

THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF GOVERNMENTS

21 August 1963

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NOTICE

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COLONEL VAUGHT: This morning we continue our studies of contemporary political thought in government, with a lecture on the subject of "The Social Environment of Governments."

To speak to us on this very important subject it is my pleasure to introduce the Chairman of the Department of History, of Columbia University, Professor Henry F. Graff. Professor Graff.

PROFESSOR GRAFF: Thank you, Colonel. This important subject of "The Social Environment of Governments" is one on which relatively little has been written from a comparative point of view. A great many books on the individual governments of the world have been written, but very little has been said about the social environment of these governments: the complex of ideas, traditions and institutions that combine around a society in order to force upon that society a particular kind of constitution, a particular kind of outlook on international relations, a particular kind of mind-set--if I may use a word like that--about its own destiny--if I may use that word.

Now, there is a field called "Political Sociology" which has grown up in the past 20 years--in the years since I and a great many of you were in college--which is concerned with the study of voting behavior and attitudes and opinions of groups within communities; that studies the ideologies which shape and frame the manifest policies of government; that studies economic power and its concentration, and the impact of both upon policy formulation. There have been a great many studies of political parties, of the groups that make them up, the interests that impinge upon those parties to give them either purpose or direction--or lack of purpose and lack of direction. And there has been, also, much work done on the study of bureaucracy; how does the Prussian bureaucracy differ from the British bureaucracy, to say nothing of our own bureaucracy, for example.

These studies have filled the learned journals of the political scientists for years. The pale reflections of them are to be found in the popular magazines and in the newspapers. There is hardly an American periodical of any claim to an interest in public affairs that doesn't at least once a year, and very frequently in many issues in a year, deal with groups in society and how they behave. (We are right now talking a great deal, for instance about the "radical right"--so-called--and its impact on national affairs.)

A few years ago we were greatly interested in what the elements were that made the Nazi Government; what curious phenomena of Italian history produced Fascism. We are still enormously concerned with the social movements and the social constellations which have made for communism in Soviet Russia and in Red China.

We have absorbed--all of us--the interview technique of the political scientist and the sociologist. And now, as I say, we have combined them in this field called "Political Sociology."

We have all kinds of polls; all kinds of surveys. As the New York Times reminded us last Sunday: "And everybody believes in polls; from the lowliest farmer to Tom Dewey, President of the United States."

These interests, as I say, are relatively new. Formerly we were all simply describers of affairs. We knew England because we had been there. We knew France because we had been there. It was once a commonplace for the Department of State to have old China hands; and they were only the best known. There were old Britain hands too, and old French hands. And there were fine Italian hands. And in the history of our interest in dealing with these governments we relied on people who knew. They knew through their pores. They knew because occasionally some of them even spoke the language of the countries to which they were assigned. Now we are told by the political sociologists that we need not be so dependent upon this kind of gut knowledge; we get the right interviews and the right surveys, and, of course, the right computing machines, and we put the material in, the correct answer comes out, and we know what kind of government we are dealing with, and hopefully, also, this will help us in our decision making.

I would like to speak this morning as a historian; not as a sociologist. And I say that not only with pleasure, but because to

do otherwise would be for me to stand here under a false flag. I, as much as the political sociologist, am concerned with how governments behave. I use, though, some other tools than the ones I have been describing. Much in any useful discussion depends upon the conception I have of the other nation's sense of itself. I believe that the other nation's sense of itself is determined as much by its historical experience, as any events that impinge upon it growing out of the daily give and take of ideas, or the daily dispatches and instructions to and from foreign offices throughout the world.

I think we have been overly emphatic in our willingness to accept the idea that governments behave only on the basis of the morning mail; that they behave only on the basis of the last statement by the last Senator, or by the last Premier. I would like to argue, and to argue vehemently, that a nation's behavior is more often than not, determined by its past. And if I were in a very belligerent mood I think I might say that every nation is trapped by its past; and that it behooves us as students of affairs as either decision makers or potential decision makers, to be cognizant of what these historical forces are and how their curious impact on the present gives us all an opportunity to understand.

