

**NONALIGNED EUROPE IN THE COLD WAR**

Dr. Laurence W. Martin

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 16 March 1964.

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Nonaligned Europe in the Cold War

11 March 1964

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
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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DR. POPPE: It is a pleasure for me to introduce this morning's speaker, Dr. Laurence W. Martin, Professor of International Politics, at Johns Hopkins University, who will discuss "Aspects of Nonalignment and Neutrality in the Cold War." Dr. Martin.

DR. MARTIN: Admiral Rose; Gentlemen:

I'm very glad to be here, particularly since I nearly wasn't here; I got caught in unfamiliar traffic. I was initially asked to speak on the neutrals of Europe, but Dr. Poppe very kindly agreed that I might make some slight change in that. I would, perhaps, like to explain why, and then that would explain the approach that I'd like to take to the subject.

It seems to me that now that the problems of the neutrals of Europe are very important to them - and indeed, extremely important to the Desk Officers in our government who have to deal with them in detail - but in a talk of the length that we could hope to give this morning it wouldn't be possible to deal with them in great detail. And the generalizations that can be made about them, it seems to me, are in some ways fairly simple, and have, perhaps, their greatest interest in their connection with this phenomenon of neutralism that we have elsewhere in the world, in the so-called "Afro-Asian World."

And so, as Dr. Poppe indicated when he announced the title of what I'd like to talk about, I'd like to take a somewhat broader sweep of the question of neutrality and neutralism, or neutrality and nonalignment.

I'm always very nervous when I'm so foolish as to be tempted into dealing with a subject as broad as that; and the words of a professor of mine at Cambridge University in England come back to me, who once wrote on a colleague's paper what I regard as memorable words. He wrote, "This paper is both brilliant and original. Unfortunately, the parts which are brilliant are not original and the parts which are original are not brilliant."⁴¹ This, I think, is the danger of anybody who tackles a really broad subject.

Now, quite obviously, neutrality and neutralism are defined by some major tension or conflict. It's only possible to be neutral in reference to some conflict out of which one intends to stay. The reason why I think it might be worthwhile this morning, taking just a brief look at both the neutrals and the neutralists, is that we are told frequently by the journalists - and I have no doubt you have been told by many lecturers - that we are now at a time of flux in the cold war, which is the main conflict in our world today; that that tension is changing; that there are movements toward multi-polarity; and that as a consequence we might expect the position of the neutrals and the neutralists to change, because that is the tension which defines their neutralism.

Neutrality, of course, is a traditional legal status of certain countries that don't participate in wars. And as such, it has played a very important part in the development of international war. This status of neutrality is very well understood by international lawyers, although as many people - Mr. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, - have discovered, it's not so easy to interpret and to practice neutrality in

specific circumstances.

In Europe a category of permanent neutrals began to emerge in modern history, countries which announced beforehand that they intended to be neutral whatever happened in whatever conflict happened to arise. Of course, the famous ones are the Swiss who got their neutrality recognized by the concert of Europe in 1815 and have stayed neutral - and very proudly neutral - ever since. Though, in that article by Messieur Fresmon, which I think was assigned in this course, it's quite clear that though they are staunchly neutral they have moments of uneasiness about it; the Belgians, for instance, who also were neutralized for a great period of their time.

And that, of course, indicates one aspect immediately of neutrality. That is to say, there are neutrals that vary; there are neutrals by choice; there are neutrals that are neutral because neutrality is imposed upon them, as it's imposed, shall we say, upon the Austrians; if not technically, then de facto. There are neutrals which are acknowledged, as the Austrians are; their neutrality has been recognized by some 70 or 80 states in formal communications; and there are neutrals whose neutrality is de facto. The Swedes would be an example. There are neutrals that are guaranteed by other powers, as the Belgians were for some time, and there are neutrals that are not guaranteed. And there are neutrals that are armed and there are neutrals that are un-armed.

The neutrals of Europe today, of course the most famous ones are the ones that Messieur Fresmon did discuss in that article, the Belgians

the Swedes, the Swiss and the Finns. There are one or two others that are rarely thought of; there are the Irish, for instance, who have their own specific reasons for their foreign policy; and there are the Spanish, who are really a frustrated ally, who nobody will have for the moment; and then, of course, there is Tito who has certain aspects of a neutral.

Just to make the list indicates that each of these countries is unique. On the other hand they have certain common features. There are certain characteristics, I think, of an international political situation, which constitute motives for neutrality; and there are characteristics of the international system which determine whether or not a country has the capacity to maintain its neutrality. And some of these common determinants of the European neutrals are also those which are felt by the neutralists of the new states, and will provide one of the links that we might look at.

Most of the neutrals, of course, tend to be - and now I'm talking about the European neutrals - small countries and exposed countries; countries that are vulnerable geographically to some major or chronic tension; the Swiss are the crossroads of the Italian, German and French struggles; the Belgians squeezed between the Germans and the French; the Belgians squeezed between the Germans and the French; the Finns squeezed between the Russians and the Swedes at an earlier time and between the Russians and the Germans at a later time; etc.

Another characteristic of many of the neutrals one discovers if one looks more closely, is that they suffer from internal divisions of a racial or cultural nature; the Finns, the Swiss, the Belgians are all

states in which more than one people, more than one language group, reside, and some of these internal tensions make the strains of an activist foreign policy too great. Because, the loyalties of the component segments of the country become too strained if the country is put into a tense structure position with other countries.

Now, despite the fact, of course, that many countries face such circumstances, neutrality is by no means the inevitable choice of a foreign policy. This depends, of course, upon the estimation of the state as to whether or not neutrality would be an advantageous policy. Some countries meet a weak and exposed position not by being neutral, but by becoming allied to one of their stronger neighbors. And for a long time, as you know, it had been the policy of the United States to encourage small neutralist states to become allied with the United States and receive its protection.

Sometimes, of course, small countries refuse such offers of protection because they think the great power isn't powerful enough to make good on the promise. They sometimes refuse the offer of protection because they're all too sure that the great power is powerful and they're afraid it will be an uncomfortable bed-fellow. Being allied to the Russians, for instance, is sometimes an uncomfortable relationship. And the Belgians had the strongest misgivings about being allied to the French.

So, quite obviously one of the determinants of deciding on a neutral or neutralist policy is the tradition of the state and the experience that it has had. We have in Europe, of course, many examples of the in-

fluence of these traditions and this experience, and of the changes which can take place in it. The Swiss have been so successful, they feel, with their neutrality, that they, of course, are extremely determined to hang onto it. The Swedes apparently feel that their neutrality served them well and have retained it, but the Norwegians and the Danes who had a policy of neutrality before the last war apparently decided that their recent experiences have made this less attractive and so they have opted for an alliance. And, of course, the Norwegians and the Danes, it must be admitted, are in a different strategic position vis-a-vis the Russians, from that which they were in vis-a-vis the Germans.

