



## THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, USA (Ret)

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Reviewed by Col E. J. Ingmire, USA on 30 December 1963.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
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The Selective Service System

12 December 1963

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
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Reviewed by: Col E. J. Ingmire, USA Date: 30 December 1963.

Reporter: Albert C. Helder



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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

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GENERAL STOUGHTON: There is probably no person on the national scene today who more merits the title of "Mr. Manpower," than our speaker today, Lt General Lewis B. Hershey. General Hershey's contributions to the national manpower scene have been going on for over 25 years, the foremost of course being the Selective Service System. Time doesn't permit me even to enumerate the highlights of General Hershey's distinguished career. And further, we want to get along with the program and take advantage of his presence here today and learn what we can from that experience which he has had.

It's a great honor for me to welcome back to the Industrial College and to present to the Class of '64, Lt General Lewis B. Hershey. General Hershey.

LT GENERAL HERSHEY: Acting Commandant; Fellow Officers:

I don't see well enough to know whether to say "Ladies;" but at least, Gentlemen. It's a sort of sentimental journey for me to come here. I don't know enough about your legal ancestry, but so far as I am concerned there was another institution that, to my knowledge, was very engaged in this sort of thing. So, as long as we're having continuous continuity nowadays I beg the right to think of the thing as a whole. I've had more experience with the organization engaged in the things that you're engaged in than I have any other institution in government. And it's somewhat of a sentiment for me to have an opportunity to get back down here.

I am also, of course, interested because you are engaged in trying to see the overall of the resources of which we are a small part. It at least gives us a chance to look up. I don't want to remind you that sometimes, looking up at a roof from beneath it, you see more holes in it than you can by looking down on it. But I've found that true in life.

You are also very much involved in what the world is going through. I'm not here with an analysis of what the world is at the present time. In fact, I probably agree with another old soldier who said that the Army wasn't like it used to be, and then very quickly added, "In fact, it never had been." And so, before I do start my commercial I do want to make a few comments on some of the things I've observed during the last century, because there isn't very much that I've had more of than time.

I, of course, started back when automobiles were very little in evidence. There wasn't very much of any place to be in evidence. We couldn't have automobiles without roads, and now we're proving that you can't have automobiles with roads. But that's neither here nor there. I have seen change being described as the greatest contribution that the generations that have passed during the last half-century have given. In fact, I'm sort of worn out a little bit by each generation pointing to their accomplishments in change and how it's just lucky that this old world had them at the time these things went on because no other generation would probably have had enough sense to change as rapidly as they did.

I have sort of missed the people who look for what didn't change. Because, I'm not so sure that the things that do not change are not the really important things. In fact, if you're going to change all the time

I don't know what's the use of bothering to learn about several of the intermediate things, because they aren't going to last. I don't know that I am recounting this because I'm a great scholar, but as I remember, Sir Roger Decoverley, after the widow turned him down never changed his whiskey. And he found out that that was the best way because he was in style more with the same than he was in attempting to change. And not only that, he anticipated, of course, the style when it was coming back in. Of course, he was out a part of the time, but then, who isn't?

So, I'm a little bit concerned about the fact that we have gone off on a tangent on change. And, of course, the things that I have observed that have changed mostly have been the things that I didn't understand much about - or at least one of the things - and that was gadgetry. Gadgetry has just been all over the lot. We have gotten so we can make things that we haven't the slightest idea of what we want to do with, or why we want to do even the things we know we want to do. We have no good reason for it, but after all we'd be somewhat backward if we didn't go places we didn't want to go as long as we could figure a way to get there quickly. And that's one of the things that has caused quite a little congestion around.

I grew up in a place where originally we didn't even have the mail brought to us; we had to go and get it. And sometimes the roads weren't too good. But the point I'm trying to make now is that I never worried in my early years too much about celestial things. We had some people who talked about it, but they didn't seem to have any way to get there, and some of them thought our trip into the celestial was delayed and you

only took it when you had ceased to stay on earth. We did monkey around a bit with the moon; we used to write songs about it. And we also thought that people who kind of got affected too much by the moon were a little on the looney side. Now, of course, that has all changed.

I'm not in any way criticizing the present; I'm just telling you where we came from, not where we're going. And so, I didn't as a child or even a young man, have to worry too much about our relationships between planets and that sort of thing. That, of course, left me a little more time to attend to my business and sort of meet the problems that we had. And we had problems. In fact, we didn't have to go outside the township to get into enough problems that kept most of us pretty busy.

Now, getting down, however, from the celestial, we get into the relationships between nations. Well, in the old days, of course, we didn't have near as many and that didn't furnish us the wide variety of relationships that we have at the present time; and we were not blessed with the ability to get where they are quickly. And therefore it made it possible for us to believe that if we only knew everybody on earth, that peace, goodwill and brotherhood would reign supreme.

Now, there are some winds that should have warned us, because we had some people we were quite close to geographically, who we wanted to be as far as we could be in every other sense, from. Continuity didn't necessarily breed goodwill. In fact, at Christmastime we like to send cards to friends we haven't seen for a long time because we haven't had much trouble with them, but we don't like our nextdoor neighbor who has a dog that barks; some little thing that shouldn't irritate a person who is

bent on goodwill. But we didn't have the transportation that was needed to get to these places. And another thing, we had to depend either on history or the magazines or something else, to find out what was going on in this world. We didn't have the opportunity each morning before we got to the office, to check the important places of the world so we could start worrying about things we couldn't do anything about.

But whether we can do anything about it or not, it is a factor in our existence. Then, there were some other things that we probably were stupid and didn't realize that war and peace were two different sorts of things, because we thought they were, and we thought we knew when one started and when it stopped. Now, when I was a child there was an attack on some of the destroyers and the rest of the fleet in Port Arthur. They got a little behind, but the next day they each notified each other that they were at war with each other, and they had the thing on a regularized basis. I mean, the thing didn't get out of hand. This original attack was before the war, but they didn't let it go on; they straightened it right out.

