MODERN WARFARE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

19 September 1961

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NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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ADMIRAL ROSE: It is a special pleasure for me to introduce the speaker this morning. As a matter of fact, I had to pull rank on our State Department Representative in order to do so because he was scheduled, as you know; however, I'll introduce Mr. Thurston.

When I was in Paris on my last job as Deputy Defense Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Thurston in action many times, and at least weekly when the U.S. Ambassador to NATO had his staff conference. Mr. Thurston was then the political adviser to General Norstad and he used to join us every Friday morning at 9:30 and we were always tremendously impressed by his knowledge of what was going on in Europe--in the world--and not only in military or political things, but economic and all the rest. Mr. Thurston now has quite a different kind of job. I am sure you're well aware that the Secretary of State has established something called an Operations Center, which is not too unusual for us military people, to keep track of what is going on, to get the newest information that there is on what is going on in the world--and there's a lot--to analyze it, and to propose courses of action. It is not in this capacity exactly, that Mr. Thurston is going to speak to us, but it is in connection with the formulation of policy both political and economic, and always with military overtones in the background. I think we couldn't have a better qualified person to speak to us on this subject, and it is a special privilege for me to introduce Mr. Raymond Thurston of the Department of State.

MR. THURSTON: Thank you Admiral Rose. My subject today is the cold war. I realize that in the syllabus you have it is a somewhat more elaborate title, but the essence of it is best stated in this shorter form. I appreciate very much the pleasant coincidence of being introduced by Admiral Rose who was a former colleague on the Paris scene and on what we might call one of the important cold war fronts of today. I took the liberty of wearing my old National War College school tie today--that building across the way. I thought I would show that much

courage anyhow. I was there just 10 years ago, in the 1951-52 class. I don't know what the present situation is in terms of the cold war between the two sister institutions. I know we were very badly beaten in baseball, but at that time at the National War College we could be rather smug because we were, shall we say, somewhat more comfortably housed. Now with this fine modern building here--that and baseball losses too--that would be too much to take. I am often reminded when speaking in schools--institutions of learning of one kind or another--of the story told to me many years ago, of an American who had left a medium-sized town to go into the nearby large city--to the metropolis--and who, from a very meager beginning economically, was able to amass a comfortable fortune and to become a somewhat prominent person in the metropolis. Occasionally he would return to the small town of his origin and he was always pleased with the attention and the prestige which he received in his hometown. One day he was walking by the high school and it so happened that the principal saw him and said: "Mr. Jones, would you do us a favor? We're having an assembly. You're so well-known in our community; I wonder if you would come in and address the girls and boys? They would be very glad to hear someone like you." So, without quite knowing what he was in for Jones found himself escorted into the high school auditorium in a situation somewhat of this kind. He found himself introduced and he had not had any occasion to reflect on what he would say. So, he somewhat embarrassedly said, "Well, children, what do you want me to talk about?" and in the back row a 14-year-old freckle-faced girl stood up and said: "Mister, what do you know?"

Now, to go to today's subject there is one thing that I think I do know, and I imagine that my belief is shared by all of you in this room--it is that our free society is engaged in a profound political and economic conflict with the totalitarian Communist empires run from Moscow and Peking. This is a conflict which, in my judgment, may well persist for generations. This is the cold war. What were the origins of this conflict? What forms does it take today, and what can we do or what should we do about it? These are the points to which I shall try to direct my remarks.

The origins of the cold war--the contemporary cold war--perhaps are best dated from 1917. One can say that always in the world since human societies were organized there have been relationships between political entities which involve tensions and strife short of the use of violence at all times. In other words, there were interludes between hostile societies which were not characterized by the use of clubs or bows and arrows, etc. Then, of course, you have the religious crusades

the Molsem-Christian tensions which went on for centuries, and although violence was also characteristic of these religious conflicts or conflicts between societies having different religious concepts, I don't think ever before in human history have we had anything quite like the emergence of the Bolshevik Sect in the Marxist-Socialist parties in Czarist Russia. It is true that Karl Marx, in his economic and sociological writings of the mid-19th century, talked in terms of irreconcilable conflicts in society. He talked in terms of conflict in the evolution from capitalism to socialism. He took the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis and built some so-called scientific theories on that.

What the Bolsheviks did with this, however, was to convert it from a philosophy of a natural evolution of society which was inevitable and therefore no matter what you did, it would happen--the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership converted this to an anticipation of history. In other words, they would make the philosophy become true; make the theory a fact by conspiracy; by manipulation of the majority by a minority. This is the essence of the Bolshevik conspiracy within the Social-Democratic Party of the old Czarist Russia. The writings of Lenin are extremely worth reading in this respect because his testing ground for his theories as to how you seize power and how you keep power were within the party itself. Now, most of the Social-Democrats in Europe at this time--and I am thinking now of the latter part of the 19th century and the very early 20th century--had gotten to the comfortable stage of gradualism. Socialism was coming, and as a matter of fact when we think of the tremendous changes in the evolution of capitalist society from the time when Marx sat in the British Museum and wrote his critique of capitalism, the tremendous developments--particularly as the 19th century came to a close and the 20th century opened--in terms of trade unionism, social security devices, it is clear capitalism was changing and it was changing in a direction which many Social-Democrats felt demonstrated the accuracy of, at least, their concept of Marxism. But this was not at all in the mind of the Bolshevik conspirators in Russia. They did not share this point of view, and Lenin kept within the party a small group--it is true that the name "Bolshevik" means majority; that is the very typical semantics of these people and that foreshadowed many semantic contributions later on of a curious kind--the Bolshevik Party was really the minority group within the old Russian Social-Democratic Party, but because at one party congress in London--I believe in 1903 or something of that sort--it managed on one tactical issue to get a majority vote and they called themselves the Bolshevik. So, they had all the time in their semantics, the advantage, you might say, of calling themselves the majority when there was only

one tactical situation justifying that description. Actually, the Menshiviki, meaning the minority, were the majority throughout the whole history of the Social-Democratic Party before the 1917 revolution. I mention this because the use by the Bolsheviks and later the Soviet Communist Party, of words to delude and to deceive, has become classic.

