

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

16 March 1964

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NOTICE

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Publication No. L64-133

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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COLONEL BEALL: Gentlemen, today there are deep-seated differences between the U. S. S. R. and Communist China which have significant implications in the East-West conflict.

Our speaker, who will discuss "Sino-Soviet Relations," has had a distinguished diplomatic career. He has closely followed the breakdown in relations from key posts that he has held throughout the country. As Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, he followed the early developments of the controversy. As Deputy Chief of Missions, Moscow, he analyzed and reported on the Moscow-Peking conflict.

Our speaker, of course, is no stranger to us, and it is my pleasure to present Mr. Edward L. Freers, Department of State Adviser to the Commandant of the Industrial College, who will speak on "Sino-Soviet Relations."

MR. FREERS: General Stoughton; Gentlemen: It is a great honor and a great privilege to appear before this critical but friendly audience. I thought for a minute last Friday that Dr. Mosely was going to give my whole speech in the answer to one question. Fortunately, I was saved by the bell. As announced, the subject is "Sino-Soviet Relations." The main element in those relations, of course, is the Sino-Soviet dispute, or rift, as it is called.

Some people think this is a big hoax; some gigantic element in a Soviet Master Plan to achieve domination or mastery of the world. Maybe they are right. And, it is easy to speculate on the dangers that could arise from being too optimistic about the controversy. Certainly, there would be temptations to relax; temptations to move in and help one side or other of the dispute, either to keep it boiling, or have it simmer down. In fact, a relaxed atmosphere of this kind could actually create new weak spots in

our world that these Communist powers could and would exploit as long as they cling to the world outlooks that they do.

But, a hoax involves collusion, and collusion is inherently difficult to document, and difficult to prove. And the burden of proof is on those who hold that view. Actually, there have been many deep splits inside both the Marxist movement and the Communist movement. The Communist or Socialist movement is on the Fourth International right now, and each one of those organizations, which have a world spread, were developed as a result of some major disagreement; major conflict over a series of policies.

In fact, the so-called monolithic unity that the Communist bandy about a great deal has not really held sway for a very long period. I am not talking about the single ideal of the Communist world that attracts so many people around the world toward communism; I am talking about a single source of decision. Actually, inside the Soviet bloc where you have one type of Communist, Communists in power who are involved in wrestling with the problems that are common to any rulers over large areas and populations, this unity lasted only from the mid-thirties to Tito's defection in 1948. This unity was imposed by Stalin by a very simple and very effective means--brute force; its ready use and its pervasive threat. Unity did prevail a little longer and on a little broader scale outside the bloc where the other breed of Communists were operating--those who were seeking power, seeking to overthrow governments in the outside world.

Well, this is a lot of philosophy. The point I am making is that there is no real guide in the past as to judging this particular development. What we have to do, really, is try to analyze what is actually happening and come to our own conclusions about whether it is genuine and where it is likely to go.

I had a little difficulty deciding on an approach for dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute because the relations between those two countries are not only relations between two big states, they are relations between Communist regimes that are wrestling with each other for control of a movement that spreads all around the world. It has its nose in every form of political-economic activity. It is a little hard to put your finger on all of the ramifications of the dispute.

So, it seemed the best approach would be to try to lay out what I think are the four background elements that are generating the heat, so to speak. The first of these is economic. From the day Communist China was born it was an economic problem child for the rest of the Communist family. Two questions arose immediately; were the other Communist countries going to pitch in and behave like members of the family and try to bring up China in their own circle, at their own rate of growth? And, was China going to be a good boy or good girl--however you refer to a country, and do what papa said.

The answer to these questions was not very clear for the first few years. Certainly, Russia and the Eastern Europeans started off with a program of at least active economic cooperation with China. They, as you know, early in the game undertook to furnish 300 or 400 industrial plants. They sent several thousand technicians to China to help in the construction and operation of these plants. And they furnished the Chinese with a big amount of useful technical data. This may not have been a decisive type of economic assistance, and China was bound to pay for everything she got--the credits were extended on strictly commercial terms--but the fact was that the relationship was very beneficial to China and held prospects for growth in the future.

But some time in the mid-fifties both China and Russia began to launch out with economic policies that the other party obviously and sharply disliked. On the Russian side, instead of concentrating, as China wanted, in helping China, the Russians began putting some of their scarce resources in what could be called an effort to bribe the neutral countries to help them weaken the West. Rather than strengthen China they were going to weaken the West.

