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U. S. POLICIES AND PLANNING FOR
MANPOWER READINESS FOR WAR

Mr. Edward L. Keenan

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Reviewed by: Colonel J. H. M. Smith, USAF

Date: 10 January 1961

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
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FOR WAR

15 November 1960

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Reporter: Ralph W. Bennett



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MR. POLUHOFF: Gentlemen: One of the most important aspects of national defense is that of planning for national security and survival. The shift ^{IN EMPHASIS} of planning for cold war, hot war, and limited war puts ^a great emphasis on those responsible for those plans.

Our speaker this morning, who has appeared ^{TWICE BEFORE} on the platform ^{FOR} before the Industrial college ^{twice}, is Mr. Edward L. Keenan, Deputy Assistant Director for Manpower of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. He has had considerable experience in the manpower field, ^{having} served during World War II as Deputy Director of the War Manpower Commission and as Administrator for the Defense Manpower Administration. He has been an advisor on manpower both in South America and abroad.

We are now going ^{to look} into the policies and planning aspects of manpower mobilization to insure the readiness of our human resources for any emergency.

Mr. Keenan, I am happy to welcome you again to the platform.

MR. KEENAN: Thank you, Mr. Poluhoff.

General Mundy, Members of the Class of 1961, and Guests: I like to break my presentation on the subject of manpower up into several segments, to talk about it in terms of the way we divide the job in our office.

I believe that this is the first of the resource subjects that has

discussed this year, and I would like to mention before I go into the specifics that, as I am sure you all know, manpower is a little different than any of the other resources that we are concerned with in our mobilization planning. Manpower is not something you can put on the shelf and stockpile. Manpower is human. It can be diluted a little on occasion. To some small extent it can be stretched.

And, most important of all, it can be motivated, or it can fail to be motivated. And this makes it a lot different than our inanimate resources. And that's one of the reasons why in our manpower planning we are putting a lot of emphasis on motivation. And you will see, as I go into some of the specifics, that we are placing a lot of emphasis upon a voluntary manpower system.

As to the way we divide up our job: Roughly there are six segments. I'd like to enumerate them and then in the rest of my talk go into some of the specifics with respect to each of these segments.

First, our job is to develop --and to some extent we have now developed--a National Manpower Plan. I believe that as reference material you were given a copy of Annex No. 30 to the National Plan for Civil and Defense Mobilization, and that is our National Manpower Plan. It is a plan designed to meet all emergencies-- general war, limited war, or national disaster. But, like any other plan, it is not very good unless the emergency manpower organization is in place and relatively ready to administer that plan. The plan and getting the plan ready is really our number one job.

Second, we must have an adequate knowledge of present and foreseeable manpower supply and requirements. We have to know the manpower picture--the way it is today and the way it appears it is going to be tomorrow and next year or five or ten years from now.

Third, we must develop policies and programs to eliminate present or foreseeable manpower shortages.

Fourth, we must have some plans for emergency administration within the Government itself.

Fifth, we must pre-attack have some plans for mobilizing manpower post-attack. It's a lot more efficient and effective to know now what we can do to line up people for certain post-attack functions than if we wait until the post-attack period in an effort to recruit and refer.

Sixth, we must have an understanding of the relationship of manpower in the United States to manpower in the rest of the world, particularly in the rest of the free world and in the developing countries, although we must also know the manpower potential and the manpower problems in the Soviet Bloc.

And here I would like to attempt to make the point that the mobilization of free world manpower for economic and social development is of direct interest to us who are planning manpower measures for our own national security.

Now, with respect to the first of these six aspects of our plan: We have Annex 30, and we have had in the past year eight regional conferences around the United States, bringing together at each of these conferences

some 125 or 150 people, representing Civil Defense, the U. S. Department of Labor, the Public Health Service, the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, representatives of local military installations, the Selective Service System, and others who are concerned with manpower, to discuss Annex 30, to question Annex 30, and to get an understanding of the organizational relationships that must exist if an emergency manpower organization is going to work.

Of necessity, this plan is broad. It's to meet any emergency. And in limited war we would be up against many different kinds of things than we would be up against in total war.

We didn't have much trouble in our regional conferences in getting understanding of the way the manpower machinery would work in limited war. In some ways it wouldn't be too much different than what we had in World War II or in the Korean conflict, if we define limited war as war on other shores and with no imminent threat to the United States. We know that we would have different kinds of labor market situations around the country. We know we would have tight labor markets, and at the same time we might have loose labor markets. We know that we might need different kinds of labor market controls, much tighter controls in some parts of the country than in others.

But when you get talking about the kind of manpower situation you would have in general war, with nuclear attack upon this United States, you get into quite a different situation, because you get into things that none of us have ever been up against or faced.

One of the first things that came up in our meetings was that in that kind of a situation it didn't make much difference what kind of a plan you had, because things would be so chaotic that no plan would work anyway. And as we went through these regional conferences, we found that we had to talk about that first.

