STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

23 February 1962

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NOTICE

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Washington, D. C.

His Excellency Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Malayan Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, was born in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Malaya, 7 July 1909. He graduated from Malay College, Perak, Malaya and joined Lincoln's Inn, London, to study law. He was the first Malayan to pass final bar exams at the age of 20. London's legal age for law practice is 21; therefore, during the interim of a year, he studied at Bristol University. From 1931 to 1955, he held various civil service posts, both State and Federal. In 1956, he was appointed Federation of Malaya's first Commissioner in Australia and when the Federation achieved its independence in August 1957, he became Malaya's first High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. He was appointed as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs in 1958 and was appointed to his present position in March 1958. For his services, he was decorated four times by both State and Federal Governments. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

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GENERAL QUILL: Gentlemen: Southeast Asia is a part of the world with the very greatest importance to America. A hungry Communist China casts covetous eyes on this rice bowl of the world and its tremendous natural resources of tin, oil, rubber, and tungsten make it mandatory that it remains free of Communist domination.

Our guest this afternoon has consented to speak to us on the subject of "Stability in Southeast Asia." Since he is the Ambassador of Malaya to the United States, he is in a position to speak with authority on this subject.

It is a great honor and privilege for me to introduce His Excellency Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil.

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: Thank you, General Quill, for your kind words of introduction. Gentlemen: The Commandant of the College has done me a great honor in inviting me to address you today on the subject of "Stability in Southeast Asia." I consider this a great privilege coming thus at a time when I am about to leave your country on the termination of my mission here, serving in a way as a parting gesture and one of my last speaking engagements in this country.

I would not, gentlemen, for a moment wish to claim to be an expert on this part of the world, southeast Asia. My competence, as you will readily agree, lies primarily in the affairs of my own country, the Federation of Malaya. What I have to say in my comments on other countries in this region is purely my personal view, looking as it were on the problems of southeast Asia through the eyes of a Malayan.

I think most experts are agreed that the term "southeast Asia," whether used in the geographical, political, or historic context, refers to a specific region of Asia confined to a definite area. This area comprises, running roughly from west to east in parts of the southwest Pacific, the sovereign states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,

South Vietnam, the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Philippines.

To these countries we should add, for want of a better term, the British territories on Borneo Island--North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei, and the self-governing island of Singapore, which lies immediately to the south of the Malay Peninsula.

Looking back into the history of the recent past, one could not help but notice one salient political fact which is common to almost all the countries that I have mentioned. This is that all the countries in this region, excepting Thailand and the still remaining British territories, immediately before the Pacific war, were under one form of Colonial domination or another. British influence stretched from Burma down to the Malay Peninsula, the French over the Indo-Chinese area, the Dutch over the East Indies, and the Americans in the Philippines. Immediately after the war, however, and sparked in no small measure by the Japanese attempt at consolidating nearly the whole of the region into a vast Asian coprosperity sphere under the domination of Imperial Japan, the upsurge of nationalism which had hitherto remained dormant was given a great impetus. The winds of change had indeed come to southeast Asia, and in less than 15 years the political picture had completely changed to bring forth a number of sovereign nations, each in its own way making great efforts to retain its political freedom to attain a certain measure of economic advancement and a higher standard of living for its people.

How far have we all progressed, and what is the picture that we see today in this region? Let me give you a brief survey of the region as I see it now.

Laos is a country which, much to our sympathy in the Federation of Malaya, has not achieved either political or economic stability. There is a civil war conflict that has plagued the country for quite some time. The struggle for power between the leaders of the country has been exploited to the full by the Communists, who are always ready to cash in on a crisis. The flight of the peaceful and harmless people of Laos, driven from their homes and seeking safety elsewhere, is a cause for anxeity, and we in the Federation of Malaya look to the day when peace and tranquility are again restored to this troubled country.

Another powder keg is South Vietnam, where the danger of an outbreak of a general war is imminent. This can be prevented if the South Vietnam Army, with assistance and advice from friendly countries, gains the upper hand over the Communist-led guerrillas that now control certain parts of the country. So far as the Federation of Malaya is concerned,

we have provided some measure of aid both in material and advice, and will continue to give support in whatever way we can to the South Vietnam Government in its struggle against the type of enemy with whom we are more than familiar.

