

THE KEY TO FREE WORLD SURVIVAL

4 May 1961

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NOTICE

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ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Mundy, Gentlemen: I'm glad to see that you all have returned safely from your field studies. I trust that all your visits were interesting and worthwhile. If you think this year has gone fast so far, the next month is really going to skip by, but is going to be tremendously interesting.

Today, of course, as you know, we begin the final unit of study of the curriculum. We assess our national overall security preparedness posture in this section for all types of conflicts. It is, therefore, appropriate that we kick off this course with a keynote lecture entitled "The Key to Free World Survival."

Our speaker this morning is a Member of Congress from my home State of California. He is a member of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I would also like to state that he is a captain in the Naval Reserve.

He has long been a student of world affairs and their impact on the United States. On many occasions he has spoken on the current world situation and the cold war; and I'm sure that his views will help us immeasurably in our final problem deliberations.

I hope that he will find time during our seminars in this course to come back and participate in accordance with the invitation that the Commandant has extended to him.

So it is my great pleasure and privilege to welcome to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces the Honorable Craig Hosmer, Member of Congress from Long Beach, California.

Mr. Hosmer, may I introduce you to the faculty, guests, and students of the Industrial College.

MR. HOSMER: Thank you, Admiral Patrick.

General Mundy, Gentlemen: Welcome home. I think that this invitation of mine to be here this morning was rather a calculated thing. You have all had a good time. Now you're going to pay for it.

It's usual for a speaker to start out and say he's glad to be here. I, of course, am delighted to be here. But I am much happier that this college is here, making its very, very unique contribution to meeting the dangers that our free world faces today from the resolve of the Communist leaders to extend their domination worldwide with Moscow as the seat of authority--a resolve which has been unshaken for over four decades now. There were periods when it was expedient for them not to press their determination home, such as due to the interruptions of World War II. But once the Soviets have dealt with a crisis, they always return and renew their attack along the same theme.

There is current evidence of a desire by the Chinese Communists to play a larger role in the destiny of international communism and their leverage is increasing, as witnessed by the intense ideological struggle over, say, the coexistence policy. But it appears still to be Moscow and not Peiping against which the world must calculate its dangers and erect both its military and its nonmilitary defenses. And it's from that frame of reference that I'm going to speak today.

This conflict, of course, that has been thrust upon us is, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, a protracted one. It involves operations which can span the entire range of human activities, from sports competition to nuclear war. The key to free world survival is an understanding of what this conflict involves, and then in fighting it to win.

In speaking today and making my analysis I have made three fundamental assumptions, from which the logic, if there is any, in my remarks will flow. And those assumptions are these:

First, that the true standard for our efforts and sacrifices is not whether an action is taken in military war or nonmilitary war, but what it will accomplish toward the survival of the free world. In other words, we and the rest of the democracies have always shared a lackadaisical attitude when the bullets weren't flying and the bombs weren't dropping; and that doesn't apply today. What is to be accomplished is what determines and keys the effort, the expenditure, and the sacrifice we must put forth.

A second premise is that in the implementation of the external influence of nations there exists a spectrum of possible actions which range from least violent to most violent; and the rational selection of where along this spectrum of violence to select an action is a calculation of the risk between not taking the action and taking it

The third premise is that the effectiveness of any less violent action selected out of this spectrum depends upon the believability of a nation's willingness to escalate all the way up the scale if on rational calculation that is required under the circumstances. In this escalation the ultimate violence principle applies whether you are taking an action in offense or in defense.

On this basis, then, the willingness and ability to fight the hottest kind of war feeds back into all actions that a nation may take of less degrees of violence.

Now, because this hottest kind of war is the reference point to all other military and nonmilitary actions, because it's most talked about but perhaps the least understood, I'm going to dwell on it rather fully today, not from the standpoint of initiating a hot war, but from deterring it, for that is the one element of our national strategy that has been most consistently reiterated since the Soviets achieved nuclear capability; but at the same time has been used to the least advantage.

Why hasn't it been used to advantage? Because I think there has been no general understanding of either what it takes to deter the Soviets, or whether or not we've got it. As a consequence, by and large we have failed to take or threaten a sufficient degree of violence to successfully oppose Soviet moves; and we have failed to initiate countermoves of the intensity required to make some advances on our own. Let's go to these questions: What does it take to deter the Soviets, and have we got it?

Like a parachute, of course, this deterrent system must always work. Its most obvious capability must be to survive whatever damage a Soviet surprise first-strike attack may inflict and still retain sufficient second-strike capability to impose unacceptable damage on the Soviet homeland. It does not involve a capability to strike first. Nor does it involve expenditure for a second-strike capability that goes vastly beyond what is needed to deter.

The very success of a system deterring all-out nuclear war makes more likely the resort to lesser violence in the form of limited war and intensified cold war. So skeletonizing our limited war conventional land, sea, and air forces by overexpenditure on deterrence simply cannot be tolerated. And neither can the very important third front--nonmilitary war--be neglected if our overall defense posture is to succeed in thwarting Communist ambitions. We can freeze to death in a cold war as easily as we can burn to death

in a hot war. In any event, the cost of creating and maintaining a deterrent capability is a very high one; and for the sake of our national economic health it's important that money not be spent unnecessarily in this direction.

Determining what will deter the Soviets can perhaps best be found through the answer to another question, and that is, How much destruction to their homeland are the Soviet leaders prepared to risk in order to achieve their ultimate goal if cold war methods are not succeeding or if they appear too slow?

Obviously, only the Soviet leaders themselves can answer that question; and they probably don't have a precise answer to it themselves. It is likely that within limits the answer will vary from time to time because of the Communist doctrine that whatever is dictated by historical circumstances is party line at any particular moment and shall be implemented. Nevertheless, we can achieve an order of magnitude idea of just what they would exchange for removing the United States, by making some historical comparisons and analyzing some of their speeches and some of the other things they have done.

