-secretaries in Kenya to Mboya than any other group of people. He doesn't get along with them very well, and as soon as their heads are raised above a certain level, off come their heads. As I say, there are more ex-secretaries and ex-deputy-secretaries than you can imagine.

I think Mboya is basically on our side. I said that if the assistance from these two groups stopped he would stop being pro-U. S. That may not be wholly true. I think it would depend largely on what the United States Government did when the time came for him to ask for aid, but he is not alone in that boat.

I like Mboya. I wouldn't trust him, though. He is a smooth article. Some of you may have seen that television broadcast--Meet the Press, I think it was. Before that I used to get official VIP's through who wanted to see Mboya, and wanted to meet him. I would always arrange for that to be done. After the television broadcast I had tourists in my office who normally wouldn't even come to the Consulate General, saying, "We saw this fellow Mboya on television the other night. We would just like to shake his hand. Can you help us?" My answer was to give them Tom Mboya's telephone number and say, "You call him." We were a bit weary of him.

We have a joke, Mboya and I. We say we should set up a kiosk in the new Stanley Hotel with a sign, a legend, saying, "Mboya meets all Americans Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays between 9:00 and 11:00. Admission fifty cents." I think he would make a lot of money.

He is, I think, grateful for the assistance that he has gotten from the AFL/CIO. Because of that connection he has done very well. He has a brand new labor building. He also gets to the United States reasonably frequently. He also is the area chairman of the ICFTU Committee on Southern and Central Africa, which is quite a big job. So I think he is grateful to a certain extent. But I would hate to see the AFL/CIO drop him. Enough of Mboya.

As far as the time table for Kenya is concerned, this is the way I see it. This is my personal off-the-record view. I think when the Legislative Council meets in March you are going to have a resolution asking for a commission to come out to Kenya to examine the question of independence—either that or a group to go from Kenya to London to discuss the same thing. Talks would be in some form or another. The net result would be the same.

I have a feeling that, with the temper of the British government at the present time, as I saw it in Nairobi and briefly in London, they would accede to this request. I envisage a meeting between the British government representatives and the representatives of Kenya in about July or August of next year.

The net result of that, as I see it, will be agreement for the first African Chief Minister. He may be called the Leader of Government Businesses. Nkrumah was called that at first. You get an African Chief Minister and say he takes office in January of 1962, I don't think that will last one year. I therefore think Kenya will be independent by the end of 1962 or the early part of 1963, preferably the former. The Africans generally agree that this is the best time table that they can get out of the British, and the British officials with whom I have talked reluctantly agree that they think that is approximately correct.

It sounds like a rosy picture, independence in 1962, but they've got some problems. They've got the problem of straightening out the land question, trying to allay the settlers' fears. Whether they will do it or not I don't know. It's a difficult thing. Even those moderate Africans who don't want to move too rapidly on the land know, as I said, that it is an emotional question, and the pressure will come from the bottom. If their followers say, "You told us we could have this land," and the pressure gets very great, whether they will give into that pressure, I don't know. They, like all politicians, want to stay in office.

Another major problem is the problem of bases, which I should probably have mentioned to you, as military men, at the very beginning. They have two major ones in Kenya. One is 17 miles from Nairobi and it's called Kahalla. They expect to put 5,000 British troops into these two places by the time the strategic reserve plans have been

implemented. Kenya is a strategic reserve, as you probably know already. They expect 5,000 British troops.

The British are hoping that, at the time of negotiation of independence, they will be able to negotiate a Cyprus type agreement on these bases, but I have my doubts. The Cypriots are different people from the African nationalists, and no self-respecting African can have a foreign base on his territory, at least a sub-Sahara African. I leave out North Africa on bases.

The problem of the bases I think is going to be resolved in the Africans' favor. I can't see the British holding out too long on the thing.

Another thing that has to be faced is this coastal strip which I mentioned before. The British pay 17,000 pounds to the Sultan for this. Of that 16,000 are paid by the Kenya government. When you get an African majority in the Legislative Council it is going to be damn difficult to get the 16,000 pounds to pay the Sultan, because the Africans have already said that they do not recognize the Treaty of 1895 which governs this strip and that they intend to abrogate it as soon as they get into power. The Arabs number 30,000 in Kenya, and they are outnumbered. Six million and one-quarter to thirty-thousand odds are against them.

I think probably the biggest problem that they have to face, African and European, is the problem of Jomo Kenyata. No one knows what

Kenyata thinks. He won't talk. Under the government's auspices, after a long hassle about the ability of the Africans to go to talk with their great leader Jomo, the British worked one of their usual intelligent gimmicks, and sent the three African nationalist ministers to his place of restriction. They sent the Chief Secretary and one of the other European ministers along, too, and the Africans had a chance to talk to him.

