



## THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Dr. John C. Campbell

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 17 May 1964

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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The Problems of the Middle East

26 March 1964

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
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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DR. SANDERS: Civilization began in the Middle East and its inhabitants have been fighting ever since. One could say that the fertile crescent is more fertile for problems and issues than for abundant crops. The things you read about - Jews fighting Arabs, or Arabs fighting Arabs, or Arabs fighting Kurds, etc.

To discuss this troubled region we are fortunate to have as our speaker, a scholar widely recognized for his knowledge of the area. And we can have full confidence in the facts and views, since he is a graduate of the National War College. It is a pleasure to present Dr. John Campbell, of the Council of Foreign Relations, to discuss the Middle East with us. Dr. Campbell.

DR. CAMPBELL: Admiral Rose; Faculty and Students of the Industrial College:

A couple of years ago when I was lecturing at this neighboring institution of yours, going out after the presentation for the cigarette break I was flapping my ears a little just to get a little student reaction, to see how things had gone. And the only clear thing I overheard was, "Well, at least that bastard finished right on the dot." The moral of this story is, aside from questions of legitimacy, that time is of the essence in these lectures. I have prepared a collapsible latter part to this lecture so that I can be sure.

Now, the main problem in trying to compress what one would want to say on an area as big and as diverse as the Middle East, to avoid ramb-

ling recollections which you can do if you just start anywhere and proceed, and on the other hand, to avoid attempting to cram X number of facts within each minute. I decided to take four separate cuts at the question as follows:

First, strategic; to discuss its importance and its place in the world balance; second, to consider United States' policy the way we've approached the area and have conducted the cold war, or not conducted it there; third, some remarks on the local scene, particularly the political forces at work and the problems they pose for us. And finally, some specific questions to give a little light and concrete facts as to the theoretical generalizations that will have been mentioned before; three of these, oil, the Arab-Israel question, and finally, the Yemen affair.

Traditionally and historically the Middle East has been an area of contention among the great powers for a number of centuries. We don't have a map here but I will assume a certain knowledge of geography. The British had been much concerned as they were building their empire, to maintain the routes to India and the Far East, and to establish themselves in positions which would keep other powers out of the area of such great importance to their own world position; the French building up an empire in the Mediterranean and in Africa were rivals of the British all through the 18th and 19th Centuries, and even into the 20th.

The Russians, of course, were pursuing a general southward expansion toward the Persian Gulf, toward Constantinople and the Straits in the Eastern Mediterranean, and have had a historic policy of pushing

into the Middle East, which continued in a different form after the Bolshevik Revolution, and in many ways has continued the traditional policy begun under the Czars.

There were two critical points, as you recall, in world history and in two World Wars; that was the fourth power - Germany, which attempted in seeking a world position of its own, to do so by pushing into this area. Strategic considerations were the basic explanation for the long struggle over the Ottoman Empire, which at one time in its history really controlled the whole area of what we know as the modern Middle East. And it was the weakness of that empire that became apparent by the 18th Century, that led to the struggle between the outside powers, for key points which would preserve for them the particular positions like the Straits, Suez and Cyprus, which they felt were necessary to preserve an imperial position.

In many ways the Middle East was, in fact, what General Eisenhower said when he described it some ten years ago before a Congressional Committee, as strategically, in territory alone, the most important strategic area in the world, to use his precise language; so far as the sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategic area in the world.

The United States, of course, didn't really come into this picture until World War II and after it. You recall that within the war we were with the British in the Middle East Command; helped them to run the Middle East Supply Center which more or less controlled the economic life of the area during the wartime period; and we were in Iran with the

British and the Russians to maintain a supply line there so that the Soviet Union could get supplies from the West by this route; which was one of the essential routes of communication between ourselves and Russia.

But, instead of being able to withdraw as we would have liked to do, and leave things to the British, you'll recall that President Roosevelt never really thought of the Middle East as a sphere of American interest; he was inclined to leave things to the British. When someone brought him a Middle Eastern problem he would say, "Why aren't the British handling that? Why bring it to me?" This attitude changed entirely in the events of 1946 and '47 when we saw Stalin pushing into this area, through Greece, through Turkey, through Iran, definitely making an attempt to take over those countries and establish satellite countries in the Middle East as he was already doing in Eastern Europe.

