

**THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD**

Dr. Elspeth Davies Rostow

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The Less Developed World

25 March 1964

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Washington 25, D. C.

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COLONEL BERGAMYER: Lady and Gentlemen:

It has been claimed that the so-called "Revolution of Rising Expectations" is the most important event of the 20th Century. And few will doubt that the developments in the emerging nations have played, and will continue to play, a key role in the destiny of the world.

To discuss the "Less Developed World" we are fortunate to have with us today a distinguished scholar and a nationally-recognized authority on this subject.

Dr. Rostow, it is my pleasure to welcome you this morning on your third visit to the Industrial College and to present to you, the Class of '64. Dr. Rostow.

DR. ROSTOW: Colonel Bergamy; Gentlemen:

Among the many discoveries that I've made, not only here at the Industrial College, but at other colleges - Montgomery, Carlisle - is that unknown to the general public you are trying to solve one of the problems of our time. I refer, of course, to the problem of the price of coffee. It seems to me that single-handedly the war colleges in their consumption of coffee are doing a great national and possibly even global service. So, once again I was made aware of that in the moments before coming here.

My task today is a very large one. I don't know how, within 45 minutes, one could discuss the less-developed world, unless, as in my case, you are married to a thesis, which is a useful explanation for

some of these phenomena. As I faced the problem of discussing the less developed world, I didn't think, oddly enough, of my husband, but rather of an Ambassador from an underdeveloped country who last year really solved this problem, saying that the communist threat to the underdeveloped world could be handled easily, if the developed nations would only agree to provide what he referred to as guaranteed overseas markets for inefficient industries and unwanted primary products. So, there is your answer. I wish it were as simple as that.

I wish it were even as simple as the presentation for foreign aid each year makes out to be the problem of assistance. Because, then we would know exactly how to move and my task would be simplified. As we realize, the problem of assisting the underdeveloped world is far tougher now than when we went through a comparable stage. This is why I feel that extrapolating from our own past experience may be of less use than looking at the world at the present time as though it were a geological cross-section of stages of economic growth; which brings me to the fact of my debt to my husband.

When we were on sabbatical in England in '58 and '59 my husband gave eight lectures in a kind of busman's holiday fashion at Cambridge, which emerged as the "Stages of Economic Growth." Since then I have found this concept useful; and particularly in discussing the whole problem of the underdeveloped world I find that it sets in what I believe to be proper perspective the task of U. S. posture toward the emergent area.

The old-fashioned view - the "Pre-Rostowvian" view, if you will - is one that I still find in the literature. And in a sense, it's a pre-

Hiroshima view. As you recall, the classic interpretation of the whole problem of the relationship between different stages of growth suggested that the higher the overall level of industrial growth, the greater the capacity and the greater the potential in time of war. Old views would take such figures as these and extrapolate comfortably from them. They'd say that in steel, for example, the U. S. and the Free World command, roughly, what, 69% versus Sino-Soviet area 31%; in petroleum somewhere around 83% to 17%; aluminum 78% to 22%; electric power somewhere around the same figures; and from this generalize a comfortable lead for the West; and assistance programs, then, that could be phased over time to assist the emergent areas become a part of this success bloc which is the West.

If this is the old-fashioned view, it would tend to make the task of American relations with the underdeveloped areas a far easier one to look at. I believe this conventional view was shattered by Hiroshima; I believe that the changes in weaponry have made less important the overall level of a country than in one sense its delivery capability through alliances, through adjacents, through any other positioning that you choose to identify.

As a result, I think we have to scrap the conventional notion that simple higher levels of industrial development are by themselves much of a protection, much of an immunization. Instead, in my geological cross-section, I'd like to propose that the five stages of economic growth provide a category within which each country can identify itself and from which it can hope to move on to the next category through a fairly recog-

nizable set of procedures.

These five categories developed in the stages of economic growth first in '58 and '59 and then published in 1960, are, very briefly, as follows, and I'll mention them so that I can throw my major comments in this context. I should first say that the title of each stage was one argued over between my husband and me in which, without exception he won the semantic argument. So, I will give you these titles without necessarily suggesting that they are the best ones that could be chosen.

The first stage was one, however, in which I didn't particularly boggle. This is the traditional society, and it concerns us very little today because there are so few countries given this geological cross-section that belong in the traditional category. The traditional category is a stage where economically there is a ceiling on output per head, where an agricultural, stagnant society assumes that the future will recapitulate the past and on the whole the past didn't produce very much. It is a hierarchical, pessimistic, stagnant, relatively motionless level of development, if development is even the proper term. It probably is the proper term because you can intrude gunpowder, irrigation, a potato, and get spurts of growth.

But, as in the Milliken-Blackman book on developing nations it suggested that the major contrast between a developed and an underdeveloped country is in terms of self-sustained growth. Growth, by definition, is never self-sustained in these early stages, particularly not in the traditional society.

At the present, only Nepal, Afghanistan, and Yemen, perhaps, fall into the traditional society grouping, and therefore most of the under-

developed world has already moved past this first phase of development.

The second stage is much more interesting and I would say that today our problem, in terms of this argument, is to discuss the policy issues for a fifth-stage country vis-a-vis mostly second and possibly third-stage countries. Now, the second stage has the attractive title of "The Preconditions to the Takeoff into Self-Sustained Economic Growth." In other words, it's a transitional society and most of the underdeveloped world, I believe, falls into this stage. And therefore, a description of the less developed nations is in one sense a description of Stage 2 in this argument.

The second stage, then, is in terms of the momentum which starts you on the development process. It's the time when a traditional society has its first contact with the outside world and realizes within its own borders the resultant changes. Now, this contact may be the result of intrusion from outside - invasion, the attack, or the simple taking over of territory in a somewhat less tendentious way by a colonial or imperial power.

In other words, a more advanced society moves in on the traditional society, and the image of change begins to breed internal alterations within the underdeveloped world. In other words, in the 19th Century the second stage usually started through some of the external policies associated with colonialism. You could use Commodore Peary, you could use the Opium Wars as an illustration of this.