The historian doesn't ask alone what classes are in power. He doesn't ask alone what ideologies are in force; he wants to know, simply, how a particular nation got this way; what are its roots and what are the likely projections in the future, of the plant that grows from those roots. Or, if I may use another figure. Meteorologists talk of the "persistence factor" in weather patterns: wet periods tend to remain wet, or so they tell us. Given historical forces also tend to persist. Tomorrow is going to be more like today than in our rashest moments we think it is going to be. And today is much more closely linked to the past than we easily admit.

Let me be specific for a moment and examine very briefly some of the broad forces which have been in play in Germany, in Austria, in France, and in Russia. And then I propose to say a few words about our own tradition, and possibly some conclusions will be apparent. Let us take a look at Germany.

Germany is at the crossroads of Europe. You have heard this so many times. Germany is sometimes called by the Germans, "Das Land der Mitte," the land or country of the middle, or the country in the middle. She has a tradition of having to defend frontiers without natural barriers. This sets her apart from Switzerland.

This sets her apart from a great many other countries. Germany is always fearful of tomorrow. Tomorrow is always, in the German mind, going to be vastly different from today because great danger always seems imminent. Germany, therefore, in the Germans' conception of the past, is always on the threshold of a new beginning. And her recent history tells her that she cannot rely on her past.

The Weimar Republic in the 1920's was rejecting Kaiserliche Germany. The Nazi period is a period that is distinguished--from the historical point of view--by its rejection of the Weimar period. And who will say that the Germany of today is not marked above all by its rejection of the Nazi period. No other country in the modern world has had this kind of historical outlook--of a constant rejection of yesterday. As Germany faces out on tomorrow her tradition is one of being in the middle of Europe, constantly looking for dread. So, her tomorrow is not one that gleams like those "sunny uplands" that Sir Winston once talked about. Her tomorrow is always filled with foreboding, possible doom, and above all, the fear of destruction.

In the last 150 years, Germany has not been able to consolidate its form for a long period of time. It came into existence in the middle of the 19th century. Its borders have been shifted as much as any of the borders of any major country in modern times. There is a singular formlessness here. And Sigmund Neumann, the German historian has liked to point out, that the one reliance of the Germans has been the army. Given the German fearfulness, the army, of course, occupies a special place. And even when the army fails, as it failed in 1918, to say nothing of its failure in the Second World War, the Germans can't allow that fact to enter their collective mind. The army, the Germans convinced themselves in 1918, did not fail; the people who failed were the people on the home front. The army was stabbed in the back. This is the Dolchstuss thesis that Hitler espoused. There was nothing the matter with the army; it simply did not get support.

It is interesting that in a land as formless as Germany, constantly moving its borders back and forth, shrinking and expanding, there is an instability that the Germans feel and consequently that they must overcome. And how do they overcome it? By a remarkable emphasis on order. Ordnung is a word that has a very special emotional meaning for the Germans. The Germans cannot make rules for tomorrow; they cannot set up a plan of government

that they are sure is going to operate. Even at the moment the West German Republic seems to be flourishing, it is hoping to change its government, isn't it, by uniting with East Germany? Even, therefore, at the zenith of its economic prosperity it is unsettled politically. The only kind of order, therefore, it can really experience, is order in little things. And the incredible numbers of rules which the Germans create for everything give the German society and social environment a character that no other country of which we have knowledge has experienced.

Everywhere in Germany there are verboten signs, aren't there? There is no German constitutional tradition which can be said to have a history that brings with it its own reverence, idealism, and civic virtue; the German must rely on obedience to the signs, as to when you may put bedding on the windows for airing, when you may and may not smoke, et cetera. The national sense of Germany is muddy, therefore. You can only get order in your private existence. Who speaks for Germany? We are never sure. Is it Goethe? Is it Thomas Mann? Is it Bismarck? Is it Adenauer? Is it the tradition of historical scholarship that is represented by the great historian Ranke? When we think of Germany what image do we draw? We have as much trouble in discerning the German past as the Germans have.

I would like to suggest, as I will before this session is done, that the Germans' difficulty with this identification is as much an aspect of international politics as any single policy that may come out of Bonn.

Now, I will not deal in extenso with the religious cleavage. Suffice it to say that there have been other factors operating in Germany. There is, for example, the split between Protestantism and Catholicism which has been a very, very important factor. Protestantism in Germany was identified with the nation, and the fact that West Germany is in a Catholic majority now has led the Protestant as much as any other element to be almost ferocious in his drive for German unification, which we are not likely to see in our time.