And when the British decided they could no longer hold the line in Greece and Turkey in 1947, we made the decision - the critical decision then - to step in and carry the bulk of the load of protecting the Middle East against the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. And in a sense, we've been in that role ever since.

Now, in the years which have followed, certain changes have taken place in strategic concepts, and geography sometimes is changed by military technology. And perhaps we shouldn't call the Middle East the same kind of strategic area as we did in the old days when we considered it as an area to be contended in the kind of World War that was fought in World War I and World War II. The advent of nuclear weapons, delivery

systems, etc., have changed the value of a place like Suez, obviously. The British realization of this was one reason why they were willing to get out of the Suez base in 1954, negotiate a deal with the Egyptians and not hang onto it at all costs. And the same thing has happened to some other positions previously considered vital.

Some of the airbases which we had in the early post-war period - Dhahran, for one - are now longer considered as essential to our global position of deterrence against Soviet aggression. We have had positions in the Middle East which have been important for Middle Eastern strategic reasons and also for global strategic reasons, and both pictures, I think, have changed to some degree. Nevertheless, the basic problem is the same; the basic question for us, which is to deny the Middle Eastern area to the Soviet Union. Whether you look at it from a military or political point of view, it's the same and it's still there. Some of the methods have changed, but our basic strategic task is still that same one.

Well, there's not much doubt, it seems to me, about Soviet aims in the Middle East. There's not much doubt about the kind of long-range strategy which we are up against on their part. This has been declared openly enough, not only under Stalin, but during Khrushchev's period. We don't have to assume that military means are going to be the main method by which they will attempt to establish their own control in the Middle Eastern countries. That's certainly not ruled out, but nevertheless, one thing which seems to be quite apparent from the record of recent years, is the great caution which the Soviets have shown about get-

ting themselves into any kind of military showdown with us in the Middle East. This was apparent in the various crises we've been through with them in '56, '58, etc.

They never have committed their forces to a situation where they might be likely to come into conflict with Western forces. They've been very active in all the other ways of supplying arms, attempting to subvert governments and all the rest. But they have not been willing to risk adventurous military action.

They have a two-stage strategy I would say, on the political side, and this has been laid down fairly clearly over a long period of years, which is to push the Western powers out of positions which they have had historically in the area, as the first stage, and in doing this they will make an alliance with anybody who is available; any nationalist movement; even reactionary forces; any political groups which have any role to play in the Middle East are possible allies of the Soviet Union in order to gather the force which can push. It has been particularly the British, but it has been aimed also at such positions as we have held, out of the area altogether.

And the second stage, then, is the communization or the actual establishment of regimes which are really under Soviet control. And, while they've made a great deal of progress, particularly in the 1950s, in the first stage, and were successful in pushing the British out and destroying much of the position which we had built up in parts of the Middle East, they have not been successful in the second stage of moving on to take over governments and actually establish controlled satellite

states in that area.

The basic Soviet motive, I think, is power, but nevertheless ideology is a factor in the picture. There is a great deal of ideology mixed up not only into their public pronouncements on this subject, but also in their own thinking and in their own discussions among themselves. There have been endless debates within the Soviet Communist Party and the International Communist Movement since the 1920s, about how to go about subverting the Middle East and bringing it into the world of socialism; what bourgeois elements they should cooperate with, and how far; and which ones they should refrain from cooperating with. But, in practice, it seems to me, it's pretty clear they'll cooperate with anybody who is against the West.

Khrushchev has certainly been much more flexible than Stalin was in carrying out this kind of tactic. Stalin during his closing years, felt - or at least it was apparent from his policies - that he wasn't sure of anybody he was cooperating with unless there was somebody right there under his thumb; somebody whom he could physically control. So that, areas like the Arab countries which were beyond the border of the Soviet Union and not peripheral to it, he never really attempted to do anything very formidable in taking over those countries because they weren't within reach of the Soviet Army on the ground. Whereas, Khrushchev has been much more flexible and has been much more successful and more adventurous, and has perhaps had a much more intelligent policy in going much further afield than Stalin did.

