



NATIONS AND NEUTRALISM

Dr. Hans Kohn


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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 14 May 1964.



INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1963 - 1964

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23 March 1964

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
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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF Date 17 MAY 1964
Reporter--Grace R. O'Toole



Publication No. L64-138

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DR. SANDERS: Gentlemen: If one were to try to isolate a common threat prevalent to most of the crises of this troubled world, he would most likely pick nationalism and, if polycenenturism has any meaning on either side of the Iron Curtain, I think one could also claim that its roots lie in nationalism. And, if nations tend to stand aside in the East-West conflict, I think we can also ascribe a large part of that condition to nationalism.

Today we are fortunate to have as our speaker a scholar who can discuss the subject of nationalism not only with authority but with an historical insight with which few are blessed.

The name of Hans Kohn has become synonymous with the study of nationalism. It gives me great pleasure to welcome Dr. Kohn to address the Class of 1964.

Dr. Kohn.

DR. KOHN: Gentlemen: As Professor Sanders told you, nationalism is today, as I see it, the strongest force in history, shaping more than anything else the destinies of peoples or, to use the word, nations.

Nationalism, like neutralism, is not new. It goes back to the 18th and 19th centuries. You know very well that your European history in the 19th century was determined largely by nationalism. The wars of German unification and the wars of Italian unification were fought for nationalism. And you may say that World War I, 50 years ago, broke out

from a struggle between Serbian and Yugoslavian nationalism on the one hand and German-Magyar nationalism on the other hand. You may say that World War II, 25 years ago, started out of a clash of Polish nationalism on the one hand and German nationalism on the other hand.

After each of the two great wars we saw something that had not been expected. I remember 1919 very well. That was when I was married in my old age. Many of us expected that after the horror of World War I, which was greater than that of World War II in many ways--there was nothing in World War II that could compare with the horror of Flanders and Verdun----there would be an end of nationalism and more internal cooperation.

We were wrong, as you know. There was more nationalism after World War I than before World War I. I shall point out immediately that the era of post-World-War II is again dominated by a rapid growth of nationalism all over the world. Secondly I point out that neutralism is nothing new either. We were neutralists from early in our history up to 1917. And mind you, neutralism is not identical with pacifism. We fought a number of nice, little wars when we were neutralists. We fought many Indian wars, which were wars not for us but for the Indians. We fought the Mexican War, which took away from Mexico about one-third of the Mexican territory. And we fought the Spanish War, when we took the Philippine Islands and Cuba.

But we were neutralist in the power struggle of the European empires and ideologies. As you know, neutralism again has grown after

World War II, as I shall point out immediately. But let me now go back and I shall not go farther back in history than 1945. In 1945 our Army and the Russian Army met unexpectedly in Turgoo on the Elbe River in the center of Germany, the center of Europe. This meeting seemed to start a new era of history, an era of history in which there would be no other but two great super-powers left, we and the Russians, and these super-powers would have their satellites or dependent countries or allies. You see, we call our friends allies, but the Russian friends we call satellites, but the Russians do the same thing, the other way around. Whatever you wish to call them, the two super-powers with their clients appeared to divide the world among themselves. There seemed to grow up a world with only two power centers, Washington and Moscow. This is what we call a bipolar world, a world of two poles, a world of immense tension and seemingly a dangerous world.

Gentlemen, I wish to say immediately that the fears of war seemed to me then already unfounded. I am one of these people who, rightly or wrongly, so far rightly--but nobody knows about tomorrow and certainly I do not know about tomorrow--have maintained that a third world war is utmostly improbable. Mind that in 1945 to 1950, in that most dangerous time, we had at that time the monopoly of atomic weapons. We did not use them. But I wish to draw attention to the fact that Stalin, who undoubtedly was a horrible tyrant, did not use Russian military power, without an atomic bomb, in 1948 when he was tremendously upset by Tito, the Yugoslavian Communist dictator. You may remember the split between

Stalin and Tito in 1948. To Stalin Tito appeared an immense horror. He called him a Trotskyite, which doesn't mean anything to you but for the Communists it is the worse thing to be called, worse than capitalist. He called him a Trotskyite, and he called him a Fascist, and he shook his fist and put the whole propaganda apparatus against Tito. And yet, though Russia was immensely strong relative to Yugoslavia but not relative to us, and Yugoslavia at that time was very weak, he did not dare to invade Yugoslavia and put an end to Trotskyism. The idea that it is easy for the super-powers to start wars is, I think, an entirely wrong idea.

