



THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY

Honorable Harlan Cleveland

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF on 6 March 1964.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
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2 March 1964

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
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ADMIRAL ROSE: There have been all kinds of efforts to establish international worldwide organizations for the peace of the world and other problems, but certainly, no organization in this long history has been supported by so many people and by so many nations as is the United Nations at the present time.

To help us to better understand the United Nations today we have a distinguished American who is a scholar and a man who has had considerable practical experience as a public servant with international organizations. He is also a friend of the college and has spoken here on five other occasions.

It's a privilege to present the Honorable Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Thank you very much, Admiral. Just about 100 years ago today a toast was offered in Paris which cast some doubt on the sobriety of the speaker. It went like this: "I give you the United States, bound on the north by the Aurora Borealis; on the south by the Procession of the Equinoxes; on the east by Primeval Chaos; and on the west by the Day of Judgment."

I'm authorized to say to you this morning that the national interest of the United States is not quite that extensive. And yet, it does seem, in these days of what, I suppose for the purposes of your present course I should call "Conflict Diplomacy," that the peace can't be threatened

anywhere in the world without Americans and their government becoming deeply involved; despite somewhat lesser ambitions than the speaker I just quoted.

In recent weeks the Attorney General has been pouring oil on the troubled waters around Borneo; our representative at the United Nations has been immersed in the tangled dispute over Kashmir; and our Under Secretary of State has been trying to reconcile the irreconcilable in Cyprus. As perhaps you already know, we really started the Cyprus problem. It occurred on the 4th day of July 1944 when a friend of mine who was a Lieutenant j.g. in the Navy, assigned to the OSS, and responsible for ferrying agents and equipment out among the Greek islands held by the Germans, found himself on the Island of Cyprus with 17 homesick enlisted men, and figured he'd better do something for the morale of the troops.

So, they took themselves up on a nearby hill early on the morning of the 4th of July and shot off a few firecrackers. When they had run through the firecrackers that their mothers had sent them they shot off a few rounds of ammunition, and then they started on back down the path to the village in which they were billeted. They were met on the path by a group of breathless Cypriots - the leaders of their village - who wanted to know what had been going on up there on the hill. "Well," the young Lieutenant said, "just a little celebration, that's all." "What were you celebrating," they wanted to know. "It's the 4th of July, one of our holidays." "What's so special about the 4th of July," they kept insisting. "It's just our Independence Day, that's all."

There was a long, pregnant silence. The villagers looked at each

other and finally one spoke up. "Lieutenant," he said, "just who were you seeking your independence from?" There was an even longer silence and the young Lieutenant began to get the idea. He shuffled his feet, looked up at the sky and finally said, "Look, fellows, it was a long, long time ago. But, as a matter of fact, it was independence from the British." "Independence from the British!" The village leaders streaked on back to the village, alerted the entire community, and the Americans, confining themselves to their billets for the rest of the day, tried not to notice that the entire community was getting drunk celebrating our 4th of July. Well, one thing led to another and now they're independent.

Well, these tangled and troubled disputes are only this week's inventory. In another few weeks, one hopes, we will be nursing another set of crises somewhere else. The existing raw spots are plain to see on every continent; in Africa where the Somalis are trying to carve out a piece of what the Ethiopians regard as their territory; where Algeria and Morocco are disputing a wedge of oily sand in the Sahara; where the Congo is under attack by communist-led gangs of teen-agers; where the Angolan nationalists are filtering back into Angola with new arms and fresh determination, and meeting, on their way across the border, some of the Katanga Gendarmerie who are coming back into Katanga from Angola; and where South Africa is courting a really major racial war with its racial policy. And in Latin America where you have the phenomenon of Castro's Cuba exporting subversion and arms, with Cuba itself chronically at the point of eruption, and with Panama still boiling.

Or in Laos where new violence keeps spilling over onto the Plain of Jars; in South Vietnam where the Viet Cong guerrillas must somehow be

contained; in the Straits of Formosa where the Chinese Communists still shell the Island of Quemoy from time to time; and on that lonely and forgotten front - the 38th Parallel in Korea - where American sentries are still subject to ambush by communist infiltrators.

What is it that suddenly happened here, anyway? What is it that creates these big black headlines and activates the small black cars that shuttle us back and forth between the State Department and the White House, often at hours determined by angry men with homemade weapons in some remote corner of the world? Why does there suddenly seem to be so much ugly small scale trouble in the world? Well, one answer, I think, comes readily to mind. In the old imperial system the big nations took care of keeping the peace within their own spheres of influence. That is, there might be big wars among the nations but the little wars were internal affairs. They both had the strength, and, they assumed, the mandate to reach out a large and sometimes clumsy paw to discourage violence among the weaker tribes and principalities.

But this old system by which a few big powers made what we would now call the "peace-keeping" decisions, has broken up, and for a decade and-a-half - during the dismemberment of the old system - the little wars have tended to be held in check by another factor; namely, the fear that local wars might quickly become nuclear wars. But then, skipping rapidly through this familiar history - familiar to you - then came the nuclear stalemate advertised by the quick de-fusing of the Cuba missile crisis; dramatized by the test-ban treaty; and underscored by the unanimous U.N. resolution on banning bombs in orbit.

And so, now, just as the world begins to hope that it's not going to die of a nuclear heart attack, it has suddenly broken out with the measles; a rash of small scale but potentially serious trouble. Ancient resentments and modern rivalries competing with the headlines of the day, sometimes with weapons long considered obsolete - it must have been some kind of first the other day when an airplane in the Congo was brought down with a bow and arrow. And behind the scenes that larger and grimmer competition is still continuing and equally apparent between those who think their interests lie in chaos and bloodshed, and those who think their interests lie in keeping change peaceful.

