NATIONALISM, ANTICOLONIALISM, NEUTRALISM

28 March 1963

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NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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Dr. Hans Kohn, Professor, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1891. He received the degree of Doctor of Law at the German University there, and an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters from Colby College, Maine, in 1958. He came to the United States from Palestine in 1931. He was professor of history at Smith College from 1934 to 1949, moving in 1949 to a similar position at the City College of New York until last summer when he accepted his present position. He was on several occasions visiting lecturer in international relations at Harvard and other universities. He was a member of the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton in 1948 and 1955 and a Guggenheim Fellow in 1940. He is an associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania and editorial adviser of the Encyclopedia Britannica. The latest of his many books are "American Nationalism," (1957), "The Mind of Germany," (1960), and "The Age of Nationalism," (1962). He has also edited the book, "The Mind of Modern Russia" (1962). This is Dr. Kohn's fourth lecture at the Industrial College.

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COLONEL COLMER: I can assure you this morning, gentlemen, that you have a fine treat in store for you.

Professor Hans Kohn, from the Department of Social Science at the University of Denver, will discuss the post-World War II aspects of those three familiar words to this audience, "Nationalism, Anticolonialism, and Neutralism."

Dr. Kohn is an authority on the subject of international affairs. He is recognized by all the war colleges and service academies, and I'm surprised if anyone in this audience hasn't heard him previously. He is an educator and an author. Many of his books can be found in our library.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce you, Dr. Kohn, to the Class of 1963 of the Industrial College.

DR. KOHN: Gentlemen: I shall speak about the present world situation, and very much of it can be summed up by what might be called the three emotional forces of nationalism, anticolonialism, and neutralism which dominate a very large part of mankind today.

I wish to say immediately that I am one of the rather few people who look at the present world situation with an optimistic outlook.

In 1918 a German writer who became well-known in America, or rather his name did, had a book published in English. He held some views which became known, or at least his name did. Oswald Spengler wrote a book which he called in German "Der Unter Gang des Abendlaudes." It was translated as "The Decline of the West," but the German name implies more than decline. It implies the fall, the end, of Western civilization. Spengler put forward in that book that the West was threatened--he published it in 1918--by two revolutionary forces, one of class war in the West, and the second of race war on a worldwide scale. He predicted that these two revolutionary

forces would put an end to Western civilization, to democracy, to capitalism, to the free society, et cetera.

I think he has been proven, like so many other prophets of doom, wrong. Let me say one word very briefly about class war, which is not the subject with which I shall deal today. But, as Spengler spoke of it, I wish to say one word about it. In the 19th century, when Karl Marx wrote, and even in 1917, when Lenin came to power in Russia, it was generally expected that we--and by "we" I mean the free Western civilization--would be unable to solve the problem of labor, of industrial labor.

True, in the 19th century, when Karl Marx wrote, and in the years afterward, labor lived in a situation where it regarded itself as disinherited, as not participating in the wealth, the educational facilities, and the prospects of modern society. It felt it was something outside the society. Now you see in the last decades we--and by "we" I mean free Western society--have solved to an astonishing degree what might be called the problem of labor. You can see it less than I. I am 70 and I remember the days before 1914 and, if you like, the days before the New Deal, when there was insecurity and the permanent threat of poverty and unemployment haunting labor everywhere in the Western world.

That's gone today completely. Today the worker is part of our society, a part which, through big trade unions, has as much influence as big business or big government has. There has been an astonishing change in the situation which in 1920 or 1900 no one would have thought possible.

We spoke a few minutes ago about a strange new phenomenon. When I was young, paid vacations for workers were entirely unknown. Now workers everywhere have two or three weeks of paid vacations in our highly industrialized countries. That means that for the first time in history they travel. As the Admiral said just a few minutes ago, you find British workers in Spain and German workers in England spending their vacations. That was unthinkable when I was young. Workers did not travel. Today they travel as much as anyone else. They feel an equal part of the society.

The result of it is, gentlemen, that the expectations of Marx and Lenin of a revolution in the West is gone. The workers in the United States, the workers in Britain, in Scandinavia, in Switzerland, and in the German Federal Republic will not go on the barricades. They

have a stake, and a very important stake, in present-day society. The idea of Spengler that class war would destroy Western society has been proven unfounded.

