

The Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force, was born in New York City, 9 November 1911. He received a B. A. (1933), LL. B. (1937) from Yale with a certificate for completion of the combined law-business course at Harvard and Yale. In 1937, he began his government career as attorney for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington and New York, remaining there until 1940 when he became instructor in relations of government and business Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, advancing to assistant professor and later assistant dean of the school. During this period he also served as administrative head of the first advanced management course ever given at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. In addition, while a member of the Harvard faculty, he served as a special consultant to the Commanding General of the Air Force in developing statistical controls. He was an instructor in the Army Air Forces Statistical Control School at Harvard and has served at various Air Force bases in the United States on special assignments for the Commanding General of the Air Force. From 1944 to 1945, he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as a lieutenant (j. g.) and was released from the Navy, September 1945 to become executive assistant to the Administrator of the Surplus Property Administration, Mr. Stuart Symington. In February 1946, he became Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Mr. Symington. He became his Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in September 1947, when the National Security Act of 1947 became effective. In July 1948, he served on a committee set up by the then Secretary of Defense Forrestal to unify the court-martial code for the military services. In January 1952, he was appointed a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and served until June 1954. He then became an atomic energy consultant and attorney, remaining in that field until accepting his present assignment in January 1961. Mr. Zuckert is a member of the bar in Connecticut, New York, and the District of Columbia. He is co-author with Arnold Kramish of "Atomic Energy for your Business," published by David McKay Company, 1956. This is Mr. Zuckert's third appearance before the combined Colleges.

AN ADDRESS

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GENERAL STOUGHTON: Gentlemen: The time devoted to the introduction of a speaker is well known to us all. For Secretary Zuckert it is not necessary, but I would like to take just a moment to express the appreciation of both Colleges to the Secretary for giving us his prepared remarks in advance and thus providing for an ample question period. However, there will not be a joint discussion group, as the Secretary has to get back to his job.

It is an honor for me to present the Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert.

SECRETARY ZUCKERT: Gentlemen: I want to discuss things here today in terms which reflect not so much the professional military thinking of this audience as they do the broad and deep concerns of that ultimately decisive audience, the American people, who pay the defense bill.

We start from the premise that the American people are prepared for any sacrifice to preserve their freedom and their national being. "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute," was more than a slogan to rally a struggling young nation. In effect, it is true today.

There is a corollary, with roots just as deep in the basic idealism of these people. It is the aversion of the American people to the use of their military force for acquisitive national purposes. They have shown an historic restraint of this kind.

These premises, of course, are fixed. We probably could not change them if we wanted to. They give any adversary who is not so restrained a very great advantage. Our job as the defender is much tougher than that of the would-be aggressor who can manage his military investment to suit definable aggressive or expansionist objectives.

We therefore have to maintain a military establishment of an unprecedented quality. Our primary military requirement is for professionalism of the highest order.

Changing Standards of Professionalism

Last year I spoke at the War College on the subject of military professionalism, citing Huntington's three characteristics--corporativeness, responsibility, and expertise.

Corporativeness and responsibility really do not change. The bonds, the corporativeness that binds you together, that make for service loyalty and teamwork, remain the same. Responsibility need be defined but once because there is only one possible relationship between the military and the free state, and the obligation of the individual in the military service is unalterable.

But expertise does change. I want to say a few things today about the demands for a new order of expertise in today's world.

It seems to me military expertise is spread over four major areas. One is the conduct of operations and the organizing and training of men for the job. Another is planning all aspects of operations to carry out the designed strategy. Still a third is the design of strategy and the forces to carry it out, and the fourth is the management of the resources required.

Of course, these areas are not as separate as this listing may sound, but these are the areas in which specialized expertise is required. I believe the day is gone when professional military men would say any officer is qualified for any job in his grade. At any rate, qualifications vary. We know some men are born combat leaders, some are naturally qualified planners, others have unique qualifications for strategic studies and the synthesis of action courses called strategy, and still others are experts in the business side of the military which is the management of resources.

The application of the specialized talents, however, is never confined to one field. All of the fields demand all talents but the central function of each calls for the heaviest investment of the related talent.

In all of these areas, we have shown great strength in the development and practice of running large organizations, and in the development and use of the tools required. We have also produced men who can provide leadership for the work in all four areas combined.

We have not shown a comparable strength in the prophetic aspects of the business of planning. One aspect of planning is the organization and alignment of known quantities. Another is the prophesying from the known to align the unknown.

It is not enough to say that technological advances have revolutionized war. The point is that the revolution is continuous and is probably speeding up. What we have to do now is take the knowns, the technological data acquired up to now, analyze them for trends or direction signs, and project the course of progression of technology for as far ahead as we can see.