Thus it is that contrived riots, insurrections by guerrillas, attacks on embassies, and the threats and counter-threats of major regional conflicts, suddenly seem to be coming in dozens rather than just one or two at a time. The alternative to world war, of course, as we always suspected, is not world peace, but a world full of small wars and rumors of wars.

Well, this is all most distressing, to be sure, but why do we have to be involved in it and how do we have to be involved in it? The how is the burden of what I want to discuss today. We were all brought up on John Dunn's observation that no man is an island entire of itself; any man's death diminishes me for I am involved in mankind - he didn't know how to spell mankind very well - but still, do we really have to be so much involved in so many ugly grudge fights here and there around the world, in so many places with so many different varieties of mankind?

The answer, of course, as you know, and as your presence in the kinds of jobs you come from to this college testifies, you know the answer is

yes. Because we're too large and too powerful to hide, or even to stand on the sidelines, because we want to avoid having to use our ultimate power, we have to use our more limited power to constitute ourselves, in effect, the world's leading peace-keepers and peace-makers. If we also seem to be in the middle of crises, the basic reason is that we're not parties to the disputes; that we're not promoting the interests of one rival against the other; that we are, if you will, more interested typically, in these troubles around the world, in procedure rather than in policy.

Our national interest is to try to see to it that the disputes do not erupt in violence and violence into war. This is precisely why we have a special responsibility to exert our national power to bring about a peaceful settlement. And national power can be most constructively exercised, and most effectively exercised, always from the middle of a problem, rather than from the fringe.

Sometimes we forget, you know, how big we really are. Look at it this way; in the past three years, roughly speaking - the three Kennedy years - our gross national product rose from \$500 to \$600 billion a year. That increase of \$100 billion exceeds the total gross national product of 84 members of the United Nations taken together, including nearly all the countries whose frontier disputes and internal struggles for power are creating the headline crises of our time.

So, we're concerned by every breach of the peace because the peace of the world is all too likely to be indivisible. And because if trouble spreads the communists have an opportunity to take sides as a prelude to taking over; as they're trying very hard to do in Cyprus today. We play

some part in nearly every peace and security crisis because we are widely - and on the whole, correctly - believed to have the power to fight or to prevent fighting; to sit on the lid or let the pot boil over; to change or maintain the balance of political power in every corner of the world. And, we're involved because we're among the few nations which have the wealth, firepower, airlift capacity, organizational skill and political imagination to put together an operational peace system for a troubled world.

It's arguable that we are the only country of the Free World that has all of these factors - wealth, firepower, airlift capacity, organizational skill and political imagination, in amounts that amount to the critical mass for the purpose. Even the United Kingdom, which is not exactly a small power, is looking for help in having or conducting a peace-keeping task on a small island which, probably, for the peace-keeping purposes, doesn't require more than about 10,000 troops.

Well, okay; so we're involved. Does that mean that we have to be the world's nursemaid and the world's policeman? Here, of course, the answer is no. Because, indeed, we are so big that it's practically impossible, paradoxically enough, for us to do anything by ourselves anymore. Up in New York they tell a story about a delegate to the United Nations who was out in Central Park with his small daughter, and watching her play on a see-saw. Suddenly, to his horror he saw that his daughter was down at the bottom-end of the sea-saw and the other little girl was on the top end of the see-saw, and his daughter got off.

Of course, the other girl came crashing down. The delegate rushed over, comforted the other little girl, and then took his own child and

shook her, and said, "How many times have I told you never to get off a see-saw unilaterally?" Well, it's a lesson that's not so easy to learn/<sup>even</sup>for some of us who are older. But, peace-keeping requires power. And if we are not going to be the world's nursemaid and the world's policeman ourselves, then we're going to have to build the kinds of international structures that do the police job so that we won't have to do it. And essentially what we are doing in the U.N. these days - leaving aside for the moment the problems of the 85% of the U.N. personnel that work on economic and social problems, aid and technical assistance - but on the peace-keeping side what we're trying to do in the U.N. these days is to build the kinds of peace-keeping machinery that will prevent our having to be the world's peace-keeping machinery ourselves.

Peace-keeping requires power. And if we and other countries are going to lend a small part of our national power for international use in the form of money, logistics support or actual troops, we're naturally going to want to make sure that the power will be used for constructive purposes. This does not at all mean, as some people say these days, that he who partly pays the piper gets to call all of the tunes. And the problem indeed, in U.N. affairs, is precisely that we only control part of the action, but we want it to be parallel to our national policy; that we want to use the U.N. as an instrument of U.S. national policy - U.S. foreign policy, complicated slightly by the fact that it's also an instrument of the national foreign policy of 112 other countries.

It makes sense to work through the U.N. only where the resulting action has an international character. But we still want to make sure that the decision-making process in the U.N. reflects the agreed purposes of

those members which endow the U.N. with its capacity to act in the first place, and which, if U.N. peace-keeping fails, will find themselves responsible for the consequences. One way, we think, to do this, is to use the security council more and first in peace and security matters, and down-grade the General Assembly, which it was the purpose of the Atchison Resolution ten years ago - the so-called "Uniting For Peace Resolution," to up-grade.

A decade ago when the Uniting for Peace Resolution was passed, most thoughtful writers on U.N. affairs wrote off the Security Council as a dead or dying institution. These thoughtful writers are having to think again these days. This winter the Security Council has more business and touches more issues than ever before. Its agenda at the moment - including some items to be sure that are quite obsolete, but that are still on the agenda - contains 61 items as of this morning.