In addition to its religious philosophy, the fabric of modern Burma has two important strands. First, along with the evils inherent in any colonial system, the British brought to Burma modern social institutions, some measure of economic development, and the concept of civil liberties. Then the nationalist leaders, who rebelled against foreign rule but at the same time admired and borrowed much from the West, added idealism and courage to the nation's inheritance. Burma today wants above all to be left alone so that she may work out her many perplexing internal problems. The form of government is essentially a parliamentary republic, with two Houses of Parliament, consisting of a Chamber of Nationalities and a House of Deputies. The President, elected by both chambers, serves a 5-year term and appoints the Prime Minister, who is the chief executive. After some political instability during the late fifties, when a military leader took over to restore a large measure of stability, the elected civilian government took over.

Since its independence the Burmese Government has had to cope with armed insurgents inside the country. Some of these are disgruntled ethnic minority groups as well as other members belonging to two rival outlawed Communist parties. Within recent years, many of the non-Communist insurgents and a few Communist elements have surrendered. But the insurgency problem remains an impediment to law and order and to the country's economic development.

The Burmese Government, however, is committed to the democratic process by law and inclination. Burma has taken firm steps against internal communism, and economically it is making slow but steady progress toward the country's agricultural and industrial progress in its broad program of economic and social reforms.

Finally, it is pursuing international policies which the present leaders consider the best calculated to achieve internal political unity and economic development. While pursuing a neutral policy, the Burmese Government has demonstrated a firm belief in its national cooperation, particularly in matters of an economic and social nature. Burma has joined forces with other countries in Asia and the Pacific in the Columbo plan, which aims at pooling economic and technical resources for bettering economic conditions in the various countries of the area.

The Kingdom of Thailand boasts a centuries-old tradition of stalwart independence and resistance to foreign domination. Politically it has been a constitutional monarchy, but the national assembly, which consisted of both elected and appointed members, has recently been dissolved. The present governing authorities are preparing a new constitution and have declared their support for King Bhumibol Adulyadej as Chief of State, and their intention of honoring Thailand's international commitments, including the South Asian Treaty Organization.

Thailand has developed a foreign trade from the earliest times, and was one of the first countries in Asia to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with the West. Now both America and Western Europe have become major consumers of Thailand's raw materials, minerals and natural rubber, and other countries, such as Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, have been the major areas which have received Thai exports. Rice from Thailand's Central Plain provides almost 50 percent of the country's foreign exchange and more than 30 percent of the government's revenues.

Since World War II Thailand has made a steady advance to expand her industries, develop her agriculture, and raise the level of health and education of her people. Thailand is also a member of the Columbo plan and since July of last year joined with the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines to form the Association of Southeast Asian States. Of this, gentlemen, I will have more to say later.

As a member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, Thailand has held important positions in these bodies, including some time ago the Presidency of the United Nations General Assembly.

The young nation of Cambodia stems from the ancient civilization of more than 1,000 years ago. With the emerging independent small nations on continental southeast Asia, this country now follows the policy of neutrality and avoidance of entering into any foreign alliance, while maintaining friendly ties with countries of the Western World.

Cambodia's political setup is a constitutional monarchy, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the son of the late King Suramarit, who died in 1960, is Chief of State and political leader of the nation. The one popularly elected legislative body is the National Assembly.

With limited national resources, the country's economy is primarily agricultural, with rice and rubber as its principal exports. Of recent

years the deficits in Cambodia's balance of trade have been largely financed by aid from United States sources and other forms of external aid have been applied for the improvement of agriculture, health, education, and other governmental services, and for the development of small industries.

Further south, gentlemen, of the countries I have mentioned earlier is the largest and the most heavily populated island nation, the Republic of Indonesia, which has attained its independence from 300 years of Dutch control after more than 4 years of intermittent warfare and negotiations, beginning from the Japanese surrender in 1945 and culminating in 1949 with United Nations mediation. Indonesia became independent the following year. It is perhaps one of the foremost nations in this region, endowed with great potential natural resources.

The Indonesian Government until 1959 was based primarily on the Western European parliamentary system, with the President, Vice President, unicameral Legislature, and Cabinet responsible to the Legislature established under the provisional Constitution in 1950. Its efforts at the parliamentary system of government have not proved too successful, and by the late 1950's President Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders came to the conclusion that this system of government was not suited to Indonesia, after political and economic dissidence had erupted into armed rebellion against the government within certain parts of the nation. In more than a decade of independence, Indonesia had made only limited progress toward its goals of developing a strong nation and raising the standards of living of its people.

