

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES TODAY

1 March 1961

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Mr. Samuel S. Hill, Jr., Member of the Faculty, ICAF . . . . .	1
SPEAKER--Dr. Brooks Emeny, Princeton, N.J. . . . .	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION . . . . .	15

NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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MR. HILL: When I was coming down with our speaker this morning, he mentioned that he had recently given a lecture at a certain school for foreign service which was unable to provide a map of Afro-Asia for use on the platform. He inquired whether we had maps, and I was able to say that we do have maps, even though we are not a specialized school of foreign service. I think that puts us one up on the school of foreign service.

It is a great pleasure to have with us today a gentleman who has given a great deal of his life to the study of foreign policy. Just as individuals must make value judgments of other human beings, nations must also attempt to distinguish and evaluate those characteristics of strength and weakness which will make for international alliances.

Dr. Emeny has been president of the Foreign Policy Association and has written a number of books on foreign policy. I think we are all looking forward to hearing him tell us what the United States foreign policy today is shaping up to be.

Dr. Emeny.

DR. EMENY: Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Industrial College:

My assignment is rather overwhelming as it involves a lecture on American foreign policy today in 45 minutes! I assure you that I am not going to be able to cover the entire field. I shall rather concentrate on American foreign policy in the Afro-Asian world as an illustration of the kind of problems we face in the world as a whole.

It is important to emphasize at the beginning, however, that the prime and immediate objective of American foreign policy should be the strengthening and consolidation of the North Atlantic community. No other objective is so vital. And if it were already a reality, most of the difficult problems which we face today would, in fact, naturally fall into place. For the combined strength, economic and military, of a truly united North Atlantic community would be so powerful that the Communist menace to the free world

would be vastly reduced, provided, of course, the free world utilized its combined resources for the necessary development of human welfare throughout.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that the present Administration will do everything within its power to bring about a closer union of the North Atlantic community and thus further the consolidation of its strength and united purpose in the maintainance of freedom.

The problem of American foreign policy today reminds me somewhat of the story of a man who was driving on a narrow country road behind a truck. About every mile the truck would stop and the driver get out and pound the sides of the truck with a ball bat. Finally, in exasperation, as well as curiosity, the car driver decided to make inquiry as to the reason for the peculiar behavior of the truck driver. Upon inquiry, the truck driver informed him that the truck was a two-ton affair, rather on its last legs, and contained three tons of canaries. "Unless I can keep at least a third of those birds in flight," said the truck driver, "I'm going to break down."

American foreign policy which has largely been devoted in these postwar years to buying time, is constantly running the risk of breaking down. It is only successive shocks of world events, in many cases unanticipated and unprepared for, which has kept us going. It is probably just as well, therefore, that the Communist world continues to jolt us to action, forcing us to adopt thereby policies in many cases long overdue and greatly needed. But the time is coming when we are going to have to seize the initiative if we are ever to get on top of events, an initiative made possible by the strength of a consolidated North Atlantic community which knows where it is going and has the power to get there.

Afro-Asia is, of course, the most critical of the areas affecting the security and well-being of the North Atlantic world. Let us examine therefore in broadest terms the Afro-Asian world. For in it we are dealing with an area of the globe covering 18 million square miles and over 900 million people, not including Communist China itself.

Fifteen years ago this was a world largely colonial. Today it has become mostly independent. I have had the privilege during these past few years of traveling extensively throughout Afro-Asia. If I were to summarize my impressions in a single phrase, it would be "rapidity of change." In fact, it is the very rapidity of change which makes impossible the crystallization of policy in permanent terms

just as it makes necessary an agreement within the North Atlantic community as to the objectives of a well-coordinated and united policy. Without losing our ultimate goal, we must learn to think and act in fluid terms, if we are to maintain ourselves abreast with the implications of the rapid transition and changes which are taking place.

Let me give you one example of rapidity of change. In 1956, only five years ago, the present Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Ileo, was the principal author of a manifesto published in "Conscience Africaine," of which he was the editor. He and his associates assumed that they would be imprisoned by Belgian authorities for their audacity in issuing the manifesto. The following were the four principal statements contained therein:

That skin should no longer be considered a means of conferring privilege.

That the African had the right to be consulted by colonial rulers on policies affecting him.

That the Belgian Congo community could be peacefully maintained only provided that there were achieved a rapprochement between the white and the black, with mutual respect.

And, finally, that it was obviously necessary that the Congo should achieve its independence within 30 years!

Mr. Ileo and his associates were not imprisoned. The Congo became independent four years later!

It is well to recall certain aspects of history as they have affected American policy. Up to 20 years ago, the Afro-Asian world was virtually unknown to most Americans. With the exception of a relatively small number of tourists, missionaries, consular officers, and businessmen, Afro-Asia lay outside the personal experience of the American people. During the war years, particularly from 1942 to 1946, large numbers of army personnel were assigned to many parts of the area. But the duties of war did not contribute importantly to the knowledge or interest of American fighting forces in the affairs of the countries of Afro-Asia to which they were assigned; and when they returned to America, their experiences had little impact upon American political thought. Yet, since 1946, in just 15 years, 35 countries of Afro-Asia have gained freedom from colonial rule.

The prevailing indifference of the average American to the world-shaking impact of these events has its roots, of course, in prewar days. The American tradition from the beginning of the Republic had been neutrality and isolation. Even during the interwar years, 1918 to 1941, when the new world position of the United States dictated our "joining the human race," we remained politically aloof and therefore ignorant of and indifferent to the impact of our then-existing world power upon the peoples of other lands.