But let me point out what is more important, that the situation of 1945 does not exist any more today. The situation of the 1960's is an entirely different situation. Many people in 1945 or 1948 assumed that the situation would last. No situation in history lasts forever. History consists of non-lasting situations. The word, forever, and the words, in perpetuity--the funny words you have in the Panama Canal Treaty--do not exist in history. Nothing on earth is lasting. It is a blasphemy to speak of perpetuity for earthly considerations.

Twenty years ago, in 1944, some of you may have been in World War II. I was in World War I. That's long ago. We regarded the Japanese and the Germans in 1944 as horrible people. You may remember that. Twenty years later they are our best friends. Mind you, they are not so different today from what they were. They are our best friends. Twenty years ago the United States Government showed a movie here in the

United States, called "Mission to Moscow," written, though with certain Hollywood embellishments, from the diary of our wartime Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Davies. In this picture the Russians were depicted as very nice men. Ten years later they seem horrible to us. Things change in history. The situation of 1945 is no longer with us. If it is no longer with us, let me tell you why.

There are three reasons: First, the new strength of Western Europe. Gentlemen, some of you might have been in Germany or France or England in 1945 or 1946. These countries lay prostrate. Their people were hungry, shabby, and shoddy. No one could have thought in 1945, 1946, or 1947 that Paris, Munich, Milan, or London would look as they look today. These countries have regained their strength. And now I come to an important point. They have not become so much weaker by the loss of their empires as some people thought.

You all know General De Gaulle. General De Gaulle does not feel that France has lost prestige or power by abandoning Algeria. In fact, France has gained in prestige. Mind, when De Gaulle goes over to Mexico or to Brazil, he is stronger because France doesn't rule Algeria any more.

In 1961 some of you may remember that the French fought the Tunisians to retain the naval base of Bizerte, the most important naval base France owned in the Mediterranean, and killed ruthlessly hundreds of Tunisians. Today the French have evacuated Bizerte. There are no more Frenchmen left in Bizerte, and not one French ship. The French have not lost any

prestige or power by evacuating a naval base which two years ago they thought indispensable to them.

When we shall evacuate Guantanamo in Cuba we shall not be weakened by it but our prestige will be strengthened. But, in any case, Europe has reawakened, and gentlemen, De Gaulle's France is not our satellite and maybe even not our ally. You know that General De Gaulle has his own ideas which we find strange, but he has them because we find them strange. He has just been to Mexico, not because he likes to go to Mexico--of course, everybody likes to go to Mexico City; I do--but because we would not like his going there. You know very well that here France is behind much of the trouble in Viet Nam, and here France has been much trouble in Gabon, in Africa.

But mind what I now say. What De Gaulle represents is a feeling of the national importance of France. France wishes to be equal to us, independent from us, to be France as France. He represents in that the general European feeling. Most of the Europeans are too wise or too polite to express it in the brusque way which De Gaulle does, but the feeling that Europe is America's mother and that America is Europe's daughter, and the feeling that Europe has a real, old civilization and that we are nouveau riche, parvenues, is widespread in Europe. But the Europeans don't agree with De Gaulle at all, because they don't wish what De Gaulle wishes. De Gaulle wishes not only to be independent from us but to establish French hegemony in Europe, and the Europeans do not wish to be dependent on France. But the feeling of independence from

America is widespread, if not expressed, in Germany, in Italy, in Britain. And look at Franco Spain. Nobody has yet called Franco a Communist, and yet Franco wishes to continue relations with Communist Cuba. If he could, as he wishes, he would establish relations with Communist Russia and with Communist China, as De Gaulle did, and all that not because he loves communism. He does not love communism, he hates communism, but he wishes to assert his independence his own way.

