THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

27 February 1961

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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CAPTAIN POWELL: You just heard a discussion of the nation-state as a structural unit in international politics. With this foundation we turn now to the search for security. This is a problem which has challenged every State since early times. To assist us in this analysis of the ways and means of searching for security, we have as our speaker Dr. Arnold Wolfers.

Dr. Wolfers is the Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of John Hopkins University. He is an eminent political scientist, with a distinguished career; and it is indeed a great pleasure and an honor to welcome Dr. Wolfers to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

DR. WOLFERS: Members of the Industrial College: I thought this was a good day to parade my newest school tie which I received from your neighbor. I remember the good old days when the members of this college used to stream into the lectures over there and crowd the hall and give the speaker a kind of shot in the arm because he imagined he had attracted them. He forgot that they were ordered there, of course, to listen to him.

This search for security, which is a serious matter for this country today, in a sense strikes one as paradoxical. By a curious coincidence I was reading yesterday in the "New York Times" a quotation from Abraham Lincoln in the column of James Reston. Lincoln said: "All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years." So safe was this country when it was militarily weak. But today we feel insecure.

However, the insecurity about which I am going to speak, or the search for security which I have been asked to discuss with you, does not contradict what Lincoln said. The idea of having to join with others, of having to give up isolationism, to cooperate with others in peacetime in order to give this country more security, was not the result of a lack of security of the American homeland against direct attack. Only later did this security go too, so that now we are forced as a consequence of the nuclear age to protect our homeland against direct

attack. But this we are doing by means with which our allies and friends abroad have little to do, namely by means of our strategic deterrent which has become less and less dependent on overseas bases. It can be handled, if need be, from these shores, from the high seas and from outer space.

Now, there are a lot of people abroad who think that the result of this independence of our deterrent is going to make us less interested in collective defense, and pull us back into the isolationism. But this is a complete misunderstanding of what has happened. Before the oceans began to cease being a barrier, before the earth had shrunk thanks to technological developments, this country was beginning to feel the growing insecurity which led it into the First World War and into the Second World War, at a time when there was no threat to this country, and also into NATO when still there was no danger of a direct attack on this country.

The insecurity resulted from an awareness that what happens overseas will indirectly destroy the security of this country. If a great power should gain complete control of Europe, as the Kaiser and Hitler were seeking to obtain, or of the Far East, as Japan was trying to obtain, or of both Europe and the Far East,, as the Sino-Soviet bloc might be able to obtain, this country would be isolated and would be at a tremendous disadvantage. The balance of power would be tipped in favor of our opponents. It is for this kind of security, security against indirect attack, against the loss to an opponent of countries far away from our shores, that we have entered into the kind of arrangements with other nations that I shall discuss with you.

You will remember, after the First World War, in which the danger was first realized, this country still believed it could by withdrawal eliminate the danger. The Neutrality Act and a policy of strict peacetime isolation would make it safe. But then the Second World War dispelled that illusion; and it was in the course of the Second World War that the resolution developed to pursue a new policy, a policy of peacetime collaboration for security with countries overseas.

Theoretically--and I shall start with the theoretical--there are two different methods by which one can try to attain such security: one, the traditional and more realistic approach--the method of alliances, or what we like now to call collective defense. The other method, which developed after World War I and is often called Wilsonian and which is fundamentally idealistic, thinks in terms of collective security by an organized community of nations. These are two different approaches and it is a great mistake, I think, to look at them as merely

two quantitatively different types of the same approach, one global, the other limited or regional. The difference lies much deeper. But let me first describe the two types.

The traditional method, which is familiar to you, consists of nations promising each other mutual assistance in defense against a common national enemy. In some cases it is a promise by a strong nation to guarantee the security of a weak nation. Here the bigger and more powerful one believes it to be to its own interest to protect the territory of the smaller nation against the common foe. One is dealing, then, with a specific foe--a potential enemy or a real enemy, from which one fears an attack.

This is how alliances were constructed over and over again through the centuries. One nation supplements the armed forces of the other, or substitutes for the lacking military might of the other. It is an arrangement in which both feel that their national interest is best served by this commitment for collaboration in case of an attack or advance commitment to help each other, entered into with the alliance policy. It is power politics in the old sense of the word. One is trying to balance the power of the enemy, and by balancing the power of the enemy--by at least balancing the power of the enemy--deterring him from advancing at the expense of his opponents.

Now, the other system appeals to those who think that alliances are a threat to the peace. Some people take the view that alliances are actually responsible for wars and consider military blocs that try to check each other a very unsound way of seeking to protect the peace. It is a precarious way. We hear it so often argued that such a peace cannot last very long; that earlier or later the thing will break down, which it has done in history again and again. So there was an effort to find a new approach to the problem of peace; and this new approach was called collective security under the League of Nations, and in a somewhat modified form subsequently under the United Nations.