The world of the interwar years appeared, of course, to be relatively simple. The peace and security of Afro-Asia were assured with the maintenance of the British "Lifeline of Empire." The United States was contented to remain behind its own ramparts enjoying complete naval control of American waters. And the rising Japanese naval power, while offering a potential challenge, was recognized as the dominant force in the relatively restricted areas of the China Sea. On the Continent of Eurasia, Germany, which had challenged the European world in the First World War, was disarmed and relatively weak. And Russia, which had collapsed to communism, was considered no more than an ideological nuisance.

Reality, of course, was otherwise. For not only was Germany gathering strength under the Nazis to challenge again the prevailing order of Europe, but the Soviet Union, under the new tyranny of communism was plotting and preparing for the conquest of the non-Communist world, particularly Afro-Asia.

But on the other hand, an equally important but uncomprehended reality of the interwar years was the revolutionary impact of the new American power throughout the world, and particularly in the Afro-Asian complex. With an industrial capacity equal to that of the rest of the world combined, our influence for good or evil was enormous. Yet our response to some of the major repercussions of our power was in some cases totally contrary to the demands of reality such as the collection of war debts, tariff barriers, and the neutrality acts.

By the close of World War II the implications of the American world position, particularly in the economic sphere, began to penetrate the American mind. We saw more clearly, too, the broader implications of the technological age including the extraordinary development of communications of all types, reaching the remotest corners of the globe. These provided the means for the transport of goods of peace and war, as well as ideas on an unprecedented scale.

A second feature of the American position was its capacity for the consumption of the world's goods. Representing half of the world's industrial power, it was consuming half of its basic industrial raw materials, many of which were not domestically produced. The very livelihood of much of the Afro-Asian world came to depend upon the American market which largely determined the world price structure.

A third feature of the American impact was cultural. This derived not only from our educational and missionary efforts, particularly in the Afro-Asian world, but likewise from the influence of American tourists, business representatives, the communication of ideas through the printed word, and, above all, the influence of Hollywood. The influence of the latter was enormous. For while the sordidness of American films as viewed throughout the Afro-Asian world, gave rise to doubts as to the high moral character of American culture, the more subtle impact derived from the vision of luxury and freedom from want. This aroused in the hearts of the underprivileged masses of the globe the desire, followed by the demand for more tolerable standards of life.

Once such feelings of envy and desire became aroused, a fertile soil for anticolonialism was already present. And with the coming of World War II itself, and the defeat of the Western colonial powers in large areas of Asia, the mass demand for freedom from further colonial exploitation followed inevitably. And what is most important to us is the fact that the anticolonial revolution in Afro-Asia received its philosophical inspiration from the Founding Fathers of the American Republic and not Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.

In a real sense, therefore, the contemporary revolutions in the Afro-Asian world are American-made though not American-led. And only our ignorance of and indifference to this fact could have enabled the Soviet Union, of all countries, to pose as the true champion of freedom from colonial rule.

Surely the highest art of diplomacy is the ability of a country to seize upon the inevitable. To any careful student of world affairs the end of colonialism in Afro-Asia was clearly evident as a result of World War II. And during those war years and immediately after, the United States had every opportunity to prepare itself for coming events and to aid the safe, peaceful and rapid transition from colonial rule to freedom.

America's failure to seize upon the new order in Afro-Asia, was, of course, related to our lack of comprehension of other worldwide changes in the postwar years. It is well to recall in these respects that the American people insisted upon the demobilization of the greatest war machine in human history immediately following the surrenders of Germany and Japan. Before the incredulous though satisfied eyes of the Soviet Union, therefore, and to the consternation of our own Allies, the American power melted away at the very moment when it was needed to help fill the postwar vacuums both in Europe and in Afro-Asia, and to prevent the long-planned advance of Soviet conquests around the periphery of the Eurasian Continent.

But this was not all. At the close of World War II the American people still did not grasp the full implication of what were rapidly becoming four contemporaneous worldwide revolutions. The first of these was the technological revolution, with all of its implications for atomic war and atomic peace, as well as its potentiality for providing on the one hand all necessary goods for human welfare and, on the other, the means of worldwide human destruction. The second revolution, already mentioned, was the new nationalism of Afro-Asia, with its anticolonial, antiwhite, and anticapitalist overtones. The third revolution was the fast emerging new power complex, producing a bipolar world with the Soviet Union at one pole and the United States at the other. And the fourth revolution, relating to the implications of the atomic age, derived from the fact that war is no longer tenable as an instrument of policy. Once two sides of the bipolar world came into the possession of the means of mutual self-destruction, an entirely new basis of world relationships had come into being, so revolutionary in fact that its full implications are not, as yet, even grasped. During the past 15 years, therefore, we have been living in what might be described as the "twilight zone" between the preatomic and the atomic ages. Our conduct of policy and our political phraseology still belong, however, to the former. Herein lies the peril of the "twilight zone." For unless and until world statesmanship can begin to speak and act in terms of the realities of the atomic age, the danger of mutual self-destruction will continue to hang over humanity's head.

