

**WESTERN EUROPE & THE FREE WORLD**

Dr. Harold C. Deutsch

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF on 4 March 1964.

**INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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Western Europe and the Free World

27 February 1964

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
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Reviewed by: Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF Date: 4 March 1964

Reporter: Albert C. Helder



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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

WESTERN EUROPE AND THE FREE WORLD

27 February 1964

COLONEL LEOCHA: Gentlemen, this morning we turn our attention to an area of the world in which the United States has fought two major wars, and in which we have been engaged in most entangling alliances.

As you have noted from our speaker's biography, he is a respected scholar and has had considerable personal experience in Western Europe. As a matter of direct interest to our talk today, he has just returned from a ½-year stay as a visiting professor at the University of Berlin. This morning we will learn much about the growing political and economic importance of Western Europe, and about some of the indicators of its future.

As another aside, you all remember from his biographical sketch, he has been a visiting professor at the National War College in 1948 and 1950. I hate to say it, but he asked me as soon as I got into the car, "How did the ballgame come out?"

It's a pleasure to present the Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Minnesota - Dr. Deutsch.

DR. DEUTSCH: Admiral Rose and Gentlemen:

It is really no exaggeration to say that it's a great thrill for me to be here again this year. One of the aspects is, whenever I visit a war college or the Industrial College it is to me like a real shower bath; it's not so much the experience here when I'm dishing it out to you, but later on when you meet with the representatives of committees and they really put you on the griddle, and you have to examine all of

your easy assumptions again. By the time you're through here you really feel that you've not only been taken over the humps, but you have actually done a lot in clarifying your own ideas.

The other thrill that was just alluded to here, having played on the War College team in 1948 - and almost having played in 1950 but unfortunately I developed a Charley horse just before the game came on - and both times having suffered humiliating defeat; at one time, Admiral Hill who was an amazing player almost pulled it off in the 9th Inning as I recall; in any event, to learn that they have actually won once over there is a great satisfaction. I suspect, however, that in view of the past record this will be a rather passing experience.

Now, history may well record that the early '60s will go down as that period when you had the final aspect of that erosion of a bi-polar world that has been going on for the last 10 or 12 years. 1950, as most of you can remember back that far, this was a very common term; you always heard of a bi-polar world. In the late 1950s it was going out, and it certainly is out completely now. I needn't emphasize to you how we've had on both sides a deterioration of that dominant position; on the Soviet side, of course, first of all the great rift with China. But then, also from our standpoint; from the standpoint of what we're dealing with this morning, the equally and perhaps more important erosion of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, which is so evident, for example, in the conduct of Rumania during the last year. This has really taken on rather startling forms.

Then, on our side we needn't be told how the emergence of Europe as

a major decision-making factor in the Western Alliance has changed the picture from so many standpoints. Though we began the century - and it need hardly be told - from a Europe-centered world, down to World War II it is hard to believe now, looking back on it, that Europe was the center in so many respects of all world power. It was certainly the center of all military power on land. Outside of Europe there were only three factors that had any significance at all, militarily speaking - the American Navy; certainly not the American Army - but the American Navy, the Japanese Navy, and the Japanese Army. And that was the end of it.

That was the only military power which existed in any form outside of Europe itself at that time. As you know only too well, Europe has for all the modern period been the exporter of virtually every ism we've ever encountered; some of them we like and some of them we don't like, but every one of them has come from Europe in one way or another. And you recall how world politics were really exclusively European politics - at least outside the Western Hemisphere - and no one else seemed to count very much. And I needn't emphasize how, in the economic world, where you are so interested, Europe was the world's banker, the world's main investor, and also then - and up to a certain point - the world's main insurer.

Now, by far the most important result of World War II has certainly been the completion of a process in which the two World Wars were only symptomatic, and which involves the eclipse of the European states. I say "states," because obviously with the re-grouping of Europe the larger

combinations are still a growing significance. The individual European states passed out as major power factors of the world as a result of World War II. And you may recall vividly, though it's hard to believe now, how Europe in the late 1940s was ⁱⁿ something like an economic and political shambles; how, militarily, it had lost all significance. As late as 1950, five years after the war, the only really combat-ready Army in Europe - an Army of any significance - was the Swiss Army; a hard thing to imagine at the present time.

You recall that the United States was dragged into the picture struggling; we certainly didn't like it and wished we had the hope of escaping it. But by 1948 we had been forced to give up those compulsive illusions to which we had given more than lip service after the war. I, in fact, think of that period - 1945 to 1948 - as being for the United States a kind of "Age of Compulsive Illusions." We just didn't want to believe the international facts of life; we wished to believe that we could dump our troubles in the lap of the U.N. It may startle you to have me say so, but in my view - then and since - the enormous American enthusiasm for the U.N. in the late 1940s, or should I rather say, the late middle '40s, was, in my view, a kind of neo-isolationism; we thought we could wash our hands of international responsibility, dump it into the lap of this organization, and be able to concentrate on our domestic interests.

The second of the great illusions was, of course, our belief that if we only tried hard enough it was certain that we could arrive at some kind of modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. We simply refused to

believe during the war that there was any likelihood of a different outcome; we felt that we had to believe it and that it was our duty to believe it. I'll never forget how, in 1943 - a time when I was serving with the OSS - we had close connections with the specialists in the State Department dealing with international analysis. We used to have evening sessions with our friends over there; most of us were professors. One evening several of them came over - and this was after the visit that Secretary Hull had paid to the Soviet Union - and in a rather wry way told us that the Secretary had called together all the Desk Chiefs and principal figures in the department, and made them a speech which began with - I think this is an exact quote - "Gentlemen, the age of power politics is over." I needn't dwell on the fact that this proved to be just a little on the optimistic side.

We felt, of course, that as a nation it was our duty to believe well of our ally, and we tried to erase from our mind all that we had learned about our Soviet associates as they now had become. In the 1930s we tried to whitewash everything, and I never can forget how in, I think it was March of '42 there appeared an issue of Life Magazine, which only the extreme American Right would call "communist-oriented," and which was devoted entirely to the Soviet Union - as Life often does with a single issue. You had articles dealing with education; the role of women; and with agriculture. And one principal article on the role of government had a reference to the famous - at that time it was the MVD, the secret police force. They said there was a man named Beria who was the head of this force which was a state police force "similar to the

FBI." You can imagine the squirmings of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover when he read that one.