Now I'm afraid I don't know what war is and I'm a little afraid our vocabulary hasn't caught up to it. And I don't know what peace is because I hear people talking about the "cold war." I asked them whether it's war or not and they say no that's peace. They say it's kind of a strange peace, and it must be when you have to describe something in terms of its opposite. And therefore, the vocabulary just hasn't caught up with what we've got. Fortunately, I guess, we never know where we are, because in the solution to a problem we start out where we are,

where we want to go, and then decide how to get there. The only difficulty is that we can never agree on exactly where we are, and that sort of makes planning a little difficult.

Now, it's in this sort of world that we live, and I hesitate to come down here to this group. I'm a little embarrassed anyway because I'm a little like the fellow I heard of who was a lawyer and a doctor; a strange combination perhaps, because one group makes a living by disagreeing and the other makes a living by agreeing. I'm not picking on anybody; that just happens to be the way it works. To have a man who can be both, should be saying something, but unfortunately the lawyers always called him doctor and the doctors all called him judge. Now that sort of demonstrates something, probably, about what they thought of him.

I have somewhat the same situation. I'm a retired officer of the Army - with a physical disability - recalled to active duty and loaned to a civilian agency on a reimbursable basis. It's quite a simple sort of status. Therefore, when I come to civilians I always wear a uniform, because then I can tell them how we ought to run the Armed Forces. And I have the uniform to prove that I know what I'm talking about. However, when I come to Army people, or Navy, Air Force, Marines or Coast Guard, I not only wear civilian clothes, I say, "Look here; let me tell you a few things about your relationship with our civilian government." And, of course, that's always good anytime.

The point I'm trying to arrive at is that you people live in this same atmosphere that we do, and that is, trying to decide what is military and what is civilian; and what do we mean when we're talking about

the military and what do we mean when we're talking about the civilians? Sometimes, way back, is the fact that we're all talking about survival. But at times you can get more money by keeping that kind of muted and talking about peace. There's an agency of government I shan't name, that I think has quite a job of playing both sides of the road. You try to be peaceful and civilian when you want money from the people who happen to believe in peace - and who doesn't? - and you know very well that if worst comes to worst you can resolve yourself by saying "In addition to, that we're engaged in survival." And if you can make people believe that they need survival and you've got it, you don't have much trouble getting the money.

The only trouble is making them believe that they need survival while it's still early enough to get it; you don't wait around until it isn't on the market anymore, that it's sold out like some of the things here at Christmastime; and then they want something yesterday or the day before. You are confronted with planning your resources, when at the time you could do something intelligent you can't sell it to anybody. Now, I don't know whether that's because we lack people who have enough intelligence or not.

I know at times one of the members of my family - and there are only two of us in it - says to me "Nobody but a fool would make such a decision," and I said, "If I could just get those folks to vote for me I could be elected to anything."

But, trying to decide now what we're going to call something - and we in Selective Service are something like you people who are involved in

trying to decide whether what's being done for survival - strictly civilian - whether that isn't in some ways more war-like and more military than anything you could imagine. When we defer somebody to figure out how you can kill a million people with the same effort you used to kill one, does it make much difference whether he's wearing overalls, a shade over his eyes, or some other sort of thing, and happens to be paid a little more on a higher level, maybe; at least we think so in the Armed Forces, at times? If he's a civilian just at the moment by status and classification, how do you classify him when you're trying to evaluate him as his value toward survival? You're in that area and so are we.

How fast we are moving we wonder, at times, and obviously we're operating under a law that was passed last time this summer. But it was passed this summer like it was passed four years ago this summer, which was passed like it was four years before that. Not only that, it had its ancestry back in the 1940 law and back in the 1917 law, and by at least omission, in the laws on both sides in the Civil War - if I'm talking to the New Englanders, or the War Between the States, if you happen to be from Alabama or somewhere down there. But it's the same tussle that I'm talking about. And one of the things we did some wonderful work on both sides on was in showing how you should never run manpower procurement. And to that extent our law has ancestry that goes back to 1814 attempts to pass a Conscription Law and the militia system which we brought over here from England.

Because, after all no matter how thin you slice it, compulsion is

compulsion. So, here we are in a world that doesn't even have a vocabulary fitted to where it is. And I want now to make a slight commercial on what we claim we do. I'm not going to argue too much with people who say, "That's just a claim." In Washington, you know, it's a very old story, "How many people work in that government building?" The fellow says, "Oh, about half of them."

So, we put in number one - and I don't want to get into any argument about whether this is priority or not - we put number one, procuring men for the Armed Forces. It sounds very simple. And just roughly, we do it by persuasion and by a little more firmness which is sometimes called induction. We provide individuals for all of the services minus the Army, by persuasion. I don't want to speak of my competitor in any bad spirit, because I have the greatest sympathy in the world for the people who are doing the recruiting. If I can slow down my enthusiasm in listening to me, I'm going to try to speak a little bit about that later.

But we do persuade people to enlist in the Regular Forces and in all of the Reserve Forces. We do have some complications with the Air Guard and National Guard, on paper, because they have a little different relationship. But as far as we're concerned, I will cancel an induction for someone who had, as the fellow said who quit the throne of England, "Had at long last decided that they had always been a volunteer at heart." And because they've had that altered slightly by an order for induction they now pray that somebody relieve them of this order for induction, that they may enlist and prove again that America is a nation of volunteers.

Therefore, I will cancel an order for a person to enlist in any of the services. I'm no Santa Claus and I'd look kind of stupid, insisting a fellow serve for two years if he wants to serve for four, or even three. And somebody has convinced him - and I'm sorry to say this - that he can get more money for less work he enjoys. I feel rather badly, as an old broken-down American citizen, that we have come to the place where we try to get people to defend us by telling them where they can do it for the most money with the least work, and the greatest opportunities for escapism.