I think it may be safe to say that it was the threat of the Soviet Union to the freedom of Greece and Turkey in 1947, as well as the Berlin incident shortly thereafter, that awakened the American people to some of the new realities of the postwar world. Our 11-1/2-hour response to these new realities were dramatic and

effective. The Truman doctrine, which guaranteed the defense of the independence of free nations under threatened Soviet aggression, together with the Marshall plan, laid the basis of a completely new orientation of American foreign policy. These were followed logically by the development of NATO, beginning in 1949, which provided a military basis for the united defense of Western Free Europe in partnership with the United States and Canada. Thus the critical vacuum existing in free Europe began to be filled as industrial and military power were revived.

It was in the same year (1949), however, that the United States had a terrific traumatic experience in the loss of China to the Communists. The degree to which this loss had been caused by past mistakes in American policy will long be a subject of controversy. But there is little doubt that we lost our heads in the confusion and commenced upon a line of policy so contrary to the realities of the moment that we have been handicapped ever since in our championship of the freedom of the non-Communist nations of Asia.

Part of American response, of course, was the famous point 4 program. It was conceived as a means of duplicating for Afro-Asia the highly-successful Marshall plan as it applied to Europe. But it was one thing to provide the means for the revival of an already existing highly-industrialized and technologically advanced Europe and quite another to begin the creation of such in the underdeveloped nations and regions of Afro-Asia, which possessed only raw materials and were generally devoid of industrial plants and a technically trained working force. The problem of aid was completely different, therefore, from that of Europe, as were the responses of the recipients of such aid. On the military side, the SEATO Alliance of Southeast Asia of 1954 and the Bagdad Pact of 1955, disclosed a similar lack of comprehension on our part of special conditions and forces prevailing in Afro-Asia. In fairness to the American side, however, it must be recalled that all these policies represented a complete repudiation of tradition and the initiation of new relationships for which we had no adequate preparation or training.

Why is it that the Marshall plan and NATO succeeded so superbly in Europe, whereas our policies in Afro-Asia have not enjoyed a similar success? It is not just that the European situation was simple, in the sense that it was easy for us to understand, whereas the Afro-Asian was complex, being beyond our full comprehension. Let us look therefore a little more closely to the basic characteristics of postwar Afro-Asia.

Speaking in the broadest terms, Afro-Asia is characterized by certain fundamental common elements. The first of these include general prevailing conditions of poverty, disease and illiteracy among the masses of the peoples. Secondly, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asians exist in primitive, peasant, nomad, or tribal societies, urban centers being few and generally far between. Even the population of the urbanized communities of India account for a relatively small proportion of the overall population. In the third place, the average income of the peoples of Afro-Asia, even today, is below \$100 a year. The fourth common element characterizing Afro-Asia is the fact that virtually all its peoples have had the common experience of colonial rulership.

It is natural, therefore, that the rise of anticolonialism should be accompanied by a revolt against the intolerable standards of living which prevail. Extremes of nationalism, with their anti-white and anti-Western overtones, are hardly to be wondered at and should be viewed as the natural expression of the "revolution of rising expectations."

It is, of course, these common characteristics which have given a community of interest between the disparate members of the vast Afro-Asian community. The first outstanding example, moreover, was the Bandung Conference of 1955, to which delegates from 26 non-Western states, 21 of whom had been former colonies, assembled. The community of interests so intelligently expressed by the resolutions of the Bandung Conference has had an enduring effect on their policies as participants in other world conferences and in the United Nations.

But such apparent unity must be judged in light of the profound differences between the various areas and regions of the Afro-Asian world which handicap their achievement of mature freedom and their struggle to span the centuries in a single generation. Of the differences I need only mention a few without developing in detail their import. They are racial, historical, cultural, and economic in character.

The racial differences existing in Afro-Asia as a whole, as well as within various political units, have long produced tensions as severe as those maintaining in many parts of the West. The historical experiences of these people, moreover, have been so profoundly different as to make difficult their common understanding. They explain, too, the many basic differences in cultural levels, as illustrated for

instance by contrasting the rich civilization and historic traditions of Indian culture with that of tribal units in the vast areas of Africa. These differences in turn relate to contrasts in the economic status of various units and areas of Afro-Asia. Whereas in India, Egypt, and the Philippines, for example, technological advancement and know-how have made possible the beginnings of industrialization, the peoples of Africa and of many other parts of Asia have years of education and special training before they can achieve on their own, the full exploitation of their natural resources and the development of even the most simple industrialized economies.

To these profoundly important handicaps of lack of trained personnel and a primitive economy must be added three others of equal importance. The first is the threat of a population explosion in many parts of the area, the outstanding examples being Egypt and India. Here, as elsewhere, even the most valiant attempts at economic development and exploitation of natural resources run the risk of being overtaken by a burgeoning population. In fact, one of the most explosive dangers arises from the fact that since the war the industrialized West has become, in a per capita sense, richer as Afro-Asia has become poorer, in part due to the population explosion.

A third handicap contributing to the difficulties faced by the newly-independent states of Afro-Asia is the breakdown of ancient religious and social controls and customs under the impact of Western civilization with no adequate substitutes for such controls. The Congo, of course, is an outstanding example. But at a higher level India itself offers many illustrations of such stresses and strains. And throughout both Asia and Africa the enormous number of different languages, even within a single county and differing religions add to the tensions.

A final element in the situation is the often paralyzing effect of suspicions of the West. While historically such suspicions may be justified, both as to a fear of more subtle forms of colonialism and distrust of exploitative capitalism, they serve to help open the way to a less critical acceptance of Soviet and Chinese blandishments, both as an expression of "neutralism" and nationalistic independence.