A third illusion was that we would be able by, for example, bringing France into the German occupation picture, to make of her a real make-weight as against the Soviet Union. And clearly, while France in the last couple of years has certainly recovered tremendously in her relative weight on the international scale, at that time thinking of it as something that could develop in a decade or so after the war, this was also a supreme illusion.

Now, I won't review the Soviet actions that you all know about, which forced us to face these facts, especially in the Year 1948 with the taking over of Czechoslovakia by communism, and the Blockade of Berlin. I'll also not deal with the long, and to us in many respects, satisfying and reassuring story of the Western return. I always feel when I have my moments of depression, when, according to the view not only of myself but to many of us, the weaknesses of democracy in dealing with international affairs are again demonstrated, and the strength of a dictatorial regime there is emphasized; that here is the great reassuring memory that the way in which the democratic world responded in the late 1940s in connection with Berlin, and the immediate response of President Truman at the time of the invasion of South Korea; that this does demonstrate that when a democratic society at last realizes what's at stake - and I think this is especially important in connection with a war situation.

My favorite lecture that I give for audiences of different types

in both Europe and America, deals with the relative role, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy and of the dictatorial form of government in World War II. My view is that democracy has it all over the other forms. So, we have again this experience when we finally were sufficiently ahead to know what was at stake we did respond with a determined, and on the whole, very successful fashion.

So, the New World, then, by the late 1940s, was definitely committed to the saving of the Old. And in the pursuit of that policy we particularly developed two lines of action. One was to support every serious move in the direction of European integration, and secondly, to support also, in a somewhat less complete fashion but pretty much in tandem, the development of a broader Atlantic association.

Now, the former, of course, has always moved a good deal faster, partly because the Europeans wished it that way and partly because we were satisfied with that development. First of all, there was the fact that many of the Western problems were peculiarly European and had to be solved in large part on the European basis, by Europeans, and so it was natural that they should have special instrumentalities and common institutions to do the job.

Secondly, Americans, of course, find it awfully easy to be as Adenauer once called us - and he wasn't being ironical; he was being complimentary - "the best Europeans." Because, naturally, it doesn't mean any sacrifice of our sovereignty insofar as we encourage a purely European development.

A third factor was that the Europeans gradually came to realize

that only by closer association among themselves would they be able to represent any really significant decision-making factor in the Western Alliance. They have had two shockers over the years; the first of these you will recall was Suez in 1956, and Adenauer at that time made it very clear that this showed that no single European power, or even any two European powers could hope to deal with any situation where the Soviet Union was on the other side, unless America was willing to back them up.

The second great shocker was Cuba in October 1962, which, of course, also represented a great tonic to the Western World. But it shocked the Europeans once more with the realization that in some respects American interests and their interests were not absolutely 100% of the same type and that we would, on many occasions, be obliged - we had no choice - but to act without consulting them at moments which involved the real problem of peace or war not only for us, but also for themselves.

So, this has helped, especially the second of these shockers, to move the Europeans faster along the line of developing their own institutions. Incidentally, in connection with Suez we might have had no Common Market at all, if it hadn't been for that. It was because of Suez and the effect of Suez psychologically, that the Europeans hurried-up their negotiations and arrived at the Pact of Rome early in 1957; a pact which was developed so quickly that in the last night the experts worked through the night and Adenauer the next morning made some rather wry jokes about the fact that the statesmen were signing an instrument which none of them had ever had a chance to read; it was put together so rapidly during the

last couple of days and during the previous night itself.

Now, in this whole story a very significant factor also is the development of nuclear power, which has, curiously enough, had exactly opposite effects. Obviously, in the late 1940s and early '50s - and into the late '50s - the development of nuclear power emphasized the role and the dominance of the two great giants, the United States and the Soviet Union. That has been completely reversed since, and nuclear power's development in the last five or six years in many respects has helped to bring about and speed up that erosion of the bi-polar system about which I spoke in my first words.

In the first place, of course, having more fingers on the trigger; more members in the nuclear club, the decision of using nuclear forces is no longer a Soviet and American monopoly. And the second feature here is that the growth of our own hitting power - the very power of the Americans and the Soviets along these lines - has made, as you all are aware, the use of that power less credible, and in consequence there is the greater development of other means of pressure, whether military in connection with possible war on land - whether conventional or something else - whether economic; whether diplomatic propaganda; every other means of pressure that men have used in international relations, has become, again, more important after having been eclipsed, almost totally it seems, in the early 1950s. Because, with the little chance of the use of nuclear power itself, these other means again assumed greater reality.

Europeans, also in connection therewith, felt a lot less sure about

our willingness ultimately to use that weapon; to press the trigger when it involved their fate, and there wasn't yet an absolute certainty as to the question of the existence of New York, Washington or any other major part of the United States.

All together, then, this has changed very drastically the position of the super-powers. Another factor too, has been the very sad failure of the West - in my opinion, the greatest failure of the West since the war - in arriving at anything like a common Western policy with respect to the control of nuclear instruments. That is a long, long story which I will, again, skip over virtually entirely. But, you know how we Americans have to take a great deal of blame for that; how we ignored the problem as such right down to the Year 1960. It wasn't until 1960 and the Norstadt Plan that the Americans for the first time were willing to face this issue. We always acted as if we could take it for granted that the American monopoly would last forever. And the consequence of this has been that as the Europeans have secured greater influence and power, and more weight in every respect - internationally and especially in inter-Western affairs - they are bound to go off on their own particular lines here.

By 1960 the best opportunity to handle this problem was gone. And not once had the Western states in the 1950s really gone to the mat in connection with this question. You've heard the reference to some situations in history that they ought to put the statesmen into a room and tell them they'd have nothing to eat or drink until they had arrived at a solution of a particular problem. If there ever was an issue in world

affairs where this would have been in order, in my view it is in connection with this problem; that somewhere in the early or mid-'50s - or, at the very latest, shall we say between '56 and '58 - we would have done that with the Western statesmen.

Now, by 1960 two things that were conceivable as means to this end have passed out of the picture. In the first place, the Americans were no longer in a position where they could, if necessary, impose a solution. Then, too, at that time, we could have from the consequences from the standpoint of dissatisfactions in the Western Alliance, if we had known exactly what we wanted, imposed virtually any kind of solution upon our allies. Also, we could have won them to various solutions which are a lot better from our standpoint than just letting everybody in the Western Alliance develop his own nuclear power.

