

CHANGING PATTERNS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

30 September 1963

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NOTICE

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DR. REICHLEY: Before turning the platform over to Dr. Sanders this morning I want to take a few minutes to preview our program on the economic and managerial aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency during this coming year. As you are all quite aware, this is a subject of acute concern to our Government, from the White House on down. It is a concern which seems to show no sign of diminishing. I dare say most of you already have some familiarity with it, and some of you may already have been active as counterinsurgents.

The program is divided into two parts. The larger part is the consideration of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the context of the entire Resident Course. For example, in the unit that is running now, Unit II, you will learn something about the responsibilities for counterinsurgency programs as divided among the various Government agencies, such as, let's say, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, along with the other responsibilities of those agencies.

Another example is that next week you will have a lecture on Military Assistance, by General Wood, and I'm sure he will give you some notion of how military aid is used to support counterinsurgency efforts.

When we study later on in the year the comparative strengths of countries and regions overseas, we will consider, among other things, the social and economic conditions that make a particular nation or region--let's say Latin America--either vulnerable or resistant to subversive insurgent penetration by communism. In these various ways, then, we study the causes of insurgency and the actions the United States and its allies take to counter it. We do this in the broad context of the economic and industrial aspects of national security, and the management of resources for defense.

In addition--and this is the second part of the program--we have scheduled a number of lectures, seminars, and discussion periods, to deal wholly with specific aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This part of the program is described in the booklet that you received last week. It is part of what we call our "General Studies Program," which runs throughout the entire year.

Now, Dr. Sanders' lecture this morning, which you will hear in a few moments, inaugurates the latter part of our program. About three weeks from now, the 24th of October, in a joint lecture with the National War College, we will hear Major General Krulak of the Marine Corps, who is the JCS Special Assistant with regard to this type of operation. During that same afternoon we have General Frank Osmani, J-4 in Vietnam and a graduate of ICAF, who is coming to town, and we have arranged for him to discuss the logistical problems in that area.

Then there are about four other lectures, one class seminar, and two discussion periods spaced throughout the year. All this information is contained in the book I mentioned.

A final word on what we expect you to do in this program. We have tried to keep the reading requirements down to a minimum, consistent with giving you an adequate background. Most of the essential reading will be found in this yellow book, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology." In addition to that, and available in the library for individual distribution, we ask you to pick up Crozier's book "The Rebels." Only certain portions of this are assigned reading. It is our hope, however, that you will go through the whole thing. I believe, after reading a few chapters you will do this because it is a fascinating book, covering insurgency activities throughout the world since World War II.

In addition, I'm sure some of you will select counterinsurgency subjects to write about in your theses, and finally there will be a group of five oral presentations on subjects in this particular area.

If you have any questions concerning the program, in addition to talking to me, Dr. Leighton, Colonel Lake, Dr. Sanders, and Colonel Muller constitute a committee which oversees this program throughout the year.

Now I'll turn the platform over to Ralph.

DR. SANDERS: General Stoughton; Gentlemen: This morning I'm going to introduce the subject of "Communist Insurgency." Now, nearly every writer on Communist insurgency stresses the importance of people. Surely, the most oft-quoted statement in the whole mushrooming literature on insurgency is Mao Tse Tung's analogy of the people as water and the guerrillas as the fish that inhabit that water. It seems strange, then, that analysts have devoted literally tons of paper to explain how people are important in insurgency. People are important as sources of intelligence, for taxes, and for recruitment. But it seems strange, as I've said, that they have largely ignored the question of why people are important. And this is the question to which I would like to address myself today.

Today rebels make massive efforts to alienate from established governments the people in emerging lands. Yet, in the past, if one thinks back, successful rebels usually seized power without asking for the support of the people. One could ask, "Why should the Communists try so hard to cultivate people in their struggle against what they call 'bourgeois regimes?'" Logically, the Communists would prefer to seize power without this large expenditure. But there is no all-embracing hypothesis which explains every fact of every situation. However, I have tried to formulate a theory, which is admittedly imperfect--it can't explain everything--which does, I believe, give a clearer insight into this question.