We came to the conclusion that a lot of people have got some rather false ideas about that part of what they call civil defense--the idea that if we were bombed, everything is hopeless anyhow; that nothing can be done about it. I think in the past few months a great deal has been done to dispel that notion, but not near enough.

Some of you may recall that a little more than a year ago the Rand Corporation, Herman Kahn specifically, of Rand, made a study in which he attempted to torpedo some of these beliefs; and he made this analogy, which I think is a good one: He said that people that had looked at nuclear war had looked at the United States and looked at the country as if it was a human body; and if you hit the vital organs, the whole body would die. He said he thought this view was not only questionable, but wrong. He thought we should look at the United States as if it were two countries--a country A and a country B--Country A, with perhaps fifty to a hundred of our largest cities in it; and Country B, with the remainder of our towns and villages and the remainder of our population. In most hypothetical attacks that we have taken a look at and planned for, Country A would be hit very, very hard; Country B would still be in existence. Country A might not be able to exist; but Country B could not only exist; but if the

planning was proper, could rehabilitate Country A within some reasonable period of time.

This point of view, plus the realization that a reasonable amount of fallout protection can save many thousands and millions of more lives than was originally thought, makes planning for nuclear not only sensible, but practical and a "must."

If the average individual only uses horse sense and takes ordinary precautions in his present home, he can improve his chances of survival from fallout approximately 50 percent. And if he makes reasonable preparations beforehand, he can improve his chances of survival against fallout by 75 or 80 percent. And even though we all know the horrors of a direct hit, and we all know it's not going to be very easy to have the kind of hard protection that would protect us against direct hit, we also know that percentagewise there aren't going to be that many direct hits. The real chance of survival, the real chance of winning, if we should be attacked first is to have a reasonable advance preparation against fallout, because then the great majority of the population can be saved, and a great majority of our resources can be brought back into use in a reasonable period of time. So we found we had to talk about this first before we talked about manpower planning.

I'd like to talk a little bit about what this manpower plan provides for in case of either this all-out war or in case of limited conflict.

I mentioned in my opening comments that we place a great deal of weight upon a voluntary system. That is largely due to our conviction that, no matter how you plan a manpower mobilization program, you are not

going to the desired results unless people are motivated to do the things that have to be done. It's easy to direct a hundred people to go to a job somewhere. It's not quite as easy to make them work at a certain pace unless there's a will to work at that pace.

Consequently, for this reason and for historical reasons, we have worked out this manpower plan with the very close cooperation of management and labor in this country. If there's one thing that management and labor are agreed upon--and I'm speaking of organized management and organized labor, and there may not be too many things that they are agreed upon--but if there is one thing, it's their disdain and dislike for compulsion in the manpower field, although I think after many years of discussion with our National Labor-Management ^{Manpower} Policy Committee, the members of that committee realize that in the case of nuclear attack, we would have to resort to some measures no doubt that have never been resorted to before in this country. And there is an understanding of the necessity of that. If the program is properly started and if the compulsion it would be has to come into play, only for those few who don't voluntarily do what they are asked to do.

We talked through this National Manpower Plan with this Labor-Management Committee in great detail. In fact, many of the sentences were painstakingly worked out with this group. This committee is not a group of people that the Government has just called together as a sounding board. The labor members of that committee are nominated by the national office of the AFL-CIO, and the management members are nominated half by the NAM and half by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. And although

this committee did not endorse every word in this plan, they endorsed if the principle of it; and they realize that when we say in the plan that the national security of our country is threatened, that personal services may be required, that they would have a responsibility of working with their groups among employers and among workers to get across to them the need for this requiring personal services. This is because until we reach such a point, they realize that we would do everything possible to administer our manpower plan with the consent of the governed, if you want to put it that way.

We assume that if we should sneak into a general war--let's presume for a moment that we have a limited war and conditions get slowly worse, which is an assumption that some think is a realistic one, in the period limited war we would have tight and loose labor market areas. We would in some parts of the country want to move people to other parts of the country. We would in the tight labor market areas want to take people away from less essential employers. And we would wish to restrict the rights of workers to referral to those jobs that were most important, to the most critical jobs in the most essential industries.

In this kind of a situation in limited war we would presume that this would be administered locally. We would set up local labor-management committees. We would put in, with the approval of those committees, what local controls were necessary to direct the referral of individuals to those jobs that needed filling in the national interest.

If this didn't work in a period of limited war, of course the Congress

would still be in session, and it would be possible to go to the Congress for legislation to put sanctions behind such a program. Such legislation has been drafted and is on a standby basis. But will recall that in World War II several efforts were made to secure what was then called national service legislation, and it didn't get very far at all. And yet at the same time in World War II, with a so-called voluntary system, what some of the men in the labor movement call voluntary compulsion, these local labor market controls were administered in some of the tightest labor market areas in this country, to such an extent that an individual simply did not get a job unless he accepted one of the few jobs to which he was referred. His availability was limited. He could only go where he was referred. And we had the situation of individuals actually being unable to work because they turned down critical jobs in essential industries even though we had no national service legislation. And, although there were some mighty rough spots in it, by and large the manpower part of the job got done in World War II.