Indonesia is currently undergoing a change in its governmental structure considered more suited to its needs. Over the past few years the strength of the executive has been progressively enhanced, while the powers of the political parties in the legislative arm have been diminished. The organization of President Sukarno's "guided democracy" takes the form of appointed bodies comprising representatives of political parties and functional groups, such as youth, labor, commerce, and others, with whom the President shares legislative powers. Until security conditions throughout the country permit, President Sukarno has stated that the holding of a general election for a new parliament under the 1945 Constitution which in 1959 was decreed as the country's permanent charter will be deferred.

Economically, Indonesia has passed through rapid development toward a more productive and a more diversified economy with greater

emphasis on manufacturing industry than hitherto. The economy, as is true of all the economies of primary producing countries, is very sensitive to the fluctuations of the world commodity prices, since its exports are almost exclusively raw materials. The major ones are rubber and petroleum, which account on the average for 70 to 75 percent of total exports.

Since the Korean war boom, the prices of Indonesia's major commodities have not recovered sufficiently to achieve any balance of trade improvements, and its heavy expenditure for services has been made up by sizable economic and technical assistance both from the free world and from the Soviet bloc countries.

A major area of concern in this region involving Indonesia is West Iran or West New Guinea. Here is a territory which is held by the Dutch and claimed by the Indonesians as their own. An Indonesian invasion of West Iran or West New Guinea could be disastrous to both sides and perhaps even to the world. I have no wish now, gentlemen, to go into the merits of the claim by either side here, but I do want to reiterate our hope that it should be possible to bring about a solution to the dispute by amicable means. The lives of several thousands of innocent men are at stake, and the peace of southeast Asia is in jeopardy.

The last country that I am going to touch upon, apart from that of my own, is the Philippines. Three hundred years of Spanish rule and about a half-century of association with the United States have left their mark on this young nation. The Spanish left an imprint of a system of law and a system of strong central Government. From the Americans the Filipinos inherited the democratic philosophy of government, a system of universal public education in English, and a health and sanitation program as a basis for further development.

The Philippines, since independence in 1946, have received a substantial total of grants, credits, and reparations from foreign sources, thus contributing significantly to Philippine industrial development, expansion of agricultural production, and mining. In common with other developing countries, the Philippine economy is characterized by underdevelopment, coupled with a high potential for expansion and growth. The same obstacles, striving over the past, and rapid fulfillment of this potential are being faced in the existing state of underindustrialization, shortage of domestic capital, lack of trained technical and managerial personnel, inadequate power and transportation facilities, and a lack of comprehensive data about the country's natural resources and potential for development.

In the postwar period, and despite the existence of serious economic problems, every sector of the economy has expanded, with the fastest growth taking place in manufacturing and mining, with the result that the current estimate of per capita income has reached the reasonable figure of $220, well in the top bracket among the developing nations of the world.

The Philippine economy is basically a free enterprise system, and is guided by such government regulations as extensive exchange control in order to correct any disequilibrium in its balance of payments problem. Recently, with the advent of the new Administration, the Philippines is moving away from its multiple rate of exchange, with the help of additional financial assistance from abroad.

I need not here go into any details of the structure of the Philippine Government, which is, I am sure, familiar to you as Americans, patterned as it is after that of the United States.

In international affairs, the Philippines has played a constructive role in the United Nations while at the same time continuing to expand its relations with other nations, particularly in southeast Asia. It has been an active member of the Columbo plan and of SEATO, and of recent date has become associated with my country and Thailand in the formation of what I stated earlier, the Association of Southeast Asian States.

We now come to my own country, the Federation of Malaya. This young country emerged as an independent nation with a healthy and growing economy characterized by a sound currency, a substantial accumulated surplus, and an absence of any serious problems of unemployment or inflation. This is not to say, gentlemen, that this young nation of less than 5 years old is free of economic problems. A basic problem is the rapid natural increase in its population at a rate of more than 3 percent per annum. The necessity is to expand the economy sufficient to keep pace with basic human needs and to provide for its people in future years greater opportunities and social services.