Of course, as I have mentioned, their goal is the installation of a Communist government in every nation, with all looking toward Moscow, and hopefully from the Peiping standpoint, toward there, for guidance. To arrive at this goal, Communist doctrine dictates the utilization of any means which are expedient as long as the Soviet revolutionary base itself is not endangered. Military force is one instrument for carrying out this policy; and, of course, they are not inhibited by any moral restrictions from utilizing it. To them the important factor is that inadmissible risk must not be taken. To do so would constitute adventurism, which is a serious deviation in Communist ideology.

At the same time, if within the limits of acceptable risk Soviet leaders deemed it wise to take an opportunity to eliminate the United States as the obstacle to their goal, Soviet leaders would consider it just as much a sin as the other deviation--not to engage in that kind of destructive act. In short, and from a theoretical standpoint at least, Communist doctrine imposes on Communist leaders a constant responsibility to proceed by the most expeditious means possible; and these may range from dropping pamphlets to dropping thermo-nuclear bombs. The degree of violence to be selected is that which can gain the most advantage with the least proportionate cost under the particular circumstances existing at the time the decision is made

Now, peaceful coexistence is the fervently announced policy of the Soviet Government. The Chinese Communist doctrinally regard it as involving less violence than their "more accurate" application of the Marxist-Leninist theory that today's historical circumstances require. Khrushchev defines peaceful coexistence as a form of intense economic, political, ideological struggle between the Socialist camp and what he calls the forces of imperialist aggression. This, he says, is a better way to achieving world communism than war. What he means is that today it better advances the Communist cause to proceed by nonmilitary means than it does by military means. Tomorrow it may be different if the circumstances are different.

Even under today's circumstances, of course, the waging of peaceful coexistence by the Soviets must be understood as neither peaceful nor aimed at coexisting for an instant longer than necessary. Except for all-out war between major powers, in the final analysis peaceful coexistence amounts to a no-holds-barred conflict for world domination, fought under Soviet ground rules.

Now, one of these rules is that the world is divided into two zones--the peace zone, Communist territory; and the war zone, non-Communist territory; and the contest shall be carried on entirely in the war zone, our territory.

Another of their rules is that all action to forward the Communist cause is just, and any action to resist it is unjust. Thus, subversion and sabotage of free world institutions are Communist instruments of peaceful coexistence. And revolts, such as in Algeria or Latin America, are encouraged under the guise of national liberation movements. These are just acts and just wars, to be fully supported.

Recent successes have lent weight to Khrushchev's and the Soviet people's contention that their current policy is indeed a presently effective substitute for military war. More than this, Soviet officials have been exhibiting a real fear of becoming involved in nuclear war, either growing out of surprise attacks or the escalation of a more limited situation. Khrushchev often refers in his speeches to the deadliness and horror of nuclear war; and a leading Soviet military analyst, Major General Nicolai A. Talensky, recently wrote a widely publicized article pointing out the futility of resorting to nuclear war to decide political controversies.

The difficulty is that it's almost impossible to determine how accurately these statements reflect the military doctrine of the Soviet

Union, and how much they are a part of the long-standing campaign against nuclear weapons and to deny their use to the West.

It would be dangerous in any event to assume that the Soviet leaders would not make a sudden, massive attack against the United States if their calculation of relative strength indicated to them that it could be done without serious risk of disaster to the Soviet revolutionary base. Such a situation could arise if the relative balance between forces suddenly tipped in the Soviets' favor by some scientific or technological breakthrough. It could arise if we permitted our deterrent capability to deteriorate badly. And it could arise if by repeated cold war and limited war defeats our position became so weakened that retaliatory action would appear quixotic and unbelievable. So our only security against the kind of military attack they might make on us in balanced strength, which includes a retaliatory capacity so swift, so certain, and so deadly that it does in fact deter.

Now, how deadly must it be? What punishment would be too great for them to accept to achieve victory over us?

Victory? Some contend that there would be no victory in a general nuclear war. But this isn't the present Soviet view. In 1960 Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet that in such a war the U. S. S. R. would suffer great damage and destruction, but that it would survive, because its territory is so enormous and its population less concentrated in large centers than in many other countries. On the other hand, Khrushchev says, the West would collapse and it would be the end of capitalism.

One way of arriving at some understanding of how much destruction the Soviets might accept is to make a historical comparison between them and ourselves. For one thing, the standard of living is substantially higher in the United States than it is in the Soviet Union; and always in societies, when they proceed further away from their primitive beginnings, their value on life becomes higher.

Also our country, the continental United States, has enjoyed nearly a century of stable government, without suffering the consequences of invasion or attack from an outside force. During this period the Russians have had a very violent nationwide revolution and civil war, they have experienced vast destruction to life and property in two world wars, and they suffered the costly and humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. So what would deter us isn't necessarily what would deter them; and we must think in terms of what will deter them.

Another factor that has bearing on our considerations is the Soviet civil defense program. They did nothing until 1953 regarding civil defense against a nuclear war. Today their civil defense preparations are greater than in any other part of the world.

This effort that the Soviet Government is making in civil defense indicates that it takes a realistic attitude about the possibility of the Soviets participating in a general nuclear war. However, its objectives must not be concealed. There is no evidence of a new-found benevolence among the Soviet leaders toward human life--greater in proportion to the West than Soviet civil defense efforts are to Western civil defense efforts. It's characteristic of communism, its callousness toward human life. It is their primary interest, not to save human lives per se, but to preserve the skills represented by them that are so important to their military and industrial strength.

Well, assuming the effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program, this could be one of its results: Assume they decide to make a first strike on us, and at the same time they concurrently evacuate 80 percent of the 50 million people living in their 160 largest population centers. In that event, casualties from any nuclear retaliation of ours against population centers would not be 50 million, but 10 million. Our retaliatory capacity by their civil defense efforts, in this regard at least has been cut by a factor of 5.

Now, even if we could kill 10 million people over there--and 10 million is a lot of people--in U. S. S. R. experience this is by no means a prohibitive or even a crippling price to pay to achieve important national objectives. A study made in 1959 by Professor Warren Eason, of Princeton University, indicated that the Soviet Union had lost 25 million people in World War II. This amount of casualties followed on the purges of the twenties and the thirties, which by some estimates accounted for another 25 million deaths.