However, if this limited war situation should develop into general war, with bombing upon this country, and the Congress was destroyed or at least not in session, we would then rely upon the war powers of the President for the authority we needed to go beyond a purely voluntary system. Here we would have a number of things that could be done.

We presume in that kind of a situation--and I don't want to take the time to talk about chaos and that period when things would be so chaotic that you couldn't even find people--but outside of that situation, we presume

that the great majority of people would be looking for guidance, would be looking for leadership; and if Government knew the jobs that had to be done first, the things that were most important, not only for survival, but for the immediate retaliatory efforts that we might be undertaking, the people would be more than glad to take those assignments first. The whole history of mobilization in this country through every war would indicate that.

But if there were a few who didn't care to take the directed referral, or didn't care to take the assignment to the particular area or the particular line of work where local authority thought he should go, we would set up a very rough-and-ready kind of an appeal process to the local manpower authority, where an individual would have a right to state his case and make a case as to why he shouldn't take ^{that} a job; and he would be judged by a jury of his peers, assuming that we could get a few management ^a and labor people together at the local level; and ^a decision would be made. If it was still the decision of Government that this individual was qualified for that job to which he is referred, he would again be referred there, and he would be expected to go.

We have been asked, in that kind of situation, if the Congress was not in session, what could be done to make such a system work. There are alternate plans. We have several of them. We have a rather nice marriage today between the two most important civilian and military manpower agencies in the United States--the Public Employment Service and the Selective Service System--and it doesn't take much imagination

to bridge the gap between the referral of a man to a job through a Public Employment office, and then the second step of referring that man to a local Selective Service board under amended Selective Service regulations and the referral of that man to an assignment, be it whatever it may be.

These are the two agencies, incidentally, that are the heart of an emergency manpower program. The primary delegation under Annex 30, the National Manpower Plan, is to the Public Employment System, the Employment Security System, which is a Federal-State system, administered Federally by the U. S. Department of Labor, and administered in the States by the State governments.

This is a very large and very well trained piece of machinery. Over 55,000 State employees are in this system, and 35,000 to 40,000 of them are in the 1900 local employment offices. A heavy percentage of that 35,000 have been trained as employment interviewers.

In the Selective Service System there are some 4,000 local boards, with volunteer board members but full-time clerks, and on-the-shelf emergency plans to expand that local board coverage literally overnight to 8,000-odd boards.

Together, these two pieces of administrative machinery, if working in unison, could do quite a job on manpower mobilization. And that is the way the plan is set up.

I might say in that respect that the plan itself, as I mentioned earlier, is general. But the United States Employment Service, which is part of the Bureau of Employment Security of the Labor Department today,

and the Selective Service System are sending out corollary and additional instructions to their field organizations to implement, in considerably more detail, the things that have to be done.

The Labor Department has a document known as the Defense Readiness Handbook, which is in relatively good shape now and is being improved all the time, which sends detailed instructions down through the State employment security agencies to the local employment offices.

This Federal-State system of employment security is a very nice device, because under the Federal act there are certain Federal standards, and there is a State acceptance of Federal guidance in policy matters in manpower. In fact, the State organizations have agreed that they would follow Federal directives in time of emergency. Consequently, instructional material can be sent directly through the State agencies down to the local employment offices. So that all 1900 of these offices, as well as all 4,000 of the local Selective Service boards, can have the same basic policies and instructions in their hands.

They have the same instructions as to what to do on the clearance of labor, as to what to do on reporting labor shortage and labor supply, as to the techniques that can be put into effect to meet local shortages, local employment stabilization plans, local employment ceiling programs that limit the number of workers an employer may have, local restrictions on hiring opportunities which limit the jobs to which a worker may be referred.

Another part of this plan, which is somewhat beyond the mere manpower

end of the job, but which must be understood at the regional, State, and local level if the manpower and other resource parts of the job are to work, is how a system of priorities and urgencies is to be administered, because in any kind of emergency situation we are going to have to decide which things come first, and where manpower shall be directed first, and where material shall be directed first, or where any other resource is to be directed first. And we have in Annex 30 certain broad guidelines on that, and we are pleased that now the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has decided to issue the same guidelines to control all resources.