But, after all, it costs to do things voluntarily. Our second job after the procurement business is to run a standby reserve. And it has not cut much of a figure in American life up to date. I'd be the last one to say what we'd be able to do if we suddenly had to mobilize the 6 or 7 hundred thousand of them tomorrow that we have. You probably know these things because these conflicts are in the field in which you are particularly interested.

Starting with about the early 1950s there was quite a little discussion in the field of reserves. We had a Universal Military Training Law and some people were perhaps short-sighted enough to think that everybody would have to train. If everybody had to train and then went into the reserves everybody would be in the reserves. And if you kept everybody in the reserves for eight years' total, the Department of Defense would certainly have control of a great many people for a great length of time.

Now, I'm not going to name any agencies of government that might be

disturbed at such a thought, but there were. And I'm quite sure that you are aware that there are individuals who are quite disturbed that the Department of Defense would have so much control over everybody. In 1955 when the Reserve Act was amended there was a compromise made which I think was different from every compromise I know of - and there are a lot of things about this world I'm glad to say I don't know, and I keep my peace of mind that you're just not going to have when you get too much knowledge. I don't happen to be one of these fellows who has been over-loaded with knowledge.

I'm not like the farmer who didn't want to buy a book on agriculture because he knew more than he could use anyway. And so, first of all, the Armed Forces - and I don't want to be critical of them; no agency of government has anything that they want to let go of, and no agency of government sees anything they think they can possibly use that they do not want to get. Having been in a small agency around here for a long time, don't think that I don't know. There have been times that I've come down wondering in the morning to see whether my building was still there or not because there are a great many agencies that could use another small agency to kind of fill in a slot in the organizational setup. Most of them have enough overhead for an organization fully their size, or twice their size perhaps.

Therefore, we were sort of between on this. These people who wanted to save men into the control of science, industry, education and all sorts of things that go for the national interest, didn't like us particularly. But they didn't fear us quite as much as they did the Department of Defense because we aren't near as large. Not only that, the Department of

Defense, because they can control the reserves all the way, these individuals who represented the other agencies wondered where their share was coming from.

Not only that, but the Congress - and maybe I am misinterpreting what the Congress thought; but I've heard it said, at least, a number of times, what when you talk about what the Congress thinks you're going pretty wide because there are a lot of them up there who not only do a great deal of thinking but sometimes they do some talking, and sometimes the talking precedes the thinking. Therefore, it's not strange that they were not content with the way the reserve forces were handled in the Korean War.

Now, they weren't very happy about the way the reserves were handled in World War I; I was there. But one thing about it was they came to the place where they took about all of them, and the discontent was what they did with them after they took them. Of course, it was more or less true in World War II. But in the Korean War we ran it on the installment plan. And there the Congress would have mobilized some of the reserves. The Department of Defense did not mobilize and they would not have mobilized some that they did mobilize.

Therefore, they were not content and they wanted to do something. One of the things to do was first of all to give control over the ready reserves to the Department of Defense and then to create something else that the Department of Defense only got when they couldn't win with what they had. And that became the standby reserves. We've never worked it, so I don't know whether it will work or not.

Obviously, before we got into this law, the Department of Defense was quite anxious to create two ready reserves - the ready ready and the unready ready. Well, the difference between the two was that one had at least a few guns on hand, or at least knew where they were or had the blueprints of them, while the other people there was no presumption that they had anything except the Department of Defense had the control. And I think the Congress, somewhat naively, probably, may have been a little more trusting than they should have been, thought that if they legislated, that the unready ready should be standby, and that they could then have the ready ready.

There was just another little thing; it was a very small detail, but there were a few billion dollars involved in trying to get the equipment to make the ready ready. And if came from nowhere that was fine. But if it came from some of the regular forces, that wasn't quite so fine. Human beings being what they are - and one of the reasons I've stayed an optimist is that I've never expected too much from human beings and I've never been let down nearly as often as some people have. But just the same, in this legislation I think there was an idea in the mind of Congress - and I only take this from certain things which I might say to you - we had some little discussion about the President's control over the ready reserves.

At first they weren't going to let him call out anybody without Congressional consent, and we eventually were able through a rather strange way, to negotiate a million in the hands of the President. And I think that some of the Congress thought that if they got a million ready they

would do pretty well with the budget where it was. I think most everybody thought so, and I'm sure the Department of Defense had no illusions about that one. But the fact that they only had control over a million didn't in any way curtail their desire to have control secondary over the rest of them so that if they couldn't call them out until they got permission they know how things are. Anybody who has been around knows that you don't have much worry over getting Congress' permission to do something to save all of our lives, including, of course, theirs, in an emergency. It's beforehand when you have trouble.

Therefore, the law was passed saying that a million could be called up by the President. For the rest of them he'd have to get permission from Congress. No standby reservists could be called out until the Congress had authorized it. And then, very flattering to the Director of Selective Service, after they had authorized it no individual could be taken until he'd been declared available by the Director of Selective Service, which was an effort to try to use the same selective arrangement that was made for the non-serviceman, to the individuals who had become almost non-service again, by having been in the active forces; then in the ready; and then finally in the standby.

Well, the standby didn't grow very fast; the unready ready grew much faster. But eventually we did have as many as 1½ million in the standby reserve, and it was the problem of the Selective Service first of all to find them. From the sixth copy of the transfer to the standby reserves sometimes that's a little hard to read. And that's about the one we got. And sometimes a boy staying with us for only two years, we

spent that finding him. We sort of shouted Eureka, and about that time we found out that he had been gone for a month - there had been a little delay in getting the paper to us, discharging him outright.

