

CURRENT STRATEGIC THINKING AND MILITARY  
THEORY IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD

24 September 1963

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NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Dr. William R. Kintner, Deputy Director of the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute, was born in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, 21 April 1915. He received the degree of B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Georgetown University. His twenty-one years of Army service saw him go from cadet to colonel, and from Normandy to Pork Chop Hill. He also had a wide range of staff experience, including the Korean Armistice Commission; and as Special Assistant, Commanding General, U.S. Army France for relations with the French Government. In his last military assignment prior to retirement he was Chief of the Long-Range Plans (Strategic Analysis Section Coordination Group, Office Chief of Staff, U.S. Army). His Government service included the role of Chief Planner, element of Central Intelligence Agency; Assistant to Defense Department, Member, Planning Staff National Security Council; Member of Staff of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower; Consultant to the President's Committee to study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee). He was consultant to the Stanford Research Institute, and Senior Advisor, Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 1956-1957. In the academic world he is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He was Deputy Commandant, National Strategy Seminars, National War College, 1959-1960. He is widely known as a lecturer before both military and civilian audiences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, National Planning Association, American Political Science Association and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. He is author or co-author of a number of publications, including, "The Front is Everywhere," (1950); "Atomic Weapons in Land Combat," (1953); "Forging a New Sword," (1958); "The Haphazard Years," (1960); "Protracted Conflict," (1959); "A Forward Strategy for America," (1961); "The New Frontier of War," and numerous articles in prominent magazines. His military decorations include the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star, each twice awarded to him. This is his third lecture at the Industrial College.

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COLONEL AUSTIN: This morning we continue our examination of modern warfare and strategy, and we do it with a presentation entitled "Current Strategic Thinking and Military Theory in the Communist World."

We are particularly fortunate this morning to have as our guest speaker a soldier, scholar, researcher, educator, and a widely known guest lecturer in his field.

It is my pleasure to present to you Colonel, Doctor, Professor William R. Kintner.

DR. KINTNER: Thank you. Admiral Rose, Gentlemen: It is indeed a pleasure for me to return to this podium. I asked myself this morning, "Is this speech really necessary?" What prompted me to ask that question was reading the news the last several months, and I wonder whether or not in all fairness we should even be discussing Soviet and Chinese military policy, because we appear to be moving into a world in which peace and light, reason and rationality will rule the world, and the need of force is obsolete.

I kept thinking about it a little more and I recalled that it was just about a year ago, that a gentleman named Khrushchev was piling missiles into Cuba aimed at our throats here in the United States. I have met a lot of men who are rather elderly in age. Mr. Khrushchev is around 70 now, and it seems to me that it is very difficult for a man to have a fundamental conversion about the age of 69 or 70. He spent most of his life, in the words of Eliza, in the play, "My Fair Lady," trying to do us in, and I don't think he has quite given up. If you would accept the image that we are now dealing with the benign, kindly, old peasant leader, as depicted in the Karsh portrait in "Life" a couple weeks ago, you would have to believe that a conversion as great as that of Saul on the road to Damascus had taken place.

I personally believe that my corresponding number, who is talking in Moscow today concerning the preparations of the Soviet Union to deal with the "mad imperialist powers" is probably discussing in straightforward terms that the Soviet goals in industrial production and technical performance need to be achieved. In short, I believe there is a still reason for my talk to the Industrial College this morning.

As a general rule, things do remain true to their origins. Before discussing my views on current Communist strategy and policy as it pertains to the application of force, I was asked in my precis to discuss a little of the evolution of the modern military structure of the Soviet Union and its erstwhile ally, or part-time ally, Red China.

If we look back at the history of the Communist movement, we are struck by the fact that almost all the great leaders were either students of war or practitioners of war. For example, Engels, who collaborated with Marx in writing most of the basic documents, was a lieutenant in the Prussian Artillery. He was dubbed "The General" by the fellow revolutionaries of his day. Marx himself was an avid reader of Roman military history, he was a reporter for the Herald Tribune on the Crimean War, and a reporter for the London Times of the famous War Between the States. In the insurrections of 1848 he gave instructions for the seizure of power which were based on the application of the best military thinking of that time: Seize the proper objectives, isolate the hostile forces, namely, the government forces, and, finally, attack with audacity, audacity, and audacity.

Lenin, who succeeded Marx and, in fact, who made communism an operational factor, rather than a theory, found as his favorite bedtime reading, not Sherlock Holmes but Clausewitz, the great German theoretician of the theory of war. He kept a personal copy of "On War" by his desk which was heavily annotated. All of Clausewitz's views on the interrelationship between power and diplomacy certainly permeated Lenin's mind.

After the Russian-Japanese War of 1905, Lenin discussed at great length the technical innovations that had taken place in that conflict--one of the major modern uses of machine guns--and the meaning as to the application of these techniques to revolutionary theory. After the abortive 1905 revolution, he himself reviewed very critically the mistakes that had been made by the revolutionaries in the use of force to dislodge the Czar's power.

Simultaneously with this study of war there was the consistent study of revolution. This goes back to the French Revolution and the various people who influenced Marx, who influenced Lenin, and who influenced many other anarchists and other varieties of revolutionists of the 19th century. The Communists have made a study of revolution. They believe that it can be reduced to a science and a technique, that they can generate the conditions of revolution, that they can mobilize the masses, that they can apply the proper psychological warfare, the proper subversive tactics, and the proper agitation to bring about a major political change.