So, you have, then, a group of men under the leadership of Lenin, trained in the manipulation of power--not by compromising with the Menshiviki; not by agreeing that over the long term there could be common interests, but by an implacable, divisive approach to the problem of revolution. This relatively small group under Lenin remained apart, unsullied by compromise and implacable in their demand for the use of violence to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whether we wish to get into the field of psychology as to why men of the type of Lenin took this position, I don't know. I'd rather not go into that today. But those of you who would like to understand the heritage on which the Soviet society today works you are well advised to read Lenin in his early pre-1917 days when he was fighting for control of the revolutionary movement in Russia.

The interesting thing about the Bolshevik coup in November 1917--November by our present calendar--they call it the October Revolution, but that was the old Orthodox Calendar--was that the seizure of power was, even from a Marxist point of view, illegitimate. That is to say, according to their own lights, according to their own ideology, there should be a true proletariat before the revolution would be successful. Now, not only was there not a true proletariat in Czarist Russia according to the definition which the Socialists themselves were using in those years, but there was hardly, even a solid bourgeois class risen from the feudal conditions which characterized Czarist Russia. So, you have Lenin and his colleagues capsuling history by conspiracy and violence. I feel that if we wish to find a beginning of the cold war which characterizes this present century, that it was in 1917 when the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd.

I want to read, if I may, a statement prepared in an official document of the State Department, on the dualism in Soviet policy, a dualism between party and government which began right at the onset of the revolution:

> Soon after seizing power, the Soviet Government addressed a formal note to allied missions in Petrograd informing them that it considered the establishment of official relations necessary both with foreign governments and with foreign revolutionary parties seeking the overthrow of those governments. It was a candor which, I suppose was a bit shocking. To hasten the establishment

of such relations with other revolutionary parties the Soviet Government some days later published a decree signed by Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and by Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, allocating 2 million rubles to the Soviet Foreign Office, for the needs of the international revolutionary movement. Then, in 1919 the Russian Communist Party issued a proclamation again signed by Lenin and Trotsky, this time in their party capacity, calling for the formalization of such relations in a third Communist International. Although the proclamation was a party document its contents were radioed to the world by the Soviet Foreign Office. The top leaders of the Soviet state--Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Chicherin--served as delegates to the Founding Congress of the Comintern when it assembled in Moscow in March of 1919 and again when the conditions of admission were drawn up and approved by the second Comintern Congress in 1920. Though they participated, wearing their party hats, it was fully evident that they represented an interlocking Directorate of Soviet State and Party. Far from disavowing the direct ties between the Soviet state and foreign Communist parties thus formalized in the Comintern, Izvestia, the official organ of the government, went so far as to characterize the relationship as an organic one. On the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1922 it wrote that, "The close organic and spiritual connection between the Soviet Republic and the Communist International represents an incontrovertible fact." Although, for obvious reasons, the Soviet Government soon became more cautious and circumspect, and preferred to admit only party-to-party relationships, the record of its early direct ties with foreign Communist parties is amply documented.

Now, in the period between 1917 and the end of World War II the Communists went through a period of consolidating their power in what had been the territory of Czarist Russia. This involved, as you know, a drawn-out civil war and then an internal struggle among the Communist leaders, out of which Stalin emerged very much the number one. And Stalin directed the attention of the party and of the state away from the Trotskyite doctrine of an immediate world revolution to the doctrine of building socialism in one country, but never losing sight of the fact that when socialism was established in the one country there would then be a more solid base for penetrating and vitiating the decadent capitalistic societies outside. Now, in these years, the early years of the Communist regime in Moscow, we may sometimes think that the Soviet

Union was relatively weak. It had, of course, many problems both in the East and in the West. There was reconstruction, there was disorganization, in the Western European countries; the British Empire was relatively strong; Germany was coming back to strength; France was still a powerful country; there were balances here which operated to keep the Soviet Communist voice at a relatively low pitch in intergovernmental matters. But what was happening throughout the great world in terms of Communist activity?

This, again, is something which, to understand the true nature of our enemy, we should give some attention. What they did in these years between the two wars was to build up a worldwide apparatus of men and women loyal to them, believing in them, and they depended not only on belief and on doctrine, but they used techniques which, to put it mildly, were pretty repellent. Blackmail was used; all the tricks of conspirators; all the tricks of bringing human beings under your control were used. Intellectuals were attracted to this movement. You had, perhaps, workingmen in the true sense of the word attracted by virtue of their desire for a better break in the economic sphere. You had various fanatics and unbalanced people, but you also had people who were forced to work for the movement because certain pictures had been taken and because they had the goods on the guy. And this deep, underlying seamy side of the Communist conspiracy is sometimes forgotten by those who talk of freedom of ideas in the market place; not that for a moment I wish to deride freedom or civil rights; I ask only that it be understood that the other side is not just engaged in a sort of Oxford-type debate. It's far more vicious and dangerous than that.