Now, economically the second stage interests us today because, as I say, this is not only the description of a large part of the 19th Cen-

tury, but is still the description that I believe is valid for a large part of the emerging world right now. Economically, the Stage 2 country is still predominantly agricultural, of course, but it often has some export of raw material which is significantly beginning to move. ] You're reading today from the January '63 Foreign Affairs stresses the fact that in the past a developing country needed such an export crop in order to solve its balance of payments problem, in order to pay for its finished product.

This is certainly true and I'd like to underwrite Mr. Butler's point on this because it seems to me that this is one of the dilemmas that we have to solve if we're going to assist these underdeveloped countries at all, adequately now. Take the contrast between a currently stage two society and America during this period. Now, the dates for America going through the stages of growth are very simple. We never had a first stage. So, when we begin to talk about the second stage as I am now, we're talking about America from Independence down to about 1843.

This was our second stage, and like any underdeveloped country we had to push a primary product onto the world market, and what we found primarily, aside from Southern cotton, was Western wheat. We did exactly, as it were, a Butler exercise, in shipping out as much as we could in order to ease our balance of payments problem. We did this across the railroads which were built during the first half of the 19th Century, and we did it at a time when the price for these agricultural products was relatively firm. To be sure, the price for cotton was, in a sense, more depression-resistant than that for wheat in the early 19th Century, which

partly explains the whole phenomenon of King Cotton in the South, and a good deal of American history hinges thereon.

But as far as the West went, we tended, then, to open up the West more rapidly because of this characteristically Stage 2 requirement, the need for easing the balance of payments situation. So, if you contrast this with the current problems of an underdeveloped country which also would like to play our Western wheat game, but is doing it at a time when the price level is fluctuating and often falling, you see the dilemma that every underdeveloped country sooner or later must confront. Thus the argument for commodity agreements; thus the argument for everything, including the Executive Service Corps, as a way of easing what in the 19th Century was fairly clearly, simply, and without such external assistance in the happy case of the United States.

Economically, then, the second stage country is one where not only are you beginning to see the beginning of modern transport, commerce and industry, but in the American case - and I think too often we extrapolate from the comfortable national experience of ourselves - we went through the three stage communication revolution - and transportation revolution - in the first part of the 19th Century; first turnpikes, then canals and then railroads, and through all of this tended to facilitate the problem of getting goods to the East Coast ports.

We also saw the development of towns and cities, which is characteristic of the second stage; starting with harbors and ports, moving inland and, in our case, moving westward. But throughout this period, the second major generalization aside from the problem of the need for shipping out

some agricultural produce, the next major problem is that the Stage 2 country is always capital-hungry to a very marked degree. It never has adequate funds for reinvestment and it therefore must turn to the most likely source for these funds. ] And, in most cases, speaking as a historian I would say in most cases the logical place to turn is to the ex-mother country, if, in the second stage it has just emerged from colonial dependence. We did it.

As soon as we finished fighting the British in the War of 1812 we began immediately to try to get them to help fund the opening up of our West. And neither the British nor ourselves saw anything particularly unusual in this. And we were very lucky indeed; we got funds from Britain, and most of American railroads at this stage were built with British capital. Why did the British come into this American market? Well, for the usual reason that you go into an investment field, because it was a high-yield field. And like any high-yield field in those days, it was also risky. Bankers were adventurous in the 19th Century, a talent which many of them seem to have lost.

They were willing to take risks because the returns were so great, and you must admit that they sustained a great many discouraging, as it were, counter-indications in the American market. Because, a lot of development capital came into Stage 2 of the United States and went into the pockets of some character last seen heading westward. And this had very little development-yield. Frequently this occurred with a representative of the public sector.

This brings me to another point. The Stage 2 society usually has

to promote its development through the public sector, again, by the very fact that its private sector has yet to grow. As a result, you tend to find public servants the agents of the development process. This means that if they also exhibit the perhaps normal human dimension of corruption, this discredits the relationship between the public sector and development which has been so important in this country.

I would argue, then, that the great enthusiasm for laissez-faire in the United States after the Civil War came in part because in the period down to 1860 we'd seen what can happen when the government gets into the economy as directly as it did in the task of opening up the American West. So, the notion of the public sector was in a sense discredited by this very act of development in the second stage that I'm referring to.

And we had other reasons for being somewhat suspicious of the public sector; we also found, like underdeveloped countries now, it occasionally very difficult to meet payments on our loan. And we had a splendid, early 19th Century pragmatic do-it-yourself way of softening loans, which was known as defaulting. This made it occasionally rather difficult to get funds for development purposes, but, again, the British investor came back because of the yield, even after he had been burned; although, he came back on terms which were progressively harder and tougher on the American recipient.

Well, capital imports, then, coming often from the former mother country, and also accepted without any worry about the ideological quality of the funding, is a characteristic of the second stage. You remember last spring in the Clay Report the suggestion was made that perhaps

the best way to promote the development of Africa was for the countries who formerly actually owned the real estate now to continue on a bilateral basis the development of the newly independent countries; with an exception made for Nigeria and perhaps a few others if I read between the lines in the report correctly.

But, the Clay Committee, in effect underwriting the normal historical process of a country, to turn to the one outside force that it knows best, even though it happens to be the often-hated ex-colonial master. In some way, then, the problem of capital has to be solved externally. It's a problem that cannot be solved within the economy. And the degree to which the Stage 2 society needs funding is usually so great that the ideological strings become less important than the yield itself.

Now, socially this second stage is a combustible and dangerous period, again by definition. I will start in each case with the fortunate American example and compare it with the less fortunate contemporary examples. Since we didn't have a first stage - a traditional society - we bucketed into the second without the legacy of feudalism, an old elite; what have you. Most Stage 2 societies are not so fortunate. They came into this pre-conditioned period with the old elite still anxious to conduct business as before and a growing new generation of modernizers coming in against the resistance of those who have been previously in control. This, by definition, is a socially tense situation. It's no accident that Castro said several years ago that the intrusion of guerrilla warfare in an underdeveloped society is like a match thrown into a haystack.

The haystack is a haystack of social as well as economic tension of the second stage, and you need mount an offensive from anyplace - move away from Castro and let's take Hanoi as a place at random, and you can do a lot of damage to a Stage 2 society because it's ready to go up in smoke, in any event.