The currently-proclaimed strategy of the Russians - and this ap-

peared in the 1960 statement of the 81 Communist Parties of the world, is to establish in these countries what they call a national democratic state. Well, now, what this means is a popular front state, really. It means a regime including communists, front organizations, and such other non-Communist Parties as are willing to go along. It doesn't necessarily mean it has to be a state which is wholly communist in the makeup of the regime. But it does mean that they have to play a role in it and they have to have freedom of action to subvert the other parties within the coalition. That is, what they wanted to have is free reign as they had in Eastern Europe to enable the communist elements gradually to push out those who would be their potential or actual rivals.

They have not really established such a state to their own liking yet, but they came very close to it in Iran in 1958 and '59. You recall after the revolution which destroyed the monarchy and the Nuri Said Regime in 1958, in Iran, under the Kassem government which succeeded the old one, the communists had a very strong position, and Kassem tolerated them and allowed them to build up power to the point where it was not quite evident whether he was going to be able to control them or whether he even wanted to do so.

But at a critical moment in the middle of 1959 the communists made some false moves, Kassem turned against them, and the Russians, with this choice before them, decided not to push for<sup>a</sup> showdown and instructed the Iraqi communists to be loyal to the Kassem government. But it seems to me that there was a chance for them at that time to push for the kind of regime I've been talking about here - a popular front regime which

the communists really would control in Iraq. But they haven't done it, and since then the tide has rather been running against them.

Now let me turn to American policy. Our policy in the area, as I said, dates from the immediate post-war period. It was the first time we attempted to develop any kind of general strategy and line of military and political thinking for dealing with that area. And it began with our assumption of a position in Greece, Turkey and Iran, which we looked at not merely as areas to be defended for themselves, but also as the crust, so to speak, which was on top of the softer parts of the Middle East in the Arab World.

We set about doing this with the cooperation of the British, trying to preserve, so far as we could, the strong-points and positions which were the historic British strong-points in that area. After all, Britain had come out of World War II with what looked like a very strong position in the Middle East. And it wasn't apparent until a couple of years later that it had as great weaknesses as it did.

What we tried to do, really, was to take over that system with the British as partners, but also to bring into it the new nations that had come into being in the area, particularly, in addition to Turkey and Iran, Egypt and such other Arab nations as we could get to come along. The difficulty was that at that particular period in history it was impossible to line up the Arab nations with the Western powers in any kind of common defense policy. So that, all our proposals of that time - the Middle East Command proposal which we put up in 1951; the so-called Middle East Defense Organization, which never really got off the ground;

it never got out of the planning stage, with American, British and Turkish Officers working to plan it, but there was never any alliance on paper that ever came out of it- all these foundered on the rock of Egyptian nationalist opposition to any kind of military alliance or tie-up which would associate them with the British and with the West in general.

Mr. Dulles in 1953 and '54 somewhat changed the emphasis and attempted to build what became the Northern Tier Alliance, or the Baghdad Pact, which included three non-Arab countries - Pakistan, Turkey and Iran - and one Arab country - Iraq. In this effort we were trying to at least show that we could get the cooperation of a certain number of Middle Eastern states; those who were willing to go along with us in an alliance really directed to protect the whole Middle Eastern area against the Soviet Union and get that amount of cooperation with them.

We can see now, looking back on it, that there was a great deal of undue optimism; that we miscalculated, perhaps, the balance of forces in Iraq; we miscalculated the strength of Arab nationalism which would be against this particular line-up; but at the time it looked to be quite a logical move to make.

The Baghdad Pact contributed, of course, to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and to the movement the year before, in 1955, when the Russians really came into the area in a big way for the first time by making the arms deal with Egypt.

The Suez Crisis of '56, which we won't discuss here in any detail, in which we stumbled, it seems to me, parting company with our British

and French allies, presented a really harsh dilemma in which we had to make a decision; we had to choose between our allies at that time, and a kind of reversion to the 19th Century method of imperialism which they were engaged in on the one hand, or we had to support the principles of the United Nations and support Nasser whom we didn't like very much, but nevertheless he was the victim of an attack, and there wasn't any real doubt in the end, what our choice was going to be. But actually, the crisis itself, though a victory for Nasser above everybody, didn't settle anything on the main question of our own position in the Middle East.

