



SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Samuel L. Sharp

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 23 March 1964.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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13 March 1964

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
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Reporter--Grace R. O'Toole
Reviewed by: Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF Date: 23 March 1964



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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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CAPTAIN BRADY: Gentlemen: Today we turn our attention to the Soviets, more specifically, this first period to the Soviet Foreign Policy, and the means whereby she intends to achieve her foreign policy goals.

We are indeed fortunate today to have as our speaker a man who is very well qualified to tell us about this. He has addressed this College on four previous occasions.

It give me very great pleasure to introduce Dr. Samuel L. Sharp.

DR. SHARP: Thank you, Captain Brady. Admiral Rose, General Stoughton, Gentlemen: It is indeed a pleasure and a privilege to be asked to appear again on this platform. I have been here on several occasions in the past and I have always carried away with me the impression of a vital interest of a sophisticated audience.

Last here after my talk here I received an unsolicited letter from one of the gentlemen in the audience. In addition to the letter being answered he didn't want anything from me. He got his Ph.D. 10 years ago. He complimented me on the presentation and also at one point he suggested that I had captivated and disarmed my listeners. Endowed with a fine sense of humor, the writer realized that this might be the wrong compliment and that disarming a war college may indeed be subversive. So he switched around in midletter and assured me that no lasting damage was done, that on the contrary he believed that I made

a useful though possibly somewhat disturbing contribution to the thinking of those assembled.

I am returning today in the spirit of a humble expectation, not of disarming you but of contributing ever so modestly to your ways of looking at so vital a subject and thus arming you with what I believe to be a fruitful way of approaching the issue of Soviet foreign policy.

Permit him to state or to restate here once more my view that, of all possible groups--and I have been speaking to a fantastic array of audiences in this country--it is the military who can afford less than any other group to look in a distorted or ill-informed manner at the situation which may, under certain circumstances, call for a major and even a supreme professional and personal contribution on their part.

This audience is not a ladies' garden club, amusing itself in acquiring points for after-dinner conversation by listening to a so-called expert. This is by definition, by my definition, anyway, a business outfit. In the past I have found it easy and pleasant to talk to this group in a businesslike manner.

So permit me to begin in the hope that there are few in this audience who believe that fluoridation of water is indeed part of a nefarious Communist plot against our way of life. Otherwise some Communist has already fed me some coffee which contained water, and that might dry up my vital juices.

My assignment, as outlined in your impressive curriculum, is to discuss the objectives of Soviet foreign policy and the underlying

motivations currently shaping those objectives, to tell you how the Soviet leaders view and interpret the current world situation, or, more accurately, to tell you what I think their view and interpretation is. That's a rather tall order for someone who, unlike some other lucky colleagues of mine in this business of expertise on the Soviet Union, cannot create the impression that I have spent any significant amount of time under the table around which Khrushchev and his associates usually discuss the world.

The problem calls further for a discussion of the various means pursued by the Soviet Union in its attempt to achieve its foreign policy goals, and, finally, the relationship of Soviet foreign policy to what is described in the program as the objectives of world communism.

Now, if I were really competent to speak on all these topics and I wanted to explain them to you, the better part of a semester would probably do, provided you did not expect too much detail. Let's see what we can do in somewhat less time than a full semester.

How many times have you encountered or heard the statement attributed to Sir Winston Churchill that Soviet policy was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma?" Let me begin my presentation by demolishing this particular cliché. Mr. Churchill, as I found out by a very unusual scholarly endeavor, namely, by looking up the second half of the sentence, actually said just the opposite. This is a well-known oratorical trick. When you want to say "a" you say "b" up to a certain point, and then you make a U-turn and you say what you really wanted to say.

I'd like to remind you of Mr. Churchill's full statement. He said, "I do not pretend to be an expert on Russian policy. Soviet policy is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Then comes the U-turn. "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." I expect some kind of Nobel prize or some archaeological award for digging out from oblivion the second half of the sentence which, like the first half, is in the public domain. It is printed. Both halves of the sentence, believe it or not, were uttered simultaneously in a radio broadcast on October 1, 1939. Those of you who don't believe me can look up page 449 of the American edition, the first volume of Mr. Churchill's wartime memoirs, "The Gathering Storm."

Now, having thus, I hope, murdered the beautiful cliché, I should like to call to your attention a broader issue involved in the study of Soviet foreign policy. That is this business of quoting in and out of season and also in and out of context what Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, or whoever else may be handy, said. Occasionally a well-indoctrinated lady at a garden club or some such organization will say, "How about this fellow whose name begins with a G, who said, quote." I say, "Maybe some fellow whose name begins with a G said something, but I am not responsible for it." It is this whole business of quoting what this or that person once said.

In a recent book review in the Washington Post of a book on American foreign policy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.--and the White House's loss is our gain-- asked the question, "in reviewing a book on American foreign

policy, "Why does the author rely so much on what people in the White House or the State Department said? Why doesn't he concentrate on what was done?" I should like to point out that this same argument applies to the study of Soviet foreign policy, too.

People say all kinds of things, for a variety of good, that is, politically or psychologically good, reasons. I may not tell you all the things which the curriculum promises for me to tell you about Soviet foreign policy, but I will tell you something about foreign policy, and the rest you look up in the library.

Let us for a minute enter the field of psychology in my hapenny way, and let me point out to you that words serve all kinds of purposes. Above all, words, when they are repeated, serve to create the image of consistency and of faithfulness to first principles. In the process they serve to hide the cracks caused by the divergence between theory and practice. The wider the cracks the more need for that verbal placot. Words also perform another function. They help one, an individual or a group, to maintain his or its self-respect, the self-assurance that, no matter what detours from the originally stated goals have been forced on the traveler, he is still going in the direction originally indicated.