The process involves projection with reasonable accuracy and dependability for the immediate future, and less and less accuracy as the projection is extended. The problem is to mobilize every possible applicable talent and skill to help outline the future as it affects military preparedness as accurately as possible.

This is what the Air Force tried to do last year in Project FORECAST. We brought together qualified people from the military--all three services--from Government, from industry, and from the academic world, including the nonprofit Government study organizations.

Their job was to examine the state of technology with a view to determining several things:

In what way will the indicated directions of technological development influence weapon systems of the future.

What might technology permit us to do in the next 10 years that we want to do now and cannot.

Where should we concentrate our research and development efforts in order to produce the greatest military advantage from technology within the same time period.

Believe me, this is hard work. It illustrates very clearly the expansion in military expertise. We think of FORECAST now not so much as a project as a process. It goes on. We will do more and more of it. We are looking for people with imaginative and probing minds in order to stimulate the prophetic side of the planning business. They must be skilled observers and objective analysts. They must overcome service bias, military bias, and every other kind of bias. They must respond intellectually, not emotionally, to the threat of change and the hazards of their profession.

This work calls for both specialists and generalists, and every military organization as well as every big corporation, must have both. It also offers military people an opportunity for an overview of the whole business in lieu of the segment to which a job in such a big organization usually confines one.

All of the returns are not in on FORECAST, but the work served to validate the reshaping of our forces to provide effective deterrence across a broader range of possible conflicts. It also emphasized the importance of intensified efforts on the part of the Air Force to expand its capabilities in support of ground combat.

U. S. Defense Goals

Now, I want to try to define our own military defense job in terms of the most basic of America's national defense goals. They are our overall military objectives. There are two which overlap to such an extent they are almost but, not quite, one and the same, and there is an emerging third which I will discuss later.

The first is to protect and defend the United States and, in conjunction with allies, the free world against military aggression by keeping military forces ready and able to overcome any attack.

The second is to deter war by denying to any would be aggressor the margin of power necessary to employ military force--or the threat of it--as a means of attaining his ends.

In one sense, there is no difference between the two, because, as General White said, a force which cannot win, will not deter. In another sense, there is a difference because we can have deterrence at the top of the ladder of intensity, and war at the other end.

The reason this is possible is related to a change in the units of measure of explosive power. Until near the end of World War II, we used the pound as the basic unit of measure of the explosive power of weapons. Today, we use the megaton. A megaton is two billion pounds.

The consequences of a full scale war of megaton dimensions are such that it is to the interest of all possible antagonist to avoid it. The degree and probability of broadcast destruction in any megaton war are sufficient to undermine the reward of victory. A megaton war is just a bad bet.

The fact remains, of course, that the aggressor who attains a really credible superiority in power to wage such destructive war may have the rest of the world at his mercy, particularly if such power includes defense against any method of response available to his would-be victims.

Even such an aggressor, however, inevitably comes to weigh the cost of attaining and holding this superiority against the cost of using other means, i. e., methods other than megaton nuclear war, for attaining expansionist goals.

The defender has to be prepared to stay the hand of aggression not only at the top of the scale of intensity of war--first there, yes--but also at every other point at which military forces might be applied as a means of attaining aggressive national goals.

If the defender has confidence in the effectiveness of his deterrent power at all of the probable levels of conflict, he is then in a position to take the initiative in pressing the search for other than violent means and methods for settling disputes or differences between nations.

It is just such a position of confidence in our strength which the United States has sought and pretty well maintained--perhaps unevenly--for about a decade and a half. We had it unquestionably until at least 4 years after World War II. This was the period when we worked so hard to get the United Nations into full operation and sought through the Baruch Plan a system for the control of destructive potentials of atomic energy.

The point of progress which I believe we have attained in 1964 is the point of our strongest military posture, with a margin of

superiority over the Soviets over the widest range of combat intensities. This is true despite the fact that the U.S.S.R. is also stronger than ever before in history.

It seems to be only wise and realistic for us to acknowledge the fact that the tables might be turned if space should become a medium of offensive military activity. As of today, the space threat to our security is hard to define because we do not know enough about operating in space.

This is one reason for the new Air Force MOL project-- Manned Orbiting Laboratory. We must learn how to live in the space environment, in case we need to for purposes of defense and in order to broaden the base of our peaceful exploitation and utilization of space. The earth orbital sphere, out to the synchronous distance of about 22,000 miles, is the place to start.

As long as we maintain today's relative strength, throughout both the range of intensity of conflict and the levels of aerospace operations, we can properly and safely take the initiative in proposing among the nations agreements which might relieve some small, but welcome part of both the tension and cost burden of the arms race.

To paraphrase an historic and dramatic statement of U.S. policy, we are in a position to talk sense to our adversaries, speaking firmly with a very big stick.