Now, they are not complete advocates that you can manipulate everything by political action. There is an element of spontaneity, but the sensing of the conditions and the support of the conditions, and the choice of the right timing are factors which have introduced themselves into Communist military and strategic thinking. These factors have in common also certain things with the military, namely, that they have recognized that, if you are going to use political manipulation in organized fashion, you have to apply certain elements of military methodology--organization, discipline, selection of the objective, the right supporting forces, neutralization of hostile elements, and gaining the support of allies.

So, consequently, what I am trying to lead up to is that they were students of war, students of revolution, and that their State system, as it finally emerged, became a quasi-military type organization. The Soviet state from its beginning has had the characteristic of a state dedicated to the maintenance of power and the expansion of power, and it has relied very heavily, but not exclusively, on elements of military force and a variety of nonmilitary pressures to accomplish its goals.

When Lenin took over power--again to go back to the origins--he indicated that the master of insurrection should be listened to. Lenin was the only man in the entourage who had the guts to apply Marxist theory: audacity, the need to strike now. Against the opposition of everyone else he achieved power for the Bolsheviks. As you know, there followed a 3-year civil war. After the civil war the consolidation of power began and, from the very beginning, an idea which dominated the Soviet state was the creation of industrial power so that dominant military power might spring from it.

Lenin's first thrust was for electrification. Lenin didn't live very long to apply his theory, but when the real industrial

revolution began in the Soviet Union, with the first 5-year plan in 1928, Stalin began the building up of a modern industrial system and a few years later systematically began to build up scientific cadres leading to the technological achievements we have all become too familiar with in the past few years.

During the period between wars, the Red Army was developed as a primary tool of the Soviet state. In the beginning, they were not too concerned about its efficiency. They were concerned with its loyalty and commitment to the policies of the Soviet state. In the course of time they have succeeded in achieving both a professional military force whose leaders honestly and objectively look at the concrete factors which they are discussing, namely, how many divisions, how many tanks, how many airplanes, and at the same time are able to commit themselves in an ideological sense in support of Soviet objectives.

This army has had its ups and downs. You recall the great purge of 1937. You recall the decisive losses at the beginning of the Second World War, and finally the eventual triumph. The triumph indicated many things. One was that the Soviet industrial base was in pretty good shape, because 90 percent of the material which was used in that war was made in Russia, even though one-half of the country was practically destroyed by the German invaders. Secondly, it showed that they had the capacity for major, large-scale organization. Thirdly, it showed that they knew how to use military power in a massive way. As you know, artillery has always been the king of battle in the Soviet system, and infantry was always used to mop up what fire power had opened up to their exploitation.

This is a very important thing, because, as we have moved on to the missile age, the Soviet missile leaders are following the tradition of the artillery, which has been the predominant arm in the Czars' system--as well as the Soviet system--ever since the Napoleonic Wars.

After the war they were faced with the fact that atomic weapons had entered the scene. There is no question that they were aware of its existence before Potsdam when we officially told them about it, and there is no question that they made very major efforts to acquire it as soon as possible. When they acquired their first nuclear weapon or device in 1949, they were 4 years ahead of schedule, according to at least General Grove's estimate as to when they would achieve it.

During this same period, however, they publicly degraded the significance of nuclear weapons. They said they were a transitory device, they could not really affect major strategy. Mr. Stalin kept laboriously repeating the four permanent operating factors that had brought success in World War II, ignoring, of course, that their wartime success was due as much as anything to the fact that they had more real estate to trade for time than anybody on earth.

But, nevertheless, while they were publicly degrading nuclear weapons, they were actively acquiring them, and after Stalin died the road was paved for a major shift in Soviet strategic thinking.

Recognition was given to the fact, after they had started to acquire nuclear weapons and after the acquisition of the hydrogen device in 1953, that these weapons had introduced a decisive, new character into modern warfare. There was a question in their minds as to how significant the change was. The question they wrestled with is the one that perhaps engages us more than it should, namely: Is there a significant role for power in international relations with weapons having the destructive impact of, particularly, hydrogen weapons?

As you may know, Malenkov, in his short reign as the Premier, committed a terrible heresy, when he stated that the use of nuclear weapons could possibly lead to the destruction of both sides. Of course, this was completely anti-Marxist, because, regardless of the technical means, the Communists' dream of history is supposed to unwind and cover the earth. Malenkov was dispossessed, and in the process of removing Malenkov, Khrushchev took the other tack, namely, that nuclear weapons have not changed the fundamental nature of the role of force in international relations, and that the Soviet Union had to proceed to the acquisition of all the nuclear weapons it could get its hands on, as well as the means of delivery.

Khrushchev, in his subsequent deliberations on the role of force, has made one very small change in basic Soviet doctrine. As you know, the basic doctrine is that war is inevitable in the process of communization of the world. He changed it to say that war is not necessarily inevitable. Then he went on to qualify, that, if the capitalist powers finally wake up to their senses and voluntarily give in, then force is not necessary.

I'm sure you have heard a good deal of the Sino-Soviet controversy which has been going on for some time. During July there

was a 25,000-word letter written by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to their fraternal brothers in Peking, and, at one point of the letter, they came out quite openly and stated, "We are not certain that force will be needed in the liquidation of the bourgeoisie and the remnants of the capitalist system, but we must make every preparation for the use of force and, if necessary, we together will employ it." That's a little paragraph which I think needs reiteration, particularly in the state of euphoria that we seem to be moving into.