Let me resort here to an example on which I am usually handicapped, because I teach at a Methodist school. A man is drunk--the Methodists never heard of it but life provides such situations--and if someone is drunk he has an irresistible urge to insist that he can walk in a straight line. The drunker he is the more he insists that he can walk in a straight

line. He doesn't do it to assure you or to fool you about his ability to walk in a straight line. He does it for himself, because of his self-respect. This is a tremendous thing with which everybody, including Bolsheviks, is endowed, a need to be able to look at yourself in the mirror or to look yourself in the face in one way or another.

However, life is inconsistent. It is full of detours. Words cover up these inconsistencies and make it look as if you were always traveling in the direction in which you started out to go. This function of generating an image of consistency and of replenishing the dwindling reservoirs of self-esteem is performed, in the case of our subject here, by Communist ideology--the invocation of the ultimate goals, the rededication to them, the assurance that seeming deviations from the goals are merely tactical adjustments, that any step backward is merely a way of gathering momentum, as the French say, *pour mieux sorté*, for a leap forward, at some time in the future--six weeks, 100 years. In a brilliant phrase adapted by a young American scholar, who turned Marx upside down, this is the opium of the bureaucrats. This is a young man named Eric Goldheim, a brilliant graduate of Harvard. He says, "Communism is the opium of the bureaucrats. The belief in a final realization of their goals makes it possible for them to live with themselves, with all the hardships which they have imposed on people for over a generation and even all the blood that they have shed. All this can make sense to them only if they tell themselves, and the stronger the doubt the louder the telling, that it was all for a good purpose, and

that no matter how it might puzzle you--puzzle you, let's say, as a rank-and-file Communist or citizen of the Soviet Union--into asking, 'What is my leader doing', the answer is, 'I am going in a straight line.'"

The trouble with you gentlemen is that you don't believe this is a straight line, but that is the result of your lack of grounding in the Marxist dialectics. You are devoted to vulgar, lineal geometry. But that is wrong. Dialectically this is a straight line. Of course, when Stalin was alive and you had a kind of puzzled face, he would make a very ominous statement, "He who does not understand this is dead to Marxism." But when Stalin said "dead" very few people listened to the end of the sentence. I assure you that political science, bolstered with machine guns, is extremely impressive.

Now, if this be the main function of Communist ideology--this will improve as time goes on--I'm running out of notes--this is just early morning comic relief; you will be treated to real, 16-ton caliber stuff later in the course--and I do believe that it is, there is absolutely little in it of help to the student of Soviet foreign policy, once he has realized that the predominantly psychological function performed by ideology is a form of patting one's self on the back, unless one is addicted to the habit of quotology, a habit very well described by one expert on foreign policy, Professor Marshall Nappy, who defines this business of quoting things as a collection of loose generalizations and so many exceptions and contradictions that one can find little practical guidance

in it.

For our purposes I suggest that we agree, just for the duration of this lecture, to take as a working proposition the assumption that, in spite of Lenin's often repeated dictum to the contrary, theory, and by extension ideology, is not a guide to action. I suggest that the sequence is just the other way around. By the way, I am not alone. Professor Robert Dinas has written a very fine book called "The Nature of Communism," where this is very well argued. Theory is not a guide to action. Action to be taken is a guide to how theory will be reinterpreted and reread.

There was a famous question thrown by a Soviet farm manager to his bookkeeper: "How much is two and two, Comrade bookkeeper?" The answer is: "How much do you need, Comrade Chairman?" In the light of what you need--as they say in the Middle East, "Are you buying or selling?"--you reread the theory of how much two and two is. Such reinterpretations, which sometimes amounted to kicking old boy Marx straight in the teeth, if he had any left, were known in Stalin's language as creative adaptations. In any up-to-date Communist official text of any message it has to convey, except to the low-grade, idiot Communists who are just called upon to memorize it, Communists on a somewhat higher level can read very clearly what the message is in the official description. The message is not to take doctrine statically. Now, I won't say not to take it seriously, but not to take it literally and statically, but to reinterpret it creatively, in the light of ever-changing needs, in response

to ever-changing circumstances. If a Communist, especially one in a high or mid-riff-raff, decision-making position, fails to make this adjustment he is condemned as a dogmatist. You have heard this word very frequently recently. This is exactly what the Russians these days call their Chinese comrades, that is, whenever they don't call each other Hitlerites, which is not a very comradely compliment in Communist language. The thing is for us to live long enough and to enjoy the ever-richer exchange of compliments among them.

Now, if I may digress here for just a second, I'd like to point out to you that, when I am asked to define briefly the nature of the current Sino-Soviet conflict, I point out rather paradoxically that the Chinese call Khrushchev yellow, and he answers, "Better red than dead."

In suggesting to you this rather restrictive interpretation of the role of doctrine and ideology I am fully aware, and I think I should tell you, that this is by far not the most popular interpretation. It certainly was not the most popular interpretation until recently, although it seems to me to be creeping in a little more energetically these days, possibly because the situation is such that one can ill afford the luxury of nonsense.

A diametrically opposed interpretation, as summed up by the English scholar, John Keith, holds that "the Soviet leaders mean every word they say when they proclaim the invincibility of the Communist system and their own unremitting determination to bring about the doom of

imperialism and thus make it possible to establish a world state on the Soviet model. The zealous Communist in this interpretation relates all his actions, no matter how trivial they may be in themselves, to the ultimate goal, whereby they gain in his eyes the supreme validation."

Still another variety of view stresses the fact that ideological conditioning obscures the Communist policy-maker's field of vision and makes it impossible for him to view the world correctly and objectively.

Let me just comment briefly on these two views. My reaction to the first view is that I just don't care how the Communist squares his actions with his Marxist conscience, or how he validates it, as Keith says. That's his problem. What I care about is what I make him do and what I can make him not do. This is policy. I am not interested in reforming their dreams.