This is the basis on which our representatives participate in the 17-nation disarmament negotiations in Geneva. We certainly must remain at full ready with the stick. We must continue to improve our relative security.

But we must also apply our energies and competence to the search for means of preventing war, not just deterring it. It would not be strange at all to have come out of the American military some really useful and effective ideas in the field of arms control, because I believe our military is beginning to think of it as it should be thought of, as the problem of war control. This is our business.

Military men, certainly military men raised in the high tradition and integrity of the American military, do not accept the argument that the presence of arms per se is a major cause of war and, therefore, we must have disarmament. This is the factor at

the root of any apparent lack of enthusiasm for and confidence in disarmament proposals to date.

The American military man certainly is interested and prepared to work, however, on problems of war control in order to supplement war preparedness. He has committed his life to the proposition that war control is possible through preparedness. Preparedness can include investment in surveillance and control systems as well as in weapon systems. The great reservoir of 20th century technology may contain as many ideas and as much data applicable to the machinery of preventing organized violence as it does for producing it.

This idea could well lead to the oft-repeated experience of military life that just when it appears everything is settling down to routine methods of handling familiar jobs, the future prospect explodes into a whole new field of endeavor.

Our Third Objective

Now, the fact that the two most powerful adversaries in the world today, and most of the other nations, are willing to talk disarmament, and, or--this is one of those places where that wonderful legalism "and/or" seems to fit--disarmament and/or other methods of reducing the probability of a nuclear holocaust does not mean that all warlike friction between nations will be reduced.

Agreement on nuclear arms means just that, agreement on nuclear arms. It does not cover anything else. Treaty definitions of the hazards of nuclear warfare and even effective controls and inspection do not remove the historic causes of war. These agreements relate to how wars are fought, but not why. The why's are all the historic and some new differences among nations. There remain the pressure points, the ancient prejudices, the areas of economic envy, the material imbalance between peoples, and the abrasive variations in behavior patterns--some of them newly festered by Communist injections. Experience around the world in social exchange and governmental mechanisms is quite disparate, so that wars may erupt with bows and arrows and poisoned darts, or with sharpened sticks and Molotov cocktails, as well as with rockets and missiles.

Whatever the agreement last year in Moscow, or this year in Geneva, military force is going to continue to be necessary in order to maintain peace. This is the third objective of American military policy which I said is emerging.

There will have to be military forces in the world adequate to prevent the spread of those conflicts which, while high in bitterness and determination of the antagonists, are still low on the ladder of technological intensity. At the top rung of the ladder are thermonuclear missiles.

There is always the danger that the power leaders who wage war well up the ladder will become involved in the conflicts which start at the bottom. I believe the Soviets recognize the danger and will be ready to reinforce peace at selected points--but not too much.

If the contending power leaders, however, are interested in avoiding thermonuclear war--enough to enter into agreements with each other for that purpose--they do not want to be cheated of the gain of being dragged into or engulfed by conflicts started by small fry.

This could result in a possible increase in what have been euphemistically called police actions, employing multinational forces in order to avoid direct involvement.

Controls on megaton war do not in any way preclude the possibility of small-fry contests fostered and fomented by the expansionists, fought by proxy, and labeled cold war in order not to interrupt the peace or disarmament conference sessions on how to prevent hot war.

Clearly, the Communist expansionists suffer no restraint by high power agreements aimed at restraining the use of megaton weapons. Expansion may also be accomplished by trickery and terrorism, with or without tanks.

We have recognized the danger of a thermomusclebound posture, and our forces have been designed to respond promptly and appropriately to a wide range of expansionist provocation.

The emerging new objective of American defense policy, then, in addition to defense and deterrence, is pacification, if not policing,

and our armed forces must be designed with the necessary mobility, flexibility, and weapon adaptability. We have to be able to teach and advise indigenous forces, and to supply them with weapons they can use. This requirement could make very significant changes in our military activities. It could also involve new concepts and substantial increases in military assistance in the civil works field, that is, in transportation, communication and sanitary engineering, for example.

There is a continuing requirement for a strong military assistance program, alongside an equally strong and oftentimes larger, economic and educational assistance program to all the friendly free nations needing help and willing to accept it from us directly.

Those governments needing help and preferring the ways of freedom but who, for a variety of reasons may prefer to take our help through the U.N.'s channels, should be heartily welcomed as friends, and encouraged to help themselves through U.N. technical assistance which we generously support. This is also a military requirement.

Our military policy response to all of these environmental factors and conditions was summed up in the national defense section of President Johnson's message presenting the budget of the United States for FY 1965. He said:

To preserve freedom and protect our vital national interests in these recent years of uneasy peace, this nation has invested heavily in the improvement of its defenses. We have chosen not to concede our opponents supremacy in any type of potential conflict, be it nuclear war, conventional war, or guerrilla conflict. We have now increased the strength of our forces so that, faced with any threat of aggression, we can make a response which is appropriate to the situation. With present forces and those now planned, we will continue to maintain this vital military capability.

