

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY THROUGH
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

25 February 1964

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NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C.

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GENERAL STOUGHTON: Gentlemen: Our speaker this morning, Dr. Arnold Wolfers, is such a distinguished person that he hardly needs an introduction to an audience like this. He has had a long association with military and educational institutions.

Dr. Wolfers is a recognized authority in his field both at home and abroad. I know of no one that we could have gotten who could discuss better for us the subject for today, "The Search for Security Through Collective Defense."

It is a real pleasure to welcome back to the Industrial College and to present to the Class of 1964 Dr. Arnold Wolfers.

Dr. Wolfers.

DR. WOLFERS: General Stoughton and Members of the Industrial College: Today I feel a little inadequate. I understand that my friend, Secretary Tyler, discussed NATO with you yesterday. You realize that he has all the inside knowledge and I have only the outside knowledge. It reminds me a little of the two cows who were standing in the field. The milk truck came by. It said on it, "Pasteurized, Enriched with Vitamins, and Homogenized." One cow said to the other, "It makes one feel inadequate, doesn't it?"

Speaking about "The Search for Security Through Collective Defense," I think that we will agree that collective defense is a kind of new expression for what, through the centuries, has been called alliances. We were a little shy about using the word "alliance," after the war. It was not popular in this country, while collective security, under the U.N., was very popular, so collective defense seemed a nice way of bridging the gulf between the two. Moreover, in the U.N. charter, nations are given the right to individual or collective defense-- "collective self-defense" it says in the U.N. charter. This was a loophole through which one could smuggle in the old alliance as a means by which nations could make themselves more secure.

But, actually, what it comes to is a return and for this country a new beginning in the field of alliances, which you know have always been regarded by nations in danger, by nations that felt insecure, as an important supplement to their own national armaments. Now, alliances are a supplement provided they add to a country's national security in the same sense as armaments add or give security.

The problem was, after the war, that the United States needed such supplementation of its Armed Forces, and, as you know, as early as 1947 the decision was reached. It was not really a purposeful, intentional move, but it turned out to be a turning point in American foreign policy. The decision was reached that this country was going to line up with other countries in peacetime with a view to the danger threatening from enemy countries.

The decision to go into the United Nations was not of the same nature. Here was a different concept. One was not thinking in terms of enemy countries but merely of the possibility of future aggression, and, as you know, it provided for a commitment by all member nations to participate in sanctions against aggressors, wherever they might turn up.

But this was not the same as the decision to line up with others against a specific common foe. It was only when the cold war set in and we were aware of the fact that we might be faced again with a conqueror in Eurasia that this country decided not to repeat its former procedure of waiting until the war was under way but to go in before that and see whether it might not prevent the outbreak of war by throwing its weight on the side of those who might become the victims of soviet aggression. It was definitely with an eye to the Soviet Union that we entered into this new phase of our history, the establishment of collective defense agreements, starting in Europe and then moving out, as we shall see, and as you know, to the other parts of the endangered world.

It does need a word concerning the usefulness of alliances to the United States. It is not by any means as obvious as it has been in European history, most of the time, when the countries that were endangered by their neighbors would find it necessary, particularly the continental ones, to line up together in order to strengthen their position--France with Russia, Germany with Austria, and so forth. This repeated itself, as you know, through the centuries.

I say it was not as obvious in the case of the United States that to do so was a way of increasing our own security. If we look at the world today, one might ask one's self whether these alliances are not making us more insecure. One cannot help thinking back to the warnings of George Washington, warning this country of entangling alliances. Aren't we simply entangling ourselves in the quarrels of other nations? Are we not endangering ourselves? It is a question we do not even like to ask ourselves any more, because we have decided that it is not true, but I think it is a good thing to realize what the argument is that justifies this rather extraordinary policy by which a country separated from the danger zones by great oceans commits itself to the defense of countries, most of them very weak countries that are extremely vulnerable and thousands of miles away from us. The argument is simply that this country has had the experiences of World War I and World War II in which it discovered that, if war breaks out across the oceans and a conqueror begins to roll across Eurasia, this country inevitably becomes involved because of the indirect threat to our security.

When we entered into these alliances, there was still no direct threat. There was not a country in the world that could attack the United States. It has happened only in the last few years, when the Soviets equipped themselves with long-range bombers and long-range rockets, that for the first time this country became directly threatened by a foreign country. And do not forget that, as far as the direct threat is concerned even today, there is very little the allies can do to help us meet that threat. The way to meet the soviet nuclear threat is to have nuclear forces of a strategic character in this country, and the allies can at best give us some marginal assistance.

So what we were out for were not mutual-assistance pacts in the old sense of alliances, but pacts by which we commit ourselves to the defense of rather remote countries, the reason being what we realize that what happens to them would in the end happen to us. If the Soviet-Chinese bloc got control over Eurasia, the offshore islands would go, and this country would find itself isolated, in a world dominated by the Communists.

The rationale behind our alliances, I would say then, whether we were aware of it or not, is an attempt to create a steady world balance of power in which we are safe against a drive by the Communists to gain world domination or to tip the balance irreversibly in their own favor.