I turn now to the second great revolution of our time, because this changed situation of the working class, to anyone as old as I am, is one of the great revolutions, peaceful revolutions--evolutions, changes--in our lifetime, in my lifetime. The second revolution is the awakening, if you wish to use that word, the demand of the people of Latin America, of Asia, of Africa, for assuming their role in history. These continents like Asia and Africa, when I was young, seemed unchanging. We spoke of the sleeping East. By "East" I mean not Russia but Asia. We spoke of the unchanging East, tradition-bound, which stayed sleeping throughout centuries and centuries. Gentlemen, that all has changed in the last decades. There are no parts of the world where there is as fast a change as in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

This transformation, again--and I wish to present something which might in a certain way astonish you--is going on as smoothly as, even more smoothly than, anyone could expect. Gentlemen, if you look back on the history of the Western world, taking for example France or any Western country, the transition from a medieval, tradition-bound society to a modern society has been a long one, a painful one, and not a smooth one. Think of our own society becoming a nation before the long War of Independence against Britain, before the long and bloody Civil War in our own midst, before we settled down to become a consolidated nation. We might compare it with the terrible centuries of nation-growing in Western Europe or in Central Europe. The transition from a prenational stage to modern nationalism in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America, though naturally not entirely smooth, though naturally coupled with crises, nevertheless is, comparatively, immensely smooth. The specter of racial war of the underprivileged races and nations against the privileged ones is now as fast disappearing as the threat of an uprising of the underprivileged masses in England or Switzerland or Scandinavia or Canada or here against the established order.

If we wish to find one name for this transition we can say that the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are entering the age of nationalism. That means that they wish to catch up with the West which has gained its strength from the feeling of national organization, of participation of the people or their feeling of participation in governing or directing the destiny of their country, of their nation. Now the very same feeling is growing there. Certainly they

imitate the pattern of Western organization, or, to say it differently, I quote a well-known quotation to you, they are striving "to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." They are striving to occupy on earth the separate and equal station. This striving, this desire, came to them, not, as some of our simplifiers in the United States think, from Russia or from Lenin but from the West, from Britain, from 1789 France, from our Declaration of Independence, from our interpretation of the equality of men and the equality of peoples in liberty, which this country was the first to proclaim here on earth. Then in 1775 and 1776 there was the unheard of, daring step, taken by the Anglo-Americans of founding a new nation, born in liberty, the echo of which has meanwhile spread all over the earth, and the seeds, in a certain way, of this power of nationalism, this wish to be organized and live after the pattern evolved in the modern West which inspired what I regard as the great revolution of the 20th century.

I am deeply convinced that historians in 200 or 300 years will regard as the decisive event of the 20th century not the Russian Revolution or counterrevolution, if you like, of Lenin in November 1917 but the rise of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, their demand for an equal station among the countries and peoples of the earth.

This has happened in our lifetime with astonishing rapidity, so fast that today the situation in these countries bears no resemblance to that of only a few decades ago. I don't know whether you remember, gentlemen, that in 1937 and 1938 the Foreign Offices of the great European states in London, Paris, and elsewhere debated the question: What can we do to appease Hitler's Germany? Germany was bent on reassertion of its European hegemony at that time, 25 years ago. The question was: What can we do? What was debated most was the "return" of the former German colonies in Africa to Germany. In the British, French, and other Foreign Office documents you will find plan after plan to try to satisfy the Germans by "giving them back" Togo, Cameroon, and other possessions. Gentlemen, today, 25 years later, nobody can give Togo or Cameroon to anyone.

There's a tremendous change. I have always wondered about a phrase very frequently used in the United States, when people say, "We 'lost' Cuba to the Communists, or China, or Vietnam." We didn't lose them. They were never ours. I can only lose my money which I carry here. I can't lose things which don't belong to me.

That is still a premodern word or expression. This feeling is growing, their demand to be equal, not in power, naturally. Take me. I am an emeritus professor. It is not very much to be a professor, as you know. It's even much less to be an emeritus, and it is even much less to be as emeritus as I am, on a negligible pension, and yet I feel equal to Mr. Rockefeller or anyone else having millions and influence. Naturally I have not his influence, and unfortunately I have not his millions. It's a feeling. I stand here in my own light irrespective of my power, bigness, influence, and so on.

This feeling is now growing among all these peoples. It was not there 40 or 50 years ago. What is growing among them is that they don't wish to be directed, they don't wish to be pushed around either by Moscow or by us, either by Peking or by Paris. They wish to be pushed around by no one.