The President also said that although we continue to seek a relaxation of tensions, we cannot relax our guard, and that while the nuclear test ban treaty is a hopeful sign, neither that nor other developments to date have, by themselves, reduced our defense requirements.

PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

Decision-making

One of the hardest perennials of big organizations is the recurring problem of the proper levels for decision-making.

It is one that interests me because from 1947 to 1952, the first 5 years of the Department of Defense, I was in a position as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to see the beginnings of the problem, and I have been able to keep up with the fluctuations since.

Tomorrow, I will have served 3 years and 3 weeks as Secretary of the Air Force, longer than any of my predecessors. A service secretary sometimes gets rolled around between the decision layers below and above, but he has an exciting job--sometimes frustrating, sometimes rewarding, sometimes abrasive, but never dull.

Some of the abrasiveness stems from the fact that there are a number of facets to the three-department form of organization of defense which are not smooth and shiny. Nevertheless, the net effect is a stronger and more progressive defense organism. I believe the problems of three services are more solvable than the problems of a single service.

Some of the arguments between the services for greater roles or greater shares of the defense dollar can become pretty heated sometimes, but there is a surprising amount of light generated along with the heat and, some issues are properly aired that would not be otherwise.

We have a strong competition in ideas, which is good. At the same time, we preserve the stimulative and cohesive qualities needed by a fighting outfit, probably best understood as esprit de corps. Three military departments make more manageable operating units, avoiding some of the objectionable aspects of just bigness itself. These among others, are on the credit side of the separate military service form of organization.

On the debit side of a tri-service system is one problem which should have been anticipated and solved when the Department of Defense was created. It has been substantially helped by taking

into the Office of the Secretary of Defense the final decision making authority in those areas in which service affiliation or bias might seriously affect either the speed or the quality of decisions.

I think it only fair to point out that the planning and operational aspects of the three services are better coordinated than ever before in our history.

What is of equal importance, under the direction of Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, our military response to the requirements of foreign policy is better coordinated and more effective than ever before in our peacetime history.

For many reasons, including these less visible reasons which do not fly or shoot, our military posture is stronger than ever before, and unquestionably more powerful than any military organization has ever been in history.

The Strategic Air Command is the commonly cited example of our power. I mention SAC not because of its megaton firepower capabilities but because it is a marvel of good organization, efficient procedures, and disciplined devotion to purpose.

All of our strength is not in nuclear explosives. It is also in the phenomenal Air Force capability, for example, to communicate around the world. It is in the best run airline in the world, MATS, and in the managerial competence which brought the Minuteman missile system from the starting line to operational readiness in 5 years. The Polaris is another example. A key part of our strength is the pride which the men of each service feel in such accomplishments.

Do not think for a moment that the Secretary of Defense is not impressed by some of the competence he sees demonstrated in the services, or that he does not understand the morale-building effect of demonstrated good management within the military. Furthermore, he is aware that decision-making in key areas has been pulled up to the top level. Some of the decision-making was pulled out of the military departments in order to speed up the process and relieve its compromise-prone aspects.

The quality of decisions is more important than the centralization of their making. It is my feeling that when less strong managers than McNamara, Vance, and Brown, for example, are in the Office

of the Secretary of Defense, the level of decision-making will change again.

It is worthwhile noting, too, that the quality of the decisions made at lower level has improved because of the insistence by OSD on analysis in depth and thorough justification. I know from where I sit that there has been a tremendous improvement in the form in which recommendations come from the staff and major commands.

The management area of organization and decision-making is so broad and has so many facets that I would like to take advantage of the discussion period to treat them more fully, and to deal with those aspects of greatest interest to the class. I look forward to getting some of the views of the classes of both Colleges in the questions.

Program Packages

In all the years we had only two services, the problems of coordination never became too serious, even though they were sometimes a bit sticky within the departments, for example, among the Technical Services of the Army. One reason is that preparedness did not cost so much. We were not maintaining a war-ready military machine year-in and year-out of relative peace. The jobs of each of the services were separated to such an extent, or at least they seemed to be, that there were few problems of deciding which service should perform a particular function, and one medium, the aerospace, did not even mature until World War II. Finally, and probably most important, we needed the military services, we thought, only when war came.

Now, everything has changed. We keep a war-ready military machine as a means of keeping peace. We see no end to the job. This is the all important factor underlying that big new problem that I said was the third point of my talk. I will come back to it.

Despite the indicated advantages of separate services, there remains the apparent contradiction of modern military science that no one service can fight alone today. It is difficult to imagine a sizable war situation which would involve but one service.