The Russians figured that the governments of these newly-independent countries had a strong common objective with them in trying to press the West in moving forward on disarmament; to help liquidate the system of American bases around the perimeter; and in general, just keep fighting on the issues of colonialism and economic imperialism.

There is a chicken and the egg aspect about which party started off on its own path first, and the chronology is pretty obscure. But China in roughly the same period in which the

Russians were so courting the neutrals struck out on some domestic economic measures the Russians disliked very much. The Chinese slogans for them are pretty picturesque "The Great Leap Forward," "Walking on Two Legs," and, a little more prosaic, the "Communes." The first two were economic programs designed to speed up Chinese economic development, ignoring or outstripping current formal plans run around the neighborhood, gather scrap and make steel in backyard furnaces, et cetera.

But the one innovation that perhaps disturbed the Eastern Europeans and the Russians was the communes. The commune was an institutional innovation. By its very nature it had great ideological overtones which the Eastern Europeans did not like. What it meant was that the Chinese were leap-frogging Russia and the Eastern Europeans in the advance toward communism; in theory. They were not afraid of the practice, but this doctrinal challenge did have big implications in Eastern Europe at the time.

Whether these were the main reasons or not, what happened in 1960 was that economic relations took a sharp turn for the worse. The Russians withdrew their technicians, as you know; trade started on a rapid decline; and for the past 4 years there has been practically no economic cooperation between Russia and China. There has been trade, but at a reduced level, and no particular interest on the Russian side to help out. What was suspected earlier and what is clear now, is that neither Russia nor the Eastern Europeans are going to impose additional sacrifices on their own people, or put additional burdens on their industrial and military potential in order to pull up the Chinese to their level.

The Chinese are double their number and it would be a tremendous job even if they had the intentions of doing it. But it is clear they are not going to share the wealth with the Chinese. That means that China has no particular reason to be beholden to the other Communist countries.

Militancy is the next bone of contention. By militancy I don't mean getting tough in any individual situation, because both countries have, when they saw fit, been tough in specific situations. What I mean is a general atmosphere of tension instead of a relaxation of tension. The Chinese want this and the Russians do not. The reason goes back to their own domestic stage of development; the place they find themselves in their march toward communism; the

place they find themselves in consolidating their own power inside their own countries. Russia is at two plus two equals five; China is at two plus two equals six.

In other words, the Russian leaders feel that they have reached a point where they can try to bridge the gulf between themselves and their people, to de-Stalinize, as they put it. They do not worry any longer that there are large elements in the population in Russia who yearn for the old days and might have some stomach and capability to try to do something about it. They do not need the weapon of coercion as much as they did before. Persuasion is a little more effective. The common Russian may not be satisfied with his lot but he knows it is a lot better than it was, say, 15 years ago.

To illustrate this I want to draw on a personal experience. In the old days in Moscow, Stalin used to drive around town in a convoy of seven big black limousines; the curtains were drawn; nobody could see who was in any of the cars. Police were stationed on streets all along the route. They would keep people on the back streets and not let them go along the side of the route he was taking. Nobody knew when he was coming. He would whiz through at 60 or 70 miles an hour.

Khrushchev behaves in a totally different manner. One day I got a call saying that Khrushchev would like to come out and make another visit to our exhibit. At that time we were getting about 50,000 people a day at the exhibit. When he pulled up with Mikoyan and Gromyko we all got together and started moving into the exhibit hall. The crowds just surged around. They broke their way through the security police. Mikoyan was swept in one direction; I was swept in another. Khrushchev was milling around and people were sort of clutching at him.

The point is that he gets down among the people. I do not say that he always wants to be in crowds like that. He does have security protection about like what our President does. But he does like to meet people; he does talk with people. He is well, popular perhaps is the word. I think the Russians would be happy not to have any Communist at the head of the government; they know they are being exploited for the Communist system--but, in relative terms, Khrushchev is popularly accepted.

So, all this leads to a situation of less tension at home in Russia, and a desire for less tension abroad.

In China, things are totally different. There the regime is only 15 years old. China abounds with political enemies who would like to go back to the past. The Chinese leaders rely heavily on coercion. Communism for them must involve the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the Communist Party in the vanguard and with Mao himself calling the tune.