I have said that this approach is idealistic in its assumptions, meaning that it is based on the idea that the world consists mainly of peace-loving nations among whom from time to time appears an evil or aggressor nation; and that the community of the peace-loving nations need only hold together and stand up against the aggressor, and the chances are that the overwhelming strength of the peace-loving community will deter the aggressor or crush him with relative ease; the community would take police action.

But this also presupposed that each of the nations would feel that they were concerned, vitally concerned, with aggression anywhere by anybody, and would therefore be ready to make the necessary sacrifices to put down such aggression.

Now, there are a number of things, I am afraid, faulty about this reasoning, which we will see when I discuss the way the method has actually worked. But I do want to point out again that the fundamental difference between the two methods is that in one case nations join together in what they regard as their traditional vital interest of protecting themselves against enemies, specific enemies, against whom they can line up geographically, and militarily in a definite way. Here they know in advance whom their power has to balance. The other method presupposes a community that is ready to fight against any aggressor anywhere, the unknown aggressor X who may have to be met by police action.

Of course, the two methods have in common the fact that they are nonisolationist policies. They call upon nations to collaborate; and that often makes them seem rather close to each other. They both assume that from time to time there will be danger to the peace or to national interests, and that nations will therefore have to be militarily prepared. But the military preparations in the case of collective security seemed to require a minor effort, because the majority of the peace-loving nations, by merging their efforts, would easily be able to cope with the exceptional aggressor; in the case of alliances on the contrary, the emphasis is entirely on the military effort of a few countries; and if the enemy is known to be a powerful nation, as in our case, the policy may call for immense effort.

Having said this is in a very theoretical fashion, let me talk about the way the United States has sought to obtain security through collaboration; how after giving up its old and traditional isolationist policy, it joined hands with nations overseas to protect overseas territories against aggression.

At the end of the war this country decided to give up its isolationist policy of "going it alone" and embarked on collective security as a means by which it would avoid again being drawn into other people's wars for not having done enough with others to prevent the occurrence of such wars. It would not wait again until the others were almost knocked out, but prepare in advance so that there would be peace in the overseas territories and therefore no danger of this country being sucked into wars in defense against indirect threats to American

security and survival. The United States helped, therefore, to set up and became a member of the United Nations.

The U. N. commitment against any aggressor anywhere was a limited one. It was not actually directed against any agressor anywhere, although perhaps the limitations were not fully realized by the public, which was told that this was going to be a much more effective league than the old one. In fact, through the veto, the big powers were protected from any collective action against themselves and thereby also from any action against one of the major powers of the World. All the countries in the U. N. could be comforted by the thought that they would never have to take up arms in a police action against one of the major powers, because the major powers could and surely would veto such action.

Moreover, the whole basis of this new system was the assumption that the great victors of the war would act in harmony; so that collective action could only be taken against minor offenders, or and particularly, against the former enemies of World War II. In a sense the system was a kind of continued grand alliance against the Axis powers; and in fact, the name "United Nations" was simply taken over from the wartime alliance. At least, in its original intention this was the pattern of the new organization, which, of course, had many other functions than this function of serving as a policeman of the world.

It didn't take long until the insufficiency of this system was realized as a means of providing the United States and its friends with security. Actually it only took a few years until it was discovered that among the group that was to maintain the peace, the group of the "peace-loving nations" who together were to maintain the peace, there was a deep cleavage.

The United States very quickly shifted its ground to take up the traditional method of providing security now specifically against the Soviet Union and later the Soviet bloc. The United Nations, more realistic than the League of Nations, had explicitly provided for this contingency. In Article 51 a general permission was given to the members that in cases where the collective security system should break down, where the Security Council was not ready or able to define the aggressor and demand action against him, every nation should be free to come to the assistance of the victim of aggression.

Such assistance is called collective defense--or as in Article 51, collective self-defense--and represents permission of alliances,

although the Article didn't quite say so. It spoke only of coming to assistance if an armed attack occurs; but this was interpreted to mean that one could also prepare for this situation and do what the French had already done under the League, underpin, as it was euphemistically called, the collective security system by the traditional and well-established method of alliances.

The Russians were for it, the French were for it, the United States was for it, each for special reasons. This country didn't want to depend on decisions of the Security Council in case an attack should occur in the Americas. And so we got into this double tack system of collective action--one, the collective security system of the U.N. which was not given up; the other the collective defense system, which became our great alliance system, all the way from NATO to the many alliances, bilateral and multilateral, in the Pacific and other parts of Asia.