If you now look at the alliances from that point of view, the problem that poses itself to us day after day is: Can we afford to let this or that place go? Do we have to throw ourselves in to save people, whether they be in Berlin or Vietnam, in order that the world balance remains stable enough for us to be secure?

Whether we might or should go beyond that and make it more secure by tipping the balance in our favor is a second consideration. But none of our alliances were entered into with an understanding that our allies would help us to tip the balance in our favor. They were defensive all the way through. These countries except for the Republics of China and Korea, were hesitant even to enter into defensive alliances with the sense of insecurity and weakness which has prevailed in most allied countries even to the present day. The best they hoped for was to be able to hold on to what they had. So the best we could hope for was to have assistance from them to maintain a precarious balance but still one which seemed tenable and which has proved to be tenable to this day.

How they would react if we ever went beyond that, for instance, if we set out to conquer North Vietnam, we do not know, because from their point of view this would mean running into much greater risks than they were willing to face when they lined up with the United States in the various defense treaties which we have signed with them.

Now, going to the European scene first, which you discussed yesterday with Secretary Tyler, the European situation seemed the simplest. That is where we had suffered most in both World Wars and where it seemed most natural that the United States should establish for itself a position it had gained with much blood and toil in the course of two World Wars. It would project its strength onto the European scene so that the line could be held there against the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union was and is today the dominant threat to the security of this country and of the whole Western World

So, with that in mind, we initiated and signed the NATO Pact by which 15 countries on both sides of the Atlantic committed themselves to the concept that an attack on one was an attack on all. If we look at it from the way it has developed since then, we can understand why it has begun to run into serious difficulties. I am not going to minimize these difficulties. They are very great though perhaps even greater for our Asian alliances.

In the beginning, as I said, things seemed simple, because everybody was thinking in terms of World War II and what it would take to prevent another conquest of Western Europe calling for subsequent liberation. It would obviously take a strong "shield" on the Iron Curtain so that the Russians could not hope to gain control of Europe. In the beginning, in the first place, everything was set on this idea of a strong "shield," to which the European countries seemed ready to commit themselves and to build up sufficient forces to hold that line. One must not forget that the nuclear age had only just set in and there was only a kind of vague sentiment that the few atomic bombs which the United States could be credited with would help back up the "shield", or that at least the American Air Force and Navy would give a lot of backing to a "shield" which was, however, to be primarily European.

Then we put in more troops to make it stronger, because the Europeans were not coming through with sufficient efforts. The European people did not have their heart in it. NATO to them really meant only the assurance that the United States somehow would take care of them. There was no militancy left in Europe. The Germans had been knocked out, and it took time before they even got to being an armed nation again. NATO in the early days was really not much more than a psychological factor, a military bluff, as far as its military value was concerned. Very soon we discovered that the force levels worked out at Lisbon were not going to be reached.

But then came a second phase, which was the happy phase for NATO and the Europeans, namely, the phase of American nuclear supremacy, the time when we and they--we telling them to do so--were relying on the American threat of massive retaliation. So they could settle down rather comfortably without much effort on their part. All it took was an American trip wire as it was said which would threaten to release American strategic intervention if Europe were attacked. The assumption was that the Soviets would recognize the immense danger to them if they got entangled with the superior American strategic force they probably did just that.

This second phase continued into the midfifties. As far as European psychology was concerned, it remains prevalent until a few years ago. The military effort was mainly on our side--though not entirely, because they did make some effort, and the Germans began to help build up more than a trip wire. The British, the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch were not in it with their heart. They did not

feel that there was any need for such an effort; in fact, they had no faith in it. They were not going to prepare to fight a war in Europe. It had to be deterrence, or it would be the end of Europe.

This idea that it had to be deterrence and nothing else, that it was dangerous even to prepare actually to fight a war if nuclear deterrence failed because that might give the Russians the idea that they could get away with a lesser war. This sentiment is still very strong today and has, in the last few years, thrown NATO into a very dangerous turmoil and into controversies, from which we do not see an exit, yet.

What is the problem? The problem is that deterrence does not look as watertight any more as it did in the fifties. It has been gradually realized--although we may have tried to hide the fact even to ourselves--that maybe the American strategic deterrent might fail to deter the Russians because our nuclear threat might not be credible any more. The great change that came about was the establishment of a soviet strategic force which made America immensely vulnerable. Europe understood that no matter how strong our strategic force is it will not be able to knock out enough of the Russian counterforce to make us safe against intolerable retaliatory damage.

Under these circumstances the Europeans began to ask themselves: "(a) Is this deterrent credible? Does it protect us at least against conventional attack on a big scale by the Russians? And, (b) Are the Americans actually going to come to our assistance at the risk of incalculable losses to themselves? Would we sacrifice Paris for Detroit? Would we do this and that for the Americans? Why should they do it for us." Suddenly the nuclear umbrella appeared to have leaks.

What reaction was possible to this situation? Here our views and the views of an important number of people in Europe, not only of de Gaulle, began to divide. One view was that if the American deterrent was not reliable, the European nations must have their own. Let us not forget that the British were the ones who first expressed this view. Then came the French, with de Gaulle insisting that the remote umbrella was not good enough, that he must have his own, at least as a supplement, at least as a fallback position. We insisted that this kind of proliferation of nuclear weapons would break up the alliance, and would make a rational strategy a controlled nuclear response, impossible. So the big fight came about

proliferation and our struggle against independent deterrents particularly in the hands of the French where it surely would provoke the Germans to follow suit.