In Russia, when it comes to foreign problems, talk of war being inevitable is very unpopular. Peaceful coexistence is popular. When the regime makes statements about supporting violence and liberation abroad it gets a very unenthusiastic reception at home. I am talking about the people in general, not about the 18,000 Communist activists who go down and hear the leaders speak in the sports arena, shout, clap, wave their arms, et cetera.

In China, talk of the inevitability of war, on the other hand, is a slogan that helps the regime mobilize efforts behind greater production. It is very useful. The Chinese do not talk a great deal about negotiating with the outside world; about improving relations with the outside world; partly because it is not accepted as a negotiating partner. General de Gaulle seems to be working to change that situation. So, it is not surprising that China wants a generally tense atmosphere in the world. Russia doesn't and this is a major source of conflict running through the whole Communist movement. It does not matter what Russia does, China is going to criticize it for being too yellow, as one of our speakers said. Take Cuba. The Chinese say Russia was wrong when it went in, but after it was in, it was wrong to pull out, et cetera. So, the issues themselves, whatever their intrinsic importance, are part of the political maneuvers and polemics.

Now, as you can see by the map, the Chinese-Soviet border is perhaps the longest continuous border in the world. That can be quite a headache, even for peaceful neighbors, and certainly for people who are having trouble the way the Russians and the Chinese are. It is potentially a very dangerous stretch of territory. About a hundred years ago; that is, about the same time we were fighting Mexico and taking some territory from her, the Russians were imposing three treaties on China that resulted in Russia getting territory as big as France and Germany combined. This was the territory from Lake Baykal over to the Pacific Ocean.

This is a territory that has a lot of mineral resources, timber, fishing and water power. And the Russians have been actively developing this area in modern times. They have put up some fairly large cities; Vladivostok, Khabarousk, and Komsomolsk, for example. There are no Chinese in this area to speak of, but now that the two countries are having their quarrel, from time to time Chinese scholars, map-makers and theoreticians, keep making allusions to the fact that this is, according to them, Chinese territory and they hint very strongly that the Russians are behaving like their Czarist predecessors in keeping it for themselves.

There is, furthermore, a current source of friction in that area. There are some islands in the Amoy River--which flows along the border north of Manchuria, over to Khabarousk--that the Chinese like to fish from, and that the Russians patrol to prevent their fishing. There are from time to time, skirmishes and squabbles. This is a live problem that China keeps putting up to Russia to solve.

Further west is Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is a name that strikes a warm chord in my heart personally. I was tapped to carry on the negotiations with the Outer Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow, directed at exchanging missions between Washington and Ulan Bator.

Mongolia is a place of Soviet-Chinese rivalry. Nobody knows how significant it is at this time, but the prospects are that if the dispute gets hotter and hotter it would become a point of greater friction. Outer Mongolia was Chinese for centuries, but in 1912 the Russians helped a group of rebels kick out the Chinese garrisons and cut off Chinese immigration into Outer Mongolia. Mongolia was made independent in 1945 through a plebiscite. After a period of certain indifference, the Chinese have in recent years been moving back in. They have put in aid programs; they have sent cultural delegations; and they are in many ways giving the Russians a run for their money as far as influence there is concerned. The Chinese, many people think, are more skillful in dealing with the Mongolians.

But, the touchiest problem along the border is the one in Sinkiang. Sinkiang is rich in metals and oil, and the Russians have been exploiting these resources for several decades, hand-in-hand with local Chinese Governors. However, twice before World War II

the Russians were obliged to move troops in and put down revolts by the local Moslem population, a great number of whom were refugees from the Moslem populations that reside in the central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

In recent years the Chinese again have moved back in and re-asserted their authority. They have increased their participation in developing the resources in the area and they have moved Chinese into the area in large numbers. The result is that the balance has changed a little; the Moslem population is suffering some; there have been some disorders. The Moslems have been fleeing to the Soviet Union. Soviet Consular officials have been helping them. And the local Chinese rulers have had to use troops to put down some of these disorders. The Soviet Consular officials have been expelled and the situation is a bit tense.

There have been reports lately that both sides have moved some troops into the area. When they say troops, of course, this may mean Soviet border units being moved into the area as a general precautionary measure. The thing about border problems is that they are more concrete than all of these policy questions that are so heatedly discussed by the parties in the dispute. Border problems involve people, they involve land; they are really a matter for governments rather than for the political parties; and they are a potential long-term source of friction and they can heat up any time the general dispute takes a turn for the worse.