By 1960 it was no longer possible with something in the way of a moderate concession, as I see it, like the Norstadt Plan, to satisfy the Europeans on this issue. It has been a matter, then, of too little too late. In my own view I will say quite frankly that I regard the NLF essentially in that category.

I don't know if I'm going to have time; I've been warned that I have to stick to my 45 minutes. But at the end if I do find that I have time to discuss that I'll be very glad to do so. If I don't, I'll be very glad to have you ask questions. That's one way in which the speaker can extend his remarks a little bit, by hinting to the audience things he'd like to say but can't because of lack of time. If you refer to them you'll give me an excuse to cover some of these things that I'd

like to deal with but can't do within the time assigned to me.

Well, what I've dealt with up to now is obviously essentially a background against which the problems of the European and Atlantic Communities must be assessed. Here on the European side the tying in very closely with the Atlantic side is the development of the Common Market as the climax of the U.S.-sponsored effort toward European integration. Close-up observers from the first were aware that this was not entirely just a golden promise; that it involved, also, very serious, even deadly, threats.

We realized from the start that it could on the side of improving the Western position, mean economically that Khrushchev's famous boast of burying us would become about the silliest one that anyone has ever uttered in history.

There is a story that we don't talk so much about nowadays, which at the end of 1962 was a very thrilling one; the way in which four years of development of the Common Market had represented probably the greatest leap forward in a large area of the world - economically speaking - that human history can record. Some of you may recall the estimates made in 1952 that if the Common Market continued to develop the way it was, by 1964 you would have a situation where you would be even at least - or perhaps a little ahead of where you would have been if you had had no World Wars and if the growth rate of 1913 had continued. Now, that's really a startling thought. In 1964 you would be just where you would have been if there had been no World Wars to set Europe back, and if the situation as of 1913 had just continued at that rate.

So, here you then had a situation where, from the Western standpoint, the outcome was virtually inevitable. Under these circumstances you had for the first time a large part of the West demonstrating a larger growth rate than was the case with the Soviet Union; not as before in a positive sense a greater growth, but a larger growth rate percentage-wise, which had not been the case at any period since 1945, where the European and American bloc together represent about four times the economic potential of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc.

Here, certainly, in the Common Market there could be the core for Western unification. Here you have the famous plan of President Kennedy to utilize the Common Market, to build, first of all, a larger European combination - add Britain and the EFTA states - then, perhaps, eventually some of the neutrals in Europe, and then tie this in in some kind of partnership, not our joining the Common Market, but a partnership on an Atlantic basis. In 1962 this seemed to be a fairly realistic assumption.

Now, against all this golden promise you had also, as I said, a deadly threat. There was the danger of the disruption of the Western Alliance over economic or political issues in the process that I described. There was danger of economic civil war. Now, while we realize that these were conceivable, we really couldn't take them very seriously. Remember that at the end of 1962 and early 1963 we felt that here you just couldn't afford to fail; that somehow you had to succeed; that a remark made by one of the European statesmen - I wish I could recall which one - in one of the major Common Market arguments over agricul-

ture, was to his colleagues, "Gentlemen, we are condemned to succeed." In other words, "We have no choice. No matter how painful it may be in the way of individual and national sacrifices, we must solve this problem; we just cannot afford not to have it solved."

And so, it was, you might say, really the roof falling in for the West when, in January of 1963 you had the De Gaulle veto at Brussels which rudely interrupted this development and made it for the future completely questionable. So that, by the end of the year that had begun with so much promise, where you felt that you couldn't possibly fail because you couldn't afford to fail, remember the press in America again and again raising the question in the early part of the month of December - only two months ago - "Is the Common Market finished?"

Well, these agricultural negotiations had been going on then, and would these negotiations break down and bring the dissolution of the Common Market, and perhaps with it a great deal more; certainly, the collapse of the German-French entente, and perhaps even the collapse of NATO. A chain reaction of that kind seemed likely to occur at that moment.

Well, we have arrived at a modus vivendi here - or the Western Europeans did - with a great many question marks remaining for the future.

Externally, of course, the issues have looked largely economic. In the discussions last December you had, first of all, the everlasting, always reappearing agriculture question, and secondly you had the problem of the European attitude in the coming Kennedy round. Remember how

the two were linked. Actually, especially in connection with the latter, in the linking of the two it is my view that political and psychological factors have been more determining than just the selfish economic interests of the countries concerned. It's inevitable that the discussion at this point should revolve around the role of Charles de Gaulle. No one, surely, has shaken the dry bones of the world as much since the days of Adolph Hitler, as has been the case with this remarkable figure - remarkable in many ways.

He has been called everything, within the last year, from "mutineer against the West," to various unprintables that are uttered at American cocktail parties.

In the day of mass-dominated culture - and that's a phrase that you meet all the time nowadays, - it has really been one of the most startling things that we've had to reexamine the problem of the role of the individual. We had assumed that the individual as either the hero or the villain was passing out of the picture. The determinist school of history was more and more demonstrating its reality. But in the case of Charles de Gaulle one really has to wonder about this.

Among historians in the last year in particular, there has been a good deal of raising of the question, "Will we not have to somewhat reassess that whole problem?" I, on the whole, would say that while this may have been the decisive element in connection with some of the issues of the last year, that in the end, De Gaulle could have done nothing if he hadn't represented forces and tendencies that are very real in the European picture of the present time.

It reminds me of a famous remark of Bismarck who was the coiner of so many remarkable dicta. He said, "The role of the individual is usually much exaggerated. The individual, no matter how great he may be, as a statesman, for example, can do nothing more than listen to the footsteps of God through history and grasp a corner of his mantle as he rushes by." In other words, the statesman, if he's going to be really effective, has to basically conform to the trends of the age; he cannot really expect to take the current of history and turn it off into a completely new direction by himself.

And so, while Charles de Gaulle's part is really very remarkable - and perhaps decisive - it clearly could not have been anything like it has been in the last year or so, if he had not represented and utilized forces which are real and which exist actually in the European and the Western picture. Now, in many ways, obviously, De Gaulle is a man of stature, quite aside from being the right figure for an American basketball center. He's a man capable of big thinking; a man who sometimes has a disconcerting simplicity in his thought.