The crisis did pretty well destroy the British position in the Middle East except for their position in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. And we soon found ourselves trying to fill what we called a vacuum left by the destruction of the British position in Egypt and elsewhere. In doing so and attempting to build up some kind of coalition which could substitute for what we'd had or thought we'd had before, we ran again into fierce Arab nationalism and a split in the Arab World between the more dynamic forces which were in fact following Nasser, and the more traditional forces which we were supporting because they were friendly to us and willing to cooperate with us, in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and elsewhere.

The difficulty of this position when you look at it more or less from the over-view, was that we were attempting to oppose and fight at the same time both communism and Arab nationalism. And the combination on the political stage was too difficult an opponent for us to win out over. This was apparent, it seems to me, in the crisis of 1958, the next one on the list, where we did go into Lebanon, where there was a revolu-

tion which destroyed the pro-Western government in Iraq. And the whole American effort of trying to build a strong group of pro-Western states in the Arab World really fell apart. And Iraq, the center-piece of the Baghdad Pact was, in fact, knocked out of the pact.

So that, when you look back over this period of American policy in the '50s in attempting with the British - or against the British; it seems to me whether we work with them or against them we came to a disastrous end either way - the record of the '50s is one which we tried methods of organizing the Middle East in a pro-Western alignment and did not succeed in doing so.

But, the year 1958 is an interesting one, not just because it was a low point in our position in the area, but also because it turned out to be a turning point. And there have been developments since then which put a much brighter face on the picture. There was a great apparent victory both for Nasser and Arab nationalism, and for the communists, in view of what happened, particularly in Iraq. Nevertheless, the very success of their revolution, or what they thought was their revolution in Iraq, brought them to the end of the period where they were both cooperating against the common enemy, namely the West.

And after 1958 when we were out of the picture in many of these countries, these forces came into contact and conflict with each other. There were increasing checks to Nasser's position and his brand of nationalism, largely because it turned out that the Iraqis didn't want to join with Egypt; they had other ideas of their own. And there were increasing checks to Soviet ambitions, on the other hand, because resistance

arose in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, to the role which the Soviets were trying to play; they were trying to push into their second stage by seeking out for the pro-communist elements in the Middle East, a larger part in what was going on. And in that they ran up against Nasser who wanted to run a totalitarian state of his own type and not have other kinds of totalitarians given any role in it.

So that, we, then, quietly and without any fanfare, reversed our own policy toward Nasser, and this, I think, has been a major factor in explaining many of the things which have happened in the Middle East since 1959 and 1960. We did so not because we thought he'd become a democrat or for any reasons that we had to respect him or like his policies, but we did so on the basis that after all, here now, proved by the fact, was an important force in the Middle East. There was no question that Arab nationalism was on the march and that Nasser was the symbol and recognized leader of it, and that we had to take account both of him and his country, which was, after all, the strongest country - the most populous one - in the Arab World. We could not build a policy in the Middle East which didn't take account of the fact that Nasser and Egypt were an important factor.

At the same time, we didn't make him the pivot or the fulcrum of our policy; much more important was the fact that we still had Iraq, Turkey and Iran as allies. The Baghdad Pact had disappeared but we put it into new form, as you know, and called it CENTO, and it has gotten along much better with the Arab member of it outside, not inside, and bringing Arab problems to disturb what has been a reasonably good working

relationship among non-Arab states, all of them with a pretty general idea of what their objective was with respect to the Soviet Union.

And so, we've gradually built up our influence in the Middle East by a policy of "mutual tolerance," is what I call it, with Nasser, to the point where, in many ways, we have a stronger position there than any other country, including the Soviet Union. There are even some European observers of the scene who feel that the United States has worked itself into what might be called a dominant position in the Middle East.

There has certainly been plenty of unrest and plenty of crises in this period of the last five years. But somehow we've been able to get over them. They haven't been the type of crisis of the 1950s, each of which seemed to result in some kind of forward step and victory for the Soviet Union, and some kind of retreat for the West. And we've also been able to live through such affairs as the falling apart of Nasser's United Arab Republic when Syria defected in 1961; the crisis in Kuwait in 1961 which the British handled very well; these more recent crises haven't been of the type which seemed to threaten a real world military conflict as was the case in '56 or '58.