The Soviet trends in warfare, after Khrushchev took over included the movement toward the ICBM as their primary delivery means and great emphasis on warheads of major destructive power. I mentioned earlier that the ICBM has, from the Soviet point of view, the characteristics of artillery, and the concept of a high-yield warhead has a very good parallel to the type of artillery barrages that they laid down in World War II. They have no qualms, in other words, about applying maximum force to achieve an objective. They do not concern themselves nearly to the extent that we do about the controlled selective response, careful targeting, or matters of that sort. They do not distinguish in their literature between counter-value targets, namely, cities, and counterforce targets somewhere out in the countryside. They say that the first goal of war is to go after the command posts, the nerve centers, of the opposing system. By definition, these are cities.

It is interesting to note that the tremendous expansion of Soviet prestige and power has essentially taken place since the marriage of their ICBM and the worldwide apparatus of the Communist system. This global political organization, namely, the Apparatus, matched to a global military support system is a combination which, up to the present time, we have not found all the answers for in dealing with it.

Khrushchev himself, I think, gives us the best guideline as to the broad parameters of Soviet strategy. There is no clear demarcation in Soviet thinking between political strategy and military strategy. There is one strategy, an organic strategy. Sometimes they will use military force; always they have military force behind them as the fundamental backstop for their diplomacy.

The Communists like to review their situation periodically and make a major assessment of where things stand and a projection forward of the appropriate strategy to deal with the oncoming years.

For example, in 1928 the Sixth World Congress of the Communist Party essentially set the guidelines up to and including World War II. In the latter part of the fifties, another reassessment began in the 20th and 21st Party Congresses. Following these congresses, Mr. Khrushchev delivered a very famous speech to the Presidium on 6 January, 1961. This speech has been universally regarded as probably the most significant statement that has been uttered in official Moscow quarters for some time. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kennedy thought so highly of it that a couple years ago, shortly after he had taken office, he went over the speech in great detail with 30 or so key people in our own Government.

The speech covered a great deal of ground. For the purpose of this discussion, I am going to limit myself to three aspects of it. One was his concept of conflict; one was his concept of coexistence; and the third was the significance of arms control to this entire process.

He said that in the present situation there are three kinds of wars: One is a possible thermonuclear war, the general nuclear war, as we call it; one is limited war; and the third is wars of natural liberation. With respect to all wars, the Soviet philosophy is that there are just and unjust wars. Any war that a Communist fights is by definition a just war. Any effort made by ourselves or anybody else to oppose them results in an unjust conflict.

In this trilogy of wars, Khrushchev contends that for the time being he does not wish a general thermonuclear war. In other words, his policy is roughly parallel to our own, which, as I understand it, is to take measures to render general thermonuclear war improbable. I think it is a very wise policy from his point of view. For the time being, at least, we do enjoy strategic superiority, so there is no sense in risking the whole Communist show on one cast of the nuclear die. At the same time he argued that he did not want the limited wars along the style of Korea, because these might escalate and blow up into thermonuclear war, which he is not prepared to handle at this time. He devoted a great deal of attention and interest to the third category, armed uprisings of people, or wars of natural liberation. He contended that these were not only right and just but that it was the Communists' sacred duty to support this kind of war. Then he illustrated with examples by referring to Ben Bella's taking over in Algeria, the Communist operations in Vietnam and Laos, Mr. Castro's little operation down in Cuba, and a number of other places. He said, "Looking around the world there

are other examples where this kind of wars can be fought, and it's an obligation of the Communists to carefully examine the situation and to nurture and feed this kind of conflict."

I dare say that over the next 10 years this type of conflict is going to be occupying us as it has been occupying us for the past 10 years. This is the area which we have tried to deal with through the emphasis on counterinsurgency, the emphasis on air and sea lift, greater mobility, and the buildup of the special forces. But I am sure that none of us here would be willing to say that we have found all the answers.

Now, it is important for the next 10 years, at least, in which Khrushchev doesn't want a thermonuclear war that these "small" wars permit the dynamism of the movement to stay alive. There is something going on somewhere, and the great forward push, the support of the Communists as active agents of history can be demonstrated in this type of conflict. At the same time it is a debilitating conflict as far as the West is concerned. There is no liberation war which does not bring about tremendous political dispute in the countries concerned.

When the French were in Vietnam, the domestic French politics was torn in two. We are already beginning to notice this phenomenon in the United States in conjunction with our own involvement in Vietnam at the present day. You pick up some of the advertisements in the "New York Times" by those who wish us to get out of there and you see their opposition to the policy that we are trying to develop.

So, for the time being Mr. Khrushchev is a very peaceful man at the upper end of the scale and a very belligerent individual down at the lower end of the scale.

Now we turn to the coexistence strategy. The big question you have to ask yourself is, "Is it real?" Certainly it's real. We are coexisting. The question is: Is it from the Communist point of view a permanent state, one to be fervently sought for an indefinite period of time? Again I cannot look into Mr. Khrushchev's mind. I can read, however, and, if you go over the years and read what he said on the subject you find a recurring theme. For example, in Warsaw, in 1956, he said, "It is impossible for us to coexist internally or for a long time. One of us must go to his grave. What

should I do? I should push the capitalist opponent into his grave." This thesis has emerged in many other ways.