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These are listed for the guidance of State and local officials, because I think all of us who have thought about the kind of administrative problems that we would have in a real conflict know that the actual implementation of priorities is not going to be made from behind a desk in Washington, or from behind a desk in any regional office in the United States. It's going to be made right down in the local community where the manpower is, and where the pieces of steel are, and where the trucks are, and where the gasoline is. And we're going to have to train the State and local people in these priorities and urgencies. And we're going to have to look to local government to administer them, because when the chips are down, the bombs are dropping, and Washington is out of communication, and you can't even get in touch with your regional office, local government or State government is going to be making the decisions for a brief, and perhaps more than brief, period of time as to who is going to get what first.

So we have given great stress in our conferences around the United States to getting understanding on what these priorities and urgencies are, and to set up a resource committee at the local level to administer them.

We list as the first priority--although this listing is arbitrary, in that each of the four may under certain circumstances all be equal-- but we list as first the immediate retaliatory combat operations of the United States forces. We list as second the maintenance and the reestablishment of government authority and control; third, the provision of certain essential survival items and services; and, fourth, specific services which might have to come along to make some of the others work, such as radiological detection, eradication of bacteriological and chemical warfare, and so forth.

A lot more has to be done, but at least at this point in time, all State manpower officials and all State civil defense officials have been trained in these priorities and urgencies, and how they would be utilized to make a manpower plan work and to make a directed referral plan work.

There is more to this than just the details of the manpower plan. I mentioned as our second responsibility keeping up with the manpower situation and the labor market. We don't have the time this morning to dwell on that, but I'm sure you're familiar with some of the general facts-- the fact that, while our population is growing tremendously, in the next ten years. our population will exceed 200 million, and our labor force is going up at a greater rate than ever before, in our history, and we will have many more entrants into the labor force in this decade than we had

in the decade of the fifties; but, notwithstanding this fact that we will have more people in the labor force, we still are going to have fewer people in the prime age ranges of life, 34 to 45, because of the depression years low birth rate. This is a fact that we have with us. This lean generation of manpower is going now from the thirties to the forties in terms of age range. We have to think about this in our manpower planning.

To those of you who may not be familiar with it--and I imagine most of you are--the U. S. Department of Labor in this book, "Manpower: the Challenge of the Sixties," sums it up better than you can find, I believe, in any single document.

Well, realizing these facts--and they are facts, because all the manpower that we're going to have ten years from now, as far as any useful manpower is concerned, is already born, and we're not going to have any new ones come along--realizing these facts, what can we do about improving our manpower base? This is another part of our job. This is the third step I talked about. What can we do in terms of policies and programs to improve our manpower base, so that if this great disaster should come upon us, we will be ^{always} stronger tomorrow than we are today?

This is not easy. There are two things primarily that we are working on; and hopefully there will be some others.

We have a Manpower Utilization Program under way. We are working with industry and the colleges throughout the country in terms of getting better utilization of manpower, particularly high-talent manpower--engineers, scientists, and the emerging and very vital group of technicians,

educated technicians, not just skilled craftsmen--technicians that know math, that know some physics, that can take their places as engineers' helpers, as engineering technicians, as science technicians, in our electronic laboratories and in our electronic production lines.

In this group are some of the greatest occupational shortages today in the United States.

/ This subprofessional group, if you want to call it that--the man with two years of college, that knows calculus, is short of an engineer but is an engineer helper. We have shortages today. And yet if we should get any nearer conflict, if any emergency should come, these and the occupations related to them are the very occupations where we would have the greatest demand on the part of the Department of Defense, on the part of our whole Military Establishment, because the increase that they would need would call for the same type of manpower where it was short in industry today.

So it behooves us to do everything we can to bring these facts before the public and do what we can to improve our manpower base in these occupations where we know we are going to need more people tomorrow. The projections in this Labor Department booklet that I mentioned indicate that for the decade of the sixties, between now and 1970, we will need approximately 40 percent more scientists and engineers and related occupational skills than we have in the labor market today. We will need a considerably larger number in service occupations and skilled workers. We will need no more in common labor. We will need fewer people on the farms. But we need 40 percent more people in these higher skills. And it's not just engineering. A lot of it is in that general area, but

there are other areas of great importance that are also in the higher education bracket. The foreign language needs and many others could be brought in.

So it behooves us in our manpower planning to do what we can today in what some people call coexistence or pre-attack or whatever you want to call this era we live in to improve that manpower base.

We have a program to bring industry and educators together, to try to get industry and educators working more closely together in the kind of training that is being given, not only in secondary schools, but in institutions of higher learning, and particularly in technical institutes. This is something we can do as long as this period continues, and it's something that, if we are successful in doing, will make our manpower base for mobilization always stronger tomorrow than today, because we will have more of the kind of people with basic skills that would be ^{needed} / in the expansion of our forces if an emergency did come.