That is in a certain way--and we shall come to it--what they call neutralism. But, before we come to this neutralism, let me point out the first two nations which pointed the way to modern nationalism in non-Western underdeveloped lands. The first was Japan. Gentlemen, I am not an expert in Japanese affairs, but, whenever I consider the present world, that means the world of the 19th and 20th centuries, I am astonished at the immense achievement of Japan. You see, a short while ago people spoke about the immense strength of Russia and said that Russia under Stalin had become so strong and industrialized. Some people spoke about the power of bolshevism, of communism, to modernize backward societies. I always say, "Gentlemen, look at Japan. Russia in 1917 was a European country. Russia in 1917 had excellent universities, Western-trained engineers, mathematicians, chemists, educated people in the Western sense. Russia is immense, full of resources. Japan in 1868 had nothing, no mathematicians, no engineers, nothing. It was a small, overpopulated island, without any native resources. Out of their own strength, without any extra barbarism, they turned this backward country into as well industrialized land as Russia is."

What Stalin achieved with an immense barbarism on existing, strong foundations and natural resources the Japanese achieved without barbarism. Japan defeated in 1904 and 1905, as you know, a great European power, Russia, because Russia was then a great European power, one of the six great powers of Europe and of the world. This defeat was a kind of model for the people of Asia to follow, the Japanese example, to try to become a modern nation.

The second revolution, gentlemen, which started a great deal, was the revolution in Mexico in 1910. I wish to dwell upon this revolution for a very few minutes. I think it is very much necessary now. I don't know whether you studied that history. I would very much recommend it. I don't know whether you write papers on international relations, but, if you do, you study the attitude of the American press and of the American Congress toward the Mexican Revolution in 1910 and the years thereafter when the Mexican government expropriated American and British, but let's say American, land, mines, and oil, you might remember that President Wilson bombarded Vera Cruz in 1914 and sent an expeditionary force under General Pershing to invade Mexico.

Mind, gentlemen, if you could have followed it, at that time we wrote about Mexico as we write today about Cuba. It might be very interesting for you to put column next to column from the Congressional Record or from the newspapers, to compare the attitudes. Our enemies then tried to use Mexico. You may remember from the history the famous Zimmerman dispatch to Mexico in 1917 in which the German government asked Mexico to declare war upon us and to regain Texas, California, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico.

The Mexicans didn't like us. Then Mr. Hoover sent an Ambassador, Mr. Dwight Morrow, who arrived at a modus vivendi with the Mexican Revolution. Today Mexico, always exercising its independence from us, as the Canadians do, too, gentlemen, is one of the most reliable, middle class social systems to be found anywhere in Latin America.

One shouldn't forget that the first national and social revolution on earth that is today being followed in Cuba and in certain ways in Egypt and in all of Africa and Asia started here, in Mexico, in 1910. Now you see the situation of nationalism which has changed the map of Asia and Africa completely. Of what I learned in high school and in college before World War I about Asia and Africa in political geography not one thing is true any more, it has changed so completely in the last 10 years.

Gentlemen, we speak about these countries being anticolonialist. Here I say: What should they be? What do you expect them to be? I always wonder at the strange reasoning of my American friends. They are aghast at the anticolonialism in Africa or in Asia or in Latin America and Cuba. Gentlemen, that's nothing unique. I don't know whether any one of you has any knowledge of Ireland, but there

may be some whose grandparents came from Ireland. Do you think the Irish were always pro-British? The Irish were more anticolonialist, that is, anti-British, than the Indians are today.

I grew up in what is today Czechoslovakia. The Czechs separated as a result of World War I from the Hapsburg Monarchy, which I thought was not so bad a monarchy, and they wiped out immediately all memory and all connection with Austria. I have never found in any of the newly emancipated countries as strong an anticolonialism as among the Europeans.

Gentlemen, I came to this country in 1931. Do you know which was the most disliked country in this country? It was not Russia, not the Communists, not Fascist Italy, not the Nazis in Germany, but Britain, because 150 years ago the British "oppressed" the American settlers. As you very well know, the American settlers were the freest men on earth at that time. They were not really oppressed in the sense in which Africans or Asians were oppressed.

When I came, there was a man in Chicago running for Mayor on a platform of hanging George III, and the greatest newspaper in the world--at least in its own judgment--was then afraid of one thing--that we might become an English colony again, a very improbable event in any case.

I would say that I find that anticolonialism in African and Asian countries is astonishingly small compared with what I found among the Irish, the Czechs, and later the Poles, and the United States population. I would say that makes me very certain that the prediction by Spengler, with which I started, of a racial war will be defeated as much as his prediction of a class war in the Western world.