But what is the rationale behind it? I have indicated that he doesn't think he is on top in the strategic sense. He is afraid that if he plays his game too violently he might trigger a premature U.S. reaction while we still enjoy an advantage. So, until he gains the watershed of superior power which may be in 1970 or 1975, or thereabouts, he has to play a very subtle game. He can't push the needle in too hard. He might get a visceral reaction from us. So he has to condition us to accept a state of quasi-peace in which he is able to make very small but gradual gains in the increments of his power, his authority, his position, and his influence.

He must operate in such a way that he can eventually convince the American people that there is no issue so important that the risk of using America's major resource of military power, namely, its nuclear systems, will be taken.

This is the fundamental tactic behind peaceful coexistence. I know this view is disputed by many, and that some argue that Mr. Khrushchev has looked down into the barrel of the inferno and has decided that there are overall and abiding mutual interests between us, and that henceforth he will regulate his conduct in such a way that a genuine modus vivendi is possible between us. But up to the present time I have not yet seen the substantive evidence to support that point of view.

The third strategy was that of arms control and disarmament. Here his intent was quite clear. If you examine both his 6 January speech and many other utterances, the object is to disarm the bourgeoisie, but never a word is said about disarming the proletariat, i. e., the Communist states. In fact, in his 6 January speech he came out quite clearly and said that the aim of their arms control endeavor, support of the peace drives, and so forth, is to degrade Western and particularly U.S. military power. In this he has considerable success, and I think there is a likelihood that he will have more in the future.

If you take a look at the three different strategies--conflict, the war strategy; the coexistence strategy; and the arms control strategy--you will see that the conflict keeps the dynamism of the movement going, coexistence keeps down the temper of our reaction, whereas disarmament over a period of time is designed to slow

down our effort and therefore bring him to where he wants to be, namely, on top of the heap, a little bit faster. This is a general strategy of strengthening his own position while attempting to de-grade ours.

If you will review certain recent developments you might begin to see the significance of the application of these strategies to events that are taking place around the world.

Earlier in my talk I mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union, in starting out, placed tremendous emphasis on industrialization, scientific training, and acquisition of a technological position. They have also built up their industrial base by now, according to all accounts, to somewhere near 50 or 60 percent of that of the United States. But the application of this base to the pursuit of power, in the direct and brutal sense of the word, is greater by far than that of the United States or any other Western country.

The Soviets have had their disappointments, particularly the fact that the ideological appeal which so characterized the movement in the thirties has lost ground. As a result, if you go back over their pronouncements of the past 4 or 5 years, the main thing they emphasize is their scientific and technological powers, not the promised benefits of the socialist state.

Looking at the future, it seems to me that the last major effort that they have to make in order to achieve world domination is to achieve technological preeminence and to use that technological preeminence in a way which will place us in a position of permanent inferiority. This would be entirely in keeping with their philosophy. Remember, they are Marxists. Marxists believe that he who dominates the industrial and scientific order eventually dominates the political order. This is the fundamental thesis of their entire philosophy, and there is a certain amount of truth in it.

To the extent that this is true, we have to look at every Soviet move in terms of not where we are now but in terms of where we are going to be in 10 or 15 years from now. This suggests another important feature of their overall strategy. They are future-oriented people. They are not thinking about where they came from; they are thinking about where they are going. If you look at the evolution of a 5-year plan, a 7-year plan, and a 20-year plan, which they are now operating under, you see that they have set some very ambitious goals and direct their efforts to achieve them. If their goal is

scientific and technological supremacy, then efforts to persuade us that they are not seeking the objective of world domination or a kind of world hegemony may be helpful in bringing this about.

The fact that this technological thrust is one of the key factors that we have to deal with was revealed in the test ban negotiations and in the test ban debate. I suggest that all of you read the report put out by the Preparedness Subcommittee of the United States Senate which was regarded by some as being a little too pessimistic. If you accept some of the rationale put out to support the test ban treaty, what we are arguing is this: That we, the United States, now enjoy decisive superiority. That showed up in Mr. McNamara's testimony, and by signing the treaty we will maintain superiority if not indefinitely at least for a great number of years in the future.

If you look at it from the Soviet point of view, by signing that treaty they were, by our logic, automatically accepting a position of permanent inferiority. Now, does this make sense? At the same time we say, and every public spokesman has stated this, that the Soviet goal of world domination has not changed. How can they have that goal if they are willing to accept a position of permanent inferiority on the decisive element of force, namely, the nuclear systems-- delivery, defense, and so forth?

I don't think they have accepted that. As a matter of fact, if you have read their publications, "Red Star," they put out almost the same claims that Mr. McNamara did; namely, they said, "By signing this treaty we are assuring our own interests and advancing our cause in the future." There is evidence, as I am sure you have known or will be exposed to, that in certain fields, particularly in the missile defense field, the Soviets believe that they have acquired an advantage by gaining knowledge which we haven't been able to acquire, because we haven't tested in the atmosphere. We also know that they are making a considerable effort in this field, and that the result might be that the advantage which we have now in 1963 may become transitory in 1969 or 1970.

In trying to summarize the Soviet position it might be well to take a look at a possible strategic concept which the Soviets seem to have been working on. If we go back to our own strategy we know we moved from massive retaliation, to the new look in 1954, to a type of graduated response, then moved into the pause, and now the kick words are the deliberate, selective controlled response.