This social tension, then, is the result of the fact that the old social structure remaining and the modernizers coming in. That was what was called a crunch. The younger generation are usually those who have come to terms with the outside world. And if, as is often the case, this means with an invader, a colonial master, there is in one sense, the old argument of patriotism typified by the old elite versus the new argument of let's get on with the job typified by the younger generation. Now, America was able to combine these forces around the image of the nation without this much tension. Our Tories fled at the time of the Revolution.

We had no aristocracy and therefore we were uniquely fortunate in being able to centralize all the impulses for development and nationalism and make them seem relatively attractive to a large group within the country. This didn't mean that we didn't have internal arguments over improvements; that Henry Clay didn't get in trouble. But by and large, we went through the second stage with far less tension than is characteristic of a pre-conditioned society.

In most countries, then, the middle-class is growing in this second stage. And it's growing against opposition, against history; and against usually the rather knock-down-drag-out procedures and tactics of the older

groups who had exercised power more comfortably previously.

So, the emerging sense of nationalism which is characteristic of the second stage hasn't yet become a dominant nationalism in the second stage; it is verging on it, but with these tensions remaining. Psychologically, then, the underdeveloped world has the image of new horizons built in without the realization of them as a day-to-day phenomenon. And this is important. Because, it's important to have the image; the difference between the first and the second stages is that there is no image of change in the traditional society. By the second stage there is this image of change, but it comes so slowly that many are discouraged and many, as it were, drop out along the way. It usually, then, is left to a crucial but narrow class to carry the concept of economic development, through the long, slow period when you can't sell your goods, when you're troubled at home, when you may be facing intrusion from outside.

This is the time, then, when some are able to parlay the uncertainties of the second stage, into quick, private fortunes, but when, as a whole, the middle-class is only emerging, about to arrive, not yet a reality. I would define it then, psychologically, as a time of great expectations and a dangerous time. Because, if these expectations are first articulated and then not realized over time the resultant atmosphere of discouragement and disaffection may play very comfortably into the hands of the communists, into the hands of those who are anxious to exploit the second stage; not for economic and political development but for their own private power purposes.

So, this is a time of struggles between generations, between classes, and between interest groups within the society. And if, at the same moment - and this is the last point I'll make at the moment about the second stage - you find, as you always have in a pre-conditioned stage, that there's a radical decline in the death rate. And your maximum rate of population, occurring as it does in the second stage, you are giving to this already tense and over-burdened second-stage society a set of problems which are very hard indeed to handle, because the extra mouths to feed are usually a problem close to insoluble for the average weak Stage 2 society.

And again, contrast this with America. We at the beginning of the 19th Century appeared to have reversed Parson Malthus' predictions about population. At the end of the 18th Century, Thomas Malthus, as you recall, had said that land was going to run out; that we were going to have a plethora of people, and that the future was very poor indeed. Living as he did, not only in a parsonage with a lot of children around him, but in England where the pressure of population was more visible, I think it's easy to understand why he came to this rather gloomy conclusion.

America appeared to have reversed Malthusian land-labor ratio and during the first half of the 19th Century indeed we did. We had almost too much land and certainly not enough population. So, since we had during our second stage exactly the same rapid increase in population, the same decline in the death rate, and through both natural increase and immigration, our population went up quite disproportionately in the early part of the 19th Century. I say disproportionately because the contrast

between American population figures at this stage and population in the countries of origin of most Americans show a sharp increase for the increase on this side of the Atlantic. And this is, again, a characteristic of the second stage.

But, we needed every new pair of hands and we were able to feed every new mouth. This is certainly not the situation that the characteristic underdeveloped country has now where it has precisely this population burden which we must move, I believe, from the credit side of the ledger, as it was for us, to the debit side at the present time.

I don't know whether you saw that very serious, and I think, important, contribution made, I believe, in the Washington Post a while back. A suggestion was made simply that statistics tell us that a woman gives birth to a child every four seconds. Our problem is to find this woman and stop her. This, perhaps, over-simplifies, but it highlights the problem that I'm alluding to.

Once the second stage has passed - and this is saying a great deal, because it has not for most of the underdeveloped world - you get into the third stage; the takeoff. ] And this, again, is the phrase defined by my husband as, "takeoff into self-sustained economic growth." And given the mixed interest of this audience I should point out that my husband was attached to the Air Force in World War II, which I think explains the terminology for the third stage. What it would have been called had he gone into the Navy I do not know, but perhaps you can guess.

The takeoff stage, then, is the crucial stage; it's the make or break stage in terms of underdevelopment. Because, here you are not yet devel-

oped, but things are happening more effectively than during the second stage. The economic characteristics of the third stage, then, first of all, you get the end of the old era. I talked about the tensions of the second stage; the modernizers have taken over in the third stage and growth is becoming a way of life. Growth is smoothing out into what could be called a regular pattern. The increase in per capita output of the third stage is marked. And the major economic feature of this stage is the importance of a leading sector. This leading sector concept is very simple; it merely says an economy does not grow symmetrically; you do not find growth, well, in any way analogous to a Macy parade, all marching in step. But, instead, one sector moves dramatically ahead like an engine pulling the cars of the rest of the sectors along behind it.

This is interesting because every former colony or dependency usually tries to copy the leading sector of its former mother country. After all, this is about all that it knows. Frequently such elite as you have in the third stage have been educated in the mother country and have learned by observation how it succeeded. We did it too as a new nation. We copied the British textile push - tried to - because we thought that would pull us into the modern world at the beginning of the 19th Century. By 1792 textile mills were getting started in Rhode Island, and you begin to see New England moving in this direction. But it does not work for the United States.

Because, it's an important but difficult fact for the developing country to realize that the leading sector is a function of the characteristic of one economy and can rarely be translated from country to

country. We tried, then, to use the British textile sector and it was not until we got onto railroads that our own leading sector emerged. And for the United States, the whole phenomenon of the railroads became, then, the leading sector that pulled us through this third stage. The railroads did what a leading sector must do, not only to provide the dynamism of the third stage, but to produce secondary effects in terms of demand for iron and steel, the creation of cities, the push westward, all as a function of the railroad.

And it's interesting to realize that Russia used railroads also. It may, therefore, suggest something about the scale of the country and the quality of the leading sector. The most popular leading sector now for developing countries is the whole range of import substitution; to try to replace the high-cost imports by rather punitive restrictions - tariffs, etc., is the characteristic of, let's say India; was for Mexico which I believe is in the beginning of the fourth stage, etc.