In addition to human casualties, damage of all kinds from Nazi military operations in World War II was massive. In addition to nonindustrial losses, the official Soviet historical review of World War II places the figure of 40 percent on the destruction of the total Soviet industrial capacity--40 percent of it wiped out by that war; and that figure is pretty well accepted by Western students of the war's consequences.

Now, despite these huge losses and the population loss, totaling 13 percent, and the industrial loss, 40 percent--13 percent and 40 percent--by 1950, just five years after the war's close, less than

five years, the national production of the U. S. S. R. was higher than at any time in its history.

Well, looking back to World War II, its damage, and even granting some increase in the value placed on human life in the Soviet Union by the increase in living standards, I think we can pretty well assume that they would pay a price at least equivalent to the destruction of World War II if that price would gain for them the elimination of the United States as a checkmate to their goal.

From that figure, then, we have an absolute minimum for the capability to retaliate that we must possess. And it is a second-strike capability, to inflict damage equivalent to the combined effect of erasing 14 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 41 percent of its industrial capacity.

I use and emphasize the fact that this is a damage-equivalent figure, because, aside from the moral questions involved in threatening death to 14 percent of their population--that means 29 million people out of a population of some 209 million--the combination of Soviet civil defense and natural dispersal over 8.5 million square miles of territory makes even attempting that kind of operation utterly impractical. For this reason, a deterrent system based on targeting population simply would not be believable and would not deter the Soviet button pushers.

Further, even if you could knock out 14 percent of their population, there isn't any assurance that the Soviet leaders wouldn't willingly pay that price, or 15 percent or 20 percent or 50 percent or even more to achieve what they wanted if the deal guaranteed them world supremacy.

The physical futility is equally clear of trying to base a retaliatory system on attacks against their agriculture, which spreads out across two continents.

All this by no means implies that we cannot achieve a steady, stable deterrent system within the limits of peacetime budgets, for in the final analysis what the Soviet leaders fear most is the impairment of the instrumentalities by which they exercise international power. Now, what are those?

They are principally the Soviet military establishment and the Soviet industrial economy. And, consequently, a positive U. S. second-strike capability targeted at crippling these to an unacceptable

degree will effectively deter. Moreover, these are the targets within the U. S. S. R. that with our present and projected combinations of manned aircraft and missile weapon systems we can get in and do the job.

Finally, it would be necessary to utilize only a small portion of the forces we possess today to impose the minimum damage figure in a matter of hours--the equivalent of all the damage the U. S. S. R. suffered in World War II.

Now, why do I say that? I say that because just under one hundred individual, separate retaliatory missions would be needed to bring 60 percent of the U. S. S. R. 's industrial complexes under attack. Even assuming that a third of these missions were turned back by Soviet local defenses, the two-thirds that got through would impose damage equivalent to the 41 percent figure I mentioned for World War II.

Now, the United States capability obviously goes far beyond that. This is because an adequate, flexible transportation system is essential to any nation seeking to exercise power on an international scale. It's prerequisite to the effective utilization of military forces, and it's vital to bringing in raw materials, power supplies, and moving out the finished goods of an influential industrial society.

Soviet transportation is peculiarly vulnerable in this respect. And let me describe it. It is characterized by an especially heavy reliance on railroads. Eighty-five percent of their tonnage moves on railroads, another 10 percent on inland waterways, and only 5 percent by pipelines, trucklines, air transport, and coastal shipping combined.

In order to conserve steel and build up their heavy industries, Soviet planners have consistently allocated a disproportionately small share of their national capital investment to the railroad system and the transportation system as a whole. Only by overburdening facilities to the maximum have transportation requirements been met. One of the leading wartime planners in the Soviet Union, Nicolai Vosnesensky, has warned that the lack of proportion between the nation's production and its transportation facilities could bring the economy to a standstill.

This railroad system of theirs, the all-important one, covering two continents, comprises about 80,000 miles of track. The traffic density is extremely high--close to theoretical capacity--and over twice that of United States railroads. Almost one-third of the tonnage

carried on these roads is coke and hard coal, a good portion of it being used by the railroads themselves for power purposes.

It is obvious that the constant heavy use of this system has deteriorated it and reflects itself in the repair and efficiency of the roads. I can't get any statistics on this, but in 1954 the now-deposed railroad boss, Kaganovich, complained that one-third of his mileage was subject to severe to moderate speed restrictions. And by comparison, speed-restricted mileage on the United States main line railroads due to track disrepair is essentially negligible.

Further in connection with this transportation system, a 1960 study by the Joint Economics Committee of the Congress noted that the Soviet basic resources, manufacturing capacity, and urban population is concentrated in a very limited number of major centers, resulting in a high degree of concentration of the origin and termination of all rail shipments.

Now, at these major centers the tonnage is exchanged between this 80,000-mile national system and a subsystem of some total of 50,000 miles of track, mostly narrow gauge, that is operated here, there, and the other place by large industrial enterprises, such as mining, extractive, metal, manufacturing, chemical, and other industries. The estimated number of these centers is again that figure of 160 that I mentioned before. Since the average rail distance between that number of centers and the official figure given for the average rail haul in the Soviet Union approximately coincide at around 500 miles, I have fair confidence in this 160 figure that I have reiterated.

Now, in wartime you assume that a railroad system will involve itself in much greater difficulty than it has in peacetime. But the World War II experience of the Soviet railroads, despite all these inadequacies that I have mentioned, was quite the other way. In many ways they had an easier time than in peacetime operations. That was explained by the fact that the Nazi-occupied territory contained about 40 percent of the Soviet track mileage. Each time a location was threatened, the Soviet railroad people pulled back their rolling stock, pulled back their repair facilities, and everything else they could move, and thereby accumulated comfortable reserves of all this kind of equipment for operation on the 60 percent of track that was left within the Soviet Union.

In addition to that, their track repair methods were ideally suited to the localized kind of damage that can be inflicted with

conventional explosives. They repair track in 82-foot sections, and with a large tracklaying crane throw the whole section down. So they could go out and, with one panel in most cases, repair track damage caused by conventional explosives. So they were able to quickly restore any interrupted areas of their railroads to full service.