In the process, the nuclear deterrent, the nuclear umbrella, which we had in 1954, which covered most of the world--and Mr. Dulles applied it to Indochina, for example, and threatened to apply it in Korea--has now for all intents and purposes shrunk back to the continental limits of the United States. That question is at the center of the strategic debate with respect to Western Europe. Is Western Europe under our nuclear sanctuary? The Europeans argue that during the pause we will flip a coin and decide whether we will support them or not.

In this course of time, the Soviet development of an effective nuclear striking system, the big warheads, and so on, has acted as a deterrent on the United States. In other words, it is very unlikely that in the future we will use our nuclear deterrent except in response to a direct attack.

Now, on the other hand, while they have sought to deter our acting abroad the Soviets appear to have designed a war-winning strategy for Western Europe. If you look at their deployments of surface-to-surface missiles, the size of their surface forces there, and the size of their submarine force, which can be used as an interdiction force as well as in a direct attack against the United States, as soon as they get the Polaris-type submarine, you will see that what they have succeeded in doing over the past 5 or 6 years is to not isolate the United States from Western Europe but to make it very difficult for us to maintain that organic linking in our strategic posture which existed just 5 or 6 years ago.

If, in the future, they can add to this position an invulnerable Soviet base by the acquisition of a meaningful combination of missile, air, and civil defense, in a period of 10 years from now they could be in a position where they say, "Gentlemen, this is what we can do. And what do you intend to do about it?"

This, to my mind, is the long-term goal that they are working toward. It's the last chance that they have to come out on top in the world scene, because, if they wait much longer than that, and the Chinese by that time have achieved a modern industrial base and have the concomitant military power to go with it, and if the United States is able to maintain an alliance with NATO, then the Soviet Union will be caught in the middle between two very important, significant sources of power. The Soviet Union will have a choice of either joining up with one side or the other or completely altering its policy.

Therefore, in my opinion, these next 10 to 15 years are most critical. The critical area we have to deal with is to make certain that in all our efforts to find a detente with the Soviets we do not surrender a position of power until a genuine settlement is achieved.

I would like to call your attention to an article written by Walt Rostow which appears in the October "Foreign Affairs." In the very end he stresses this point, that we must not let our guard down; we must keep our powder dry every step of the road. If the policy of the Administration to achieve a genuine modus vivendi works, I'll be the happiest man in the world, but I am, frankly, somewhat skeptical about the possibility. Therefore, I would encourage you gentlemen who are working in the field of preparedness to make certain that the United States does not lose its technical and industrial preeminence during this very important phase in history.

Thank you very much.

COLONEL AUSTIN: Gentlemen, Dr. Kintner will welcome your questions, and Professor Kintner will answer them.

QUESTION: Doctor, will you supplement your remarks on why Russia seized the nuclear test ban treaty as a means of reducing their power differential between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. plus any comments about their motivation as a result of the Chinese-Russian differences?

DR. KINTNER: On the first point, under the test ban agreement, the Soviets can work on the lower range of atomic warheads if they choose to. Underground testing will permit this. We cannot work on the testing in the atmosphere. The testimony is all very guarded but it did come out that they did learn certain things in their 1961 series by testing operational offensive missiles and operational defensive missiles. They also may have learned some of the electronic magnetic pulse phenomena with respect to communication, radar discrimination and missile circuitry.

If you recall from Mr. McNamara's testimony, he stated that there are great areas of uncertainty and we will work around them. Whether we are able to work around without testing is the big question. For the first time in our history we are depending upon weapon systems which we never really tested. Those of you in the

Navy know the problem of World War II with the torpedo, which perhaps was a pretty good torpedo, but at that time we had insufficient funds to test it. As a consequence when our subs got to the Pacific they were shooting a lot of torpedoes but were not hitting a lot of ships.

The Soviets, in signing the test ban, felt there was some advantage to them in signing it. I believe that they felt that they had data and knowledge that they could build on successfully, whereas we would be denied that knowledge because we can't test in the atmosphere.

Another factor has been presented as to why the signal to test ban namely, that they are having economic difficulties and would like to slow down the so-called arms race. I don't think there has been an arms race, because we haven't been racing. In other words, the amount of our total defense effort has been relatively small. We have not mobilized to any extent the full energy of our country.

So, if they wanted to hold us down, and if they had to meet certain demands for consumer consumption, this would be one means of doing it.

Now, whether the Sino-Soviet split enters the test-picture or not it is hard to say. The Chinese apparently have been cut adrift as far as nuclear developments are concerned from the Soviet Union. According to the Chinese disclosures, which the Kremlin has not been happy about--they said that the Chinese should not openly display classified documents--the Chinese were cut off from the nuclear program as late as 1959. But the Chinese probably have enough of a start in it to go ahead on their own program. Their program will be slowed down. I don't think there is any desire on the part of the Soviets to encourage Chinese nuclear developments. With nuclear weapons in their hands they have a decisive advantage over the Chinese.

To sum it up, they felt there was some military gain. There was some value internally inside the Soviet Union, of course, on the worldwide scene. I believe the political euphoria which will emerge from this will facilitate Communist endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere. After all, if a major anti-Communist power feels capable and willing to deal with the other side, then

why can't everybody else do it? This trend, I think, will become manifest in the next few years in many ways. I doubt very much that the Communists would sign an agreement which they felt was against their interest and which would not be fruitful to them in one way or another.

QUESTION: What effect do you think a European controlled strategic nuclear capability would be likely to have on Soviet strategy?