The most beautiful example, I suppose, of the way in which one's experience leads a country to chop and change in its approach to neutrality would be the Belgians who were neutral until 1914, whose neutrality was violated as everybody knows by the Germans who tore up the guarantee treaty, calling it a scrap of paper; so that, after 1914 the Belgians then opted for alliance with the French. But after 1936 when Hitler re-militarized the Rhineland and it looked as though France had feet of clay, they went back to a policy of neutrality. When that didn't work, come 1946-7-8, we find the Belgians joining the Brussels treaty and adopting a policy of alliance.

In a similar way some neutrals decide that their best bet is to arm to the teeth and make the violation of their neutrality as costly as possible. And other neutrals decide not to arm very much so as to do as little as possible to provoke their neighbors into believing that they

could possibly constitute a danger. And obviously, here again, this decision depends on specific circumstances; it depends on the terrain; it depends on the location. The Finns and the Austrians do not rely - and are really not permitted to rely - on being armed to the teeth, but the Swiss and the Swedes with their fortunate geographical and topographical configuration, and with the absence of any legal restrictions on what they may do, have decided to arm as much to the teeth as their resources will enable them to do, as the best defense of their neutrality.

But all of the European neutrals, I think, have tended to believe that a policy of neutrality was a policy of self-abnegation; a policy in which one laid low, didn't interfere in other peoples' affairs, and this was the price that one paid for being left alone. And as one knows, recent developments in the world have made this lying low particularly difficult. You're familiar with the difficulty that the Swiss have had in approaching such things as the League of Nations. Ten wanted to be neutral and participate in a collective security organization.

In the League, as you know, the Swiss thought that they could and they got permission to abstain from certain League activities, but they felt that this was so uncomfortable that they have not even participated in the United Nations. The Austrians have joined the United Nations, but, again, as I'm sure you know from your reading and from your own general knowledge, other international cooperative measures such as the Common Market, which is headed toward a political combination, have been felt to present the Austrians, the Swedes and the Swiss, with a very

grave problem. On the one hand they find it economically very difficult to remain out, and on the other hand they feel that membership, since these schemes have political ends and are designed to create ultimately a kind of super-state, that participation is incompatible with their policy of neutrality.

Now, the European neutrals of today, of course, if you look at the four main ones, there's a curious symmetry about them; on the left-hand side of the ring you have a couple - the Swedes and the Swiss are very stable neutrals; armed neutrals; voluntary neutrals who have opted for this policy on the basis of tradition. And each of them, curiously enough, is flanked on their eastern flank by a vulnerable neutral whose neutrality is imposed upon them by various treaty obligations which, although not, strictly speaking, necessarily calling for neutrality, or being, strictly speaking, legal commitments - there's an argument about this on the case of both the Finns and the Austrians - nevertheless are quite obviously in practice confined to a policy of neutrality.

Each of these voluntary neutrals to the West have racial links with the involuntary neutrals to the East, and each emphasizes, as Messieur Fresmon did in that piece, the services that they perform to their more vulnerable neighbor, by providing them a neutral hinterland and thereby softening their isolation and making their neutrality more supportable in a spiritual sense; so the Austrians and the Finns do not feel the isolation that they would feel were they alone between two great cold war coalitions, and, on the other hand, the Russians perhaps are less inclined to regard this neutral status as intolerable or dangerous when they have

this glassie of neutral protection.

And as you know, there is a theory that the Soviet Union agreed to the neutrality of Austria primarily not for the purpose of attracting the Germans, who, after all, had just decided to join NATO - although, the question of German neutrality is one we might look at - but that the Russians have gained a certain logistical advantage out of the neutralization of Austria, which has now split the NATO territory in two, and as we found at the time of the Lebanon intervention, also provides rather severe problems of air transit. You may remember that we flew troops and supplies over Austrian air space and the Austrians protested vehemently against this breach of their neutral status.

As Messieur Fresmon showed, the neutrals have, in this modern age of international action, a sense of guilt about their neutrality, because neutrality from one point of view seems negative and a cowardly policy. And this is an approach which the United States has at certain times in its history emphasized in its approach to the neutralists of the Afro-Asian World. Therefore, I suppose it is for these reasons that we find the neutrals of Europe emphasizing the services they render; not only the services that they render to the Finns and the Austrians, but the services that they render to peace; the mediatory functions that they perform; the peace-force functions that they perform to the international police forces.

Even these functions, however, present the neutrals with problems. During the Cuban crisis, for instance, you may remember that the International Red Cross was at one time going to be the agency which was going

to inspect ships and was going to do on-site inspections. This presented the Swiss Government with great concern and they did their best to emphasize the fact that although the International Red Cross is based in Switzerland and all the people who run it are Swiss, it is not a Swiss Government agency. And obviously they approach each of these possibilities, such as intervention in Cyprus and elsewhere, with great concern that it should involve them in the cold war and derogate from their neutrality.

A second point, of course, is that the Swiss and the Swedes emphasize the great military efforts that they are making; each, if my memory serves me, have a military budget of over \$½ million a year, and they emphasize the amount they are spending on weapons, and imply that they provide an element of military security in this way.

Now, I would not want to evaluate to a gathering of military men the military efficacy of these neutral forces. I recently had at the center where I spend much of my time the last head of the Swiss Armed Services who came here and gave a talk on the Swiss armed efforts. He makes them sound very formidable. He explained their system of maneuvers in which they assume that the enemy attacks with nuclear weapons at a great scale, and this is the way they always fight their maneuvers. The third time he told me this I finally had the heart to ask him who won the maneuvers. I then discovered that nobody really wins Swiss maneuvers, because the Swiss strategy is that their campaign consists of delaying action until some international help arrives.

So, privately they say, "We're really a kind of split wing of your alliance, because if the Russians attack we will fight them off, and if

the attack is a serious one we assume NATO will come to our rescue." At the time of the Hungarian Rising, for instance, the Swiss got ready to blow up all of their railway and road communications to Austria and were prepared to make a firm stand should the Russians decide that this was the time to keep going.

How plausible this military stance is, as I say, I'm certainly not the best equipped to evaluate. I think that the Belgian example shows the difficulties that one encounters if one relies on external aid from a position of neutrality. Problems of coordination of modern military warfare, I gather, make it not so easy to come to the assistance of a country with whom one has not been able to consort the strategy beforehand. And certainly, the Belgian refusal to get into detailed military cooperation with the French prior to the First and Second World Wars undoubtedly, I think, contributed to the German break-through on that flank in each case.