The alliance system and the collective security system, it was assumed, would not contradict each other, would not conflict with each other, but would sustain each other. It's interesting to reflect on the reasons for the optimism that made people in this country believe that this underpinning would merely strengthen the whole system of enforcement of the peace and lead into no difficulties.

Well, this assumption was based on, as it proved the overoptimistic American assumption that the aggressor would naturally always be a national enemy of the United States because only evil nations would commit aggression, namely, dictators, totalitarian countries, autocratic nations; so that we, who stood for the democratic world, would always find that taking action against the aggressor was a natural reflection of our national interest. It was only when some of our nearest friends fell under the condemnation for aggression that this happy prestabilized harmony proved to be an illusion.

Moreover, a second illusion existed--and I must call it an illusion--namely, that the other, nonaggressor nations of the world, would quite naturally consider themselves to be united and allied with us in the cause of peace and would therefore see no difficulty in lining up and taking police action against any future aggressor.

So we entered into this cold war period with what seemed to be a double-barrelled but therefore all the more practical and effective system of security, which would enable us to face any new dangers of the kind that we had encountered in World War I and World War II and which now again loomed on the horizon due to the aggressive and powerful opponent with which we were faced in the period of the struggle with the Communist bloc.

So far the collective defense system has not been tested. There has been no attack on any of our allies. South Korea was not an ally. And therefore one can argue that as a system of deterrence it has worked. The others have been deterred. But we have to be a little careful about saying that it has worked, because it isn't quite sure whether our strategic power, particularly our nuclear power in the days of our supremacy and in the days of the supremacy of SAC, were not enough to deter any attack on our allies, quite aside from whether we had alliances or not.

So if one says: "NATO has proved its value. It has deterred," one has to qualify that and add: "Well, it has not actually been tested and we don't know what would have happened if it had not existed." My conviction is that it has helped; and if people think that alliances are no good or are useless if nothing happens, they mistake the main, the essential, feature of defensive alliances. Their chief function is to see that nothing happens, or in other words, to deter countries which, if they had had a vacuum in front of them, might have been tempted by the opportunity of cheap conquest.

If we look ahead now, and look at the situation as it is today, we have every reason to be worried about our alliance system. We have reason to worry, because it works only as long as the countries overseas have reason to believe that the alliance with the United States will actually protect in the future. It might do the opposite. If it didn't protect them, it might provoke attack on them. And there is a good deal of neutralist rumbling in allied countries on the part of those who say: "This doesn't protect us. On the contrary, it opens us to attack, because the United States cannot or will not effectively protect us if we are attacked, and the enemy will be more tempted to strike at us if we are allies of its main opponent."

The trouble is that with all our armaments, with all the efforts we have made and our enormous expenditure on armaments, we are not sure today whether we have provided ourselves with the kind of armament that would be effective in deterring, and if necessary defeating, attacks on countries overseas. I needn't spell that out. I'm sure you know and have heard enough about this military problem. The question whether we would use our strategic deterrent in case of limited attacks overseas is now the center of all military discussion; and whether we believe one way or the other, the countries overseas have come to doubt the effectiveness of this particular way of protecting them. And unless we can supplement our strategic deterrent by the kind of limited war forces that are convincing to them, and unless they themselves make a real effort to supplement our strategic deterrence by limited war forces, the alliances may prove to be built on sand.

Fortunately--so far they have held together. Our allies and we have held together. There have been no defections. There has been a continued operation of the alliances, both in Europe and Asia, at least to the extent that the determination has been maintained by the governments and by the majorities in allied countries and the U.S. to stick by the alliances.

In a sense then we can say that we are in the midst of a struggle to maintain, by means of an alliance system, a reasonable balance of power in the world that will not only make us safe against direct attack--which we seek to do by our own strategic means--but also to make the countries safe against attack that are exposed abroad to the overwhelming might of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Now, if we turn to the collective security system, here we have had tests. In fact, we have gone through a whole series of very serious tests of this system. And if I describe it, I'm afraid I shall be describing it through a number of very sad disillusionments. The system which seemed to work at the beginning has begun to look infinitely less attractive as time has gone on. And we will have to ask ourselves in the end, what shall become of a system that offers much less protection to our friends than we had expected, and may bring upon us dangers we had not foreseen--dangers to us and to some of our staunchest allies.

The Korean War was the first test; and it looked at first as if it had admirably proved the value of the collective security system. Mr. Acheson said he was sure it would not prove a week reed; and, in fact, it helped defend South Korea and throw back the attacker.

The operation in Korea was interpreted and conducted as a police action under U.N. auspices. One might doubt whether action would not have taken place even in the absence of the U.N., but the existence of the U.N. did give this country a very considerable additional incentive to prevent the destruction of South Korea. We had no commitment under any alliance treaty with South Korea. The only legal obligation to act was the U.N. charter. But we might have acted anyway, because in this particular case the "prestabilized harmony" did exist.