I think our fear that the Germans would follow the French and throw all their effort into strategic forces is not justified. To countries that are not immediately on the Iron Curtain, like Britain and France, a conventional war on the continent seems a very remote possibility. They do not think of themselves as immediately in the first line of a soviet attack. They are much more inclined, therefore, to think in terms of deterrence by long-range nuclear weapons, than to think of this in terms of a struggle with the Russians on land. Only the Germans have gone through the struggle on land. Only they know what the steamroller from the East actually means. To the French the Russians were always allies. To the British they have been quite remote. The Germans, however, understand that that even in the first shock their country would be overrun and so they are willing to build up a very considerable army, the biggest and the strongest on the continent outside of the American army in Germany. Even the Germans cannot face the danger of another struggle with the Russians unless we are at their side with considerable strength.

I was in Germany in October. I just happened to fly over on the same day as the Big Lift to lecture to a group of German staff officers on the very day when the forces of the Big Lift began to land in Germany. The effect on them was shattering because they understood it to mean that sometime in the future we were going to pull out our troops and begin to protect Germany from the distance. This to them meant that they were going to be alone to face the Russians, for which they do not feel themselves capable. The Hudson Institute has said recently that the Germans could do it alone, but they do not believe it. We should not overestimate their sense of strength. We tend to overestimate it. They still have defeat too strongly in their bones and they know that they are not liked. Also they are a partitioned country. They do not feel strong and therefore, everything depends for them on the visible presence of American troops and a very strong American force on the continent.

Where, then, does NATO go from here? We have insisted that the most important thing is to build up strong conventional forces, so that we have an alternative other than either a nuclear holocaust or surrender. But we have not sold this idea yet to the Europeans.

My hope is that as time goes on they will get away from the idea of massive retaliation and see that it cannot be made as reliable any more. Then I would hope that they would gradually understand that, against lesser provocations, they must be equipped with adequate conventional forces and that they cannot leave that task entirely to the United States or even to the United States and Germany.

If that happens, the question still remains as to whether the strategic forces of the West can be united again or whether they are to remain split into at least three separate parts and eventually into more. As you know, the MLF is an attempt to solve the problem of Germany, namely, to give the Germans a substitute for their own nuclear forces. Maybe this will work for awhile. Maybe it will work because the Germans really have a tremendous inner resistance against building up their own nuclear force. They know how provocative this would be on the Russians, and also on their allies. So maybe the MLF will take care of the German problem for quite a while.

But it does not solve the problem of proliferation, because the French are not going to give up their force de frappe in favor of the MLF. My personal feeling is that we had better accept the idea that countries in the front line, so to speak, on the other side of the Atlantic, will want to have some nuclear force of their own, and I do not think we need to be so nervous about the idea that they might trigger us. How can they, after all? If we do not want to go into a nuclear war that they started without our agreement we will not go in--period. All we have to say is that we will not. They cannot trigger us into a nuclear war. When it comes to conducting a rational policy, they are pretty rational people, too. The military in all countries, fortunately, are rational people. If one wants to work out a plan of conducting a war rationally in a particular theater of war, why should we be able to work this out with the British and not work it out with the continental countries?

I think we are far too nervous about what de Gaulle is planning to do or is able to do. He knows as well as we do that France's nuclear force will be a relatively minor force, just enough to serve as a minimum deterrent. As a matter of fact, I am not quite sure whether one can get anything better than a minimum deterrent, anyway. The days of counterforce strategy may be running out. It may be realized very soon that no country, however powerful, could hope

to disarm the nuclear forces of an enemy when they become more and more mobile or hardened. So that in the end maybe we also will have only a minimum deterrent, and we cannot deny to the French, if they can afford it, or to the British--or maybe even to the Germans--the kind of reserve power that gives a sense of relative security in an age of nuclear weapons.

But what we need is coordination of our forces, and cooperation, not integration, which goes too far, but some form in which nuclear strategy can be worked out together. We have no common nuclear strategy today.

Well, that is the condition in which we find ourselves with regard to Europe. The strategic controversy increased the feeling of the Europeans that they need more independence. But aside from it we are dealing with increasingly stronger countries which have their own views and their own interests. We will have to deal with them in a fashion much more along the lines of traditional alliances where one ally did not dominate all the others and or tried to force them into integration but where allies had to come to agreements about the way in which they were going to defend themselves together.

Moving now to the other theaters, it soon became obvious that Europe was not the only danger spot. As soon as Communist China began to reveal its potential power, and especially with the Korean war it became clear that we were vulnerable on two fronts, that we could no more let Asia go than Europe. In the aftermath of the Korean war we began to look for allies in the Far East. It was a rather dismal situation we found there. If there was weakness in Europe, it was nothing compared with the weakness that existed in the Far East. We had not only knocked out the Japanese military force but made it impossible, practically, for the Japanese to reconsider their total disarmament. If the Europeans had no fighting spirit left, the Japanese seemed to have even less. What else was there?

Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan had an army and a considerable one. South Korea had what was left of the South Korean force, and there were islands of various types that might together form some kind of barrier against the Red Chinese. Fortunately for us, China was still a paper tiger. If China had really been a major power she could have swept her opportunity of the Eurasian mainland and maybe could have even gotten control over some of the islands. But, for our

naval strength and our air strength, and the remnants of armies on the continent, China was fortunately no match. She may become one. She may be able to mobilize the resources which she has though I think we are inclined to be too much impressed by numbers. It is not because she has 600 million or 700 million people that she is a tremendous threat. This is her weakness. But she has great natural resources, tremendous human energy and no doubt the most intensive, imperialist, missionary zeal, at the command of a very strong governmental system.

In view of the danger in Asia after the Korean war, Mr. Dulles turned to the task of building up what alliances he could. He could not get all countries to join. No "NATO" could be established there. It had to be alliances with individual countries. They hated each other. They had been enemies of each other. There was no solidarity there. There is not today.

So we entered into a treaty with Japan. We entered into a collective defense treaty with the Philippines. We turned to Australia and New Zealand and signed the ANZUS Pact. Then we turned to the Republic of China which became one of our strongest commitments.

These were not commitments of a truly alliance character. We did not say we would go to war if any of them were attacked, but we said that any attack on them would be a threat to our peace and security, and we would consult with them over the measures that would have to be taken. This was an American guarantee, if you like. They regarded it as that. After all, we had gone in on behalf of South Korea. We had demonstrated that we could be counted upon. When it came to the struggle in the Formosa Straits our Navy was there and we were giving support. There was no doubt that we would defend Taiwan. Therefore, others were also willing to fall in line in the Far East.

Now, when we move to southeast Asia, continental southeast Asia, things were more difficult from the beginning. It is not accidental that our gravest crisis is in Laos, Cambodia, and, mainly, in Vietnam. These are countries that are at least as vulnerable and exposed as the countries of Europe. They are on the mainland where guarantees given by insular countries usually fall on rather skeptical ears. One is never quite sure whether the allies from the islands will really be there when the time comes. The French still remember

how long it took in the First World War and how long it took in the Second World War until the United States was ready to save them.

What we did, then, in Southeast Asia was a kind of patchwork job, the best we could do, to get at least some common bonds that would give a certain strength to the area. What was done in the Manila Pact was to set up in 1954 what is called the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, a multilateral collective defense agreement. But I need not tell you what a shaky edifice it is. The papers are saying in these days that it is doubtful whether it still exists. The French are cold, to say the least, toward SEATO. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are not members but they are guaranteed by the pact. If they turn against the pact that weakens the situation immensely, because without places on which to land, places on which to deploy, places from which to fight are essential. Pakistan is a member but is very remote. It is quite doubtful whether she has a place in a Southeast Asia Treaty, but she was willing to go along for reasons that had little to do with the area. Britain today is more firmly behind SEATO, or, let us say, behind the American position in that area, because she is very deeply engaged in the struggle between Malaysia and Indonesia. But the SEATO Treaty is not really directed against Indonesia. It could hardly be turned around from its direction against China to serve in the defense of Malaysia. As soon as the the direction of an alliance becomes questionable there is sure to be friction, if not a break between the allies.

We have had this experience in other places. One cannot think of NATO as the French did at the beginning, as an alliance against Germany. In the beginning this idea was quite seriously held in France. Actually the treaty says nothing about the enemy. Today this is out of the question. Take our treaty with Pakistan. The Pakistanis regard every treaty as a treaty against India. You can put into the text whatever you like--it is either a treaty against India or it is worthless!

So one cannot turn alliance treaties around. Therefore, I am afraid that the conflict the British are engaged in does not really lead them to any real solidarity with SEATO.

When it comes to Australia and New Zealand, the only thing they are afraid of is a Japanese or a Chinese or an Indonesian attack in their direction. But, when it comes to the defense of South Vietnam or Cambodia, Australia and New Zealand are not much of an asset to us.

So that one can really say that SEATO has become an American guarantee pact with those countries that are willing to be defended by the United States. One has to say "those that are willing to be defended," because, as you know, not every country is willing to have a guarantee pact with the United States. Some are afraid of provoking the other side and others who are really in danger have an inclination to go neutral, with the hope that neutrality will protect them better than against an attack an alliance with a country that is very remote and may not come to their assistance in time to save them from being overrun. So that is why we are having trouble with Cambodia, and we have had trouble with Laos. And we may get into more trouble in the Far East as time goes on.

Thailand is still a relatively staunch supporter of the American guarantee, and Pakistan, at its end, is still hoping that it can rely on our guarantee, but apparently it has been shaken in its belief since we have gone to the help of India.

So one cannot help saying that, as far as collective defense is concerned, we are pretty much on our own, and the anticipated collective aspect has faded considerably. I think this is not true for Japan, South Korea and Formosa, and maybe not for Thailand, and it may not, in the longrun, be true for some of the other countries in that area. But at the moment it is mainly American strength that counts. With our strong Navy and Air Force we do have a relatively favorable access to the area and these alliances do give us a toehold on the continent which is important. Therefore, it may be possible, if necessary by strengthening our forces over there and going in on a bigger scale, that we may be able to prove to the area that we really are the kind of guarantor they need. This might turn the tide in our favor. But I do not know what would be more likely to turn the tide, whether it will be an American defeat in South Vietnam or an American push into North Vietnam. I do not know which of the two would have the greater psychological shock effect. Probably something will have to happen of a very drastic nature if we want to mobilize allied strength in those areas that would be of serious consequence to our position. But it is a position of vital interest, because if it begins to crumble, there is no way of saying where it will stop.