Now, one word about Austria which is part of the German-speaking complex of Europe. The conflict between Austria and Prussia is part of the history of the 19th century. Austria's location far east in Germany gave it a special place. Austria was a kind of bridge between central and eastern Europe; it was the

last outpost of "Western culture" before the world of the Slavs, the Slovaks, and the Slovenes appeared. The Austrian learned to live in a country which had a great many nationalities. There were Moldavians, Wallachians, Jews, Serbs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and one could go on listing all of the names of the peoples who played so large a role in Woodrow Wilson's mind when he talked about self-determination for national groups.

The Austrians liked to say at one time that they lived in a museum of ethnic curiosities. This led Franz Josef who was the Emperor from 1848 to 1916 to set one group against another. He had the Bohemians in what became Czechoslovakia guarded by German-speaking troops; he had the Sudetenland guarded by Slovak troops. This was one way of dealing with his problem.

There was another manifestation, of course, to the Austrian problem: a sense of the need to live and let live. Austria very quickly, after two defeats in the 1860's, gave up the hope of being the German-speaking country which was going to unite the Germanies. Austria left that task to the Prussians who had mastered the military art and had made the soldier a special kind of figure in Prussian society; the Austrians turned to the things which it seems to me a nation turns to which has a live and let live policy at home in order to survive. It turned to writing waltzes. I think the Merry Widow is as much a symbol of the kind of Austria that emerged as any other single manifestation. And when one thinks of Austria one can think of Austria occupying not only in the minds of those who are associated with NATO, a bridge between the West and the East, but I should think that those on the other side of the Iron Curtain would also accept the importance of this kind of country with this kind of outlook as a cushion between our camp and theirs.

It is instructive that these two German-speaking communities should be organized under social aegises that are so vastly different. The rules of behavior that one encounters in Germany are quite different from what one finds in Austrian Germany. German-speaking? Yes. Society? Different. Policies? Of course they are going to be different.

There is another element among several which I also want to make a comment upon. Germany was a latecomer to the scene. And the latecomers always have the feeling that they have been left out. If you look at a map of Africa for the year 1914 you can almost

draw a line from Cairo to the Cape, and one from West Africa all the way across, through Egypt. They cross at about Fashoda where the British and the French had their showdown in 1898. And all the rest of Africa regarded as less desirable for imperial advantage were the areas that the Spanish occupied, the Portugese, the Germans and the Italians occupied; these were the crumbs on the table. And I cannot tell you that I as an historian--and I certainly can tell you that no one as a political sociologist--can explain how this kind of frustration manifests itself in the public mind--what it did to Germans, for instance--I cannot tell you the dynamic which translates this kind of frustration into policy. One can only describe. One can only know what it must have meant at the beginning of the 20th century to an Englishman to know that the sun never sets on the British Empire. Or to a German to be able to say that the sun never sets on the British Empire because the Lord would not trust them in the dark. Where the social environment becomes a function of the making of policy is a vast terra incognita to all who work in the social sciences. We would hope one day to have some sense of how this phenomenon operates.

Men since the 18th century have been looking for social laws; some means of predicting behavior. We have, I suppose, counted almost every kind of social performance. We have counted every kind of nose, in other words. We have been looking for laws since we first discovered the laws that Newton described. And we have been looking for a kind of arithmetical politics. We are only at the beginning, and since we are only at the beginning, we have often to be satisfied with observed relationships, without being able fully to discuss the dynamics of those relationships. So much for Central Europe.

France's tradition is vastly different. France's tradition, some historians say, was shaped by the revolution of 1789. One must be careful lest one assume that all disputes in 1789 have been over the same matter. There is much argument as to whether 1789 is the proper place to begin. Suffice it to say that since 1789 there has been a kind of pendulum swing observable in French politics between bourgeois democracy--to use merely a shorthand expression--and some kind of conservatism that has manifested itself in a variety of ways ranging from monarchism to collaboration with the Nazis during the Vichy period. And in this understanding of French history, whether we accept it literally or not, and I am, of course, inclined not to accept it literally, but merely to use the scheme as a suggestion--we see a group in French society periodically disaffected.