The enemy, the aggressor under U.N. provisions, the country that had resorted to military force to change the status quo, happened to be a Communist country, against which we were taking precautions anyway. Our national enemy happened to be the aggressor. So there was no conflict between our obligations under collective security and under collective defense. From our point of view this was, in a traditional sense, the defense of our national interest. From the U.N. point of view this was the defense of the peace-loving community against

the aggressor. And therefore for the time it looked as if the double-track policy would operate ideally.

The U.N. gave us several particular advantages. Our action in defense of the interest of free countries against communism was legitimized by the fact that the U.N. voted in favor of this action, condemned the North Koreans as aggressors, gave us permission to use force, which meant a much stronger moral position. And, moreover, it gave us what we had hoped it might give us--a kind of almost universal alliance of all non-Communist Countries against the aggressor.

One has to qualify this statement. These countries were all willing to vote to condemn North Korea as an aggressor, but only very few took up arms. In that sense it was not an operative alliance. Only a few of our allies came to our assistance, and the action was by and large an American action, with the assistance of some allies, who might have come in anyway because they wanted to maintain their solidarity with the United States.

At the end of a period in the Korean War this country tried to crystallize this system into a more explicit universal alliance. By shifting from the Security Council to the General Assembly, we hoped that the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly would be assured as a continuous ally against Communist aggression; and that in a sense we could count from now on on the U.N. to condemn any Communist aggressor as the aggressor and call for action by the United Nations.

But hardly had that been done when already the defects of the system became obvious. When Red China entered the war, there was hesitation and refusal on the part of some of the noncommitted nations to vote for condemnation and action. It was too much for them to become involved against China. They did not want to provoke the hostility of a country with which they had no direct conflict. And one began to see very clearly the division between those who felt that this was something where they had a major stake and nations who were remote, with more parochial or limited responsibilities and who therefore did not want to become involved.

One might say, then that the Korean War in which there was effective collective action in the first stage, very soon proved the likelihood that the experiment would never be repeated. Moreover, it was a fluke that the Security Council was able to vote the way it did, the Soviet Union having absented itself from the decisive meeting. This it probably will not do again.

Instead of operating as a general, universal alliance against Communist aggression, the U.N. in the later stages of the war turned into a kind of mediator between the United States and the Soviet bloc; the noncommitted nations very soon asserting themselves as a kind of neutral force, and turning the U.S. itself into a neutral force. By the end of the Korean War we were in the curious situation in which the United Nations was supposedly conducting police action while simultaneously trying as a mediator to stop a war which it was conducting. This showed a split within the U.N. personality that reflected the traditional division of belligerent countries and neutral outsiders.

This was only the first case in which aggression occurred and was condemned, and it wasn't the worst from our point of view. The Suez case brought the conflict into the open--the conflict between collective defense and collective security. It was a rude awakening for a country that had assumed that the aggressors would always be its national enemies and not its friends and allies.

The French had experienced the same thing already under the League of Nations. They had just come to terms with the Italians and made agreements according to which the Italians would help the French, protect them against Nazi Germany, when the Italians committed their act of aggression in Ethiopia; and France, caught between two obligations, was asked to take military action, or at least blockade action, against Italy, that had just become her ally for the struggle she foresaw with Germany, her closest neighbor. The collective system broke down during the Ethiopian War, for the very reason which now threatened it in the Suez conflict.

In the Suez conflict, our two chief allies, on whom our whole alliance system rests--Britain and France--and a friendly country, Israel, were condemned for what quite obviously was a resort to military force against another country--a clear case of aggression as defined in all collective security systems. No question about that. The facts that they had been provoked, that they had suffered great damage through the acts of Nasser, didn't change the fact that they were the ones that initiated the use of force. And therefore, unless one wanted to eliminate the whole collective security system, there was nothing to do but to vote them the aggressors and take the consequences.

The consequences could have been more serious than they turned out to be, because the exceptional thing happened. The aggressors withdrew to where they were before they started their resort to force.

This happens very rarely. Japan was asked to do so after she attacked Manchuria. Hitler was asked to do so after he attacked Poland. But usually the aggressor is prepared to carry through.

In this case, faced with the threat of United States enmity, and the threat of Soviet intervention against them, these democracies who had resorted to force without even the full consent of their own people, recognized the weakness of their position and withdrew.

One need only imagine what would have happened if they had not agreed to do so. For a time it looked dangerously as if Israel might not withdraw. Then we would have been faced with a demand on the part of the overwhelming majority in the U. N. that we and the Soviet Union support police action by the United Nations. If the Soviet Union had moved in, I don't know who would have gotten her out again afterward! If our Communist enemies had suddenly been in on the police side, we might later have had to look for policemen to throw out the policeman, which would have been a very awkward situation. But it didn't come to that.