Anyway, we played along with 1½ million for several years and now we're down to about 700,000. And we try to keep them in about four compartments; first of all, the ones who are ready to go at any time anybody wants them, because they're neither vice presidents of corporations; they're not scientists, engineers or school teachers; in general, they're just not. Then we have those who are deferred because allegedly they're very important for the maintenance of national life, and even for the protection of this country by what they're producing in materials of drop-throw or spin, or whatever we're going to do to kill somebody with.

The third group is those who have wives and children. You know that now, of course, we're playing around with husbands, but that isn't playing for keeps, quite. The husbands are only put off to one side until the place where we get down and have nothing but husbands, in which case we say, "We'll take you." They didn't get out of 1-A, they just got to the bottom of it. That has been one of the things that we've had a little fun with lately.

It's nice that our system gets to running so well sometimes that we don't think it takes much effort. And then we get a larger call, a higher rejection rate and husbands out, and we suddenly find that we don't have nearly as many men as we thought we had. We're just coming to that now. But, this second job was to get those people lined up in four classes. The fourth class was those whom we hadn't found yet:

We've never had an opportunity to mobilize, so I don't know whether it will work or whether it will not. The third thing we had to do was a little more difficult. We call it channeling. And it's an effort in a democracy, although I realize this democracy has in its Constitution a provision which says we shall guarantee a republican form of government - and I have some doubts as to whether we've always done that or not - but anyway, in an organization such as we are, attempting to let everybody do as nearly as they can what they want to do, we hesitate to try to say to somebody that they're going to be an engineer or a scientist or something else, but we will tolerate beating him that way by deferment and threatening him at the same time by drafting him if he doesn't take the deferment.

Now, of course, the induction business sometimes is a little weak. When you call zero, four or seven thousand a month you can't stand too many of these. But sometimes, if they don't know their statistics too well, they think there is more danger and some of them will tolerate an education as an engineer rather than run the risk. Now, whether that gets good engineers or not I don't happen to know. We haven't lived long enough since we've been doing it. But, since 1950 we've been very active in that field. The same way with scientists.

I don't know much about scientists. I read an article the other day by a fellow who said he didn't know anything about science, but he knew everything about scientists. I'll not quote him, because it wasn't the most favorable article I've read about scientists. Anyway, we've been deferring people to go to engineering school; to become scientists; to

become school teachers; and I think we've got about 125,000 or so at the present time who have finished something somehow. I want to be indefinite on that because sometimes when we have to reject people with two or three years in college, mentally - and I don't mean emotionally either; I mean on the books.

In fact, we've been running a survey with this task force. We had one boy whom we invited to come in to be interviewed, to see what we could do to improve his intellectual condition, he having been rejected on the mental part. He wrote back and said, "Well, I'll be glad to come in but I'm a junior in college and I think I'm doing as much as I can to get back to some sort of mental status."

You people who are in the economy world, we had another fellow in that same state. He said, "Well, I'll come in too, but I'm making \$15,000 a year running a bulldozer and do you think there is anything much you can do for me?" These were two of our mental rejects. I mean, these people didn't know enough to get into the Armed Forces early. Or maybe they knew too much; I don't know. There's some difference of opinion.

But just the same, we have tried for the last 13 years, through the student system, and through the deferment of individuals after they got out; through very liberal deferments for post-graduate work, to try to channel people into what is said to be national interest. You people represent some of the groups who have said it's in the national interest. I don't know and I don't have to know. When you're pumping gas you don't even have to know the moral life of the guy who buys the gas; you just put it in and he drives off. And that is that. We are a service organi-

zation and we're not troubled much with thinking; we're pretty much told what we're supposed to do and we try to do it. We don't always succeed.

But we have had channeling towards school. Again going back to Indiana, if you will, with me over the last 60 years or more, my people didn't have a chance to go to school too much. They had a rather quaint idea that if you went to school you wouldn't have to work as hard as if you didn't go to school. I don't know about that. I had some reservations on it. It was a little different kind of work, but at least some of their work got them tired enough so they could sleep. And some of the time when we get tired we can't sleep. Probably they made a better adjustment than I have; I don't know.

Anyway, they brought early in me a very deep reverence for this thing we call school. I have so deep a reverence that I've been tangled up with it and majored in education; you'd never believe it but I did. If you want to challenge it I've got the papers. I'm like an old friend I used to have who went around asking folks - he was a Colonel, by the way - "Are you insane?" And the other fellow would say, "Why, certainly not." He said, "Have you got any papers to show that you aren't?" You see, he had been up before a sanity commission and he had.

So, I was indoctrinated early with great respect for anything that was put out in anything we call a school. And I've lived to see the time when everybody else seems to think along that line. It doesn't make much difference what is taught or isn't taught, what is exposed and never lapped up by the knowledge-seekers, we still think it's good. Civil Service can decide where you go when you come into government by how long, just

how long somebody has tolerated you, and what they said when you left, beside, "Thank goodness." And I understand we have some of that in the Armed Forces. I understand - and I'm sure this must have been in the Civil Service - somebody had been driving one of these long trucks; he'd been to the coast and back a great many times. He'd been on the road for 10 or 15 years. But he took an examination and they found he didn't know how to drive a truck. After all, you've got to respect the examination more than you do the mere doing of the thing that the examination purports to find out whether you can.

Maybe that isn't fair, but I've been upset a little bit; (a) by what we came to expect of schools; and (b) - and I understand that some of the forces represented here has one of their officers who writes on what we didn't get no matter what we expected from school.

Now, I don't want to hold that all things that are taught in school are education. I wouldn't even admit it was information. Certainly it isn't knowledge, and couldn't possibly be understanding. I wish somehow we could get more understanding with a lot of these things that we hear about. Sometimes our poor minds get confused by so much information, and I think there are some departments in government that think if you get enough information together you can always get a solution. Well, there are some things in life that just don't get solved.