He has been accused of having a mind either in the distant past, or the far future. I think that isn't true in the sense that De Gaulle isn't customarily aware of the basic realities of the present time. On the other hand, I think there is much to this remark if you consider it from the standpoint that he is dominated by a sense of the history of France and he lets this conception of the past history of France in large measure dictate his own actions and directions.

Secondly, he's a man who thinks of the future as something which is going to justify his whole course. They will show that he has

utilized basic forces during the present time, and that he will prove, then, to have been right. And if he doesn't have them now, he will in the foreseeable future be given weapons with which he can carry out his various policies. Certainly, De Gaulle is not blind to the appeal of Europe.

Very briefly I'll tell a story which I hope those of you gentlemen on the faculty who heard me last year will forgive me for repeating. It's really quite significant. In 1958 I interviewed one of the great historians of Europe, perhaps the most distinguished citizen of Switzerland, Karl Borkhardt, who in the '30s had been the League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig, and who had an especially close relation with German opposition elements to Hitler. I visited him at his home near Geneva just at the time that De Gaulle was coming back into power. Naturally, the conversation over teacups came around to the problem of De Gaulle.

I expressed my anxiety as to what this would do to the future of the European unification movement. Borkhardt said, "Professor, I agree with you, this is a very serious problem. Perhaps it will give you some hope if I relate a story that occurred during the war. I visited London twice during the war and on each occasion I saw De Gaulle whom I had known fairly well even before 1939. On the second of these occasions De Gaulle and I were walking in the garden of the villa where he was quartered, and the conversation came to the problem of the future of Europe. De Gaulle stopped, thoughtfully, and said, 'Well, in history, Providence has clearly endowed three Frenchmen with a special

role in connection with helping to unify Europe. The first of these was Charlemagne; the second was Napoleon.' Then he stuck the gravel with his foot and he said, 'Well, we won't go on to the third.'

So, even in 1943 and '44 De Gaulle was thinking of himself as a man of destiny, and of France as the federateur, as he so often calls it. In effect, he says the federator must not come from the outside. In other words, he says the United States must be a European force and clearly he has France in mind as destined for this particular role.

Now, De Gaulle knows that France cannot play that role in either of any of three combinations. They aren't combinations, but three political situations. She clearly can't play it in a situation of isolation. That day, as Adenauer said, is definitely over; no European power can by itself play a major role in world affairs. Secondly, he knows that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to play that kind of role in an Atlantic combination of real strength. In such a combination France is merely one of the bigger little fellows and in no sense can carry major weight.

The third combination, where, again, France is not likely to be too much of a factor, is a big Europe; one to which Britain is joined and those countries which are inclined to follow the British lead. In a case such as that, of course, especially with the British ties outside - the United States and with the Commonwealth - there is a balance against the influence of France that would be hard to overcome.

So, only a Western Continental European combination is the one where France can hope to influence greatly in a major sense, the common institutions. And here the European idea is made, then, to serve the

national interests of France and the notion of a European as well as a larger balance of power. The policies of De Gaulle, I would say, are essentially based and dominated on and by these conceptions that I have just mentioned. And Europe, in turn, and in some measure the whole Western association or alliance, has lived, in the last year, in a situation where everything seems to be dominated by response to or reaction to the way in which the picture was effected by De Gaulle's actions last January.

This has also given new emphasis to the role of Germany, and in the ten minutes which remain to me I'd like to largely dwell upon that. You hardly need be reminded that Germany has been the biggest problem of our century, down to the time when the development of the atom bomb changed the basic rules of international relations. This has been due, as I see it, not to any special character that might be ascribed on the German part. In times of war we are naturally inclined to deal in terms of propaganda that are partly based on reality and partly on just nonsense. The basic feature here is the unique fact that the Germans represent the only major bloc of population West of the Soviet Union, which considerably exceeds 40 or 50 million, that has been standard for the other larger powers of Europe during our century.

It is here you have a bloc of 70 million; if you include the Austrians, 80 million people of German language, culture and a good deal of German tradition, which, being right in the heart of Europe creates on the one side, very great temptations for Germany, and on the other side, such fears among Germany's neighbors, that their reaction in turn stimulates German action and fears and creates a kind of vicious circle

that led to World War I; and insofar as World War II was the result of more ultimate factors, in the role of Adolph Hitler personally, it also can be said to have been the basic reason for World War II. And in both World Wars, as you can recall only too well - many of you served in the latter one - you had a situation where even the combination of the other European powers wasn't enough to take care of Germany; each time, America had to be brought in to redress the balance that had been upset by German action.

The significance of this whole story today is frequently, as I see it, misunderstood. So many people think, naturally here - and that's especially true for the lay public. I think military men understand this much better; that it isn't a military problem now so far as Germany is concerned. German power, militarily, has great significance but is not a decisive factor in itself. The important thing is that this weight of Germany, whether expressed in whatever military terms there are today - or, more importantly, in economic terms, in propaganda terms, prestige terms, strategic terms, etc., especially strategic where Germany is in a decisive key position between East and West. No matter how you figure it, German weight is of vital importance in this picture, and never more so than in any Western combination. In any combination there are hegemonial tendencies. And Germany, having this extra weight, that enters into the picture, of any economic, military, political Western association with which Germany is involved. It creates special problems and combinations thereto.

Now, since 1945 - I'll make it very brief, indeed - the German problems, as I see them; there are so many of them - were all capable

of only one solution, which was the utmost integration between Germany and the West. Clearly, unless you gave Germany equality you couldn't expect long-range cooperation from her. Clearly, equality is only possible if it's a safe Germany with which you are associated. And a safe Germany is essentially one which is no longer capable of her own initiatives which are so tied-in, so almost straight-jacket-bound, on the basis of dignity and equality in the Western associations - European and Atlantic - that she can no longer exercise initiatives on any line and threaten the balance of the world.

So, here is the feature; that in every situation since 1940 has been kept in mind to some degree, but in my own view should have been kept in mind a great deal more than has actually been the case.

Now, the Germans have been thoroughly aware since World War II that this for them too was the salvation. If we had not been interested in Germany as a factor in the East-West situation, and therefore in combination with us, Germany's comeback we all are aware wouldn't have remotely gotten to where it is at the present time. The Germans, on the whole, have been sick of their past political and military adventures and are seeking stability; and for them, the close association with Europe, especially idealistically, because they have felt keenly the ideological vacuum created by the instruction of Naziism and the somewhat trial situation of the restored German democracy, is an important factor.