Taken as a whole, it is these elements which have contributed and will continue to contribute to the political instability and immaturity of many of the emerging independent states of Afro-Asia.

It is something which time and the experience of responsibility alone can cure. But it is also something which the United States has failed to fully appreciate and has at times exacerbated through ill-conceived policies. Herein lies the heart of the failure in many instances of American policy with respect to Afro-Asia. Plunged into the midst of an unknown world we have too frequently acted on ignorance and shown a lack of preparation for our highly sensitive role.

A few examples will illustrate this all-important point. In the first place, our failure to seize upon the inevitable and aid so far as we could the peaceful and safe transition of the new nations of Afro-Asia from colonial status to independence meant a renunciation of what was initially an American-made revolution. That we should have permitted the Soviet Union to champion and then distort the political philosophy of the Founding Fathers of America who were the true inspirational source of the anticolonial upsurge is an outstanding example of our sad lack of preparation for leadership in the postwar world. And in the Middle East our indiscriminating support of or indifference to the excesses of Zionist policy in the founding of Israel have handicapped almost irreparably our postwar relationships with the entire Mohammedan world.

A second major example of our failure to understand the full implications of our policies relates to the point 4 program. The very fact that it was based from the beginning, particularly so far as Congressional support was concerned, on the concept of an anti-Soviet instrument, served to poison the entire atmosphere of American-Asian relationships. Being initially a crash program, moreover, it was both badly planned and poorly staffed in the beginning. (It takes only 1 bad American administrator to undermine the good works of 10 good Americans in these sensitive lands.) Our aid program has depended, moreover, on an annual approval of Congress, giving it a tenuousness which has infinitely multiplied the risks and complications involved in its administration. But even more than this, the complicated procedures involved in its administration have resulted in bureaucratic delays and uncertainties which have exasperated beyond human endurance the oriental recipients already inured for centuries to traditional governmental deviousness. To have out-orientaled the oriental in these respects was quite an accomplishment! But it has not encouraged the Orient in the thought that welfare capitalism is efficient, or the American democracy dependable.

A third example of ill-conceived policies relates to the new alliance system in Asia and the Middle East. The SEATO Pact, established in 1954, was almost immediately repudiated and opposed by the most important free nations of the area. While joined by Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan, with the adherence of Great Britain, France, New Zealand, and Australia, it became from the beginning an American show bitterly criticized by such major Asiatic states as India, Burma, and Indonesia. It did serve the useful purpose of providing safe harbor in the area for the American 7th Fleet. But as an accepted guarantor of the freedom of all independent states of Asia, it has been a failure.

The same, I believe, may be justly said of the Bagdad Pact. For while we did not become a full member of this pact, we were a chief instigator. And the regional opposition aroused by the pact in most of the Arab world served further to poison the atmosphere of American relations therein. It certainly contributed to the revolution in Iraq and the withdrawal of that country from membership. And it did not serve to strengthen in any impressive way the powers of resistance to Soviet aggression by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, with whom the United States already had bilateral alliance agreements. Both the SEATO and Bagdad Pacts, therefore, illustrate again the folly of precipitous action on our part wherein a full comprehension of the implications of such policies is lacking. This, in turn, leads to the fourth example of ill-conceived policy.

It will, I believe, always be a matter of wonderment why the one nation in the world which had developed neutralism on a grand scale and practiced it from its founding to the outbreak of World War II should have so misunderstood the inevitable rise of neutralism in the Afro-Asian world. Our almost incredible lack of judgment in these respects has complicated incalculably our relationships with the area. Even as late as 1957, when the Eisenhower doctrine was proclaimed as a result of our concern over Soviet interference in the Middle East area, we again ignored what should have been the lessons of the past. Put in simplest terms, the doctrine declared that we would defend the independence of any Middle East nation, upon request, if threatened by Soviet aggression. Such a policy certainly lay within our rights and capabilities. But to have sent to the Middle East a special envoy of the President to "explain" to the nations concerned the "meaning" of the Eisenhower doctrine was not only effrontery to the intelligence of Arab political leaders but a continuing incomprehension of Arab neutralism. The result was, of course, that all nations except

Lebanon repudiated the doctrine and the Lebanon acceptance of it led to revolution within the country.

One cannot help speculating how infinitely stronger the American position in Afro-Asia would be today and how much more effective the capabilities of the area for resistance to Soviet aggression had we championed neutralism from the beginning. Such a championship would not only have established a basis for mutual trust and sympathetic understanding but would have also dignified our appreciation of the intelligence of political leaders of the area and their capacity to judge on which side their real interest lay.

A final, though highly important element of weakness in our position with respect to the Afro-Asian world relates to the racial problem. While progress has unquestionably been made in this country toward an eventual solution of the problems of race, the ugly incidences marking the critical transition period toward a solution have had their indelible impact upon the suspicions of the Afro-Asian world. And unless and until the stain of racial discrimination is at last erased from the American social scene, our vaunted championship of human liberty in other parts of the world cannot ring true. For just as McCarthyism raised doubts in the minds of peoples abroad as to the truth of political freedom in America, so the name of Faubus continues to symbolize for them the suppression of human freedom in America.