Otherwise you'd have more unemployment than you have now. The most you can hope is that if you stay healthy enough to keep fighting it. Therefore, I don't have quite the faith in figures, nor figurers. I don't even believe in all the things that machines sometimes turn out. One

thing is that they don't turn out much that you didn't put in. And if you don't want the turner-iner, you can't base too much on what the turning-out is going to be.

But we have tried through the system to channel people toward particularly the engineering and scientific - the skills to some extent - and school teachers.

Now, the fourth thing I'm not going to say much about; it's nothing that any organization hadn't ought to do, but we have tried to anticipate what we might have to do in carrying out our three fundamental functions - count them, sort them, and send them. And we've tried to imagine every circumstance under which we would count them and send them. And we've tried to imagine everybody who would want us to count them, sort them and send them. And, of course, that takes you into at least areas where you have no law, and probably at the time you had to do it you wouldn't have time to get a law. Because, the conditions that brought on the law might eliminate temporarily the law-makers. They might be dead or they might merely be in different places. You know, you can't legislate when they're scattered.

And so, we have tried to visualize how you'd use all of the people if you had an extreme catastrophe. And we've tried to indoctrinate our local boards in being illegal to the place that if there was anybody seemingly in authority - I'm not going to say that he was in authority, but if anybody seemed to be in authority - they would try to provide whoever he asked for. And I have a deep conviction that if you can find people who have the guts and a little bit of imagination; maybe not too

much imagination, and certainly not too much knowledge, but has the guts to do what has to be done in an emergency; that if he starts telling people to do something he won't have much trouble getting them to do it. Because, they'll be more scared than he is, or he wouldn't be telling them.

And, of course, when they get to the place where they find out they don't have to do it, let's hope we'll have things organized again so we can start filing papers and running our machines. Because, our machines are going to be out when the current is off. There will be quite a lot of that sort of thing, and there are quite a lot of people who are going to have to go through the heavy business of thinking, when maybe they haven't been doing it very lately; they had someone to do their thinking for them.

I don't know how far, and I hope we never find out, we have gone in getting our people in the local areas. Because, we happen to be decentralized. And you can blow up 3,900 chunks of us, they can do anything that all of them could do. Whether they will or not is another matter; but whether they will or not, if we have a federal government, depends on how scared they are out there. Because, when they get so they are more afraid of the enemy than they are of Washington, you're going to be in the situation of the Roman Centurion. He always had to keep his boys more scared of him than the enemy, because when they got more scared of the enemy they ran off. And generally, they did anyway when he got killed, because the thing they feared was gone. Or so I am told.

Although, I was also told that the Romans didn't trust spears to people unless they had property, or a family, because they thought if he

had nothing but his worthless life to lose they didn't want to waste equipment on him. Now would be a good time to quit. In fact, good times to quit start occurring very quickly after the start. I have had the experience of having people tell me that the 15 minutes they didn't hear me contained the thoughts that really challenged them.

But I would like to say something about the current things that are running along. If any of you go to a place where there are a lot of retired officers you'll get very much the same story of when we used to run that office up there with 3 people and now they have 300. And we don't know whether they ran it while they were there or whether they lied about the 3. And, of course, there's some question as to whether the 300 are running it now. I mean, you get all sorts of uncertainty, because a lot of these place they are talking about running, it's a question whether they really are running. There's a lot of activity but we just don't know where it's going, or whether part of it happens to be coming back.

So, I would like to say a little bit about the selection business. I understand I'm talking to experts who know a great deal about how we select planes. I've read in the paper that there doesn't seem to be complete unanimity about how you do that, but just the same, you go through a great deal of heart-searching when you decide not only on the thing when it's put together, but you spend a lot of time worrying about the component parts and whether they're well-made or not, and whether you can trust them.

I wonder if we come anywhere near that in our selection of men for the Armed Forces. And I'm talking particularly now about the enlisted

personnel. I may be entirely wrong, but I've seen all together too much of harassed recruiting officers pushed to do a great many things that they didn't like to do in order to meet a quota. And I wonder if a good way to get people to defend this country in the permanent forces is to try to take the hungry, the scared and the immature, or somebody who is convinced he's going to get something for nothing.

I'm not completely sure what I would do. But I have a feeling that if I had the power I would not let an enlisted man into the Armed Forces until, in an emergency status - call it anything you want - we had demonstrated that we wanted him. I'm somewhat shocked when I hear how many do not finish basic training. I'm not shocked, because I'm expecting it. I have some familiarity with the way we pick them. We have a lot of tests that are wonderful, but they're only partial. And so much of the time we don't let anybody use sense to supplement. We measure his height or the flatness of his feet and that sort of thing and then we get all teed up about the fact that we know all about him, when as a matter of fact we don't know anything about him, especially the things we're interested in. And that's how much guts he has and whether he stays. It's better to have him stand there flat-footed than to have arches he can run away on.

Knowledge is something we want him to have. I read the other day - and I didn't count them - but I was told that 25% of the worst part of the SS guard were Ph.D.s. So, I don't think it necessarily follows that getting them smart is necessary. Because I'm a suspicious sort of a person, if I have an untrustworthy cuss I want him to be stupid. I don't want any smart people around whom I can't trust. And I think we've proved

too many times over that we've put too much education on people who have lacked other qualities. It's pretty tough to have them Ph.D. in their studies and kindergarten or below in their character and morality.

I don't know what the answer is, but I believe we should very wisely take people in and decide whether we're going to permit them - and I know this will shock you - permit them to enlist. If we got these old forces of ours so that people felt this was something you were permitted to go into and not coaxed, cajoled, bribed and threatened, maybe we'd be better off. I wonder if some bird doesn't do something that suits him and somebody calls his hand and he says "I came in because I was told that here I could get more money for less work and be completely at liberty, and I simply believed it;" of course that would show how stupid he was.