Let me give you only one example. You all know, naturally, that Algeria fought a bitter war with the French for seven and one-half years, a war in which, let's face the facts, the French Army or part of the French Army, the paratroopers, the Foreign Legion, the security forces, behaved worse in Algeria than the Nazis ever did in France, and yet one year after Evian friendly relations between Algeria and France are much greater than they were between us and Britain after the War of Independence. I never expected that there would be so little anticolonialism as there is. Is this a natural phenomenon? People have memories. People don't forget too fast.

Now we will compare the second point, the point of neutralism. Again I wish you to understand that by recalling to you our own past. Gentlemen, until 1947, a long time from 1789 on, we were a neutralist nation, a noncommitted nation. I came, as I told you, here to this country in 1931, and in the 1930's I made a number of speeches. I was younger then, naturally, and I could make more speeches than I do now, with more vigor. I told my American fellow citizens that if we wished to avoid World War II we must make an outright military alliance with Britain and France. That was in the 1930's. Americans behaved nicely and didn't throw any eggs or tomatoes. But they said, "This poor man is a European and a college professor teaching in a girls' college" (I was teaching at Smith College) "so he doesn't understand serious business. We shall never make an alliance." Everyone quoted George Washington's Farewell Address. Nobody is quoting it any more today. Everybody warned me against being entangled in the struggle of two imperialisms, the German and the British imperialisms, struggling with each other, and said that we nice people had to stay out.

Gentlemen, the Indians and the Africans are as wise as we were 25 years ago. Why should they be wiser? They regard the present struggle as a struggle between imperialisms. Ours is nicer, there is no doubt. But why should they not stay out? There is so much for them to do at home. And then they profit from this struggle. They have one interest, that the struggle should not degenerate into a war. That's their great interest, that the struggle should remain without degenerating into war. Gentlemen, without this struggle, do you really think we would appropriate too much foreign aid? Do you really think that the Soviets would appropriate foreign aid? The other nations profit from the struggle and they take from both sides if they can. They need every cent they can get.

That's neutralism. Again, neutralism is something which we should try to understand. What is demanded in the world today is on our part an understanding of this great revolution which is going on in the world, a certain empathy, a certain feeling for its own point of view.

Let me say one word about one point which apparently occupies many minds. When I look at the history of the last five or six years, I do not see that we--by "we" I mean the free society of the West--I don't mean only the United States--are losing and the Communists are gaining. Some people try to frighten us by presenting the Communists as oversized people, saying that their leaders seem so much

more intelligent than ours. I doubt these things very much. Gentlemen, those of you who are old enough--I don't know whether anyone is so old--to remember 1919 and 1920 remember that at that time it was said that our good Mr. Woodrow Wilson was not up to the European statesmen--to Clemenceau, to Lloyd George--who could in Paris put him into their pocket. There was a strange feeling that our Administration, our Government, was not equal to those of the wily European statesmen who planned everything so well and always got their own way and then dominated the American mind.

Today we do the very same thing, not any more with the Europeans but with the Communist statesmen. We think they are so brilliant, so foresighted, and so they have a plan for the next 50 years, and the poor Americans can't keep up with them. That's complete nonsense. Mr. Khrushchev as much as Mr. Kennedy does not know what to do tomorrow. There are no supermen in the Kremlin, as there are no supermen in the White House.

The great mistakes in the last years were not made by us. The Communist government is beset, and Mr. Kennedy is beset, by problems. I don't underrate Mr. Kennedy's problems. He has to deal with the Congress. That is quite a difficult job. He has to deal with de Gaulle. That is quite a difficult job. And so on. But his problems compare with the problems faced by Mr. Khrushchev. He builds military missiles but I am sure we build more and better. We have too much to eat. Throughout the Soviet empire there is a food shortage. Two years ago there was a horrible famine in China. It is now a little bit better. In the West there is nowhere a famine.

We pay our farmers for not growing food. They cannot get their farmers to grow enough food. De Gaulle is a troublesome fellow, I assure you, but Mao is a problem, too. Today the time when the Communists were united has long gone. The little man in Albania stands up and tells Khrushchev that he, Khrushchev, is not a real Marxist. Look at Asia and Africa. Five years ago we were afraid the Soviets would take over Africa. They have not taken over Africa. The country which was most Marxist two years ago was Guinea, under Sekou Toure. He has turned against the Soviet Union. He has asked the Soviet Ambassador to leave, because he meddled in Guinea affairs. And Sekou Toure found out that the goods supplied by the Soviet Union were not up to the standards expected in Guinea--and these are not very high standards.