When one considers all of these past and present weaknesses and inconsistencies in American policy with respect to the Afro-Asian world, it is to be wondered that we have succeeded as well as we have. And certainly the Soviet Union and China have made their contribution in these respects through such shocking incidents as Hungary and Tibet. On the other hand, it should be remembered that from the early thirties the Kremlin has been anticipating the breakup of the empires of Afro-Asia and has carefully planned and trained specially chosen personnel for use in the conquest of the area. American policy, by contrast, has been largely unplanned. In fact, not until 1950, did we even begin seriously to consider the defense of our interests in that part of the world. And even since then, during the past decade, most of the major policies adopted have come into being through the goading of each recurring crisis and with the purpose, not of a solution nor of gaining control of the course of events, but rather that of buying time to decide what our basic policy should be.

It is for these reasons that I would propose that one of the major questions to be faced by the new Administration is a thorough inventory,

reexamination, and reorientation of American Afro-Asian policy. The present crises in Laos, the Congo, and Cuba, indicate very clearly that only an American strategy, carefully laid and planned, with tactics wisely conceived and maturely developed, can give us the initiative and the certainty of frustrating the Communist purposes. We have the power and can summon the collective intelligence necessary for the task. But the time is fast slipping away where the situation can be saved and then only through a major effort.

One of the things that impresses an observer traveling throughout the Afro-Asian world is the chaos of agencies, both international and unilaterally American, with respect to aid to undeveloped countries. While each agency has its own special role, and therefore is limited as to the things it may do, the very number and their lack of coordination leads to deep confusion and frustration. Of the different international agencies one may cite the World Bank, the International Development Agency, the International Finance Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Technical, Cultural and Assistance Programs, to which should be added the International Trade Agreement Agency known as GATT.

The United States is, of course, deeply concerned and committed to the above. But in addition there are such American unilateral programs and agencies as the Development Loan Fund, the International Cooperation Administration--better known as ICA--the Export-Import Bank, Public Law 480 (providing for loans on the basis of grants of our excess farm produce) to which should be added the Middle East Arab Bank, as well as special programs for military aid and the work of private foundations. Not only are recipient countries vastly bewildered by such an array of international, governmental, and private agencies, but the lack of proper coordination between them and in many cases duplication of effort, plays havoc with smooth development.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that among the first acts of the Kennedy Administration will be a thorough reexamination of the entire foreign aid program. I emphasize the word "entire" because a proper revision and reorientation of the Afro-Asian aid problem cannot be made without equal consideration of aid necessities in other areas of the world, particularly Latin America. Only by such means can sound decisions be reached, moreover, with respect to the role of the North Atlantic community as a whole in a worldwide aid program. Through such a cooperative effort, with a just allocation of available resources, a further consolidation of the strength of the free world can be anticipated. The following are the major aspects of the problem, therefore, which it seems to me need thorough consideration:

1. It is evident that nothing less than the survival of the freedom of the Afro-Asian world and eventually the North Atlantic community itself is at stake.

2. Put in such terms, it is obvious that any aspects of our present program which can no longer meet the demands or contribute in the fullest measure to the ends sought, should be either abandoned or so revised as to assure a maximum of success. If this proves, for instance, to mean the commitment of United States funds to cover a three-, five-, or eight-year period, instead of on the basis of an annual appropriation, such a policy should be adopted. If greater efficiency and effectiveness can be gained through the pooling of our resources with our NATO partners, even at the cost of abandoning present unilateral commitments on our part, then such a policy should be adopted.

3. Everything should be done to end the wasteful use of resources through more adequate controls, efficient operation, and the careful determination of priorities. The United States, for instance, in the past few years has expended nearly a quarter of a billion dollars in the kingdom of Laos. Despite heroic efforts and personal sacrifices of many Americans, the overall waste of expenditures has been appalling. Among the causes has been a lack of intelligent application of priorities, i. e., "first things first," and adequate control of expenditure of funds, even at the risk of appearing to interfere internally in the country.

In many countries there has been too much aid instead of the proper amount of aid, in terms of the consumption capacity of the national economy of the recipient nation. This had led not only to waste and corruption, but in some cases to ruinous inflation and an upsetting of the balance of the economy.

4. A final item relates to personnel. Much of the inefficiencies of operation of our aid programs has stemmed from personnel problems in the broadest sense. There have been too many administrators in many instances, as well as too many poorly qualified administrators. And these, in turn, have added further to the confusion of bureaucratic paralysis, particularly as between Washington and the field. We must, therefore, face up to the fact that only the best will do, both as to administration machinery and personnel.

This is probably our last chance. These past years of costly experience should have taught us the things that can and cannot be

done. This new frontier of world relations demands a new comprehension of what is really involved and a determination to see it through. I believe that the American people will respond to such an effort. I am certain that the young and new generation of this country, which seeks the challenge of a new frontier, will willingly make the sacrifices of personal comfort, luxury and even security for the privilege of service to humanity and the survival of freedom. For it is evident that if we do not succeed in winning Afro-Asia, our world will be doomed.

Thank you.

MR. HILL: We have now come to that part of the program which we call the question and answer period.

QUESTION: Dr. Emeny, you said that we should reenforce the North Atlantic Community. You criticized us for not meeting the colonial revolution and for not being as humanitarian as we should in our aid. These two things have been the very things that our allies have criticized us most greatly for. How can we strengthen the North Atlantic Community when we are dragging on the other aspects of the problem?