This theory advances three basic propositions. First, governments today enjoy greater power vis-a-vis local opponents. Second; that minorities make revolutions and that nonelite minorities find it increasingly difficult to oust existing regimes. Third, and this is the consequence of the first two propositions, nonelite minorities--and remember, the Communists are a nonelite minority in all the emerging lands; at least in most of them--they must cultivate the people to offset their unfavorable power position. Now, let's examine each of these propositions in turn, and then discuss certain characteristics of an emerging society which makes it vulnerable to Communist insurgency.

As to the first proposition, under modern conditions rulers in emerging lands enjoy increased tangible power resources over indigenous opponents. That is, if they have the fortitude to use them. They could, for example, imitate Louis XVI of France who ducked the decision to use his power. But, if they have resolved, their commanding position places the insurgents at a great disadvantage.

Well, let's examine one of the important power resources; one in which you are particularly interested, namely military might. At one time the combat and power capability which was available to the ruling group did not grossly exceed that available to those outside the group. For example, in the 15th and 16th centuries, the English Squire was a part-time professional soldier who owned more or less the same type of weapons as did the king's standing army. These weapons were relatively simple to manufacture and low in cost. Now, because of this situation, Parliament through the years could develop armies equal to, or actually superior to, those of the king.

Again, another example; at the beginning of the American Revolution the colonists could take up their muskets and engage the British with reasonable effectiveness. Or, the Latin American revolutionaries launched their war of independence against Spain under similar circumstances. But we cannot conclude from such historical events that revolutions were more successful then than now. Even with a narrower margin of power, ruling groups nevertheless usually were able to put down revolts by nonelite groups. For example, Spartacus caused the Romans untold trouble with his slave revolt, but ultimately he failed. Well, the point is that once rulers widen the gap of power they became even less vulnerable to ouster by nonelite groups. Insurgents, then, had to invent new ways to seize political power.

Well, one can legitimately ask, "Why did power shift in favor of ruling groups?" I believe we can attribute it to the revolution in technology; especially in the technology of weaponry and its supporting systems. Rulers more than insurgents benefit from improvements in weapons, in transportation, and in communications, because they can acquire and use these instruments of power more easily than their opponents. In Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Indochina, Cuba, and South Vietnam, government forces enjoyed technological superiority. For example, the South Vietnamese Government can acquire and operate military aircraft, while the Viet Cong cannot. Using their primitive logistics system, Communist guerrillas would find it exceedingly difficult to bring in any significant number of aircraft. And, to use air power effectively, they would have to operate relatively sophisticated supply and maintenance systems. After all, you don't get high-octane gasoline or pistons from rural villages. In addition, they would have to build an airbase and thus expose themselves to an attack on their rear.

And guerrilla doctrine enjoins them above all, not to establish such a permanent base.

Now, of course, one could argue that intelligent men by means of superior tactics and organization in certain instances have successfully used inferior weapons to overcome well-equipped forces; by using the traditional tactics of concentration and dispersion, guerrillas can assemble overwhelming strength at the time and place of their own choosing. Therefore, according to this argument, insurgents can effectively match or surpass the forces that the government can commit in any crucial engagement. On closer inspection one sees that insurgents must amass considerable resources to develop an environment for successfully applying dispersion and concentration tactics. Thousands of peasants must provide the support and intelligence to insure the success of guerrilla tactics. I will speak more about this later.

Moreover, given a wide enough technological gap, final victory becomes increasingly remote for the insurgents. The Boxers of China painfully learned this lesson. And given its technological inferiority, the Viet Cong would enjoy little success if it did not have the support of large segments of the Vietnamese population. The Communists can continue to smuggle in small arms; can use primitive ingenious devices, but cannot cope with the mobility and the firepower of the national government. Over the longrun a few isolated men using inferior weapons will lose to better-equipped forces. And Communist guerrillas in Malaya found themselves in exactly this predicament once the British launched their strategic hamlet program.