The last background element I want to discuss is the nuclear dilemma. The fact that Russia doesn't seem willing to help China with a nuclear capability just in general casts a big shadow over all their relations. The implications are that China will always be dependent upon the Soviet Union for any demonstration of strength. In 1957 it looked as if the Russians might give the Chinese some help in the nuclear field, but when Khrushchev had to rush to Peking to put a damper on the Chinese during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis it was brought out sharply that the Russians just could not afford to put this capability in the hands of a power that could embroil them in a conflict with us.

The argument over military policy must have been very long and bitter, because not only was the nuclear aspect affected, but the Russians in general have cut down on their shipments of military equipment for even general defensive purposes for the mainland.

The result is that China just cannot depend on the Russian military umbrella and apparently this is what the Russians want.

This, in a sense, is the background. I have not touched on all the letters; all the charges by one side against the other; all the bitter and violent language between the leaders--Khrushchev and Mao. This is activity that has been going on increasingly and is a sort of political maneuvering to get the power to change these basic situations. There have obviously been a number of attempts to patch up the quarrel; at least two international conferences have been held; and at least two sessions of bilateral talks have been held between the Russians and the Chinese. And as you know, the papers are now full of reports that the Russians are about to call an international conference which may finally expel the Chinese from the movement. Prophecy is a very unfruitful exercise and I do not think anybody has any real feel for this; I do not think the parties themselves know until they get together, just what they are going to do.

The Chinese have been talking about a new international movement, and the Russians are in a tough position because they stand to lose whichever way the situation goes. If the Chinese stay inside the movement they can work on considerable elements within the Communist Parties that they themselves do not want to break. And they can also give encouragement to the Eastern European countries who want to play the Russians against us and against the Chinese, and who would be hampered a little if the Chinese actually broke out and developed a movement of their own.

The real subject, as far as we are concerned, is how this goes on for so long and how is it that Russia cannot beat China down and China can continue the fight so tenaciously. This calls for appraising the relative strengths of the two sides. Obviously, in terms of physical power the Russians are overwhelmingly superior. This is true of military strength, the same for economic power, and the same for formal political support. If it came to a military showdown, obviously the Russians could paralyze China in a matter of days; maybe even of hours.

But they just cannot bang down on China this way. The big stick might silence China's voice for awhile, but it would open up a Pandora's box of other problems. Because of this, even the threat of military power is not very effective against China. Where

the Russian military strength does count very effectively is that it is the weapon that Russia uses to keep the Eastern European countries lined up behind it--excluding Albania, of course--and it is the weapon that the Russians can use against Cuba to keep Cuba from getting too close to the Chinese line.

Russia's economic power can be used in the same way to hold the political support of a lot of people in the Communist movement who would otherwise be attracted to the general approach of the Chinese. And, of course, if the Chinese would ever by any chance become more reasonable the Russian economic strength would be something of a lever; it is though, in this regard, a good deal diminished by the fact that in the last couple of years rates of growth in Russia have gone down quite a bit, as you know.

Where Russia gets its political strength is from two major elements in the movement; one is the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, as I said, who are enjoying at least a measure of liberty and a measure of progress in economic development; and the other is the big Communist Parties in the advanced countries like those in Italy and France who have some status in the political structure and can at least rationalize to themselves that they can come to power peacefully.

So, the Russians could win a battle, win a trade war, or win a victory in a parliament if there were such a thing in the Communist world. But this does not mean that they can beat China down. China's strength stems partly from the nature of the world balance of power; it stems partly from her special geographic and cultural position in Asia; and partly from the fact that China has a built-in constituency in the world Communist movement. China can play Russia against us. She knows Russia is keeping an eye out for us all the time. Although, she cannot challenge Russia's military power with any physical moves--and this is where the border problems are a tricky thing for her. She can operate within a fairly large area of disagreement.

On the geographic and cultural side, the position of China gives her a built-in advantage in certain Communist activities in that general area. Overseas Chinese are spread all around, and while there is a struggle with the Republic of China about their loyalties, et cetera, still, the Communist Chinese can and do have active contacts in these communities. And many people think that the

trend of the youth is toward Communist China. At least they can operate better than the Russians can in this area. China can do favors in a business way and in the way of travel. It can help out certain Asian countries in a political sense. And so, this is a source of strength the Russians have difficulty in challenging.