DR. EMENY: I judge the implication of your question is this: that it is difficult keeping friendships with our allies when we seem to be undercutting their empires. I realize that that is not a matter which is easily solved. But I think that it started back during the war years in the Roosevelt administration. You will remember that Roosevelt didn't really talk to Churchill about India, because he knew it would make Churchill mad. If he had been willing to make Churchill mad, we were too important to Churchill not to enable us to talk about these matters. A great deal could have been done in that regard, particularly since it involved the inevitability of Indian independence. It would not really have undermined the alliance with Britain but it would have enabled us to make it perfectly clear to the Indians that we realized that the time for their independence had come and we would do everything we could to help them.

When I speak of a safe transition from colonialism to independence and our leadership in its regard, I don't mean the kind of leadership that is in defiance of the colonial power itself. I mean the kind of leadership that is involved in the full and frank discussion with the colonial power so that it is clear to them that we know perfectly well that the end of the age of colonialism has come and that it is to our

interest to help them in the safe transition as well as to help the colony involved itself.

To take the case of France, I think there was every opportunity after the war to enable France gracefully to withdraw its colonial power upon Indochina. Again you had an area where it was inevitable that French rule was over, and yet the French returned with their armies of occupation and everything else. It was only when the fighting became really desperate that we began to intervene. As a result, likewise, we lost the kind of sympathy and understanding which would have made it possible for us to avoid many of the complicated questions which we now face in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

I wish I could find another word for "leadership." Leadership implies a defiance of the colonial powers and the leading of the revolution in the colonial country itself. I don't mean that. It's a subtlety of method but it is a method which makes it perfectly clear to the colonial power that we know what is inevitable, that we assume that they know it is inevitable, and that we are there to do everything we can to help in the safe transition. Likewise, it makes clear to the colony that we know they are going to have independence and we are interested in helping in the safe transition.

We really did not make that attempt. It's water over the dam. Most of these countries are free. Fortunately, the Soviet Union and China have pursued policies which have belied their own supposed championship of freedom. Certainly in India today, and in many other former colonial areas of the world, there is a realization that we as a country were embarrassed because of our alliances in Europe and that in reality we have sympathized with the end of colonialism. Our attempts at aid are a proof to a degree of that. But there can be no doubt through initial bungling during the very critical postwar period we lost what Wendell Wilkie pled with us before his death not to lose, our "reservoir of good will." It was something that existed, and existed in intense form in the Middle East, in Asia, and in Africa during the war. We saw it rapidly drain away because of our failure to really meet the colonial situation.

QUESTION: You criticized us on one occasion for not stepping into the vacuum that the Russians did move into, and you were also critical that we did step into a vacuum in creating the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. These seem to be somewhat divergent. Could you comment on these?

DR. EMENY: My criticism of Baghdad and SEATO was that Baghdad and SEATO were approached with NATO in mind as the model. It made a kind of neat sort of military setup on paper. It enabled us to look at the map of Eurasia and see the quarantine line running right through without any serious break in it. That, of course, was on paper. But I know that there was very little consideration given, if any, as to what the opinion would be of the nations concerned. I believe that our fleet could still have remained in the Orient. After all, that is SEATO. It isn't what militarily our present allies in southeast Asia can do, for they have no real strength. Our fleet would have been there anyhow.

If we had studied the situation a little more carefully in setting up SEATO and had not treated it as a crash emergency program, we wouldn't have had the strong opposition of India, which is after all the key to the area, or of Indonesia, or of Burma, or of the other countries involved.

There again I come back to neutralism. Think how much simpler the approach would have been if we had made it clear from the beginning that we were interested in their defending their neutralism. That would have put it in an entirely different light. We asked them to join us in an alliance against Russia. What we should have done was to have done everything to help them in the defense of their neutralism, even to the extent of making it clear to them that after all we were the founders of the neutralist concept.

When I lectured recently in India, I wanted to establish rapport with my Indian audiences because I know that Indian audiences are very critical of what they consider to be American imperialism. I opened my remarks by saying that I was a private American citizen and that I deplored and wanted to apologize for our shortness of memory and our lack of understanding of neutralism. After all we were the inventors of neutralism and we had practiced it during the 150 years of our history. We should have had enough imagination to realize that for almost identical reasons India had adopted neutralism as its policy. In the long run there would have been much better understanding had we had the imagination not only to accept but to encourage it.

So, on this approach to alliances, an alliance was a perfectly natural thing in Europe, but to apply the same technique to Asia and the Middle East was not a natural thing, and it has not proven out.

QUESTION: Dr. Emeny, would you comment on Mr. Williams' technique of inquiring into the African Congo?

DR. EMENY: We were just saying during the coffee hour that it seemed too bad that he could not have been sufficiently oriented or accompanied by someone with sensitivity to the extent that as a new Assistant Secretary he could have gone into Africa in complete humility, with the honest desire only to learn, and having learned, to speak only on the basis of what he knew to be the realities. Apparently he did not have that sensitivity, and those with him did not have the sensitivity. I have just recently been in Kenya myself, and I know that only a lack of necessary sensitivity to the local situation would have persuaded Mr. Williams to say what he did.

QUESTION: I was very much interested in your remarks regarding the Indians' reactions to your criticism of American policy, the comments you made regarding neutralism in the past. I happen to think the reverse of your remarks. I was there in the past three years and know why many Americans felt that neutralism would be a mistaken policy. One of the criticisms that are often made of neutralism, and I wonder if you will comment on it, is that it is not realistic in the sense that it ignores changes that have occurred in geography, in weapon systems, and in the nature of the threat against democratic systems since 1783. Some of the Indians like to cite the 18th century American experience and carry it over into the 20th century. I think this is unrealistic. May I have your views?