There is another factor of major importance here. As a result of the development of engines of war which permit real

strategic operations, first the airplane and then the missile, it is possible to have a terribly destructive war without any frontal engagement of military forces. The intercontinental ballistic missile is just what its name says it is, intercontinental.

The net consequence of these changes is that war is no longer planned, and military forces are not funded, strictly on a service basis. The commitment of national resources is vastly greater and the myriad military aspects of war are interlaced with each other and with civil problems. Our defenses therefore have to be budgeted on a job, or a mission basis, instead of on an organizational basis. The program package budget process is designed to do this and is as revolutionary a change as any Secretary of Defense has wrought in our national defense setup.

The change is permanent. No future Secretary of Defense, and, I feel quite certain, no future service secretary nor any military chief, will really want to change it. The reason: it makes sense.

As a matter of fact, by this pattern of relationships of forces, we get many of the administrative advantages of unification, yet preserve all the advantages of service affiliation of the men in uniform.

There is another possible gain, the effective removal of many responsibilities for allocation of resources from the channels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be a substantial contribution to the efficiency and workability of the Joint Chiefs' concept.

The new pattern of resources allocation is responsive to the changing environment. The emphasis given the respective combat force program packages reflects the probabilities as to the type of fighting we may be called upon to do within the foreseeable future. One evidence of this is seen in the build up over the past 3 years of the so called General Purpose forces.

Army-Air Force Relations

An area of employment of General Purpose forces which is getting concentrated attention through the program packaging concept--and showing progress--is in the air support of the ground combat. The long-range transport capability was demonstrated

last October in Big Lift, the precision movement of the personnel of an augmented armored division to Europe in less than 64 hours. It could have been done in less, if the Army had required it.

Big Lift also included sending a Composite Air Strike Force to Europe in support of the armored division. Its deployment of TAC fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, with the help of SAC tankers both for refueling and navigation assistance, was completed in 48 hours--the aircraft were combat-ready shortly after arrival to support the armored division which moved at the same time.

There is no question but that air support requirements of the Army are increasing. Fortunately, technological advancements permit changes in traditional concepts which give new mobility and flexibility to ground combat units.

The Army now has a requirement to get off the ground, and to utilize technological advances in, for example, power units, in order to do things that could not have been done in World War II or the Korean action.

The Air Force has developed over a half century the critical techniques of employing aerospace power--keeping aircraft operational, exploiting aerial firepower through central flight control, and extending airpower resources by centralized management. This experience, of course, is applicable to the mounting requirements for ground combat support.

A very important test program is now being worked up under the general supervision of General Paul Adams of the Strike Command. His objective is to compare the combat and cost effectiveness of a type of air assault division having its own air elements with a more standard Army division receiving air support primarily from the Air Force.

The approaches of both the Army and the Air Force to the use of airpower in ground combat have changed with the times. There are, of course, obvious differences of opinion as to how it should be procured, managed, and directed in use. We are seeking a sound and mutually acceptable solution to the problem. The Air Force is cooperating in every possible way to assure the Army the air support it feels it should have, and certainly will try to do it with the most efficient utilization of the airpower portion of the defense dollar.

The General Purpose Force budget package encourages new approaches. There was a day--and this is a hazard of pie-cutting by service--when any greater investment in ground combat support would have had to be at the expense of the strategic deterrent force, which in the early and mid-fifties had the priority mission. Now the ground support mission has equivalent status as a part of the General Purpose Force package.

Cost Compel Changes

The rate of advance of technology applicable to military requirements is so rapid that a weapon system can become technologically obsolescent during the period of the leadtime needed to bring it into the inventory. Even more serious is the steep uptrend of costs, which inevitably limits the number of systems which can be even tried. You cannot replace a system just to be up-to-date. You have to consider how well the existing system does its job. You can always improve. The question is whether the improvement is worth the cost. Somehow, the costs of new systems and of improvements to old systems seem to keep pace with the fast-moving technology.

The cost of weapon systems has reached the point that no military organization can make very many heavy bets on new systems. Very difficult choices have to be made, and the time devoted to painstaking analysis will be well worthwhile in terms of making the right selection.

As a result, the rate of succession of operational weapon systems almost has to slow down. This will not be due to any dearth of ideas but because each new generation becomes more costly and complex.

As a consequence, the mission and method of employment of each proposed new weapon system must be defined as thoroughly as our foresight will permit. Use by more than one service is always an objective. Both the time and resources required to bring it into the inventory must be determined, then weighed against other possible ways of performing the same mission. I believe we are developing workable techniques for doing this, but there are no easy or automatic solutions.

One part of the solution has been greater centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It has been brought about in two ways, one procedural, such as the changes in the budget and financial control process, the other, organizational.