In contrast, the kind of destruction that would result from nuclear attack is quite different, and the repair of that destruction would be interfered with by the presence of nuclear radiation. The wholesale severing of rail communications between all Soviet centers in this manner would effectively paralyze the U. S. S. R. Without transportation, its industrial society and military might would be rendered impotent as effectively as by the actual destruction of factories and bases themselves.

Moreover, unlike factories and bases, the rail system spreads out through vast remote areas incapable of particular and special defense. Only 160 nuclear knockout blows would be needed at less-defended areas to fragmentize the U. S. S. R. 's interdependent industrial economy into as many cutoff and isolated segments.

Now, a concept of the down times for the entire Soviet nation by this kind of destruction can be gained by reference to the number of miles of new track they are capable of laying every year with their going economy. According to the official figures, it is 534 miles. Each one of these 160 interruptions would require the replacement of about 10 miles of new track, 1,600 miles in all, compared with the 534 miles of track during 12 months that their going economy is able to lay down.

This, of course, would be further complicated because much of the Soviet Union's electric power transmission facilities parallel the rail lines, and they too would be involved incidentally in the destruction.

A concept of the capability of United States forces to inflict this amount of damage in a matter of hours can also be achieved easily and simply. Informed public estimates--and, since this is an unclassified lecture, that is what we are using--of the numbers of nuclear-capable manned aircraft that U. S. military forces possess start at the minimum figure of 2,000. Only 8 percent of that number would have to survive first-strike attack and penetrate Soviet defenses in order to inflict the damage that I just described. And you could note that this calculation does not take into consideration the considerable abilities of any missile system we might possess to inflict additional damage.

So I think it's clear that on this basis, or any basis--and these are just things that I've thrown out for your evaluation and to start thinking on the subject--I think it's clear that we have deterred. We possess the determination to strike back if attacked, and we have the wherewithal to do it and to do it in a manner so as to inflict the kind of damage the Soviet leaders know they cannot afford. Perhaps the real question that we have is, How much more deterrent capability are we buying than we actually need?

In any event, if my thesis is correct--that the Soviet leaders are deterred from quick, explosive victory--they are utilizing then the lesser means in this spectrum of violence. While carrying on a general nonmilitary offensive through the world, they have particularized in certain geographical areas; and I think we're all familiar with them.

There is the prong they would like to get through by parliamentary means in Iceland, and work down the Atlantic with the aid of the submarine fleet and so forth. That kind of thrust, if carried through to its ultimate, would separate North America from Europe.

They are thrusting from another area--out from the soft underbelly through the Mideast, Africa, spanning the Atlantic, around through to Cuba. That, of course, would cut North and South America apart, and it would also effectively isolate Europe from the Mideast and from the Far East.

The third area in which they are concentrating geographically, of course, is out from the Chinese Communist mainland down through Laos, Vietnam, through that area, eventually seeking to acquire the entire Malay Peninsula, hopefully turn the corner up through the Philippines and Japan, and by that means isolate the United States from the Far East, and isolate from every place India and Austral-Asia.

Now, the importance that they attach to these geographical areas is pretty well evidenced by the degree of escalation in violence that they are willing to use in these areas--limited war by proxy in Korea, guerrilla fighting in Laos, the revolution in Cuba, civil disorders in Iraq and the Congo and elsewhere. These are examples.

They have been successful in this effort. It amply illustrates, I believe, that our own posture in these sectors of the spectrum of conflict is inadequate, not what it takes for victory.

Our limited war forces are seriously handicapped by lack of proper mobility, by obsolescence of conventional weapons, and by a confusion with respect to the role of nuclear weapons.

As to the latter, aside from whether or not nuclear weapons should be used in a specific and particular limited war situation, there is no validity to the argument and the notion that they can never be used in a limited war situation without inevitably resulting in escalation. It simply does not follow that because a nation is being licked in a limited nuclear war, it will choose to be decimated in a general nuclear war.

Because of the nature of nuclear warheads and the 15-year Communist propaganda campaign against them, to many their use has been enshrouded with a calamity curtain which, they say, if parted, would mean the end of mankind. But there's a legitimate distinction between strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons; and it is involved in the range of the delivery unit. If the delivery unit will only carry the warhead within the considerable dimensions of today's battlefield, it is tactical. Parenthetically, a failure to recognize this distinction has got us in some trouble on the European Continent in connection with NATO. NATO was assigned IRBM's with nuclear warheads. These, sitting in easy range of Soviet first-strike attack, on soft pads, with long count-down times, simply have no survival capability whatsoever against first-strike attack. And without that survival capability, they cannot perform a deterrent function.

So what does it look like from Moscow with those things sitting out there? Well, they're either poised there as a first-strike instrument against them, or a fragile monument to the stupidity of the planners who put them there hoping to get any deterrent factor out of them. In either case it does not add one iota to the defensive strength of the West. It takes away from it.

Let's turn now to the nonmilitary war area, the cold war, the war that we are in, that we are losing, that as a Nation we don't realize we're fighting.

I'm not going to try to inventory all the weapons in the cold war arsenal, because they go on ad infinitum. But I do wish to emphasize that in this new kind of war, we suffer, in common with all Western nations, three serious, burdensome, unavoidable handicaps.

The first is in terms of objectives. The other side's objectives are clear. They want to rule the world. In Khrushchev's words, he

wants to bury us. What's our objective? It's as imprecise as theirs is precise, because perhaps the best we can say is that we want for everybody all the best in Western civilization. Now, when you have a precise objective, it's easy to select the means which are most effective to implement it. When you have an imprecise objective, the situation is just the reverse.

We suffer a handicap in terms of means. As I mentioned, Communist dialectic approves the use of anything to accomplish their purpose. Moralities are not involved. The entire list of perfidies are weapons in the Communist arsenal, to be used wherever, whenever, and however they will best advance their cause. By contrast, the West's weapons are inhibited in terms of the generally moral objectives that we seek.

Our third principal handicap is in psychological terms, and that is that, since the Communist objective is to destroy and ours is essentially to build, the burden of the destroyer is much easier than that of the builder. This building was hard to build, but it wouldn't take long to destroy it.