My impression from a report which we have received from this meeting up at this little town of Lobwar, right in the desert, is that the meeting was a sad failure. Kenyata refused to talk to the African ministers because they were ministers, even though they were nationalist leaders in their own right. I talked to a number of them after the meeting and I was told that Kenyata is straining at the lead. He wants to take up where he left off. If that is so, it bodes ill for Kenya in the future, because he is popular, particularly among the Kikuyu. The other tribes couldn't care less about him. Some of the Kikuyu, some of those whose cattle were slashed by Mau Mau, some of those whose wives and children were killed by Mau Mau, are not very fond of Kenyata either. But they are sort of snowed under in this onslaught.

The key to the whole situation, as far as I am concerned, is the attitude and the actions of Kenyata when he is released. I think he is going to be released right after the elections. I have had no contradiction of that by any British official. They may have plans up their sleeves.

One British official said that they were thinking about putting him on the top of Mount Kenya and releasing him there, and maybe he would catch pneumonia. They are also talking about giving him as much brandy as he wants and letting him drink himself to death. I'm afraid these plans won't work.

A lot of people think that Kenyata is in poor health. My impression from reports is that he is not. The Minister for Health told me that he is disgustingly healthy. But he is straining at the lead, and he has had connections in the past with Moscow. He is a rabid nationalist. His Mau Mau movement was anti-European, not just anti-British but anti-European. It was to kick the Europeans out. It failed. The British broke the back of Mau Mau and they put Mr. Kenyata in jail, where he resided for a while. They now have him, as I say, restricted. He can travel around the village, he can receive letters, he can listen to the radio, he can read the newspapers, and so forth. My contacts who have seen Kenyata say that he is quite well up to date. He knows what is going on.

I think he is the principal danger to future stability, at least the immediate future. The Africans tell me they would like very much for the independence to coincide as closely as possible with the release of Kenyata, so they could put him in as President of the new Republic of Kenya in the Commonwealth. One man said very plainly to me, "We would like very much for him to accept this Presidency." I said,

"Do you think he will?" He said, "No, I don't think he will." He wants to be the Prime Minister. He wants to be the power. Well, whether he is or not, I don't know, but I do know one thing--the African leaders are as worried about Kenyata as are the British, in many instances. They are worrying what to do with the old man when he comes out. He's an embarrassment to them.

The Minister for Commerce and Industry, one of the prominent Africans out there, said that he thought that they would suffer in two ways: One, they would lose all of the British civil service in the senior levels because no self-respecting British senior civil servant could serve under Kenyata; and, two, any potential investors in the United States and the United Kingdom would immediately drop all plans to invest because of Kenyata's reputation in both countries. It is a very very real problem.

I have been asked a question as to whether I think there will be a repetition of the Congo in Kenya. I can only say that I think it is very unlikely, because I think the people are politically more mature, far more mature than they are anywhere in the Congo, and I think that they are going to be sensible enough to keep their British administrators.

As far as the loyalty of the police and the army is concerned, that's anyone's guess. The Police Commissioner, in a very candid talk with me, said that he was certain, after going through his routine inspections, that they would be loyal to the British officers. The African force, the

King's African Rifles, of which they have six battalions in East Africa, they are also reasonably certain will be loyal. I think you will find that in Kenya they will follow the pattern of Nigeria and they will keep as many of the British civil servants and British officers, both police and civil, as they can.

The African, as I say, is moderate, and I think he believes that this is necessary. I hope he is right, because, if he isn't right, there is going to be another Congo in Kenya.

Thank you.

DR. REICHLEY: Gentlemen, Mr. Withers is ready for questions.

QUESTION: What action would you suggest that the United States take relative to Kenya both now and in the future?

MR. WITHERS: I haven't stopped beating my wife yet. Well, I can say this with a certain amount of pride, despite all of the allegations of a fall in prestige, that the prestige of the United States in East Africa at the present time is still pretty high. The policy that we are following out there at the present time I think is the best one to follow. After all, the British are still in control. We maintain our contacts in all of the communities. For instance, a small thing--when you go into the entertainment representation field, you go into most British homes. I think I have been in five British homes at which there were Africans. The only place you can see most of the Africans in European

homes is in the homes of American consular officials in Nairobi.

We maintain our contacts with both. We give as much assistance as we can to them. For instance, in this politically illfated airlift, we did our share in smoothing the way for the people to go.

At the present time, considering the time table and the uncertainty of it, the best thing we can do is to keep on good terms with both sides, both elements, and to assist in any way that we can. We have an ICA program out there. The basic idea behind it has been an agricultural and educational improvement which will benefit the African. It doesn't get any direct mileage from the African, but we have recently, I might say, taken the Africans into consideration as far as decisions are concerned.