The organizational changes involve the consolidation of procurement of common items in the Defense Supply Agency, which reports to the Secretary directly, and the consolidation of intelligence functions in the Defense Intelligence Agency. The latter, like its predecessors, the 5-year-old Defense Communications Agency, and the 18-year-old Defense Atomic Support Agency, report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The procedural changes insure that one service cannot develop a new weapon system without consideration of the roles, the possible contribution, and the requirements of the other services.

The principle of dual use of weapon systems was highlighted last summer in the course of discussions of the source selection procedure for a new fighter, the F-111, then better known as the TFX. This point was forgotten, almost, in the headline preoccupation with who got the contract instead of who gets the airplanes. Nevertheless, the plane is a significant first, a major dual-service weapon system.

The program package concept of budgeting does not guarantee but it makes possible multiple service participation in new weapon investments. It is consistent with the operations concepts of the unified and specified commands. As I said, it is clearly the most significant of the changes instituted by Mr. McNamara, and the effects go very deep into all the services.

The military departments have had to improve their cost estimating procedures all along the line, and of equal importance, they have had to improve their presentation of the programs they want funded. They have to make more critical analyses of projects, and apply more rigid tests of all kinds to the ideas and proposals whose continuing flow keep the services up-to-date.

Civilian-Military Relationships

We hear a good deal of discussion these days of the extent to which civilians have taken over military decision-making in the

Pentagon. If we examine the matter closely, we will find several things.

I believe you will find that in the primary field of military professionalism, the training and organizing for combat and the conduct of military operations, there is no danger of civilian takeover.

Next closest to this function is that of military planning, the continuing process of planning for contingencies of all kinds, determining military requirements, and providing both combat and logistics plans for established force levels. This, again, is the field of expertise of the military man. Here, there is a feeling on the part of the military of invasion by the civilians, however, because of the effect of fiscal controls. It is not an invasion of a field of military expertise, but it is the first area to feel the money pinch.

After these two, the conduct of operations and planning, comes the determination of strategies. Here the responsibility as well as the participation in the job spreads. It is an area in which the military can use, and in our country, always has used, civilian as well as military brains. I believe the military man has the initiative, but in this area, both for reasons of the system and for reasons of his own, he wants to test his concepts against the best brains he can find, and he must be prepared to listen to ideas other than those that come out of the military.

This, of course, is one of the reasons why the services have set up the nonprofit study groups sometimes referred to as "think factories." There is a right and a wrong way to use them, however, and I have taken steps in the Air Force to see that we do not pass on to these groups, problems that we should decide ourselves. On the other hand, we do not want to discourage the flow of new and even strange ideas out of the groups such as RAND.

Strategies stem from national policy objectives. In our country, the military does not make national policy. To be sure, in ours or any other country, the civilian leaders had best not finalize national policy without consideration of the military factors. Similarly, responsibility is mutual in the determination of grand strategy, against which the planners plan and for which the commanders organize and train fighting units, even though it is an area of military initiative.

Now, what is left after we consider the three elements of determination of strategy, planning, and the training and conduct of operations. The fourth element of the defense job is management of resources. This cannot possibly be exclusively a military responsibility.

The place of ultimate responsibility was confirmed by President Eisenhower, who said in support of the 1953 defense reorganization plan:

"Basic decisions relating to the military forces must be made by politically accountable civilian officials. Conversely, professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of partisan politics."

The same views were reflected in the 1954 law which added a civilian Assistant Secretary for Financial Management to each service and provided that the respective Military Comptrollers report to him directly.

It is almost inevitable, and certainly natural, that the field of management of resources would be a fertile one for the roots of concern on the part of the military man for his authority and stature. Aside from the myriad of possible bureaucratic or emotion considerations, there is the primary question of effective control by the military man over the flow of material resources which sustain him in battle.

The accountable civilian official cannot work without military guidance and assistance. Direct military management of the flow of materiel to the using arm is desirable. As a matter of fact, I believe that the strictly nonmilitary, or noncombat side of the business, in research and development, procurement, and all phases of Z.I. administration, whether it be real estate or transportation, is better handled at lower cost over the long haul by the military managers than it would be by an all-civilian setup. There are many reasons, a principal one being related to motivation.

In accord with the basic principles of our government, any handler of public funds is subject to controls. The handler must in all cases be accountable, as well as responsible, whether military or civilian. That point is not at issue, nor is the principle of civil authority over the military. The problems stem from the application of this principle to the division of responsibilities between the military and the civilian elements in the defense structure.

It all sounds fine, you say, but isn't the civilian invading the jurisdiction of the military when budget limitations determine force objectives. The answer can be yes, no, or maybe, depending on the circumstances. If you ask isn't he getting into the sphere of professional military expertise, the answer is, "Yes." Since there is no way this can be avoided, we have to live with it and make it workable through the good will, grace, and good sense of the civilians who exercise fiscal control.