Now, the second proposition derives from the fact that revolution most often results from an active, though not necessarily tiny, minority. Revolutions do not usually occur in the form of massive uprisings. To the contrary, able and well-organized vanguards spearhead even so-called "popular revolts." The Communists understand well the role of minorities in revolution. Lenin once observed--and I quote--"The more organized, more class-conscious, better-armed minority forces its will upon the majority." Now, in some instances, especially in the West, these minorities successfully courted some degree of mass support. While one could say that in 1775 only a minority of the American colonists actually favored a war of independence against Great Britain, had not mass support existed for them to initiate and continue the Revolution, they could not have won. Again, sufficient people in the

mobs of Paris and the peasants in the provinces of France gave the support to insure the final victory of the French Revolution. Now, the fact that these people had access to the weapons not too inferior to those of their enemies helped mightily to insure the success of their revolution. Well, that's in the West.

In the emerging lands not only have insurgents come from minority groups--and usually these minority groups came from the ruling elite--but these minorities who revolted usually have ignored the people in their drive for power. Ousting a regime usually meant nothing more than replacing one ruling clique with another. Most Latin American nations until fairly recently corresponded to this variety. That is why so many of them have been coups de etat. In such revolts the out-group had access to some of the power resources of the in-group. Often the outs won over to the military who then deposed the ins. In other cases, the military itself, which, remember, is part of the elite group in these countries, assumed power. And in the latter case, conflict among military cliques often determines the successive changes in government.

In any event, this struggle between elite groups normally did not involve the bulk of the population. Now, since the Communists are a nonelite minority they seek to replace the entire ruling group in these countries. Communist insurgents, then, either must lure to their side some of the elite power resources, or develop their own. Now, both in 1789 and 1848 French Revolutionaries successfully subverted the king's military. But, historically, the Communists usually have not had access to the elite's power resources nor were they able to win over a significant number of the military's leaders. Lacking this technological strength they have been forced to look elsewhere to fortify their unfavorable power position. And this brings us to the third proposition; namely, that Communists look to the mass of the people for this support.

In the less-developed world this means chiefly the peasantry. The leaders of Communist insurrection usually come from the cities. But the peasants have been made a massive target. As far back as 1905 Lenin recognized that the numerically small proletariat of Russia could not possibly win a revolution in that country. In order to succeed, they must enjoy at least the passive support of the peasants. At least this is the way Lenin reasoned. And Mao has demonstrated that he understood Lenin very well. The Communists, then, confront the difficult task of seizing power as a nonelite minority in an age of growing technological superiority of existing elite regimes.

Now, during the early stages of revolt Communist insurgents do not have to acquire the same types of resources which the government has. Before they initiate armed insurrection they usually restrict themselves to organizing human assets. After hostilities start they look neither for heavy armor nor for large communications and transportation facilities. Rather, they seek to achieve the famous and favorable insurgent to counterinsurgent ratio, chiefly by extending their control over human resources and applying guerrilla tactics. It is well-known that counter-guerrillas require from 10 to 20 soldiers to fight 1 guerrilla in organized operations. This ratio remains one of the most knotty, unresolved problems in guerrilla warfare. Thus we see that the Communists substitute plentiful and skilled manpower for scarce hardware.

They lack hardware because of logistical difficulties and because they want to make the revolt appear purely internal. In other words, if they brought in heavy armor everyone in the world would understand that this is not really an internal revolution, but is actually war proxy fought by either Communist China or the Soviet Union. The advance of technology, as I said, especially in weaponry and in supporting systems, has made people more and not less important in insurrections. Far from restricting the context of political power to a few, technological progress has extended it to the many.

Now, Communist insurgents are not content to profit only from the ratio advantage. As the revolutionary war develops the Communists, as did insurgents of old progressively seek parity and ultimate superiority in weaponry. With French help, for example, our forefathers mustered as much combat capability at the Battle of Yorktown, as did the British. Likewise, the Chinese Communists when they administered the final blows to the Nationalists on the Mainland, actually had acquired technological superiority over their enemies.