The astonishing thing is that the same thing that happened in Western Europe, in free Europe, or whatever you call it, among our allies, happened in the Communist world, too. In 1945 people spoke of a monolithic Communist realm in which there was/will, ^{one} one command, coming from the Kremlin, from Moscow. Gentlemen, that has long passed, and survives only in the imagination of some American journalists, but not in reality. In 1955 Khrushchev went to Belgrade, and you must know that when he went into Belgrade that was like President Johnson flying to Havana, Cuba. It was the same thing in many ways. Khrushchev declared there in Belgrade that each country, meaning Communist Yugoslavia, had its own right to its own road to socialism, as he calls it, which means communism. He said that each country has its own way.

Since then there has been a disintegration of the Communist bloc. As you know, Mr. Johnson has some trouble with General De Gaulle, but I assure you that Khrushchev has much greater trouble with Mao, much

greater trouble. General De Gaulle is at least polite, always very polite, a civilized, 17th century gentleman, a knight of the middle ages. Mao is not a knight at all. His expressions are brutal. Mind the way in which the Chinese speak about the Russians or the Russians about the Chinese. It's a way of hostility. And throughout the Communist bloc the foremost satellites, Gomulka in Poland, Kadar in Hungary, and Noyvago in Rumania, used this split to assert their independence. Take small Albania. You may say that in China there are 650 million people. In Albania there are one million people. I don't know how they are today, but, when I knew Albania in 1914, which is some time ago, they were hardy people. There were more eagles in Albania than literary people. I speak of 1914. Today they are all literary people and there are no eagles, maybe. Do you know that the Albanians fought the Soviet Union to abandon her naval base in Vlone two years ago. The Russians took their marines into the Mediterranean Sea to abandon their position. Two months ago there was the break in relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. There are no diplomatic relations between the two Communist countries now. The Albanian government seized, confiscated the Soviet Embassy in Tirane, the capital of Albania, and the Russians couldn't do anything about it but just protest.

That is the second great change that has come since 1945. Moscow is no longer the absolute ruler of the Communist empire. They are all Communists, but they don't see eye to eye. In fact, they fight each other. It may be very possible--I don't know that it will happen---that

Peking and Moscow may break relations this year, 1964.

But the most important element, more important for world history than the great Atlantic Alliance or the great Communist bloc, much more important, is the new emergence of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. When De Gaulle was in Mexico a few days ago, in the great official toast at the banquet, he spoke of Latin America. He spoke in French and I quote it verbatim in English. He said that Latin America is stepping out "into the foreground of the stage of world affairs." It is, of course, typical French gallantry to say it in that way, I entirely agree. But still there is some truth in it. It has happened for the first time in 300 years that Asia, Africa, and Latin America are stepping into the foreground of the stage of world affairs. How did that come about?

Now I wish to stress one point which should be understood. These countries, like India or Egypt, or others, have now stepped forward with gigantic steps from a position of deep humiliation to become active participants on a basis of equality in international affairs. Where did they get the inspiration from?

Gentlemen, we make an immense mistake when we believe that they got their inspiration from Lenin or from the Russian tradition or from Karl Marx. They did not get the inspiration there. They got it from what might be called modern Western civilization. They got it from those ideas of liberty and equality which are proclaimed in our Declaration of Independence and which were proclaimed in 1789. In a certain way what comes there to fruition is a worldwide spread of the fundamental

ideas underlying the English rules of the 17th century and our rules and the French rules of the 18th century, and the struggle of the European people for liberty and equality.

They are striving, to use a sense that you all know, naturally, "to assume amongst the powers of the earth a separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them." This is a separate and equal station in this world. It is an irreversible process. The Africans, the Asians, and the Latin Americans will achieve not equality in power but equality in status. That is what is meant by democracy.

Let me repeat what I said last year. The last year's talk of mine they put on kind of stencil paper. I won't say what I said last year but I have it here in front of me for another outline. Let me repeat one thing, because it makes clear what I wish to say. People in the United States are equal not in power but in status, not in influence but in status. The educated and uneducated ones, the rich and the poor ones are equal in status. And today Gabon, which is nothing, or Albanis, which is nothing, are equal in status to the Soviet Union or to us.