And on the road to Western associations the Germans have been thoroughly aware that this road has to lead over Paris. You often have heard the phrase in Germany in the late '50s, "The road to Europe for Germany, is over Paris. That ties in very closely too with the problem

of reunification. I wish we could give a great deal more time to that. This problem I think one can't emphasize enough and it always has two aspects. The German reunification problem, as we all know, is an East-West problem. It comes into every situation that effects possible solutions of East-West tensions.

But, it's also a pure Western problem; within the Western family many issues are raised thereby. And for Western Europeans in particular it is tied in with the fact that in smaller combinations the German weight is likely to prevail.

One of the amazing things about De Gaulle's confidence in France - optimism with reference to her future - is that he has been willing to completely reverse the French attitude here with respect to West Germany - and I emphasize the West here. In the mid-'50s, you remember, the French rejected the European Defense Community - the EDC - because they were afraid they'd be left alone with Germany. The British wouldn't come in and one of the major factors certainly was that. The Americans were only on the periphery and they felt they couldn't hold that balance. Well, now, a period eight or nine years later, when Germany's recovery has been stupendous, and has gone much farther than anyone could have guessed in the mid-'50s, you have De Gaulle apparently complacently assuming that France can maintain the driver's seat position, the senior partnership in the German-French combination or condominium in Europe.

On the other hand, even though Charles de Gaulle may, in his nationalist fancy be able to convince himself that France can more than hold her own against a 50-million Germany, I'm sure that he can't possibly

imagine that he can do that against 70 million Germans. He cannot possibly be for German reunification, no matter what he may say officially. And essentially, this is the vital point as I see it, a little Europe; the kind of Europe that De Gaulle has tried to emphasize, means a little Germany. Here is a point that I think we at all times have to try to bring home to Bonn. It will always mean that Germany's prospects for reunification are reduced by just that much.

Now, reunification, as we all know, is impossible without Russian consent anyhow. But even if Russia consented there would still be a Western problem here of great magnitude. For the Germans, therefore, it's always important - and even though I don't believe they realize it fully; last summer I gave about 15 addresses in all parts of Germany, to every imaginable kind of audience, usually on American policy toward Europe and Germany; and I felt there was only, as yet, a dim realization of this very vital factor. For Germany, a big Western association - European and Atlantic - is the only hope for a big Germany. Because, only in such a Germany can the West hope to balance up the German factor.

Now, what of the Franco-German entente? I wish I could give a lot more time to that, and I rather hope that you will raise some questions about it, because I can only say a few things. Now, when this was first established early last year it looked like one of the great, momentous, historical developments of the 20th Century, or all modern times. In historical perspective that's certainly true in this rivalry of so many hundreds of years. Actually, I would say that in the perspective of our time it is not that significant. Because, the Franco-German rivalry and

the rivalry of any immediately neighboring Western European states is an absolute anachronism in the nuclear age. This doesn't make sense and it was bound to be overcome in one way or another within our generation.

A second aspect here that was not quite appreciated at first was that the association had gone too far too fast; it went beyond the realities, and especially beyond the intentions of both parties. As many of you may not be aware, it is probably the result entirely of Adenauer's position early in December 1962, just a little over a month before the treaty was signed. Up to that time they probably weren't even considering a major treaty. It was supposed to be a kind of common protocol or common declaration. But then, Adenauer in "Der Spiegel" affair, in which he had to promise that he would leave office in the fall of 1963, felt that this thing must be nailed down much harder - more fully than otherwise possible - and he was the one who suggested a treaty, and it wasn't until a week before it was signed, that the French fully went along with the idea.

Well, I haven't the time to go into the many disappointments on both sides. The Germans especially, had a let-down feeling in the close association of this treaty, with the veto at Brussels. It made them feel that far from the road to Europe leading over Paris, that road now involves at best a detour and perhaps a blind alley insofar as Europe is concerned.

In Germany there has also, perhaps more than anything else, been a feeling of concern about the French strategic concept. Some of you

may have noted the article that appeared early last summer in the "Revue de France Nationale" - the Review of National Defense - written by the French Minister of Defense, Mr. Messmer. In that he spoke of the basic French defensive concept at the present time. He said that the present forces in Germany - two divisions, nominally, at least, and one Air Corps; eight squadrons, as I recall, that was to be the limit, more or less for the future; everything else stationed in France - he spoke in terms that could only make shivers run down German backs - like a "second battle." That is, a big battle would be in France against a Russian attack; not in Germany.

He spoke of a system of "defense in depth." You can imagine German feeling when you speak of defense in depth, which means that somewhere west of Germany, if it came to a real showdown. No wonder, then, that the Germans agreed to develop their tanks with the Americans rather than with the French. They agreed to that in August.

The French, of course, have their annoyances in connection with the treaty, and once or twice it has almost seemed to be at death's door.

Now coming back for a last word or two about the prospect of Western association. Here, clearly, the problems that have been raised since the veto of January 1963 have made the future far more questionable and cloudy than otherwise. There is the question, we all are aware, especially with the Labor Government perhaps coming up, "Will Britain want to go into the Common Market if the French should change their policy and the barriers are removed?" That deserves quite a bit of discussion for which I don't have time.

The second problem, "Are the Americans going to continue to assume that everything they do for European unification is a good thing; that the all-out support for the Common Market, for example, has really been so advantageous?" You know, there are many doubts in our country that have arisen during the last year.

And the third problem, and the most interesting of all, is the question whether Germany is always to continue to consider that there is no other road for her except the road of the utmost Western integration - European and Atlantic. Germany has acquired a new bargaining position. We all know how Germany has become for us - Bonn, you might say, is the place over which the road now goes to Paris.

The other aspect of the story is that the Germans for the first time since 1945 have an alternative of some reality to full integration; they can play this somewhat adventurous game of condominium in Europe at the side of France. It's not a good alternative for them, but it's a conceivable one. And if the circumstances in the next year or two continue to disappoint and frustrate them, I'm afraid that here there is real danger for the West that the compass of which can as yet hardly be guessed.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

QUESTION: Sir, my question relates to De Gaulle's little Europe concept. Should it become apparent to General De Gaulle that his objectives in the Little Europe concept could not be met, do you think he would be prepared to join in a Big Europe along international lines; or what do you think he might do? Also, what would be your answer if De Gaulle weren't there?