On the other hand, some rebels, usually because of external circumstances, have been able successfully to terminate their revolutions before they attained technological preeminence, as in Cuba and in Indochina. But in either case, nonelite insurgents initially must utilize their manpower to keep revolutions going. Well, if the Communists must secure the support of the civilian population the attitude of these people takes on vital significance. Of late, much has been written about this subject. Many authors point out that modernization sweeping these emerging lands have created stress and tensions. There is little need for me to recite these findings in detail.

It seems more useful to discuss some major generalizations which help explain the vulnerability of emerging societies to Communist machinations. Social and political instability has led to a general frustration which the Communists exploit. At the outset it must be stated that not all insurgents act out of frustration with intolerable conditions. Brian Crozier, whose book was mentioned earlier, points out that some men are just born rebels. This type would preach revolution to the angels in Heaven.

Let us take a closer look at one such born rebel, the legendary Lawrence of Arabia. Before Lawrence ever set foot on the Arabian Peninsula he exhibited a defiant nature. Several conflicting biographies of the man depict Lawrence at war with the world. He clashed violently, for example, with his strict Calvinist mother. He hated school as an irrelevant and timewasting nuisance. He took up vegetarianism for three years to protest man's treatment of animals, and deliberately was vague about dates and numbers because he disdained what he called "unimportant accuracies." Now, while Lawrence did not strike out against everything, he revolted against so many conventions that one can truly call him a born rebel. The cause of Arab Nationalism was merely an accident of history which gave this rebel the opportunity to display his rebelliousness.

Now, as with any abstract word, the definition of frustration varies. Psychologists tend to define it in terms of interference with gratification of a motive, of a need, of a desire. Crozier noted--and I'll quote--"Frustration is one of the elements common to all rebels, whatever their aims, political ideas, or social background." He went on to define frustration in everyday language,--and I quote again--"The inability to do something one badly wants to do, through circumstances beyond his control."¹

The famous American vagabond-turned-philosopher, Eric Hoffer, in a highly-respected inquiry into the origin and nature of mass-movements, aptly observed--and I'll quote--"The frustrated predominate among the early adherents of all mass-movements." And--now listen to this--"they usually join of their own accord."² The evidence supporting frustration as a key cause of insurrection is so

¹Brian Crozier, The Rebels, Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p. 16.

²Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New York: Harper and Row, 1959, p. xii.

overwhelming that most people merely assume the condition exists, when they think about rebels. One could say that the degree of frustration corresponds to the ratio between a man's ambitions and his rewards. If this be the case a man must first become aware of better things. The peasant does not covet a higher office if he assumes that nature denied him such position. Nor does he desire an automobile until he knows that such a mechanism exists.

Modernization alerts people to undreamed of benefits. As people recognize the yawning gap between desires and probable accomplishments they naturally become frustrated. And unfortunately, intensely ambitious people in emerging societies seem to react to gratification by demanding more. In such cases, awareness merely feeds a constantly growing appetite. Within emerging societies frustration stems from a number of causes, including a feeling of helplessness to escape from unwelcome tasks; the inability to solve their problems; and unsatisfactory leadership, which thwarts the gratification of the led. All three causes are important, but the third is the most dangerous.

After becoming aware of better things the peasant may chafe at his hard and monotonous life. He may complain about his inability to solve his problems. But very frequently he takes up arms against rulers who fail to provide the escape hatch or to solve his problems. And these people unfortunately expect government miraculously to end the causes of frustration.

At this point I want to make one thing clear; frustration may create the right environment for insurrection, but frustration itself does not foment revolt. For ages men in many lands have stoically endured interference with gratification. Rebellion occurs when frustration prompts or instigates aggression. That is, behavior directed toward injuring the person blocking gratification. Now, while psychologists argue if frustration inevitably leads to some form of aggression, they all agree that aggressive conduct always stems from prior frustration and the changing attitudes of people in emerging societies, I believe, supports this conclusion. Active hostility is replacing passivity which was traditional in these societies. Throughout the centuries these people had docilely accepted frustration as part of their way of life. But as they become aware that they can change circumstances they tend to act with increasing hostility against interfering masses.

Now, the intensity of people's aggression depends upon three major factors. First, the stronger the drive being frustrated the more vigorous the reaction. This is only commonsense. The peasant may complain if he is denied extra pleasure, but he often will fight if he is denied land. He sets such a high priority on land that frustrating this drive invites extreme wrath.