DR. EMENY: I quite agree with you that it is unrealistic, but the thing that impresses me more and more as I live on this planet is that we have the human element involved. My argument about this thing has been, and it has been from the very beginning, that we should never underestimate the intelligence or the ability to learn of people any place in the world.

After all, our postwar policy itself has been largely based upon our learning from bitter experience things we should have learned in the interwar years but didn't. My argument is that, even though at the time the situation with respect to south Asia was critical and something drastic had to be done, Dulles in his exasperation made the fatal mistake of telling the Indians that anybody who could be neutralist was really immoral. It is perfectly true that under present circumstances of the world it is probably dangerous and bad to be neutral, but it is human to be neutral, and only through the experience of self-government and the consequent necessity of dealing with

the world can people discover for themselves, and therefore be able to act upon, the problem of neutralism.

May I recall to you that as late as 1937, after the complete exercise of democracy--I mean by debates in Congress, on radio, in forums, and in newspapers throughout this country--the collective wisdom of the American people emerged in the form of neutrality acts which were the most extreme forms of neutralism in our whole history. I could not forget that, because I happened to fight it at the time. When I began to apply my own thinking to these people, it seemed evident to me what an insult it was to them to tell them how to think. Peoples have to learn by experience, and I think that neutralism is the most natural thing in the world.

Now, of course, there are certain doubts in the Indian mind, and for that reason I could always get a laugh when I said, "You know, in our country today we are able to write perfectly calmly the fact that if it hadn't been for the British Navy in the 19th century the Monroe Doctrine might not have survived. We did not have the power to defend it during a great deal of that period." I would then add, "It may be that 100 years hence some Indian historian will comment that the Indian neutralism in the long run would not have been possible had it not been for the 7th Fleet."

I am only trying to say here that in our future approach to these problems we must not underestimate the importance of experience in world affairs on the part of these countries, even though it is going to take a lot of patience. Likewise, we must not underestimate their capacity for intelligence.

QUESTION: Doctor, we have had many speakers here on the platform and it seems that no matter what the subject may be, whether it is assistance, aid, loans, grants, foreign alliances, policies, social, economic, military, or whatever it may be, they all come to the same statement you made this morning, and that is that anyone familiar with the area could have known what would happen. Could you tell us just exactly what you think, say, in the case of Africa now, as to what our foreign policy should be, so that next year's speaker won't make the same statement?

DR. EMENY: What our policy should be in Africa is certainly a very large subject. I don't think I can deal with that in the time that is available, nor am I by any means clear as to what our policy should be specifically in many areas. We are faced with a situation wherein the

rapidity of change is such that it even overtakes a specific policy which may be adequate for the moment and yet ceases to be shortly thereafter.

There are certain things that I am certain we must do. One of them, which I consider probably the key to the situation, not only in Africa but in Asia, is a more rapid solution than at present is taking place of our own racial problem at home. There is no single thing which offers a greater handicap in our regard in dealing with Afro-Asia. In our talk about democracy, freedom, equality, and all of that, so long as we maintain at home the racial views which we do, we are not going to be able to persuade the peoples of Afro-Asia that we are sincere. We can set out a perfectly good program for Africa for instance, but it will not succeed as it should until it is clear that Americans have honestly accepted the principle of the dignity of man in every respect.

With regard to more specific programs, I feel you have to break this down. I'll explain what I mean. Take Nigeria, for instance. Here is a country with a rate of literacy of 12 percent, a high amount for Africa. You cannot fail to be impressed by the ability of the educated people who are in the administration of the country and who are really carrying the burden of independence. On the other hand, in the Congo we are dealing with a nation of 9 million people inhabiting a country 4 times the size of Texas. At the moment of independence there were no Ph. D. 's and only 16 A. B. degrees in the entire country! The remaining people who were literate had hardly what we would call a high school education. Yet it is these people who have assumed the obligations of government.

Or take Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Ghana, Senegal, as well as Nigeria and the Congo. All of these countries now have universities. But they are on the average only half full. Why? Because the secondary school system in those areas is not sufficient to give them the manpower to fill them. So I would say that one great immediate specific is every aid possible in the educational field.

Next look at the problem of economy. There again I think you have to break it down to individual countries, because each country has its own specific problems. There are nations that have only one crop, for instance. One-crop nations are always in a vulnerable and dangerous position. Every effort must be made to enable them to have a variation of crops, so there can be more certain revenues. That is directly tied in with the whole problem of world prices, a thing which we in this country in the interwar years so largely

ignored. We were delighted when we could get raw rubber for a very few cents and we were exasperated when it went up very high, without realizing that a nation which consumed half of the supply of the world's raw materials had a strangle hold on the livelihood of all the peoples involved.

Therefore I think that one very definite approach is a more intelligent rationale of the whole raw material price structure and the enormous influence which the United States has as the greatest consuming nation. That's another kind of approach.

When you come to the necessity of loans for this or that phase of development, certainly in Ghana and in Nigeria, the development of waterpower or the exploitation of aluminum resources can be very important in the beginning of the development of local economies. I was much impressed in Ghana and Nigeria with the job being done by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The man responsible, Bob Fleming, was a ball of fire. He had been able to commence the development of local industries in very important areas as a means of enabling these two countries to conserve foreign exchange by making some of their own consumer goods. An example is bottle factories. All bottles are imported, or were. Yet there are wonderful sands in both countries for the making of glass. These developments are being carried on with the permission of the states but as a private enterprise and offer a single example among many others.