I had a meeting last evening with twenty-five or thirty men who represent technical institutes in the United States who are ^{very} concerned with this particular problem. A couple of them were talking about the needs that may be coming in the next two or three years, as they see it, for two-year technicians in industries that will be using atomic energy for peacetime purposes, if we stay at peace. The fact that there are practically no training schools where we are turning out in mass volume two-year technicians capable of using isotopes, reactor operators--the kind of health physicists that we need, that understand medical uses of

nuclear energy. There is a whole new field of occupations coming along, and a field, again, where they will have their counterpart in the military and in the military -supporting industries in the event of an emergency. So that is the third phase of our program in manpower.

I mentioned as our fourth phase the necessity of having a trained group of individuals who can step in and help administer the civilian side of the government in the event of an emergency. We have an organization known as the National Defense Executive Reserve, which is composed today of about 2500 individuals, who have signed up, as it were, to become Government executives in the event of an emergency. We have from their employers a signed statement that they will be made available to the Government if called upon in the event of an emergency. And these individuals are being trained.

There will be more appointed this next year, particularly in the field and regional offices, because I think all the Federal establishments that are concerned with mobilization today--and more of them than ever are working mobilization into their peacetime operations as a planning proposition--realize that their field organizations have to be beefed up, because in an all-out war we are going to have to depend on the field to do a large part of the job. So we have this device. We are moving ahead with it. We don't have the time to go into details on it here.

The fifth item that I mentioned was lining up pre-attack groups of workers that would have post-attack assignments. This and the sixth point, on international aspects, are a little bit different, perhaps, than what I

have talked about here for the last couple of years. But I think the more we get into this manpower planning, partly as the result of these conferences we have had around the country--I said we have had these eight conferences. I forgot to mention that since we finished those eight conferences there have been 42 State conferences; and between now and June 30th there will be several hundred local conferences to bring this manpower organization down to the community level--but as we talk this through with State and local officials, it becomes apparent to us that we should give more time and thought in our planning to the realization that survival may depend more on how we mobilize now than on how we mobilize post-attack.

So we are moving ahead with this idea of lining up on an organized basis certain cadres of workers now that would have post-attack assignments. This has nothing to do with the old civil defense volunteer system, of signing up volunteers. It has more to do with lining up people on an industrial unit basis, people that usually work together, people in a plant that work together under a foreman --give them a specific job to do; lining up the kitchens in the churches and the schools for feeding purposes instead of putting a lot of volunteers in field kitchens, using existing people who have skills today for the nearest related post-attack skill, with an assignment understood now, so if an emergency should come, they would know where to go and ^{exactly} what they were to do. It's a practical way of approaching it. We will have several experiments on the community level this year on this part of the job, and we hope that we will really make some progress after a few months of experiment in getting this lined

up; so that whole groups of people, many of whom are anxious to help but don't know what to do, can be lined up now.

The Associated General Contractors of America have a plan, which is particularly concerned with rubble cleaning, but the use of their skilled crews and their road-building and repair equipment, which is pretty well locked up now. It's a darned good plan, with complete cooperation between the contractors and the labor unions.

There are other areas where we're going to work out this cadre group particularly through the labor unions, because in the event of an emergency it's not going to be very easy to find some of the skilled people. In fact, you can only find them now through the business agents in some occupations. They know where these people are that are working for contractors in half a dozen States. But if those individuals know what their post-attack assignment is, if they're in a cadre of 25 men that is going to report to this place and be available for this job, that's a step along the way; and it's a darnsight better than waiting until after the bomb drops and then going through the employment office and trying to, I suppose, get out with a loud speaker and shouting for 25 pipefitters or whatever it is we want. So we're going to be pushing this part of the program quite a bit more.

The sixth part of the job has to do with the relationship of our manpower planning, not only with manpower planning in friendly and allied nations, but with the whole question of manpower development in developing nations, because there is a relationship between what happens in

those countries and our own security.

Manpower has been recognized by some of the international agencies the last two or three years as being a bottleneck insofar as their plans are concerned. The old Office of European Economic Cooperation, the OEEC, which is now being reorganized to OECD, has a Scientific, Technical, and Professional Manpower Program. It has been one of their liveliest programs during the past year.

Some of the other international organizations, as well as our own international endeavors, through ICA and others, have recognized the fact that the bottleneck to economic expansion in some of the developing nations of the world, which hitherto in many instances has been capital and raw materials, is becoming a manpower bottleneck; that as they build this and they do that and they get this started and something else ready, they don't have the people to run them. They don't even have the people to maintain them. Some of the things that we built, some of the things we have been working with ^{on} some of these countries--I've seen some _^ very graphic examples of it myself.

One other result is that we and some of the other countries of the free world are being called upon more and more to send technical people to these countries. There's a limit to that. Also these countries will move a lot faster if they put more emphasis on training their own, because as these countries become more industrialized and more a part of the modern world, their shortages are more apt to be the same shortages that we have, to a lesser extent, to lesser skill levels, but the same

general categories where we are short in this country.