Related to this problem is the fact that natural rubber and tin, two commodities which are the mainstay of our economy, and of which we are the biggest single producer for the world markets, are subject to wide fluctuations in price. Additionally, since recent years, natural rubber has been facing, and will increasingly be facing, competition from synthetic production.

The government since independence has energetically undertaken a program of diversification of the economy, encouragement of domestic investment of capital produced in the Federation, as well as foreign capital investment, especially in combination with local capital, and an extensive rural development program whose chief aim is to open up these reserves of land for economic exploitation by those who do not already possess land in sufficient economic units. The exploitation of the Federation's rich tin deposits and the development of rubber plantations in combination with Singapore's strategic trading position have produced a generally vigorous economy in the Federation of Malaya.

Industrial and commercial development grew under the system of free enterprise, achieved largely, and initially, by foreign capital. By the judicious use of Anglo-Malayan administrative skills, European and Chinese enterprise, and Chinese and Indian labor, the Federation has been able to enjoy a higher standard of living than most countries in the Far East.

Although Malaya had suffered heavy losses during wartime occupation by the Japanese through exploitation of its natural resources and manpower for the Japanese war effort, its postwar recovery has been very rapid. And since 1948, despite the enormous strain put on it by the long-drawn Communist guerrilla warfare which was happily officially declared ended in 1960, the economy has shown a marvelous resilience to bear the strain.

During the peak period of the pursuit of guerrilla warfare the Federation spent not less than 30 percent of its revenue for this purpose. Today the picture of the Federation of Malaya--the latest development--is among the best in all Asia. Transport, communications, electric power, and other social capital installations are sufficiently developed so as to generate income per head of population at an estimated figure of $260 per annum, one of the highest, I believe, in the entire Far East. The latest figures I have for other countries in this region by comparison, which may interest you, gentlemen, are, Burma, about $59; Laos, $50; Thailand $105; South Vietnam, $153; Cambodia, $100; Indonesia, $60; and the Philippines, $215.

When one looks around in this region of the world, the very difficult experience faced by a few of these emerging nations may give rise to certain skepticism regarding their ability to translate their freedom into any degree of political-economic competence or the subsequent viability of their governments. However, I believe that if there are

shortcomings they stem not from freedom itself but from conditions and circumstances in which freedom is granted.

In the case of the Federation of Malaya, we are more fortunate. Even when the British assumed the role of protecting power, she anticipated the day when she would have to relinquish the reins of government to Malaya, and her policy took that direction. In that process a corps of civil and ancillary administrative personnel was built up and nurtured. From being feudal chiefs, the rulers of the Malay States themselves have become constitutional monarchs, delegating the executive business of government to ministers and civil servants, and exercising their personal powers only with the advice of the executive councils of their respective States.

The States themselves, as you know, are now federated with the former British colonies of Penang and Malacca, and a Federal Government with strong central powers has been created at the center. The essential effect is that the whole political structure of the government, in which all communities take an increasing part, is based upon gradual adaptation and development of the whole Malayan political system.

Thus there was built up a group of Federal and local government services as an essential part of the political structure. The Malayan civil service, Anglo-Malayan in origin, and the other Federal services, have been open to recruitment from the other communities who have come to settle in the country.

When the time came for the British to leave Malaya, there was no chaos abounding, as happened in most other countries when the protecting powers abdicated, but orderly transition. Subsequent events have amply demonstrated that the people's faith in themselves had not been misplaced. One important result flowing from our own situation is that the link with Great Britain has been maintained with our continued association in the Commonwealth of Nations.

I need not examine here in detail, gentlemen, the Federation of Malaya's increasing role in the affairs of nations. In less than 5 years of independence it has won prestige abroad and a measure of self-respect for its people, chiefly through its own efforts. We have been one of the first supporters of the United Nations efforts in the Congo operation, a staunch champion of anticolonialism in whatever form or guise it may take, and an advocate for the principles of respect for the fundamental human rights as laid down in the United Nations Charter and

the universal declaration of human rights. We have repeatedly taken the lead as well as given our support in the cause of the suppressed people of Tibet and Hungary.