So, there are, I think, reasons for some concern as to whether or not the strategic preparations of these countries are, indeed, adequate. On the other hand, as I now see our own strategy in Western Europe growing, it seems to fall, on the one hand, into the theory that areas should not be easily pinched off by a sudden Russian coup, and on the other hand, should a major action develop that would rapidly be likely to escalate. And certainly, I think that neither the Swedes nor the Swiss would be a pushover, and perhaps if we did come to the point of escalating to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, perhaps to some extent some of the traditional forms of cooperation between us and the Swiss would become

irrelevant.

Anyway, this situation is changing, and before I look at how it's changing I'd like to turn to the other half of my neutralists for a moment. Now, the neutralists of Afro-Asia are, in fact, described by this term neutralist which indicates a difference, and a considerable difference. A rather unkind British newspaper a year or two ago explained the difference rather succinctly in saying that a neutral country like Switzerland is where a neutralist leader like Nkromah has his bank account.

But, quite obviously there are some similarities between the neutralists and the neutrals. They too, though some of them are big, certainly you can't call the Sudan or India small countries, they are, nevertheless, in terms of the great powers of Europe, weak countries. They feel themselves exposed and in the middle in the cold war. They similarly are beset by sharp domestic internal divisions which an active foreign policy of a certain kind - of an aligned kind - might exacerbate, and they feel that to a large extent they are preserved by a balance in the world, though that balance is not a purely military balance.

Some of the neutralists of Afro-Asia have therefore have taken up - and particularly the very exposed ones - what I would describe as a traditional European neutral response. The Burmese, and until very recently, perhaps, the Cambodians, have indeed taken up a policy of lying low, of having next to no discernible active foreign policy, in the hopes that they would be left to mind their own business.

Most of the neutralists, of course, are activists. They are far from minding their own business. On the contrary, they believe they have

a right, and in the United Nations a convenient forum to intervene and participate in all kinds of world affairs. Nor are these countries, as are the European neutrals which are relatively satisfied with their existing status; they are not status quo powers, of course; on the contrary, they make sharp demands on the world for economic assistance and for financial aid. Therefore, they have taken up the policy, it's quite clear, not of promising to be neutral whatever happens, but of maintaining a policy which is allegedly impartial between the two sides in the cold war, but which has over it always the aura of suspicion that they might decide to jump one way or the other. And by exploiting this position they obtain leverage from which they get help; first of all, protection in the sense that should either party in the cold war encroach on them they could expect the aid of the other, even though they're not allies - as the Indians discovered and as they doubtlessly knew they would discover in connection with the Ladakh conflict with China.

The United States extends a kind of permanent tacit alliance to everybody, from this point of view. Secondly, they obtained economic aid, and as you know, they tried to maintain a kind of competition of economic aid between the great powers in the world struggle. Thirdly, they tried to extract prestige from their diplomatic activities. It's very flattering, I think, to some of these small countries, the piece of ivory on which the name Togo is written is just as big as the piece of ivory on which the United States or the United Kingdom is written, as they sit around in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.

And it is, I think, of real political importance to the leadership

of these countries that their local press shall be able to show them hobnobbing with the distinguished leaders of the great countries. And, of course, sometimes this prestige value of an activist international policy has particular reference to domestic situations. So that, shall we say, for instance, a domestic elite which is trying to resist the pace of the social revolution may compensate for that in terms of the internal political situation, by a policy of great radicalism on the international scene.

So, you have the ironic thing that in with Nasser, shall we say, and Nkromah in the so-called "Casablanca Group," you have King Hussein and Morocco, which is far from an Afro-Socialist Government, but which maintains at times an activist-neutralist policy on the international front which partly enables them to buy off the internal radical opposition and helps them to avoid the charge that they are merely neo-colonialists and agents of the colonials.

This, then, obviously leads to a very confused situation. Now, I think, these countries - not to be too cynical about them - do genuinely, many of them, believe that the mediatory role that they can play in the cold war is a valuable one. They believe that the services that they can perform for peace - just as the European neutrals believe - are important. And, of course, quite apart from the humane interest in peace, the traditional policy of the neutral was to avoid the costs and destruction of war by staying neutral.

If one takes the view that any major war in the world today would be of such dimensions that everybody would be severely damaged, then, of

course, the traditional policy of neutrality will no longer have its traditional payoff; staying out of the war will not help you if the whole world is destroyed, and therefore you have to advance the policy one echelon and try to contribute to seeing that the war doesn't come about.

And you know that innumerable articles written in the New York Times Magazine and other papers - they seem to print the same article over and over again - quote some African saying, "There is an old African proverb; 'When the Buffalos fight the grass gets crumpled.'" Sometimes it's elephants, but it's always the grass that gets crumpled. And this is the way in which they express their anxiety about being squeezed in the middle of a world struggle.

This camp, however, is not only confused in the sense that although they have a common attitude to some extent toward the cold war, they're certainly not non-aligned or neutral with regard to their own local problems. The Indians are ^{not} non-aligned with regard to Pakistan and Kashmir; the Somalis are not non-aligned or neutral with regard to their controversies with Ethiopia; etc.

Secondly, there are quite obviously two divergent tendencies in this camp. On the one hand there is the solidarity of the so-called Afro-Asians symbolized by the Bandung Conference in 1955, which was not non-aligned, but Afro-Asian, to which the Chinese came and to which Members of SEATO came. On the other hand there is the theme of non-alignment which was the theme of the Belgrade Conference of two years ago, where the countries were non-aligned but not all Afro-Asians, where the Yugo-

slavs and the Cubans participated; even though whether they would now be accepted as non-aligned is a question which is becoming significant. Because, at present, as you probably know, there is going on in the Afro-Asian non-aligned world, a struggle between those headed by Mr. Nehru Nasser and Tito, who wish to convene a new conference of the non-aligned - which would exclude the Chinese and the Russians - and perhaps the Cubans - and those who wish to emphasize the colonial issue; who wish to have a new conference of Afro-Asians; these being led by Mr. Sukarno, ardently abetted by Mr. Chou En-lai, whose recent journey through Africa was supposed to have been largely connected with pushing this angle.

That is obviously to the advantage of the Chinese who are now seeing an advantage to playing up the racialist anti-colonialist issue not only against the United States, which is the traditional policy, but now, of course, increasingly playing this issue against the Soviet Union which they try to present as a white, non-Afro nation, and therefore unfriendly and an unsympathetic country.