DR. KINTNER: I think a European controlled nuclear capability which is somehow linked to ours--would be the most favorable way of assuring for the long run a position which the Soviets would be unwilling to challenge. Our policies in a way are encouraging this. Each time we talk about a pause, each time we indicate that we are going to have a soul-searching operation as to whether we go into the defense of Western Europe encourages those forces in Europe to want to have their own national deterrent--not only the French but the British also.

Last March Lord Hume, who is the British Foreign Minister, said that if Britain did not seek to maintain a strategic capability, it did not have the right to claim to be a great power.

The likely trend over the next 10 years will be to encourage the emergence of these forces to some type of European-wide control under the Western Union or under the aegis of NATO. If we did have a capability in Western Europe, then the Soviet aim of trying to separate the United States and Western Europe will be very severely threatened. As the situation is now Western Europe is under the gun of about 1000 odd surface-to-surface missiles targeted all over the area, and except for what we have in Europe there is probably no counter to this. This gives them a tremendous military advantage which they have been exploiting politically.

QUESTION: You have indicated, I think, that our short-term problem is that of the wars of liberation. With two centers dedicated to liberating--that is Peking and Moscow--and we hear so frequently that country X has succumbed to Moscow or Peking, or vice versa, do you see any method open to us to exploit this system or this problem?

DR. KINTNER: We are finding it very difficult to exploit the Sino-Soviet split by any positive actions on our part. In Southeast

Asia there have been many endeavors in the propaganda field, both overt and covert, to indicate that the masters of Moscow and Peking are not cooperating with each other. I think that this can create dissensions and fractioning tendencies inside the local Communist parties. If it succeeds in doing that, it will certainly cut down the momentum of the attack.

Beyond that I really don't see how, by external manipulation, we can do much about it. If you want to play sheer power politics, we could support one side against the other. If you play sheer power politics, the Chinese are the weakest element in the struggle, and we should support them. But ideologically that would not be acceptable to the American people at the present time.

Except by actively entering in on the list on one side or the other, there is very little, as I see it, that we can do to take advantage of this schism. Even in the areas of the world outside of southeast Asia, they seem to be not too hostile toward each other. For example, both the Chinese and the Soviets support Ben Bella's regime. I am not saying that Ben Bella is a Communist. I am saying that he's a leftist, and his survival and the strength of his position appear to be of interest to both the Chinese and the Russians.

Likewise, in Latin America, I don't see any great evidence of their working at odds with each other.

QUESTION: You mentioned the Soviet civil defense program. Would you comment as to the effort being devoted to this program by an oriented choice of the U.S.S.R.?

DR. KINTNER: This is an area of great controversy as far as any positive, hard data is concerned. Some people contend that there is very little going on, and others maintain that it is somewhat like a training program such as ours.

From the available information, it is hard to put your finger on it, but from a broad point of view, I think the decentralization of Soviet industry can be considered part of the civil defense program, and the fact that they have less urbanization and less concentration by the population within the cities.

From the information that I have had any access to, they appear to have taken certain efforts to place some of their headquarters

underground and to provide perhaps more shelters than we have. But again this is a very uncertain area in terms of the data.

So I would say that from their published literature they regard civil defense as a basic component of their overall strategic posture. Whether they have put that policy into full operation, I can't say. Just like in our country, we keep talking about civil defense, and we put a certain amount of effort into it, but in terms of our strategic posture, where do we have the population protected against fallout? We have hardly made a dent in the full extent of the problem.

QUESTION: Will you evaluate Russia's adventure in Cuba with relation to its coexistence strategy?

DR. KINTNER: Well, there are all kinds of analyses of why they went into Cuba. One was that they recognized that if they were pressured into the strategic exchange, and that, if they could get 50 or so of their own missiles there, they would pick up a great deal of power, because they could hit the United States directly. I think that may have been one of their calculations.

On the other hand, the calculation may have been associated with another series of events. If you recall, last fall we anticipated right after the election a major thrust on Berlin and simultaneously the Chinese attack on India. After it was over and the Soviet missiles were discovered, the Chinese attack appeared to be an uncoordinated affair. Perhaps it was and perhaps it wasn't, but, if the missiles had stayed in there, had they put the heat on Berlin, and had the Chinese moved into India, we'd have had that problem which we have been worried about for a number of years, namely, how to deal with three crises simultaneously. We sometimes have difficulty dealing with one, but three crises in Washington would be most difficult to handle.

That's another possibility. The military advantage is first, secondly, there is the possibility of the three crises situations, and the third advantage, that many people talk about is that they really didn't want to do more than consolidate, on a semipermanent basis, their base in Cuba.

Of course as things turned out they did at least get the third gain. There is no indication of the Soviets being willing to remove their troops from there, and, to a significant extent, their

utilization of Cuba as a base for training, for propaganda, and for further operations in Latin America seems very evident.

QUESTION: A report that I heard the other day indicated that, as the Soviets are leaving Cuba, the Red Chinese are swarming in. Is it possible for cooperation to exist at this point between the U. S. S. R. and Red China, in spite of their so-called rift?

DR. KINTNER: I don't think the Red Chinese are swarming in. I think the report is erroneous. The Red Chinese have been in there for the last 3 years, but in relatively small numbers. With respect to the Soviet influence there, Mr. Castro went to Moscow, as you know, last May, I think it was, and received a more or less permanent statement of support from Khrushchev. The Soviets are primarily footing the bill for the operation.