As a matter of fact, when the Soviet Union suggested to this country that they and we take common coercive action against France and Britain, this country turned down this suggestion as absurd, though it was entirely in line with the provisions of the collective security system, which presupposes that if one country is the aggressor, all the others are fit to be policemen.

This was not the end of a development disfavorable to our interests in the cold war. The next thing, which was even less foreseen, happened with respect to Lebanon. This country was in its rights at least, the way we interpreted our rights, to send troops at the request of the legitimate government to maintain order in Lebanon. But already at that stage many other countries, and not the Soviet bloc alone, regarded this as a kind of military interference which they might interpret as aggression.

We had helped coin the term "indirect aggression," which meant that things that were not really an attack across borders could fall under the condemnation of aggression. This was also an old story which the French had experienced prior to the war--that by extending the term "aggression" in a kind of indefinite fashion, nobody was quite safe from being accused of aggression. And now we have reached the point where even flying over other people's territory may come under the condemnation of aggression, where the word "aggression" is being used freely for everything that is disagreeable if it is done by the other side. This, of course, weakens the whole definiteness and workability of the system.

But in the case of Lebanon we came immediately under pressure; and if we had done what some people said might be in our interest--I didn't happen to belong to them, and I think we have seen now that it would have been a mistake--but if we had marched on and into Iraq, there isn't any question in my mind that an overwhelming majority in the United Nations would have condemned the United States as the aggressor.

It is an interesting fact, after all, that none of the great powers that have existed or exist in this century have not at one time or another been accused and condemned for aggression. You can go through the whole list and you'll find that in changing circumstances all of the great powers have come into a situation where they felt that resort to force was necessary for their vital interest. And it is not surprising that the neutralist countries given their temper which is anti-Western on the whole, fearful of imperialism and Western imperialism only, should see signs of Western aggression on the slightest provocation. This neutralist group of new states which is growing in number in the U. N. could line up with the Soviet Union against anything they regarded as Western or American imperialist aggression. Recently, Belgium was accused of aggression though not voted an aggressor.

So now we suddenly find that not only does this collective security system sometimes line us up against our own allies, and jeopardize the collective defense system, but we ourselves may become victims of a system that could be turned against us, depending on the votes of a body in which we are by no means assured of majority support. The days of the "United for Peace Resolution," when this country could command an immense majority in the General Assembly, when the Soviet Union was limited to its nine votes are over. And now, with changing majorities and the ideological orientation in the in-between and uncommitted world, we are in danger when taking measures we regard as vital--for instance, against Cuba--we are faced with the possibility, and in many cases the probability, that our action even though it were intervention on behalf of a government we considered legitimate, of being accused of aggression. One trouble is the conflict over which government is legitimate. In Laos I don't know how many legitimate governments there are; therefore what used to be regarded as assistance to a government can now easily be interpreted as intervention.

This brings us to the Congo crisis, which is still too acute for any definite interpretation. What is the U. N. doing in the Congo? People say: "Here for once genuine police action has been voted and is being taken." But this is not "police action against an aggressor." The Belgians have been asked to withdraw, but not by coercive U. N. action.

The Africans would like the U. N. to become a police force against the Belgians, but even the newest resolution doesn't make it that. It's a police force to maintain internal order which is quite something different from the action of several countries against an outside aggressor.

Whether such police action as is being undertaken for the protection of life and property in the Congo will work is an open question. It has had a limited success in the Gaza Strip. Much depends on whether the uncommitted nations of Africa and Asia may find it to be in their common interest to use the U. N. to maintain order in the Congo. I have grave doubt that this is what they want, and even graver doubt that they can agree on the way in which it should be handled if they want it to happen.

Where does all of this leave us now, with our nonisolationist policy? Deterrence of a direct attack against this country remains, I believe, what you might call an isolationist enterprise. It has to be, because against attack on this country, which is necessarily by air or from outer space, allies are of little help, and will be of less help as time goes on. This is a matter of national policy, it has to be conducted by national forces; allies can be helpful, but their help is not likely to be vital.

As far as the defense of the security of overseas free countries on which our own security and survival depend indirectly is concerned, the alliance system is as indispensable today as it has ever been, and maybe more so, because without the chance of deploying our strength overseas, without the chance of projecting our power overseas, while having the contribution of indigenous local forces, it seems to me utterly Utopian to believe that we could maintain the security of overseas free countries. As it is, it is difficult enough; along the fringes of Red China it is certainly a herculean job, with the weak allies at our disposal there. Besides our own Armed Forces, then, the alliance system is, the second great pillar of our security.