The "outs" on the British side of the channel--the political outs--are never so far out that they cannot hope to get back in soon again. This is part of the history of parliamentary democracy. The political outs are never destroyed in Britain. They are not destroyed in our country either.

Anglo-American politics have a peculiarly glorious way of dealing with those who are purged. I have often reflected that the three most purged men in the recent history of Anglo-American politics are--and you may possibly want to add to the list, but I hope you won't dispute this list--the Duke of Windsor, President Hoover, and, in a sense, General MacArthur. And they all live at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. I use this merely symbolically as an illustration of the fact that we don't do the other side in. We do not need a Halifax any longer to go to. We know, if nothing else, that we do things differently than the French.

Now, the libertarian tradition in France, it has been pointed out, has always been somewhat destructive. As one French political philosopher said, "Obey, but resist." There is the whole secret. And you need a Gallic sensibility in order to know how to combine obedience and resistance. Anything which destroys obedience, the same philosopher wrote, is anarchy. Anything which destroys resistance is tyranny. And, of course, one political commentator has put it quite shrewdly: the French Chamber, until the coming of de Gaulle--and there is no reason to think that the French Chamber won't become something like it again--remains, to use American political parlance, a kind of presidential nominating convention, never "freezing" on any one set of policies or any one candidate. It is constantly in flux, the slipping and sliding of the coalitions are a kind of embodiment, a kind of symbolizing of this curious balance between obedience and resistance.

I think it is also important that in the French political reform tradition--under the Bourbons they were looking for reform; under Napoleon they were looking for reform; they were always looking for the time when the present tyranny would be over, because there is always that disaffected group that wants tomorrow in order to redo yesterday. Toqueville wrote once,

At no time have the American people laid hold on ideas like those of the French Revolution with the passionate energy that the French people showed in the 18th century, or displayed the same blind confidence in the absolute truth of any theory.

Why? Because our disaffected have never been out of range of political power. "The Americans," he wrote, "are a democratic people who have always directed public affairs themselves." The French are a democratic people who, for a long time, could only speculate on the best manner of conducting them. The social condition of the French led them to conceive very general ideas on the subject of government; which I might add to Toqueville, transformed themselves into an ideology that was long in the oven before it could be put to practical use, an element that operates also, in the case of modern Soviet politics.

The social condition of the French, then, led them to conceive very general ideas on the subject of government, while their political constitution prevented them from correcting these ideas by experiment and from gradually detecting their insufficiencies.

Now, Russia's history, once again, partakes of other elements. It is a huge country. There is no shortage of land. But, Russia, for most of her history, was landlocked, or so she thought. She was a trapped giant, as one historian has said. There was no room for cavorting. She was merely fat, and clumsy. There is a curious interest in this conception of the country. Some think that possibly Khrushchev is an ideal symbol. Edward Crankshaw said,

The Russians are, by nature, inclined to anarchy and individualism and they require a strong hand to bind them to a common purpose, given such a very large land with such diversity, and for so long a history, such poor means of communication. And there must be equal submission by all to one power.

And whether under the present period of Russian history, or earlier, the ruler must be far away so that he is your constant support and resource. If only the great father of all the Russians knew how much I am suffering he would do something for me, is a traditional Russian sentiment. The ruler is good, whatever the apparatus may be for getting to him. Crankshaw argues--somewhat obliquely and often very interestingly, if not with complete persuasion--that this outlook has shaped the Russian view of its government and has given its government the peculiar forms which it has taken.

Furthermore, the fear of being backward has long enervated the Russians, going back to the time--the end of the 17th century--of Peter the Great's trip to the Western World where he sat in awe and wonder in the House of Commons; and where he visited Holland and discovered how ships are built. He came back to his Boyars--his chiefs--and talked of how from now on the court will speak

French and not speak Russian. You know he cut the beards of all those connected with the courts, separating, incidentally, the rulers from the ruled, long before the year 1917. Because there was always the sense that "we are backward," to a Russian the accomplishments of Gagarin and Titov and others in space have a meaning that we only dimly perceive. We in America who have always had the sense that we are in the advance guard of progress.