Just before I left we had a series of talks with the African Minister for Commerce and Industry, with Tom Mboya, and with some of the other African leaders to try to find out what they thought Kenya needed in the way of American assistance. The ICA, the American assistance program, is an integral part of our foreign policy. The only thing I can suggest is that we continue doing what we are doing.

QUESTION: Outside of the areas that you were talking about, in looking at the map, there is sure to be a great number of countries that are very small that may perhaps have some considerable difficulty in maintaining an economic self-sufficiency. Likewise there may well be some state lines that cut across racial lines. This would seem to

lend itself perhaps then to some of the larger nations trying to take over some of the other nations by force, to create strong economic states or to reintegrate people. I wonder if you can hit some of the highlights in this area of future problems.

MR. WITHERS: That's an appropriate question as far as East Africa is concerned. In East Africa, like in almost all the rest of Africa, the boundaries are artificial. For instance there is this border between Kenya and Tanganyika. Half of the Masai are in Kenya and half of the Masai are in Tanganyika. This is Uganda (indicating). You have the second largest tribe in Kenya. The Luow are split between Uganda and Kenya. The boundaries between Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda were drawn by the British and the Germans. This is old German East Africa (indicating). This was just an arbitrary line, so they split the tribes up.

The thing I think you will find in East Africa is a federation of some sort. It may be a loose confederation, or it may be an economic union. It is going to take some form of federation. The leaders in Tanganyika and in Kenya are in favor of it.

That would, of course, militate against any incursions into here. The biggest problem on this side is the Somali problem. That whole triangle there (indicating) is made up of Somali tribesmen. You know, for political reasons, in the new Republic of Somali they are talking about Greater Somali. They have, as you have probably studied in your

course, a problem between the Somalis and the Ethiopians over the boundary there. The same problem is going to come up with respect to Kenya. As the Africans get into power in Kenya, they are not going to turn over an inch of territory, because of pure nationalism.

The danger that I see, as far as Africa is concerned in that question, is the Nkrumah type trying to maintain a sort of, not superiority, but trying to gain control through various associations. Dr. Nkrumah has great ambitions, and I suspect that under the tutelage of the Communists Secoutoure' of Guinea has also.

What is going to happen I have no idea. It is a very great problem, because all of the boundaries are artificial. They were set by the British and the French, the British and the Belgians, the French and the Belgians, and the British and the Germans, just in an arbitrary way.

I think you will find Irredentism breaking out in Africa. It is no different than the rest of the world.

QUESTION: This is a two-part question. No. 1, Did you have any Negro Americans in your staff? No. 2, Do you think it would be an advantage to us to have Negro Americans representing us in these African countries, or would it be to our disadvantage?

MR. WITHERS: As to your two-part question, if you deal strictly with Kenya, the answer is no to both of them. As far as the rest of the sub-Sahara in Africa is concerned, we have Negro members of our staffs in West Africa at the present time. The head of our ICA Mission

in the Sudan was a Negro officer. But Kenya is a different kettle of fish. The official connections of a Negro officer in Kenya would be perfectly all right. But the city is zoned in Nairobi. We had this problem come up a year ago. I recommended strongly against sending a Negro--he wasn't an officer, he was a clerk. I recommended strongly against sending him out there for his own sake. The Minister of Commerce and Industry has an American Negro wife, and for a long time she had to carry her passport to prove that she was an American. And still they live out in the African location. Admittedly he has a nice house out there, a small house. But any Negro employee we would have would not be able to belong to any of the clubs, would not be able to go into some of the Nite Clubs. There is one that the General knows, the Equator Club. It would be bad for the American Negro employee.

I would have welcomed him. I have had Negroes on my staff for a long time, but in Kenya at the present time, no, for his sake alone. As far as the rest of Africa is concerned, we have had Negro ambassadors to some of our republics in West Africa. The scuttlebut now is that we have a white ambassador in one of our countries because the Prime Minister complained that he was being treated as a second-class nation, and he wanted a white ambassador out there.

QUESTION: Mr. Withers, you gave us an interesting discourse on Tom Mboya. Did you have any opportunity to establish relations with Kenyatta, or Ogingo Dinga, or any of these other unknown quantities

or what would you think about trying to have some association with them?

MR. WITHERS: Well, on Kenyata, no, because he is still under restriction. He was released from detention about a year or 18 months ago, and he is now restricted to one area and cannot receive visitors without government permission. It would have been fruitless for me to go up to Kenyata, simply because, if he wouldn't talk to his own Africans, I'm damn sure he wouldn't talk to me. In the first place, I think it would have been embarrassing if I had asked the government to let me go see him. They would have wanted to know why.