I want to wind up with some suggestions today about what we can do toward fighting and winning this new kind of war. But, before I do, I want to point out four often-overlooked special problem areas in nonmilitary war.

The first of these has to do with international law. We as a Nation seek to live by it, and so do our free world neighbors. And it has become a part of our philosophy, psychology, and outlook. The Communist countries are, again, in the reverse. They regard international law as something to be utilized, to be broken, by them at any time they can use it, prostitute it, to gain their objectives.

I have in mind in connection with this such things as even the negotiations that are going on in connection with extending the three-mile limit seaward. The Soviets would love that, because it would inhibit the operational areas of our Navy and our airplanes. And they have got a lot of people in the free world to go along with them on the basis of fishing rights or something like that, when they don't realize that here is a prime example of the use by the Communist conspiracy of international law principles and techniques not to live, but to kill.

The second thing that we've got to watch out for, which flows directly from that, are treaties, of course. There can't be any confidence in a treaty with a Communist nation. We all know that. They

actually go out and try to get treaties, where they give us nothing presently. The non-Communist country gives up today in return for a promise for them to give up tomorrow. So today the non-Communist country gives up. When tomorrow comes, they're not even there.

Even the very process of negotiation itself is used to gain cold war victories. Any place it is needed to gain time, they'll negotiate. I have in mind specifically the Geneva test ban negotiations, that have been dragging on for two and a half years, during which we have as a free world, at least as our country, had no opportunity whatsoever to carry on the R. & D. that we may need in connection with our nuclear capability.

The third special problem is what I choose to call negatory propaganda. These are the long-term kind of propaganda campaigns that the Soviet Union carries on around the world. I call it that for lack of a better name. I have in mind the 15-year "ban the bomb" campaign, aimed at denying the West the use of this weapon by the force of public opinion.

The long-term Communist campaigns with respect to colonialism and neutralism are much in the same category, because they too are aimed at denying the West the freedom of either time or method in solving problems in the colonial area.

Now, the last special problem I want to discuss is that concerned with the propaganda efforts that are always being urged upon us to beam behind the Iron Curtain, and particularly with respect to the U. S. S. R. We must realize that almost all of the adult population of the Soviet Union has come to adulthood since the Communists took over, and that they are the creatures of the Communist-controlled education system. And that education system has deliberately withheld large areas of knowledge. You can talk with some of these people, as many of you have, and they cannot understand, because there is no basic concept of whole groups of ideas within Soviet minds. And in other cases they have deliberately twisted facts and twisted history, so that anything that you beam at them cannot be the same as you beam at Western minds, but must be built up from this twisted structure in order to be understood, in order to penetrate the minds over there.

Well, what do we do about this nonmilitary war that we're in, the one in which the enemy has 40 years leadtime in know-how and experience in fighting?

First, we must recognize that we're in it, of course; and that the stakes are freedom and national existence itself. It isn't a preliminary bout. Indeed not. It's the main event; and the loser won't have a second chance if the struggle is fought to termination in the nonmilitary war arena.

I just wish this class would spend a whole year, after they graduate here, going throughout the country--and the world too--speaking, passing along the information, the knowledge, the comprehension of these dangers that you receive here. It's something that the American people must know.

I've thought that it might not even be a bad idea for Congress to declare nonmilitary war. I looked up the declaration in connection with the Japanese. It was in terms of "Whereas the United States has suffered unprovoked acts of military aggression and so forth, therefore formal war is declared." And whereas the international communistic conspiracy has performed acts of aggression upon us and so forth, maybe we ought to come out and say so and direct the President to use all the resources of the country to bring it to a successful termination.

Well, somehow we must achieve that irrevocable determination to bring this thing to a successful conclusion. I know, being a political creature, that the American people are sick and tired of getting kicked around on the international scene by these forces. And they're just anxiously, desperately, waiting to be told that we're going to pick this thing up and we're going to carry it through to its conclusion. And I think that most of the people around the rest of the world, the ones who really look to United States leadership, would welcome such a declaration and determination, because they too want to fight this common cause. They too have their worries and their doubts and their fears about losing their freedom and their way of life. But until the United States moves, and moves decisively, as a world leader, it cannot expect the world to take on this job by itself.

Another thing we must do is to define the enemy. We fail to do that a lot of times.

Now, there are two U. S. S. R. 's--U. S. S. R. -A and U. S. S. R. -B. U. S. S. R. -B is the country, the people, and its resources. It's a poor country. I read in the newspaper last Sunday that it couldn't even get meat and gasoline up to its capital. Our enemy is U. S. S. R. -A; and the A country is the international Communist conspiracy of an elite

few who have enslaved country B and extort from it the wherewithal to present the illusion of a large and powerful society and the false image of a new kind of society which is bettering mankind.

In reality, country A is no stronger than country B. This we must understand ourselves. And to the people of U.S.S.R.-B, China-B, and all the other B countries, the captive nations, we must drive home that they have friends outside the Iron Curtain who seek to share their freedoms with them.

I think the fourth and last thing that I want to suggest by way of things we must do to meet this situation is that we must organize to fight nonmilitary war in terms of a major enterprise, on a scale of victory, with all the brains and weapons and resources we can muster. It would be insane for us to try to fight a military war without national strategy, without a top-level command, without war plans, without offenses and planned defenses, without mobilizing the national effort, without appealing to the patriotism of the people to work and win it. Yes, it would. And yet without any of these things, we are engaged in a new, strange, and deadly kind of war, in which the stakes are survival.

I think it's our clear duty to establish the organization we need to fight this kind of war, to mobilize the people and resources, and to embark on the long, difficult road toward victory.

Of course this effort involves economics, diplomacy, intelligence, science, civil defense, psychology--all the phases of human activity short of military operation between major powers in a general war. The effort required goes far beyond the State Department, far beyond the Defense Department, far beyond any other single agency of Government. And it goes far beyond the Government itself. It sweeps across our whole society.

The President alone has the broad power and control over the wide range of functions which must be organized, carried on, timed, coordinated, and pushed to overall success in order to meet the enemy and overcome him. At the top, in the White House itself, with the President's daily attention, must be the national nerve center and command post. Let's call it the strategical and tactical office of the President--STOP. Now, here at COM STOP, stopping communism, must be the 24-hours-a-day operation for so long as it takes to do it.