If we go from the SEATO area westward, we come into an almost complete military vacuum. We could afford to leave Burma and India as a vacuum, because they seemed to have another protection, namely,

the mountain ranges of the Himalayas, which made them less vulnerable, perhaps not vulnerable at all and certainly not vulnerable to the Soviet Union. But, as we know now, they are vulnerable to the Chinese--though not as vulnerable perhaps as it looked when the Chinese crossed the Himalayas and marched into India. I do not think it is accidental that they turned back after a short while. Logistically, and in terms of geography, generally, their excursion was thoroughly adventurous. Maybe it would have been the best thing to let them move on as far as they could to discover how far they were out on a limb. But I can see why the Indians did not cherish that idea.

Anyway, this is not the most important section, except perhaps for Northern Burma. But when we go further West we get into a dangerous gap in the defense perimeter of the free world. I need hardly say anything about it. The CENTO Treaty, of which we are not even a member, can hardly be said to be in existence. Iraq has dropped out. The British have not put much into it. Turkey is a member of NATO, Pakistan is our separate ally and so is Iran. It remains a very weak position because there is practically no local strength there that amounts to much. Our good fortune is that the Soviets have not tried to push through. They may have their own reasons why they do not want to become entangled with us over relatively difficult terrain in Iran and to the south of Iran.

So I cannot leave you with the impression that our alliance system, except for NATO, is a very strong protection of our security, but it may be the best we can attain at the moment. The question is, what we can do in the longrun to give it more solidity, to create more solidarity, to encourage more resistance, and to build up our defenses to meet the growing danger that China might become a major power.

COLONEL AUSTIN: Gentlemen, Dr. Wolfers is ready for your questions. We have already in the faculty lounge planted one with him which I will restate to him. That is: With the benefit of hindsight, Dr. Wolfers, if we were to do it all over again, would you have advised the United States to have entered into the alliances which it has, in the sense which you discussed a moment ago?

DR. WOLFERS: Well, if the alternative would have been returning to Fortress America, I would definitely never have recommended that. I could not imagine a proud, strong, victorious country simply giving up having influence in the world and letting things drift again to the point where this country would be dragged into a war which it had not tried to prevent. This I think would have been disastrous.

But, if you ask me whether the specific alliances, the whole series of alliances, look reasonable now, if one looks back, I would say that as far as NATO is concerned I would never question the need for the United States to project its power into Europe at the end of the war. After all, we were in part responsible for the fact that the Soviets were able to march into the heart of Europe, and the rest of Europe was in no position to stand up against them. Whether they would have expanded to the Atlantic nobody can tell, but the invitation was certainly there as far as Europe was concerned. We had our troops over in Germany as the only safeguard for Europe. I think the treaty was in order. As a matter of fact, I recommended it very strongly at the time. I had just visited Europe and talked to members of the General Staffs of Western European countries and members of the governments. I believe I was one of the first who insisted in a memorandum published by the Yale Institute of International Studies that we would make Germany an ally rather than keeping her in the position of a Protectorate and that we build up strength there. So there I have no question.

When it comes to the Far East, I do not think I would have taken the initiative for anything like SEATO or CENTO. There we were running after countries to get them to be our allies instead of waiting until they came around and showed that they really meant it when they said they were going to help defend themselves.

In the case of Japan it is a different matter, since we were the controlling power. I think we fooled ourselves into believing that we could create a kind of NATO in Asia, when in fact we should have looked at the situation from place to place. I would have suggested, I think, that we should have simply tried to hold some of the strategic positions, vital to us, for the balance of world power, and then let the development draw us to places where there was real willingness and determination and solidarity to take a stand against the Soviets or the Chinese.

QUESTION: One of the many problems that we have in defense today is the selection of a proper nuclear strategy. At one end of the scale we have the counterforce and at the other end a countercity doctrine. Our strategy at the moment is somewhat akin to the counterforce theory. Could we have your views on these strategies, and perhaps an indication of where we should go?

DR. WOLFERS: If one comes to the conclusion that the idea of an effective counterforce blow, one that would really reduce the enemy force to where it could do only tolerable damage has to be given up, the temptation is to say, "All right, then, let's accept the de Gaulle view that a bit of countercity force is all we can get anyway and is moreover enough to deter the other side." I do not think we can go to that extreme. If we do, then it means that nuclear weapons cannot be used in a militarily meaningful sense because swapping cities is not a meaningful strategy. Then we are really back to a position where we are absolutely at the mercy of the opponent. If he does not want to lose cities, fine; if he does, all we can do is to take revenge.