I am a retired professor and that is not very much. I have a very small pension. And yet I am equal in status, not in influence or power and not in wealth, to any other citizen. I am quite well educated, whether you believe it or not. But the most uneducated man is equal to me, too, in status. To hear people say that Gabon should not be equal to the Soviet Union or to us, or Albania, is one of the main and chief sins against the democratic way of life which we started.

You see, this growth of nationalism all over the earth is again one of the most important developments because it makes it impossible that the world be ruled by one power or one ideology. You know that Hitler and the Japanese oligarchy in the 1930's dreamt of a world ruled by them. You know that Stalin did. We don't know certainly but he probably did. We know about Hitler because we read his writings about it. The Japanese didn't write but, or they wrote in Japanese. I read German very easily but I don't read Japanese. Stalin did never write in that way, but I believe he thought it and dreamt it. He was an insane man in any case. He dreamt of ruling the world. These are dreams gone by. Nobody will rule this world, not we, not DeGaulle, not Moscow, and not Peking. That is due to nationalism.

I read, and you read, too, this paper of Mr. Froman, which he wrote in 1958. One should never write something down which next year is no longer correct. He wrote some funny passages about Egypt, that Nasser was bringing Egypt under Communist rule. That was nonsense. Nasser does not wish Khrushchev to rule Egypt, or us. He wishes himself to rule Egypt. Under Nasser the Egyptians for the first time in 4,000 years of history achieved a feeling of dignity regarding themselves. This is one of the greatest achievements of modern times.

Nationalism is a safeguard against the world's being ruled by any one power. I must make it clear the Khrushchev or the Russians, or some Russians-----one can never say the Russians or the Americans, but should say some Russians or some Americans-- might wish to make Russia

the strongest power on earth. That is possible. Mao certainly wishes to make China the strongest power on earth, and we Americans are today the strongest power on earth. The British were in the 19th century the strongest power on earth. That doesn't mean ruling the whole earth.

All right. I think that Khrushchev wishes to make Russia the strongest power and Mao wishes to make China the strongest power. And the strongest power cannot rule the world. The dream of the illusion of omnipotence is passing very fast. No power, even the greatest power, we, or maybe in 50 years' time the Chinese---I don't know---who knows?--- cannot rule the earth, because the peoples wish to be successes--whatever it means.

The Rumanians--I know Rumania since 1914, quite well--are asserting their "Latin" character against the "Slav" or "Slavonic" character of Russia. Under Communist leadership they wish to emphasize their independence from Russia. I don't know if you have noticed that last year in the Assembly of the United Nations the Rumanians voted twice differently from the Soviet Union. That would have been unthinkable 5 or 10 years ago.

Nationalism is the strongest safeguard against the Communist world domination, or our world domination, or anyone else's, or De Gaulle's dreams of French world leadership or Mao's. I don't know who will dream in 50 years about being the strongest power. How should I? Gentlemen, who, 50 years ago, in 1914, would have foreseen today's world situation? Not one. I can't foresee that in 50 years' time. One thing that is

certain is that no one will dominate the world. If the Chinese should try, as the Japanese did, to control the whole Far East, what will be the result? The result will be that the Japanese and the Indians and the Indonesians will unite against them, and maybe the Russians, too.

I don't say that it will happen, but it is very possible, and maybe probable. So I would say that this reassertion of nationalism is a rather good thing in this world. De Gaulle speaks of a third force, as you know, but there is not one third force in the world. There are very many third forces. What is so important is the multiplicity of complex and shifting relationships and alignments in the world. This helps to preserve peace. I say "shifting realignments." Look at Cyprus. There the Archbishop Makarios, the President, is having a flirtation with Khrushchev, not because Makarios is a Communist, and not because Khrushchev ~~believes~~ believes in God, Greek Orthodox, or otherwise.