On the second view I will merely say that it amounts to an assumption that my particular blinkers are objective--if you look at mine you will see they are not--while his blinkers distort vision. Well, from the point of view of the scholar, especially if I were a citizen of some other planet, I would say "A and B are wearing blinkers." So the point that my blinkers are objective while his are distorted is a point which is not necessarily to be taken for granted, except as an article of faith. You may find that it is much more useful to say, "I have a point of view; he has a point of view." The significant difference is that it is my point of view, and that is enough to explain it. I don't have to reach out and start patting myself on the back and saying that I am the

representative of the only truth in the world, because then I become another Bolshevik and leave them this privilege.

A very fine Christian theologian, Professor Niebuhr, says that to think of yourself as the only representative of God's truth on earth is the highest form of blasphemy. I might also add that untheologically it's also about the worst possible foreign-policy assumption. It was conveyed to me--if I ^{may} just take a minute--in very interesting circumstances. I visited, with a group of students, the Soviet Union in 1962 and we got as far practically as the Chinese border. We were in Central Asia and visited the chief Mufti of 40 million Mohammedans in Kazakstan, in Central Asia, a gentleman called Babahanuf, a very impressive character, whom I threw completely by greeting him in Arabic. I expected him to answer in Yiddish but it didn't work. I occasionally spread the rumor that he wasn't really a Mohammedan, that the Communist Party just picked somebody, ^{and that} at one point, at this very lavish banquet, he would lean to me and say, "What a job for a Jewish boy from Odessa." But he didn't say it.

However, we had a very serious discussion about religion, because the group of students I took to Russia was a group under the auspices of the Board of Education of the Methodist Church. One student asked him to explain Mohammedanism in just a few words. He very patiently explained that Mohammedianism is a very tolerant religion, that it has room or a niche for the peoples of other faiths. In fact, he said, "Moses is one of our Saints, so to say, and so is Jesus Christ." One

of the students asked him a charming question. He asked, "If you have Jesus why do you need Mohammed?" He could have asked, "If you have Moses, why do you need Jesus?" Babahanuf thought for a while and he said, "Come to think of it, there is no difference." Then he kind of pulled himself up rather proudly and said, "There is no difference between Mohammed and Christ," but then he said in Russian, "He is our boy." That's good enough.

Now you will have concluded by now that I seem to question the importance of goals and especially so-called ultimate goals, in shaping foreign policy. I have no Q clearance, but I am at liberty to reveal to you where we all will be ultimately, but maybe you don't want to hear it. If this is your impression, you are right. My point is that original goals, no matter how strongly formulated and how faithfully reformulated on the verbal level, are necessarily modified in action and that the eventual, historical record will be written not by original assumptions but by the means employed. In other words, the goals tell me where you would like to go, but the means which you use or you settle for, or are forced to settle for, inform me where you are going to wind up.

There is always at least one lady in the audience, which to me is a welcome relief from the monotony of male company, but then I hesitate for a minute and I overcome my hesitation to tell a very instructive fable which gives one tremendous insight into the process of the interplay of goals and means, and I bow in apology in advance, but it is printed. It's a story told by a 19th century Dutch writer about a young man who decides to devote his life to doing good. This example is very applicable

to understanding the Communists. He is of a systematic and scholarly frame of mind and he decides to investigate what is the most worth-while cause in his community. He comes to the conclusion that there is no more worth-while cause in his community than to bring back wayward girls to the ways of virtue, and he decides to devote his life to just that.

Then he finds, being of a systematic frame of mind, that this requires a lot of money, and he sets himself to investigate how one can make money the fastest in his community.

I will not finish the story, but, if you look up the posthumous record of this man, the historical record, he will not go down in history as a benefactor of wayward girls but as a practitioner of an entirely different profession. In the beautiful words of my friend, Barrington Moore of Harvard, the means eat up the goals.

Now, the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 not for the purpose of establishing themselves as just another government of Russia. I think they believed, and I think they believed quite sincerely, that they were merely pitching a temporary tent to serve as a temporary headquarters for something called world revolution which would spread to other parts of the world--more suitable, according to the Marxist prediction. This, however, failed to happen, and Lenin had to impose very early in the game on his idealistic colleagues an understanding of the nature of politics. Politics, Lenin discovered, and tried to beat into the heads of his colleagues without Stalin's method of opening the heads, is the art of the feasible, a definition not invented by Marx. Politics is also

the art of the meanwhile, of the here and now. There's a wonderful word in Russian. It's a four-letter word, but a good one--paka, meaning for the time being. I am sure many of you have been in decision-making situations where you find yourselves subjected to the tyranny of the in-box and the out-box. The in-box says, "Here is a problem--potatoes, wheat, boots," and the out-box says, "Before 4:30" or as you say here 1630 "a decision, good, bad, or indifferent." You may have a philosophy about potatoes or wheat or boots, but you have to make a decision, and you may not get around to relate it to your first principles. So what do you do? You make the decision which occurs to you or to the man that writes the piece of paper for you and you sign, and then you sit down and you flatter yourself that, although you have deviated somehow, this is just paka--a little bit like a cashier who steals money systematically from a bank and goes to the horse races. The idealistic philosophy is that one day he will hit it rich, put back the money, so there will be no harm done and he'll have a pile of money won, too. Again you know what the record will be, especially if he plays the horses the way I do.

Lenin also managed to convey to his associates that life is not one's exclusive oyster, that you are not alone, and that the essence of making policy as against spinning yarns is making choices, and not pleasant ones, because that's easy. If you have a problem of choosing between 57 varieties of ice cream, that's easy. But the problem of whether you should die of thirst or drink fluoridated water, that's a

real man's choice. That is an essence of policy-making. When one of his most idealistic associates pushed him and said, "We can't make peace or sit down at the table and negotiate with these horrible, imperialist Germans. What we must do is wager a revolutionary war," Lenin narrowed his otherwise already narrow eyes and looked at Bukharin, a great idealist and a favorite child of the revolution---that's why Stalin treated him so nice and made a little hole in his head--and said to him, "With what?"