This is graphically illustrated by the desires of some of the rapidly developing nations to want to move from a very low position on the economic scale where they are to the top overnight, which, of course, is impossible. Some of the countries that have just become countries want as their first request a nuclear reactor and things that they have read about that they think is going to put them right on top of the heap. But, nevertheless, as they move forward, there will be demands in these shortage occupations. There already have been bottlenecks because of manpower shortages.

So we feel that as a part of our program there has to be a recognition of this, and an ever-increasing effort on the part of our country to do a manpower planning job as a part of economic expansion because of the relationship of this in the last analysis to our own security, because, as we say in OCDM, that part of our job, of course----and it's ^{the} part that the public generally knows about and sometimes condemns us for in terms of civil defense planning being a negative thing, being a shelter in case the ^{bombs} come that you can go hide in. But there's another part of the job, and it's the part of the job that we who are interested in the whole overall program, with particular emphasis on the mobilization part of this job, are concerned with.

In our area, manpower, ^{it's} if/ strong, if we can make it stronger tomorrow than it is today--and the same is true in all areas--if we can make our economic base stronger, if we can make our whole nonmilitary

defense in this country stronger, not only are we better prepared to resist an attack, or to retaliate; but, even more than that, if we are strong enough, it may in itself be the greatest deterrent to attack that could come.

So I want to close on the note that as a positive part of civil and defense mobilization, as a positive part of mobilization planning, which is to be ready to win, which is to constitute a deterrence, so it won't happen anyhow, one of our biggest problems is getting this notion over to the rank-and-file citizens of the United States, so that they understand that nonmilitary defense is not solely a negative force, but that it is also a positive force for the security of the United States.

Thank you very much.

MR. POLUHOFF: Gentlemen, Mr. Keenan is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Would you go into a few more details of explanation in connection with how the National Defense Executive Reserve Program will be administered or is being administered? And also with respect to the cadres for post-attack mobilization, specifically with respect to whether these individuals have been identified, have been issued anything that is comparable to orders, or a card which tells them where to go and what to do when they get there?

MR. KEENAN: I'll divide that into two parts. The first is the executive reserves. There are 2500. Approximately half of that number, slightly more than half--1350--are reservists for BDSA, the Business

and Defense Services Administration, which would be the national production agency in the event of a war.

Those 1350 men are the best trained, in that they are the only group that have identification cards and all of them a place of assignment. That 1350 have also been sworn in, have taken their oath of office, as Federal employees. They are not only identified, but they actually have taken an oath of office, which we got approved by the Civil Service Commission, which becomes effective on the declaration of emergency.

The remaining 1150 of the executive reservists are reservists for 14 other departments of the Federal Government. And as each department trains its own, there are different stages of readiness.

150 or

We have about 175 reservists in the national office of OCDM, and another 75 in the regions, or 200 reservists, let's say, roughly. They all are identified. They all know the area in which they are to work. They all do not have the exact assignment. They all know now, I believe, where they are to report, the place to report--the regional office or whatever.

There is a variation in the different agencies. Some are further ahead than others. I would think that by June 30th of this year they would all know where to report and the general area in which they are to work. Currently they all are identified. And they all know what their job is.

Now, the second thing, this cadre thing--that's not nearly as far along. The executive reserve is a national program. The cadre thing is a local program. There have been a couple of experiments in commun-

ities. There is one going on now in Allentown, Pennsylvania. There's another one getting started on a rather wide-scale basis in Kalamazoo, Michigan. We had a somewhat abortive one in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

We hope within the next few months to have four areas where we will really test this out. Then, if it's successful, we will bring it around to other areas. But that cadre approach is not nearly so far along. It's a program item for this year. The executive reserve is well on the road.

QUESTION: We have been in the business of planning for civil defense to meet general nuclear war quite seriously now for about ten years, but it's my feeling that we are a number of years behind where we should be, and that we are in this position largely because of the voluntary aspects of civil defense and the concept of the delegation of authority. Would you agree with this, sir? And if you wish to step out from under your job hat and give us a candid answer, what would you do about improving the situation?

MR. KEENAN: Well, the answer is very easy. I don't happen to agree with you. I don't think in this country at this point in time that you can have it on any other than a voluntary system. I think you can get understanding on the part of people that you're going to have something other than a voluntary system if the bomb drops.

I think one of the troubles in trying to make it a more fixed system-- for example, there have been proposals made that the great number of 4-Fs--and, incidentally, General Hershey is changing his 4-F category, as you may have noticed, and not have so many of them--but that they

should be inducted for civil defense purposes and given civil defense assignments. One main problem is how to pay them. But the other problem is that as civil defense is a device to plan to get ready to do something in an emergency, in those areas where they recruited and signed up a lot of people, which would be the case if you put 4-F's in there, they don't have specific things for them to do today. You don't have the specific things for them to do.

So we have come around to this approach, which I think is sound, that we ought to stop regarding civil defense as some separate agency of government and recognize that it's simply the emergency operation of government as such--Federal, State, and local; and that we've got to train government officials in their wartime emergency responsibilities, and they will have to furnish the leadership.