With political and economic stability at home, we are actively pursuing a policy of cementing relationships nearer home. Our Prime Minister has made goodwill visits to most countries in our region and to Europe, Canada, and the United States. It was during one of these visits to the Philippines in early 1959 that the Prime Minister and President Garcia made a joint call for closer cooperation in cultural and economic matters among the countries of southeast Asia. The idea took shape quickly. Thailand immediately identified itself with this proposal. After an official working party, represented by top civil servants of these three countries, which met in Bangkok in June 1961, had produced a report, the three Foreign Ministers met at a joint meeting about a month later to declare the formal launching of the Association of Southeast Asian States, comprising the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The organization is concerned merely with matters of common interest to the people of the region, particularly in the economic, cultural, scientific, and technical fields. The idea behind the association of southeast Asia is to build for the Asian countries in this region a strong community with determination to work out our own future for the mutual benefit of our respective countries and our peoples. These countries feel that it is about time we started to think and plan things ourselves, rather than allow others to do the planning and the thinking for us, in other words, to develop our self-reliance and self-dependence.

We do not wish to be entirely dependent on the aid of the Western bloc, or any bloc, for that matter. The whole purpose of the plan is to strengthen economic, cultural, and friendship ties in the southeast Asian area. These countries do not intend to win over any country to join the Association, but if other countries in the region think the Association is a good one the door is wide open for them to come in at any time.

Political and economic analysts of the West are apt to be skeptical of the possible success that any regional cooperation in this part of the world will have in view of the long history of political hegemony as well as the economic instability of the countries concerned. It must be remembered that it has taken the countries of Western Europe many, many years to reach the state when they begin to think in terms of regional economic and political integration, and this happens in more

sophisticated and discerning societies, where universal education has been the order of the day for centuries.

In the less sophisticated societies of southeast Asia one would expect a much slower rate of development throughout the region. All the same this recent development, initiated by the few countries in the region which have achieved some measure of political security and economic stability, is, I suggest, well worth noting.

It is natural that all newly emergent nations will be having troubles in the experimentation of the democratic processes, which, after all, are alien to their traditional concepts. They will need some time to adapt this concept to suit their particular circumstances. It is, however, a measure of the political sophistication reached by these few countries that they have started to think in terms of economic and cultural cooperation extending beyond their own borders. The countries of the West should not hesitate, therefore, to assist this development and to nurture its growth. They should in concert, through such international media as the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and the developing Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as through bilateral arrangements, bring forth all economic and technical assistance that they can afford to provide. These countries would then be in a better position to reach economic viability and advancement, which, after all, are the basis for political stability

When this state is reached, these countries would then become the nucleus of a stronger resistance against the common enemy of international communism, which is always ready to step in by subversive means or even by overt aggression as we see happening today in both Laos and Vietnam.

Certainly, it is encouraging to note the increasing realization on the part of the countries of Asia and the Far East of the need for regional economic cooperation as one of the effective means for advancing individual national progress and that of the region as a whole.

Political stability cannot be achieved unless it is based largely on economic and social advancement of the people. This step, initiated by the three countries themselves for mutual cooperation and economic and social development, will no doubt form a solid basis on which the political stability of the region in future years will depend.

The next few weeks, gentlemen, will see the first concrete results of the preparatory work of the Association of Southeast Asia, when the Foreign Ministers of the three countries meet in Kuala Lumpur for the first time since its formation to consider the report and recommendations of the first meeting of the Joint Committee of Economic Experts of the Association, with a view to implementing certain common projects, technical cooperation, promotion of trade, transport, communications, industry, and fisheries.

Another significant contribution which we in the Federation of Malaya have high hopes for in making toward stability in this region of the world is the much discussed proposal put forth by our Prime Minister last May for the ideal of the creation of a greater Federation of Malaysia. The Federation of Malaya today as a nation realizes that it cannot stand alone in isolation. Upon this premise, a proposal whereby the sister territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak can be brought together in close political and economic association was put forward.

In a world in which exists a real threat to democracy and nationhood from the Communists, the smaller nations standing alone will constantly face the threat of Communist domination and enslavement. The battle is being waged by the Communists, and the tactics of Communist warfare are many and varied, stretching from subversion to actual armed conflict.

What, then, are the lines of action open to the smaller nations? They could succumb one after another, lose their national identity, and become satellites, or they could unite in groups and resist the onslaught by concerted action. Random unions, based on few or no common factors, are doomed to failure and will provide, through the ensuing chaos attendant upon dissolution, an opportunity for the enemy of democracy to make inroads and finally capture the whole position.