Which brings me to one last point about these other governments. The Russians in their last 50 years have had a dreadful experience with their allies, which has undoubtedly acted upon their fear of being backward; acted upon this highly disciplined people in ways that again our political scientists can tell us nothing about. They were stabbed in the back by their allies, were they not, in the First World War, or so they complain, when their erstwhile allies invaded right after 1918. They entered into the Treaty of Rappolo with the Germans in 1922 and made another in 1939, did they not, and in 1941 they were attacked by their allies, were they not? Can we wonder that this aspect of Russian history combined with the fear that they have not quite made it technologically, has something to do with their concern about how their ally, China, is going to treat them? Can we question that in the interesting and wide-ranging debates that are now going on on Capitol Hill, the history of Pearl Harbor, the sneak attack, shapes how we view this treaty quite as much as any other single factor in whether we will have a test ban or not?

I turn now from these illustrations of the performance of some major European countries to a brief look at our own history.

Our own history has been a history of progress, we like to tell ourselves. For us, history is like one of those train trips up a mountainside. Occasionally the view and the sun are interrupted as we go through a tunnel by a depression or war. But we are going to get to the other side of the tunnel, and we have all had the experience that the sun streams in again, doesn't it? This is our sense of how our past has gone. And since we willy-nilly accept the idea that tomorrow is going to be like yesterday, this is how we view it.

Our Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world. All our Presidents are studied in order; are they not? We are proud of them. When we think of them we think of them all in the order of their appearance; never in alphabetical order; never in the order of their achievements. They are all good men, even the

worst of them. I do not know what our view of the Presidency is going to be like when we have had, let us say, as many Presidents as there have been Popes. It is a good guess that these early Presidents--as we may come to think of them--will be regarded as a group.

We like continuity. We are constantly reaching for our history, unlike the Germans. We are proud of that continuity. I think this explains, in some measure, our great interest in the Civil War. The Civil War seems to defy the idea that our history was continuous. Our history has a before and after quality, broken by the flaming sword of the Civil War, like those patent medicine ads. We go in agricultural and we come out industrial. We go in federal and we come out a nation. And our interest over and over again in exploring that Civil War, grows, it seems to me, quite as much as out of any other single factor--out of our shock, surprise and wonder that this could have happened to us.

And the effect has been enormously interesting; hasn't it? Lincoln is accepted in the South. Lee is a hero even in the North. And the great architect of victory, Grant, is a kind of irritant on the scene and we denigrate him by saying he was a drunk. Thus we give a kind of continuity to our history. And in the 20th century we have continued to believe that what we do today has a bearing on tomorrow because it is deeply rooted in the past.

There are a number of other facets that one can explore in examining the nature of the American past as we view it. We have had little real conflict in our history; despite the history of the New Deal and despite the debates that make the front pages of the papers regularly, we have not been divided on the major issues and on the basic questions. It is instructive to think that in all our long history we have never had any real devils. Oh, we have had Benedict Arnold, but he is small pickings, isn't he? We have had no Cromwells. We have had no Robespierre. We have had no Trotsky. We have had no Montagues and Capulets. We have no antirevolutionary tradition, do we? Each President comes to office hoping to make the legacy which he is bequeathed, work better.

I have often thought that we have manufactured such differences as there are in order to give our history a kind of color and excitement. We manufactured that fierce struggle between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. When I was a schoolboy I still remember my outrage (because it violated my dramatic sense) that it was Burr rather than Jefferson who did Hamilton in. The fight

between those who support the high tariff and those who support the low tariff occupies far too much attention. Compared to the kind of history other countries have had ours has been gloriously placid.

Now, what does this mean for our conduct of affairs with the rest of the world? It means that we can only barely understand the impulses, the motives and the motivation that inspire the activities of those who speak for other traditions than our own. It behooves us, though, to give heed to what the historians know about these other cultures, not because it will make us more effective in dealing with these other traditions and cultures, but hopefully because it may give all of us at some point in our lives an opportunity, however modestly, to alter one small facet of other nations' traditions in order to advance the kinds of programs we hopefully bring to the world. And no man in his career could ask to change more than one small facet.

Thank you.

QUESTION: What was it in our tradition that caused us to change from a War Department to a Department of Defense?