Castro, however, wants to try to maintain as much independence as possible. On the Sino-Soviet rift he has generally come out on the Soviet side, but he has kept the door open to Peiping. He may have more Chinese in there from the point of view of support of his own position. As I indicated earlier, I think the rift exists, and I think it is reasonably serious, but I don't think it has reached the point where they are unwilling to cooperate in many parts of the world.

QUESTION: In reference to your statement about the necessity of maintaining scientific and technological superiority, there is growing concern that we are unilaterally disarming in this country and that by the late sixties we will have only the Polaris and the Minuteman in our strategic arsenal. Do you see any reason to be concerned about the fact that there are no strategic weapon systems being planned, or aircraft or missiles or space programs, in the late sixties or early seventies?

DR. KINTNER: In general, the position that we now enjoy is the fruit of decisions made 5 years ago. There has been an intensification of weapon systems that were designed in the late fifties. The record of the first several years of the current Administration is that there has been less inclination to go into new systems, advanced systems, where you gain a margin of 2 or 3 times what you have now. If this trend continues, and if the Soviets make this major effort in technology, we may find ourselves very much behind the eight ball.

We've got to look at this in terms of the offensive-defensive balance. We have been taking a very pessimistic attitude about the potentiality of a man-missile defense system. From the evidence that I have been able to get the Soviets have taken a somewhat different point of view and are concentrating on that.

A marginal gain in defense may be just as significant as a new device on the offensive side. I believe that the tendency, which shows up in many official speeches, is that we are seeking some kind of "stability," where we have a neat balance of forces on both sides. Yet, in my opinion, the superiority which we have enjoyed over the last 17 years gives us a margin which saves us from mistakes in other areas. If you get the stability, if there is such a thing possible, in the military sense we will get into the worst possible position of political instability. It is only when people are roughly even that a man who is carrying on an aggressive policy considers possibilities and opportunities for taking chances, whereas when he knows, as we tried to convey to him in Cuba, that we do enjoy a decisive superiority, he will make the effort and retreat, whether gracefully or otherwise.

I personally believe that we are still in a period where absolutely new, dynamic, technological discoveries may take place, and they may have utility for military application.

If we come out on the short end of the stick in all these developments, the advantages which we enjoyed might be very short-lived.

QUESTION: Should we continue to keep Red China out of the United Nations or what effect would the admission of Red China have on the Sino-Soviet split?

DR. KINTNER: The first question we have to ask ourselves is: What positive gain do you achieve if you let them in the United Nations? Whether we can keep them out is another matter. The other people may get them in whether we want them in or not. If we are trying to hold a perimeter around Asia, I think the admission of Red China would make it very difficult for us to do. The Chinese overseas communities are swing communities in many of these countries. If we go along and recognize Red China, then their somewhat ambivalent position might change to open support of the Chinese mainland. Many of them support Red China already. The task that we are engaged in in southeast Asia may become impossible then.

Furthermore, we still have unfinished businesses with the Chinese. We are still technically at war with the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea. There is no settlement of that conflict. We still have no settlement on the Quemoy-Matsu business. And, of course, the situation in Vietnam, as far as I can gather, is partially the result of considerable Chinese Communist assistance to North Vietnam.

So, would there be any gain? As of now I see no particular gain that would come from it.

Now, your second question was: Would it exacerbate the Chinese-Soviet split? As you know, in the past the Soviet Union has been the prime supporter of the admission of Red China into the United Nations Assembly. Maybe at this time the Soviet Union would not particularly encourage having the Chinese there as their colleague in the debate there, because the problem of what to do with Red China should it become one of the statutory members of the Security Council has not been resolved.

So there is a possibility that there might be some gain from the point of view of the Sino-Soviet split. But on that, because of the difficulties which it would create for us in trying to hold the line in Asia, at this time I would just as soon let the current policy which has been operative for the last 10 years continue.

QUESTION: Doctor, in terms of the longrun policy of the United States, do you see any way short of war to rid the world of the Communist menace?

DR. KINTNER: I hope that there are ways short of war. My own view is that, if the Western World continues to maintain a unified, coherent position, if we exploit the tremendous dynamism of the development of Western Europe, if we find ways and means of creating a genuine Atlantic Community, where we work with each other rather than against each other, and if we are able to keep the lid on the pot in the development process going on in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the trends are on our side, provided we do not lose this power advantage. The power advantage is what gives us the leverage to play these other areas.

If we do that, then the Communist theory about how to organize society will become more threadbare than it already is, and the dynamics of change inside the Soviet Union, which would increase by the positive pressure that would result from a greatly strengthened

Atlantic Community--and I include the United States--would, I think, over time, bring about changes that are of such a nature that we might find the ability to get along with the Soviet system, but the Soviet system would then be fundamentally changed.

The whole argument now concerns timing. There are those who believe that currently the Soviet Union wants a genuine detente. I personally believe that they don't want a genuine detente now, that they want to give the appearance of wanting one, but perhaps in 10 or 15 years things will be different.

There is no easy description of it. I think any effort to try to dislodge them now by a preemptive war or any kind of a major nuclear engagement would be disastrous. Yet I think it is essential at the same time that we maintain a power position so that we never tempt them to shortcut history by trying to knock us out of the game, or never give them a predominance which they can exploit politically to divide our alliance system. If that takes place then we are an isolated Fortress America, and our position to influence world developments will become very minimal.