Secondly, hostility heightens with increased interference. This, again, is logical. Peruvian Indians whose desire to own land has been thwarted so repeatedly, exhibit more revolutionary ardor than, say, the small farmers in Costa Rica who owned their land for centuries and have had very little interference.

And finally, the longer the frustration continues without relief, the greater the probability of recourse to overt aggressive acts. In other words, when anger is bottled up, the explosion, when it finally comes, tends to be more violent.

The mobs of Paris, for example, stormed the bastille because Louis XVI sent in just a few more troops into the fortress. The people's response was out of all proportion to the king's act. One can explain this behavior only by the fact that the people had heated their resentment in a pressure cooker for so long that even an insignificant event was enough to pop the lid. Now, other examples of this are found in history. In their revolutionary doctrine Communists recognize the relationship between the intensity of interference and the intensity of reaction. For example, they rejoice every time the police kill in quelling a riot. Why? Because they can use the martyr as a powerful symbol for portraying the government's interference with the desires of the people.

Not surprisingly, people normally direct aggression against those agents who they believe did the frustrating. It then becomes a prime task of the Communists to fix the onus on the agents of the ruling bourgeois elite. And they all too often find this a very easy task because that is exactly where the blame belongs. But when ruling groups undertake reforms, Communists try to make the people believe that the national government continues to thwart their desires for a better life. This is a more difficult task. Yet, this is precisely the task they have assigned themselves, for example, in Venezuela. Here they confront the demanding stint of convincing the people that the reform-minded Betancourt regime still seeks to deny them their legitimate aspirations.

In summary, then, we see that the masses of the people have become crucial to the Communists in their so-called "Wars of National Liberation." The Communists as a nonelite minority have found that they must substitute available manpower for unavailable hardware, for unavailable technology. Their guerrilla tactics are based on this premise. In soliciting the support of emotionally uprooted people the Communists exploit the growing aggressiveness which frustration prompts, and as a result the vital importance of people, their frustrations, and their aggressions, pose serious policy implications for the free world. Perhaps during the question period some of these policy implications will be examined.

But, at any rate, we must learn to formulate and operate our counterinsurgency programs and efforts with an understanding of what people in these lands think and feel, and why they think and feel as they do. We must be able to understand their response to what we do. We can't be like the agricultural specialist who went to a small African village and was asked by the Chief to give a speech. He got up before the assembled villagers and said, "I am here to give you all a much better life in just a few months." All the natives yelled, "Luwonga." "All you have to do is change the way you hoe your land, change the way you farm, and use the proper fertilizers that I'll give you." And everybody yelled, "Luwonga." He said, "Then all you have to do is change your family life to accommodate for these new, progressive ways of farming." And everybody yelled, "Luwonga."

After the talk he went with the Chief who invited him for a little something to eat in his hut. As they walked along in the field the expert saw in a pen the most beautiful bull he'd ever seen in his life. He was quite surprised to see this in the middle of Africa. So, he said to the Chief, "Do you mind if I go over to the pen and take a closer look at that bull?" The Chief said, "By all means, but be careful; don't step on any of that Luwonga."

Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Dr. Sanders, could you tell us a little more about this strategic hamlet concept; where it came from and what its purpose is?

DR. SANDERS: Let me try to explain that in the light of what I said previously on this technological difference--this disparity. As I pointed out, the government forces in almost all insurgencies have technological superiority. Therefore, the Communists, to equate this, have to go to the people. What we are doing, for example in Vietnam is to increase the technological disparity between the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong on the one hand. And on the other hand, what the Vietnamese have to do is drive a wedge in between the Communist guerrillas and the people. Because, as I said, this is the guerrillas form of support. This is their equalizer. Well, in Malaya the British discovered that by taking the people who were subject to threats, intimidation, and who were sympathizers, and who helped the guerrillas, into a village and protecting them they did a number of things.