However, an association that can claim for its members a common cultural heritage, fortune, history, common economic factors, common threats to their securities, and consequently the need for similar defense thinking and administrative and judicial service produced out of the same mold and for decades a common currency, such an association, I submit, gentlemen, can hardly fail.

The Federation of Malaya, the states of Singapore and Brunei, and the territories of Sarawak and British Borneo are fortunate to enjoy

these common factors, factors which are self-evident. It would therefore seem logical for territories and states such as these to merge and meet their common problems. The economic benefits to be derived from this wider association are obvious. With your permission, gentlemen, I would like to make a brief mention of a few aspects of the economic cooperation.

We know that the geographical situation of the Malaysia territories, coupled with historical, cultural, and the existing economic ties, provide a rational and an advantageous association. We are also aware of the definite trend toward larger groupings which is taking place in Western Europe, where countries which for centuries have been happy to exist economically on a national basis are now entering into larger associations, such as the European Common Market. The economic benefits of the union are very apparent to us. We do not wish to see our part of the world stagnate in this respect while many others forge ahead.

In the territories of Malaysia, a great deal of trade is interterritorial and at present customs formalities and duties abound, but with Malaysia this will cease to be a problem, so that we in this wider territory can concentrate our efforts to obtain markets abroad without any longer having to worry about internal competition.

Again, a larger economic entity can always expect to produce goods more cheaply, because of the larger home markets, and large concerns will consequently be happier to invest where returns are likely to be surer and better.

In the international finance field, the chances of obtaining loans are better if you are large. Our limited expert skills will not be frittered away through wasteful application on minor projects but will be so applied as to obtain maximum benefits from them.

There can be no doubt that from the economic point of view alone Malaysia will bring prosperity in abundance for all the peoples in these territories to share and enjoy. It should not be forgotten, also, that one very important aspect of the Malaysia ideal is that it will enable the Borneo territories to transform their present colonial status to self-government for themselves and absolute independence in Malaysia simultaneously, and thus balk the Communist attempt to capture these territories.

The days are now gone, gentlemen, in which small nations feel that developments in international affairs are the special domain or the sole responsibility of the great powers who can individually or by themselves dispose of the fate of the world and its people. Today these nations have to keep a close watch on events happening everywhere and even try to contribute to their solution within the limits of their capabilities and responsibilities. More often than not their influence could be salutary.

Particularly there is need for countries in Asia to group together, and to exchange information and experience in the economic sphere. The fulfillment of large-scale planning activities and extensive development will be considerably accelerated by closer cooperation among the countries in Asia in almost all fields.

I am glad to say from what I have been able to tell you today that the Federation of Malaya, my country, has not lagged behind but on the contrary has taken the lead in making our contribution toward the maintenance of peace and stability in southeast Asia. Needless to say, we in the Federation of Malaya believe that peace, security, and happiness are essential to all men. That is what we have been trying to help achieve in the brief time of our independence. We have charted our course in that direction while simultaneously trying to encourage other leaders and peoples of southeast Asia to do the same. Because of the proximity to one another, the desirability for Asian countries to think and act together in the broader perspective is obvious. With these other nations, therefore, we share a unity of purpose, standing for our common experience in the struggle for independence.

We want peace. What draws us together is the realization that nationalism alone does not make for a happy and contented nation and that with nationhood the facts of life must be faced. It is unfortunate that some of us are not achieving success in the best possible circumstances, but in the process have encountered civil dissension, political subversion, external pressure, racial discordance, and even religious bigotry. I would go further to say that what we need is not only peace but the stability which comes with peace, the vital foundation for development and progress.