Well, the takeoff period, then, has this leading sector as its prime characteristic, and as a result of the success of the third stage you get profits for reinvestment for the first time to any substantial degree. So, you begin to cut down your dependence on capital imports by the third stage, but not so that you can cut off, really, in any sense from your previous source of supply. We, in fact, remained a debtor nation until World War I. We went into World War I as a debtor nation and emerged as a creditor nation only at that period.

Nonetheless, the major amount of British capital was withdrawn from this country after the completion of the railroads and the Depression of

1873, the first of three depressions that we were to call the "Great Depression," because we never quite got used to the fact that there would probably be another one coming along soon. This first Great Depression started, then, when the British withdrew their capital, because we, in a sense, were no longer sufficiently underdeveloped to be as high yield as we had been earlier.

Well, in the third stage you have, then, a whole new group of entrepreneurs emerging and taking the key decisions within the economy. It is my argument that if your private sector doesn't begin to show some strength at this stage, that you are the weaker thereby, because I think the health of the private sector is one index for the developing country, of the possibilities for its future. I've taken very considerable heart in the fact that the Indian private sector has moved as rapidly as it has. I think it was somewhat startling to the Indians themselves, because it being, again, a characteristic of an emerging area; being well-trained in such places as the London School of Economics, they tended to believe that the public sector was an important agency for development and when their own private sector suddenly began to move, I think they were quite startled.

As a result, you find in India now the changes in the Second, Third Five-Year Plan as a result of this discovery, and also the phenomenon, equally interesting, that you've seen Indian boys go into trade, as they haven't in the past. In other words, business has become respectable. Well, I would say that the success or failure of the Indian private sector is characteristic of what I would hope could happen in a great many developing countries at this stage.

Now, briefly, socially, I said I was not as much interested in the third stage. Socially the new men have taken over what Mr. Loos a while back referred to as the "take-over generation." These are the men of increasing importance, the old order having been displaced. Power is coming from urban centers to a far greater degree during the third stage.

And, I should have mentioned this earlier, throughout the second and third stages the political attitudes of the government remain crucial; not in view of what I've just said, because I believe that the political matrix provides the stimulus for development, but rather, because political leadership which diverts attention from the tasks of development, can actually stop it. Specifically, the early Nasser who seemed more concerned with Middle Eastern real estate, or more concerned with the power play in that area than with internal development, could effectively have stopped economic growth entirely.

If I read correctly, a greater interest on the part of Nasser in economic development, I would say that this transition which I'll go no further in defining as a supportive political context for growth which is essential. And peace and war are often the index here, that if you find your political leadership projecting the developing country into conflicts steadily, clearly this will hamper growth and hamper it markedly.

So, a political context which is supportive of growth without intruding excessively, is the delicate mix which is desirable and very hard to come by indeed. Government, then, must understand the role of modernization, to put it in another way, or takeoff can fail. And government can provide the framework for growth; can either make or break the take-

off procedure. Nationalism, in short, is a many-sided situation during this third stage, and it is crucial to the success of the country, as to the kind and quality of national leadership.

Optimism, then, is the mood of the third stage usually; unless some of these initiatives fail a sense of national momentum arrives in the third stage, not in the second, and certainly not in the first. Again, you have a population burden to carry if it is a burden, or you have a population asset, if, as in our case, it was an advantage for us.

So, the takeoff, then, is a period which can be reversed, as all these stages can, because this is not a rigid argument. The stages of growth concept is no escalator up which you must move without turning backward. There have been countries that have gotten into takeoff and have fallen backward. I think this is true, by the way, of Mainland China. By '56 or '58 it looked as though China was getting well into takeoff; with the failure of the communes, harvests since, and other problems, there is some reason perhaps to believe that she has slipped back into the second stage. From our point of view this would be something that's at least desirable, but you must never extrapolate your policy on what you wish.

In any case, I offer this as an illustration of the fact that takeoff may fail. However, America went through it without failure, a part of America, between 1843 and 1860. And we had completed our takeoff, then, on the eve of the Civil War.

My final point about the third stage is that takeoff is not a national phenomenon usually. A part of the country goes through takeoff

and it can leave the backwash, really, of almost a first stage in the hinterland. For example, I just said that I believe Mexico is in the fourth stage. And yet, parts of Mexico seem a beautiful illustration of the first stage, or perhaps an early part of the second stage. Takeoff, then, is the descriptive term for a part of the whole. The task of the fourth stage is to try to make a national market, to try to make takeoff a reality of the total society however large.

The fourth stage I'll do very quickly. This is the so-called drive to maturity which comes from takeoff to the moment of maturity which is defined here as the period when the nation commands the full range of then-modern technology. If England reached maturity in 1850, the United States in 1900, Germany and France in 1910, Sweden in 1930, Japan in 1940, Russia and Canada in 1950, it's clear that the pool of technology varies very markedly from country to country. But at maturity you are then in command of this totality whatever it is.

The fourth stage I think is best summarized by your recollections of America<sup>9</sup> between Appamatox and 1900. It's a time when technology spreads across your entire society, when you have not only new industries emerging and new markets opening, but you no longer focus on your leading sector and you have this harsh, rapid period of plant-building which is so characteristic of late 19th Century America.

At maturity, then, you are technically able to do anything that you want to do, but socially you frequently have a lag. Because, the tensions of the fourth stage split income into a wide spectrum, put the have-nots in the slums of the newly-developing cities, put the new businessman in

a position of far greater primacy than in the way they had at any previous time. So, the fourth stage is always a time when there's a great push for social legislation, minimum wage, maximum hour and you find the kind of industrial tension, the kind of emergence of trade unions which we saw on a rather bland level in the United States, but which Western Europe had in a rather more argumentative way. This is at a time when you have new classes, new urban patterns, and when, in general, you find that the beginnings of the modern world are crudely emerging. But, I think the adverb is important here.

Maturity, then, is the water-shed between the fourth and fifth stages and we are now in the fifth, and by this argument, the current stage of economic growth. This fifth stage is the vantage point in this geological concept of mine from which we in the United States witness the problems of the second and third stages. The fifth stage, defined as the age of high mass-consumption, this term is applicable only to the United States; well, primarily to the United States. I don't think it applies to the Russia Stage 5 that we've seen since 1950.