In the "revolution of rising expectations" the most important thing is the creation of an atmosphere whereby people can live in hope. You cannot produce a miracle in a generation. You cannot produce now in Africa or Asia, a civilization of gadgetries such as the West enjoys. But, so long as these people can be made to see that there is hope and that things are developing, they have the ability to live on an astonishing low level of standard of living, and they can still maintain their optimism for the future.

Putting in vast amounts of money for this, that, and the other thing, which seemed to work in our area of the world, may actually defeat its purpose. It already has in certain countries such as Laos and Afghanistan. We can create more havoc than good by throwing completely out of kilter the relatively simple economy of the country involved by bringing about inflation and all its complications, to say nothing of ruinous corruption.

That is why I say we have to take a very careful look in each case. We can't treat Africa as a whole in our policy any more than

the point 4 program, copied on the Marshall plan, could apply successfully to Afro-Asia on a single standard. Each country, region, and area has its own peculiar problems.

Finally, and most important, our aid efforts must be applied on a long-term basis, not an annual basis. The uncertainties created by the principle of annual appropriations for aid are wasteful and utterly demoralizing.

QUESTION: In our studies in the past week we have learned that self-preservation is not an individual thing; it is a national thing. It seems that we have to dwell in this atmosphere and statements have been made to this effect by senators. Daily actions prove that we are going about this thing in a very businesslike way. Do you think we are going to look at this problem realistically and abandon this idea that we are not going to strike anybody until they strike us?

DR. EMENY: You are referring to the Rusk memorandum. I don't know that I can answer that. I still believe that, despite this turmoil in our thinking, we are going to emerge with fairly crystallized views on the matter. I don't see any indication that we intend to stop the development of arms which will certainly give pause for thought on the other side. I wish that we could move a little more rapidly than we are, but I don't see any real spirit of surrender developing.

It is quite clear that whoever strikes first, if someone strikes in the nuclear sense, it means defeat for both sides. I think we can be grateful that apparently Khrushchev is fully aware of that, although if he saw that there was any chance of getting an edge he might strike.

We shall have to continue to live, in any event, in what I call the "twilight zone." That is the pursuit of a pretwilight zone, preatomic age approach to defense and foreign policy in the vernacular of the preatomic age. But at the same time we shall be forced in the long run to adjust ourselves to the realities of the atomic age which, as I said, have made war as an instrument of policy no longer tenable.

That may not answer your question.

STUDENT: No, it doesn't.

DR. EMENY: Will you restate it, then?

STUDENT: I am thinking back to the period of 1948. At that time we were getting along probably better than we are now. We were not losing as much year after year. This policy of containment just hasn't worked. It appears to me that it is not going to work. It further appears to me that this policy that we are not going to strike anybody until they strike us is wrong, because it gives the other side too much of a chance. If we were actually fighting, we wouldn't hesitate to take any advantage that we could--ambush, anything we felt would suit our purpose. I am just wondering if we'll learn to function by looking realistically at the international problems.

DR. EMENY: In other words, you feel that we would be in a better position today if we made it perfectly clear that we would be willing to strike somebody first if it proved to be necessary. I am certainly not competent to answer that. In fact I have always believed that there is a certain advantage in uncertainty. It keeps the other side guessing as to what the United States would do. I don't believe that the Russians take entirely seriously our claim that we will not strike. We have said we will not, but I would say that they are not by any means certain, and I think it is better to leave it that way.

In regard to the first part of your remarks, I want to go back to my pleading with regard to the North Atlantic Pact. Again it seems to me that we are in a phase of world history where we are still thinking of the world in prewar terms, in a sense, and are not facing fully the postatomic necessities. I think that many of these problems would fall into place with ease if the North Atlantic Community were really coordinated and strong.

We've gone amazingly far in these respects if you view it historically from what existed in the past. When you consider the wars that have been fought in Europe between countries that have now grown together in trading areas, even though there are the Six and the Seven, it is astounding they are talking about all of them joining together. After all, it was not so long ago that Churchill made the incredible offer to the French of combining the countries as a single people. This was in the days when France was about to surrender to Germany.

In a very real sense we are faced with that situation today, and the thing that troubles my mind is that we are not pursuing consistently and determinedly enough, in this country, the achievement of unity of the North Atlantic world. OECD, as it is emerging, offers an element which is encouraging. NATO is in crisis. It should not remain in crisis. It should be further strengthened.

The issue is being forced more and more in the United Nations, where the Western World, the North Atlantic world, is being opposed by other blocks, Communist as well as Afro-Asian. The logic of all these forces at work is the rapid cohesion of the North Atlantic world.

If we had such cohesion today with a complete agreement between ourselves as to Afro-Asia and how to help these people, many of our worries would be less serious. But we are still paying lip service in this country and in Europe to the concept of the unity of the Western World while pursuing policies which are not contributing to that unity.

MR. HILL: Dr. Emeny, I can do no better than to echo General Mundy's comments, that you have made a definite contribution to our thinking. May I add the thanks of all of us for your thoroughness, patience, and frankness in the question and answer period.

(24 July 1961--5, 600)O/en:mr