I have tried to show to you the important role that the Federation of Malaya is playing in this general effort. Given the chance, we are determined to make a success of it, so that we can look forward to a bright, prosperous, and peaceful future.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN GALLAGHER: Ambassador Kamil is ready for your questions, gentlemen.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that in your Association the door is open to the other political units. What steps have been taken to get them in? Are there any particular invitation methods? How have they reacted?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: I believe, initially, as soon as the idea was promoted by President Garcia and my Prime Minister, we got in touch with the governments of our neighboring areas to tell them that we had this scheme in mind, as a result of which Thailand, as I told you, came in straightaway. But the other governments are still waiting to see what it is all about. We have had this working party established, and they have had the first meeting, discussing real, concrete problems. This will, I hope, be discussed in the course of the next few weeks, and I hope there will be a lot of publicity given it, so that the other nations nearby will come to know what we have done so far, and if they consider they would like to join in, they are always welcome to come in.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, would you care to comment on the presence of large numbers of overseas Chinese in many of the southeast Asian countries and their probable impact on future political stability in some of these countries?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: Well, probably I could illustrate the impact brought about in our region by the presence of a great number of Chinese, taking the example of my own country. The Chinese came in great numbers--although they were there before, 300 to 400 years ago--about 80 years ago, when capital provided work for them in the form of tin mines, rubber estates, and so on. They all came to Malaya. While during the prewar years the Chinese were content with resting as traders or commercial people, and workers and laborers in the various rubber estates and tin mines, after the war they felt that they had a say in the administration of the country. That was one result of the sort of Chinese grouping of population in the area. Secondly, they gave us a lot of trouble during our 12 years of guerrilla warfare against the Communists. More than 90 percent, or nearly 100 percent, of the Communist guerrillas were of Chinese origin. The majority of them were Chinese who, at that time, were only looking toward China. Except for having their homes, shops, and capital in Malaya, they felt they were not really Malayans, with the result that when the Malayan Communist

Party decided to come out into open warfare, they had a lot of support.

Under our new Constitution many of the Chinese are now citizens, either through birth or through application for registration, but, frankly speaking, we are still not certain of their true loyalty. Among the population of Malaya, for example, we have the older Chinese people who have been there in the country for 50 or 60 years, and they naturally look up to Nationalist China. But among the younger generation, the majority of them look up to Communist China. We can appreciate this, because Communist China now is developing into a big world power, with a big amount of land area and a big population.

So this anxiety will continue, not only in Malaya but in the countries in the region where there are great numbers of Chinese in the population.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, if the proposed Federation of Malaysia becomes a reality, do you see any danger that the Singapore Communists will align themselves with the Socialist front in your country? If so, do you think that the combination could be an effective political group in the new federation?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: I would say yes. The bulk of the Chinese in Singapore who are inclined much to the left and even Communist, would certainly find a way to associate with what we call our Socialist Party in Malaya. How far they will be effective as a political association remains to be seen. But the Socialist Party in Malaya, backed by the Communists in Singapore, will of course gain strength numerically and probably psychologically, too. But I have confidence myself that the government will certainly be awakened to the fact that there will be the strengthening of the Socialist Party, or even that it will turn much more toward the left, and will take effective measures, probably first of all not recognizing any legal form of Communist political party to begin with, and in tracking down those who are trying to subvert the government of the country through various ways, like they have been doing and still are doing--coming into labor unions, subverting school children, trade unions, and so on and so forth.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, you have pointed out the close cultural ties between Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. Have they not equally close social and ethnic ties with the rest of Borneo, and might not this create a future problem in the Republic of Indonesia, if the Federation of Malaysia is formed?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: You are correct in saying that the Indonesian part of Borneo Island, which is the biggest part, is inhabited by Indonesians, who are really Malayans. Malayans are Indonesians. We come from the same ethnic group. In reply to the second part of your question about getting into a clash with Indonesia, as far as I know at the moment, the Indonesian Government, through the voice of Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister, last month in the United Nations when he was making a statement on West New Guinea said that Indonesia welcomed this proposal and wished us the best of luck. So this is the present position. What comes in the future remains to be seen.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, would you comment on some of the more important factors that led to the successful elimination of the guerrillas in your country, and perhaps whether any of those might have application elsewhere in southeast Asia?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: It is a long story. I was privileged to speak to St. John's University on this very subject some weeks past. Briefly, shooting war alone will not win the fight against communism. We feel that we have a bigger fight, and the fight is against our own people, in the sense that we have to bring them up to a level of a standard of living that will give them no cause for complaint. We have to provide them with education, with full stomachs, with roofs to stay under to protect them from the sun and the rain.

Throughout the 12 war years--and I was personally involved because I was there as Chief Minister of my own little state--in the first 3 or 4 years of the emergency, which started in 1948, apart from trying to contain the Communists' armed guerrillas, we also had to reeducate our people--or I would say educate, because they probably had never had any education of this kind--in what is right and what is wrong, and at the same time to give them all those benefits that I was mentioning just now.