Economically, this is a time when you shift to durable consumer goods and services, shifting your working force to white collar, skilled, factory, etc. Think of the United States in the present century and you have, economically, in terms of the structure of your society, in terms of the many manifestations, a description of the present.

So, we now stand, by this argument, completely in control of technology; and looking backward down the stages of growth concept, particularly to the second and third stages, the question we ask is what implica-

tions from this argument can be useful for us in providing any assistance so that, a second and third stage country can move through the trauma of this period without falling captive to an ideology which we oppose, or specifically into the orbit of a power that we oppose. We stand, then, as a model of one way of solving the economic, political, social, psychological et al tensions of modernization. ] And let us explore the question of the implications of this argument, then, both for ourselves and for the underdeveloped world.

Let's look first at the implications for the Free World arising from this description of the emerging areas. In the first place, as a group of post-maturity nations we in the Free World have some of the problems not only of an early start, but problems in the sense of obsolescence. We have reached the stage where the phenomenon of competition is going to be increasingly tough for us. We, in one sense, beefed up our competition in the Marshall Plan so successfully that we now have to deal with them on a quite different plane than we did earlier. And we no longer can operate on the assumption that ever again we'll live in the, in one sense comfortable, and in another sense, vertiginous bi-polar world of the immediate post-World War II period.

We also, as mature nations, tend to face the problem of lower rates of growth. I've avoided mentioning this until now, but during the period when you apply technology to your economy, your rates of growth - whsssst - go up like that. And therefore, if you get into a numbers game with someone from an underdeveloped country, it looks as though he's doing much better than you are, because often he can exhibit a rate

of growth which is far better than the somewhat sluggish rates of growth that we've seen, particularly in the United States, since World War II.

We are now, however, reassured by the January press conference of the CIA that all is well on this score, at least the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R. Because, as you recall from this argument the U.S. rate of growth was given for '63 as 3.7, whereas the U.S.S.R. has 2.5. So, all would appear to be well in the short run. But I would not venture to go too far with this, but simply to say that the problem of lower rates of growth is a problem of the more developed parts of this stage argument. And, we're going to have to have some kind of a productivity revolution internally if we're going to meet the competition from here on out. We're going to have to divert some of our attention from hardware down the road a piece at the Pentagon, in the general direction of perhaps the older sectors of the economy - steel, railroads, etc. - if, over the long pull, we're going to go through this period of post-maturity successfully.

So, the first implication, then, is that in terms of rates of growth there is a new problem facing us that must be solved if we're going to be able to solve even internally our problems. And this makes sense out of the emphasis on poverty at the present time. It makes sense in view of the threat of automation, and the fact that an American President now of whatever party, will go to bed wishing, I believe, that he were in the comfortable days of Franklin Roosevelt in '33, when all he faced was banks closing and a general feeling of disaster, but with an old pattern for development to lead him out of the hole and upwards. Now we have to face

the problem of directing our attention to unemployment, to poverty, etc. at a time of prosperity, and here history isn't as useful as guide and here the problems, I think, are even tougher.

The second implication for us is that we do have available capital for partnership and we have the pattern for assistance to the underdeveloped world worked out not only in terms of our own national past, but in terms of the many mechanisms which the recent years have exhibited. The whole Atlantic Partnership - OECD, DAC - the various mechanisms are there. But, in our hearts, I suspect, we haven't yet decided whether we think that the ancient bilateral relations of one donor nation to one recipient nation, is better than a pool-set of resources.

Economists have agreed for once, I think, with a good deal of consensus, that it is better to use your development capital in terms of the absorptive capacity of the area in question, and by and large we've learned that an ex-mother country is less sensitive to this question of absorptive capacity than someone who is looking at the situation with a fresher eye. So, technically it makes more sense to pool your capital and to pool your programs, rather than to do it on a bi-lateral basis. But, you heard General Clay, as I mentioned a moment ago, and there is this dilemma in a sense, in the posture of the developed world toward the underdeveloped world, part of the policy reflecting own national practices, part, as it were, this new science which has developed since the Marshall Plan.

Another implication for us from the stages of growth argument is that in the West we have apparently been able to solve the problems of

agriculture in a fashion that is rather dramatically a difficulty for us. Everyone faces some agricultural problem. I would take, on the whole, our problem of surpluses, to the communist problem of shortages. This may be a preference which, occasionally, effective agriculture would not agree to, but nonetheless, it seems that in terms of the underdeveloped area we have a working model of success in this field. And I think it's no accident.

Well, it's not accident. There was an article several years ago entitled "Marx Was a City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail." Again, that's a little too simple except for this fact; that if you have a police state you are better able to police your industrial working force than you are your peasants. There are not enough policemen in the world to follow a peasant around and make sure he gets up in the morning and gets the highest yield out of his farm. It just plain doesn't work without incentives. And I think this is one of the major problems that the Russians are going to have to face, and the Chinese, from here on out.

Malenkov fell on it in the '50s. Look what happened to the communes. And again there was another useful story in the press a while back, of two communists talking and one saying to the other, "So we communize the whole world. Then where will we buy our wheat?" There is real truth in this. So, the successful illustration of a solution to the problems of agriculture through an incentive system is one asset that in a sense, they can't take this away from us. And I feel that this is one of the major arguments that we should mount vis-a-vis the second and third stage countries.

Because, they are better aware of the implications of agriculture in

one sense, than they are, implications deriving from an industrial base; they know something about it. And they have a peasant sensitivity to whether or not your failing or succeeding in this field. Interdependence, then, has got to be a little more than a slogan if we're going to pull this off. But the model is there, the technique is there, the expertise is there.

Finally, the implications for the underdeveloped world out of this are, I think, equally obvious. Here you have Stage 1 to 3 nations out of this argument, who are anxious, I believe, to modernize almost irrespective of ideology. I know that you have lectures on the importance of ideology, but it seems to me that the people whom I've talked to from underdeveloped countries are, in a sense, rather hard-nosed about the ideological content of the development process. Perhaps I wish they were less so. I wish they were more sensitive to democratic values per se. But what I found is that they're anxious to modernize, preferably yesterday; certainly tomorrow, and they can't wait until next week.