The collective security system is not altogether a negative factor from the point of view of our security. By its condemnation of aggression, it may put some restraint on the use of force. Some people are worried that it restrains only us but not our opponents. Yet it may even put some restraint on our opponents. They too want the support of the uncommitted world and of public opinion. They may hesitate, more than they would otherwise do, to resort to direct military violence. But, of course, they can use other means. They are not, one would suppose, very keen to use military means anyway; yet they have shown in Hungary and in Tibet and in the Taiwan Straits that they don't hesitate to resort to military force if the circumstances require it or make it tempting to them. We are placed under restraint. Whether we need or

want such restraint is a controversial matter. One would think we were restrained enough as it is; and the fear of public condemnation is so strong now that it may prevent us from doing things which we might regret not to have done when it proves to be too late.

The U. N., in my opinion, has one important function if it can continue to fulfill it; and that is not to be an instrument for collective security, not to be a coercive instrument, but to be a mediating, a neutral, instrument, to try to pacify the non-Communist world in the turmoil we are witnessing today. The real trouble, as I see it, is not the breakdown of a collective security system which I think had no chance anyway, but of a mediating system, a collapse which is facing the U. N. today, since we and the Soviets cannot agree any more on the neutrality of anybody. Since Hammarskjold is now labeled by the Soviets as a stooge of the West, and since most of the nations they suggest as mediators are regarded by us as stooges of the Soviets, there remains little in the way of a body of nations or men that can be accepted by both sides as mediators.

We may still hope, however, that some of the new states, particularly in Africa and Asia, will find that it is in their own interest to be really impartial in the way neutral countries have been in the past, and will be able to assert their will when it comes to keeping warring factions apart, keeping hot wars out of areas in which they can be kept out, as in the Congo, and will therefore make it possible for the U. N. to serve us as an instrument of pacification though not of collective security.

CAPTAIN POWELL: Dr. Wolfers is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: So many of the new nations in Africa are just emerging from what looks to us like cannabalism and savagery that there seems to be little hope for using them as a neutral force to bring about some solutions to things that the developed countries have been struggling with for centuries.

DR. WOLFERS: We do have a collection of so-called states there with whom we have to deal that are anything but stable nation-states. They are on the way to nationhood in many cases. There are tremendous variations among them and degrees of stability or maturity. But we have no choice but to try to find a place for them that won't turn them into a constant danger to us which they are at times.

People are always saying: "Well, Khrushchev has shifted from the military plane to the ideological and economic, and there we can compete with him." But he can outflank us by gaining the support of some of those countries. If a regime is set up in the Congo or in Guinea or in Cuba that is willing to go the full length of alignment with the Soviets so far that it can't turn back, it can offer the Soviet bloc advantages that could very seriously impair our military position. So we have got to struggle to prevent neutralists from going over to our opponents.

We can't prevent them from pursuing their anti-imperialist drive, which they direct against the colonial powers and against the United States. This drive may die down in the course of the years as they become stable, as they begin to realize that there is much more danger of another imperialism taking control of them. But in the meantime we're in a very serious struggle to prevent these countries at least from impairing any of our vital military positions.

I think we should concentrate on that. We can be pretty tolerant of what they do otherwise. Even if they get aid from the East, it doesn't mean that they are already sold to our opponents. And if we are really concerned with their independence and let them have their way, to the limit which we can permit without suffering real danger to our military position, I think we can then wait it out. I don't expect much more.

QUESTION: In the very near future we are going to be faced with the problem of Red China coming to the United Nations. It seems to me this will have an impact on our alliances in Europe and South America and it might be considered for Southeast Asia. Would you address yourself to the impact that this might have on alliances and also on relations with the United Nations?

DR. WOLFERS: I think it is safe to say that it will probably happen, because the pressure from all the others will be so great that they will vote the Chinese in whether we like it or not; and I don't think we will then quit the United Nations and give it over to the Soviet bloc. So we may be faced with that situation earlier or later. We will then have to put on a tremendous struggle to protect the interest of Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China.

But what the other repercussions will be I find very difficult to foresee. It will strengthen the Communist bloc in the U. N., but it is strong anyway. Red China is there, whether inside of the U. N. or outside. It has its pull on neutralist countries. It also threatens some of them and warns them. And we can't be sure how in the balance Red Chinese behavior in the U. N. will affect their appeal or their repulsion of the neutralist countries.

But again, merely to bring out the nature of the situation, if factions in conflict, countries in conflict, parties in conflict agree that they want a neutralizing factor to prevent further bloodshed, the U. N. is an ideal instrument, and will be used. But if they don't agree, I don't think the United Nations can enforce its will upon either one side or the other. That seems quite unlikely, because the other side will then get support from whichever camp in the East-West struggle that happens not to be on the side of the U. N.