Now, I understand that you will have an opportunity later to shoot with a rifle, and therefore I take it it's time to cease this shotgun approach. But I don't think it's particularly applicable, because you are always supposed to say something. And, as far as my first presentation is concerned, you're in the position of the young man who said to the girl, "May I have the last dance?" and she said, "You've just had it."

QUESTION: We've been persuaded, General, that it would be in the national interest to somehow have the population growth restrained. This being the case, is it in the national interest for you to keep deferring fathers?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I think that's quite easily answered because

(a) you told me that restricting births was in the national interest, but I think you left the impression that deferring fathers was not. And therefore, it's quite easy to say no, without getting involved at all. You punched the cards. All I did was read what came out of the machine.

QUESTION: Sir, I'd like to pursue your comment on recruiting. I understand there is a proposal underway, considering centralized procurement of personnel for the Armed Services, through Selective Service in providing inductees for all the services. Would you comment more in detail on that, and perhaps also consider the turnover that this would mean to the Armed Services?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, of course this last one, I realize, is in your field and I will say a word or two about it. Ever since I've had anything to do with Selective Service we've had doubts about trying to run two systems that were quite different and that yet had to work together. Now, we came very close in World War II, which was the nearest to getting down near the bottom of the so-called manpower pool. And we weren't as near the bottom as we thought we were. We have rather rich ideas, and unless we have a few million dollars, etc., we think we're starving.

So, we did talk about trying to have one channel for inductees; people getting into the service during World War II. Now, there were two exceptions. One exception I don't think made the slightest amount of difference. That was for people over 35. If anyone wanted some unusual fellow over 35 and they wanted him to enlist, it never interfered much with anything except, perhaps, with industry or some other sort of thing.

But below 18, of course, we just had all of the wisdom of the bat-

tery commander who waters his horses upstream and takes water downstream for the kitchens. In other words, if you let people go out and work the 17-year-old, what do you expect you'll have at 18? And throughout World War II I'm ashamed to say, there wasn't a state in the Union that wasn't spending more time with Officers of the United States Army and Navy - and Marine Corps - I don't want to leave the Air Force out, but at that time we couldn't convict them; and I don't want to discredit them either; I'm sure they'd have been in it if they'd been in existence - they were out trying to scare these kids into their particular branch of the service, and costing two or three times as much as we were spending for Selective Service, including the transportation of the people we sent.

And how does it end up? Well, in the first place we had about 85,000 individuals who'd been enlisted and never called - very well selected individuals of one group. We had 125,000 of another group that had been selected and not called. And we had 50, 60 or 70 thousand of another group that somebody had been allowed to recruit and who promised them that they could stay at home until the war was over, or some other time, with the result that here we were, using rather artificial means to interfere with some sort of intelligent handling of manpower.

Now, we generally don't have too much trouble with individuals on trying to have a centralized procurement system in time of war. But then we get back to this thing that I talked about originally. When you have war is somebody going to tell you at the time it happens, just before it happens, or are you going to have to go to history in order to find out? We had a little trouble finding out during the Korean War whether it was

a war or not. In fact, one of our services got pretty angry about something the President said about what that was. In fact, what they said about him I'll not repeat.

But just the same, I think we did come to quite an agreement. If you have complete control of manpower you hadn't ought to have everybody enlisting people as they come out of the examining station. In one month we furnished about 450,000 people to the Armed Forces, by induction, and lost 250,000 that we had ordered. Well, how can you do any bookkeeping when they put a recruiting station at the bottom of the examining station? The guy finds out he has to go in anyway, and then you do a big selling job and tell him you've got something better. That's what we had during World War II.

Now, at the present time that isn't so; I realize that. But what do you do; wait until there is a war, to do the things that you ought to do? I have the utmost respect for all the traditions of every one of your services. In fact, I have so much respect for them that I might wake up tonight if I thought that anybody would ignore the great things we have in your traditions, and try to get a conglomeration that some statistician had arrived at by adding all these traditions together and dividing them by four or five, or something that like.

In 1954 or '55 we furnished some people to one of the Armed Forces. The Chief of the Personnel Bureau at that time - he's retired now, but everytime I see him now he still says, "I wish I could convince my service that these are the best men I've ever had." Now, I realize you have a question of continuity, but the fellows whom you enlist for three years

you've got to sell the second three during the first three. I don't scare them for that second three years. I can scare them in once, but the next time you've got to sell them. And is there any reason why you can't possibly sell anybody something in two years? Is there some virtue about three, or for some of you, four? I don't know. That is one of the reasons that I have thought we ought to sell a fellow after we got him and not out in some alley somewhere where he's either cold or scared.

One time in the old days I understand that some fellows woke up on sailing ships belonging to something they didn't know about, and they were two days out. Now, I don't think that is done anymore, but there is a little bit of pushing of pins at times when a fellow is about mentally capable. I think the pin was pushed a little when the quota was high.

And, getting back to what you asked, if you insist, I had an inquiry about a week before Labor Day this year. It was a rather simple inquiry and had to do with husbands were being taken the same as anybody else. And I was just simple enough to answer yes. And then I was visited by an aide who said that was not what the writer had wanted. He wanted pretty much of a survey of the whole question, and if I had anything to say about how we ought to run the Selective Service System he'd like to hear it.

Well, obviously, you don't find a man of my age who can be quiet. In the first place, he's generally not quiet when they don't ask for his advice. And certainly, if they ask for it they get it - a book full of

it. We turned out about five pages, and one of the things we suggested was either a recruiting business where all of the needs were set out and the boys were given a chance. And whatever else we had in the way of data to try and locate these people and send them to a central point. The boys there, I suppose, would look them over and enlist them. We also suggested the sending of individuals for all the services to a place where they gave them their basic training, and then tried to use recruiting from within rather than recruiting from without.

And personally, I would not object to some incentive after you decided you wanted to take a person. But the thing that frightens me is when you go and give incentives to somebody when you don't know whether you want them or not.