The problem of this argument is that it suggests that if you get into takeoff it takes about 60 years to get to maturity. There is not yet one country that has pulled this off without a 60-year gap. We work out different figures for the beginning of takeoff and maturity, and it took us awhile to make the necessary subtraction and realize that it took 60 years to do it. I think it's no accident. I think you need two generations. You have to train your working force, build your cities, develop your interest structure, do all the things you have to do to modernize. But every underdeveloped country wants to telescope it and wants to en-

large it. And so, in a sense, they're looking to us to see if they can leap-frog from the middle of the second stage into the fifth stage, and do it right now, thank you.

So, this argument in one sense is hortatory, or discouraging. Because, if the past is any guide, it has taken more time than any underdeveloped country wishes to carry this process through.

The Russians, in a sense, can answer much more readily; they say, "We'll get it for your wholesale; we'll give it to you right now." But, in terms of the decline in the Soviet aid effort, the retrenchment, the withdrawal, the selective use of the residual forces, I would say that the Russians have, in one sense, demonstrated to themselves less capacity in this field than we have. But, in the end, the stages of growth concept then, gives the underdeveloped world a yard-stick by which to test its progress and a way of analyzing the model at the end of the road. Because, they can see past maturity, the model of a Free World society versus the model of a communist society.

And if they believe that ours is a working model of a successful economy their momentum in this direction, I think, will necessarily be accelerated. Well, where does that leave us? With the believe that on every level of analysis, that our position to assist these underdeveloped countries is a very useful one. We have for the first time, really, since Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard in June of '47, we've developed a theoretical confidence in dealing with theoretical problems. We've developed a core of people who have been experienced - if experience is a useful guide - in dealing with these problems over a 15-year period.

We have developed the patterning in OECD, etc., a way of a multi-lateral approach to this. We have developed, in short, all the necessary skills and we have the resources. We have the resources, and yet, at the present time we face in terms of an assistance program, a kind of handicap, a kind of hurdle in the political sphere that we have never seen in this dramatic degree, since the program got started in '47 and '48.

So, from the point of view of the United States this is something that is technically soluble. From the point of view of the developing countries the pattern is there. But as always, in the human situation, the residual question is whether a post-maturity, high-mass-consumption United States still has sufficient energy really to solve these problems. Or rather, once the initial freshness of an American assistance program has worn off - and I would put it to you it has in this period - once you institutionalize an assistance effort and therefore can shoot it full of holes, as we've seen done each year when the bill has gone up on the Hill, whether we're going to be able to carry this through successfully is still an uncertainty.

And it is a test not only for the underdeveloped countries that we can assist, but it's really a test as to whether the United States at this point in the fifth stage has the internal energy to do two things at once; to solve the internal problems which will make this the working model of a successful end-of-the-road and at the same time contribute productively to the many-faceted policies necessary to assist Stage 2 nations so that they will go generally in the direction of a free economy

and in time hit Stage 5 with residual freedoms built in.

So, this is the policy that I assume you gentlemen are on the way to administer, and I will close at this stage and be glad to have your questions later.

QUESTION: Professor Rostow, this morning the Washington Post had an article with regard to proposing a new scheme for war on poverty worldwide. I wonder if you would care to comment if you're in favor of this article, as to what its overall effects might be. It seems rather unorthodox.

DR. ROSTOW: General Stoughton told me about this, but I haven't even seen the headlines of the Washington Post. It sounds to me as though this is an effort to muddy the waters on the part of the French in an American election year, and to promise a good deal more than in the past they've been willing to put up. Because, the degree to which the French have been dragging their feet, I think has been marked. And I would take as an index to the French performance not only the episode of the British and the Common Market, but by and large the foreign policy of the de Gaulle period as a whole.

I view with interest, though not particular alarm, General de Gaulle's initiative toward Latin America. I think that right now this is a function of what I would regard as a disruptive rather than a positive contribution to international solution. All this thing said is, "These are clearly the problems that we all have to deal with." And, what seems to me good in the French proposal is to suggest that there is no single

answer to the problem of developing. You work on commodity agreements; you work on any kind of technical assistance; you would develop, in our case, something like an executive service corps; and you would approach the problem of development as indeed we approached our own national past, from as many different vantage points as possible.

The distinction between the American initiative and the French, if I could be prepared to comment on something I've not read, would be that in the past we have tried to act on our initiative and we have taken rather seriously our commitments. And it seems to me that a good deal of the record of the French performance in recent years is just the converse. So, I wish I had the text before me. But I'm afraid this is perhaps more than I should say with no more information than that.

QUESTION: Professor, since you identified five stages of economic development, there inevitably must be a sixth stage, or one in the offing. I realize that this must contain many variables that are not known. I wonder if you might give us some foresight or some look into the future on this?

DR. ROSTOW: Well, one reason I went in for history was that I didn't regard myself as a prophet. But I am married to an economist and therefore there is a certain, I suppose, osmotic transfer, and economists do look forward. So, I think my husband's answer would be more or less as follows; that either the end of the fifth stage in the United States, or the sixth stage, will address itself to this range of problems. And the quality of the sixth stage will be a function of the way in which we solve these problems.

First of all, the problem of solving the yield of automation and working toward a solution of this within an America which is plagued with the other problems that I'll get on to in a moment. I feel very keenly about this, having been a colleague for a good many years up at M.I.T., of Professor Norbert Wiener, who just died last week, the father of cybernetics. And the M.I.T. contribution to this problem I regard as disproportionately large. So, perhaps that's why I put it first.

The second problem is a related one, and that's to address ourselves to the problem of poverty-unemployment at a high stage of development; in other words, to find out what a post-maturity society can do to achieve growth under these circumstances.

Now, I suggested that there's a range of issues which I meant to refer to as a need for a productivity revolution. If you go on making your car engines out of aluminum rather than steel; if you allow railroading to spiral down, if not to a halt at least to a pretty poor level, there are clearly many areas of the economy that are obsolescent or that need attention. And if, at the same time, you direct so much attention into your defense establishment, inevitably you filter away brains from this area that could profitably be used in the other parts of the private sector.