PROFESSOR GRAFF: Well, this is a question you may be able to answer better than I. I suppose that one aspect of the whole Western tradition is that war is bad and you must, therefore, use a euphemism. And I think that in the year in which the Department of Defense was created we were hopefully preparing for peace with the same abandon that we had only recently used in order to prepare for war.

One nice question is, "Why did we have a War Department and a Navy Department?" At the very beginning of our history the Navy was engaged in something more than simply collecting sea samples.

QUESTION: Professor Graff, during this age of development of new nations such as in Africa, how much time do you feel is necessary, historically, before you can evaluate such new nations on the basis of the sense of value of itself?

PROFESSOR GRAFF: This is a very, very important question. My department at Columbia has recently appointed a professor of African History, after a long search. And one of the interesting questions we had to answer is, "What is African history?"

As I see it now, it is mainly the history of the impact of the West on this continent. The materials of history as we understand history are written documents, not word-of-mouth traditions. And most of the African countries have no documentary history, no documentable history. We haven't learned, really, how to grapple with this subject. The professors of African history have not learned how to grapple with it either. We in our country can document almost any event since 1789. We have such complete records that I suppose we can discover almost everything that we have ever wanted to know about American History except, possibly, conversations at Cabinet meetings. We have very little of that kind of record. But almost everything else is in the records somewhere, and if we do not have the records, there is a record of when the records were destroyed.

We do not have this kind of material for Africa. And I think it takes a long time before an African nation has enough of this world's goods in order to put energy and treasure into accumulating records. The Africans in some parts of that continent will have to change their climate in order to preserve materials.

We are going to be dealing here with a culture that is going to be as difficult to pick up as a porcupine. We are not sure whether nationalism in this third quarter of the 20th century will manifest itself in the same way as the kinds of nationalisms that I have been talking about, which came into being with the rise of the national states about the beginning of the 16th century. And I come back to what I said at the very start, in my response to your question; we are going to be a long time coming to understand these traditions. In many places these traditions are a curious amalgam of what is West and what is native. And in the aspiration of these countries to acquire Western technology there undoubtedly will be a new form of nationalism; it will not be Western nor African, and for which we have, at the moment, no tools for comprehension.

QUESTION: In one instance of French and German history could you predict the success of supranational organization of European states and when this might come about?

PROFESSOR GRAFF: Well, now, I will sound like a political scientist rather than a historian. Historians are always safe. They bring you to the edge and leave you there. And when they attempt to do anything else they are in trouble. My own belief is that Germany will long remain divided, which will be a barrier to full

participation of the Germans in any kind of supranational state. I think, though, that French history is going to be different after de Gaulle; how different, it is very difficult to say.

I think the French are going to be much more amenable to some kind of cooperation on a much larger scale, with England and the United States. But I do not foresee the end of this epoch of nationalism yet. I think that the Soviets have found also that nationalism dies very, very slowly, if, in fact, it is dying at all.

The nationalistic upsurges in Africa; the nationalistic upsurges in Asia may take different forms. But pride of nations may be as powerful a factor at this late stage of the 20th century as any allegiance to class, race or religion. And I am not optimistic that we are going to see supranational government in our lifetime.

QUESTION: Professor, could you give us a brief idea of the nature of the traditional factors in Chinese history?

PROFESSOR GRAFF: Well, I wish I knew more about Chinese history than I do. I have spent a great deal of time studying Japanese history. I know something about China, but I can only make broad generalizations. It seems to me that if one wants to understand what the Chinese situation is, in part, one would have to observe that the Chinese were once technologically far in advance of the Western World with respect to things like gunpowder, printing, paper manufacturing, glassware, et cetera; matters which are well known, and there was very little that the Western World had that China wanted at a moment when there was hardly anything that China had which the West did not want to buy. This is almost schoolboy knowledge; the "Drang nach Osten" that the Germans talked of in the middle of the 19th century was as nothing compared to the desire in the great age of exploration to find the East.

The one thing that the Chinese wanted from the Western World was gold and silver. And it is sometimes said that China became a kind of necropolis for Western gold and silver, a kind of burial place for it. One almost visualizes the lines of trade in the 16th and 17th centuries directing great quantities of gold and silver toward the Orient, in return for brocades, ivories, spices, cheap calico and that kind of material which was so much in demand in Europe.