Here are just a few of the activities that I feel must feed in and out of COM STOP: National strategy and tactics--as a matter of fact, I think we could just about move the Industrial College up there,

or move COM STOP down here, and we'd have it--national strategy and tactics, military and nonmilitary strategy and tactics, intelligence, political operations, diplomatic operations, labor and industrial mobilization, economic operations, finance, agricultural and commercial functions, covert and overt international operations, cover and deception, information and cultural programs, ideological positions, psychological warfare, military liaison, posture evaluation, and so on, with a host of others. All these kinds of operations must be tied together constantly, orchestrated like a symphony. Each must be run by managers who themselves understand the nuances of nonmilitary war. Command of these activities is as big a job as any command that the military can offer. And we must quickly train the officers and the men who can man this fourth force effectively in our defense.

I want to emphasize that COM STOP must not only defend against the actions that the Soviets initiate in the war zone--their definition of the war zone--but must, if we are ever to win this thing, carry the fight into their peace zone. Within the Communist empire there are countless areas of weakness and possible internal strife. Brigadier General David Sarnoff has done a lot of work on this, and he urged former President Eisenhower in 1955 to wage cold war and turn Moscow's weapons against world communism. In doing so he said that our potential fifth column is greater by millions than theirs.

Well, my time is up. I have given only a little more than a skeleton outline of what the dangers are that we face, and some of the things we must do about them. It would be futile to try to make a concluding summary. I'll stop by just saying this, these three points:

We have the Soviets deterred from all-out war. We need to beef up our limited and conventional war forces. And we must declare nonmilitary war and do all in our power to win it.

Thank you, gentlemen.

COLONEL REID: Congressman Hosmer is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, my question has to do with what we can do with the press. This recent experience in Cuba, I think, has pointed out that in our cold war situation we certainly need to steer away from this idea of telecasting our moves well in advance; and then if it goes wrong, telling everyone about it.

MR. HOSMER: You are certainly right on that. The large area of difficulty here is, again, in establishing the realization that we are in a deadly conflict.

In World War II the press did a job of self-censorship, because they realized we were at war. These people are paid to know what news is, and they do know. They know the kind of news that is dangerous to national security and the kind that is not dangerous to national security.

I was on a CBS television program just a few days ago. A question was asked me along these lines and I said: "Yes. I think CBS is the worst offender in this regard." I had in mind the Walter Cronkite show, "Eyewitness to History," the night following the Cuban debacle, when the commentators went on and acted like they were a bunch of enemy spies revealing things to their employers. The commentator asked me, "What did you object to about it?" I said: "It made the country and the people look naive and stupid."

At the President's request I think that the press will come along, but we have to keep pressing on them all the time to do it.

QUESTION: You emphasized the necessity, sir, for informing all the people of the terrific struggle that we are engaged in. As a Congressman, of course you're a representative of the people too. On the other hand, there's a possibility that it can work the other way and that Congress itself do something in the field of educating our people toward the danger they face. Would you comment on that, please?

MR. HOSMER: I mentioned the war declaration idea, Congress is a great platform. Its committees in their usual functions do as much educating as they do legislating, because of the volume information that comes in and flows out. But until such time as Congressmen themselves realize the nature of the conflict and its needs, they're not going to be talking about it or taking the necessary actions.

I happened to be at lunch with a newly elected Member from Indiana recently, and found out that he was vastly interested in such a project. He said: "There are some other men who came in with me who also are interested in it." It will probably end up with four or five of us getting together, making speeches, sending out press releases, and attempting to awaken the interest of other Congressmen and the Nation.

Also, I would hope that if we could get the kind of COM STOP organization I have suggested, we would parallel it in Congress with a joint committee that would follow it through from the side, the legislative branch of Government. I don't have in mind a big committee, but maybe three or four from each house, or two from each house, who would be on rotational duty at COM STOP all the time, and do the things that are needed to inform the Legislature and do the public opinion-making job in regard to this thing of which Congress is capable.

QUESTION: Sir, in many of the conflicts that you see, the degree of violence, such as in Algeria, in the Congo, in Laos, is equivalent to gangsterism. This is the kind of thing that we've got to develop and carry on. However, in all our public life we're against sin, for motherhood, and so on; and these are the things that we're going to have to disrupt. How do we get over this thing and get away from the legalistic approach to our activities?

MR. HOSMER: Again, it comes down to a matter of national war psychology. We execute people for murder in this country and when we are in hot war, we send Americans out to kill people. These are morally acceptable because they are believed to serve the ends of our society. Essentially we have to realize that we are in a war, even though it is a nonmilitary war.

We do not necessarily want to or should engage in all the perfidies--blackmail and things like that that go on. No. But we can engage in many kinds of violence without prostituting the fundamental moral objectives that guide us, if we adjust our national psychology to one of war rather than the delusions we are suffering at the present time because the outer forms of peace show on the international horizon.

I haven't given you a precise answer. I think many of these answers stem back to the fundamental psychological attitude that we have to develop about the conflict once we understand it. Necessarily my answers must often feed back to these fundamentals.

QUESTION: One part of your discussion disturbs me, sir, and it's this: You spoke of a changing attitude on the part of the people, and particularly in terms of declared war. You spoke of the protracted conflict idea. And yet you threw back this idea of "Let's declare war and get the thing over with." Here we are dealing with something where we really need a team attitude for the real pro-Western free enterprise system that's got to go on forever, that is not just going to be over in, say, six months or a year. Is there

some other terminology than "war" that you can excite the people with, or any idea along this line, rather than just a short-term burst of energy?

MR. HOSMER: You have pointed out the inconsistency that I felt with respect to my own statement. But in speaking to people you have to take them step by step. I don't have to do it with this group; but when I go home, when I go out to the general public, I have to speak in inaccurate terms. I have to conjure up whole ideas; and necessarily I can't do it using precise language. If we can get them into the idea that we are in a war, or at least a vital conflict, then, of course, the very next step is to achieve a public realization of its protracted nature.