Now, our response to neutralism has gone through several vacillations. Originally, just as in Europe, we sought to make people align. In Europe, you may recall, we thwarted the efforts of the Scandinavians to set up their own military bloc in 1949, and by refusing to provide any military support for this, forced the Norwegians and the Danes to fish or cut bait - and they chose, as you know, to come into NATO, whereas the Swedes chose not to come into NATO.

As regards the underdeveloped world, there is the famous quotation of Mr. Dulles, which is frequently quoted, of June 9, 1956, in which he

spoke of the fallacy that a nation can buy safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This increasingly becomes an obsolete conception, and except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and short-sighted conception. This, then, was the policy of the period of the United States which was referred to by unkind outside critics, as "pactomania," in which the idea was, "Those who are not with us are against us," and you must get everybody signed up in SEATO, CENTO, NATO or some other such collection of initials.

This policy was very rapidly succeeded by another for another set of reasons. In just a few days, as a matter of fact, the other theme appeared. After Mr. Dulles spoke, Henry Cabot Lodge - whose opinions I suppose we must now treat with added respect - then Ambassador to the United Nations, said, "The test is whether these countries are determined to be independent." When the Kennedy Administration came in it became quite clear that independence was about as much as we demanded of these countries.

The reason for this switch is, I think, first of all our singular lack of success in recruiting allies in many of these areas. Secondly, I think, even more not so much that we became fascinated with the virtues of neutralism as we realized what bad allies we frequently acquired; that many allies were not too good, and as the Iraq case has shown, an ostensible ally is really an ally with a regime which can change overnight.

And thirdly, I think, although this has been less spoken of, the technological changes in our military machine which have tended to make

us perhaps slightly less anxious for the acquiring of bases on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet area than we once were. Now, in the last couple of years there has been a counter-reaction, I think, beginning particularly with the Belgrade Conference, when, as you may remember, during the Belgrade Conference the Soviet Union suddenly broke the moratorium on testing and began to bang off 50-megaton bombs. The reaction of the Belgrade neutrals who had been very keen on test-bans and disarmament was mild beyond all imagination.

At that time there began to arise a cry in the West, particularly the then Lord Home and now the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, began to talk about the double standard, the bias of the neutrals against the West. And there is indeed, of course, a bias against the West. The double standard was reinforced by the Indian invasion of Goa, which was a slightly different double standard. There, you must remember, Mr. Stevenson at the U.N., etc., spoke of the double standard of morality; what was aggression for one was not aggression for another.

Mr. Krishna Menon, you may remember, squared that circle rather neatly by announcing that colonialism was permanent aggression and therefore wiping out colonies was always defensive.

But, there certainly seems to be a bias against the West, and this is not unnatural. First of all, there is the colonial legacy - I'll skim over this rather fast. Secondly, I think, in the past Marxism has had an appeal to these nations as a way to Westernize without Westernizing; let's say a way to modernize without necessarily feeling that one was only following in the footsteps of one's masters. There, I think, there

is a dynamism to the international system, which creates a bias against the West, which you can sum up as "middle-ism." That is to say that if these countries believe that neutrality is the be-all and end-all of their policy, and wish to stay in the middle, then the middle, of course, at any scale, is determined by the position of the ends. And if you have one end which has a policy of great rigor and reacts ferociously to slights, and threatens to do all kinds of terrible things, and on the other hand another end - by which, of course, I mean the communists - you have another end of the pole which believes that its policy should be one of sweet reason and that one should do everything to avoid seeming unreasonable, then, some people believe, there is a built-in bias in the system which tends to urge the neutralists always to demand concessions in a conflict, from the more moderate side.

A Labor M.P. in England who is well-known for his Toryism, a man called Padgett, summed this up rather well, I think, at the time of Belgrade, when he said, "The neutrals are not fundamentally concerned with judging righteousness, they're engaged in backing winners." From this point of view, then, one would feel that there was to some extent, perhaps, a bias. But this bias is, in some respects, wasting; I think the colonial-Marxist aspect of it; and secondly, of course, it is a bias about which we can do something about moderating our own policy.

If the neutralists believe in getting what the market can bear, we have some capacity of determining the terms of trade in that market. And then, quite apart from the waning of the colonialist issue and the decay of the prestige of the communists, as I think they have decayed in

terms of economic development - the Chinese and Soviet troubles in agriculture; the sphere of most interest to these countries, I think it has greatly weakened their claim - on top of all of these things, as these things wane the neutralists are getting more and more interested in their own specific local problems. These are the local disputes I've mentioned already.

When a Somali or Congo issue comes up one initial reaction is the anti-colonialist reaction which may go against it. But when it gets down to brass tacks we get into the situation of looking for specific solutions, and then I think we will find that this bloc nearly always turns out to be much less coherent than one might have suspected.

Now, to wind this up, if we are - let's suppose for a moment that these pundits are right - entering a period of multi-polarity, as the phrase goes, of polycentrism, as they say in the communist camp; that the bi-polar world is now loosening and becoming more complex, what will this do to the neutrals who, to some extent, have had their position defined by relation to this struggle? Well, in Europe all kinds of possibilities could occur, but I don't think they are likely to occur very rapidly.

One possibility - an optimistic one of course - is that Eastern Europe will be drawn, and the least, toward the neutralist model; that the Poles can go more and more Gomulka-like; that the Hungarians who attempted to go neutral in 1956 and were prevented, might be able by a more gradual policy to do so and to approximate to the Austrian model. I myself would not be too optimistic about that. In '56 the Soviet Union

showed, I think, that however it might talk about the wonders of neutrality for the Austrians, it was not averse to showing what it felt about neutrality for the Hungarians. But still, such tendencies might emerge, perhaps in a much less dramatic form, and this, then, would be the vindication to some extent, of George Kennon's whole set of predictions about the outcome of the containment policy.

Now, on the NATO side there are other tendencies. I've talked almost exclusively about neutralism and neutrals. But there is, of course, neutralism in allies, and there is neutralism in parts of our NATO alliance. I think it is quite possible that should the cold war wane, should the American tie to Europe, as some trends show it might, loosen in the sense that NATO would revert more to a traditional coalition and less to a standing military organization, then, for instance, the trends in Scandinavia which were manifest in '49 might reassert themselves.

I think it's correct - you no doubtless have much better knowledge than I - that the Danes and the Norwegians are only partial participants in NATO at present. That is to say that they certainly do not, I think, dispose of nuclear weapons, and if I'm not mistaken they do not let us base nuclear weapons or even nuclear-capable carriers on their territory. They are concerned about the fate of the Finns, and I think it is true - and I have certain informants in Scandinavia who tell me this is so, - that it is possible that Norway and Denmark, should NATO loosen, might be tempted to move over to a Scandinavian Bloc. And Iceland, of course, has several times made moves in that direction.