But it is true that the shifting, complex relationships in the world in which we live will grow more complex and more shifting. I think it was a great merit of President Kennedy, among others, naturally, that he recognized this natural, new character of the world of nationalism and neutralism emerging today when he spoke at the Commencement Address at American University in Washington last June, on June 10, 1963. He spoke about us and about Russia. Russia is less important than she seemed 15 or 20 years ago. He said, "Let us not be blind to our differences but let us give direct attention to our common interests and the means by which these differences can be resolved. If we cannot end now

our differences, at least we can help make this world safe for diversity."

I will say that is the greatest heritage in the interpretation of today's world. I don't say the world before, of 20 years ago, and I don't say the world hence. I don't know. The world 20 years ago was very different from today's world. The world 20 years hence may again be different. I shall not be here to see it. You will, or many of you will. But, for the world of today, the slogan which Kennedy left us, to make the world safe, not for democracy, not for communism, but for diversity is, in my opinion, the greatest safeguard for the peace of the world. Most peoples are neither democratic nor Communist. Egypt, or for this purpose, Peru, or Argentina are neither democratic nor Communist. The largest number of people are neither democratic nor Communist. At the same time this is the fulfillment of the pluralistic concept of Western freedom.

I am going to close with only one word more. The feeling for the legitimacy of diversity was expressed by no one better in recent months or years than from an unexpected source. The late Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical "Pace in Terres," expressed in a way superior to that of any statesman of our time the need for an open mind in a world of diversity, of **plurality**, in which Christians and non-Christians, believers and nonbelievers, democrats and Communists, Hindus and Mohammedans, Greeks and Turks, have to live together more or less in peace, never in complete peace or harmony. But, gentlemen, even the North Americans, and by that I mean the people of the United States, don't always live in

peace and harmony amongst themselves. You may say that Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. Goldwater have different ideas about what life in the United States should be. This difference makes the essence of democracy and is something with which we must learn to live on the worldwide stage, too.

Thank you.

DR. SANDERS: Dr. Kohn is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Doctor, we would like to hear your views as to what the foreign policy of the United States ought to be to make the world safe for diversity.

DR. KOHN: That's a large assignment which the Secretary of State would handle much better than I, naturally. In fact it's his business, not mine, primarily, but I shall try to fill in for him, without his knowledge, naturally, and maybe without his approval. I would say that I do not think that the cold war is going to an end. The cold war changes its character without ending. I will say that for a time to come--I don't say a short time and I don't say a long time--for the foreseeable future, we have to maintain a certain military strength.

If you ask me--and again I am not the Secretary of Defense, as you know--I would say today that we are probably overarmed, but we should maintain a reasonable level of armament.

However, we should understand what I tried to say today, that what is driving the world today, and what helps us against the Chinese

or the Russians, or anyone else who would dream of world domination , is nationalism. Just now during this coffee break I spoke with a gentleman who spoke of Outer Mongolia, and we recalled that not so long ago as history goes, 700 years ago, the Mongols tried to dominate the world and almost succeeded.

Today nobody dreams of the Mongols trying to dominate the world, but they almost succeeded. Gentlemen, the Mongols had overrun Russia and had subjected Russia, and then the Mongol Army was at Silesia when the Commanding Chief heard that the Great Khan had died in Mongolia, and by this accident Germany was saved from becoming part of the Mongol Empire. Eager to be back in Mongolia at the election of the new Great Khan, he commanded his troops to go back. That was an accident. The Mongols might have achieved, but for an accident in history, domination of Europe in the 13th century, and not only of Russia.

You have to understand that when I say that there might be other world dreamers, dreamers of world conquest. I don't know. I would say that Khrushchev doesn't dream of world conquest. He might dream of making Russia the strongest power, a legitimate dream. We are now the strongest world power. In 50 years China may be. I don't know. There is always a strongest power but no world-dominating power.

Mind you, Russia may not succeed. They have not the personnel for it nor the managerial skill. Maybe in 50 years they will. I don't know. Nobody knows.

We should be at the same time patient and understand the new forces, and we should not forget that military power, though important, is not the most important thing. Gentlemen, De Gaulle has no military power behind him. The French Army is an unequipped army. The famous force de frappe doesn't exist. For years it will be a very small force de frappe. What is behind De Gaulle is not military power. There is none. France was saved from destruction in 1914 by Britain and us, not by her own strength. France was saved, as you all know, in 1944 by the British and us, not by her own strength. There is no military strength behind De Gaulle as such. There is a certain prestige of ideas.