That is the only way, in my own opinion and, I believe, in the opinion of my government, that we can stave off the incursion of communism not only in Malaya but in other regions surrounding the country.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, would you give us a critique of United States foreign policy, the way we carry out our foreign policy in your area, where you think it is strong, and where you think we might improve our policy?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: Well, as far as I can see, United States foreign policy in the area would probably cover at the moment participation in the troubled area of Laos and Vietnam. I believe she has certain responsibilities there. She is committed to the defense of this area. To that extent I don't think anybody could have any quarrel about that.

I was asked the question the other day whether any United States armed intervention as against what we know now as intervention through having advisers, teachers, instructors, and so on would be welcomed or would be looked on with disfavor. My reply was a frank reply from my own understanding of the position, that any armed intervention, as for example the United States sending an Army or Navy to do the actual fighting, would be looked upon with great disfavor, not only by those in our region but by other nations, too.

That is my appreciation of the problem. But so long as the intervention and help are confined to aid, in the sense of military aid, in the sense of having instructors, teachers, and economic aid or technical aid, I don't think anybody could have any grouse on that. To that extent the policy is, as I said, that you have certain commitments. I don't think anybody has commented on that with any disfavor.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, would you care to comment on the view of your country toward SEATO as a potential base for further regional cooperation?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: I do not believe myself that SEATO would expand in the sense of having additional countries as members. What one has been talking about lately is whether SEATO would remain SEATO, because of SEATO's ineffectiveness. That is one of the words used. I cannot foresee at the moment that Malaya, for example, would join SEATO. We have been against joining SEATO right from the beginning. We know we have a defense problem, but we felt that because of our age-old association with the United Kingdom that it would be sufficient if we entered into a bilateral agreement with Great Britain for mutual assistance and defense.

So from the point of view of expansion of SEATO being a focal point for stability in the area, I would not like to commit myself to say that the existence of SEATO in the area would contribute toward eventual stability in the southeast Asian area.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, do the countries of southeast Asia, and you, yourself, view India's action with respect to Goa recently as a threat or as a boon to political stability in that part of the world?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: First of all, our Prime Minister was quizzed on this question in Parliament some time ago after the event took place. He said, "What is the use of talking now? The thing has happened." This should convey to you gentlemen a lot of meaning, in the sense that I personally did not like the action India took at that time. I feel that, given a lot of good will and understanding, one could resolve problems of that nature. Probably the Portuguese have had a lot to be blamed for.

We didn't like it. I can tell you that. The example set by India may well be taken as a blue print for what Indonesia might wish to do regarding West New Guinea, for example.

The ineffectiveness of the Security Council to do anything has caused us a lot of alarm and despondency, just through this power of veto by the Russians. Even if we could not take immediate action--and I am sure we could not have done anything in the sense of sending a body of soldiers to keep them apart--at least the passing of a resolution would have helped psychologically and morally quite a lot, and would show that the United Nations is a body for peace and security and happiness for people.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, I would like to pursue further the answer you just gave on intervention by the United States. Are you saying that if it came to the point of the Viet Kong takeover of Vietnam the people would prefer that it go that way rather than that the United States intervene actively to help prevent this?

AMBASSADOR KAMIL: Well, I am sure the bulk of the people in the areas of Vietnam and Laos would not like the Communists to take over. The point is whether the United States or for that matter any major power which has an army, a navy, and an air force should pour down into the territory thousands of troops, for example, to fight. There is still time to get the people themselves to realize that this is their own fight. But at the moment they do not have the facilities to do their own fighting. They do not have enought trained soliders and trained officers. Have they built enough security on the ground, for example? Have they educated their people to realize what is right and what is wrong?

Maybe I am theorizing from the examples we had in Malaya. Maybe the time is short there now. What I stated earlier, sir, was that if there is direct military intervention in the way of the presence of foreign troops, not just the United States but the United Kingdom or SEATO troops, for example, then that presence will be looked upon with great disfavor, not only by people within our region but by other countries of the world.

That was my point. It is not whether they like the Communists to take over or not.

CAPTAIN GALLAGHER: Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for interrupting your busy schedule and coming here to give us a very informative lecture.

(10 July 1962--7,600)O/en:ijk