I have discussed this problem of civil-military relationships at length but far from exhaustively because it is going to be always with us. It will be with us as long as we have a free society and constitutional definition of the relationship of civil and military authority. We will never have any serious problems with it as long as we keep it under open discussion.

There is a constructive discussion of it in the January issue of "Foreign Affairs," entitled, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism." I urge you to read it. It was written by Colonel Robert Ginsburgh, who was in the 1963 War College Class. He takes a sound approach to the matter and has some worthwhile recommendations for the professional military man.

Almost any discussion of the problem is better than none, because as long as we have it out on the table and in full view, it will not cause us any trouble. It is when we hide such problems and pretend they do not exist that they become serious. This is why it was a service to our military people when President Eisenhower, in his "Farewell Address," cited the dangers of the growth of undue influence in our government by any combination of industrial and military interest. As long as so many billions go into military spending, the danger is going to be there. Just be sure we keep it flagged.

The quality of professionalism in the military life depends upon the fact and acknowledgment of the civil authority over the military. I said in my talk here last year on military professionalism that without adherence to such a principle, military professionalism loses its integrity. Where military power is supreme, it becomes an end in itself and the practice of its expertise is self-serving. By definition, a profession must serve the society of which it is a part and which gives it status.

This concept of military professionalism has always been the standard of the U.S. military officer. He has honored it in a way which marks him among all the military men of history, and in a way which in turn honors the nation he serves. The years ahead, however, will test the professionalism of the American military in a way it has not been tried before.

This brings me to the third of the three points I wanted to discuss today. The first dealt with the environmental conditions which determines our military posture. The second covered the internal conditions which so affect the life of the military man. An objective awareness of both of these points is necessary to an understanding of the third.

THE GREAT CHALLENGE

Historic Military Problem

My third point, the problem which I said no other military had ever faced, is this:

How does the world's most powerful military establishment keep itself war-ready for decades and generations when its purpose in being is to prevent war, its design wholly defensive, eschewing aggression, and having no acquisitive goals, and do this without either deteriorating in military quality or growing out of its proper role and relationship to the society it serves and protects?

This is the challenge of the ages. No military organism in history has ever been put to such a test.

Look first at the conditions.

The requirement that it be the world's most powerful military establishment is a prerequisite of the objective of deterrence.

The absence of any acquisitive national purpose deprives it of the traditional planning and rallying point.

Being "war-ready" in an age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, megaton military explosives, and an emerging new medium of potential operations in space, means ready by the minute for a man's whole lifetime.

Maintaining quality means competing with every other area of demand and of opportunity for men with vision and brains.

Being war-ready means being up-to-date in relation to every other military machine which could threaten the security of the nation.

It means competing for funds with every other area of demand and opportunity for the expenditure of public funds for other socially beneficial and nationally worthy purposes.

But it also means recognition on the part of the nation as well as the military that preserving something to defend and husbanding the resources of defense, are part of being ready to defend. The military must recognize the restraints imposed by other national goals and limitations on the means available for their accomplishment.

Our Antimilitary Beginnings

The American military man can do these things if he continues the great work of the men who have elevated his profession above the colonial background of suspicion and mistrust of things military, stemming from England's long struggle for parliamentary supremacy and ending in the civil authority feature of the American Constitution.

The American system at the outset was a military but not a militaristic system. It conceived of the military as an agency of civil power. Thanks to the quality of American military professionalism, the tradition stands stronger than ever.

President Kennedy emphasized what this relationship really means in his remarks to the men of the First Armored Division during a field exercise just about a year before his death.

He said that regardless of how persistent our diplomacy may be in activities stretching all around the globe, our prestige and constructive effect in world affairs depends in the final analysis upon the military power of the United States, adding:

The United States is the guarantor of the independence of dozens of countries stretching around the world,

and the reason that we are able to guarantee the freedom of those countries and to maintain that guarantee and make it good is because of you and your comrades in arms on a dozen different forts and posts, on ships at sea, planes in the air, all of you. And there are a million of your comrades in uniform outside of the United States who are also part of the keystone of the arch of freedom throughout the globe.

Test of Professionalism

In this role, however, the American armed forces are being called upon to do something which is unprecedented. Indeed, the country itself is embarked on a course never before attempted. The problem thus created is difficult to describe precisely, but it is essential that it be explained and understood.

Historically, armies have been organized and maintained for conquest rather than defense. The Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Macedonians, and the Romans lived by military power. It was military power used for acquisitive purposes.