Gentlemen, we have been very slow in developing ideas. Kennedy tried, in his last year only, unfortunately, there is no doubt about it. There is the idea of the feeling that we have for people, that we sympathize with them. We cannot solve all the problems. We cannot solve the problem of Cyprus. We cannot solve the problem of Viet Nam. There is no way for us to do all these things, even if we wished. We are neither omnipotent nor do we know everything. The Russians know even less than we do, in spite of the idea that some people here have that the Russians are supermem. They are not supermen. They have their own troubles.

Mr. Johnson made the declaration two days ago about Panama. It was excellent. He should have made this same declaration the first day. What a different position we would be in if he had. It was an excellent

declaration, on Saturday. The Panamanians have a case. What would we say if there would be a canal cutting the United States into halves? Mind, we must start to realize that other people feel as we do about their national sovereignty.

I would say that what we must do in foreign policy is have a strong posture. That's what we call it today. The word didn't exist in my youth. We should have a strong military posture, a strong, modern posture. Second, we should have ideas in foreign policy like those of Mr. Kennedy, and like what Mr. Johnson suddenly said. Mr. Johnson is a great man for surprises. Nobody expected him to say something on Saturday, suddenly. He appeared among the journalists and began to read the best declaration so far on foreign policy, about Panama.

Let's continue in that way. I travel quite a lot around. I am not an official man. I don't speak with Communists. They don't speak with me and I don't speak with them, but I speak with liberal, democratic Europeans quite a lot. They are astonished at our oversimplification of issues. We try to see them in all their complexity. We should try to employ an empathy, and that means we should try to feel as other people feel, and try to understand them.

I am quite optimistic that we shall learn it. If I may end on an optimistic note, the American people learn astonishingly fast. In March 1947 there was the Truman Doctrine and in April 1949 there was the signing of the NATO Treaty here in Washington. In two years the American people

veered from complete isolation to a full participation in world affairs. That was an immense change of the public atmosphere, the public mind. I think that no other people would have been able to accomplish this kind of change so fast and so well as we did.

Now we face a similar change from the belief that we must settle all the disputes on the earth, which we cannot settle. Again we need cooperation and a much more open mind than we have shown these last years.

QUESTION: Do you think it likely in the foreseeable future that the nations of Western Europe will implement their desire for independence from the United States to the extent of assuming the entire burden of their own defense in Europe?

DR. KOHN: Whether the European nations will assume the entire burden of their defense? Yes and no. What is now prevailing in Europe, maybe wrongly but I think rightly, is the fact that the Soviets will not commit military aggression in Europe. There is a widespread conviction, I think, shared by practically everybody in England, France, and Italy, that the Soviets will not attack militarily. Thereby our direct help is of less immediate importance.

You may remember that in November 1958 Khrushchev put out another six months' ultimatum about West Berlin. There are five years gone and West Berlin is as free as it was in November 1958. There's a lesson not lost upon the Europeans. They wish to keep our umbrella. There is no doubt about that, but they don't believe that there is an urgent need for it, though they like to keep it in any case.

The sky gets bluer and bluer according to them over Europe, but they still like to keep the umbrella somewhere in the corner but without emphasizing it, in case the sky should again become, as it may, very cloudy. They know two things: That the Russians today, and the whole Communist bloc, are suffering economically. The idea that the Russians can catch up, not with us but with Western Germany, in any foreseeable future, is completely nonsensical. The respite in Russia and China may grow. We spoke about Outer Mongolia and about Eastern Siberia. Kavaroks was stuck with the Chinese from 1858 to 1860. Nobody knows about it.

This fear of communism was there in 1947 and 1948, the fear that the Communists would sweep to the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic Ocean through Italy and through France and through Greece. This fear has gone in Europe, fortunately, for the time being. Nobody knows about the future.

QUESTION: Doctor, I would like to ask you to relate the religious drive versus the nationalistic drive. I think the most perfect example is the mass migration of Indians to Pakistan as they set up their partition.