The French told us--when I say "the French" I mean some French, naturally--there are always different people everywhere, in America as well as in France and wherever you go, naturally--that if Algeria became independent it would go Communist. Algeria is independent, and Ben Bella is cooperating with France, not with Moscow. The teachers invited to Algeria are French teachers, not Russian teachers. Nobody starts to learn Chinese there.

We heard so much nonsense to the effect that Nasser would go Communist. You saw the very same Nasser attacked by some Americans as being Communist. He is attacked bitterly in the Communist papers, and not without some justification, for putting all Communists into jail.

Today in Iraq and Syria they have brought anti-Communists governments into power, strictly anti-Communist governments who go as far as, if not farther than, our own Government in imprisoning Communists and in stopping Communist propaganda, et cetera.

I don't see that communism is winning. If you ask what is the greatest safeguard against communism's winning, it is the nationalism of these people. The Egyptians wish to be Egyptians, whatever that may be, and not a satellite of Washington or of Moscow.

Gentlemen, I know something of Egypt. I lived in the Middle East before I came to this country. I came to this country from Palestine, as I told you, in 1931. I know the Middle East quite well. I don't know Cuba at all. But what I say now I mean quite seriously. The idea that Castro is Khrushchev's satellite is a nonsensical idea. Castro wishes to be his own master. Castro is, if you like, a kind of super beatnik, so imbued with his own importance that he has no great respect for Khrushchev. He cooperates with him at present. Whether his successor in 20 years' time will cooperate with the successor of Khrushchev I doubt. No one knows.

The Cubans are a people in the state of nascent nationalism who want to assert themselves, not to assert Moscow or Peking or Albania, or anything like that. In a certain way this diversity of these various nationalisms is the safest protection against anyone taking over the world as a whole, whether it is Khrushchev or Mao--these two are competing, not cooperating, in their efforts--or whether it is we or anyone else. The world is full of diversity. Diversity protects it from uniformity. In such a situation we are living in a great world revolution, but a world revolution which on

the whole will lead to more freedom in the world than there was in 1900 or 1910 when I was young, and to more equality in the world. That means the two slogans of North American existence--freedom and equality, the dream of the Founding Fathers, the bulwark of the Declaration of Independence.

In such a world revolution what we must show is a sense of patience, of empathy, and not of overrating momentary nastiness which you shall always find in this world. Even in 100 years' time this world will be a very imperfect world. It will demand on the part of the more advanced people, who are the wiser people, a sense of historical perspective which will explain to them the immense changes happening all around us.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment on Europe's tendency toward a supranational type of government, independent from us?

DR. KOHN: The two things have to be separated. I would say that the chance of a real, supranational government of Europe is very slight. The nationalism in Europe is still very strong, not only in France. To create a real European government is neither in the plans of de Gaulle nor in the plans of Adenauer, nor would it find any support in England or in Scandinavia.

But the desire for independence from us is very strong, too, and in a certain way, as you know, de Gaulle dreams of a Europe united--let's speak quite plainly--against us. That's again understandable in the age of nationalism. France is a very proud nation which has gone through terrible experiences. There was the defeat of France in 1940 and the loss of the empire, which the French did not take in as good grace as the British, or even the Dutch did. All these were traumatic experiences, and the French yearn for a reassertion of their status. They find it naturally in kicking us. That's natural. Whom should they kick? They can't kick Senegal. That would make a very poor impression on the world proper. But to stand up to the American giant and to shake their fist and tell the American giant, "We are really the civilized people, la grande nation, with the true civilization," is what de Gaulle is doing. I think that most Frenchmen sympathize with him.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you predict how Mr. Nehru will continue his stated desire for neutralism with his real requirement for support in his battle with Communist China?

DR. KOHN: The fight between China and India, as I see it--and I may be wrong, naturally--is not primarily a battle between communism and democracy but between two imperialisms, the Chinese and the Indian. The Himalayan territory, with the three realms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, has been a long disputed territory between China and the British raj which has been taken over by the Indians.

How Mr. Nehru feels I don't need to answer. He answered it in an article which I recommend very highly for information in the latest--that means the April 1963--issue of "Foreign Affairs," a quarterly published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Incorporated, in New York. In the "Foreign Affairs" for April the first article there is one by Mr. Nehru defending the policy of noncommitment. You can find out how he defends it. I think that will go on. He couldn't follow another policy. We are supporting him because it is our interest to strengthen India against present-day China. If in China Mao would not be ruling but Chiang in Peking, Chiang would claim Tibet and the Himalaya border as much as Mao does. That would put us into a real dilemma. In the same way Mr. Khrushchev is at present in a great dilemma. This is one of his many dilemmas. He wishes to be friendly to India and yet the Chinese are Communists at present. If Chaing Kai-shek would be in Peking it would be simpler for Khrushchev and more difficult for us.