But I don't happen to think that it necessarily will be as protracted as some people say who write and speak about the so-called cold war. If we look back--let's see; this is 1961--go back to 1941, May of 1941. Could you have imagined by the wildest stretch of your imagination the changes to you, your own life, the Nation, and the world that have occurred in that 20-year period? It would have been impossible to do so.

So I think that these changes may be somewhat faster than we realize, and that the protraction of the conflict doesn't mean that it is in the magnitude of centuries rather than decades. But it certainly is going to last longer than any hot war we ever experienced. It already has lasted longer. And perhaps it will have to become a way of life with us, at least for one or two generations of Americans.

QUESTION: Sir, I've been very much concerned over the tendency of many of our high-ranking public officials, including the President, to say that we will never be the ones who will make the first strike; that we will always wait. I wonder whether this doesn't undermine our position very seriously in the cold war situation. Where we so effectively inform the enemy that we're willing to take their blow first.

MR. HOSMER: Of course, you are getting essentially, I think, into the matter of preemption. Or are you getting into the actual offensive in a military sense?

STUDENT: The offensive.

MR. HOSMER: A national strategy, then, of military opportunism. I guess that's the way to define it. And perhaps that might be the answer. I don't know. I haven't thought that one through.

I feel that there are many situations in which it would be necessary for us to preempt the first strike. But whether we could achieve our objective by a calculated policy of adventure, striking when we can, is something else. It would be a difficult thing to justify morally, and it would be a difficult thing to achieve a unanimity with our so-called allies, friends, or the other people in the free world.

QUESTION: We have stood by for several years here and watched the inactivity of our Government, its lack of initiative, our losses on so-called negotiations. I wonder if we can look forward to any change in the future, where we will take the initiative or have this positive program.

MR. HOSMER: You're sick and tired of it, I'm sick and tired of it, the American people are sick and tired of it. Generally, when those conditions concur, you start to get some action. I would hope so.

QUESTION: Mr. Congressman, I agree that we are in a cold war. It is very appealing to conceive of a declaration such as you suggest; but a disturbing aspect, as I see it, is that the cold war is perhaps an ideological war, where we are matching our morality against Communist international immorality. Now, if we approach this from a warfare standpoint and start breaching some of the freedoms and concepts of international morality, aren't we then losing the cold war by doing just what they have been accusing us of?

MR. HOSMER: I mentioned that there are these moral inhibitions on our actions that do exist; and in that context I would include such things as the constitutional liberties and the general philosophy under which Western society lives. But at the same time, we mentioned constricting somewhat the press. There are certain limitations on liberty and on freedom of action that each and everyone of us must accept so that ultimately we can either preserve them from total loss, particularly in warding off a particular immediate threat of them.

It was Chief Justice Holmes who said that liberty does not include running into a crowded theater and shouting "Fire." And liberty does not include, in the short range, doing many of the things or enjoying many of the freedoms that particular circumstances of

the moment indicate would be unwise to exercise from the long-range standpoint. I don't suppose we will ever really get settled in our minds what we can do and what we can't do. Fighting is in conflict essentially with the fundamentals of our way of life. In shooting wars we have learned we can never be free of the psychological disturbances to our minds that nonmilitary war versus the philosophy of Western civilization compels us to suffer.

Again I must say, I cannot give you a precise answer, because it's a philosophical question. It is tough to answer. I suppose each one of us has to resolve it in his own mind. Somehow not that the means are justified by the end, but that there is some escalation of means and some sacrifice of niceties that we must endure in relation to achieving our ultimate objectives.

QUESTION: Do you think our intelligence is sufficient and accurate enough so that we can identify these dangerous individuals at the early stages?

MR. HOSMER: You're not trying to involve me in this current finger pointing at the CIA, are you?

I think essentially it is good enough to indicate what the probabilities are. I think that in the broad view it would not have been too difficult to calculate that Mr. Castro would end up in just about the position he now is unless his career was interrupted.

I think that it also illustrates the point that in this battle there must be machinery in such places as Cuba and other parts of the world to mobilize the elements that are with us into some kind of effective action and into positions to assume leadership where vacuums exist into which people like Castro move. If the Communists can mobilize Castro and the people who are supporting him, why shouldn't we be able to provide some kind of apparatus to give cohesive action to the elements around the world who are on our side, who don't want communism, but don't know how to go about providing an alternative to it? Take the riots in Japan, which a few Communists were able to generate. Most of the Japanese people didn't want them, but most of the people, despite their desires, were ineffective in expressing their ideas, because there wasn't leadership to show them how to do it. I'd like to see some pro-American demonstrations instead of anti-American ones once in a while. And that probably could be generated.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned two or three times waging the cold war to victory. I wonder if you would define that state of world affairs which you would conceive of as victory.

MR. HOSMER: I don't suppose anybody has ever waged any kind of struggle to victory, because it seems that when we surmount one set of difficulties, we find ourselves in an entirely new struggle.

But let's say that we understand what our danger is today; that there are Americans who can be successful at fighting this new kind of war; that the geopolitical and all the other understandings are with our leadership. All right. If we could have had a similar understanding in the minds of our leadership while we were fighting World War II, we would have ended up in quite a different situation than we actually did. The Soviets were interested in fighting off the Germans, but Stalin was equally interested in setting up postwar conditions and circumstances that were favorable to the Soviet Union and its objectives.

Now, if in this new kind of war we fight knowledgeably, then we may be able to end it up, not without any dangers and stresses at all, but under circumstances and conditions that are much more favorable to us than ever before. And one of these circumstances and conditions, of course, would be that communism must go as a force in the world.

In my A countries and B countries discussion I tried to make the distinction between countries and resources and people and a kind of conspiracy for power that sweeps across them. It is that idea and ambition that the Communists have which we must dissipate in order to achieve the final victory. And that's tough, because those people are dedicated to it, and they consider themselves elite. They have the human desire for power and self-perpetuation. But I think that victory does involve the dissipation of that idea and ambition.

Now, whether you're going to dissipate it by wholesale executions of all the top Communist leaders, or their constructive execution in the form of a worldwide opinion that would be as antagonistic to them as it is now antagonistic to the ideas of Nazism--maybe one or the other or maybe a combination. I don't know. I think that's an element of it.