DR. DEUTSCH: Well, with reference to the first part, if De Gaulle were convinced that he couldn't do it the Little Europe way he'd obviously have to seek an alternative. I think that he would much prefer a situation where France is somewhat out-balanced, like a larger European or Atlantic tie-up, than to go the road of isolation. He, of course, again and again threatens, as he did in December, that if the others won't adopt his line he will go the road of isolation. But I don't think he really means it, at least not for any long period. He may be willing to go that for a couple of months or a year or so, hoping that the forces at the time can utilize for his purposes.

But, assuming, as you say, that he were convinced that this couldn't work, then I think it would be simply a problem of the degree of a European combination. I think he would prefer a big Europe and emphasize a Big Europe against the Atlantic combination; not that he wouldn't be willing to continue and enlarge, perhaps, some of the Atlantic bonds. But I think he would still prefer the closest to a Little Europe that he possibly could achieve. He'd be forced to compromise somewhat, but he'd like to get the best deal he could, which would look more like the Little Europe than the Big Europe or the Atlantic.

Now, with reference to the second question about what France would do if De Gaulle were out of the picture, that question, of course, cannot be definitely answered; it's all guess-work. But clearly it becomes tougher as time goes on. It would have been simpler in 1962 or January 1963 to answer the question. As the polls show very clearly, French opinion is only slowly coming around to the De Gaulle concepts. They have made very great changes there. If, at that time, De Gaulle had

gotten out of the picture, and if France and he had not gotten on the record as became the case at Brussels, then I think there would have been no major problem here; France would have gone along, essentially, with the grand design of President Kennedy, as I mentioned before.

Now, with every evidence that De Gaulle is getting away with things; that France is acquiring more prestige; that she is able to reach out into areas like China and Latin America and exercise influence that was undreamed of just a short time ago, it becomes tougher to return to the basic trends that seem to be accepted by the French as well as the Europeans in the early '60s and some in the late '50s.

So, it depends on when this happens. If De Gaulle were to pass off the scene today my guess is that it would be a lot easier to get France back on the track where we would like her, than if he continues for another one, two or three years.

Does that answer your point, Colonel?

QUESTION: Dr. Deutsch, how do you assess Willy Brandt's chances of heading up the Socialist Party's ticket in the next federal election in Germany; what would be his chances of winning that election; and how might German foreign policy change under a Brandt-Socialist leadership?

DR. DEUTSCH: On the first point I think there is no question. Brandt, as you know, has just been made National Chairman in place of the deceased Ollenhauer, and that has reaffirmed his leadership of the party. As he already had been, in the last election, the Premiere Designate of the Socialist Government, his position is stronger now than it was before.

The second part of the question, I recall, was what would be the

chance of a Brandt government in case, as I assume, he does head the party in the next election. Well, of course, much depends on the way things go in the next months. We all know, first of all, that Erhardt is on trial. On the whole, the Germans are giving him a much better chance than seemed possible a year or two ago. During the six months that I was in Europe - most of it in Germany - last spring and summer, I could discern a very definite change in the attitude, and the Germans were also aware of a change in attitude toward Erhardt.

While they hadn't gone along with the Adenauer estimate of Erhardt, which has been quite low, the Germans at least had big question marks on Erhardt and were inclined to debate the Adenauer thesis. However, during the months of May and June last year, particularly that period, you found a more sympathetic attitude toward Erhardt was growing, a feeling that he was probably going to do much better than they had previously anticipated, and they would give him a really honest chance to prove that he had qualities of national leadership, political leadership, competence in international relations, etc., all of which Adenauer had so much brought into question.

Now, if Erhardt in the next year does seem to prove himself, then obviously that election will be in a very different type of atmosphere than if there's a feeling of let-down. If there seems to be a failure or a question as to whether he has been a success it will obviously have a divisive effect upon the Christian Democratic Union - his party - and it will also rather demoralize that party in the election.

On the other hand, if Erhardt does very well, I think Brandt has no chance whatsoever. I would assess Brandt's chances in the next elec-

tion as, well, at the best, one out of five. But circumstances can change very much in the next year.

Your third question was, "What do I think of Brandt as the leader of German policy?" I don't think he would change anything to any considerable degree. As you know, Brandt, on the whole, has been person gratissima with American diplomatic representatives in Europe, Berlin and the West, and there has been a certain amount of uneasiness created by his negotiations with the East Germans in connection with the problem of the access by West Berliners to East Berlin. But on the whole he still enjoys a great deal of confidence and I cannot conceive of his altering any basic lines.

Certainly, on the whole in these years he has been just as strong, if not stronger, than most German leaders, for close association with the United States. I think on the whole Brandt is a man of infinitely more imagination than was the case with Adenauer. I do feel if there, for example, should arise a situation where direct negotiation on the part of Germany, with the Soviets, should appear at all promising, that Brandt would be more likely to try it out. Remember, this is the socialist position - in the early 1950s especially - that Adenauer, and I think they're essentially right here, had never sincerely felt out the Soviets diplomatically, to find out what they would do if the Germans did not re-arm, or if they were only to assume a neutralized position.

That, later on became academic. As you know, the socialists have changed their policy, but they still say with much bitterness that ten years ago this chance perhaps existed and it at least should have been explored. Brandt would have behind him this socialist plea and claim

and it would, I think, incline him more to explore possibilities, as you remember he was inclined to do two years ago when he was invited by Khrushchev to visit Khrushchev in East Berlin and negotiate with him; and he was prevented from doing so by the revolt of the Christian Democratic Union component of the Berlin Parliament.

I hope I've covered a couple of the points that you had in mind, sir.

QUESTION: Dr. Deutsch, to what extent do you think the British opposition to any possible German finger on the nuclear trigger has been a preventive solution of this particular problem? And secondly, what do you consider logical alternatives leading to a solution of - - - -

DR. DEUTSCH: (Interposing) Logical what?

QUESTION: Alternative solutions to the nuclear age taking place.

DR. DEUTSCH: Well, the second point is one on which I was going to talk for about 15 minutes. I'd better discipline myself very sharply now because I could just go on and on on that particular point. I happen to have rather strong ideas, though I by no means feel that I have exhausted wisdom on this occasion.

In connection with the role of the British and their suspicions of Germany, which often take very unfortunate forms, I think it's much harder to make real progress in tying Germany in with the West. I don't know to what degree their anxiety about any kind of German finger on the trigger has dominated their policy in the last year or two. I think it has been somewhat less than other factors in the situation. I think the British leaders are realistic enough to know that you cannot permanently keep the Germans out of the nuclear picture.