Then, as I mentioned before, inside the Communist movement there is a certain element that just cannot live with the Soviet line. As long as the Soviets are completely dominant, there is not any place for them to go. But now that the Chinese are in opposition, they can support the Chinese. These groups are convinced that in their own situation they can only progress by fighting tooth and nail with all their political opponents. They do not want to play the game of popular fronts with the socialists. They do not want to get along with other political groups. And they are a sort of made-to-order, rock-bottom, hard-core that the Chinese can count on from here on in. And what troubles the Russians is that this group is not likely to diminish; it is more likely to grow.

At this point it might be useful to close and expose myself to the questioning. In the long run--and somebody said, "In the long run we'll all be dead"--will find out whether it will be the Chinese or the Russians who are going to put their position across in this dispute. In the meanwhile there will be a good many OP's under the dam, or over the rostrum. As the Russians say, "I am finished."

QUESTION: Mr. Freers, I was most interested in your personal knowledge of the proposed Outer Mongolian-U.S. affiliation, and I can see why this may have come to an abrupt halt. Would you care to predict whether there is a possibility of this resuming?

MR. FREERS: I do not see any prospect for some time. The occasion that we had was a very propitious one for us. It was a case where Outer Mongolia was going to come into the United Nations anyway, and we thought we might as well use this opportunity to get missions in both places and open up, in a sense, that area. But that is all past now and you would have to fight the whole battle if you were going to recognize a new Communist country.

You know, before all this started, the official definition of Outer Mongolia was that it was a dubious entity. And the people who would now have to justify entering into relations with it would

have to fight this whole battle in Congress and elsewhere, to prove that it is an independent country. I do not see any prospect.

QUESTION: Sir, at one point in your remarks you indicated that the people in Russia would prefer a non-Communist leader, and recognize that they are being exploited. This seems to be contrary to the generally-held view that--(remainder of question inaudible).

MR. FREERS: I do not know what the generally-held view is. I think you may be referring to the fact that people who go to the Soviet Union now feel that the population is relatively contented, or however you put it, and this

QUESTION: (Interposing) Experts indicate that if Khrushchev were to run a free election he would be overwhelmingly elected.

MR. FREERS: I do not believe that. I mean, that would depend on the choice, of course. If it were Khrushchev against Molotov, I think he would be in. But Khrushchev against Adlai Stevenson--I think the Russian people, the general mass of the Russian people, are very worldly. They have lived through all sorts of ups and downs, flip-flops in ideology, doctrine, situation, et cetera, and they are fairly cynical. But they do realize, as I said elsewhere, that they are better off than they were 15 years ago. And as long as there is peace in the Soviet Union there will be a steady increase in the standard of living.

Their rate of growth has gone down in the last couple of years, but these improvements are still noticeable. But, the people are not satisfied, as they are not in most countries. And in Russia they do know that they pay an extra premium for supporting a government that has world connections and aims.

QUESTION: Mr. Freers, would you comment on the extent of the Lenin Institute and whether or not the Russians ever brought the Chinese in on some sort of academic parley?

MR. FREERS: This question was asked earlier this year, and I wondered what the Lenin Institute was. There is an Institute of Marx, Engels, Lenin, which is the top theoretical institute in the Soviet Union, which is a repository, in a sense, of theory, and it prepares publications, works out the line, et cetera. Frankly, I

do not know whether there are foreign Communists in the institute. I just don't know.

QUESTION: Mr. Freers, you mentioned that you thought that Russia could neutralize China in a matter of days. Were you talking conventional, or nuclear? There are those who feel otherwise because of its large population.

MR. FREERS: I am thinking of nuclear weapons and I am thinking of what would happen.

You know, Mao and other Chinese Communists are reported as saying that in a nuclear war 600 million or 300 million Chinese would survive. I think this is part of the polemical battle with the Soviet Union. I don't think it has any relation whatever to Chinese thinking about nuclear warfare. You Air Force people would have a better idea than I of what would happen if we dumped a load of nuclear weapons on the major Chinese cities. I think they would be paralyzed.

QUESTION: What position does Chiang Kai-shek in Nationalist China play in this struggle? And if the answer is "small," how do we justify continued expenditures in this area?