The other flank of NATO, the Greek-Turkey flank, is more obscure to

me, but obviously there could be trends there. Should a fully Gaullist Europe emerge, a Europe de partrie, a Europe which in some versions of the Gaullist philosophy seems to look like a Europe of independent states, each possessing its own finite deterrent and looking after its own defense - if that should transpire; and I do not think it is likely to; if it should transpire I would expect to find a rather more pronounced stampede toward neutrality on the part of those states that didn't see any future for themselves in this kind of medium power system.

The \$64 question in Europe, of course, is Germany and the possibility of Germany moving into neutralism. But that is such a big subject and one which you've doubtlessly discussed elsewhere, that I think I will merely mention it is relevant and pass over to my Afro-Asians.

Here, I think, in the multi-polarity we see the difficulties that the communists face particularly sharply. Their monolithicness is weakened and therefore their invincible image. Their economic prestige, as I say, is weakened. And I think that perhaps one of the most important things that has not been fully realized yet, up until recently, any unrest, any trouble, any revolt in the underdeveloped world, the Soviet Union could expect, I think, to redound to its advantage. This has now disappeared. The Soviet Union has to look anxiously at unrest in the underdeveloped world and decide, "Does this benefit us, or does this benefit the Chinese?"

And there's a third problem which is not quite the same; the Soviet Union, I understand, is getting very alarmed about do-it-yourself communism. In fact, there are groups in Latin America, etc. which set up

revolutionary movements and call themselves communists - and who knows; maybe Lee Harvey Oswald was one of these - who call themselves communists and use the name of the communists, and also maybe brings communism into disrepute without accepting the sharp, hard discipline that the communists have traditionally regarded as a necessary relationship between them and other communist parties if the communist movement is to spread and to serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

Now, having said that, it seems to me that I have to come back with a caveat and say that I think, of course, that first of all we can exaggerate the extent to which the cold war is thawing. Secondly, we can exaggerate optimism about the Sino-Soviet split. First of all, it may yet not be irrevocable. But even if it is irrevocable - and probably is to a certain extent - it does not necessarily redound to our advantage. That is to say it is obviously theoretically possible, at least, that the Chinese and the Soviet Union should trample over the underdeveloped world in a spirit of rivalry against each other, and still not do us any good. They could still erode our interests separately, and perhaps there are even ways in which they could gain advantages from an appearance of polycentrism within their own camp which would lead possible joiners of their camp to feel that there was, in fact, an independent role in the communist camp, so that they were not accepting simple Russian domination.

As regards the neutralists themselves, I think their situation is getting confused and their ideology of neutralism actually is weakening. I think very soon it may not be appropriate to even give lectures on

neutrality; you may have to find another term. I did a recent box-score, and not reaching the end of it I discovered that, for instance, the following people have been charged with imperialism last year: Khrushchev, Kennedy, Nasser, Nehru, the Bath Party in Syria, Tito, King Hussein of Morocco, Ben Bella, Edele Toure, Maurice Thorez, Jomo Kenyatta, Haile Selassie, Sukarno and Abdul Tunkuramah. They've all been accused of imperialism by somebody in the last year or so, which seems to indicate that this is no longer a very simple principle with which to organize one's image of the world.

This, I think, gives us an opportunity. As I say, the more they turn to specific issues, the more I think we have the opportunity of minimizing the extent to which these countries instinctively tend to turn against us on a basis of anti-colonialism. And I'm encouraged in this because a book which I edited and wrote part of a year-and-a-half ago on the "New States in World Affairs" - in that book I made the statement that our best hope lay in concentrating on the specific issues and playing down the ideological general concept of neutrality.

This was particularly bitterly attacked in a review in the "Moscow Journal of International Affairs," under the title of "Unwanted and Unsolicited Advice;" which leads me to believe that I might be on the right track. The biggest danger, it seems to me, is that we may be concentrating too much on the statements of the neutralists; I don't believe in taking a moral attitude against these countries and saying, "Why, they have a double standard and this is morally despicable."

I think they don't have a double standard. I think they have a

single standard; namely, they are pursuing their own interests. And the apparent double standard has to do not with their characteristics, but with the characteristics of the great powers in the world struggle. But as I say, if our conduct gives them the opportunity to be nastier to us than to the Soviet Union, the remedy is not to call them immoral - they're merely being sensible; within limits they're being sensible; it is possible for them to lose their grip - then we should reconsider our own policy.

The greatest danger, I think, would be if we began imperceptibly - as I say some of our spokesmen do - to accept their view of the cold war. It is, after all, in a sense our cold war, and the views appropriate to a neutral are most inappropriate to a participant in a cold war. In particular, in the very near future I think that since these countries profit from the conflict between us, yet they do not have to have that conflict in a military form; in fact, the military form frightens them; they'd much rather have this conflict put on an economic aid basis from which they benefit; therefore, I think they have an inevitable bias to encourage us to exaggerate the current trends in the world which would minimize the role of the military balance in the cold war conflict.

This, I think, would be a great mistake. The "London Economist" some time ago mentioned that Nehru, Nasser and Tito were men sitting on an ice-flow, congratulating themselves on the speed with which the warmth of their bodies was melting it; the point being, of course, that it is the balance of power in the world which not only preserves us but preserves them. And however much we must sympathize and see their point of

view, as I say, it would be inappropriate indeed, I think, for us to adopt it.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Would you give us your views on the tendencies toward neutralism in Germany vis-a-vis - one of my interests - what must be the burning desire for reunification?

DR. MARTIN: I'll give you my views on almost anything, but I don't vouch for their value. I do not regard myself as in any way an authority on Germany. My impression, from having looked into this a little bit recently, in connection with such things as a multi-lateral force and attitudes toward that, my impression would be that neutralism at present is not a serious problem in Germany, because I don't think that most intelligent Germans see this as an option that is open to them with anything of a payoff.

That is to say I don't think they're interested in anything that they formulate to themselves as neutralism. Now, I think there is another question, namely their interest in opening up their relations with the East Germans. And we might ask ourselves the question whether that might not lead them in the direction which we would regard as neutralism. Now, there, of course, the situation is extremely interesting and complex right now because of the hints that have been dropped that the East Germans would be interested in opening up better relations with West Germany; partly, I think, because Mr. Khrushchev having put up his wall now believes that he has stemmed the immediate hemorrhage of East Germany

and East Germany is still a liability to him and he would like others, I think, to make it viable, as they say.