But in these years, then, between the wars, the Communists built up an international apparatus. People like M. N. Roy went to India and organized the Indian Communist Party. Similar types went to China and organized the nucleus out of which we now have a Communist China. In Mexico there were revolutionaries from Russia who organized the Mexican Communist Party. It's very interesting in Iran, to go back to those early years of the twenties and watch how Azerbaijani people who happened to inhabit both the southern part of Russia and northern Iran--people of Azerbaijani origin--were sent into Iran to organize the movement there.

Now, this leaves out of account the very large Communist parties which were built up in the advanced countries; in Germany, in Italy, and in France in particular. So that assets were being created even while the state power of the Soviet Union was relatively weak. I would like to say here that you have in our century, to understand our century,

and I don't know whether any of us understand it completely, but it has, from the beginning, been a dynamic century in which the fairly comfortable assumptions of the 19th century soon were found to be invalid. You can trace interesting dates in the first decade of the 20th century. You can take, let us say, the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in China in 1911; the Mexican Revolution as beginning with the Huerta Revolution, I believe in 1909-1911. The first revolution in Persia for almost a millenium occurred in 1906 when the Majlis was established. You had in Russia itself the beginnings of the stirrings in the 1905 revolution there. You have in the Western World--the advanced countries--not so much the revolutions as the Theodore Roosevelt trust-busting, the muckrakers in the United States; at the same time in the United Kingdom the abolition of the powers of the House of Lords so it could not prevent bills from being passed.

So, right from the beginning of our century we've had a national and a revolutionary ferment at work which would have existed regardless of the rise to power of the Leninist group in Russia. But what the Communists learned while many of us were rather comfortably enjoying, let us say, the American isolationist period between the wars, the Communists with their apparatus--with their activists--many of them very loyal and disciplined people--were establishing a base for extending the power of the movement all through the world, whether it be in Asia, Europe or Latin America. I recall in this connection that when Gandhi died, a retired Foreign Service officer--I was then on the India desk--wrote me a letter asking whether he could see from the State Department Archives the memorandum of conversation of a talk that he had had with Gandhi in about 1921 in Bombay. This man had been the American consul in Bombay at the time.

So, because this seemed like a reasonable request I dug the thing out of the National Archives and read it myself with great interest. This American consul had, with some temerity, approached the British Governor of Bombay and asked whether it would be all right for him to talk with Gandhi who was staying at a little beach north of Bombay, a beautiful beach, and the Governor had graciously consented to this interview, pointing out that of course Gandhi was a pretty bad guy, and he would appreciate any report the consul might give to him on the interview. But what was interesting to me was the slap on the wrist that our consul got from the then State Department. When his dispatch arrived by sea pouch in those nice days when it took 40 or 50 days for a report of this sort to get to headquarters, the State Department drew itself up and told the consul that it noted with approbation that he had gone to the British Governor in this case, but that in general it was bad

to have anything to do with people of this kind. Well, at that time M. N. Roy was organizing the Communist Party in India. Moscow was very busy building up her assets. We were either putting our head in the sand or content to leave the responsibility to, in this case, the British power.

Now, we've got to recall here the kind of situation which favored the development of the Soviet state power which, you see, combined with this conspiratorial international apparatus, has created the crisis we live through today. In the two World Wars of our century you check over what power blocs have been destroyed or fragmented, and it's quite a list--the Ottoman Empire gone, broken up into pieces; Turk and Arab; the Hapsburg Empire, gone, broken up into pieces; the Hohenzollern Empire, revived under the Hitler fanaticism; now again there is a divided German nation. The British Empire, the French Empire, the Japanese Empire, the Dutch Empire; these great blocs of power which involve overseas possessions or continental domains. What has happened? The one empire which continues almost territorially intact under the control of the Communist regime is the Czarist Empire. And, of course, there is another nation which has managed to maintain a pretty good territorial situation, and that's the United States of America. But the Soviet Union, then, has had the advantage of those years of consolidating their control in the old Czarist territory and of becoming one of the two most powerful nations in the world.

Now, the limitations of Soviet power in the period until World War II, some of them related directly to the personality of Joseph Stalin. Stalin was a man not inclined to take undue risks. He moved when he was sure the move would be successful. He did not show flexibility, but for his time, perhaps, he did the necessary thing to strengthen the Soviet power.

In World War II itself you had fighting for survival on the part of the Soviet leadership, but at the same time, and we see it now in better retrospect, some of our Western political societies were very much bled white, and I refer again to what happened in terms of the British Empire, the French Empire, and the Dutch, etc., in the case of the Far East the Japanese factor being very important. But there were hopes by people of good will during this period, that out of the struggle in which we were partners, and out of the internal impact of this struggle on Soviet society, the Bolshevik mentality, the implacability, the drive to destroy all that which was not in their image; that this would somehow mellow in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union. This certainly was the hope of the American leaders of the time--most of them, and it continued to be a

hope in the immediate postwar period. But in February 1946 Stalin made a speech. It was a redeclaration of the cold war. He, in effect, said, "We've now survived. We're going to build up and we're going to do it in a Bolshevik Communist way, and we're going to recognize that our enemies continue to be the Western capitalist states."