When an issue is taken to the U.N., as happens more and more frequently these days, it's important for us Americans to realize that what the U.N. can do crucially depends on what we Americans and a few other countries are willing to do. When the Indians marched into Goa a year-and-a-half or so ago, you had a certain amount of public comment in this country, "Isn't this terrible? Why doesn't the U.N. do something about it?" The question of whether the U.N. is going to do something about anything is essentially for us a question of whether we're going to do anything about it or not.

I've been going around asking people whether they wanted to go to Goa to protect Goa from the Indians and I have yet to find a volunteer.

My guess is that most Americans concluded about what the U. S. Government concluded, which was that it wasn't a very vital interest of ours, especially since the Portugese didn't really want to fight for it; they mostly just wanted to lose it by military action so they wouldn't create any unfavorable political precedents that might be applied in the really important cases, from their point of view, of Angola and Mozambique.

To decide on the other side that a peace-keeping task should be taken on by the U.N. again doesn't obviate the responsibility for leadership on our part; it just makes the exercise of our leadership somewhat more complicated. The essence of democratic leadership, after all, is never the loud voice or the deceptive air of absolute certainty anyway, is it? Real democratic leadership occurs when the leader maximizes the participation by others in the exercise of his own leadership. The most effective things we do in foreign policy, I think, are those actions which widen the community of the concerned; those actions which associate many nations with the leadership our great power compels us to assume in international organizations.

In the development of international peace-keeping machinery we're re-learning a basic truth about the leader's role, one which we didn't invent, but one which we would hope in our finest hour to exemplify. A Chinese philosopher and man of action, Lao Tze, said it 2,500 years ago and I don't think it has been said better since; he said, "Of a good leader who talks little, when his work is done; his aim fulfilled, they will all say, 'We did this ourselves.'"

Now, we've had a little experience with the peace-keeping business. There have been a dozen international peace-keeping operations since

World War II. Some of them don't tell us very much about the future arrangements for international peace-keeping because they are one of a kind. Such a one for example is the Korean War, where, because people had not figured out yet how to use the U.N. as an international body for peace-keeping purposes we simply got the U.N. to designate us as the executive agent for the world in stopping the communist aggression in Korea. This is probably already an obsolete technique, though you never can tell.

A more relevant technique is the kind of thing that was developed since Suez, particularly in the Middle East - the U.N. Emergency Force - and the U.N. force in the Congo, which is to be phased out at the end of the current fiscal year. The essential lesson to be learned from the history of U.N. peace-keeping so far, which is very short and quite primitive still, is the importance of executive machinery on the ground. That is to say, if fighting starts; if an armistice is broken; if a frontier is violated; if the agreed arrangements for calm are violated, what happens? Do you have a committee meeting somewhere? Or does somebody actually go there and try to stop the fighting? This is the essence of the difference between the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Let me put it in very specific terms. In Southeast Asia, as a result of the world's and the U.S. Government's inexperience with international peace-keeping up to that time, we got involved in 1954 - the then Administration did - in a very bad deal; let's face it. We got involved in a deal that set up an international peace-keeping organization called "The International Control Commission," in the form of what we have come

to call in more recent days, a "Troika." That is to say, a representative of the communist side, a representative of our side, and a neutral. That means that up to 1962, in Laos for example, if there was an incident in Laos that required the attention of the peace-keepers, you had to first have a meeting about it. Then you had to get unanimous consent before anybody could actually go and do anything about it; even go and look at it; even go and find out who shot whom, etc., or how many people were killed, or any of the normal things you'd kind of like to know about the incident.

Even after 1962, where the deal was changed to provide majority rule, that still meant that you were dependent upon the view of the Indian Chairman, for action. In the Middle East, by contrast, after Suez, a U.N. emergency force was set up and the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization, which had been there even longer, has been gradually built up. As a consequence, when there is an incident in the Middle East the peace-keepers without any further instructions than they already have in their mandate, turn up. And there is real technological improvement in the peace-keeping business in the Middle East.

In '47 and '48 you had about a five-day wait for world opinion to catch up with a spurt of fighting, on the average. You'd have a couple of months of talk in New York and then it would erupt again. But again, it would take about five days to quiet down. The most recent incident there, the Israeli retaliatory raid on Syria, starting in the demilitarized zone - which both of them seem to have well-stocked with military equipment - the fighting started at 12:00 o'clock midnight. The

truce supervisors were there in their white jeeps by about 3:00 or 3:30 in the morning; and by 7:30 a.m. that same morning they had a cease fire. Now, this is a certain technological improvement measured by the time it takes to get the cease fire.

In the Congo has been the largest international peace-keeping operation, I suppose, in all history, of a really international character. It is not a very big operation; at the peak it was just under 21,000 troops, which is not really a very big show. But the presence in the Congo, for these months - these three, almost four years now - of this international force, provides, I think, a rich experience which ought to be examined and codified - perhaps by some of you - for future reference.

I went to the Congo twice last year; and let me just suggestively summarize a few of the lessons that leaped to the eye from that operation. Because, I think that in talking about U.N. peace-keeping the best way to talk about it is in terms of the field operations themselves. I talked to all the Generals who were involved in the operation during the past year-and-a-half - and a number of other officers - and the most striking thing was, when I asked them my standard question, which is, "What's different about this operation from what you would be doing as an officer in your own national military force?" The standard answer was, "Well, you see, a peace force doesn't have any enemy and that makes it hard."

As one of the Indian Generals said to me, "If somebody shoots at our soldiers it's a political question whether they should even shoot back." A Malayan General said, "We never had any trouble telling who

was the enemy in the Malayan jungle. If anybody stuck his head out of the jungle and shot at us he was the enemy. But in Bhukabu if I go down the street and somebody shoots at me from the alley, I have to try to remember that he's the fellow we came here to try to help."