As far as Mr. Ogingo Dinga is concerned, I will tell you an interesting little story. About three months after I arrived in Nairobi, I started on the orientation tour, with which you, of course, are familiar. I got in my automobile and I drove all over Kenya, including Mr. Ogingo's constituency, Kisumu, right on Lake Victoria. It had all been arranged for me. Mr. Ogingo Dinga picked me up in his Land Rover, a brand new Land Rover, mind you, and, armed with his fly whisk, which is a symbol of authority, he took me around his district. The roads are not very good, and we drove 95 miles, stopping at tea shops, bakery shops, bicycle-repair shops, and various places like that. I found it fascinating, but I found Mr. Ogingo not quite so fascinating. Frankly speaking, Mr. Ogingo Dinga is a fatuous fool. I have had contact with him ever since then. I might say that he is the only one in the Legislative Council who has adopted the robe. When he was in London for the Lancaster House

conference he had one tailored for him. It had gold braid from A to Z. That is his Luow national costume. I suspect he is wrong on that, because, before the British came the Luow national custome was a leaf, if they could find one.

But Mr. Ogingo Dinga is a very interesting type. He has wanted to come to the United States, seriously, for a long time. It got embarrassing for me when I met him in the street. He would say, "What about my trip to the United States?" I had to tell him--you know, you always have a buck that you can pass--"That's settled in Washington. I really have nothing to do with it."

We had made the decision long ago that we would not send any of the African members of the Legislative Council to the United States under the leadership program, not because of criticism that we would receive from the British--that we receive anyway, so it doesn't make much difference--but primarily because of the criticism we would receive from his fellow members of the Legislative Council. They would say, "Why take that jerk? Why not take me?" So we decided that none of the 14 would go. The truth of the matter is that a number of them have been over here. Tom Mboya comes over under his own steam, and Dr. Kiyano, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, is invited over to lecture on Africa from time to time. He spent eight years in the United States. He has a Ph. D. from the University of California and an M. A.

from Stamford. So we figure he has seen a good bit of the United States in eight years.

But we just made it a policy not to take any of the African politicians as such. Some of them turned into politicians after we took them, but that was not our fault.

QUESTION: Sir, what are the Russians or the Communist bloc doing in Kenya?

MR. WITHERS: At the present time it isn't a problem. It is certainly a threat, as it is anywhere else. There is no Communist Party as such in Kenya, no open Communist Party. There is no ban against a Communist Party, just as in Britain, but there is none. The British have kept a pretty tight control over their citizens coming into Kenya. You go to Kenya and you have to stay five years on probation if you are a British subject. After five years you can apply for permanent residence. After five years, or before the five years^{are} up, the British have sufficient on a man and back to the U. K. he goes.

To my knowledge there is only one self-avowed Communist Party member in Kenya, and he is residing in the pokey. Don't think that the boys in the Kremlin have forgotten him in East Africa. What they have done is they have concentrated on broadcasts, Radio Moscow broadcasts, and, frankly, they have been working through Cairo.

The principal Communist danger to East Africa, I think, and to that

whole area of Africa, is from the Chinese Communists. They are very busy on Zanzibar. Zanzibar is a little two-bit-size place. They have taken I don't know how many people from Zanzibar up to Peking for a little trip, and they have all come back.

From Kenya we did have a number of students studying behind the Iron Curtain, but not one has returned to Kenya yet. It is a threat. But, at the present time you wouldn't think that there was anything like a Communist in the world there, unless you read the U.S.I.S. reports.

QUESTION: My question is a corollary to an earlier one regarding the designs certain countries may have on their neighbors. The specific immediate question is the Sudan and Egypt's desires regarding it. In view of the traditional desire of Egypt and the leaders of Egypt to control the head waters of the Nile, would you care to comment on the intensity of the desire of Mr. Nasser to control the Sudan?

MR. WITHERS: It's a bit out of my province, but I would conjecture that Mr. Nasser is interested in expansion all over, not just the head waters of the Nile. I think we saw it in Sudan and I think you are going to see the Egyptians move in in great quantities into Somalia, the new republic. So that he will have the corn there. He hasn't made much headway in Ethiopia, and so far he hasn't made much headway in the Sudan. There is a group up there in the Sudan who are willing to play footsies with Nasser. Now there is the move southward.

Regarding the head waters of the Nile, by the way--this is Lake Victoria (indicating). The Owens Falls Dam is the one on the top there. The Nile flows out of there, right there, and he would have to come down pretty far. He would have to take over Uganda and Kenya.

The Egyptians have two officers stationed at the Owens Falls Dam and their job is to count the cu-secs as they go over the dam. It's a big job.

DR. REICHLLEY: I think that's probably a very good note to end on. I believe this thing works two ways. If you are going to the Imperial Defense College now you have some experience with how an academic institution operates. We surely appreciate your coming here and giving up your leave time to help us on this subject. Thank you very much.