If the other major powers of the West, the United States; then Britain; then France, have developed their strengths along this line, it's very conceivable that Germany sooner or later will insist on some kind of equality. And it's so much the better here, as I indicated in my view is the case with the whole problem, that we direct our attention to it on time and don't wait until, as in so much of history, it's just a matter of yielding to reality and being swept along by a situation which you no longer can control; where in fact your chance at initiative has largely vanished.

With reference to the larger problem of nuclear controls in the West, it is strongly my view, in line with the views expressed 11 months ago by Hansen Baldwin and by Henry Kissinger, in the magazine "Reporter," that the only possible solution in the West now which is likely to stick would be a European nuclear force which, while integrated with the American forces tactically, would be essentially under European control from the standpoint of triggering.

It is my view that the Europeans are, in many respects, quite right in feeling that this is not only significant from the standpoint of their own prestige in the decision-making part of the Western Alliance, it's especially important with reference to Soviet policies. The Soviets at present have essentially the prospect of the Americans reacting by pressing the trigger. If they know that this is a general European decision that can be made on the side it may make a considerable difference.

The point here is not what the Americans will do, but what the Soviets think we are likely to do. The Soviets, like the Europeans, have, at times, shown considerable doubt as to whether we will press the big

trigger in defense of Europe. The Europeans themselves, I think, on the whole are much less bothered about the possibility that we wouldn't press the trigger - whoever did, it would be their end anyhow - than what the Soviets think about it. If the Soviets think we're likely not to do it, naturally it encourages an extra adventurous turn in their policy.

If the Soviets know the Western Europeans also have a collective hand on the trigger, then whenever they do something rash in Western Europe they face two possibilities; that the Americans and the Europeans will act; or that the Europeans alone will act. This, then, involves a feature of restraint in Soviet policy in all dealings which concern Europe, which I think the Western Alliance can benefit by as well as the Europeans.

I don't think the Europeans will be satisfied with anything else. I don't think the multi-lateral force will satisfy them. There are questions, of course, about the military value of that force. Some of them are a little more convinced of that now than a couple of months ago where they felt it was just a matter of over-kill again. But it looks as if the multi-lateral force is thought of more and more as one which is merely replacing other possible development of Western nuclear power, as air power is gradually being phased out, you might say, from the picture. In some respects it's certainly more questionable, and some people feel it's becoming gradually obsolescent as a real effective threat against the enemy.

In any event, whether you think it's likely or not, the fact is that all over the world there are people who in the last four or five years

have erected an enormous question mark concerning how useful the Air Force would be in a nuclear war, where they could really strike home. That's the vital feature. What is important in human decisions, as you know, is not what the facts are but what people think they are, or are inclined to think they are. That enters, then, into this particular picture.

So, for the Europeans, then, I think any solution which involves an American veto, like the MLF - a number of us for awhile were inclined to call it the "Multi-Lateral Farce"- this is to them, I think, basically unsatisfactory. The Germans, as we know, have gone along, not with wild enthusiasm, but a certain readiness - which means, of course, a great increase in their own prestige. For those who have been worried that some German future government would get the bit in its teeth and try to develop its own nuclear force, this is a measure of reassurance. And in a third sense, of course, it also provides a greater German voice in all Western matters.

Germany is an active and significant part of the multi-lateral force. It means that in every issue, economic or whatever it may be, Germany has a little more weight than if it is not a part of this kind of combination. But I don't think the Germans any more than any of the rest will be permanently satisfied. Unless they have this situation, as I mentioned, where the Soviets always have to reckon on two possibilities - an American decision and a European separate decision - I don't think that they will feel that they have achieved maximum security along this line.

Now, I may have seemed to talk very long about this, but I've

scarcely scratched the surface.

QUESTION: What would be, in your opinion, the ultimate choice of Britain if she had to choose between European unity or Commonwealth affiliation?

DR. DEUTSCH: Well, my view is that the British made that choice last year; that while they hope to maintain an absolute maximum of Commonwealth association - in their negotiations, of course, they were very tenacious about that - if it came to a showdown they would sacrifice the Commonwealth. They felt that they just couldn't afford to stay on the outside the way that the Common Market was roaring ahead at that time. It seemed fairly safe.

Now, this situation changes as the price, perhaps, becomes less in staying outside. The fact that the British were rejected has forced them to make adjustments in their economic policies that they would not have considered if they felt that within a few months or a short time they would be in the Common Market. These adjustments have, on the whole, gone better than they thought. And the more the British are able to arrive at some kind of a modus vivendi with this situation; that they're able to muddle along without being in the Common Market, the less likely are they to pay a big price such as significant Commonwealth relationships, to get into the Common Market.

That's why I said before that - or at least I wanted to say - that quite independent of a Labor Government, it has become a serious question whether, if the barriers were down tomorrow, next year or the year after, the British would want to go in. That, to me, is most unfortunate. Have I answered your question there?

QUESTION: Sir, it appears each day that Turkey and Greece might enter the Cyprus affair. And if they did, it would appear that since Russia doesn't like Turkey, that Russia might well support Greece. Are the European nations concerned about this problem, and would they take some action?

DR. DEUTSCH: Well, if they aren't concerned, they'd better be.

QUESTION: I've seen no demonstration of their concern.

DR. DEUTSCH: Well, the British, of course, are obviously concerned. At least they are officially still a part of Europe according to the maps; I don't know what De Gaulle might think about it. The Western Europeans at this time have their eyes fixed very much on other things. Germany has her gaze inverted to the domestic political developments that are going on that we alluded to briefly before. There are all the problems in association with the next developments in the Common Market. There is a terrific amount of concentration on the agriculture question. There is the big problem for the Germans of how to balance off a developing association with France and the maintenance of the essentials of the past association with the United States.

De Gaulle himself is reaching out in all directions - toward the Far East and Latin America. They are obviously impatient at being asked to give any attention to this matter, and I surely agree with you that they haven't shown much sign of being greatly concerned. I personally feel that they ought to be much more concerned than they are, and that if this situation continues to develop in the tragic direction that it has taken, this can be for the West one of the greatest trials since NATO was established.