True military professionalism is of comparatively recent origin. Roman soldiery, like many of its predecessors, reflected some characteristics of professionalism, but its acknowledgement of the civil authority broke down when Caesar crossed the Rubicon. The Roman military subsequently failed the test of sustained quality.

It is interesting to study the military establishments of more recent times, the last 500 years for example, and apply the test of sustained quality and integrity in relationship to the state. None of them, Spain, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany nor Britain, had quite the conditions surrounding the U.S. military.

The United States maintains in peacetime the strongest military force ever assembled in all recorded time--not for conquest, but for defense. This is the salient truth of America's awesome responsibility. The worth of this force for the long term defense of the Nation depends entirely on the professional vision and integrity of its military members.

Several strange difficulties or hazards confront the professional soldier in equipping himself for command. The profession is unique in that he may never exercise his full skill. Or he may do it only once in his lifetime. It is as if a surgeon had to practice throughout his life on dummies for one possible operation, or as if a barrister appeared only in mock trials until taking on the most difficult and important case on record in the highest court.

Another strange occupational hazard is that the complex problem of running a military organization is likely to occupy the professional soldier's mind and skills so completely that he or others may forget what it is being run for. The demands of military management and administration--for example, the maintenance and supply, the discipline and the human attentions required by an organization as big as a fair-sized town--are in peacetime enough to occupy the senior officer to the brink of war. A commissary general was reported to have complained bitterly in 1898 when the Spanish-American War came along and disrupted his splendid organization.

The story may be apocryphal, but it illustrates a not too unreal type of deterioration of a military organization. It can happen many ways. Most of you have had enough experience to understand all the things that can happen to undermine the morale, the subtle and invisible ways esprit can decay, and the pleasant diversions that can occupy otherwise industrious officers if they do not have enough to do.

There are a number of safeguards against the other type of hazard to military professionalism, stepping out of role or extending influence beyond the military realm. One is the specific constitutional provision, another a free press, the most important one probably being the awareness on the part of the military of the hazard. The extreme form was journalistically dramatized in "Seven Days in May," but nobody believes we have to worry about anything like that. There are other more subtle things that can happen which are not so easily detected and countered.

Eisenhower's warning about undue influence provided an example of a subtle hazard. He realized the possibilities of the pressures which could be generated if the military threat were ever described in a manner to serve economic ends. As I say, this is one of those hazards we do not have to worry about as long as we talk about it.

This principle of objective and frank discussion of all problems of human behavior and its consequences applies to our basic problem of maintaining military professionalism. I hope the subject becomes and remains an important part of the curricula of service schools at all levels.

CONCLUSION

The principle of open discussion applies to the great challenge of your professionalism that the coming years present--maintaining military quality and constitutional integrity. Remember, we are talking about generations.

History indicates pretty clearly that there is a real problem. It must be difficult to keep a dynamic and war-ready military establishment as a proper servant of the state in a society of free men over a long period of years because it has never been done.

I have talked about the threat to our security and certain problems of running the defense business because these are the things which mark if not determine the direction of the hazardous road ahead. I have tried to discuss them not from the standpoint of any of the military services nor as a civilian head of service, but as they possibly appear to an informed and intelligent public. It is important that we, as responsible managers of the defense business, always try to think of the way it looks to the people of the United States.

I say this for two reasons. One is that unless the threat to our security appears basically the same to them that it does to us, the professionals, you can be sure they will not continue to listen to our recommendations as to the forces needed to cope with that threat.

You can also be sure, therefore, that the longer the burden of \$50 billion annually continues, the harder their look will be.

The second reason is that trying to see things through the eyes of the long-suffering but still defense-minded public, will help us respond more constructively to their growing urge for solutions to the basic problem of war.

We must understand the reasons why the American people will continue to press for some form of arms control or disarmament. It is up to us to direct our energies and competence in that direction.

Perhaps progress in this field could also be a helpful safeguard against the occupational hazards of an unused military machine, loss of quality internally, or loss of perspective on its role as servant of the state.

They are as much hazards to democracy as to military professionalism. When military professionalism grows out of its role of service to the free state, it is the end of both. Similarly, when democracy's military defense begin to deteriorate, the end of both is in sight.

It will not happen in America if our military continues to exercise the degree of vision and intelligence and integrity which has earned it its professional standing. It will not happen if there is enough confidence in themselves and faith in democracy on the part of our professional military men to keep the subject out on the table and in full view.

One point I want to emphasize. It cannot be done from the outside. No legislation, no protective laws, no act of civilian authority can be effective. The only capability for this defense of democracy, like the visible and tangible defense, is within the military profession.

Thank you.

COLONEL LAKE: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of both Colleges, thank you very much for an interesting and stimulating morning. We regret that your time does not permit you to carry this on a little further.

(18 March 1964--7, 600)O/pd:syb