George Kennan who was then counselor of our Embassy in Moscow, sat down and analyzed this speech in a telegram of some length, which has become a classic and which I know is in the library of the National War College, and in effect, we began our counter cold war. And this is where we enter into the modern period. The Kennan dispatch laid the basis for the Marshall plan, certainly, and although Ambassador Kennan would probably not admit it, it probably laid the basis for NATO too. Certainly it was the origin of the well-known containment theory vis-a-vis Soviet power.

The Soviets, while they were internally weakened in many material respects by World War II, ended with their forces in very favorable positions indeed, far into central Europe. Eastern and central Europe were theirs in terms of armed might. At the same time there were weaknesses in Iran, Greece, and Turkey, to be exploited. So, there began a period of Soviet aggrandizement using their armies, their military forces as the backstop for subversive penetration for political purposes. And again, if you take the 1945-1949 period and you want to see how the Soviets conducted the cold war using armies without fighting, using subversion, slogans, propaganda, secret police methods, and economic methods through manipulation of the trade unions in the various Eastern European countries, you'll find that the whole bag of tricks was employed by the Soviets in this period.

Because the Soviet control of Eastern Europe threatened the security of the United States--this dawned on our leaders at that time--we did develop these counterinstitutions of which all or part were and continue to be, in some cases, part of the cold war: The Marshall plan, which was a success in that the productive capacity of Europe was restored under the impetus; NATO continues to be the hard core of our own security; the Truman doctrine, which retrieved the situation in the vulnerable areas of the Eastern Mediterranean--Greece and Turkey; and then the longer term schemes which continue to be so significant in our policy and the policy of our allies--the schemes for building up a European community in a military sense, in a political sense, and in an economic sense.

I have only one question, which occurred to me at the time, in the late forties, perhaps because I was then working in the field of south Asian affairs, and that was whether--looking back, now, with the benefit again of hindsight--it may not have paid us to have put out more resources on the same scale as we did with the Marshall plan; more resources for the then retrievable countries like India and Burma, and also Ceylon and perhaps southeast Asia. There were possibilities. The rationale at the time in Washington was understandable. It was that we had limited resources; that the great productive center of the world, the great center so far as skills and organized economic capabilities were concerned, was Western Europe, but there was an immediate threat from the Soviet, poised as they were with their armies in Eastern and central Europe; that this is where we must make our investment. We did, and it was a success. Whether we could have put an additional requirement on the American people at that time to begin to do the things which later we were driven to do in competition with the Soviets, to make investments in capital in the Arab countries and in south Asia, I don't know. I raise this as a query whether we could be further ahead in the game in the underdeveloped areas if we had had the vision and the imagination which now it is rather easy to see in retrospect.

When I arrived in Moscow to do duty there in 1949 I was very much struck with the impact on the Soviet leadership of two U.S. initiatives in the cold war. I was very much struck with their attitude toward the then-called "point 4 program." President Truman had announced that in his inaugural in January 1949. I got into Moscow in May of that year, and the Soviet press was full of this, attempting to knock it down. And why? It was just an idea, but to them a very dangerous idea because any kind of constructive relationship between the American capitalist government and these underdeveloped areas cut across their whole picture of the world which involved either tyranny and control, or conflict. The idea that there could be a useful relationship, a solid constructive relationship between a country like the United States and the underdeveloped areas not only was incompatible with their doctrine, but it had practical dangers in terms of their influence in these areas. So, point 4 really was attracting a lot of attention.

Then NATO. They called it the "aggressivniy Atlantichiskiy pact." And that was a phrase which I heard very much of in those early months in Moscow. I think, in a way, although it's now more than a decade later, the idea behind these two things--point 4 and NATO--continues to be the same; they are the two main tools in our arsenal in the cold war. The forms change. The requirements become even greater on us in

these two fields, and I refer to collective security and to the need to build a better social and economic infrastructure in the so-called uncommitted, underdeveloped world.

The apogee of the Stalinist era, of course, was the Korean war. We cannot quite call the Korean war a cold war--it was pretty hot, as perhaps some of you remember personally, and yet at the same time it had aspects of limited warfare which bring it between the cold war and all-out conflict. I don't think this is the place for me to go into that, but it was the one time when the Soviet power took a risk that they have not thus far shown themselves willing to repeat in the actual use of organized military power across a frontier.

In the Khrushchev period which has been with us now for several years, we are confronted with a greater challenge in many ways than we had from the Stalinist regime. For one thing, under Khrushchev, and by under Khrushchev I mean beginning with Malenkov and Bulganin in the post-Stalin era out of which Khrushchev has emerged as the leader, you had a new Soviet flexibility in their competition with the capitalist West, a flexibility which has paid dividends to them. I'll deal with one particular situation here to illustrate my point concretely. In early 1955 I was then in the State Department and I was called down to the South Asian Affairs Office to look at some reports which were coming in indicating that the Soviet Union was willing to build a steel mill in India. These were preliminary reports. They needed evaluation and my friend there wondered whether these could be true in terms of everything we knew about Soviet activities abroad up to that time. I remember telling him that if these reports turned out to be true we were in for very difficult days indeed because it would show that the new leaders in the Soviet Union were willing to take risks which could give us serious trouble. Because in the Stalin regime, Stalin would never make an investment of Soviet resources where he could not control not only what happened, but the image to the outside world, of what happened. In other words, he would not think of going to a place as uncontrolled, from the Moscow point of view, as India, and risk the steel mill being a flop.

