

## INTRODUCTION TO UNIT IX

16 February 1962

## CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SPEAKER--Colonel Parker R. Colmer, USMC, Member of the Faculty, ICAF . . . . .	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION . . . . .	12

## NOTICE

This is a transcript of material presented to the resident students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As such it represents the views of the author and not necessarily those of the Industrial College or the Department of Defense. Members of the College may quote it only in student reports or publications for use within the College. Other persons may not quote or extract for publication, reproduce, or otherwise copy this material without specific permission from the author and from the Commandant, ICAF, in each case.

Publication No. L62-127

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

## INTRODUCTION TO UNIT IX

16 February 1962

COLONEL COLMER: General Quill, Ladies, and Gentlemen: For my OP this morning, I am going to tell you about the problem we have developed for the final unit and how we plan to conduct it. Although the unit does not begin until your return from the international field trip, we feel it important for you to begin to consider the challenge posed by the Final Problem.

You will return to the D.C. area on 2 May, and on 3 May, before you can completely resume your family responsibilities, the problem starts. (Chart 1, page 2.)

Rather than a separate unit of instruction, Unit IX is the culmination of your year's work. It is a synthesis of all the other units of the curriculum. You will have the opportunity to put to use much of the information and many of the ideas which you have acquired during the year. You will spend the major portion of your time gathering and evaluating facts, reaching conclusions, making recommendations, and engaging in what we hope will be creative thinking, chiefly on a committee basis.


Specifically, you will analyze and evaluate the adequacy of our national preparedness for any type of conflict--cold war, limited war, or general war.

To set the stage, I'd like to show you a quote from the October issue of "Harper's," describing the international situation.

## Chart 2. --The International Situation

It is a gloomy moment in history. Not in the lifetime of any man who reads this has there been such grave and deep apprehension. Never has the future seemed so dark. In France, the political kettle ferments and bubbles with uncertainty. England--the English Empire is being sorely tried and exhausted in a social and economic struggle, with turmoil at home, and uprisings of her teeming millions in her farflung Empire. The United States is beset with racial, industrial and commercial chaos--drifting we know not where. Russia hangs like a storm cloud on the horizon--dark and silent. It is a solemn moment, and no man can feel indifference. Of our troubles, no man can see the end. . . .

Chart 1



**"I'LL BE HOME LATER, DEAR -  
I GOTTA START ON THE FINAL PROBLEM!"**

I forgot to mention that the quote is from "Harper's Bazaar," and not from "Harper's Magazine," and it wasn't last October, but 10 October 1847. Though decades pass quickly, life has never been easy. Since 1945, look at some of the world's experience. (Chart 3, page 5.)

The international scene today resembles in many ways what was described so gloomily more than a hundred years ago.

You have heard it said time and again that our freedom today is as severely threatened as at any time in our history, and imperiled in ways that make it difficult for people to understand the magnitude and nature of the threat. Now a vast, tyrannical, expansive force challenges the freedom we recently took for granted. Two great blocs of nations stand poised in deep opposition, involving the thought and action of men throughout the world. Military strategy, new weapons, foreign policy, and worldwide economic problems have become matters that deeply affect each of us personally. What should we do? What can we do? This, gentlemen, is the Final Problem.

I want to touch on three important aspects of this Unit, namely, the missions of the Final Problem, significant aspects that bear consideration, and how you will organize to attack the problem.

First, let us look at the Problem Directive.

#### Chart 4. --Problem Directive

To analyze the preparedness posture of the United States for national security and for cooperation in providing free world security under all conditions; to develop policies, plans, and programs in all areas of conflict but primarily in the economic area, that the United States should adopt to ensure victory for the free world in general war, limited war, or the continuing economic, political, and ideological war that now exists.

Notice that the problem directive says "analyze." We don't want you just to examine all existing plans and then comment on them. Far from that. While we want you to examine and evaluate strengths and weaknesses of these plans, we want you to do some original thinking.

Our national security preparedness planning to date has been based upon the premise that the Soviet Union has three capabilities:

First, continuing the present state of international tension and competitive coexistence, which we call the cold war, while masterminding brush fires and trouble spots, such as Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Viet Nam.

Second, waging limited war or wars on one or more fronts, using either Soviet forces or satellite forces, or both, but not including a massive nuclear attack on the United States.

Third, that of fighting a general war.

You will be assigned to a committee which will study the implications of one of these types of conflict.

You will be required to analyze the preparedness posture of the United States for national security and for cooperating with the free world for international security under conditions of war particular to your committee, and develop policies, plans, and programs in all areas of conflict but primarily in the economic area, which the United States should adopt to assure ultimate victory.


Let's take a glimpse now at each phase of warfare the committees will tackle.

#### Chart 5. --Cold War

The use of political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, and military measures short of overt armed conflict, involving regular military forces to achieve national objectives. Cold war includes periods of increased international tension, accelerated paramilitary activities, and increased activity by military forces.