Now, this basic notion deeply effects the kinds of attitudes that U.N. troops, or troupes loaned to a U.N. force have to have; the doctrines by which they're trained for a U.N. mission; and the tactics that apply. As to attitudes, the military commanders in the Congo stress the principle of restraint. A peace force, they say, must exercise more restraint more often than regular military units. Even when regular military units are deployed to handle a civil emergency, they say, these units are accustomed to having police and local governments deal with the civil population, with the Army kept in reserve for emergencies, as of course, it was, for example, in a couple of our Southern desegregation cases.

But an international peace force may be projected, as it was in the Congo, into a situation precisely because police and local government forces have broken down or do not effectively exist. Or, as in Katanga, are actively hostile to the peace-keeping objective. This requires a very special restraint, and tactics and techniques developed from police rather than Army training.

For example, when a mob of women attacked the Indian troops in Elisabethville, the Indians were ordered not to fight and took considerable punishment, including slaps in the face, kicks in the shins, ripping off of their epaulets and insignia. At the psychological moment when the mob was beginning to tire of this non-resistance, the Indians were ordered

to counter-attack against the mob, using only batons. Only nine rounds of ammunition were fired in the whole affair, all of them into the air. The Indian Brigadier in charge of the operation told me that in a normal situation of this kind, as he put it - for example, in India - an Army unit brought in to quell a comparable riot would have killed a couple of dozen and perhaps as many as 60 civilians, if a civilian mob had in this manner rushed troops standing on a line.

As to training for a peace force, the commanders emphasize the importance and difficulty of educating U.N. troops never to use the word "enemy" in their operational planning. Thus, a peace-keeping force cannot select a putative enemy and conduct training maneuvers against him. Even if it has to fight in its own defense - the policeman defending his right to walk the beat to which he has been lawfully assigned, as President Kennedy described the Congo operation - the peace-force must think of itself as above the battle in which it's engaged. Its purpose is reconciliation, not victory.

The principle that a peace force can have no enemy has a pervasive effect on its work-ways. The smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol can readily become a major political issue; as the Malayan Brigadier explained it to me, "In a regular war I would be commanding a brigade. Here I have to command each platoon." He had a very complicated communications setup that enabled the lieutenant in charge of a platoon to get in touch with him any time of the day or night, in effect to ask whether to shoot back or not in particular circumstances. Because, out there at the end of the line was where the political decision was really being made on behalf of the world community, the United Nations.

In a peace force, these commanders told me, the commander has to go out ahead of his troops. This used to be standard operating practice, I guess, back in the Middle Ages, when a commander would go out to negotiate with an opposing commander to see whether things could be settled without anybody actually getting hurt. But in modern warfare, I suppose, he doesn't typically get out quite that far and the troops do most of the fighting. But a peace force is not quite sure of the fighting that will be required. It's up to the commander, not the foot soldiers, or even the platoon leader, to try to settle matters without fighting, if it's humanly possible.

Again, the Brigadier commanding the Indian Brigade in the Congo made a practice of going out ahead of his troops and persuading the opposing forces to return stolen helicopters and give up cities, and retire gracefully from the field of battle. And he was remarkably effective about it. "It's remarkable," said the Brigadier to me, "how well the thing works in situations where the other side is not quite sure of itself or of its orders." "If you do something that looks deliberately stupid," he said, "it's sometimes so surprising to others that you get away with it."

At least one commander in the Congo says that when opposing troops run from a police force, the no enemy principle requires the U.N. force to let them get away. He doesn't think this is necessarily a military disadvantage. "If a man has to run away from you," he says, "he will deliberately exaggerate the size and effectiveness of your force in order to look better in the eyes of his own people."

If the U.N. force has a public international mandate, the interna-

tional press ought to be allowed to watch it at work. In the 1961 fighting in Katanga the U.N. forces - I think, stupidly - treated the press as hostile, partly because the lines were so drawn that all the bars were on the Katanga side of the lines, and most of the press men were there too. As a consequence, the press operated almost entirely from the Katanga side, and nearly all the reporting and news photos served to carry Katanga's plan against the U.N. into the international news media.

In December 1962 you had a new crowd of commanders, especially these two brilliant Indians. They let the press come right along with the U.N. advance, once the U.N. decided to respond to continuing attacks by the Katanga Gendarmerie. The U.N. force helped reporters get their stories out over U.N. facilities on a pool basis when the signal capability was strained, and the result was prompt and accurate reporting of events as they actually took place in the field.

Now, there's danger in this kind of openness for any kind of military force. You remember the Chadeauville killing of two women in a Volkswagen was dramatized by the presence of an alert news photographer. They were the only people killed in that whole operation. Nevertheless - and, as you know, it was by mistake - the U.N. field commanders, looking back on it now, say they think that the policy of openness with the press was the best policy, and indeed the only appropriate one for an international peace force.

A peace-keeping force in an underdeveloped area, finally, is drawn deeply into the civil life of the community, which is to say that it's more like our military government experience - our G-5 experience - than

our regular military experience in the last war. Local U.N. units throughout the Congo have found themselves providing leadership, supplies and even transportation to local governments, and even to private firms in an effort to help the local economy get going again. The U.N. forces even had to develop a scale of charges by which private firms can be billed for hauling goods to market in U.N. military vehicles. The danger, of course, is that the temporary peace-keeping unit can too easily become an indispensable prop to the civilian community.