One thing they did was prevent him from giving aid to the enemy. In other words, he was no longer available as a recruit. He was no longer able to pay the rice or the taxes. And, above all, he was not able to give the intelligence information which the guerrillas require for their concentration and dispersion tactics. Consequently, in Vietnam they looked the situation over and they decided that perhaps there were some lessons to be learned from what happened in Malaya. And the government set up these strategic villages which, in addition to the things I said before, also provide the villagers with certain services. They provide the villagers importantly with better defense. And they also provide the villagers with, for the first time, some sort of connecting link between themselves and the national government. Counterinsurgents feel that once they get enough of the Vietnamese population into such villages and make the cost to the Viet Cong so dear, they will be well on their way to winning the war in Vietnam. That, in brief, is what the strategic hamlet concept is all about.

QUESTION: One of our previous speakers left us with the distinct impression that Communists tend to exploit, let's say, new college graduates; that general class of people, in order to further their aims within a country, as opposed to discontented masses of uneducated people. Would you comment on that?

DR. SANDERS: Yes. Well, number one, he's right. In fact, in your reading material there is one article which talks about the appeal of the Communists to the less-developed world. And it brings out there--and this is quite accurate--that the Communists direct their appeal initially to the intelligentsia--the city people.

But, these city people are used, then, as the cadres to go out to the countryside because the battles will be won in the countryside and not in the cities. In fact, the Communists found, for example, in China and in Indonesia that when they started revolts in the cities they got clobbered. In Asia all revolts which have been successful went into the countryside.

I might also add something else; that while we say they go for the intelligentsia, we have to understand what we mean by "intelligentsia." We tend to think of them as people with a college education--or artists, lawyers, doctors; that type of person. This is true to some degree in these countries, but to a large degree Communists look for what I call the "lumpen intelligentsia." The "lumpen proletariat" was an expression used by Marx to mean sort of the bums, the proletariat which doesn't really understand they are proletariat. Well, the Communists look for these lumpen intelligentsia, people with an education which is marginally superior to that of their countrymen. But it is not necessarily the type of education or the degree of education that we are used to. I think it is very important to keep this in mind because these people with this marginal education are a group that usually become much more frustrated than others, because normally, they do not come from the top bracket of the elite and consequently their career opportunities are limited. Therefore, they go to that organization which offers them some sort of career opportunity, in a way, and that is the Communists.

So, he is very right; that they do look for these city people and for the intelligentsia. But at the same time, these people do go out into the villages to propagandize and to convert villages against the nationalist government.

QUESTION: Doctor, with the majority of remarks on the world opinion of Communist-organized mass technology in Vietnam, what are your views to predominant world opinion on U.S. activities in Vietnam at the present time?

DR. SANDERS: Well, the United States usually operates at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Communists. In this one instance we have an advantage because we are not trying to prove that this is entirely internal. In effect, our official line is that the revolution in South Vietnam is not really internal, but is directed by the North Vietnamese. In fact, the State Department has two publications that document this. So, we start with an advantage. Consequently, I think people just expect us to go in there with the best we have.

Nobody gets particularly excited because we are sending high-priced hardware into the area.

On the other hand, if the Communists were to do that they would tip their hand that this is not an internal revolution, and consequently they would lose some propaganda value. Now, I am not saying they won't do this. All I am saying is that if, in their estimate they feel that it is important for them to maintain the facade of internal revolution they will keep their sophisticated hardware out of the area.

QUESTION: You made it a point that political and social instability were the cause of insurgency. And frequently, the ruling governments are unwilling to change the power structure. Now, how do you cope with this situation?

DR. SANDERS: Well, I might add that instability of itself--I think it's a good point to bring out--while it lays the groundwork for insurgency, is not necessarily in all cases going to lead to insurgency. Nations throughout history have gone through long periods of instability without insurgency. What I said was that instability leads to this increased frustration, and if this frustration is then translated into some sort of aggressive act on the part of sizable numbers of people, you're going to have insurgency.