MR. FREERS: Well, in this struggle; that is, in promoting the rift between Russia and China, I do not think he plays much of a role, apart from the instance itself of the government of the Republic of China. In fact, his pressure on China may even be a little counter-productive in the clash between Russia and China. I think there is always present the element that if either of them were seriously threatened with pressure from the outside they might find it easier to reconcile their differences. Since they are not, they are in open clash.

As far as supporting Chiang Kai-shek with money, et cetera, I think, from the military standpoint as I understand it, he has a fighting force which is an important element in the Far East. We have strategic interests in Taiwan, and Chiang does have influence among the overseas Chinese. I don't know how much importance we attach to that; I think it is more that Taiwan is considered an important military area as far as we are concerned. The amount of money, I do not know.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the various ramifications of the recent Rumanian Delegation that went to Peking and what impact it might have on the problem?

MR. FREERS: Well, the Rumanians, oddly enough--and they have had a great deal of experience in dealing with one side and another in their part of the world--have sensed that in the Chinese-Russian dispute there is an opportunity for them to improve their own position. But I think the Rumanians worry about the possibility that this split will become too wide and that their room for maneuvering will lessen. Because, if the Chinese are actually put out of the movement, then the Russians, in the area where they do have their support, can exert more pressure.

So, I think the Rumanians have been trying to pull things together. But, of course the Russians are playing their own strategy with the Chinese and I do not think they like this Rumanian maneuver. There is a balance of forces now all the way around; neither party in the dispute can really do anything forcibly about what the other one does. There is no way of imposing their will; they cannot use force.

I don't think the Rumanians will make any impact on either the Chinese or the Russians. But this is the game they play for their own national interest.

QUESTION: Would you hold to the thesis that the development of a government in a large country like the Soviet Union or China is evolutionary, not revolutionary, and that their split is because of a difference in the chain of developments, the Soviets being relatively sophisticated and the Chinese still mouthing Marxist-Leninist dogma without regard to where the situation is?

MR. FREERS: I forgot the first part of that. Discuss the?

QUESTION: The thesis that the development of a government in a Communist country is evolutionary, not revolutionary.

MR. FREERS: Well, this is not a theory in the sense that a revolution is largely taken care of in a Communist country by the actual eradication of opposition; there is nobody to carry on a revolution. Now, this is the case in the Soviet Union. Stalin was a little worried about this after the war and he wrote a theoretical treatise ruling that from now on, within the Soviet Union, the

doctrine would be evolution rather than revolution. I mean, revolution was good Marxism outside, but inside it was a little dangerous.

Acceptance of evolution is based on the fact that there is enough power to prevent any opposition; there is just no sign of any capability for revolution in the Soviet Union.

In China it is a little different because China is at a different stage in its development. It still has the problem of beating down a lot of people who can remember more than 15 years back, a big element of the population. But we have no evidence that the Chinese are not capable of finding the necessary force to do that.

QUESTION: Well, is it possible that the split comes because there is a difference in the stage of developments between the two countries?

MR. FREERS: Yes, This is one of the things I tried to bring out. As I said, Mao is faced with a population that is not as settled down, let us say. This is the reason why the Chinese want a general atmosphere of tension in the world. And it is this general atmosphere of tension which causes the Russians trouble, because they are working on another line. That is what causes the split in this particular area.

The split is over how much tension there should be in the world. That is what it amounts to. It goes back to the domestic situation.

QUESTION: Mr. Freers, if the Communist Chinese are put out of the Communist movement, would you care to comment on what they are likely to do thereafter? Would they continue to teach the Communist movement, or would they more likely, say, develop a Pan-Asian, the old Asia for Asians philosophy?

MR. FREERS: Well, I think there would be a tendency for them to do both. After all, they are struggling for power and influence. And no Communists are going to let themselves be bound up too much in a general line to overlook opportunities to develop a power base. The Chinese are going around currying favor with the neutral governments; just the thing they have criticized the Soviets for. There is no consistency in their operations. So, I would think they would do both.

In certain areas it would pay them to use the racial issue. It just depends on the situation in the individual countries. They would follow both lines. At least that is the pattern.

QUESTION: Is there any possibility, Mr. Freers, that in this growing rift the presence of Red China on the Security Council might be just so embarrassing to the Russians that they might pass the word, at least to other Communist nations, to keep China out?