QUESTION: Sir, in view of your personal knowledge of the situation, could you discuss for us the presence or absence of nationalism in Czechoslovakia?

DR. KOHN: There is no absence; there is a very strong presence of nationalism in Czechoslovakia. But I wish you to understand two things. One, the Czechs and the Slovaks were in modern times--that means in the beginning of the 19th century--subject peoples. In 1914, when the war broke out and very many Czechs began to think of Czech independence, there was a very strong trend in Czechoslovakia to have an independent Czechoslovakia with a Russian great prince--that meant a member of the imperial family that was then ruling in Russia--as a King of Bohemia. The second thing is that the Czechs do not fear the Russians qua Russians. They fear the Germans and to a lesser extent the Magyars, the Hungarians. Then the Czechs in 1938 went through the traumatic experience of Munich when, as you may remember, they felt "betrayed" by the Western Allies. The Czechs are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that in any future in which Germany regains its strength they might again be the victims of German revenge or German aggression, and that the only power to help them

in that sense will be the Soviet Union. They may be right or wrong. It's not important. What is important is what the people feel. Munich has remained a traumatic experience in the Czech mind.

QUESTION: Sir, in view of your opinion on some of the motives of the Europeans in moving toward integration, even though it may not ever happen, do you consider it a logical policy for us to favor this European integration?

DR. KOHN: I was not so sure from the beginning, sir. I was then very doubtful about European unity which I expected to become a third force and a sign of emancipation from us in a certain way. You see, I am not an economist, and I don't understand anything of economics, but I do not believe that a great territory is a guarantee of prosperity.

I came to the United States in 1931. It was a very big territory then as it is today--the same territory, by the way--and we did not live in a very prosperous time in the 1930's. On the other hand, small countries like Denmark or Switzerland do prosper. There are no slums anywhere in Switzerland. There are no slums anywhere in Denmark. A picture like that afforded by Washington, D.C. would be unknown in Switzerland or in Denmark.

I don't see bigness as a supposition of economic prosperity. I just don't see it. I may be wrong. I'm not an economist. But I know the following things: France and Italy are at present very prosperous. England was very prosperous five years ago. From 1954 to 1959 England lived through a wave of unprecedented prosperity, so much so that Mr. Harold Macmillan, the conservative leader, could win the last election on a slogan, "You never had it as good as you have it today." That was the slogan on which Mr. Macmillan won the election so handsomely five years ago.

All that is changed. The prosperity in Italy and France may change, too. I don't think the European integration is a condition of prosperity. I would very much like the Europeans to be members of what I call sometimes an Atlantic Community, which includes us and the Canadians and the Europeans, and not only those six nations who are now forming under French leadership what they call integrated Europe.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment on whether the resurgence of nationalism visible in Europe will in fact effect the power position of the United States vis-a-vis that of the Soviet bloc?

DR. KOHN: I am not so sure about that, you see. The Europeans have no desire to become dependent on the Soviets. The large majority of West Germans, I would say 98 percent of West Germans, are violently anti-Soviet. In France and Italy, of course, the number is smaller. But, as to a serious showdown with the Soviet Union, which I personally do not think will come, on the whole the Europeans do not believe that the Soviets represent a real, military danger at the moment. Deep down the Europeans don't believe any more what they believed 15 years ago. Fifteen years ago, in 1946 and 1947, the possibility of a Soviet sweep to the Atlantic Ocean, or to the Mediterranean through Greece or Italy or Turkey, was something widely assumed in Europe. Therefore the Europeans looked to us. Today I would say few Europeans expect a Soviet military aggression toward the Mediterranean or toward the Atlantic.

That makes them independent from us in many ways. They think they don't need us any more. We gave France more economic aid than to any other nation in the world, more than to Britain, Italy, or Germany, and of course more to Africa, and so on. France is immensely prosperous. They don't need us any more. You see that gratitude on the whole is not an element of international relations.

QUESTION: Doctor, how would you classify Yugoslavia today? Is it neutralist?