Now, the form it would take; the way in which the Soviet would enter the picture, would, of course, largely determine the next reaction of the West; the degree to which this would be disruptive to the Western association. That depends too, again, upon how the situation is for the Soviets at the time; whether there are other factors that would make them hesitant about calling for another period of considerable tension with the United States and the West, generally. I think there are many question marks here and we can't foretell the development too clearly.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you comment on the significance of the communist minority parties in existence in both France and Italy? Are these parties increasing, or decreasing in influence? And also, in France in particular what would the position be with respect to communist minorities maybe passing out of the picture?

DR. DEUTSCH: How many hours do I have now? This is a tremendously important question, one in which I am extremely interested. Take the case of Italy. We have the fascinating developments in connection with the socialist party joining the governing coalition and now breaking up, in part, with about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the deputies, as I recall - I think it's 19 out of 75 of the Nenni Party; that socialist grouping - breaking off and re-establishing, as they say, another socialist party which is still inclined to play ball with the communists.

There is a very complicated situation there which can develop in various ways; there might be a healing of that breach. In the next local elections the group that has broken off from the Nenni Party may collapse completely and thus cease to be a factor. All kinds of possi-

bilities exist also in connection with the personnel and other relationships within the government itself. There are endless wheels within wheels in this situation.

Now, against this there are also very interesting developments in the Italian Communist Party. The Italian Communist Party is probably, of all Western Communist Parties, demonstrating the most independence of Moscow, and has been during the past two years. Its leaders have spoken out on a number of occasions, especially Togliatti, the principal figure in that party since the war, in a manner which is really rather frightening to orthodox communists.

About a year-and-a-half ago Togliatti made his speech to a convention of the party - or a large gathering of the party - in which he said, "We communists will have to re-examine some of our basic viewpoints." In other words, he was deliberately holding out the prospect of what the orthodox communists call "Revisionism;" development of a revisionism of communism for the Italian Communist Party. This was closely associated at that time, with the complete break - or so it seemed - between Russia and Albania; Albania backed up by China. In my view this was the greatest shock that the communists have had since 1917, in the world; the fact that in this break between the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese, it became clear that there were possible basic divergencies within communist ranks.

The communists, as you all know, ever since they came into existence, have preached as their socialist ancestors had preached in the days of Marx, that socialism-communism was the answer to the problem of war; war was conceivable only in a world of capitalist imperialism; if you had

nothing but communist states you'd have the absolute ideal of peace and there would be merely police forces left in the world. There could hardly be any kind of basic breach, because there would be no conflict of interest between communist states.

Well, now, clearly in this erosion of Russian domination over world communism; the rift with China; and in the erosion of control over Eastern Europe, this has represented some terrific shocks to the communists. The shock was greatest in the Italian Communist Party, and the Italian communists have in many ways specifically said, "We can't be sure of many of the assumptions to which we gave not just lip service, but full conviction in the period of the past."

This has created various possibilities that in the Italian picture can go in a number of ways. In the French picture, while the French communists have lost in influence in many ways recently, the most interesting factor is again tied in with the developments in the Socialist Party - in this case, in the opposite sense. While in Italy the socialists have moved away from the communists - except for this split now; the little splinter group of the Nenni Party - in France the frustrations of the socialist leadership - of Guy Mollet and others - in dealing with the growth of the De Gaulle-directed democracy, they have been so embittered that they are ready now to give a certain amount of confidence, or at least take a chance with popular front tendencies.

I don't know how many of you have followed the story - and it's a fascinating one - of the visit of Guy Mollet, the leader of the French socialists, and of, I think, some 20 or 30 prominent party chiefs, to Russia; their discussions with Khrushchev back and forth. I recommend

to you especially, an article in the Reporter, and another one in the magazine "The New Leader," which report quite fully on this situation; where you have the socialists contemplating a deal with the communists in the election, in which the communists will support a socialist candidate. As you know, last week or the week before, we had the announcement - which was not surprising - that Gaston De Faire, the socialist Mayor of Marseilles, is going to run against De Gaulle in the next election.

Gaston De Faire has been the leader in the French Socialist Party, of the anti-footsie group, you might say, the group opposed to playing footie with the communists and of associating with them. But he has begun to hedge on this. He has fixed his eyes on the next election and of course wants the communist vote. His position is not as clear as before.

Now, I've hardly started talking about this; I've just tried to indicate some of the major possibilities. In France on the whole I think the communists have lost in strength. In Italy they have gained in strength in the last elections. The success of De Gaulle has won him support in fringe groups which were previously on the fence - some voted communist and some did not. But in the next French election there are some very disquieting possibilities, and I would personally regard it as most unfortunate if the communists and socialists do establish a popular front combination.

QUESTION: Doctor, I wonder if you would tell us to what extent, if any, you feel Red China is beginning to make its influence felt on the thinking and internal politics of the Western European nations?

DR. DEUTSCH: The question here is the degree to which I think that Red China is beginning to make its influence felt on the thinking and politics of Western European nations. I would say that the influence of Red China in this case is very minimal. For example, the actions of De Gaulle are not reactions to what the Red Chinese have done or said, but are based on coldly calculated considerations in connection with the world picture and the world role of France. Where the situation in Viet Nam is favorable to France we are assuming some influence in that area.

Certainly, the development of the rift between the Soviets and Red China have been significant in Europe. It has led to a weakening, I think, of the NATO Alliance and other Western combinations because, with the feeling that the Soviets now are busy with China and worried about China; that in some ways as, for example, the test ban, they've indicated a more conciliatory attitude toward the West. They don't exactly want to join us, but they're also not quite so sure they want to beat us. As a consequence, then, the Europeans have a sense of greater security and less a sense of being under the gun than was the case a few years ago.

They're willing to let the bonds with America become looser. They're willing to proceed a little less vigorously along the line of European integration. That, I would say, is not the effect of Red China's actions, but merely the Western estimate of the situation in Asia and between the Chinese and Soviets, which will inevitably play some role in connection with our policy.

This, as you know, has also been a factor in America; a lot of people have said we don't have much to worry about; the communists themselves are split and under these circumstances why should we spend so much on

our military budget; why should we maintain such large forces in Germany, etc., etc., etc. So, for us too this has been a relaxing factor with respect to our vigilance and with respect to being on our guard, as I see it.

COLONEL LEOCHA: Dr. Deutsch, as you know, during the next period, in the TV Room, some of the students will have an opportunity to extend our discussion. However, on behalf of the Admiral and the students who will not be with you, thank you very much for an incisive and interesting presentation.