The Christmas pass/^{agreement}through the wall sort of symbolized, I think, the interest of the East Germans in holding out advantages to the West Germans in participating more freely in their relations with East Germany. The first step, presumably, in Mr. Khrushchev's mind is to get recognition of the status of East Germany, and I suppose a further step would be to tempt West Germany into some intimate relationship with East Germany, which would breach its relations with the West.

Again, I say for the moment this, I think, is a very complicated issue because it's quite clear that this gets into German politics in a very complicated way because of the fact that Mayor Brandt is now the Mayor of Berlin and also the Social Democratic candidate. And as you know from the papers the Bonn Government is at present telling Mr. Brandt and the Berliners to go very easy on relations with the East. But it's very difficult to see what lies behind this because it is complicated. I mean, this is, on the one hand, I think, a divergence of interests between Bonn and Berlin, because these are different entities, but on the other hand it's a divergence of interests between the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party.

So, the situation is complicated for the moment. I don't, myself, see much danger of neutralism in the sense of the Germans deciding that they would do well to become disarmed and give up Western support in exchange get relations with East Germany and a guarantee from the Russians. I don't think this is very likely for two reasons; I think first of all

the Germans are aware that there's not the slightest sign that the Soviet Union would relinquish its controls or the communist controls over East Germany in a way which would make East Germany a truly workable part of a united, even confederal Germany, and secondly because I don't think they trust the Russians enough.

There is one possibility, however - and I must stop this - General De Gaulle is obviously tempting Germany to throw its lot in with him rather than with us. I would have thought, myself, that the greatest danger in Germany for the moment, though perhaps a fairly remote one, is not neutralism in the form of them deciding to become disarmed and neutralized in the center of Europe, but that they might, if they succeed in pursuing their own unilateral armament, and pursue the French offer and gain dominance over Western Europe as a united entity, then be interested in making a deal with the Russians in the interest of unification. But I wouldn't exactly call that neutralism.

QUESTION: Dr. Martin, what connotations do you see from the development of multi-polarity, for the future control of nuclear weapons, say arms control under the conditions of the loosely-defined program?

DR. MARTIN: I'm not quite sure whether you mean - I think you mean arms control and not command and control from the Western point of view. If multi-polarity proceeds along the lines, say, that General De Gaulle seems to want it to proceed, which is that the Western European nations should gain nuclear capability of their own, possibly moving toward a Western European coalition, which, while not supra-national would dispose of nuclear weapons in national French, British and perhaps German forces which were integrated but not united, if that were pursued it would ob-

vioulsy - and this is obviously the belief of the American Government - it would throw a very large wrench into the current American Administration's view of the requirements of command and control.

As to arms control, I happen to be very pessimistic on the prospects of any significant measures of general arms control. I would think that in some ways multi-polarity can only make it more difficult. I would think, myself, that arms control will not come about by some agreement in principle which is reached by all the nations of the world on the basis of a theory of international relations, but that a most hopeful road toward arms control will be a very carefully arranged balance of mutual interests between the two great nuclear contenders in the world who will agree to set aside certain forms of nuclear competition and to put forms of self-restraint on the remaining forms of military weapons.

For that to be successful, it seems to me, it is highly desirable that as much of the nuclear power in the world should be concentrated in as few hands as possible. Because, multi-polarity means a dissemination of nuclear power, and I would have thought it boded very ill for the prospects of arms control. If multi-polarity took a slightly different form, namely not the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the recognition that there exists a stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States, which can be institutionalized by forms of arms control and will then give all of the other countries great freedom of action within that over-hanging stability, they might feel that they had sufficient scope for maneuver without acquiring nuclear capability; in which case I don't know whether they necessarily would be entitled to arms control.

But, as I say, on just a rough rule of thumb I would have thought that proliferation of centers of control makes the problem of internationalizing the control more difficult. But these are very speculative realms.

QUESTION: You mentioned the Belgians several times but you didn't tell us anything about the Dutch. Would you care to comment on them?

DR. MARTIN: Well, of course, the Dutch are not neutral now.

QUESTION: They're not neutral now, but they were only neutral up to a point, for example.

DR. MARTIN: Well, I don't claim to know very much about Dutch neutrality. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that it's quite true that the Belgians and the Dutch tried to remain neutral in the First World War. All I can say about that is that it demonstrates that you may have a policy of neutrality, but ultimately the success of that policy is not in your hands, but in the hands of one of the powers that has the capacity to violate it. And if it sees its interest in violating it, then by and large it will violate it.

The deterrents to violating it are presumably (a) the inherent capacity of the country to resist; (b) the capacity of other countries to come to the assistance of that country; and (c) I suppose, the loss of moral repute that one may get in certain quarters from violating a neutral; this may have a negative payoff.

In 1914, as you know, the modified Schlieffmann Plan called for the use of Belgian territory for the invasion of France, to out-flank the French defensive efforts. The Schlieffmann Plan did not call for

the use of Dutch territory. Therefore, it seems to me it's for that simple reason that the Belgians were not neutral and the Dutch were neutral.

Incidentally, that's a very good example, of course, of the negative payoff, as the game theory boys would say, of the violation of neutrality, because I don't think there's any denying that the violation of Belgian neutrality was an albatross around the neck of the Germans and played a significant part in the American role in the First World War.

It is, I would agree with you, somewhat paradoxical that the Dutch - well, no, maybe it isn't paradoxical. I said that the Dutch and the Belgians both were attempting to be neutral in 1939, and they were both attempting to be neutral in the Second World War. As I said, the Dutch, presumably, on the same basis as the Swedes now, because they had a successful record of neutrality. The Belgians, as I say, I think because of the specific reason that though they did not have much faith in neutrality anymore, the progress of appeasement policy in the '30s had given them even less faith in the support that they could get from the erstwhile allies.

Hitler's invasion plans of France and the Continent, of course, did call for the use of Dutch territory. So, this time the Dutch weren't neutral. And I think the lessons of that encouraged them to join the Brussels Pact.

Also, and the final point, of course, the fact that the Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch and the Belgians had all decided to join NATO, is

of course, I think, also relevant to the fact that we're now talking about fighting the Russians and not the Germans. As I say, these decisions rest on a balance of calculations. One of the calculations is how exposed or vulnerable is your situation. If it's very exposed you may seek allies; if it's utterly exposed you may be afraid to seek allies and you may rely on neutrality.

Now, of course, neither the Norwegians, the Danes, the Belgians nor the Dutch, are as immediately exposed to the Soviet Union's pressures as they would have been to Germany's pressures. So, I suppose the policy of alignment has less immediate spiritual tension for them than it would have, shall we say, for the Finns.