There you have the beginning of policy, not after you have made a statement saying that you hate the capitalist world and that the capitalist world is doomed. The beginning of policy is that you realize that you have to relate it not only with wishes but with means. After you have said capitalists or Communists, this is not the end of your finding. It is the very beginning. As Harry Goldman would say, "It's new, and what else is new?" This is only the beginning of policy, the state of it.

I am pleased to see that various countries by now on this map here have different colors. I remember a time, maybe not here but in similar establishments, that it was one, big, undifferentiated blot of red. That was a mistake. I always suggested that the budget of the United States can stand a little variation, at least in paint, no matter how honest and frugal we are these days.

The rationalization used is obvious, but it is not very interesting to us. The rationalization was--and I think Lenin gave it a start, and that became the key to Soviet policy--that while you may remain faithful

to doing what your ultimate goals indicate one day--paka for the time being--you concentrate on building up the strength of the bird at hand, and the bird at hand was the Russian state, or whatever remained of same after the First World War, after the civil war, and what not.

This concentration of strength in the Soviet state, formalized under Stalin as the so-called doctrine of socialism in one country, fills the content of Soviet foreign policy **in the** interwar period, a policy of survival against very tough odds. Both internally and externally there were very high odds against their survival, and yet they were surprised. Lenin used to touch his head in the very first 100 days to see whether it was still there.

The essentially defensive and largely isolationist nature of Soviet foreign policy in the interwar period was obscured, that is, it was obscured from those who wanted to have it obscure, by the Communist international and its high-flung revolutionary phraseology which was actually a cover-up for weakness, a psychological compensation for the sense of loneliness. So if you are lonely you imagine yourself to have some allies somewhere. Ah, "all these dirty, capitalist governments are against me, but the toiling masses of this and that country are on my side." This is, again, as I said before, needed for your self-respect, and it is needed just to keep going.

It was also rather childish, or infantile, as Lenin himself said, the hope of shortcircuiting the established pattern of international relations by jumping over the heads of governments to so-called people,

to so-called masses. who turned out not to give a damn about their message. Here I go by what? By the results. Why were the results poor? Because there is no way of shortcircuiting--only when you are very young and you think you are Superman, and all you have to do is sneak into the linen closet, take a sheet, wrap it around you, say abracadabra, and off you go.

When I want to fly I have to pay for gasoline and I need good weather. In addition, it wouldn't hurt if I knew how to fly. There were no results because Russia was weak and this weakness lasted well into the 1930's because of the internal upheaval of the purges and because of the rather slow buildup of the economy, and also because of a lot of wishful thinking on the part of others who thought that Russia was weak at a time when she wasn't so weak any more.

One of the supreme manifestations of how the outside world gaged the Russian position in the interwar period was Munich. Munich meant the settling of the affairs of a country rather close geographically and technically an ally of the Soviet Union since May 2, 1935, without the participation of the Soviet Union. Let me point out to you that, there again, in this game of international relationships, sometimes it is not the meritum of a decision taken. Don't look at it as a rational pursuit. It has a stronger mixture of something which we call very mildly other-than-rational aspects. It is not the meritum of the decision taken but who is asked to participate.

Anyone who has been in a power position at all understands very well

what I am talking about. If you are not invited to dinner and other people are invited to dinner, it is not your yearning after a lost piece of filet mignon--which we all can afford despite the fact that the pay raise fell through yesterday, but don't worry, it will be voted next week again; that's ideology, to show the folks at home how watchful they are; but next week it will be quietly voted--but of the prestige consideration that is involved in being or not being invited.

The same is true in international relations. Why do the Russians hop around mad about Cyprus? Not because they question the wisdom of this or that decision but because they are not asked to participate in it. You will find that this is a very important element. I might add parenthetically, in jumping ahead of my historical account that, to this day, the Western World has still managed to keep the Soviet Union out of participating in decisions--we are among friends and we can admit it--actually affecting parts of the world territorially very close to the Soviet Union. Do you remember the circumstances of the Suez crisis and the circumstances of the Lebanon crisis? If you look at the map you will find that Lebanon is much closer and Syria is much closer to the Soviet Union--Syria is practically a border state--than they are, for instance, to Kansas.

I think we can admit to ourselves that the double standard is rampant in international relations, and it should be that way. I told you why--because it's not his'n, it's mine, and that is enough to explain why I am interested in it more. Get it out of your head that when you are

President you also have to be right. It's not so. It's enough to be President.

In the crisis of 1939, directly before the outbreak of war, the main assumption of the British was that Russia wasn't worth talking to. The process here of perception--and I don't know why I am stuck with psychology; maybe it's because you woke me so early--is the reverse. Once you conclude that for good, practical reasons Russia isn't worth talking to because her military establishment is no good and her economic power is rattled, as some people believed in 1939, then comes all the rationalization that they don't brush their teeth after breakfast, they don't go to church, and what not. If, on the other hand, the British had felt that the Russians had an important contribution to make against Hitler in 1939 you would find that although it's true that they don't brush their teeth after breakfast, who knows? maybe brushing your teeth after breakfast isn't really good would be the way you would rationalize it. It goes back and forth.

Before we continue, let me just point out the consequences of this concentration on the bird at hand, that is, the consequences of acquiring and holding power in a certain country, by quoting from Ambassador Kennan's book, "Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin."