DR. KOHN: You are entirely right, sir. I would say that in our period now religion becomes to a large extent an instrument of nationalism. There's the case in Cyprus where the Orthodox Greeks are not so much Orthodox as they are Greeks, and the Mohammedans are not so much Mohammedans as they are Turks. Yet it is this religion which adds to the

general nationalistic tension.

In India, sir, it's a religious tension which increases and enhances the nationalism in Pakistan and in India. You may say this is true in a certain way in Israel. Religion brings a surge of nationalism.

It's everywhere. I think, if I may be allowed to add this, which has nothing to do with your question, it is so significant that at this very time, as you rightly point out, the close support religion gives to nationalism in many cases is evident.

Pope John XXIII and the present Pope emphasized the universal aspect, the worldwide mission, the ecumenical character, the human character, not the national character, of religion. I am one of those people who regard the dogma of the Catholic Church proclaimed in 1958 on June 23 by Pius XII as one of the greatest events, done without arms, but with the power of ideas of a very old man. But on the whole I entirely agree with you that religion has become today the maiden, the subservient, of nationalist drives.

QUESTION: Doctor, you commented on the nationalism right now in Rumania, Hungary, and Poland. How long do you feel that Russia will allow this nationalism to continue without using force to suppress this nationalism? Or do you think they will find their own status in the Communist bloc of nations changed?

DR. KOHN: I think the second of your alternatives is the more probable one. I think that the process of nationalism, of growing

independence in the Communist bloc is irreversible. I think that Khrushchev has neither the ideological power nor the possibility of interfering today really in Hungary or in Rumania. On the contrary, in the last 2 or 3 years there has been a definite trend in Moscow to treat the former satellites with much greater consideration and that Commikant, which means/the organization of economic cooperation amongst the Communist countries is the amputator of its content much more, even, than NATO. Do you suppose this will go on?

I would suggest that all these countries will become not less Communist but more Polish or more Rumanian or more Albanian or more Yugoslav, but not less Communist, or that communism will become greater.

Now comes this question which the gentleman asked about religion and nationalism. Communism will enter into a strange mixture with nationalism as religion does today in many cases.

QUESTION: Could we have your views on the relationship between the leadership and nationalism? To put it another way, is General De Gaulle the product of French nationalism or or is he the creator of French nationalism?

DR. KOHN: That's a very important question. It can be answered, like all questions, as not either or but both. De Gaulle is a product of French nationalism and he follows in many ways certain trends of French nationalism. He is a reincarnation of Jeanne D'Arc, a reincarnation of Louis XIV, and a reincarnation of Napoleon the First. It's a three-fold incarnation of three important trends in French nationalism.

But there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that, without his emergence, French nationalism would not have found that strength, that voice, that integrating force which De Gaulle gives to it, and in that sense he creates French nationalism. Now, mind, most Frenchmen, not all, but most Frenchmen, even those who dislike De Gaulle's authoritarian ways, agree to his nationalism. You must understand that the French had a traumatic experience and shock in 1940 when the French Army was not defeated but disintegrated. The French ran like hares. And the French never did overcome the deep feeling of humiliation, of offended pride regarding 1940.

Having believed that they were La Grande Nation, the great nation, and having been the strongest nation in Europe under Louis XIV and under Napoleon the First, they feel in De Gaulle a certain reassertion of national pride, and not all Frenchmen, but the majority of French, even those French who disagree with his economic policy, for instance-- you can't speak of the economic policy of De Gaulle, because he is not interested in economics; it bores him--in a certain way in their hearts are quite happy to see France all over the map again.

Don't forget that Napoleon III dreamt of the Latin union in Italy and Mexico. De Gaulle dreams, too. Don't forget that Napoleon III was the first to establish French influence in Indo China. De Gaulle dreams of that, too. He does it in a very intelligent way. He knows that we have to give up to win certain things. He had the strength of giving up Algeria. He has not lost Algeria completely just because he

gave it up. He would have lost it completely if he had not given it up.

I don't share De Gaulle's ideas nor his nationalism, but I have a great respect, personally, for De Gaulle. He is a man with ideas, and he is a ruler among statesmen today.