DR. KOHN: Yugoslavia is definitely Communist neutralist. That exists, too. You may remember in 1948 in June that Stalin declared Tito to be a Fascist. You see, with Stalin, Fascist meant everyone who disagreed with Stalin. Tito was, of course, no Fascist. Tito was as good or as rotten a Communist as Stalin himself. He still is as good or as rotten a Communist as Khrushchev is or as Stalin was. But he is motivated also by nationalism. Tito doesn't wish to play second fiddle. The Russians interfered in Belgrade. The Russians tried to dictate to the Yugoslavs that there must be Russian security police in all Yugoslav offices to supervise the strictness of Yugoslav following of the Russian Communist line.

The Yugoslavs wished to be Communists but to follow the Yugoslav Communist line. Tito owes his ruling of Yugoslavia not so much to the Soviets but partly to himself and his followers, and partly to the British, who in the war against the Nazis supported Tito and not his competitors, like Mikhailovitch and others. So Tito felt independent. He declared his independence, not from communism but from Moscow.

The same is true, if you wish to say it, of Canada. Canada is now fighting an election in which independence from Washington plays a fundamental role, but Canada is a democracy. Canada is not Communist or Fascist. Canada is a better democracy than we are, maybe. I would be inclined to believe that.

Tito believes that he is a better Communist than Stalin was. Stalin believed that he was a better Communist than Tito. The same is true with Mao and Khrushchev.

So Tito is a real Communist and a real neutralist who wishes to get profit from both sides. He got profit from us. Now he is friendly with the Soviet Union because Khrushchev needs him in the struggle with Mao. Mao hates Tito as much as Stalin hated Tito. When Mao wants to say that Khrushchev is a horror, he does not say Khrushchev is a horror; he says Tito is a horror, but he means that Khrushchev is a horror.

It's a very complex game they are playing. You have to read between the lines, as in all Communist publications. But Tito is a Communist neutralist, or a neutralist Communist, or whatever you wish to say.

QUESTION: Professor, I wonder if we could ask you to draw on your many years of study and observation and give us your thoughts on the future of the European satellites and East Germany. Will they stay as they are? Will they be absorbed? Or will they eventually be free?

DR. KOHN: Of course, that is a very difficult question, because it demands prophetic gifts which I don't have. I can speak about history with some confidence and about the present with some diffidence, but about the future it is very difficult to speak at all. I would think you must distinguish between Eastern Germany or what is called the German Democratic Republic on the one hand and states like Poland or Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the other hand.

You see, Poland--and again I come back to the question which the gentleman asked about Tito--is deeply Polish nationalist and Communist. To a certain extent the Poles under Gomulka--which they were not under Bierut--lead a Polish life very strongly and they feel that they are independent, though Communist. The same is true to a certain extent today in Hungary. We have read in the papers that Kadar, the present Communist leader in Hungary, has made a profound change in the last days in the attitude of the

Communist guardsmen and in the rapprochement with Hungarian popular forces.

That's not the case in East Germany. I would say in East Germany that Ulbricht there is the one remaining arch Stalinist who in many ways out-Stalins Stalin. He is not like Gomulka or Kadar, who are products of the Khrushchev era, but is a product of the Stalin era.

I believe that in all these, what we call satellites but which are not satellites, in my opinion, each one follows more or less its own life, under Khrushchev, which they could not do under Stalin. They changed between Khrushchev and Stalin.

That is, however, not true in Eastern Germany. Eastern Germany is still a real satellite. I think the discontent there is very great. Don't forget the Poles have no center of attraction outside Poland. In fact, if they leave the protective umbrella of the Soviet Union, they may run into some dispute with Germany about the Oder-Neisse frontier. There are still very many Germans who dream of Breslau or Stettin or cities in Upper Silesia, with its very valuable minerals, as a Germany territory.

That's not the case in Eastern Germany, the German Democratic Republic. There's an immense center of attraction for most Germans in the German Federal Republic of Bonn.

Yes, I will divide your question in two parts. I would believe that Poland and Czechoslovakia will remain in a changing pattern, whether they wish to call it socialism or communism--I have no objection to what they wish to call it--or people's democracy, in a changing pattern, because everything changes. We change. Russia changes. Poland changes. Germany remains. The Eastern Germany future is entirely uncertain. It is the weakest point, outside of Albania, the weakest point in the Soviet system is certainly the German Democratic Republic. Anything might happen there.

The building of the famous Berlin Wall was not so much a defeat of the democracies of the West as an acknowledgment of defeat on the part of Ulbricht. He built a wall not against us but against his own citizens, so that they cannot escape. A country which exists on prohibiting its citizens to escape is not a very secure country on secure foundations.