So, this came back with an order that we'd implement the husbands and that we would from time to time consider the implementation of the rest. Now, I don't want to leave the impression that the President said we were going to implement anything beyond the husbands. But we were chased over to the Department of Defense to talk to them about several things, and I think that was the cause of the last turmoil.

Now, I have no illusions - and I so stated to the Undersecretary of Defense; I've been talking a lot of these things for years - and you're not going to sell them, I don't believe. And I don't know whether anybody up on the telling level will tell them or not, I don't know. I should regret if you had to tell people things that they aren't at least partially sold on. But I do believe that first of all we have a right to have individuals in our Armed Forces that we know we want. Now, of course you may find out differently afterwards - 6 months, or 8 months, or 4 months, or 12 months -

I don't pretend to know what the number of months is - but it will at least give you some ideas that do not come out in these tests.

And I do believe that we have a lot of people in the some three or four million who have been rejected, who have some very good potential. But, we examine them in a very small length of time. We truck them in; we bus them long distances. They're not psychologically, physically, mentally, or anything else, what they would normally be. We don't observe them except when they're tired, or this or that - and you don't ever know how much of it is involved in the boys' seeing how far they can go to fool you.

Now, I know the psychologists tell us they can't fool them. I still take Sgt Kelly's word about who was fooling who. But, I knew Sgt Kelly better than some of the boys who are engaged in this.

Now, what was the question about the Armed Forces?

QUESTION: With respect to the two-year induction turnover in the Armed Services.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Oh yes. Well, I would say of course you want to have them for a longer period of time, if you want them. You certainly want to have them a less period of time if you don't want them. Now, just where those two things meet I don't know. Of course, I say if you recruit from within, you don't have to content yourself with two years, and I don't buy all of the things that the fellow says we like and we'll recruit them while they're out, but we can't recruit them after they get in. What kind of a joint are you running, that you can't sell to a fellow because he knows something about it?

I get a little disturbed at somebody saying you've got to take him when he doesn't know what he's getting in. And he won't reenlist. So, therefore, I think that we've won some wars when we didn't make the guy be in two years before we let him fight. I had a lot of trouble during World War II with the boys who got killed when they hadn't been in three months yet; probably not too many were killed, but you don't need too many when you get the thing over on the Hill properly.

You didn't ask for this one, but I never could understand why our government would let 17-year-old kids bloody the waters of the Pacific, particularly voluntarily, and then didn't have the guts to make an 18-year-old or 19-year-old go and do his duty. I didn't know why, if he got killed, nobody worried about it because he volunteered. He was just as dead as if you had drafted him. And I think it shows some lack of resolve in a country that expects its citizens to go out and defend the cussed place when the country does not make other people do what they can do. If that's democracy, I want to move somewhere else. And I don't think that's what we are.

This two-year business has some difficulties. I guess two gets to be the minimum, although we settled for one year back in 1940 because we couldn't get any more. If the fellow is good you want to keep him, but I think you've got to keep him some other way. And if he's bad, I think there's too much. Because, we are in the recruiting business and it's difficult. I think we're keeping some people around in the Armed Forces which would be better off if we didn't have them. But you've got them just because they'll stay with you and you can't think of the best reason

in the world to get rid of them. That hasn't answered your question, but I think that will about do for this morning.

QUESTION: General, would you give us your thoughts on the induction of women into the services as a source of, or means for relieving the manpower problem?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I don't know much about this question. But I don't believe at the present time the demand for women is great enough so that you could sell it. I don't like to use the sell it business, but I remember somebody told a story about somebody who had tried 10 or 15 different concoctions that contained three or four kinds of liquor, and they very quickly called each one of them. Then they gave him some water and he said, "I don't know what it is, but I'll tell you one thing; you'll never sell that."

In the first place, if we get so that we're fighting for our lives I have no feeling about it, you're going to have to use women; you're going to have to have compulsion. There's no question about it, you'll have a lot of problems with compulsion with women that you haven't with men. It isn't anything new; it's just that you've got more problems anyway. I generally duck the question by saying that I have enough trouble trying to induct men.

But, I think in an emergency we wouldn't hesitate to induct women. But it's going to be more difficult, because in the first place there is nobody, including the women, who can express some opinion on whether they are useable or not. And so, at the present time I think it's somewhat academic. I don't think we ought to duck it and I don't think we ought to consider that they're above inducting. But unless you are using a lot

more women in the Armed Forces than you are using now, I don't believe you'll get anywhere trying to sell Congress, because Congress does not pass any Selective Service Law because there's any justice in it; they pass it when they think you can't get them any other way except by scaring them in.

QUESTION: General, would you compare for us the current quality, both physically and mentally, of the inductees as compared to World War I, and, if possible, World War II?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I can do just as well on one as the other. Because, in the first place you're comparing acceptability when your standards for use are completely different. And therefore, whether John L. Sullivan could lick Jack Dempsey or not, is somewhat academic. It would depend on how they fought, probably. I imagine Jack would have been a little embarrassed over being bare-fisted. And I suppose there would have to be some collective bargaining on just which rules they were going to use.

In World War I we did not X-ray the chest of anyone. Therefore, we had people who were later in the hospitals of the Veterans Administration, with things on their lungs when they went in. We probably had men who died and had Distinguished Service Crosses, or Congressional Medals of Honor given to them, who had these scars or active things on their lungs. We didn't know it because we didn't look.

Therefore, I suspect that with the material that we had to look at them, and the time we took to look at them in World War I, I doubt very seriously that they were as carefully selected as they are at the present

time.

World War II varied greatly. We started out with a surplus of people and we had unemployment all over the country, and therefore you could be tougher. I don't think it ever got as bad as some people claim; some people said all you had to be was warm; I think a little warm, but that was certainly toward the end when we began to take Class B men in. At the present time I think the physical standards are fairly low.