As long as the status quo exists in terms of international affairs, I suspect this will continue. I saw it also at M.I.T. in watching my best students inevitably go in the direction, in effect, of the Pentagon and go away from these areas where their creative intelligence would have been very useful. We can't direct our work force; the Russians can, and

they can achieve results out of this that we can't. But, something like a productivity revolution, then, is needed.

To me the classic illustration of the problem we face in overseas markets, was a pair of Japanese sunglasses which I saw a few years ago, which were roughly the shape, initially, of a fountainpen, but which unfolded very efficiently to make a really first-rate sunglass. And they were sold with a little slip of paper included in them saying, "Beware of inferior American imitations." This is a slight reversal of a situation that we had seen in the inter-war years.

Well, that need, then, for a productivity revolution I think, again, will be one of the problems of the late fifth stage. I should have put higher on the list, perhaps, the whole problem of cities. I listened the other night to Professor Doxiadus, the Greek city planner of considerable imagination and competence, painting the shape of the future. And he gave as one figure which is useful here the fact that at the present time the average rate at which a car moves in New York City, is nine miles an hour. He has found that the last time when vehicles moved at this speed was at the beginning of the century, just before the introduction of the internal combustion engine. And he was predicting a period when the average speed of a car would be well lower than it was in 1900, and asked us to consider the implications of this for the future. He refers to it as "the problem of the universal city.

Well, whether you take the Doxiadus point of view or not is immaterial, but certainly the fact that within our country we haven't had the wit to solve the problem of getting people in and out of cities; the prob-

lem of increasingly high tax burdens within the city; the decay of the central city, etc. And the quality of urban life; I think that this too is a problem on our agenda for the late fifth stage. Well, put just these few problems in; throw the problem of farm surpluses in, if you wish, and the proper utilization of same. It seems to me that the problems, then, of the fifth stage, will be to deal creatively with this burden of post-maturity in such a fashion that we can get the growth yield that we now do not have.

Because, since we do not apply, as it were, any of our imagination to the major bulk of the economy we simply aren't getting the yield in terms of growth that we could have. So, this is the range of problems that will determine either how long the fifth stage lasts - and they're not symmetrical in length, or the quality of the sixth stage. Beyond that it's the function of many other things which are even less predictable than the ones that I've mentioned. But I would regard this as the agenda of the late fifth stage and therefore the determinant of the sixth stage to follow.

QUESTION: Professor Rostow, I'd like to take up your point that the United States is a good model now for the developing nations. It seems to me that other countries such as New Zealand, Australia, possibly South Africa, maybe Argentina, or even Russia, would be in the same genetic model, which had the following attributes: 1. There's an area to develop, and 2. The injection of people into these areas were about of the technical competence of the rest of the world. Now, today we have China, India, Southeast Asia, in which I do not see these attributes.

Therefore, would you reinforce your point that our earlier model stages will still be good models for these countries?

DR. ROSTOW: I should state - apparently I didn't make myself as clear as I wish I had - that the United States, to me, shares the characteristics in each of the fifth stages, but is not a particularly useful model from which to extrapolate because of the quality of the American endowment; the fact that we were born into the second stage; the fact that we had that degree of literate and competent middle-class that was, let's say, illustrated at the Philadelphia Convention. We were overly-endowed with human talent; we came out of a high level of British technology; we came out of a high level of British constitutional and political theory. And we therefore had assets that no contemporary underdeveloped country has, without exception.

To extrapolate from that, then, I think would be misleading. By the same token, the American fifth stage, since we in effect pioneered the age of high mass-consumption, and did it on a continental basis, this too would be a tricky base. By model I think I meant, in one sense, a show window of some of the characteristics of the fifth stage. I don't think we showed more than these characteristics in earlier stages.

We shared in the second stage, nationalism, the need for capital, the use of primary products, population, optimism. We showed in the third stage the leading sector, the economic changes that I suggested, and the importance of the political factor. We showed in the fourth stage the widening spectrum of income, change in the work force, new *firms* entering the market, etc. And we've shown in the fifth stage this momen-

tum of the suburbs, and all the attendant problems of the age of high mass-consumption. But that is as far as I would go.

If I were to try to find a model that they could look to for closer examination, well, in terms of the economy I suppose the model of Sweden would be useful because this was a country that was reasonably underendowed to begin with and managed to use this underendowment productively; to use the whole extractive field to spiral into a very successful operation.

I think I would use the countries which are now in this process. I mentioned Mexico. I'd use Mexico for Latin America if it's getting into the fourth stage; this is far enough along for most of Latin America right now; forget the colossus to the north and concentrate on Mexico, even though the Mexican endowment is disproportionately large by Latin American standards.

But I would ask the other countries of Latin America to observe the kinds of things that did happen within Mexico during the takeoff period, the problems that were solved, and the ones that still remain. It seems to me that a model that is perhaps closer to the underdeveloped world is sometimes more persuasive.

I mentioned India before. I think I'd use this as, again, a country wildly overendowed in terms of human assets. The trained civil service there is clearly not to be compared with the kinds of civil service which you find. I still have arguments occasionally with some Belgian friends who make it an article of pride to try to persuade me that there were 20 university graduates in the Congo at the time of independence

as I had been led to believe. Well, I'm not prepared to argue the case, but even given the six extra bodies - and it in no way is comparable to the kind of human endowment that, let's say, India had at the moment of her independence.

But, I would use, then, models of earlier stages of development which regionally are closer, if you possibly can. But I would be always aware that nonetheless they are looking at the end of the line to see if they follow along, what kind of a society will they be apt to see. And, of course, our social tensions; the whole problem of civil liberties in this country, is too readily observed to need comment here.

By the way, I personally believe - I don't have much more evidence on this than just a hunch - that one of the difficulties that we face in terms of the aid program is in just this field. It seems to me that because we have lost the consensus in Congress, which was slowly built up, as between Southerners, Liberals, etc. in both parties, we have lost it because of the intrusion of the Civil Rights issue into recent politics. I think that the break-up in both is, in part, a result of this, and the increased tension of the last year or so in arguing on assistance, I think, is then a function of the internal tensions of the 1960s.