Well, I could go on with examples of this kind; supply and logistics for an international force are extraordinarily complex. The U.N. Congo operation, small as it was, in our military terms, used several different kinds of rifles, 40-odd different kinds of vehicles, three different kinds of fighter aircraft - for a total of about 10 - four different ration scales for troops from different parts of the world. The standardization of weapons and supplies for a U.N. force ought to, in our judgment, have a high priority in peace-keeping planning.

But perhaps enough has been said here to indicate that the experience in the Congo is worth studying if we're serious about working toward a world in which international armament is reduced by agreement and international disputes are not all settled by the primitive test, or war.

How does the American citizen or official, looking out at a troublesome world, tell whether we are making any progress in this business? I'd like to suggest, in conclusion, two gauges of our success as leaders in an effort to calm the fevered brow of international politics. First, ask these questions: Does each crisis leave us better able to cope with

the next crisis? That is to say, does each peace and security crisis leave the world with more and better peace-keeping machinery?

One of the most interesting and creative parts of the kind of work that I'm doing, and that the people in our shop are doing, is in the midst of these midnight flaps over Cyprus or whatever, trying to invent the kinds of international gadgets that will not only be useful in Cyprus but can also be used in another Cyprus somewhere else if it comes up. Because, amidst the rivalries and killings and loud polemics of each crisis an opportunity for institution-building is always to be found.

If we can, in the midst of each crisis, strengthen the international arrangement and train the international people and soldiers to handle efficiently the tasks of peace-keeping and peace-making, we'll be making sure that the next similar crisis is not going to be quite as troublesome as the last of its kind.

The other gauge of our success, I suppose, is whether the same old crisis keeps recurring in the same old form. The criterion, in other words, is whether today's problem - in Cyprus, Somalia, Kashmir or Borneo - it's not whether those problems look tough, it's whether the tough problem we're working on today is the same tough problem we were working on last year. Some of the current crises are certainly hardy perennials; Cyprus is one; Kashmir another. A third is the continuing fight between Israel and its Arab neighbors, featuring this year the Jordan water affair.

But, as we look back at the crises called "Bizerte" or "Suez" or "secession in the Congo," or "West New Guinea," we get some perspective

on the kinds of international peace-keeping machinery needed to handle the current flaps. If we sometimes seem to be carrying the lion's share of the peace-keeping load, put it down to the fact that in the jungle of world politics we are now the lion. So, let's not be too plaintive about the policeman's lot. We know from hard experience, as well as from Gilbert & Sullivan, that the policeman's lot is not a happy one. But we also know that it's an essential function of civilized society and that it can be shared with others if we work hard enough at sharing it. In a troubled world, of course, the beatitudes get scrambled. Cursed are the peace-makers for they shall be called just about every name there is except the "Children of God."

But the hallmark of national maturity, of course, is a citizenry which knows that power and popularity seldom come in the same package.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have there been any encouraging signs that the financial crisis in the U.N. might be resolved in the near future?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, first of all, the financial crisis is, of course, essentially a political crisis. The U.N. is, in some book-keeping sense, in debt. But since the debts are owed to governments; that is, the debt is held in the form of accounts payable to governments, if the governments don't insist on being paid there isn't any financial problem; there isn't a cash problem, that is. The reason for it, of course, is the boycott that the Soviets and their friends have exercised on all international peace-keeping; that the Arabs have exercised mostly

on the U.N. Emergency Force; and the French have on the Congo.

So, the U.N. is now about \$130 million in the red. That isn't very much money in American terms, but it's quite a lot of money in U.N. terms. I think there are some signs that we are about to start a negotiation with the Soviet Union and with a number of other countries, looking to the kinds of changes in the U.N. structure that we want to make anyway; in effect, weighting the influence of the big powers more, in the General Assembly particularly. And our hope is that those changes, combined with a certainty on the part of the Soviets that if they continue their boycott their vote will be removed from them in the General Assembly, under Article 19 of the Charter which says you lose your vote if you're more than two years behind in your dues, this will avoid a major donneybrook on this subject this year.

If I had to predict, I'd predict that there is at least a 60-40 chance that we will have a major knock-down-drag-out fight in the General Assembly this year over this issue. Because, the Soviets will carry it right down to the wire. You know, they always get on a collision course and yell and scream, etc. And only when it's clear that there will be a collision do they veer off. So, our determination is to make sure that they know there will be a collision on this one.

QUESTION: Sir, with respect to U.N. peace-keeping forces, there are two fundamental questions that you haven't directed your remarks to; one, we know that there are no Article 43 PCB stand-by forces that we've had to rely on. Is there any promise for the future that we will not have to maintain this reliance on ad hoc forces and will constitute something that will be more available? And secondly, is there any possibility

that the big nations will be incorporated in these forces in the future?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: On the first of those, the question implies that it would be preferable to have a standing stand-by force. I think our conclusion is that it would not be preferable to have a standing stand-by force; that the Article 43 thing was probably never a good idea, even if it could have been done. Under Article 43 the big powers would have gotten together and developed, in effect, an international peace force. This didn't happen, of course, because the Soviets would never agree to anything under Article 43. So, a number of estimable military officers have cooled their heels in New York over the last 15 years, waiting for that to happen.

I think our conclusion is that it's really better to have a more flexible system, a call-up system, in effect, whereby a number of countries ear-mark national units for immediate overnight deployment. And indeed, both in the Congo and in UNEF, the first battalion got to the site of trouble within 24 hours after the Security Council decision on the subject.

A number of countries - unfortunately, all of them still white countries, European and Canadian - have ear-marked some units for military service with the U.N. Our feeling is that since you don't know what the crisis is going to be, and if you look back on the history of U.N. peace-keeping problems, every one of them is entirely different from all the others; you don't know whether you're going to need an infantry operation, a military government operation - as you did in New Guinea with the Pakistani there - a submarine, some airplanes, or what.