The cold war committees will have to dig deeply to come to grips with the fundamental issues, with concrete situations rather than oft-repeated generalizations. Exactly what are the Communists' tactics, especially the economic ones, what are their organizations, and who are their specific targets? On the other side of the coin, what are their vulnerabilities, their disadvantages, and their inner discrepancies? Then, how do we minimize their success and maximize the effectiveness of our actions? In sum, we must examine the threat of communism and the actions needed to employ our resources to thwart this threat.

# WARS SINCE 1945



## Chart 6. -- Limited War

Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. "Incidents" are brief clashes or other military disturbances generally of a transitory nature and not involving protracted hostility.

Assuming that the United States succeeds in deterring a general war, we still face the possibility of lesser conflicts. For the Final Problem we will assume that these wars could range in size from several simultaneous and scattered brushfires to a very extensive war limited only by the absence of a strategic nuclear exchange on the United States and Russia.

We also are going to assume that tactical nuclear weapons may or may not be used, and recognize that a limited war could trigger general nuclear war.

These committees will determine the adequacy of our national security measures to win limited wars, as well as suggest the necessary organizational changes in our economy. If we have another Lebanon, the economy will scarcely be affected. If we have another Korea, it might be necessary to impose temporary controls. Naturally, the greater the scope and intensity of limited wars, the greater chance of needing more regulatory measures to control our economy.

It is important that our weapon systems be kept modern and equal to requirements. New and improved generations of weapons systems are required to increase our flexibility and freedom of choice in the conduct of limited wars without detracting seriously from our overall general nuclear war deterrent. President Kennedy, throughout his first year in office, has indicated the need for an improved capability to fight limited wars. How far have his goals been realized? Can we do more?

## Chart 7. -- General War

Armed conflict between the major powers of the Communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

We also call this the hot war. The most ominous task of the United States is deterring an all-out Soviet surprise attack with nuclear weapons.

However, for the purpose of this problem we want the general war committees to assume that deterrence will fail and that the United States and Russia will launch nuclear attacks against each other.

Your problem concerns current programs which will insure effective retaliation and also provide time and opportunity to carry out adequate plans to absorb the shock, mobilize our strengths, including economic, and then reestablish our global position of national security, independence, and prestige. They also must consider the fact that our national capability, including military forces, increasingly depends upon a healthy and dynamic economy.

In all these areas, the nonmilitary aspects are just as important as the military. You must guard against the natural tendency to stress the military factors at the expense of the nonmilitary.

Cold, limited, and general nuclear war then, will constitute the major problem areas for your consideration. I now want to highlight some of the significant aspects we would like you to follow and suggest some aspects which should bear investigation.

One word about national strategy. We know that our national strategy calls for the maintenance of a strong military force, for strengthening the economy of the Nation, and for reinforcing the political and economic base of free world allies to deter any form of Communist aggression. Now, I don't suggest that the subject of strategy be avoided entirely in the Final Problem; however, I do not desire that the early stages of committee effort degenerate into arguments of details such as one Polaris versus a Minuteman. There should be more attention given to problems of a broader nature dealing in the categories of air and amphibious lift, strategic reserves, and the like, thereby developing and using the fundamental resources which constitute the national capacity needed to carry out our objectives.

In general, you should study and plan in the areas of mobilization involving any type of emergency. Mobilization is not a dirty word; nor is it only a post-D-day phenomenon. We still must marshal our resources in order to bring the desired type and amount of pressure to bear on our adversary. This is what the Congressional Joint Committee on Defense Production highlighted in its report of January, this year.

## Chart 8. --Mobilization

Mobilization for general war involving a nuclear attack is so broad in scope that each department and agency of the Federal Government and each State and locality has responsibilities which are so vast as to involve many unanswered questions. The achievement of preparedness for such an emergency will be highly dependent upon the development of mobilization plans followed by such action programs as will provide the means to retaliate against enemy forces, provide warning and protection for the population, and the means for retaliation.

We face a central question in analyzing industry's role in national security. How can we insure that industry produces needed material over the long haul during a period of rapidly changing technology and rising costs? This question raises implications which touch the heart of the preparedness posture of the United States.

Are vital industries properly dispersed? Are long-lead-time machines protected or stockpiled? Is industry responsive to Administration requests for planning their industrial defense?

You also have President Kennedy's 1963 fiscal proposals for the Department of Defense into which to sink your analytical teeth. How do they meet our military requirements? What can our country afford, as well as need? Unit V has certainly opened the door wide in this particular matter. A mere rundown of the section titles of Economic Stabilization gives plenty of food for thought. The recent expressions of Heller, Roosa, and Balderston, will consciously influence your conclusions to a great degree.

So it follows that you must inject economic realism into your solution. We ask you to cost your recommendations, for nothing bares the impracticality of fuzzy ideas better than a price tag. Naturally, if you set the price of security, you must devise ways and means of getting the money. Your attention then also will be directed to questions of economic growth, taxation, public debt, Government controls, and international finance.