But, is there something in between? This question is difficult to answer. I think we have to have a force that can be pinpointed against military targets, and we must think in terms of less than total nuclear war, and in less than total nuclear war, where both sides are deterred from going all-out, we must be able to strike at meaningful targets. So that we do come down to a kind of relative counterforce capability. But it is not enough, I am afraid. It is enough to protect us, I think, but it is not enough in itself to protect our overseas allies. We want to be able to protect our overseas allies in the years to come. Maybe we can still do it by sheer nuclear threat, but, as time goes on their security will depend on our ability to deter attacks that remain below the level of all-out nuclear attack. Otherwise I am afraid they will be lost.

QUESTION: Sir, would you give us your impression of the state of health of the OAS?

DR. WOLFERS: I do not know whether I should go into the topic of the OAS, which was not mentioned in the outline of my topic, I do not know too much about the Latin American situation; moreover the OAS is not an alliance in the traditional sense. It really is a collective security system, by which we promise to defend each other against any and all internal as well as external foes. It is not directed against any single enemy. It is a kind of regional UN, which means that, for military purposes, there is very little to it. If it came to a matter of real fighting, the OAS would be just as little available as the U.N., I think. I do not believe that the collective security can operate. But, when it comes to strengthening regimes against subversion, or when it comes to expressing some solidarity against a threat, like the Cuban threat, it has some value. It at least has the value of legitimizing actions we might otherwise have to take alone.

This is all that it does, but, of course, at a price. It does give us a certain legitimacy when we act, but it also restrains us. It is hard to decide in advance--whether the restraints are going to be more harmful than the backing, which is more a moral backing, is going to be helpful. This I would not want to decide in a general way. After all, we are not absolutely restrained. We are not absolutely bound. We still have the ability and, if we want, the will to go it alone. On other occasions, as long as we can afford it, it is fine to have the backing of these Republics, because it creates a certain amount of solidarity and of cooperation in this hemisphere.

QUESTION: Can you discuss for us the relationship, if any, between the Common Market and NATO?

DR. WOLFERS: As far as the Common Market and NATO are concerned, they really are not related. I think one has to emphasize that. The Europeans have gone into the Common Market not with an idea of making themselves strong against the Soviet Union. They have shied away from any suggestion that that was what they were doing, and they were not doing it for that purpose. The purpose was to give them economic strength. The purpose was to begin to create unity in Europe, not against the Soviet Union specifically but as a return to a powerful position for Europe.

This they had to limit to six countries, because the others would not go along on the terms of the Six. Of course the effect is that it is directed in a sense just as much against ourselves as against any other outsider, as far as the economic side is concerned. It is directed against us only in the sense that they are going to protect themselves to some extent against all outsiders in order to create internal unity and solidarity. It has in that sense not worked out as harmoniously with us as our defenders of the Common Market expected. We simply took it for granted that what was good for Europe was good for the Atlantic Community. This is not necessarily so. And I must say, if you want to unite Europe, if you want to merge it into a United States of Europe, you have got to allow them to show a certain antagonism against the outside world and emphasize that their prime interest and identity is with their own group.

This is what we are up against and what we are going to be up against in the Kennedy Round. I think this is inevitable and we should accept it as long as it does not hurt us too much, if we still want European unity and strength. And we have some interest in having

a stronger and united Europe, because we do not want to get entangled in European quarrels again, and in a sense, of course, in the end, it does help NATO, if it creates unity and strength.

QUESTION: Dr. Wolfers, will you please give your opinion on the feasibility and likelihood of an internationalized access to Berlin materializing?

DR. WOLFERS: One can speculate about the possibilities of future agreements with the Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe. This is one of the possible compromises which can be discussed, but the Berliners in West Berlin and the Germans are going to be terribly reluctant to depend on a U.N. guaranteed access rather than on an American guaranteed access. After all, the U.N. is a very weak reed for them to lean on in any such conflict as might arise over the access. Therefore, at the moment any change if seriously suggested, immediately creates the impression in Germany that maybe our position is weakening. Many Berliners including Mr. Brandt, have said to me, "The American flag is what counts." Now, eventually, I think they may find that if we come to agreements with the Soviets they need not be the sufferers and might even gain by an agreement in which other countries would feel that after the maximum had been done to satisfy the Soviet bloc the protection of Berlin was more than ever an interest of everybody.

I think it is conceivable that something of that kind might be worked into a future agreement, which is, however, still very remote. The difficulty in reaching any agreement is the sensitivity of this very vulnerable population in West Berlin and the sensitivity of the whole of Germany to anything that might suggest a permanent partition of the country and a stabilization of the present status quo.

QUESTION: Dr. Wolfers, you discussed and pointed out the difficulties of choosing between a counterforce strategy, a conventional strategy and others. Isn't there developing an intermediate possibility in the use of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly if these become clean and therefore more practical for battlefield deployment? Would you care to discuss the possibility of this being open to the alliance?

DR. WOLFERS: I think the tactical nuclear weapons are likely to become "conventional". I do not think this can be avoided very long. It means only that we have found a new kind of fire power which might be more helpful to us than to the other side, but the idea that

it is necessarily favorable to the defense is not generally held any more. It is not necessarily true. Actually, we may not gain very much if we resort to tactical nuclear weapons, since the other side has them, too. After all, if we do want to defend that line we had better defend it with the minimum of damage to the battlefield countries, otherwise they will cave in.