I don't believe you can occupy many thousands of people in strictly civil defense duties today. So I happened to feel--I'm not saying that everything we've done is right. I'm not saying we're not further behind than we are. I am inclined to think that we are further behind. I'm inclined to think that somehow or other we managed a few years ago to scare everybody to death and make them think the whole damn thing was hopeless. I personally think that that is one of the greatest evils in it. But I do at this point believe in the voluntary approach.

QUESTION: My question is premised on the assumption that a mobilized situation would demand probably more specific skills than peacetime in certain areas. I use for example your nuclear technician which

you spoke of. If my assumption is true, that if we mobilize, there will be a greater demand for these types of technicians, and we train for a mobilization status, what do we do with these people in peacetime?

MR. KEENAN: I don't believe you could afford to train them just for mobilization. I don't believe that enough people would take the real hard-core training.

I think my answer would be that by and large the expanding industry of tomorrow needs people in these very same classifications and that we are pretty safe in increasing our training for the future use of industry, that in a few years from now you would get a dividend for defense purposes by shutting down less essential industries. Train them for industry now, have them work in industry. Your dividend would come then in that you would have these trained people, who were skilled, say, in nucleonics, who were working in an industry that would be less essential; and you would shut that down and he would be available for defense purposes. That's rough, but that's the way I see it in general.

QUESTION: We all know that the female contingents played a large part in the last war. Have any specific plans been made for utilizing women in executive positions and in technician jobs and in civil defense? Or are we planning to use them strictly on a voluntary basis after the event?

MR. KEENAN: Well, recognition of the fact that in the increase in the labor force in the next ten years a very heavy percentage of it will be women, that by 1970 over a third of the women of working age

will be in the labor force, it is assumed, it is estimated--in terms of executive positions there are a few, I must admit there are relatively few women in this Executive Reserve. I think we recognize that in an emergency, in a catastrophe, women would become an extremely important part of the labor force for certain so-called civil defense occupations. We might actually be looking at people who are not in the labor force today to fill the jobs.

In the case of nuclear bombing, to be specific, the child care and the welfare activities that would be so tremendously stepped up, instead of taking people that are in the labor force today, you would probably take housewives into use for the care and feeding of children and use them in those occupations. You have to perhaps recognize that there are some general plans in that direction. I am not sure we have done all we should in terms of planning at the executive level.

QUESTION: The public school system, supported by tax funds and so forth, personal property taxes included, it seems to me would be an excellent way to get the young people in the country indoctrinated as to your aims, requirements, and that sort of thing. Have you made any arrangements to make it required study, for example, for all junior and senior students at high schools throughout the country? If you had been doing it for ten years now, you would have a bunch of people who would be out in practice who would understand the problem.

MR. KEENAN: I don't want to be facetious, but I am tempted to answer your question with another question. Have you ever seen the

Federal Government make anything a requirement in all the junior and senior high schools of the United States? The answer is No. The way the educational system is set up in this country, the Federal Government doesn't tell the States and localities what to teach in any way, shape, or form. You influence them indirectly and indirectly only.

I don't think, to face up to your question directly, that---in some States they have had in their high schools, by State initiative, State action, certain basic courses in civil defense. But it started back in the old days when it was more air raid warden and tin hat and sand box kind of proposition. In terms of a modern course that involves the mobilization aspects, if there has been anything done, I'm not aware of it.

We have one man from OCDM in the audience that might know more than I know about it. Joe, do you know anything about that?

STUDENT: There are two men in the audience and there may be more.

I believe that we in recent years have done considerable work in the field of radiological detection treatment through the high schools. And also, in connection with the Office of Education, we have attempted to introduce other courses in this general field in to the high school programs. This is more specifically true, I think, in the HEW adult education program.

QUESTION: I believe you mentioned that you had very close working arrangements with the Manpower and Selective Service. In case a man did not want to go to the place of mobilization and he could be referred

to the Selective Service, it wouldn't appear that this would advance the cause of civil defense very much by placing him over in the military. Is this a threat to insure that these people do go to their proper place?

MR. KEENAN: I guess I didn't make my point clear. I said that if Congress was not in session, if you didn't have a national service law of any kind, there are other ways you could do it. We talked to Selective Service, and there are several alternatives. Nobody has made a decision which one you could use.

It was not thought that the threat would be, you put him in the Army and make a fighting soldier out of him, because at that point in time you might not need fighting soldiers. There has been discussion that there could be an amendment to the Selective Service Act that would establish a category quite different than fighting soldiers, a work battalion category; and that if these people didn't take jobs as civilians, they might work in that capacity. That would be the sanction for not working that would be imposed, if they didn't work as a civilian. The thought was that.