President Kennedy recently requested an investigation of our stockpiling program of strategic materials. Obviously, our defense position and, to some degree our economic well-being, depend upon our on hand assets of materials which may be needed in an emergency. Yet we must

strike a balance between requirements and costs. The Congress will soon tackle this knotty problem; you can do likewise in your deliberations.

With the emergence of the Common Market, we must determine possible effects on our industrial base for defense as well as the influence upon the overall economic well-being of the United States. That possible tricky obstacle to even the optimistic objectives of free traders, agriculture, as ably portrayed by Mr. Cochrane, becomes a scene stealer. We are moving into a new type of economic world. Any major change brings with it new problems and the need for adjustment. Some of these adjustments may be painful. Since we are just embarking on this new economic venture, you have an open field to vent your opinions. Think also about the trend sophisticated societies appear to be following, confederation, while underdeveloped and newly emerging nations seek independence and isolation.

The present trend in centralizing military agencies will require study to determine how it affects the ability of the United States to conduct cold, limited, and general war. I need not elaborate this point to this audience. I merely want to point out that this is your opportunity to think about some military problems with which you will have to live after you leave here.


These are but a few seeds I'm now planting. Think about them during the next two units and on the international field trips, if you have time.

And now for some of the mechanics of the Unit.

Chart 9. --The student body will be organized basically into three teams, each of which will study the entire spectrum of international conflict. Each team consists primarily of three committees, one on cold war, one on limited war, and one on general war.

To coordinate the effort, we are assigning a coordinating council to each team. This council will consist of 3 permanent members-- 3 students. The committees will consist of approximately 16 students each. Also in the coordinating council, we are going to have the chairman of each war committee on an ex officio basis.

Chart 9



Also within this structure the faculty will fit, as faculty advisers. There will be a faculty adviser in each coordinating council and one in each of the cold, limited, and general war committees. That means four faculty advisers per team. Within those four we will select one who has specific qualifications in the following subjects: economics, international relations, and military science. Although they are assigned to a particular team, those specialists are available to the students and to all the others. The faculty advisers also will meet with the coordinating council as required.

We do not want to limit you in any way in developing your ideas in the committees, for that is the important educational mission of the College; but we do feel that these coordinating councils can spot areas of omission and duplication and call them to the attention of the committee chairmen. It's hard to tell where you start limited, then cold, and then where you start general war. It's an accumulative thing, and the thing has to be coordinated.

By having a coordinating council which is impartial and not part of any team, like we did last year, we feel we will get a more objective view and get off a little bit faster.

Each committee will be required to make a written report, setting forth the committee's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, together with supporting reasons.

Each committee also will be required to make a 40-minute oral report, based on its written report, to the ICAF student body. In these presentations, the chairman of the coordinating council for each team will introduce his committee and following their presentations will then summarize, indicating how the whole problem ties together.

The College will see to it that you receive secretarial help. In addition, the Library personnel and the Visual Aids Department are available to serve.

Certain of the presentations, as determined by a faculty board, will be presented to the National War College on 7 June.

To wind this up, I wish briefly to announce a few additional items.

a. You will receive the curriculum for the final unit a few days prior to departure for the international field trips.

b. Each chairman will be contacted early and will be responsible for organizing his committee so you can get off to a flying start.

c. As far as practicable, we will concentrate members of each committee in student rooms adjacent to their seminar rooms.

d. We are in the process of arranging liaison trips to relocation sites, DOD, JCS, OEP, and other appropriate Government agencies which you in the committees might desire.

e. Students will not be given a preference as to what their committee assignments will be. We will follow the traditional procedure in organizing committees. They will be composed so that service connections are equitably and proportionately represented by Army, Navy, Air Force, Civil Service, and those who wear this proud emblem (Marine). (Chart 10, page 14.)

I have just introduced this problem. I didn't intend to solve it.

Remember, you can conclude this problem successfully only if each of you utilizes fully his ingenuity and background. Your task can be a pleasant and rewarding experience if your committees distribute the workload equitably, and each member contributes his maximum effort toward solving the problem.

Thank you.

I have time for half a question. Any questions?

QUESTION: Do the three teams work on the same problem independently?

COLONEL COLMER: Teams work independently. Your chairman will organize a team effort in such a way that it would be very difficult, other than minor collaboration for a few facts, to progress rapidly to your objectives. You don't come out with three identical solutions in the three teams because each team organization interprets the requirements differently and places emphasis on different considerations.

QUESTION: How about the availability of JCS documents?

COLONEL COLMER: That's what I inferred in mentioning preliminary liaison with other agencies. We set up a briefing at JCS which

worked very well last year. Although we can't get selected documents here, we can send those people who are involved in "needing to know" that information over there. They are very cooperative. I want to send representatives from each committee to the two relocation sites by helicopter. We are making preparations for you to be able to visit almost any agency in the Government. We will know whom to talk to in case you come around and say, "We want to go here or there," We feel that you'll get a lot out of the school if you get out and visit various departments and agencies. You can be critical of them until you get inside of them, and then you see that some of them are really working, and have difficult problems.

Any other questions? Thank you.

(21 Mar 1962--375)O/ekh:




Chart 10