Beyond that, if you wanted me to get into the internal politics as to how the Dutch made these decisions after the Second World War - and this is the first decision they really made to give up neutrality - I really must confess to ignorance of the details of the debate.

QUESTION: With respect to your comments on the Sino-Soviet split, in our position of neutralism we seem to be accepting neutralism with respect to the Soviet Union. How about with respect to Communist China? Are we as willing to accept neutralism in our relations with them, particularly in Southeast Asia?

DR. MARTIN: May I interrupt you? I'm not quite sure what you mean when you say we're willing to accept neutralism.

QUESTION: Well, we have apparently been willing to let the neutralists be independent and not pro-American. Would we take the same position with respect to Communist China as we would the Soviet Union?

DR. MARTIN: Well, I do think there is one thing to be said. There is one area of this that I've taken an interest in. I have an erstwhile colleague from graduate school, namely Mr. Roger Hillsman, who, as you know, has been engaged in such matters recently. And this, I suppose, is one of the issues you probably have in mind - the question of Viet Nam and the proposals for neutralization there.

I think the only answer I can make is two or three very simple points. First of all, as I think I said in my lecture, I think we have turned to neutrality and independence not because we're so terribly keen on it but because it's the best we can get. I think we would rather have staunch weight-pulling democratic allies. But, they're scarce, and so we say better that they're neutral than that they're against us. But it's a sort of second-best in a way; though, you can then extract advantages from it; you can say it never was reasonable to expect them to align with us, and if we don't insist upon everybody aligning with us we will seem more tolerable to countries that never would have aligned with us anyway, but would have shrunk away from us if they had seen us as mad alliance makers, and now that we show them we're relaxed they're more likely to cooperate with us.

So, I suppose, roughly that's that rationale of our acceptance of independence. Now, the difficulty, of course, of extending that to Viet Nam, Laos, etc., is quite obvious. On the one hand, we've done quite a bit of neutralizing in that area. It seems to me again, we have obviously done it not because we like it but because it's the best we've been able to get. As a matter of fact, in Laos, as you know, this is controversial;

I don't want to get too much into politics, but as you know, in Laos we had a neutralization, in 1954, and the kind of neutralization we hoped for Viet Nam under the Geneva Agreements, by 1960 or so we had gotten depressed about the neutrality of Laos and the way it was going, and as you know, there are allegations that we engineered a right-wing cap which backfired on us and we now have another form of neutrality which may be less advantageous than the one that we had to begin with.

Then, General De Gaulle talks about the neutrality of - I understand it has a significant difference in the eyes of the French - Viet-Nam; it's not clear whether he means South Viet Nam, North Viet Nam, or all of Viet Nam - or what he means. We may come to that, I suppose.

I mean, there is Mr. Dulles' domino theory in his alliance theory. You remember, he had the domino theory; if one domino goes, the whole row goes down. The trouble with that theory, of course, it points up the danger of appeasement and of making concessions and the moral rot that sets in when you accept defeat. On the other hand, of course, if you took the theory strictly and absolutely seriously it would mean you should be willing to go to thermonuclear war for the end domino because they all hang on a chain. And we have discovered in practice, if not in theory, that we're not willing to do that.

So, there must be some price that we would put on Viet Nam and certain other areas. I think that the danger, though, the reason for looking very askance at neutralism is simply this; when these people talk about independence being enough - and Mr. Hillsman and some of his colleagues talk - and talk publicly - about, for instance, they say our

policy is one of nation-building; and by this they mean, create an entity in these countries which will then have a drive of its own to maintain its independence, and that's all we ask. I think the flaw in that as a complete rule-of-thumb, is that it depends on the geopolitical position of the place you are talking about. I think it's one thing to talk about independence being enough in Africa where we have fairly good logistical opportunities to insulate the African countries from direct Soviet pressure, or from excessive pressure. So then, we can expect them to indulge in a great deal of internal unrest and a great deal of neutralism without actually falling under the thumb of the communists, and maybe there is time for nation-building, which we are told by the theorists of nation-building, will take two or three generations.

But it seems to me it's quite a different matter in, shall we say, Indo China which is under the gun of China, and which looks on any geopolitical view of the map as a very natural sphere of influence of China. And there I'm inclined to think that we may be forced back into the situation that independence is sometimes not enough. Because, I said at the very beginning, ultimately neutrality depends on whether your neighbors let you be neutral, and it may therefore take a more forceful policy there.

So, that's why I would look askance at a policy of neutralism or independence as enough for South Viet Nam; I would question their capacity to maintain it. That doesn't mean to say we may not come to neutralism. Because, the task of holding up a country that doesn't want to be held up has proved a very tiresome one in the past, and therefore we may not be able to do it. But I'm suggesting our options may be holding up South

Viet Nam, shall we say, as an ally - and this may apply to other peripheral areas - or not holding it up at all; there may not be a middle way.

There are people who assume that if one solution is difficult, then there must be an easier solution; this is not the case in life. Sometimes there are only difficult solutions.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment upon the extent to which the better-developed neutral nations give financial aid to lesser-developed neutral nations?

DR. MARTIN: Not really, I wouldn't, I don't think. I'm not an economic development man and I don't have that kind of statistics at my finger tips. It has been my impression, but I am open to being rebuffed by anybody in the audience, that not a great deal of that aid has as yet taken place. And the most formidable example of that kind of aid scheme that I know of is the Colombo Plan where the nations of Southeast Asia that receive aid from the West - from the British, French, Americans, Australians and New Zealand - where they not only receive aid, but where, on the basis the same as the Marshall Plan operated, they have regular meetings by which they assess the resources of the bloc of underdeveloped countries in an attempt to exchange such technical assistance and economic aid and direct such trade as they can with mutual profit.

But I'm not aware myself of any extensive schemes of aid from one underdeveloped country to another; unless you think of Israel as an underdeveloped country, which I shouldn't, which has certainly begun to undertake economic aid programs in Africa. Or, unless you include such

things as the contributions that some of the African states have made - and are proposing to make - to, say, helping the^{East}/African countries police themselves, etc. But I'm not aware myself - and this may be purely ignorance; this is not my field; but I'm not aware of any extensive aid from one underdeveloped country to another. But, I may be wrong.

QUESTION: I assume that the opposite of neutralism is alignment. Is there a possibility that a country like Great Britain which now has a state of multi-alignment politically with NATO and commercially with many other places - France which has at least two political alignments; Germany which has a political alignment with NATO and has a commercial alignment with Eastern Europe - is it possible that this status of multi-alignments or roads leads a trend toward neutralism? Or some status toward it?