The Germans are divided on this. On the whole they think that tactical nuclear weapons would help them. But then you immediately come to the question of the medium-range rockets, and there, as you know, the battle lines are drawn much more tight at the moment. The Germans and other European countries are exposed to middle-range soviet rockets and nuclear weapons, and there are no land-based, medium-range rockets on the Western side. That has led to the big debate about sea-based Polaris rockets as a substitute for land-based weapons, and about who should control the Polaris missiles. Here you get right into the MLF debate, which originally was mainly an answer to the question raised by General Norstadt and his successor, namely concerning NATO needs, or SACEUR needs of a medium-range ballistic force. Since no country except West Germany wants to have these land-based missiles on its own soil, the ocean is the only place in which it is practical and actually prudent to base them.

Whether there should be a single multilateral force or several national forces, is open to debate. This is really a more serious problem at the moment than that of the tactical weapons. They are available on the spot already.

QUESTION: Spain is becoming more important to us in terms of military bases, yet she remains outside of NATO. Should she be brought into NATO?

DR. WOLFERS: I think I would want to say two things on that point. (a) I do not think she could be drawn into NATO even today. The opposition to Fascist Spain is still very strong in Europe. Maybe this could be overcome, but I am not sure that we want it. Our special relationship with Spain has great advantages. Spain is not only a base for medium-range rockets and bombers but is also a supply base for operations in the Middle East. It may at times be easier for us to deal with a single country than if such operations had to be conducted through the NATO Council. So in a sense here again a bilateral arrangement has proved to be rather more effective.

(b) Whether as a base Spain will continue to have the same importance for us is an open question. As you know, the intercontinental type of rocket operation is becoming more and more practical, and the bases abroad are becoming more vulnerable. We are probably going to be in trouble with Libya. We have already lost out in Morocco. And how long we can maintain the present position in Spain is an open question. It may all have to be moved out into the ocean. Whether onto submarines or onto surface vessels Spain may lose much of its strategic importance.

QUESTION: Sir, would you give us your views on the part the United States has played in the Greek, Turkish, Cyprus problem, and, following that, your feeling as to what effect the outcome of the situation will have on the NATO alliance.

DR. WOLFERS: I do not know whether it is recognized in all the NATO countries how serious this struggle between Greece and Turkey might become. There is no question in my mind that a key position in NATO is in danger. After all, Turkey is one of the pillars of this NATO system. We can hardly dare to get into a fight with Turkey. But it would also be difficult, of course, to line up against Greece. Therefore, we have a tremendous interest in preventing a direct clash between Turkey and Greece, in which case we would probably have to take sides, if only because the Soviets would probably take sides. At the moment it looks as if the Soviets were leaning strongly toward Makarios, and that means Greece. They would not mind a pincer movement on Turkey. That pushes us over to the Turkish side, with very serious consequences for our relations with Greece.

I do not know what we can do. I am not sure whether NATO is really prepared to put a NATO force into Cyprus. The French immediately said that they would abstain, that they did not want to get involved. I can see no sign that other NATO countries want to be involved. So it comes down to either some U.N. solution, which is always of doubtful value to us because of the conflict within the U.N. between the East and the West, or it will eventually have to become an Anglo-American operation.

It is not something pleasing to contemplate, since the Turkish minority is really in a very dangerous position, and I do not know how long Turkey will stand by, with its navy right off the shores of Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriots expel the Turks or mistreat them. After all, the Turks drove the Greeks out of the Near East, and it

is quite possible that the Greeks might think that this was the time for revenge. But that does not make it more pleasant to contemplate. It is a very bad situation.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment upon the effect of our relationship with Israel on our relationship with the other Middle Eastern countries and the advantage that this may give Russia?

DR. WOLFERS: You do seem to want to take me from one American dilemma to the next. Except for the Turkish-Greek one, I think our worst dilemma is posed by the Arab-Israel conflict. If you look at that area you see how weak our position is. The Arabs are blinding themselves to any soviet threat, which in fact has never really materialized for them. They are concentrating on what they regard as the Israeli danger.

Nasser, who might unite the Arabs and might make Egypt a relatively powerful country, is concentrating entirely on Israel, but is still much weaker than Israel. One can understand why they concentrate in that direction if they cannot come to terms with Israel, which they do not want to do.

So here we are in a very tough position. We can side with one or the other party, which then means that what we get is another enemy. We do not get any real supplement to our strength. Again, it is one of those situations where all our effort has to be diplomatic and an attempt to moderate the conflict in order to prevent it from degenerating into war. As long as it does not degenerate into war these countries, after all, remain free, if ever there should be a soviet invasion to move in the direction we would like them to move. But, once they are in war, then we are on one side and the Soviets on the other, almost inevitably.

QUESTION: Sir, I may have a military mind, but something you said rather worries me. This is the fact that we are facing a militant ideology and more particularly a dictatorship. Throughout history, when a dictator thought that he could move, he moved. The only thing that is keeping the U.S.S.R. from moving right now is our strategic force which does today, and I think will in the future deter the Soviets. What you said, sir, is that we cannot use our counterforce. I think the only reason the Russians are not moving is because they think we might use our strategic force.