QUESTION: Dr. Kohn, how do you assess the U. N. as a means of containing conflicts of nationalism?

DR. KOHN: I have the highest respect for the U. N. To make myself clear, may I say two things: One, the U. N. is almost 20 years old. When the League of Nations was 20 years old--I knew the League of Nations very well; I was frequently in Geneva then--it was dead. The United Nations is young at 20. I was young at 20. It is growing in influence. There is the conflict in Cyprus. Where do people turn? To the United Nations. I don't know whether the United Nations can solve the Cyprus problem but there may be a chance for it, better than any other chance.

I believe that the United Nations is at present the most hopeful, single instrument--not a panacea; there are no panaceas in this world--for keeping harmony or the peace. What do the peoples do there? These people have never known democracy. What does democracy mean? Democracy means the recognition of the rights of opposition. That is what democracy means; nothing else. Democracy does not mean the will of the majority. That's nonsense. Hitler was supported by the majority of the German people, undoubtedly. It was not a democracy. Mussolini was supported by the majority of the Italian people. It was not a democracy. Khrushchev is supported by the majority of the Russians. Make no mistake

about that. It's no democracy.

Democracy means a recognition of the right of opposition, of talking back, of a discourse. Democracy means talking together, not liquidating the opposition. Mind, people who never knew democracy are sitting in the United Nations, and their delegates there discuss according to the example set by the British Parliament in committees, in commissions, in discussion at home. If somebody would say something against the head of state, he might be liquidated. There the men of Ghana must say that the distinguished representative of somewhere else says something like that. It's forced into what we call civilization.

I would say that the United Nations is the most civilizing force at present among what we might call precivilized peoples.

Second, I spoke already of the Popes. I'll come back again to the Popes. I do this gladly, because you know about this play which is being put on in New York, "The Representative," a play by a young German Lutheran, which has certain objections to Pius XII. I am not a Catholic, not a Christian, not a believer in general. I have certain objections to Pius XII, and not because he didn't speak out for the Jews. That's not my main objection. He didn't speak out for the Gypsies, either, who were exterminated with brutality, and they are human beings like the Jews. He didn't speak out for the Catholic boys whose education heads were liquidated by the Nazis. They were Catholics.

My objection to Pius XII was that he was friendly to Fascism and not a democrat at all. He was friendly to Franco and to Mussolini

and to Hitler, not out of anti-Semitism or anti-Gypsie, but because he regarded communism as arch enemy. Many Catholics, make no mistake, identify Pius as the Church. He is not identifiable. No single individual may speak for the Church forever. Six Borgias spoke for a time. Pius was followed by a man whom I regard as the greatest man of the 20th century, John XXIII. He was a real democrat, a real man of peace, a real man of what I think democracy stands for.

A very fine statesman sits as Secretary General of the United Nations. As you all know, he is a Burmese Buddhist, or a Buddhist Burmese, if you wish to say it that way. Here is again the same thing, religion and nationalism. This would have been unthinkable in the League of Nations, that the Secretary General would be a Burmese Buddhist. He would have been British or a Frenchman, not a Burmese Buddhist.

He does a very good job. The Pope received him on July 12, 1963. He spoke to him. I am going to read only two sentences from the Pope's speech. The Pope spoke in English. That is something again that never happened before. He spoke English--not Italian, not French, not Latin, but English. He said, and I read it because it expresses what I cannot say as well as Paul VI does, but I think of the United Nations exactly as Paul VI does. Paul VI is the present Pope, naturally. He says, "The Holy See considers the United Nations as a steady, developing and improving form of the balanced and unified life of all humanity in its historical and earthly order. The ideologies of those who belong to the United Nations are certainly multiple and diverse, and the Catholic Church

regards them with due attention. But the convergence of so many peoples of so many races and so many creeds in a single organization intended to avert the evils of war and to favor the good things of peace is a fact which the Holy See considers as corresponding to its own concept of humanity."

These words of Paul VI sustain my consideration of how I regard the United Nations.

DR. SANDERS: Thank you very much, Dr. Kohn, for not only giving us the facts of the situation but what I consider is the true historical insight.