In Moscow for the palace of the Soviets they made a big hole in the ground which turned out to be geologically unsound, and even years after the excavation (there was just a fence around it) we used to say the definition of a reactionary is a fellow who doesn't know the tallest building in the world from a hole in the ground--but in Moscow the mistake was covered up. They had a fence around it, and people all around the Soviet Union still thought there was a palace of the Soviets. And you

would see poems written in praise of the palace of the Soviets. It was a nonexistent building. But you could fool a lot of people who didn't actually come to Moscow. And there were models of this palace of the Soviets in all the provincial towns. Well, there was an example of the failure which they tried to cover up. But you couldn't do that outside the Soviet Union where you don't control the news media. So, it seemed to me very significant if these reports were going to be true, and as you know, these reports turned out to be true, and Soviet technicians are still in India finishing up this steel plant which has by no means made our job easier in the world so far as India is concerned.

Now, we were getting ourselves at the same time into an inflexibility about aid. In the Eisenhower administration our aid program tended to be dominated by people of very good will and good intentions, but who felt that if there was a so-called Socialist tinge to an enterprise in another country, this we shouldn't give help to. And in India particularly, where, as Mr. Palmer knows, who was engaged in the same business at the time, I went out to help evaluate our aid program. I found that the philosophy in Washington was that we should not aid the Socialist sector, but only the private enterprise sector. This was to my mind an inflexibility--a doctrinal inflexibility coming at just the time when the Soviets were showing themselves willing to take risks. This policy on aid even went so far as to defeat our own ends at times. The great free enterpriser in India is a man named J. R. D. Tata; he is an enlightened capitalist in the best tradition. But when J. R. D. Tata visited Washington the then head of our aid administration gave him exactly a minute and a half.

Now, even taking into account, let us say, that we should stick to a doctrine of selective aid for the building up of free private enterprise, our own people didn't even know who the real free private enterprisers were, in India at that time. I say this--it's several years past, and I think we're doing much better. But this is the sort of thing which can defeat us in the economic aspects of the cold war.

I'm beginning now to get to the end of my time, and I find that I have many more points that I would like to have made. I have not been able to touch on the technological developments of the sputnik era, but I would like to tell just one short story about that. There was a little peasant boy in Poland. Someone came by and said: "Have you heard, the Russians have gone to the moon?" And the little boy said: "All of them?"

Summing up I think I can say that in our cold war activities we have had considerable success in Europe; we have had some success in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East; but some setbacks too. And, of course, the very serious problem of the Communist control of China. What can we do? Well, I think above all there is the psychological requirement to have confidence in our own material progress and in our spiritual advantages. The best cure for someone who gets defeated is a trip behind the curtain; I recommend it. Then you can see for yourself the very, very mixed picture of both material progress and the happiness of human beings. We still have something worth fighting for, and fighting indefinitely for. I think our aid programs might well be more sophisticated. I think the President is reported to have said the other day, "We want to give a certain priority to those people who share our views in the world crisis." I think there is something to be said for that. I think we might make more progress in that regard because our resources are not unlimited--human or material.

The importance of collective security continues strong. NATO is a bulwark both in terms of our spiritual values and of our security. In Asia and Africa I think we should continue where suitable, to help build up the social and economic infrastructure, but at the same time not be afraid to tell the peoples there that we do have security requirements which involve close and mutual interests with the European nations. Here at home, perhaps the challenge is the greatest. We are a national society, though we have great problems with our Federal structure of working together. I sometimes wonder whether we should not take a more radical attitude in looking at our own political and economic institutions. I mean radical in the best American sense. Perhaps the statehouses, the State capitols of today, have taken on some of the rather undesirable characteristics of the old county courthouses with their spitoons of our boyhood. I think we need to organize our talents, using modern techniques. I think of the kind of thing that we're trying in this experimental way in the State Department, in the Operations Center which is still uncharted--we have many headaches--but the idea of being able, for example, to get on the telephone and talk in a secure way with, let us say, General Norstad or Ambassador Bruce, instead of having to go through antiquated cable systems which take hours when life is moving at a more dynamic pace, I think we can do much in government to live in the middle of the 20th century that we have not yet done, and that we have the resources to do, provided we make the decisions.

Then there is the great need to learn languages. I think--and this again, to me, seems to be a national responsibility--we need to have more of a language-knowing resource of the major languages of the

world and some of the exotic languages. I'll end with a language story. I was on a Czech aircraft from Bucharest to Budapest some years ago and I was surrounded by East German Communists, Chinese Communists, Rumanian Communists--a bunch of cutthroats if I ever saw any--but on the plane was a very attractive Czech stewardess. I noticed as she went around--they had a good Pilsen beer and some light reading material like Izvestia, Trud, etc., and she was passing this stuff around. She spoke several languages and I observed that her German sounded completely fluent. She also spoke French, Rumanian, Czech, of course, and Russian--there were some Russians on board. She spoke to me first in German, and when I said that I was English-speaking she spoke in very flawless English. Before the end of the trip I went back and sat down with her--she was a very attractive girl about 23--and said that I didn't want to disturb her, but I was very interested in how she had learned so many languages at such an early age. Then she explained--she said "Well, it's really very easy, you see. We Czechs have our Czech, and I come from a part of Czechoslovakia where Russian is given in the schools so I learned Russian, and when the Hitler people came in we had to learn German. French is just part of our school education. I'm now flying back from Rumania and Rumanian is very easy to pick up. I said, "Yes, but where did you learn your English?" She said, "Oh, I had an English lover once."

Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Much has been said, both pro and con, about our foreign policy. I believe you said it should be more sophisticated. I wonder if you would elaborate on that?