But, to get back to your question, I would use, then, very carefully, the American model for only those purposes that I suggested. And one more point might be made; that the federal structure of this country, I think, in terms of the relations between some of these new "nations" that we admit regularly to the U.N. may be the way ahead. Because, clearly, if we had tried to move in the direction of a single state, calling it a nation

and applying the test of viability, we wouldn't have gotten very far in the late 18th or early 19th Century. It was only because we brought together high and low-yield areas; we brought together city and hinterland, and fused it under federalism, that we were in one sense able to pull off the 19th Century success story.

So, I would say that whether you call it a Common Market; whether you call it a Federation; that this notion of inter-relationship will do something to beef up the very weak national basis of many of these new nations. Because, when I went to school I was taught what nationalism was and how a country became a national whole out of history, linguistic union, culture, the ethics, passage of time, being attacked from outside; all these. Professor Hans Kohn had his argument; Professor Carleton Hayes had his; but we all knew what a nation was. But now, suddenly, we are asked to accept as nations areas which no longer satisfy any of these criteria for nationhood which, in the past, were prerequisite to independent status.

That's why I call them "nations," and these "nations" will need to have some greater degree not only of political solidarity, a broader political base, but clearly, many of them have no economic base which will get them out of these second stages. They can just stay there indefinitely. And many countries have stayed indefinitely in one stage in the past.

Therefore, I would urge selective use, as it were, of all parts of this argument, but not the concentration on any single area. It's quite clear that, let's say for Togo, the model of 19th Century America is as

meaningless as an illustration which came from a Martian base. So, all this is to say that the stages concept has to be used very selectively, but with these qualifications I think it has some utility.

QUESTION: Professor Rostow, you presented a theory of individual economic change within a nation, which is generally increasing or irreversible. Generally, on a broader scale, history has shown more of a slackening pattern in political and economic changes, such as Dr. Toynbee has shown. Have you ever attempted to resolve your theory with that of Dr. Toynbee?

DR. ROSTOW: Well, that's your challenge. My response, in the Toynbee sense, would be that this is not a determinant view. Sure, countries have failed, and sure, there have been cycles of history in the past. I would say that whether you start pre-Toynbee, with Gibbon, and work on it, you usually find a country, a society or a civilization fails not, I think, because of any pre-determined time-span, but usually because they have been unable to solve either the political, or in some cases, the economic realities that they confront.

This failure of leadership, a failure of will, if you will, we've seen in the past, and certainly we could experience it. But I see no evidence within this country that we are either running out of problems - and we have made our success in the past by the solution of problems; the internal problem of colonizing our West; the political problem of holding it together reasonably at this stage.

We have, as I suggested in my late fifth or early sixth stage of gender, we still have the problem. The question of will is something

that I don't think anyone can answer. And if you take the pessimist's view that the Lord, or whoever determines these matters, has allotted a certain time-span to nations, then indeed you might say that as the problems have grown greater perhaps the will to solve them will diminish and perhaps we like other civilizations will decline. The Decline of the West and the other views are perfectly familiar.

I am not, in that sense, a determinant, and I see nothing internally that bears on this. But, it could happen if, as a country, we decided that the problems were insoluble. However, we have one great advantage that no previous civilization to my knowledge, had; we institutionalized out of the highest kind of optimism about man's capacity; the 18th Century; the Enlightenment. And we institutionalized politically in our Constitution, economically, and accepting Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" - which, after all, was an accident, but it was a rather nice one, published in 1776 - and we took, then, this concept of the responsible individual as a base on which we would develop.

This, to me, is a far stronger base for the limited optimism that I'm expressing, than we've ever seen in previous civilizations which have fallen. And I think we were mightily lucky. I suppose I am a Calvinist, but I'm awfully glad that we didn't institutionalize and freeze in the 17th Century because I think it would have been a pretty dreary world. But what we did by chance was to take that moment when rationalism had peaked and when the notion that man can control and manipulate his environment and build it into the things that we prize so deeply in this society, namely an amendable Constitution, a free enterprise system, and

ultimately a dependence upon the individual to control his destiny rather than vice versa.

To me, the degree to which we are constantly criticizing our own performance is an index of health. We're never content with the way we operate and the notion that father knows best, which started with Plato's Republic and works all the way through, is something of anathema, I believe, to Americans. So, what I'm talking about is something that's hard to pin down. It's the American style, the American Constitution, the American approach to the problem of solving the range of issues before us.

So, I know of no previous civilization which begins on the bed-rock of what I call the "Enlightenment" which institutionalizes this way and in the end puts so much responsibility on the individual. That's really the basis of my feeling that we need not recapitulate the pattern of other societies where it has been in the last analysis the state which has made the early successful decisions and later the failing decisions. So, it's out of that that I have this limited optimism.

QUESTION: Could you tell us whether the World Bank is an effective instrument in assisting the developing nations?

DR. ROSTOW: I think the whole range of soft and hard-loan windows that we have in this world are unquestionably useful. It's important that you do have an option if you're a developing country. It's important that you have a World Bank; that you have the Ex-Im Bank; that you have the whole range of international institutions. Because, they make more flexible the policy of a developing nation, and certainly they make more cap-

ital available, which is, by itself, a good thing. And also they reduce this dependence upon, if it is an old mother country, or at least a traditional tie.

So, in the degree to which we move toward a multi-lateral base, I think that I'm profoundly convinced that we have moved forward. There is one danger; it's less in terms of the World Bank, than, let's say, in terms of the old U.N. programs for assistance, which relates to the question of absorptive capacity. I've never been much of an enthusiast for what was earlier called the "Sun-Fed Program" and the other U.N. proposals. Because, if you vote your funds out of a club which contains both donors and recipients, it's pretty hard to put in standards for the use of funds. It's pretty hard, in short, to be anything close to scientific. It seems to me that this is an unscientific way of going about it.

But, if this is the most multi-lateral context; if you move downward in scale toward the bank, I think that this widens opportunity; renders multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral relations, which, to me, are thereby improved; and on the whole - again, I talk in human terms about the development of expertise - has the increased competence of those in a position to release funds, and this has been marked over the last decade.

So, all in all, I think the great initiative that started at Bretton Woods is something that has, again, been beneficial and technically very advantageous.

CAPTAIN McCUSKEY: Professor Rostow, may I thank you on behalf of the class, for one of the most delightful and beneficial mornings that we have had during our academic year.