He says, "Anyone who has looked reasonably closely at political history has had many occasions to observe that the daily experience of holding and exercising supreme power in a country saddles any ruler of whatever his original ideological motives with most of the traditional

concerns of government in that country, subjects him to the customary compulsions of statesmanship within that framework, makes him the protagonist of the traditional interests and the guardian against the traditional dangers. He cannot free himself entirely from his predecessors or his successors. However despotic he may be and however far his original ideas may have departed from the interests of the people over whom he rules, his position of power gives him, as Gibbon once pointed out, a certain identity of interests with those who are ruled. Their energies, and for this reason their lives, their health, and their morale are important to him even if their freedom and happiness are not, and he becomes ipso facto in many respects their guardian, their spokesman, and their champion vis-a-vis external forces. One cannot therefore just exploit one's power over a given people for the exclusive purpose of pursuing ideological aims unrelated to their interests and concerns. One is always to a degree the captive of one's own power and is obliged by the logic of one's position--"

I once said rather flippantly to one of my classes something which I think was very good. I said, "I am not eligible, for instance, to be Pope, but if I were elected Pope I would act like a Pope, because this is what you owe to the position into which you are cast." I wish I would always remember it. I seem to play poker with the rules of bridge, with disastrous results, because I don't put myself into the role in which I am cast.

To come back to Kennan:--"to think at least partly in terms of the

national interest on which that power is founded. This began to happen to the Soviet government early in the day. As early as 1921 it was obliged to shift the focus of its efforts from world revolution to the building up of the physical strength of Russia itself"--the bird in hand, the bouncing baby, as Lenin once said. He said, "Maybe Germany is pregnant with revolution; here we have a baby already, a bouncing baby." It wasn't terribly bouncing, it was barely alive, but it was there.

"If after that time world revolutionary motives, motives of ideological hostility to the capitalist world, continued always to be present to some extent in the pattern of Soviet statesmanship, many other motives were also present which did not have these connotations."

Of course I can't write or speak English as beautifully as Mr. Kennan does, nor do I have this real, scholarly propensity to have three hands, you know--one on the right and one on the left, and then the other one which comes from the middle of the chest, the third hand. I don't have them. But in simpler words I think I say the same thing, or in still simpler words I say, when you face a rabbit pie and you are told that it isn't pure rabbit but a mixture of rabbit and horse, it's a good thing to inquire how much horse and how much rabbit there is. Very quickly you find it is one horse to one rabbit. Then you might just as well stop calling it rabbit pie.

Instead of continuing the historical recital, which is a matter of record, let me point out another thing which I mentioned before

briefly, and that is the awareness of the Bolsheviks that making foreign policy is not the area of absolute wish-fulfillment, that you live in a world with others, and that what others do determines how you relate yourself to it, that your plans, no matter how beautiful, how noble, how ambitious, are of limited significance.

Listen to Mr. Litvinov, the Foreign Commisar, speaking in 1930: "Unlike other commisariats, the commisariat of foreign affairs cannot, unfortunately, put forward a five-year plan of work, a plan for the development of foreign policy. In drawing up the plan of economic development we start from our own aspirations and our wishes, from a calculation of our potentialities, and from the firm principles of our entire policy. But, in examining the development of foreign policy we have to deal with a number of factors that are scarcely subject to our calculations, with a number of elements outside our control and the scope of our action. International affairs are composed not only of our own aspirations and actions but of those of a large number of countries pursuing other aims than ours and using other means to achieve those aims than we allow."

Now, this is an excellent quote, unfortunately overlooked, because it shows this awareness, the awareness which one gets upon growing up in this business, that you are not alone, that you are not Superman, that you don't say abracadabra, and that what you will do is the function of interaction with the acts of others.

Of course, for reasons that are totalling puzzling to me, some Americans think that Soviet foreign policy is always action and ours

is always reaction. That's not quite so. In fact, there are people in the Soviet Union who say just the opposite. Why? Because the action is always greener on the other side, even if it's red.

Now, I won't go into the details of Stalin's foreign policy, but I think the main course was set. He said, "Russia is weak; Russia must be strong. If she is strong people will pay attention to her." He dedicated himself to making Russia cast a longer shadow, to be a bigger nuisance. To be a big power means to be a bigger nuisance than others, at least in the view of others. Of course there are primitive interpretations. He had it all figured out, as if he had some kind of master plan as to what he would do some day at 4:30 A.M. I know what he would do at 4:30 A.M. He would not be asleep yet. That's quite true. But that's about all one can say.

Let me just start from the end of Stalin's foreign policy. That is a current fashion among my illustrious colleagues in this business, to reappraise Stalin's foreign policy. In fact there is a book which I am sure you have here in the library--your very fine library. Professor Marshall Shulman of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, a long-time Associate Director of Harvard's Russian Research Center wrote this book which is called "Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised."

Let me point out to you why it is so easy to reappraise Stalin's foreign policy and to look at it half-way intelligently. Don't say I said that. Stalin offers us a tremendous advantage over Khrushchev. Guess what it is? He's dead. About the dead there is one kind of nice

thing. You can look kind of statically at them. They don't budge. Of course, Stalin budged. He was budged out of his grave, and not by his own action. You can be more relaxed--let's put it this way.

Mr. Shulman comes to a conclusion and he says, "Come to think of it, now that I take a second look at this, one general characteristic of Soviet policy which becomes evident is the largely rational responsiveness of Soviet policy to changes in the outside environment, and particularly to changes in the power relationship." His book is specifically about the last years of Stalin policy, 1949 to 1952.

Of course we would like to know more, and Soviet foreign policy is not rich in documentation. Mr. Shulman says, "This approach to Soviet behavior was an explicable human phenomenon." Time was, gentlemen, when you could be investigated for merely suggesting that maybe Soviet foreign policy is an explicable human behavior, and not a mysterious, devilish behavior.