QUESTION: Will you please discuss the effect of some of the common market agreements on the collective security system? You were talking about the development of the strength of nations. Certainly industry and economic development are important in enabling countries to develop a strong military posture.

DR. WOLFERS: We are very much dependent on the economic development in allied countries, as you say, to support the burden. Europe has made tremendous progress in that respect. Japan has made immense progress, although it has not been translated into military power yet. The question now is whether the integration of European countries in one form or another will substantially contribute to this strength.

This was what this country believed in when it was supporting the Common Market--that by making Europe into a big customs union, and maybe a federation, it would greatly strengthen our allies, maybe make them so strong that they wouldn't even need our support any more. That was the original idea.

Now, the Common Market has also made progress. But the prosperity of Europe today is not the consequence of the Common Market. It has been going well in advance of the removal of trade barriers. The Common Market, moreover, has unfortunately split Europe into two groups, which could weaken Europe in the long run if this became a serious split.

I think we are all in favor of continuing the Common Market, because it does give the Continent a nucleus of real economic strength. But I personally believe that an equal effort should now be put into trying to bridge the gulf that is beginning to separate particularly Britain from Germany and France, the chief members of the Common Market.

I am glad to see that a good deal of effort seems to be going in that direction. Adenauer himself has been trying to work out a solution with MacMillan. And I suppose our Ambassador Averill Harriman will also

be discussing it with the European governments. I think the United States can play quite a role in trying to bring about the rapprochement. We have been rather one-sidedly on the side of the Common Market and have antagonized the British with the idea that what we really wanted was a European federation, though any political federation is still in the far, far future.

QUESTION: Doctor, if you were to limit it to the Congo situation and the requirement for some type of agreement before the situation can begin to become stabilized in a real sense, would you address yourself to the long-term implications of what has to be done in the Congo to take up the slack that was created when the Belgians pulled out and left the country with an inadequately trained and poorly prepared group of officials who try to function as governments?

DR. WOLFERS: I think this is an enormous task, a very difficult one. I would be very sorry indeed if Katanga had to go through that experience too. They have been able to preserve the source of the real wealth of the Congo, because the Belgians have continued to operate as their military and technical advisers, and as heads of the industries. In fact, Katango presumably is being run pretty much the way it was run before. If this should break down because of the hostility of the rest of the Congo and of the African countries, then the problem would be much more difficult, because Katanga has a big industrial complex; in the rest of the country there is nothing to compare with it.

But, of course, one can also understand that for the rest of the Congo any separation of Katanga would be a major catastrophe. All of the Congo depends financially on this, the source of most of the wealth of the country. So some kind of agreement between Katanga and the rest of the Congo is imperative. Otherwise the rest of the Congo may decay and become a disintegrating entity.

When it comes to deciding what kind of system would we like for the Congo, I presume what we would like best would be a Federal system, in which Katanga would maintain a good deal of autonomy, a system which would be centralized sufficiently so that there would be one authority and an authority that could maintain control over the armed forces, which doesn't exist today, and which, moreover, would not be hostile to us, not go over to the Communist camp.

This is quite a bill of fare. I don't think there is an easy way to find a solution. Our hope is still, and I think rightly, pinned on the self-interest of the African countries, who want to keep us as well as the

Russians out of Africa, who are tremendously ambitious to maintain control over every part of Africa themselves. This should drive them together and has in the last U. N. resolution pulled them together, with the idea that the one thing they've got to avoid is intervention from the East and the West. This means that they unite on some kind of Congolese government, which they will then back, which they will provide with military force, and which will then permit them to try to bring in whatever technicians and help they need in order to keep the thing going.

For them too this is an enormous project; and since they have conflicting ambition--and some of them are quite imperialist themselves--nobody can say today whether Nkrumah and Sekou Toure and the Moroccans and the UAR and the rest of them will be able to stick together particularly since the military situation in the Congo changes from hour to hour. This I think is our program as far as a rational foresight is possible at this moment.

QUESTION: Sir, I hate to use this term, but let me ask you, Do you think the prospects of what the idealists call a world government are any closer today than they were 20 years ago?

DR. WOLFERS: I wish we were as near to it today as we were 20 years ago. In fact, the world has never been so deeply split. It's all very well to say that we can get together regionally. I didn't say anything about regional agreements, which have exerted great attraction in this country. A regional agreement for the Western Hemisphere is fine. It means that we try in most cases to settle things alone, without the help of the others.

But when it comes to defense and to the conduct of conflicts, regional usually means half the world against the other half of the world, or one section of the world against another section. This doesn't bring one nearer to world government. It means, on the contrary, that one emphasizes the split. And this is what has happened. We are split into two camps.