MR. THURSTON: I was referring not to our foreign policy as a whole. Perhaps one can always ask for improvement in our foreign policy. I had in mind more our foreign aid programs. We find it difficult to set up priorities. Our resources are limited. Certainly, money, in the crude sense of the word, is available, but our human resources, the skills, etc., necessary to make effective use of money and funds is not always available in every situation. Therefore, I use the word sophisticated, which is, perhaps, not too precise a word--it has somewhat the wrong flavor--but we would make use of funds in places where it was not just a question of pressure from that country in a game where they play us off against the Soviet Union.

There might be places, in other words, where we can safely let them go along and take calculated risks, and use the funds and resources in other places. Sometimes we run into trouble because of our own internal political system. For example, it's well-known that people of

Italian descent have an interest in what our policy toward Italy is, and maybe specifically in terms of aid programs to Italy. Pressures are brought to bear on the Hill that have nothing to do, really, with the foreign policy objectives; it might have something to do by chance, but it would only be by chance. So, I raised the question of whether we couldn't be a bit more hardboiled--I guess that is a better word than sophisticated--in allocating our resources.

Yugoslavia is an interesting case in point here. Yugoslavia broke away from the Stalinist arrangements in 1949 and I think we were absolutely right to give aid to keep Tito afloat. However, I think that needs reviewing from time to time. I think that if we look at the kind of speech that Tito made at the Belgrade conference, we don't know what game he is playing but it looks very much like Khrushchev's game and not ours; this may be attributable to the Soviet wheat supply not being completely inexhaustible. I think that is the sort of thing we ought to receive from time to time. That is what I had in mind.

QUESTION: You referred to the importance of NATO. You see it as influencing Soviet influence in Europe. I would like to ask you a question as to why you think we have such a weak position with regard to CENTO and SEATO which are the same type of arrangement?

MR. THURSTON: That's a good question. I think that in Europe and in NATO we have strength. That is to say, not our own strength--we take that for granted--but in these European governments you have economic strength. You also have a certain amount of military strength--not up to our level, but considerable for certain types of military operations--and we have common traditions; common ways, though sometimes you don't think so as when you live in France for 4 years, but we do. We have essentially the same traditions, the same attitudes, certainly as when compared with the Persians, Indians, Thais, or someone like that. So that we have the possibility for a solidarity and a building up of a position of collective strength in the NATO area--the North Atlantic area--whereas in CENTO and SEATO it is pretty much our strength plus the other peoples' weaknesses. I am not saying that it isn't useful to have these other collective security organizations. I do honestly believe, on the basis of my own experience, that a distinction can be made in terms of effectiveness and therefore in terms of what resources you want to put into it.

QUESTION: Sir, I would like to have you comment on whether or not there is any real difference in Soviet aims in central and Eastern Europe

of today as compared with the regime in the 19th century, in the same area, and if there is any similarity or difference in their policies, what might that be?

MR. THURSTON: Well, of course, it is quite true that Czarist Russia continued to be an expansionist power. It was blocked--to go back as I said earlier--by the existence of other empires; the Hapsburg Empire, the Hohenzollern Empire, and the Ottoman Empire in the south. Those blocs no longer exist.

Perhaps the second implied aspect of your question relates to whether the animal we are dealing with here is Russia, or whether it is communism or some particular synthesis of the two. I think there is no doubt that the Russians in the Kremlin think that to be a good Russian and good Communist is the same thing. I think that in their mind it presents no particular problem, whether it answers the Russian cause or the Communist cause, or vice versa. It's true, and you can go to specific cases of--well, for example, let's take the Greek guerrilla thing--where the Greek Communist guerrillas, when the situation there became difficult for them, the Soviets disengaged themselves. They got out of this one and they just let the thing become a failure; they didn't bring Soviet state power into the situation to retrieve it which physically they were capable of doing. Also in Iran in 1946. They withdrew Russian forces from Iran at a time when certainly physically they need not have done it; there were no other forces in the area which could have chased them out. I think that in the decision making in the Kremlin there is probably an interplay between these two things; the Communist movement--the forces working for communism in the world--and the state power of the Soviet Union. Among those of us who have been involved in Soviet affairs this is a great debate. We have those who argue that the state power is always the greater factor in decision making. Others will argue that it is the ideological and the Communist Party. I myself think they are pretty pragmatic and probably make their decisions in the light of actual circumstances, and sometimes give priority to one and sometimes to another.

QUESTION: What may be the effect on the United Nations and the cold war as the result of the death of Dag Hammarskjold?

MR. THURSTON: That is very topical. Well, the effect on the United Nations is that it is going to have a weakening effect on, to be specific, the United Nations' enterprises, whether it be the Congo thing which has come forward right now, or quieter enterprises that they still have going, let us say, on the Gaza Strip. Because Hammarskjold was

a man who combined tremendous diplomatic finesse with a pretty hard-headed executive capacity. Even if it were conceivable that we could find an early replacement, he may not be up to the Hammarskjold character in these two respects, but the fact is that all indications point to a conflict with the Soviets as to what should replace Hammarskjold. I did not mention the United Nations at all in my remarks earlier and in a way that is an oversight because certainly the United Nations is a forum in which the cold war is being fought. Perhaps it is an imperfect reflection of a very imperfect world. We have considerable problems now in the United Nations because the Asian and African countries tend to combine on an irrational basis on almost every possible cause, and much of this is being done for demogogic reasons, so that we can no longer be assured of having a majority in lots of situations that effect our vital interests. Certainly, Hammarskjold's death is not going to be helpful to us at all.