Now, I want you to understand that Americans--and I am a fairly recent vintage; I did not come on the ~~May~~flower, in spite of rumors to the contrary--maybe cannot distinguish these things. He who opposes me is devilish by definition; he who happens to be on my side is human. It isn't so. The very history of conflict shows that conflict happens among humans, happens among brothers. The first case of homicide, of murder, in fact, is reported in the Bible as having been taken among brothers. Conflict has a certain objective quality. It is part of the human lot, and it's time for us to grow up and to absorb it as being part

of the business.

I spoke to another military establishment, the Army Transportation School, and I mentioned that my closest associate in this way of thinking is General Shoup of the Marines, who has just retired. He once said, "I make hundreds of speeches and I never mention the word 'communism.' I say 'target.' I define target as saying that target is what the President of the United States tells me is the target."

Others usually tell you, "How else do you talk to the Marines?" But I think it is an admirable understanding of what is involved in the thing. It is not at all a matter of a low IQ but of a high understanding of what the nature of conflict is. Is it target? This is target. Tomorrow, this is target. Therefore, any static investment in hating or loving X, Y, or Z is terribly confusing.

I expounded this idea, and then I said, "I have a slogan for you boys. Hit, don't hate." Then a young lieutenant swallowed the bait and got up and said, "Well, sir, isn't it true that he hits the best who hates the best?" I said, "Are you kidding? I was in three armies and this includes training as an artillery officer in the glorious Polish Army. It had artillery officers but it didn't have artillery. But I found that he hits the best who has a cool hand and a cool eye and performs the best job."

Now there is an idea that maybe Stalin was rational. What does rational mean? Professor Shulman comes to our help. He says, "Rational does not mean free from error and it doesn't mean that you look at things

the same way as we do. Rational means that there is a demonstrably rational relationship between Soviet behavior and changes in the world environment." What were these main factors in the changes in world environment which shaped their behavior, good, bad, or indifferent?

First, the Soviet leadership showed a profound grasp of the nature of new weapons. It came to them slowly. Stalin was an extremely conservative and very stubborn person, but there again you can be misled by what he said. There is a description in Churchill's memoirs on how Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill, after hemming and hawing, decided to break the news to him that there had been a successful explosion of the atomic bomb. This was kind of an indirect way of delivering mail, via Hiroshima, addressed to Moscow. Stalin listened, and said, "Very interesting. Just another weapon." What would you say if you didn't have it?

I went around Moscow making subversive propaganda by using a Poloroid camera, which is kind of a miraculous thing. I saw people cross themselves. The first reaction was, "Oh, just another camera." The next reaction--and there came the ideology--"I read in a journal that we are going to have it on the market next month." First, who needs it? Second reaction, we have it, too, or we are going to have it next month. It's very human.

They showed their profound grasp, even if slowly, of the nature of new weapons. They accepted the fact of their vulnerability for several years in the postwar period. They were a bit uneasy, maybe even puzzled. "Where is it? Why don't they drop it?" By concentrating

their full energies on the development they tended to shift or restore the balance of power. Second, Stalin's concentration on what I call the extended bird in hand occurred, and that is the satellite area. All right. This was it, rather than the revolutionizing of the Western European proletariat, which, as Shulman said very wittingly, was the business of joining the installment plan. Third was their reaction to the colonial upheaval. Here it is very interesting to see how you can have your prophecy fulfilled and it doesn't do you any good. The eventual colonial upheaval was always on the books. Lenin has written an awful lot about it. Marx has written nothing. When the Bolshevik prophecy came true it did very little for the Russians. What's more, it came with a speed and in a form to which they were just as unprepared as we were to meet it intelligently. They were thrown upon improvisation. Then the fourth element was the domestic stirrings, which began before Stalin's death, and an attempt to accommodate those stirrings, because the Soviet society was growing up, because there is an overhead, there is a penalty which you pay for teaching people to read. Missionaries discovered it long ago, my Methodist friends. You teach people to read and you have figured out that you have only one book in the library. But they go out and buy other books and smuggle them in. The same is true in Russia. You figure you teach people to read but you dam up the channels. You will control what they read. Well, it doesn't work. The word gets around. There are various techniques of reading. You can now record on the tape recorder things which are read over the radio, and then you

sell this. It sells like hot cakes in Russia. It sells better than hot cakes.

Let me just say one thing, that, in the opinion of Shulman and other experts, Stalin's foreign policy, especially in the last period of his foreign policy, looked different than what it did to his contemporary observers. Now, gentlemen, this wasn't a thousand years ago. It was 10 years ago. Let me tell you, from painful personal experience, that 10 years ago this was not a very popular view, even to suggest remotely that maybe they were even residually human. So when he speaks of the contemporary observers I should like to plead like Sam Goldwyn of Hollywood, "Include me out."

Now I think you deserve some relief from this drudgery for a while.

CAPTAIN BRADY: Gentlemen, before we have the question period Dr. Sharp would like to sum up his remarks very briefly.

DR. SHARP: I have found myself to be remarkably garrulous, to an extent to which I used not to be. It must be advancing age or something. I would like to point out that the framework of thinking about foreign policy which I suggested to you need not mislead you into the temptation of shedding tears for the Soviet Union or having some kind of misguided sympathy. When I say that the Soviet Union is a normal state the word "normal" should not release some kind of a glandular action on your part so that you will melt away. It's a normal state but it is another state, and I don't like it. That's good enough.