It would be better, I think everybody admits, if you had that in terms of national service legislation. If you went through a limited war and things were really getting tough, and if Congress was still in session, there is a draft National Resources Act prepared. At some point in time the Government might submit it to the Congress and let ^{them} see whether they wanted to pass that kind of legislation.

There has been no national resource legislation submitted to the Congress in the last few years, for the reason, as I understand it, that,

perhaps after consultation with people on the Hill, they came to the conclusion that they couldn't anything reasonable passed at all and it would be better to go along this way than have nothing. But you could reach a time when people sense the danger and when you could get it by law, which obviously would be better.

QUESTION: I'd like to look at the other end of the spectrum--the person who is used to serving and would perhaps like to continue to serve, but because of the so-called hump in the Navy and other things, he no longer can. What possibilities are there for such a person, a prematurely retired officer, to work actively in civil defense now, or to be made a part of the mobilization picture?

MR. KEENAN: We have been talking quite a bit about that recently. I think we haven't got any real good answer. We have been talking with the Department of Defense in terms of civil defense training for reserve officers.

But, specifically on your point, we have secured the IBM ^{tape} listings of the retired officers. We have sent them within the last four months out to the field, and have just about a few months ago got the permission of the Department of Defense to put the names and addresses of these men in the hands of State and local civil defense directors. We have put them in the hands of the regional, and now they are going to State and local civil defense directors, so that they can be contacted to see if they want to be a part of the regional, State, or local organization.

I don't know how it's going to work. The weakness in it is that it

depends upon the initiative of civil defense officials to make the contacts; and this isn't the subject of my talk. But one of the problems that we have had is the very great unevenness of civil defense in this country. It's no secret. You've got a few good operations and you've got many weak operations. At the municipal level in too many places civil defense is not well organized. In fact, it's a fiction.

We hope that this is going to be materially improved. Congress in '58 made civil defense a Federal-State joint responsibility, but not until this summer did they give any financing. We in OCDM now have six million dollars that we can give to the States in matching funds, fifty-fifty matching funds, for administrative staffs.

If the States respond and match some of this money, and we get a better staff, we could get more action at the local level to go out and get hold of these people and build up organization. There is more has to be done. We have gotten these lists out, and there are ^{some} other things on the stove, but nothing has actually been done yet.

We have a big job ahead of us to improve the administrative capability of civil defense at the State and local levels. We have some very live-wire operations, like New York State. We have some other States where the whole civil defense operation is being run by, say, two people.

QUESTION: To follow up on the statement which you have just made, and which relates to the voluntary aspects of the entire concept of civil defense, I get the distinct inference that there is a need for some kind of action to galvanize State and local governments into more effective

action. Would you address yourself to the question of what the people within the States where little or nothing is being done can do to accelerate and expedite action by their government in this area of civil defense?

MR. KEENAN: Governor Hoegh, Director of OCDM, was asked a similar question at a meeting with a number of the executive reservists a few months ago. His answer struck me as being a pretty sound one. He said: "Well, you men"--I'm paraphrasing, but something like this-- "You men from industry have done something about industrial readiness in your own plants, and now you're complaining that there's no civil defense organization that you know of in your town and State. Well, you're citizens of that town and State. You have a right to ask your local government to do something about it. Go back and ask your local governments or your State governments, whichever you are complaining about, what their plans are; and if they haven't got any plans, take the same action, take the same steps, you would take in anything else where you want to improve your State and local government."

He then emphasized the point that in many types of situations, action by the Federal Government cannot be the answer. The action in the case of a bomb drop must come first at the local level. And the electorate have a right to expect that their local governments will take the responsibility and do something about this. And if they haven't done it, he said in effect, "Go back and go to work on them."

I don't think it's a completely satisfactory answer, but I think it's along the lines of the best answer we can give. If the people make an

issue of this locally, let it come up and be decided.

Some interesting examples of this, just as an aside. Portland, Oregon, had a mayor a few years ago who was quite civil defense conscious. They are one of the few cities that have built a hardened site. They dug a cave in a hill outside of town a few miles out. It runs on a 24-hour basis right today. It's a terrific establishment. The initial cost was \$750,000.

They got it, incidentally, after a wrangle. They got a bond issue through. Either two or four years later--I forget which--an opponent ran against him, and one of the issues that he made was the waste of taxpayers' money for this crazy civil defense purpose. The man ran on his record and said that not only was it not wasted, but he wanted more; that this was imperative; that it was part of the responsibility of the local government. They had to have a place to go. They had to be able to operate their local government. He won the election.

It hasn't happened in many places. But I was in Portland a few months ago and talked to them out there. Maybe airing this issue at the local level, getting it before the voters, getting it talked about, would be a healthy thing. That's all I could suggest.

MR. POLUHOFF: Mr. Keenan, your ^{fine} talk has given us excellent guidance and cast light upon a very difficult area of our resources course. On behalf of the College, thank you very much.