DR. WOLFERS: Well, what they do think is that we might go into a war. I do not think Khrushchev assumes that we could disarm him, but he does not want even a part of that. The Soviets are surely very much scared of the American nuclear force. They are scared of a nuclear war. There is no question about it. Everything they have achieved goes by the board, whether we strike effectively at his counterforce or only at his cities. This will be the end of the rise of the soviet industrial system, and now, with China on his rear, he certainly has no desire to give over Siberia to the Chinese.

So, you are quite right. It is still our strategic force that is holding him under control. Moreover, he has internal weaknesses, his conflict with the Chinese, and his difficulty with the satellites-- and the strength of the NATO shield forces is considerable, too. If the Russians got involved in any big fight with us, it is not out of the question that the West Germans might take East Germany or even more.

So he is not in an invulnerable position, he is in an insecure position. He may talk about dominating the world but I think Khrushchev is very pleased if he can hold his own. But this does not mean that we are safe, because, while he has to hold his own and struggle to hold his own, he takes advantage of any weakness that appears, and, if there is a Greek-Turkish war where he could profit by giving assistance to the Greeks, probably in a subtle and not open fashion, and if he can weaken Turkey, it will relieve his position immensely, so also if he could split NATO.

These conflicts do not facilitate our position or make it safe, but I do think we have succeeded in making North America relatively safe from attack. I think we have also made Europe relatively safe from nuclear attack. Therefore, we have achieved something. But there are still a lot of vulnerabilities of which the Soviets can take advantage.

QUESTION: Dr. Wolfers, the Philippine Islands appear to be one of the more pro-American and more solid-citizens island groups that you have mentioned. Do you see them as a major anchor for us, for our Pacific plan?

DR. WOLFERS: Surely, until quite recently we could regard the Philippines as a very important position. After all, what we need usually are harbors and bases and supply depots, and all that

kind of thing. As long as the Philippines were reliable and safe this was important. Now, as you know, in recent months or so, even that position of ours has become somewhat more shaky. At the same time that Pakistan alliance became more shaky, the Philippine one became more shaky too, partly because they have caught on to this nationalistic desire to be liberated from their protectors, partly, however, because of the Malaysian issue. So that things do not look as good there. If things turn badly in southeast Asia, one cannot be sure whether the Philippines might not seek refuge in neutrality. I do not think the danger is acute now, but it is curious that there is no position any more where one can say that it is 100 percent on our side. I would say that of Spain, I would say it of the Philippines, I would say it of almost any other country. There is everywhere the temptation of neutrality, there is the nationalistic, popular sentiment, which resents the overlordship even of a benign overlord like the United States. There is the fear of the growing strength of China in one area or in another. All of these operate against us, and we have to make up for all of this in some fashion.

QUESTION: Sir, with respect to the friendly nations, and also the nations like the Philippines, do you think that we should perhaps change our doctrine and promote the doctrine of neutrality for younger countries?

DR. WOLFERS: I have been in favor of that in some instances. Maybe it is a prejudice of mine because I was born in Switzerland! I think we could have done better with some countries if we had not tried to press them into alliances or alignments. After all, this country was the best example in history of a neutral country. For weak countries and emerging countries, neutrality does give some protection. It puts less pressure on the domestic situation and it provokes the opponents a little less than it does if they line up with a major country.

Now, it is hard to say which ones should have been left to be neutral. But we would never have wanted Yugoslavia to be neutral if she had not decided for herself. The same is true for some of the other countries. We wanted them all on our side and we wanted them definitely lined up with us. We pressured them as much as we could. The result is a lot of neutrality all over the world.

For us it creates difficulties. Neutral countries do not allow us to have bases. Neutral countries do not give us any kind of military support.

QUESTION: Doctor, do you foresee Japan ever returning to an attempt to move toward seizing power in the Far East as they once did before World War II?

DR. WOLFERS: The first answer is that there is not much of a vacuum into which Japan could move because the Chinese are there. But I think Japan eventually will catch on again to the fact that she is potentially very strong. I would not be surprised if China went on having internal difficulties, and if Japan were to rise again to the position of the major power in the Far East. It is a little early to predict that, because she has moved very slowly. Industrially she has moved fast, and, of course, all of her neighbors are aware of the danger of Japanese expansion and would not look at it favorably today. But eventually, if opportunities offer themselves, and if the Japanese really get back on their feet, also militarily, I have no doubt that she is potentially a great power.

QUESTION: Sir, do you visualize that we can give up any of our alliances or guarantee relationships today, particularly those that are not really worth while without losing face before the entire world?

DR. WOLFERS: It is a very difficult thing to do. That is the trouble about alliances. They all get linked together by the fact that, if you drop one ally, all the others begin to get scared. But, of course, some of these alliances may simply fade away, as they are already doing. We may find that we have a lot of alliances on paper but very few allies.

COLONEL AUSTIN: Gentlemen, today we are the proud possessors of 5 hours of Dr. Wolfers' life. As you know, he is going to be in our special discussion groups and also with us for lunch. Then he goes to New York, where they become the beneficiaries of his time.

In addition to thanking you because you have come to help us, we note that you are 72 years young, Dr. Wolfers, and I think that the entire group here joins me in expressing the hope that the United States and the free world for many years will be the beneficiaries of your outstanding contributions. Thank you very much.

(16 Apr 1964--7, 600)O/syb:pd