Of course, you see, the process of thinking is that if I don't

like somebody, he can't possibly be normal. But the word "normal" or even the word "legitimate," in international relations has specific meaning. If there is any doubt about it, you can find in your library a document of German foreign policy. There was a conversation between Ribbentrop, Hitler's Foreign Minister, and the Duce, Mussolini. The time was March 1940, half way between the deal between Stalin and Hitler and Hitler's invasion of Russia. Mussolini was worried that his boyfriend, Adolph, was running around with Joe. He said, "What's the good about him? Isn't he for world revolution?" Ribbentrop said, "World revolution? Whoever heard of that? He has forgotten it long ago." Then Mussolini tries to get him on another sensitive point, and he said, "How about the Jews? How can you be friendly with a country that's run by a bunch of Jews?" Ribbentrop said, "Jews? I haven't seen any. Stalin killed them all." Mussolini pinned him down. He said, "I've seen a picture of you next to Kraganovitch. How about Kraganovitch?" There Ribbentrop made this beautiful statement. He said, "Kraganovitch is said to be of Jewish blood. To me he looks more like a Georgian."

Here, Gentlemen, you have the process. In the same story he said, "The Soviet Union is more and more like a normal state." What does "normal" mean? "Normal" means one which happens to be going the same way as I, today, this morning. This, I think, is the framework. Therefore, any investment, emotional or intellectual, as if were static, in something that is moving by definition, is a mistake. Therefore I've

tried to explain to you that, if Soviet foreign policy has been successful--and I happen to think it has been moderately successful--then you can relate those successes to to a very simple key, and that is plausibility. They were based upon a plausible evaluation of the outside world, of the feasible, and on what one could get away with. Occasionally it was unsuccessful, and then it was because it was implausible, and the implausibility is not a result of the so-called Marxist blinkers but of one element that is distributed very lavishly and quite evenly throughout the whole system. That is stupidity.

There was the stupidity which/ ^{the} Swedish Ambassador at the conference that ended the Thirty Years War called _____ to the attention of his King. He said, "Your Majesty, you would be surprised at how much stupidity the world is governed by." This is what Marshall Shulman means when he says, "A rational policy is not error free, but it is no more full of errors than any other foreign policy." In that sense it is enough to think that it is somebody else's foreign policy, and therefore you don't have to like it, and you can oppose it. I just don't think it is necessary to put yourself into some kind of a fluff of misinformation or into some kind of an artificial uplift in order to do the job properly.

I particularly appeal to my fellow artillery officers, if there still are such. They will understand, I'm sure, what I am talking about.

As I told you, if I had the rest of the semester we could discuss

in detail all these things. Let me just say that in the post-Stalin period there were many adjustments of Soviet foreign policy and some of them are quite unjustly claimed by Mr. Khrushchev. There is very good evidence that it was there all the time but people just didn't want to look at it, but by now they reread it and think that it was Stalin who said, "War is not inevitable."

The point that I was trying to make is that there is the challenge of the Soviet Union, because it is a substantial country with still a lot of very dynamic power, and it is still growing. To that extent it is uncomfortable for us, but also there has developed a large area of common interest which I think the late President Kennedy so beautifully pointed out in his commencement speech at the American University last year. His most lasting contribution to an understanding of the nature of foreign affairs was when he said--and this was clearly a paraphrase and a rejection of Woodrow Wilson's irreligious arrogance in saying that this particular world was going to fix us up once and for all-- "Let's endeavor to try to make the world safe for diversity." I have counted with some of my students how many times Wilson said, "once and for all" in an area of human endeavor which, like all areas of human endeavor, cannot be done once and for all but only in meeting certain chunks of paka, of meanwhiles, of realities.

To make the world safe for diversity is a fulltime job, and I think the American people are admirably equipped for it if they shed some notions which I think, in St. Paul's language, are childish things,

no longer commensurate with the age and with the frame of responsibility of this country. But then I would be talking about American foreign policy, and my real area of interest, which you would not want to listen to now.

Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Doctor, I am interested in some areas on which I have some thoughts, but I have found out in the past few months that my thoughts are not very reliable. You mentioned something this morning about a bird in the hand. I have thought that maybe the Russians didn't really want the Western powers out of Berlin, that they really wanted to keep them there so that they could find some way to get legal title to this piece of real estate called East Germany. What are your thoughts on that?

DR. SHARP: This was quite true at the time when I argued it in a complete wilderness. It was true in 1945 I think and maybe well into 1946. I hesitate to say these things in the presence of a great authority on the subject, Professor Mosely. I argued at the time that the Russians were not very comfortable in Germany and that we could get them out for the price of according them what we call in law quiet possession of the particular bird which they had in their hand. But no, we were liberating Poland. By the way, don't misunderstand me. I wouldn't mind if we liberated Poland. We were talking about liberating Poland. So if you are liberating Poland by definition you cannot bother with Germany, because, once you liberate Poland, Germany is

already liberated.

In these times there is the essence of the conflict, if there is a rational cause for conflict, and I suggested to you this morning that you don't have to have a rational cause for conflict. We are in conflict with the Russians because we are. My favorite laboratory for the study of behavior of great powers are children. Children sometimes give you the deepest insight into motivation. You ask a child, "Why do you do this, Johnny?" You get the beautiful answer, which all of you parents know, "Because." That's it. Of course, this kills dissertations and footnotes and term papers, but there is a large element of it. The great tragedy is the discrepancy between the quite understandable propensity of analysis to be rational and life, which is not.

In my favorite example, a little girl is commissioned to count the number of legs of six people sitting around the table. She comes up with the finding, 11 legs. The analyst has no problem. There must be a one-legged person. In life, she doesn't know how to count.

So if you ask me whether their provocative behavior on Berlin might not be a way of getting, as you suggested, title or recognition of their hold in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, I felt very strongly this way on just one of those intuitive hunches. But I can't footnote it, I can't prove it. Or maybe I could if necessary. This was true in the immediate postwar period. But we had a finger in their pie, in what they considered to be really their pie. Machiavelli said that the most

dangerous irritants are small irritants. We were engaged in small irritants which did not do any good to that part of the world. We haven't liberated anybody yet.

I think that the Russians have firmed up their position in Germany. By now it is a little less negotiable than it was, substantially less negotiable than it was in 1946. But I frankly would defer to Professor Mosely, who knows so much, infinitely, more on this subject than I, who can offer only wild guesses, even without footnotes.