QUESTION: Sir, could you comment on the future of Arab nationalism, as contrasted with the Syrian or Jewish artificial status?

DR. KOHN: Arab nationalism is a very strong, emotional force everywhere, but whether it will be able to overcome the vested interests and the different regional traditions and conditions is a question which no one can answer. You see, the distance from Morocco to Iraq is tremendous; the distance from Beirut to Yemen is tremendous. There has been until recently no modern means of communication whatsoever. There was since the 15th century no cohesion whatsoever among the Arabs. These deep cleavages of social structure, of tradition, of, I would say, the whole way of life are so different. You take a city like Beirut and, say, Yemen, a city like Cairo and, you may say, Algeria, and they are so different that nobody can foresee how these differences can be integrated into some living organism.

There is no doubt that the attraction of Arab nationalism is tremendous, and there is no doubt that there is only one figure of Arab importance, and that is Nasser. It is my deep conviction that I am on rather safe ground, because I know the Middle East. Nasser is the first statesman of any stature to emerge in the Arab world for many centuries, the first great, real, national, popular leader. I mean, very suddenly the heart of the youth in Algeria or in Kuwait or in Tripoli or in Lebanon holds the picture of Nasser. It is deeply engraved.

But, whether this emotional appeal will overcome the deep-seated, vested interests of the various regions is a question. There is the difficulty of organizing such an immense territory with different traditions. I doubt it very much. I would say what holds the Arabs more or less together is a common hostility to Israel and the fear of Israel. What drives Syria and Iraq into the arms of Nasser against the will of many Syrians and Iraquis is the fear of Israel's expansion.

Whether the fear is justified or not is another thing. Always people fear, as we fear Cuba, maybe without justification. The Arabs fear Israel. That is a cementing force at present. The humiliation in the defeat of the war of 1948 was the first cementing factor bringing Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon together.

But the future nobody can see. There is a problem of practical organization which is difficult to solve. I doubt that the people will act to solve it. I doubt it very much.

QUESTION: Sir, since the boundaries of most of the new African states were fixed rather arbitrarily by the European powers without much regard to what happened to the tribes, what effect do you think these boundaries will have on the growth of nationalism in those countries?

DR. KOHN: So far as I can guess--and my guess is no better than yours--I would say there would be a stabilizing effect. The boundaries drawn once had a certain trend. You see, like here in Washington you see some temporary buildings erected in 1917. They still stand. They may stand for--I don't know--several Administrations longer. That was 1917 and we are now in 1963. These buildings should have been torn down after World War I but they still stand.

These frontiers may last because, you see, they represent, much more than these buildings, vested interests. That means that the governments wish to remain governments. If you take Africa you can become a very important man only in the government. In America you can become a very important man without being in the Government. The president of a big bank in Chicago, the president of General Motors, the president of Ford, and the president of General Electric are as important as the Secretary of State in many ways. That is not true in Africa. The one way to arrive at power and prestige in Africa is through the government. A bank president in the United States can drive a big Cadillac with a chauffeur. In Africa, only government officials can drive Cadillacs with chauffeurs, no one else.

There is a drive toward status. You know the status seeker. This is something that is happening in the world today. All these established governments have a tendency to stay, have a staying power. That is true about the Arab governments too, sir. The government of Syria doesn't wish to play second fiddle to the government of Egypt. Therefore in Africa I think there is a trend for these governments to remain and for the states to remain, though, as you say, the tribes are living on both sides of the frontiers in Togo, Ghana, or Somaliland.

The Somalis are today violently excited about the frontier of Kenya and the frontier of Ethiopia. There are very many Mohammedon Somalis living in the Eastern part of Christian Ethiopia, and they feel oppressed by Ethiopia. They feel oppressed. I don't know whether they are oppressed, but they feel oppressed, and they wish

to unite with their fellow Somalis. There is no doubt that the Emperor of Ethiopia doesn't like it at all.

Well, nobody can tell. We are faced with the same problem that we were in Europe. How much did they dispute frontiers in Europe? How much dispute was there about the town of Trieste, of Fiume? There was the problem of Teschen between Czechoslovakia and Poland. What about the Saar? There has been so much unrest in Europe. The Africans are not different from the Europeans. There are territorial disputes among them.

We have another example in Kashmir, in Asia. On the whole, frontiers once drawn have a certain stabilizing effect.

COLONEL COLMER: Professor Kohn, the time has arrived when we have to break up here. Thank you on behalf of all of us for a splendid morning and a wonderful presentation.

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