Now, to answer your question specifically, one of the most difficult problems is to try to get the host government to undertake certain reforms. And this is one of the reasons I think we have to understand the frustration and aggression problem. Because, we cannot hope, that even if we have a very reform-minded government in power, that they are going to wipe out the causes of frustration overnight. They just cannot do it. Not only that, but as they relieve one cause of frustration people naturally tend to focus on another. In other words, the element of frustration is going to exist no matter what they do, for a long period of time. In fact, it still exists in the American society, and I see no reason for it to stop developing in an undeveloped society.

What is important is to give the people some mechanism whereby they can manifest these aggressive acts in a constructive way. In other words, if we were to go to a village and get rid of all the causes of frustration as we see them, we would probably find that there is still plenty of frustration there and this village may not be sympathetic to the national government. But what we are doing--

and this is being done in the strategic hamlet village--is helping the host government bring these people into an area whereby they can manifest their gripes and aggressiveness in a way that we like to see them manifested.

The British found this out in the strategic hamlet in Malaya. They were very surprised. They thought when they brought these people into the village that this would help identify the people with the national government. At first it did nothing of that sort. What it did was to allow a lot of disgruntled and discontented people to complain ad nauseam to the agents of the national government. But the British found out that this was good, because for the first time it established a dialogue between the people and the government. This was crucial. And that is what we are trying to do in Vietnam with the strategic hamlet; through local representatives of the regime in Saigon, we allow these people to express their gripes in a constructive way, in a way we like to see it manifested. Because, if they don't manifest it that way they are going to manifest it toward the Communists. And the Communists are past masters at exploiting the gripes and frustrations of people.

So, all we can hope for is reform, things to erase causes, and also give them an avenue for expressing their gripes.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Communist insurgency efforts?

DR. SANDERS: Well, two things I think we have to keep in mind. One is that throughout the world there is a struggle within the Communist Parties of all these countries, between China and Russia. Now, there is debate as to the intensity of this struggle, but I think that no one can deny that the struggle is taking place. This means that there is going to be some difference of opinion as to what course of action a particular Communist Party should take.

This is generally so. The Chinese would tend toward a more overt act sooner. The Russians, on the other hand, while they don't eschew violence, are more cautious because they see some of the other ramifications. So, I think that what you are going to find in these countries is that while there are Russian-prone and Chinese-prone Communists in these countries, they are still going to have as their ultimate objective the replacement of bourgeois regimes with Communist. They are going to have a different way of looking at the actions they want to take. The Chinese would tend to be more

violent sooner, and the Russians tend to be somewhat more cautious. So, I think this will affect what they do.

In certain instances if the split gets very, very pronounced I think it may jeopardize entirely their operations of an insurgency nature in the undeveloped countries. In brief, I would say I don't think the rift goes well for Communist insurgency operations.

QUESTION: Doctor, this term "insurgency," isn't it a little unfortunate when we are really fighting Peking and Moscow, rather than the insurgency within the country itself?

DR. SANDERS: Well, I think one of the things I did not bring out, and maybe it should be brought out, is that insurgency is nothing more than what used to be called in the 19th century the "limited commitment." In other words, they are promoting insurrections because they don't want exactly what you said might happen. They don't want to have a confrontation between American and Russian troops or American and Chinese troops. This is the reason they are going into this type of operation. Now, we could, if we wanted to, perhaps, adopt a gradual increase of violence, depending on how serious we think the condition is. In other words, we could say right now we are just fighting in South Vietnam. Well, if we feel it's getting out of hand we could attack North Vietnam; we could bomb the factories that Bernard Fall wrote about in Sunday's "Washington Post." Then, if it gets worse we could attack Peking. And if that gets worse we could attack Moscow too.

But basically they are playing by the rules of the game of limited engagement--limited commitment. And as long as these are the rules of the game, then I think it is the way the game is going to be played. And if you take Khrushchev at his word, he said that he believes local conflict will escalate to nuclear conflict, and the thing he wants to avoid at all costs is general nuclear conflict. So, all I can say is, these are the rules of the game. That is, limited commitment. And so far, the Communists have not violated that.

QUESTION: Doctor, is there any way that we can recognize at an early stage whether insurgency is truly locally inspired, or Communist inspired? I am pointing specifically toward Castro.