But on the mental side, if you call standard something that depends on your familiarity with the things we pass around in schools, I would say we demand a great deal more now than we have ever demanded before. Because, among our other troubles during the last six months - and you wouldn't believe this, I'm quite sure; but between the first day of July this year and the 31st day of October, we sent 60,000 men to the induction stations. And of that number, about 48,000 were examined and accepted. They rejected 8,000 out of the 48,000 that had already been examined and accepted.

Now, why? Because the mental standard had changed some in some of these boys who passed six months ago, but couldn't pass now. Of course, some of them had passed six months ago and three months ago, and couldn't pass now. One of the things that bothers me more than anything I can think of is the fact that we're running up to 20% and some of the time over, on the rejection of accepted men.

It makes me think of trying to get out an Executive Order. You have to go to 26 different agencies and you rewrite it for each one. Eventually it gets into the question of who gets their hands on it last before the

President signs it. And here we are, depending on the last fellow who looked at them, as though he, somehow or other, was better than the fellow who looked at them some time before. I don't know; we haven't solved the acceptability business. I don't think there is any question on the mental angle; I think we require far more. And there are some very, very good reasons. Because, we're fiddling around with a lot of gadgetry that the boys didn't have in World Wars I and II.

On the physical, I think the standards are not too different. But standards are not all the problem. Who exercises the standards and what is the pressure on him? The pressure is on him. He has to write letters telling why in the world he took somebody who had something, when he can turn him down knowing there is another one coming. So, why take any chances? When it comes to the place where they're all held loose, when you don't send in the numbers that you're supposed to send in, then you'd better take anybody you can. And when you get down to brass tacks that's about what controls the thing anyway, eventually. One of the reasons they can be snooty now is because they've got a lot of people.

In fact, we've got about 1,200,000 that are in 1-A and a couple million more who aren't in 1-A because we haven't classified them yet. One of the ways not to have so many is not to classify too early.

QUESTION: General, assuming Congress shares your views about the inadequacy of the Selective Service Act and cancels same. How would you propose to attract people into the service on a career basis in view of the incentives that we have now seem to be inadequate, and the fact that patriotism in time of peace is not too obvious? Do we have enough people to do the job?

GENERAL HERSEY: You embarrass me. It flatters me, of course, to have somebody ask my opinion about something I know as little as I do. I am very much concerned with one thing, as you say; I am very much concerned with the quality. This is adolescence. And at my age I am still adolescent. When I was a kid we thought very highly of the federal government, because the only way we came into contact with it was through the Post Office. We had a lot of respect for the flag. I don't suppose we knew what it was made of. If we had been chemists and could have analyzed it we probably could have felt superior to it because we knew what it was made of.

And I am very much worried about the fact that we've always had a lot of people in this country who weren't worth much. If George Washington were here to testify he'd tell you when he started from Alexandria here on his way to Winchester that if he got up there with half the boys he started with he'd be doing pretty well. Once he didn't have anybody, but that was a time when there was some rumor of somebody getting scalped up in there.

So, there have always been people who don't follow too well. But I think what we have done is we've tried to get the average so that the people who used to lead well would have the average qualities of the people who couldn't do anything. We're trying to make everybody something and we tend to ignore the ones who used to be.

Now we're getting back to how are you going to get them. And if it takes three years to be effective, I do not know that you would fail to convince Congress that you should have three years. On the other hand,

Congress, again, does not pass laws to have equality. They may challenge this, but that's my observation; they pass them only out of necessity. And I am not so sure that if I had a battery, as I did for quite a little while - and I don't want to be an expert, but I did spend 17 years in the grade of Captain and got so that I was somewhat accustomed to what Captains did and didn't do - and if I had a battery again I don't believe that I would be looking for some of the people whom the Armed Forces are looking at.

I'd probably buy somebody whom I thought that after a year or two I could get him to the place where he'd be worth more to the government than he would to any of the industries. Now, I know very well that if I start with Ph.D., B.M.s and B.S.s - or A.B.s - there's no use talking about it. He may not be worth that much to industry, but they get to thinking he is.

I happen to be a trustee of an engineering school and I can shiver at what they pay some of these runny-noses that we turn out up there every year with a bachelor of science in engineering. Well, they can do it because they're getting their money from the government. But I do believe that we've got some people who are a little below some of the levels we're taking now that still have some of the devotion and dedication to, and some appreciation of the country.

And I don't want to trouble you, gentlemen, by saying that some of my observations has been that the more they get of this thing we call education, the less they have of team-play and the more they have of a sense of self-centered selfishness that doesn't accept any responsibility,

because they've been pampered by a society that has given them about everything they want, and then they get to thinking they want more. What was it Red Skelton said? "I got everything last Christmas and I want something different this year."

I don't know the answer, but I don't believe that you're getting exactly what you want to get. I think that people are stealing your best people. I realize it isn't much of a country, but I think I know of one little country that permits enlisted men to remain in the Armed Forces of that country only nine years. They do happen to have a place where your time in the service is counted as a part of your overall retirement business that the government guarantees. And you may get 1½ for your nine years, but they do not permit people that we have today in the grade of Corporal, to reenlist after three years. And I understand you have to be at the top of the Non-Commissioned grade if you stay the third three years.

Now, obviously this is a very big country and I don't know what the Armed Forces have been able to do. But, we are not doing our best on selection, and whether there is a better way or not I don't know. And I think we have got to saying you can't do anything with a person in two years. And I don't believe that you practice it. One of the services that can't do anything with two years orders all their reserves for two years' training. I don't know whether they're kidding me or kidding them. Because, they take them and make them believe they're teaching them something, and not only that, but using them while they're teaching them. And yet, they only have them for two years.

CAPTAIN O'TOOLE: General, time has run out on us. Contrary to your famous saying about people, we in ICAF have learned to expect a lot when you come here and we sure got it this morning. Thank you.