Most of you will recall, probably, how the entire deployed military

force of the world community in the Congo, were pinned down for a period of a couple of weeks by a single Fugumajistere Jet, which, I'm told, is not the fastest jet yet invented, because nobody had thought to send some airplanes. Then they got some airplanes in and changed the situation entirely.

So, our general feeling is, a very flexible system with a mix of weaponry, races and political sponsorship, so that you can mix the mixture any way that seems to fit the particular situation that you want. And if you had a standing force it would always be the wrong force for the actual crises that came up. Indeed, the people creating the crises would probably make sure that their crisis didn't fit your force. So, this is our conclusion, for better or worse, and this is what we're pushing; this is what was in the President's speech in 1961 to the U.N., the ear-marking idea. I'm sorry; what was your second question?

QUESTION: Do you anticipate that the major nations, such as the U.S. and Russia, will ever participate?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Yes. We have carefully kept the door open for big power participation. Indeed, this Cyprus force, assuming it's put together - we're assuming this resolution will get through this afternoon or tomorrow - the core of the Cyprus force will be British and the commander will probably be British. And this is a good precedent. This is what I mean by in each crisis trying to establish precedents that will be useful the next time.

The Secretary of State is very anxious that we don't create any precedents, or we don't create the presumption that big powers - and even

ourselves - are excluded from U.N. peace-keeping. It just so happens that in the last two it has been possible to do it with small power, essentially neutral forces. But, there's nothing in the charter that says it has to be that way, and we're trying to keep it open.

QUESTION: Sir, you commented that the U.S. must necessarily be in on the peace-keeping business because of our wealth, firepower, airlift, organizational skill and political imagination. I would like to ask if you would address yourself a bit further to the organizational skills part. What are the organizational skills? Is there anything peculiarly meritorious about our organizational skills?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, I think the thing that makes us a great country is our ability to organize on a large scale. The definition of underdevelopment is the inability to organize on a large scale. So, this to me is the crucial factor if you have to pick one factor. Of course, we don't understand much about it yet; we haven't theorized very effectively about it; we don't know how to export it very well.

It's a curious thing, you know; we're best at exporting the things we don't have. We're very good at exporting central economic planning - which we wouldn't touch with a ten-foot pole in this country - but the American economists are all over the place handling central economic planning in other countries. But on the thing that really makes us great, which is our ability to organize on a large scale, we hardly have the words to talk about it even. And so, we export bells, buzzers and girl secretaries and techniques, but not very much philosophy, because we really haven't philosophized about this skill of ours ourselves.

I think, myself, that we have been by far the most influential fac-

tor in developing the operational side of the U.N. And I think our unremitting pressure in the direction of administrative effectiveness is the main counter-weight to the kinds of ineffectiveness that are built into a situation where you have to have a lot of different people from different cultures representing different work-ways, speaking different languages - there's a lot to overcome in the way of built-in inefficiencies.

So, I would put the organizational skill point very high, and perhaps at the top of the list of our assets as peace-keepers and peace-makers.

QUESTION: You mentioned national objectives. I'm not so certain as to what the objectives of the U.N. are, other than keeping the peace. Would you care to comment as to the compatibility of the two sets of objectives?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, the objectives of the United Nations are carefully set forth, unlike ours. I think your objective is a little short; it leaves out an awful lot of things in the Declaration of Independence, if you say "containment of communism." Our objective is not the containment of communism; our objective is the exportation of the subversion of freedom. I mean, as far as I'm concerned, it's hardly worth the effort if all we're going to do is contain the communists. Our problem is to undermine them. And we're going to undermine them by making the Free World hum with the contagious noises of success. Indeed, this has now developed in Eastern Europe. The contagion of the demonstration in Western Europe - which, of course, was the product, in considerable

measure, of our Marshall Plan at one stage, is very important.

Now, the combination of philosophies that is captured in the first two articles of the Charter of the United Nations is essentially a modern re-write of Thomas Jefferson. And one of the things that we have going for us in the U.N. is that the principles by which the exercise is going to be developed, and the procedures that are reflected in the charter - and the charter, like any practical document, has four pages of philosophy followed by 40 pages of procedure - are essentially democratic; are essentially in our image. This is why we are relatively skillful, I think, in working at and through this kind of machinery, and why the Soviets are constantly finding that the U.N.'s machinery gets in their way, and that they're not very skillful about using it.

They made every mistake in the book in the Congo. They voted three times in the Congo operation, thinking somehow that a peace force run by Dag Hammarskjold and Ralph Bunche, was going to be somehow for them. Now, why they ever made a mistake like that I can't imagine. Then they got themselves thrown out and they actually left when they were told to leave. It was a phantastic state of affairs. The power was not available to throw them out at that time, but they left because they were told to.

Then they associated their Congo policy with their attack on the Secretary General; they didn't realize that the one thing you can't get away with is attacking the integrity of the organization itself when all the little countries feel that the U.N. is the center of their foreign policy. Indeed, many of the little countries do all of their bilateral diplomatic business through New York; they can't afford to have Ambassadors around everywhere. They do all their business with the other

missions in New York.

And the idea that anybody would want to destroy the U.N. is appalling to them. I don't know why my opposite number in the Kremlin didn't write a memorandum saying so, but he failed to at the crucial moment.

So, I would say that the charter's philosophy in the Pre-amble in the first two articles, is the foreign policy of the United States. That's not a very radical thing for me to say, because the Secretary of State says it about once a week. Everytime he addresses any group extemporaneously, this is the way he puts it. But that includes a lot of things besides containment; it includes other people's human rights inside their own country. And it includes what I call "the subversion of freedom," which is, of course, the most subversive influence abroad in the world.