QUESTION: Sir, will you give us your views on overall Communist strategy in southeast Asia?

DR. KINTNER: I think the goal of the strategy is to drive the United States Western influence out of the region, which would have a second subsidiary gain, namely, that Japan, which is the major potential industrial power there, would be isolated from its eventual natural source of markets, trade, and commerce. Those are the goals.

The technique is fairly obvious. It's a war of mass liberation. The reaction to it on our side has been, in my own view, somewhat limpid. The Laotian settlement, for example, I think exacerbated the situation in South Vietnam. Either we have to make a decision to hold the line and also perhaps roll it back in some places--and I think this is possible because we don't have the possibility of nuclear escalation--or we are going to be fighting, as we have been fighting, a very dogged, defensive battle.

But it's more than a military problem, of course. As you are all well aware, the problem there is that you are dealing with very old societies that are trying to become modern societies in a short period of time. They are poorly organized, they lack sufficient

trained personnel, and in many cases they don't have a positive goal to which they are moving, whereas the Communists do have a positive goal--the elimination of us and the imposition of their own order afterwards.

In southeast Asia I think we made some fundamental mistakes in policy. I think the general support of Sukarno in getting rid of the Dutch was a mistake, which only whetted his appetite. I think the Laotian settlement has complicated our difficulties there. I think the Chinese attack on India may turn out as a possible benefit on our side, particularly if the Indians will wake up sufficiently to see that not just war in the defense of their own borders is required but that India and Pakistan together might possibly take some strategic responsibility for the area.

I think it is unwise for the United States to be committed there indefinitely. If we can find somebody else who can hold the line while we are involved in this tortuous process, I think we will make some gains, and if we not only set as our goal this defensive stance that we have taken but also take positive action against North Vietnam. Incidentally, that idea has been advocated by many people, including some very high people in the State Department, but it has never been sold as official U.S. policy.

QUESTION: Will you comment on the significance of the recent border controversies to the Sino-Soviet relationship?

DR. KINTNER: Historically, the Chinese and the Russians have never been particularly cordial toward each other. The Russians are big, white-nosed barbarians in China. Russia has taken more territory from China than any other power. Eastern Siberia, for example, was once under a vague type of Chinese suzerainty. You have that nationalistic drive. You have the fact that the border areas are inhabited mostly by remnants of the various Mongol races, who owe allegiance to neither China nor Russia. Drawing the line has been very difficult.

I think the border incidents, as alleged by the Soviet Union, if they have taken place, are part of the Chinese effort to reestablish control over areas which historically they felt should be under their dominance. I think it also reflects a tremendous manifestation of personal Chinese hostility toward the Russians.

I was talking to a friend of mine who repeated the conversation of a British representative who was in Peiping just a couple months ago. He said that the evidence of Chinese dislike and disdain for the Russians shows up very heavily all over the place, particularly in Peiping.

So I think there is a natural basis for the conflict. I think it is kept very muted. As you may recall, in 1937 there was a major war between the Japanese and the Soviets on the edges of Outer Manchuria. The two totalitarian powers were able to control a conflict like that and use it as a means of communicating with each other without letting it get out of hand.

I don't think that it indicates that the Sino-Soviet split has reached the point where there is going to be a complete diplomatic isolation of China, or even the next stage, where there will be any serious major hostilities between the two powers.

QUESTION: Sir, would you please comment on the significance of the grain shipments to both Communist China and Soviet Russia from Western countries?

DR. KINTNER: The obvious implication is that the Communist states throughout the world have never solved their grain problem. They have never solved it because their political method of controlling the countryside has not permitted the incentive needed to grow food successfully. It has been the colossal mistake in communism. The question is: Should the West bale out the Communists from their internal difficulties? Well, the problem there is that the West has no coordinated economic policy, so you have Canada, which currently is in very difficult economic conditions for a variety of reasons, going anywhere it can to get some gain. Unfortunately, as far as these grain deals are concerned, I am not certain that Canada is getting anything in the way of hard currency out of it. The \$300 million loan to China was partially in credit extended by the Canadian government. In other words, they subsidized shipments of grain just like we subsidize agriculture in this country. On the \$500 million for the Soviet Union, what Canada will actually get out of it, I don't know, but the Russians are going to get the grain.

We come back to this fundamental policy: Should we help out by grain and food shipments of various kinds the internal economic problems of the Soviet system, which then permits them to turn

other energies to the acquisition of this technological supremacy I was talking about, or not? I think there is a value in certain types of trade relations for the purpose of contact and perhaps even for the long-range adjustments of internal thinking, but personally I see no great gain for the West in letting the Communist system move in and exploit our own economic incoherence.

As another example of that--Great Britain buys more lumber from the Soviet Union than it does from Canada. If Canada had sold lumber to Great Britain, maybe the Canadians would not have had to sell wheat to the Soviet Union.

I think our inability to find common economic policies among ourselves toward the Communist bloc is one of the greatest weaknesses in the free world.

COLONEL AUSTIN: Gentlemen, I know you have several unanswered questions. After we break up here Dr. Kintner will go to the faculty lounge, and you are welcome to come there and ask your questions. After that he will visit several of the discussion rooms.

Dr. Kintner, I think I can speak for all of us here in saying that you certainly gave depth treatment to a very important subject. Thank you very much.

(27 January 1964--7, 600)H/syb:pd