QUESTION: I went to Central America with our group, and in talking to the principal civilian leaders in those countries they were extremely disappointed in our losing out in Cuba, and indicated that we should do whatever is necessary to get Castro out; and the sooner the better. And yet when we are back here we talk about having to do this with their consent. Well, when you see the military strength represented in these countries, you almost feel that the Army should ask the Boy Scouts whether they should make their next move. One of the leaders in Guatemala told us that their problem is going to be extremely difficult, and it could get difficult in about two months, and at the outside a year, unless something is done. And yet in the announcement yesterday we called Cuba a Soviet bloc nation, which just means that we won't do anything about it; that it's lost just like any other satellite. How is this going to maybe operate to prevent the President from taking appropriate or almost immediate action?

MR. HOSMER: Well, I'm glad you didn't ask me what I think we ought to do in Cuba, because that's a tough one to answer. I think you are asking me: "How is the President going to take any action in relation to the inability of OAS and its member states to take action?"

Of course, it's going to have to be done under some kind of cover of legality. There are many of us that are interested in a redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine which applies the Doctrine to intervention in a covert manner, as it now does to overt intervention. That redefinition, plus the various inter-American treaty alliances, would actually permit one nation to move if the others do not decide to move in concert. You can establish a good legal case for going in there and doing the job unilaterally. Whether or not the job should be done in that manner is something else. The Soviets have perfected the technique of fighting by proxy. They don't often involve themselves directly; they do it by proxy. And there are ways that we can carry this operation on by proxy on a successful scale rather than an unsuccessful scale. That's involved in how to go about this manner too.

One of the best suggestions that I have heard was that we should keep in operation and maintenance all the time a captive nations brigade. That would include Europeans who have fled from captive nations over there, and would include the Cubans here. Then they are in a trained and equipped posture to do the fighting, carry the burden and do it under their own flag in somewhat of the same manner that the Soviets carry on their proxy operations.

QUESTION: This COM STOP organization seems to have considerable appeal as a means of directing and coordinating our efforts. But, like so many other things, I wonder if it wouldn't be limited by our present fiscal procedures. I just wonder what your feelings are with respect to embodying the best span of time in our current fiscal procedures, as to how effective we can make it under the present procedures.

MR. HOSMER: I only made one direct reference and one indirect reference in my talk to this fiscal problem. One, I said that a COM STOP would have to deal with finance. The other, in discussing this deterrent capability, I at least implied that we may be spending more money in that direction than we need to.

This kind of operation is an expensive one. It's one that will take possibly more money out of the pockets than we have now. If we realize what we're doing, what we're fighting, people aren't going to come running up to Congress with all these pork barrel projects that were knocked off in December 1941, and didn't resume until after the war was over. In other words, we may have to take more out of our people's pockets, and we may also have to redirect the expenditures of our Government.

For instance, in this overseas aid, foreign aid, or mutual security--whatever you want to call it--it's nice to be humanitarian, but I don't think it's constitutional. Even if it is constitutional, it is unwise to do it at the expense of nonmilitary security. And so every one of our expenditures in this kind of aid must get the top dollar in relation to the conflict that we're in. And that requires the operation of management.

In other words, we can spend our money more effectively. We can take money from some of the social programs that we like and want, but can defer. We can take a little more money in taxes, if needed. In science alone we must perhaps spend a great deal more money than we do now, because that's a great element of this thing.

STUDENT: I'm interested in approving it over a period of more than one year.

MR. HOSMER: That's almost inevitable. I mean, we can get around it without changing our procedures on that, I think.

If COM STOP has a good, healthy appropriation, within the range of one-digit billion, and if 10 percent of the appropriations for all other agencies of Government are earmarked for COM STOP to call on for performance of conflict functions, I think that even under annual appropriation we can still achieve what we want to achieve.

As a matter of fact, the annual appropriation is not a really accurate description of the system that we operate under now. We got a long ways away from annual appropriations. Many appropriations are available over quite a span of years. For instance, an appropriation is made for a shipbuilding program or a tank-replacement program; and the money, although appropriated this year, actually is available through the program life. If a program terminates, there are ways of shifting money to another authorized project. In other words, I don't think that annual appropriations are a rope around our neck. It is something that we would like to get rid of, but it is not required that we do it in order to achieve our objectives.

QUESTION: I certainly like your ideas, sir, but I wonder if it's enough to talk about stopping communism. Shouldn't we go further and say that we want to destroy communism as unacceptable in the free world? Wouldn't that be a more precise objective?

MR. HOSMER: I actually used that phraseology because I had those letters S, T, O, and P in mind for a particular purpose when I was putting this talk together. First I called it the "Presidential office of strategy and tactics." But that was "POST" and it didn't mean anything. So I changed it to the "strategic and tactical office of the President." That became COM STOP because it made a rememberable phrase. Which all illustrates that in order to sink things into people's minds, you've got to develop a handy, though imprecise, little label like that and put it across.

Of course the fight involves just what you've mentioned. We would have to make the idea of communism unacceptable. It has been sold in false terms. If you look at any country that is Communist today and see what the Marxist-Leninist theory promises in relation to what they actually get, you can see that dialectical materialism is as full of holes as a sieve.

But how many Americans have studied communism--its theory and how it works out? Very few. I even get letters from people saying: "Don't you think it's a bad idea that they teach communism to kids in the schools?" And so I write back and say: "No. I think

it's the best thing we can do." Then I get a reply: "What kind of a guy are you? We thought you were a loyal American. Now you sound like a Communist."

It's true. Unless you understand this enemy, you cannot expose him. Unless you expose him, you cannot get rid of him. And when you do expose him, you do that job of "constructive execution" which I was talking about in reply to another question.

Gentlemen, it's been a real pleasure for me to be here. It's stimulating. I hope that somehow the rest of the Nation, particularly those of us in Congress, can achieve what you will have achieved over your 10 months at the Industrial College, which is mainly the know-how that it takes to be a patriotic, loyal, and effective American in the kind of world in which we live today.

Thank you.

(27 Sep 1961--5, 700)B/rb:ijk