QUESTION: What do you foresee for the development of NATO during the next 10 years? With the withdrawal of our financial support do you foresee a European financing of arms for the weaker members and the shift of leadership, say, to Germany, or weakening of the bilateral ties with the United States?

MR. THURSTON: I think it is inevitable that, looking at it on a 10-year basis, that the European members of NATO should be called upon, or will be increasingly called upon to make a greater relative contribution to the overall effort. What was true in 1949 is certainly not true in 1961 in terms of gross national product. Ways must be, and really are being found to increase the contribution. The increases are relatively modest. They don't make sensational headlines, but this is almost, I would say, the central focus of activity in the NATO Council in these recent weeks and months, particularly having Berlin in mind, which is a situation where we want an increase in resources. We, of course, are setting quite a lead ourselves in building up our own strength on the continent.

I think, too, that there is a tendency in NATO for the European members to--this is DeGaulle's leadership to a great extent, but there is a certain naturalness to it also--but the continental countries--with their Common Market affinities etc.--can, and do, tend to be a club within a club. This up to a point is very good because we wanted to build up a European unity. But it can also be detrimental, perhaps, to the broad North Atlantic concept on which NATO was founded.

QUESTION: Wouldn't you say that one of the major factors, looking toward a more sophisticated operation of our aid program is the recent change in policy which has just taken place, in which we have gone away from a put-out-the-fire attitude in short-term emergencies, to a longer point of view of a decade of development or a 5-year period of development?

MR. THURSTON: Yes, I certainly agree with you.

QUESTION: And secondly, since I have to live with this class for the rest of the year I would appreciate it if you would point out that the recommendations for aid to any one country bear the stamp of the United States back of them.

MR. THURSTON: Touche. Okay.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned our internal strength, the strength of NATO, and the general strength of the Western World. Do you think we can and will negotiate the question of Berlin on the basis of this strength?

MR. THURSTON: I am convinced we will.

QUESTION: Sir, in view of the Belgrade Conference and the results, do you think that this apparent great concern that we have had for so-called world opinion is still worth the strategic sacrifices we've had to make for such things as nuclear testing moratoriums, etc.?

MR. THURSTON: I am inclined to sympathize with what I understand to be the spirit behind your question. I do think that with the advertising and public relations emphasis which increasingly seems to come to the fore in the modern world and gives rise to this word "image," as if, you know, it were a game of mirrors all the time, this has distracted us because I think there is real policy, real action, and real programs, and this is what we should stand for. And if they are constructed on the basis of commonsense and a healthy regard for our own interests I feel that our society is the kind which can live in peace with other peoples. And our activities are not basically inimical to others and we should go ahead on that basis and the devil take the hindmost. This is my own opinion.

QUESTION: In further development of your answer to the last question in recognizing the real gains that the United States has made in the

cold war have been through such programs as NATO, Marshall aid, and what we did in Korea, is there any real benefit to diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Communists in the normal sense of the word, of course recognizing also the double nature of Soviet standards of negotiation? What do we gain by negotiations with the Soviet Union on such matters as disarmament, nuclear testing, or anything of this nature?

MR. THURSTON: Soviet concepts on diplomacy, of course, are entirely different from ours and never the twain shall meet, really. I am always amazed at how people discover for the first time the kind of characters these are. And it keeps going on. I mean, not enough books seem to be written that are reminiscent, such as memoirs. We keep being an optimistic people. We are a generous-hearted, straightforward people, and we keep being surprised at what s.o.b.'s these characters are in negotiating. They come in with the concept of there being irreconcilable interests between us basically; profoundly, and that therefore their job in negotiating is to get us to concede, even if it is a slight retreat. And then, if there's a summit conference or something of that sort, all the pressures, the world-opinion deal, and the images and all of that, they beat on our negotiators. And their internal arrangements being different, they don't beat on theirs. Now, having said this, we nevertheless, because we are dealing here with terribly grave issues--the continuity, you might say, of organized societies themselves is at stake here--don't want to make a mistake. We have to maintain contact with them. There has to be some system in which we can signal back and forth to each other, because our assumption is that while they expect in the end to eat us up, they don't necessarily want to be killed before they have a chance to eat us. Therefore there is a certain prudence on their side about taking certain steps. I think we need the diplomatic contact always, so that each of us will understand the other to the maximum extent possible, in this kind of peculiar relationship.

So, quite apart from the world-opinion question--I did not want to brush that aside entirely a while ago--you have got to be for peace. I remember a discussion came up the other day where we got the message from George Kennan that Sukarno and Keita were coming. These boys were getting on a chartered airplane and dashing away to bring a message to the President. All of us who were concerned with this, in all frankness said, "Oh, good grief, do we have to have these two fellows here?" I mean, we knew exactly what they were going to say. We knew what the conference results were--"Peace, it's wonderful"--and we could not take action to prevent those people from coming to Washington. I thought the President handled it very well in the kind of

message he gave to them. He managed to point out that in self-determination he hoped that it also applied to the problems in Europe as well as to the areas that they were from, etc.

You see, their mentalities, it seems, are of a different kind and we do have to play to the gallery to the extent of seeming to be for peace, which we really are, and we have to play that role. We have to talk, but if we are tough-minded about it, for example to go back to your negotiating question, if we negotiate without any illusions, then I think we can hold the line pretty well and maybe on occasion make an advance of our own. There is no reason why we can't produce advantages to our own wishes too.