MR. FREERS: At this stage, and for some time to come, I think the Russians would consider this an academic problem. In spite of all the activity about China and the fact that there might be votes in the U.N., there is one big hurdle. That is, the Republic of China, has the seat in the Security Council which seat gives it a veto and nobody as yet has figured out how to overcome that. So, I think the Russians are just not dealing with this question at the present time. What it would be in 2 or 3 years would depend on how the dispute is going.

So, it would be hard to answer that question. I don't think, in the long run, that the Russians would do that. I think they would feel that they are capable of handling the Chinese in the Security Council. It is true, the Chinese try to keep the Russians out of all these Afro-Asian meetings, and have been successful up to a point, but I don't think the Russians would do it the way you mention.

QUESTION: Sir, there seems to be some general feeling that the Sino-Soviet split is to our advantage. Would you conjecture, shall we say, on the theory of our managing the split to our advantage?

MR. FREERS: I think the answer is that the feeling is instinctive that the split is beneficial to us; because it is loosening ties in the Communist world, that it is a general good thing to have Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the others more and more follow their own paths; that this works in our interest because all these countries have no interest whatever in being run by the Russians any more than by the Germans or by us. Therefore, they are a force that works to soften the conflict and reach a modus vivendi. So, people think that is a good thing. But I have not seen anything or heard anybody think further than that.

QUESTION: One of the possibilities that we hear completely misinterpreted is this whole thing about the Chinese-Soviet split. The reason I am asking this question is because the Russians were pulling engineers out of China--and technicians--long before this split moved into the open. One of the possibilities is that Russia has found a bottomless barrel and is trying to prime the economic pump of China.

MR. FREERS: Well, I think they have. You recall the argument we ourselves had 20 years ago about pouring money down the rathole and trying to bolster China then. I think the Russians, when they look at this picture, think it is hopeless. There is evidence to indicate that they do, and that is why there is this lack of economic cooperation. But I do not get the connection with the, let us say hoax part. This is a natural reason why China can feel absolutely free to go its own way, because it is not getting anything out of its association with Russia except a common umbrella of ideology of communism which has its pluses and minuses.

Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: Well, I do not think it is a hoax. I think Russia just got discouraged, and pulled out.

MR. FREERS: Well, they were pulling them out in 1960, but these two economic policies that have created the divergency go back to 1956; maybe a little earlier. And so, the removal of the technicians was an act of frustration at a certain point in the development of this dispute. Now, as you say, they got fed up and pulled them out. It did not do them any good because it exacerbated the split and now they have the problem of whether or not China is going to stay in or out. It had greater implications than just picking up their marbles and going home.

QUESTION: What was the Russian rationale in supporting India in the Chinese-Indian border dispute?

MR. FREERS: Well, this, again, stemmed from this sort of policy in 1955, and India was one of the main countries that Russia chose to try to bribe to put pressure on us to weaken us. We had a lot of trouble with Indian policy for a long period of time. So, the Russians had a stake in this neutrality posture and nonalignment of India. Then China came along, in their view as a bad boy, and was disrupting this policy.

So, Russia was faced with helping its own policy or helping Chinese policy. And it chose to help its own.

QUESTION: In the confrontation between China and the Soviet Union, ethnic differences interest me. It was stated from the platform here that the Chinese think of the Russians as Europeans rather than blood-brothers in the cause. Would you comment on this influence in that direction?

MR. FREERS: Well, they are white and the Chinese are yellow. The Russians in this whole area around China, for example, are all new people in these lands--some in the last 25 or 30 years, and some earlier, say 80 years ago. Otherwise this had all been Asian territory, without the Russians. I don't know China too well, but all of our Chinese people say the Chinese have a particularly deep xenophobia that takes in everybody but a Chinese. So, I think it is a natural thing for them to think of the Russians as somebody else. This is not only true of Chinese and Russians in the Communist movement. There could be an international conference in Moscow, and the Bulgarians, for example, would be there. The Russian police would be following the Bulgarians as much as they follow us. There is not any great feeling of kinship. There is a feeling of a common political, ideological orientation, but there is no other unusual ethnic attachment. The Poles, for example, hate the Russians, and it doesn't matter that they are both Communist. They have to work together because they are, but this doesn't change the nationalistic feeling.

COLONEL BEALL: We seem to have run out of questions, so, on behalf of all of us, thank you very much for your very fine coverage and a very interesting lecture.

(22 October 1964--5, 900)H/ en:dc