If we and the Russians could agree on world government, we wouldn't need world government because we already would be such friends. Any nation that merges with another under one government, even be it a Federal government must have a deep affinity with the other. Even the French and the Germans haven't achieved such affinity yet. They were very close to it. It looked as if a European Confederation was around the corner. It looked to some people as if it were. In comes DeGaull and says by implication: "I dont't want anybody superior to me, anybody who is going to tell me where to get off."

It isn't easy for two countries to merge. We can't even merge with the British. Are we going to accept their King? Are they going to accept our republican form of government for the Union? There are tremendously deep differences that keep countries apart. And I'm not so sure whether the anarchy of a set of orderly nations may not be better than anarchy under a disorderly world government that can't keep anything in order. This one has to consider too.

QUESTION: Sir, as you indicate, the main pillars are collective defense and the military. Do you think that we and our allies are going to gain enough from the U. N. to warrant our putting our money and our effort into the U. N. rather than concentrating on the other two aspects?

DR. WOLFERS: Yes. I think we have a tremendous stake in the U. N., namely, as the bridge to the uncommitted nations. No one can say, "This is just a mass of backward people. They have no power." They do have territory. And if that territory is handed over to our enemies, they've got an asset there that's very important.

We can't, for instance, afford to let the UAR become an agent of the Soviet Union; and we have been able to prevent it. We had written off prematurely quite a number of countries. We thought Nasser had gone, Syria had gone, Iraq had gone, Indonesia had gone over to the Communist camp.

None of them have as yet gone over. There's Communist influence in most of them. There are times when they oppose us and take help from the other side. But when they get a little far out on the limb, we find them swinging back because they want to be between the two sides. They have enough sense of the balance of power when they are directly affected.

Sukarno loves to come to Washington. This gives him a little more bargaining power when he goes to Moscow. I mean they're playing this game for what it's worth. Of course, they're blackmailing the East and the West. Let them blackmail the East and the West as long as they don't pick on us and blackmail us only. This is the situation.

Now, the U.N. is their pride in a way, because this is their forum. This is where little men with a lot of noise can become quite important. This is a place where they can build up the prestige which allows their regimes to maintain themselves at home against their competitors. And that's why they love this publicity show. And we've got to give them a chance to use it.

New governments, new regimes, are so vulnerable that they've got to get prestige in some fashion. And this is one of the ways they can do it. And if they make a nuisance of themselves, we should be able to stand it. This is not going to do us too much harm.

QUESTION: As you have pointed out, we in our efforts to try to get everybody together in the world, have actually built fences which tend to keep us apart. The split world and all of our alliances tend to make the Bamboo Curtain and the Iron Curtain even stronger, and yet we're trying to break it down. It has been pointed out recently that the cultural exchange between those behind the Curtain and ourselves has been on an increase, and that this might lend itself to ultimately breaking down and joining in with the other forces that are obviously going to make more exchanges between people necessary in our world. Would you comment on the importance or the significance of Russia in effect opening her doors to that exchange?

DR. WOLFERS: I would want to warn first, let's not overburden the cultural exchange with things it can't do. Nations that know each other very well may be the worst enemies of each other. The French and the Germans fought over and over against each other because they knew each other so well, because they knew what the other fellow was after. It's not necessarily true that one is fooling oneself about the other. And therefore knowing him may not prevent major conflict.

There's a second point. Individuals usually get on well with one another. I have been meeting some people from behind the Iron Curtain. They were charming fellows. We got along beautifully if we talked about our private affairs. They have similar problems. They are divorced or they want to get married or whatever it is. They want good food. They like good concerts and all sorts of other things. Sometimes they even have a good taste; sometimes it may be better than ours. But that doesn't in any way affect the solution of the big national problems. As soon as I say: "Let's talk a bit about Berlin," then the game is up as far as mutual understanding goes. So most people who go into those countries just stay away from the national problems and come home saying: "It's wonderful with these guys. They're just like we." Of course they are. So there is a danger of expecting too must from contacts.

If you ask, What is their value, then? I think the value is that it may change their basic orientation eventually; that it may give them an opening toward the outside world which they may be looking for for other reasons. There may be more and more elements in their society

that begin to rebel in a kind of covert fashion against the restrictions, the lack of freedom, the uniformity of their system. Culture relations with other people open their eyes, give them new choices, give them new inclinations. And if we can achieve that, if we can penetrate the wall of their domestic restraints and restrictions, then we are doing a good job.

Some people are afraid that they will change us too. I would take that risk. If anybody comes home and says: "Let me have a nice totalitarian system. I would love it," well, he can go to Russia as far as I am concerned.

CAPTAIN POWELL: Dr. Wolfers, we're all sorry our time has come to a close. It's been a real pleasure having you with us this morning. On behalf of the College, thank you for a significant contribution to our course.

(21 June--5,000)B/bn/mr