QUESTION: Sir, I have the impression that you feel that it is not too useful to look to Communist ideology as a guide to their foreign policy. Secondly, I notice that the Communists always say that they are Marxist-Leninist and not just Marxist. How would you say the foreign policy that you have described is inconsistent with the Leninist portion of Marxism-Leninism?

DR. SHARP: It may be more inconsistent with the Marxist portion. Marx had no such problems. He wasn't running anything. He couldn't even run his own household. So, just as he could be very vague about the nature of future Communist society, now Mr. Khrushchev has to sweat and give a half-way, plausible image of something which may or may not happen in 20 years. But in the process of concretization it is usually cut down.

This beautiful castle which you promise your girl friend while you sit near a lake you find is much better equipped than the house you eventually buy in a suburb. There's no tax.

Lenin was for concretization. If concertization worked our really significantly, it was only after the seizure of power, when he realized what it was to be in power and what the relationship was. He said, "You can spin beautiful dreams, but how are you going to do it?"

This is why I said it is the tyranny of the in-box and the out-box and the need to make immediate decisions and partial decisions, gentlemen. Foreign policy is not a once-and-for-all business. There is no such thing, really, as long-range foreign power, because the longer the range the vaguer the framework. It's true even in economic planning. Even the Russians don't try to make plans for 100 years, because they decided that there has to be a reasonable chunk of time.

But, certainly, in foreign policy, as Litvinov so well pointed out, you are not alone. It doesn't depend on what you would do. Therefore these large statements of national goals or purposes or what not are merely kind of German signposts. There is a beautiful book written by a man who was in the policy-planning staff of the State Department, Charles Burton Marshall. He made a speech as a young man. The name of the book is "Limitations of Foreign Policy." In his speech he said, "We must be guided by the stars." He said that after the speech somebody came over and tapped him on the shoulder and introduced himself, saying "I am Admiral So and So. Young man, did you ever navigate a real-life boat?" He said, "Frankly, no, sir." The Admiral said, "I thought so. Leave the stars alone. Those you check from time to time. Keep your

nose down. There are reefs, shoals, and other boats. Worry about those."

STUDENT: Yes, sir, but how is their foreign policy inconsistent with Leninism?

DR. SHARP: It is not inconsistent with Leninism, actually. It is inconsistent with those who take their Lenin or their Marx literally, you see. On the contrary, Lenin is a guide to the utmost flexibility and how to combine the utmost flexibility with a series of ritual bows toward the great Communist Mecca. He told them how to be consistent and inconsistent at the same time. This many American politicians could have taught them at a much lesser cost in suffering.

To me, as a student of Soviet foreign policy, why should I be taken in by that? Why shouldn't I allow that he owes it to himself? There is a beautiful story. At the Congress of the Communist International, a delegate of Outer Mongolia appeared and made a speech in his native language. Nobody understood him, and Lenin was kind of worried. He looked around and asked, "Could somebody translate?" A fellow got up and said, "Yes, I'll translate. The Comrade from Outer Mongolia just said that, under the guidance of the great Soviet Union, the devoted masses of Outer Mongolia will march unflinchingly toward the final victory of communism. Hurrah, hurrah." Lenin turned to the translator and he said, "Comrade Rubenstein, I had no idea that you spoke Mongolian." He said, "I don't. But what else could he have said?"

You see what I mean. There is a ritual and a predictable framework for what you say. For instance, I can draw you a graph of the future

inaugural speeches of American Presidents for the next 100 years, a graph, not the exact words, because it depends on how good the grammar of the particular speech-writer is. But the graph will be there. I can tell you that in the penultimate sentence there will be an invocation of the Deity, even if an atheist is in the White House, because a certain style develops.

I'll tell you frankly that the most frightening experience I had was when I was told in all seriousness that the late Mr. Dulles said that in a sleepless night when he didn't know what Khrushchev would do he would reach for a volume of Stalin's problems with Leninism. I imagined Khrushchev tossing around--yes, from overeating--and reaching for the Bible to find out what John Foster Dulles would do tomorrow. It's equally reliable as a guide.

QUESTION: Doctor, as China grows larger in power, do you think that Russia may become rational and associate itself or ally itself with us?

DR. SHARP: There is every one of three combinations possible between every two states, A and B--friend, foe, neutral. Nobody has yet invented an enrichment of this combination that can be a shading, such as neutralist, dubious friend, or good friend. But the pattern is exactly that. Any two states can be in any relationship.

What bothers me about your question is that you assume that of necessity we have to ally ourselves with the Russians against the Chinese. Not necessarily. We might find ourselves in a situation where we ally ourselves with the Chinese against the Russians. I

wouldn't prejudge it. I just don't know. I leave myself open. I don't cut myself off, because to say they are all Communists is the beginning of thinking about policy, not the end. To say they are all Communists is usually the beginning of a speech, such as the speech by Mr. Russell to the electrical union. But, if you want to save yourself time--and I am sure you have a lot of reading matter--don't read the speech from the beginning, and don't read it to the end. Read between the but and the however.

This is what is significant operationally. Of course, Mr. Rusk says they are all Communists and wish us no good, and I agree with him. But that is gossip and it is not significant. But let me give you a very drastic answer. If two people say that they will bury you, the proper thinking is in the framework of policy. In the framework of non-policy you are despondent and you either cut your throat or you blow up the world, or you stop drinking fluoridated water, or what not. In a policy framework you say, "Excuse me, gentlemen. What is the timetable for burying me?" One says today and the other one says tomorrow. Now, for this time span, the other one is your ally.

CAPTAIN BRADY: Dr. Sharp, having been born on the 13th and having Office No. 13 and having come to address us on Friday, the 13th, if 13 is in it, you've got it made.