QUESTION: Sir, if I quote you correctly, you stated "We are too big to do anything by ourselves." Do you believe that 100% down the line, or do you think we should possibly make some exceptions, perhaps like Cuba? If you do believe we should make some exceptions, how do you explain this to your U.N. colleagues?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, I frankly can't think of a situation in which we are even today making an exception to that generalization. The Viet Nam operation is close and our relations with the Chinese Nationalists are close to being done without any really allied or any other structure. But nearly everything we do has to take a lot of other people into account. Presumably what destroyed the Bay of Pigs operation was precisely the cutbacks that had to be made in it for this reason; which raises the question, really, why those cutbacks weren't predicted as a part of the original contingency planning for the operation, which was

very unprofessional in this respect; that all the elements weren't cranked into the planning.

Look at the Cuba thing. What do we do in the Cuba thing? We have the military power to throw a blockade around Cuba any time of the day or night, presumably. But we didn't. We sent the ships on their way and immediately started a very complicated process of what I call "widening the community of the concerned." First there was an attempt to make the blockade a regional action and not a U.S. action; and then an attempt in the U.N. - a very successful attempt - to advertise why these were the actions of reasonable men given the facts as they appeared on those photographs.

Then we got the Secretary General to start throwing international inspection arrangements at Castro. Of course, he didn't buy the international inspection arrangements, but it was the most successful non-sale in history because all the other countries in the world, who had started thinking this was David Castro versus Goliath Kennedy, wound up at the end of the ten days of negotiations between U Thant and Castro, feeling "This fellow is an outlaw; he's thumbing his nose at the World Community; he won't take international inspection." And this, among other things, is part of our justification for the continuation of aerial surveillance of Cuba.

Our aerial surveillance is pursuant to a regional mandate - to a hemispheric mandate and not just to a U.S. action. So, we work very hard at this business of widening the community of the concerned. And no nation that doesn't work hard at it is going to be able to get away with the unilateral action.

This is Turkey's problem today in Cyprus; even though they have the treaty right to invade Cyprus, in effect, it's increasingly clear that it's a very difficult right for them to get away with exercising in the modern world. And I think the same thing can be said for Cuba. The destruction of many other things we're doing in the world, that would be brought about by our invading and taking over Cuba - which I assume we have the military power to do - would be not worth a candle. Cuba isn't really that important. Politically it's important in this country, but in the overall military sense it doesn't have that position in the scheme of things.

I've invented a new principle of <sup>international</sup> political science, which is that every country gets to be pathological about one subject. And if you don't exceed the limit of one you're probably all right. Ours is Cuba these days.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned all these preceding operations that the U.N. has done and which have had a dampening effect on war plans throughout the world. Is there any effort currently being made to put this dampening effect into effect before the fires break out? In other words, in Indonesia and Malaysia, it strikes me that there has been enough noise and enough appeals and counter-appeals so that there might be some excuse for a little preventive maintenance, perhaps. Is there anything along this line?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, of course, in the Middle East this is precisely what there is. It's a force designed to sit on the lid while the political rivalries still continue. In Kashmir there is a truce supervisory organization, international in character, which tries to sit

on that lid.

In Malaysia an arrangement was made by the Attorney General when he went out, for what amounts to a sort of U.N. presence in the form of the Thai Government sending observers in to see whether the cease fire is being violated. The problem is that the Thai Government sort of wants to operate by unanimous consent and that's pretty hard to do. And so, we haven't quite got, in the Malaysia case, the ideal kind of arrangement, which is, if you have people working for the Secretary General who don't have to go around and ask all the Foreign Offices in question whether they can move before they move physically somewhere, and go and look and report.

The great thing about the preventive maintenance, as you call it, the great weapon for preventive maintenance is the klieg light. It's the fellow who goes in and switches on a great big light that gets into the world press, that says, "These fellows are going to cross that border, for goodness sake." They don't have to say it's bad; they just say they are doing it. And the embarrassing effect of that, even to a great power, let alone to a small power, is a very great deterrent in itself. We see this in the Middle East. It's really remarkable how little bloodshed there has been in the last 15 years in the Middle East as a result of the fact that anybody who goes anywhere is observed by international people.

So, we are moving in that direction, on Malaysia. My hope would be that if they're able to make any kind of political deal, that the political deal would include some U.N. presence in the area, so that when it breaks down, as it undoubtedly will, we're then one step ahead in the

chess game; because, you've got somebody who can make an independent report.

Even today in Cyprus, one of the reasons that Makarios has turned down the heat on the Turkish Cypriots during the last couple of weeks is that there is a U.N. observer there who is in a position to provide material for the Secretary General to go to the Security Council and say, "This fellow is turning the heat on his own minority." He doesn't want to let it get to that point because it will destroy his other objectives.

So, this klieg light diplomacy is a very important new factor in the scheme of things, primarily useable at the preventive stage.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does your optimism for the Security Council's effectiveness and approval take into account the potential for the Chinese Communists gaining membership?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, of course, it isn't strictly a membership question, as you know; it's a representation question. That is to say, China is already in the U.N.; it's a question of who sits in that seat. Yes, I think that these international operations obviously have to be under constitutional arrangements that adequately contain the destroyers; the people who are in the organization for the purpose of destroying it. But, it has been possible to build a United Nations system that spends rather more than \$½ billion a year, and is represented now in various functions in practically every country in the world, in the face of destructive tactics, loud grumbling, non-cooperation and financial boycotts by the Soviet Union.