Then, in the 19th century the West got ahead, with manufacturing. Something happened there in the middle of the 19th century that continued until the middle of the 20th century. There is hardly anything that the West had that the Chinese did not want. And one way or another it was provided, not in large enough quantities; we never supplied enough oil for all the lamps of China, but we were aware of those lamps, weren't we?

Now, if one can extrapolate from what we see and what we know, we can guess that China is getting back on the track again. How soon this will happen I don't know. I dare say that we are going to see this nation with enormous energy, with developed skill, with a tradition of scholarship which makes it a quite different place from Africa (a tradition of scholarship that involves an ability to get at the corpus of technological literature in the rest of the world), become a competitor in very special ways. And as I was just saying to the Admiral, one wonders what will happen in the foreseeable future, or at least within our lifetime, if some new technological breakthrough should occur in the nonwhite world, and possibly in China. What will this do to our notion that we are in that advanced train of progress I was talking about?

I am concerned that the Chinese sense of inferiority which they have had to an even greater extent than the Russians in the last 150 years will be harnessed to their enormous intellectual energies. And we are likely to confront a very fearful opponent showing itself in all the dimensions of our international behavior. And I just hesitate to offer any suggestions as to what the way out is.

QUESTION: Sir, I wonder if you might comment on what in the U.S. tradition would account for our rather prompt recognition and help offered to the emerging nations in Africa, and yet our rather tardy concern for the almost same problems of our close neighbors, the Latin Americans?

PROFESSOR GRAFF: I think that is explainable in the light of our recent history. We have, in the 20th century, been a racist-oriented country. This goes back to the 17th century when the first slaves were introduced. In the beginning of this century we fastened our eyes on Western Europe; part of the sense of being in the elite of nations involved participating in the same kinds of struggles and enterprises as the most elite of these nations--Britain. This is certainly a significant part of the history of the first decade of the 20th century. And that very quickly brought us into those avenues

of the world that embrace Africa and Asia; the sense that we were the inheritors of the tradition which the British were no longer able to maintain had much to do with our prior involvement in Africa and Asia.

In Latin America we had access to trade. This history of our own country, including, but not most important, the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the peculiar history of Western Europe resulted in keeping the great imperial countries out of Latin America. And this became a kind of neglected area for all but businessmen.

Politically we never dominated the whole of Latin America. We, I think, have been smitten since the very beginning of our history, by the tradition that was so strong in Great Britain, that you should march to the West and there you would find riches. And "the West" was first across this country; then across the Pacific; and then China. Call it what you will; an interest in saving souls; call it the tradition of our absorption in the glamorous adventure of Marco Polo; the West has always turned to the Orient. There empire lies.

If you look at the history of Portugal; the history of Spain; and the history of Central Europe; it's access to the spices; then it's the control of China; then it's the open door in China. All the great empires of history have battened upon the Orient, whether Byzantium, or, as I say, Portugal and Spain; or whether Britain. And in the 19th century when we talked of the necessity to engage in international politics we too were going to bring ourselves closer to the Orient. And in the whole dynamic of building the transcontinental railroad and building the Panama Canal, we were moving toward the Orient. And in this sense we were absorbing the tradition of the rest of the Western World. This is as much a factor in our unwillingness to stay at home here, if one can call Central and South America home, as any other single factor.

We are trying very late in the day to resuscitate this area; to make it ours politically. The day for raising the flag over other countries and other nations is gone. We always eschewed that solution. We had an opportunity at the end of the Mexican War to acquire the whole of Mexico; we turned it down. We had an opportunity to acquire Santo Domingo right after the Civil War; we turned it down. We were not in a land-acquiring mood. Now the day has passed and we have not found a way to persuade these people in

Latin America. And I rather fear that someday historians looking back on this time are going to say that the Alliance for Progress was a device for applying Marshall plan principles to an area which had not reached the industrial level that the Europe which accepted the Marshall plan had reached.

COLONEL VAUGHT: Gentlemen, I regret we do not have time for more questions at this time.

Professor Graff, you have given us a wonderful insight into the approach to this subject. Thank you very much for a job well done.

PROFESSOR GRAFF: Thank you.