QUESTION: Recently I watched a debate on television between the Indian Ambassador and a local politician. The Indian Ambassador was convinced there was no moral harm where the Formosans would be left, or, in other words, be permitted to be reabsorbed into the giant. In other words, the Chinese on Formosa, and by the same token, for example, the Egyptians, when they look at the situation in East Berlin are not morally concerned about anything that is going to happen to the East Germans. They tend to center the blame on the Americans, i.e., if the Americans were not here in Europe there would not be any problem today. Now, that to me reflects the profit that the Reds or the Communist people are making, by convincing the people--i.e., the North Americans and the big powers--to alter their moral values.

Now, how can we, being Americans, convince the uncommitted or neutralist powers of our sense of moral values or ideals? I mean, looking at the Red or East German situation through our eyes, of saving the peace for the people on Formosa, through our eyes?

MR. THURSTON: Well, this is our daily job and we are working at it. We have some reason to believe, for example, Mr. Nehru himself is not entirely unrealistic on this and has taken a stance that on balance tends to favor us, more, perhaps, than is publicly known.

You have a demagoguery here, if you work in Asian affairs. These people in the present regimes, the so-called--what the Soviets would call bourgeoise--nationalist regimes in order to stay in power, even in competition with the leftwing and the extremists, they have to engage in a demagoguery which is essentially that you have to show that you are independent. Now, in the case of India, for example, the British ran the place for a couple of centuries, so in order to show your independence

you cannot follow a policy like the British. For example, if you keep voting for NATO that makes you sort of pro-British. If you're in favor of the United States--then you are given the Anglo-American tie. So, these political parties in these newly formed states have problems in terms of getting the necessary support in order to function. They do things often which, in the quiet of a drink after dinner, they admit having done for demagogic reasons.

I remember talking with an extremely competent Indian official; the highest civilian in the Defense Ministry 4 years ago, about the relationship of NATO to what we were doing in India and what the Indians themselves were trying to do. And this fellow--I didn't have to prod him; it came out, really, on his own initiative--told me that he and a lot of other Indians who really understood the situation--he did not indicate that this was a majority, but he was not alone in this--realized that there was a connection between what the United States had done to build up security in the Western World--in Europe--and therefore deterring the Soviet Union from some adventure. There was a relationship between that and the ability of the Indians to be able to have a 5-year plan, quite apart from the direct U.S. aid that had gone into those plans. He recognized that there was a relation between the security measures we had taken on the NATO side, and in that situation, revolving on real world stability. This is again a sophisticated judgment that happens to be one that is held in some responsible circles in these Asian countries and is helpful to us. How to do this on a grass-roots base, I don't know. I am not sure. People are of different caliber in terms of understanding these complicated situations.

I do not know in our own country how you can really take this--and this is what those of us in the State Department are constantly up against, and perhaps we are considered rather queer because of it--but if you take these very complicated situations, they have a history and roots, and you have to write a book about every one of them whether it is Kashmir, Trieste, or whatnot. It isn't anything you can just compress in one little headline or some peppy little slogan. Because of the difficulty of communicating the complications, often there is no popular understanding in our own society, forgetting about the Indians and the others in the world who live in mud huts.

QUESTION: With respect to adopting a more practical attitude toward such things as foreign aid and developing criteria of allocation, what are your views as to the final objective of our foreign aid program? Is it to move uncommitted and perhaps wavering nations into

our camp, or is it to bolster the determination of those who are already in line with it? If so, how do you set a criterion to fit it?

MR. THURSTON: I think our aid objective is broadly the same as our foreign policy objective which is to do everything we can to create a world environment in which our independence is assured as much as possible, and the true independence of other countries is assured. And this would be our objective, presumably, if the Soviet Union did not exist. This is, you might say theoretically, anyhow, divorceable from the Communist threat and the Communist problem. It so happens that in our estimate there are many threats to liberty and independence in the world, but the greatest concerted organized threat does come from the Communists. Therefore, though theoretically one would not want to say that you are having an aid program only to fight communism, it so happens in the actual context of today's defense, aid programs would seem to be directed to that end, and I don't see why we should be ashamed of it, because we did not start this cold war.

What I am worried about is the fact that in the many governments that were just beginning to emerge in the African state we had as Charges d' Affaires relatively junior officers. They were there because they had been vice consuls or consuls during the Colonial period; however, it was not 5 minutes after the independence ceremonies that the U.S. State Department representative was called in and the new government would say, "Well, you know the Soviets have promised us so and so. Now, we would rather deal with you, you see." I saw all these messages going back to Washington, and in some cases we had no alternative. I saw this very much a couple of years ago when I was in Paris. In fact you can even say--taking a very long look, providing true independence is maintained--that these countries do not come under the subservience of Moscow and Peking. You are not asking them to join in NATO or anything of that sort, you are not asking them to join the free world. That is, in the sense that they develop institutions which are broadly compatible with resistance to subversive forces from the outside. It is a big question you asked.

QUESTION: In your considered opinion do you believe that Red China will succeed in the U.N. this year?

MR. THURSTON: I don't think so; not this year. The votes look okay so far. But that is just this year; no bets beyond that.

CAPTAIN HYDE: Well, Dr. Thurston, I know I certainly speak for everyone here when I thank you very much for your very thoughtful presentation. I know we have all gotten a lot out of it.

MR. THURSTON: Thank you.

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