I think there is some prospect that even when, on some basis or other, the Chinese Communists moderate their behavior sufficiently so as

to get themselves into the World Community; that they can be contained in this business. It's one of the reasons that we don't want to get the Security Council to the point where everything has to be done there subject to the veto. But on the other hand we want short of that to be able to use the Security Council with the General Assembly, as kind of a safety valve on the other end, as in the "Uniting for Peace Resolution."

It's not going to be easy. And, indeed, now that the Soviets are showing some preliminary signs of wanting to talk about international peace-keeping, particularly with respect to territorial boundaries - I'm sure you read the Khrushchev New Year's Day message, which is an extremely important document; after you've waded through the first few pages of propaganda it gets to some very important new doctrine toward the end. Now, to the extent that that represents really a decision on the part of the Soviets, they're going to have to cooperate to some limited extent in the development of international machinery.

This isn't going to make things easier in the U.N.; it's probably going to make them more difficult. A fellow who hangs back and won't participate is relatively easy to take care of, just as he was at the time of the Marshall Plan. Just think if they had participated in the Marshall Plan how much more difficult the politics of that operation would have been. And similarly here; if they decide to participate in the U.N. it's going to be difficult.

If they decide - as I believe they are in the process of deciding - that those Americans seem to be able to use the U.N. as an instrument of their foreign policy and all we do is stand on the sidelines and watch it grow, why don't we use it as an instrument of our foreign policy? This

is what I'd be advising them to do if I were advising them, because I think that is what makes sense. They can't get out of it. They are being had in their sort of passive position now. Their only real alternative is to participate vigorously, to, if you will, start conducting a more sophisticated form of guerrilla warfare, which takes the form of getting Russians into the right places in the Secretariate and all the rest of it.

So far, they're so clumsy about this. I mean, they have a fellow, an Under Secretary of the U.N. for Political and Security Affairs. Everybody knows he reports every week to the local Soviet mission, and that every piece of paper that goes across his desk winds up in the Soviet mission. What's the consequence? That he's very influential? Not at all. The consequence is that all the important pieces of paper by-pass his desk inside the Secretariate, because he's disloyal to the system.

So, they're going to have to figure out some way to participate in this thing. And the Chinese Communists, when they come in, will probably go through the same process of first grumbling and sideline activity, and then gradually beginning to participate. It's going to make it difficult, but it also means that in participating they will be in the process of moderating their political behavior. So that, it's going to be a real interesting decade.

QUESTION: We discuss the desirability of peace-keeping everywhere, but on the other hand, newspaper comments on the Cyprus affair claim it was the U.S.' initial position to keep us out of the U.N. in this. Is there some conflict there?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. Essentially what we were trying to do, we were clear from the beginning that it was going to be necessary to bring this into the United Nations. What we wanted to do was to cook the deal first and get the arrangement all set up, and then get a kind of U.N. blessing on it. But the Greek Cypriots, with a British labor lawyer as their legal adviser, thought that they could get the Security Council to take an action which would derogate from the treaty of guarantee.

So, they insisted on going into the Security Council before they were willing to agree to the peace-keeping force. We consequently had to change our tactics and put on in the Security Council a demonstration that the treaty of guarantee could not be compromised by Security Council action. So, that illusion was shattered before Makarios would come around, as he now is, to agreeing to the peace-keeping force.

The resolution that will go through, probably this afternoon or tomorrow, does not destroy the treaty of guarantee, and our position is that the Security Council resolution couldn't anyway, even if it said the wrong thing - and this one doesn't say the wrong thing. Makarios will doubtless claim that it does, for his own domestic purposes. But he will have agreed to the peace-keeping force.

So, the problem in these Security Council operations is always to have the Security Council come in at the time when it can turn on some useful action rather than merely being a place for magnifying and publicizing the exacerbation of passions on both sides. In this one we were able to get part of the way before we got to the Security Council. From our point of view it was still premature when we got there, but we had

to go in on a pre-emptive basis in order to make sure that the procedure in the Security Council reflected the British and our view rather than the Cypriot view.

There is virtually no dispute of this kind that's really dangerous, that can stay out of the U.N. anymore. And I think we just have to assume that there is a U.N. angle to every flap. And there has indeed been a U.N. angle to every major peace and security crisis in the three years that I've been in the State Department, which accounts for not getting enough sleep sometimes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been some Senators who have suggested that rather than unilaterally furnishing aid to the underdeveloped nations we make the funds available to either the United Nations, or to one of its subsidiaries, like the World Bank. Do you think there is any possibility of this happening, and do you think there is a possibility of other developed nations furnishing funds under this concept?

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Well, this concept, of course, is already operational. There is quite a large technical assistance and so-called pre-investment operation in the United Nations itself, run essentially by Paul Hoffman. And there is not only the World Bank, but its Soft Loan Window, the International Development Association. And, indeed, it has been U.S. policy to push in the direction of doing as much through international agencies as we can get other developed countries to go along with. In a sense, we're always prepared to do somewhat more than are our European friends in this respect.

But we want to keep our proportion to some reasonable proportion like around 40% or so, which is a reasonable proportion. We are about

40% of the gross national product of the U.N. membership, for example.

Now, the difficulty is that we've got two Houses of the Congress. The House of Representatives is not equally enthusiastic about this concept. In fact, it lacks enthusiasm so completely that it turned down the appropriation for the authorization for raising the ceiling before the International Development Association just a few days ago. We hope we can resuscitate that before the end of this session. But on the whole, the Administration agrees with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee policy that you were citing. But it's sometimes a little hard to sell it to what the Senators know as the "other body."

COLONEL LEOCHA: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the Commandant and the student body, I thank you very much for coming over and sharing with us your experience and knowledge on this important subject.

SECRETARY CLEVELAND: Thank you very much.