DR. MARTIN: I don't know; there was a lot in that question. If I had that in a seminar I could keep going for an hour dissecting that. I'm not even sure, actually, that neutralism is the opposite of alignment; I think it probably is. But I remember as a child, thinking that Dodd was the opposite of Kant. And there are, sort of, subtleties in those words, but, yes, obviously these are alternatives; I mean, these are ends of a pole, at least - neutralism and alignment.

Now, as I say, I wasn't quite sure about the question from this point of view; multi-alignment weakening alignment. Then you brought trade into it which, presumably, refers to sort of trade with Cuba and trade with Russia, etc., on the part of the British. It's quite clear that none of these alignments are total commitments. This, I think, is one of our great illusions in this country, to believe for a long period, that NATO

was somehow a total commitment. We have been, I think, so bemused by speakers who have talked about the magnificent work of NATO - and it has been magnificent - and have talked so much about its unprecedented nature as a standing military alliance, we have tended to forget that, after all, it is an alliance; an alliance between sovereign states, although of different degrees of power and capacity, into which they've entered on a basis of the calculation of their interests, from which, presumably, they would withdraw if they did the sum again and found that the answer was different.

And, as I said, there are circumstances, I think, under which this may take place. Obviously, General de Gaulle would like to renegotiate the terms of the alliance. So, obviously within any alignment the commitment is not total. Each of the participants has interests which do not fit neatly into that alignment, which, to some extent, makes a sacrifice for the purposes of loyalty to the main alignment. And if these sacrifices become too tense; if their other interests don't coincide with the main drive of the alliance and become so dominant, presumably yes, you do get into a condition in which the state is likely to detach itself.

Now, I don't actually think that in the case of Britain, for instance, we are seriously near that point. For one thing, of course, as the situation stabilizes; as the alliance is successful in its primary purpose of military security, then, of course, the more attention one can devote to these other interests.

I think that one of the things that tends to distort our perspective in this country is, of course, in many alliances there is sometimes a

central state, the pivot, the kingpin; and this is the United States in this alliance. The United States is the hub of the wheel; all the other countries are at the ends of the spokes. This means, then, I think, that the United States - and only the United States - has the interests of the whole alliance at heart, not because the United States is, so to speak, bigger-hearted than other countries, but because as the manager and entrepreneur of the alliance she has a kind of overall worry about the health of the alliance. If anything goes wrong at the end of the British or the French spoke they worry about it more than the French or the Germans do, or down at the end of another spoke.

This you can easily see, of course. If you take the global coalition, if something happens in Laos the Germans aren't very worried. In fact, they get very worried if the Americans get too committed to it and they begin to write editorials about not exaggerating the tenseness of the cold war, etc. The moment the Berlin issue blows up, of course, you find the people of Laos don't show much interest, but the Allgemeine Zeitung, etc., will have editorials, etc. about the necessity of pulling together.

So, I think in any alliance you're going to find that this is not a total commitment and obviously all of the interests which don't fall in the main drive of the alliance are, to some extent, incentives toward breaking up the alliance, or to neutralism. I don't think that in the case of the British, or even, perhaps, in the case of the French - certainly not in the case of the Germans - we have reached anything like a breaking point. But the potentiality is always there. That, I think,

is in the nature of an alliance.

QUESTION: (First part of question inaudible.) Would you assess India's position in the attempt to be the current leader, or do you think this is the traditional role of the people themselves?

DR. MARTIN: I have a very earthy view of history. I see sort of precedents that foreign offices follow, etc. But I'm not, like Mr. Toynbee, very much taken with these ideas of policy being in keeping with the spirit of a people, though I think there is something to it.

On India - I mean, first of all, of course, you're right - when I'm speaking I'm speaking in shorthand; I did mention the fact that these countries are neutral as regards the cold war, but they are involved in local issues and local alignments, and on those they're not neutral. Quite obviously, India is a big country, has wide-ranging interests in Southeast Asia, and potentialities and aspirations of leadership. And certainly, I think, one of the motives in Mr. Nehru's mind as he encouraged the non-alignment and Afro-Asian movement, has been the possibility of leadership.

On the question of India, therefore, I would be inclined to say, first of all, I don't think there is any doubt that the policy of non-alignment, particularly its mediatory peace-keeping functions, is a policy which is peculiarly tasteful to Mr. Nehru. Mr. Nehru, after all, is a London School of Economics British Socialist, by training even though he's an Asian. And much of the ideology of this bloc has some Western, I think, Left Liberal Socialist circles, and obviously, I think, this is definitely very much a personal policy of Mr. Nehru.

That doesn't mean to say, however, that - and it would be very surprising because of his personal predilections - he could pursue a policy distinct from the national interests of his country. Obviously, it's in the interests of his country.

I think two things; first of all, you're right, it's a big country. It is a matter of fact that Africa has spawned dozens of pan-African, East African, West African, Franco-formic associations. Asia has produced next to none; or regional organizations of neutralists. The reason, I think, is simply that Asia happens to consist of two or three very big neutralists - Indonesia, India - each of which has a potential possibility of being a leader. Obviously, Mr. Sukarno has quite imperialist notions; although he uses neutralism and anti-colonialism as a weapon he's not particularly interested in merging himself into some kind of association.

So, I think you're right in saying that perhaps in India there is a feeling that they deserve a position of leadership. But for the moment, it seems to me, that neutralism isn't just Mr. Nehru's whim. They may be big, but I don't think, frankly, that they are a power. My first proposal was that we should somehow get India to help us in Southeast Asia. Well, India can't even handle its own problem in the Himalayas, so I don't see how we can expect them to help very much in Southeast Asia, not on a military basis .

So, I would say that perhaps in the future India has the potentiality of being an active force or sphere of influence dominating power in Southeast Asia. But for the moment, I think that despite its size it

falls into the category of weak and vulnerable powers whose interest are best served by remaining out of a major power conflict. So, I think there is a coincidence between the national interest of India in its present stage of development and the individual predilections of Mr. Nehru.

And incidentally, to conclude, you musn't exaggerate the dominance of his ideological preferences when the chips are down on a specific issue where the Indian national interest is concerned. I mean, all of the ideology of non-aggression and self-determination didn't encourage him to let the United Nations, say, decide the Goa issue. It has not prevented him from accepting Western military assistance when he thought the Chinese were attacking him in the north. I would say that quite to the contrary of his personal predilections dominating the interest of India, you can see plenty examples where the interests of India seem to over-ride what you'd expect to be his personal predilections.

DR. POPPE: Dr. Martin, on behalf of the Commandant, I'd like to thank you very much for a very fine presentation.