DR. SANDERS: Well, one of the most difficult things in insurgency is doing precisely what you ask; namely, taking a look at a revolutionary force in a country and determining, number one,

is it Communist-inspired and exploited, or is it truly local? Number two, is it receiving Communist support from the outside? It is very difficult in many instances to do this. I remember I spoke about this last year and I raised a question. We know that there is a revolutionary movement in Angola; there is a liberation movement. We also know that there is some Communist infiltration into this movement. We do not know how much, but we do know that there is some Communist infiltration. So, ask yourself; "Well, if you say that the winds of change," as Macmillan said, "are inevitable in Africa, you conclude that you're going to have nationalist movements take over colonial regimes." On the other hand, if you say, "But the Communists may become the eventual victors," you have yourself a real problem.

Now, in some instances we have been successful in determining that the Communists are, in effect, the leaders of the revolt. For example, in the Cameroons, in Venezuela we know this. In other instances it is much more difficult. Some people still argue the point of the Algerian Revolution and the exact status of Ben Bella. There is no answer to your question.

It is something that has to be decided on the facts available to our intelligence at the time and the place in which this thing is going on. There is no general answer to it. When you try to make this evaluation you find out you can be wrong as much as you can be right. It is that fluid or intangible.

QUESTION: Do the Communists, in your estimation, enjoy any advantage over us in their skill as pertains to psychological warfare?

DR. SANDERS: Well, I don't think they know any more about psychological warfare than we do. I think that where they are successful they are successful because they are able to apply it a little bit more directly. In other words, one of the disadvantages to the United States is that we cannot go directly into all of these countries. We have to rely upon the host government to do the job for us. All we can do is support it. Well, if you get a realistic, intelligent host government that can apply psychological techniques, fine, because you are operating among the indigenous population with indigenous agents. This is where the Communists have their advantage. They operate among indigenous people with indigenous agents.

In other words, the Communist cadresmen who go into a village in most of the cases in South Vietnam are actually South Vietnamese and not North Vietnamese. They are South Vietnamese who went north and have returned. First of all, they know the people very well, and secondly, they are part of the people. The Communists go to great lengths to try to establish their identity. And in fact, the agents, I understand, they sent up into the Montagnard country in Vietnam and among the Meos, actually filed their teeth and wear the same types of bodily ornament that the natives wear. They married native women. This gives them an advantage. It is somewhat akin to what is happening in Africa between the evangelism of the Christian missionary versus Mohammedan missionaries.

The Mohammedans have gained. Why have they gained? Because they sent in people who live as these people live. They live in the huts; they live in the dirt; they are used to the disease, et cetera, and overall the Mohammedans in Africa have been gaining more converts than the Christians because while the Christians provide good medicine, et cetera, they find it much more difficult to come into the level of the masses of the Africans. The same thing is true with the Communists and the nationalist governments. If the nationalist government gets their people to go into the villages and propagate their ideas there, then they stand a very good chance of winning. If they sit in Saigon--no.

QUESTION: Dr. Sanders, since we do have this 20 to 1 ratio for the insurgents, and since there are certain areas in which we would like to see our own insurgency, what, if anything, are we doing to follow the lessons that we have learned from the Communists in sending our own people, trained in the United States in native customs, to actually infiltrate, intermarry, and therefore succeed as we have seen the Communists?

DR. SANDERS: Well, first of all, I don't think we are going to do it with Americans. I don't think we are going to have American boys marrying Meo women. What we are doing is, our special forces are equipped to go into these areas and engage in certain types of insurgent action. The point that you raise will take a much longer time than I have left to discuss it.

You can conduct insurgency operations in insurgent territory. In other words, you can have Meo tribesmen, for example, conduct insurgency operations to hit the supply lines of the Viet Cong. And this they are doing. The answer is to get indigenous people to do

this type of intermarriage, et cetera, than to get Americans. I think in this way we stand a pretty good chance. Actually, this has been very successful. The Montagnards have come out of the mountains of Vietnam in droves, and have actually come over to the Diem regime. And if the Vietnamese don't blow it as they have done in the past, they have something good working for them.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.