This was partly because I think we have established a stronger position for ourselves, which is based, really, not on any obvious American presence in the Middle East; it's something on the contrary; it's by our being able to detach ourselves more from Middle Eastern internal disputes - from inter-Arab conflicts particularly - that we have been able to establish a position both with those countries which tend to represent more

radical and dynamic nationalism, like Egypt and Syria; and also to maintain a position still, in a more traditional and monarchical country such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, etc.

Now, let's look for a moment at our relationship with Nasser. Incidentally, this is of considerable benefit to him. It has been built partly on the extension of a great deal of American aid to him. This chart will give you an idea of how far that has gone. This, incidentally, shows both military and economic aid to the major countries of the Middle East. On the Egyptian side you see the degree to which it has gone up from practically nothing in 1959. Just in four or five years it has gone now to over \$800 million worth of aid. That has mostly been in surplus agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, from the Egyptian point of view it has been very important both to feed the population and to help their balance of payments, and their ability to keep their economy going.

Obviously, the largest quantities of aid have gone to our out-and-out allies in the Middle East. Turkey, for obvious reasons, heads the list. Pakistan and Iran are also very high. The military figure on Pakistan can be deduced from the figures which are given for the whole area, because it's the only one which is classified except for Saudi Arabia which is not very high. Nevertheless, it doesn't appear on this chart on the ground that it is classified. You see the extent of the economic aid which has gone to Pakistan.

Now, we had hoped that our aid would make Nasser more susceptible to our influence and encourage his concentration on domestic developments rather than foreign adventures. We are no longer trying to line up the

Arab states against him; on the contrary, we've really let him get away with an adventure of his own in Yemen, which we'll talk a little about later. Now, it looks from what I've just said, that Nasser is getting all the benefit of this and we're not getting very much in return. I think what we have got is a regaining of prestige and influence and position in the Arab World, where we do have the possibility and capability of saying more to governments and having our words listened to than was the case in the 1950s when we were so much involved in the internal Arab quarrels which were going on and unable to make our influence felt in a very constructive way.

Now, some have even gone so far as to say that Nasser has become a chosen instrument of the United States in the Middle East. It seems to me there is really no ground for this, if only because Nasser himself does not follow such a policy, and certainly the United States Congress would not go along with any such policy. It might perhaps be called just the other way around in the Yemen affair; that we are, in a sense, his chosen instrument to help him get away with a particularly difficult situation which might not otherwise have been the case.

The position we've established rests on three main pillars which are related to the three main instruments of our policy. And I'd like to say this by way of summary on the American policy side of this; but the first is obviously the military side. And there Turkey remains the strongest point in our military position. Iran is also essential to it. CENTO, I think, is not important as a military barrier, but it does have some importance because it is a political commitment, and particularly

because it is a commitment to Iran which is not in NATO as Turkey is. And thus, it does add to the value of the Northern Tier in keeping the Russians away from any kind of military adventures further to the South.

In the Arab World we still have some kind of military posture and presence even if it isn't based on those countries themselves, and even if it isn't obvious to the eye of anyone who is there. The important thing is the ability of the United States to bring military power to bear in the area when it might be necessary to do so, and to have that factor present in the calculations both of the Arab Governments and of the Soviet. And it doesn't make any difference whether the bases are there or not, from that standpoint. The main thing is to know that the United States in certain cases would act, and that it has the capability of doing so.

The second pillar of our policy is diplomacy. And here, as I said, we're no longer trying to enlist new allies or set up a defense organization that we don't have there already. But, diplomacy is necessary to keep as much influence as we can in a very unstable situation with periodic revolts, changes of government, and all the rest; preventive diplomacy, as the State Department likes to call it, necessary to keep local conflicts from erupting and perhaps growing into something worse and endangering our vital interests there - to control that kind of situation.

Also, to encourage those policies and trends which keep the revolutionary forces in orderly channels so far as you can do that. You're never going to get any real stability in the Middle East, but it's a question of how you can control the instability and the degree you can

do it, especially in those countries which are vital to the world position that we have, and to such primary interests as access to Middle Eastern oil. This, again, is a question of flexibility and timing, mainly, and not a question of principles and doctrine. I think we've more or less passed the stage where we feel that somehow we can effect the Middle Eastern situation by proclaiming doctrines and by building formal organizations; that we've had much greater success by what you might call pragmatic diplomacy, maximizing our influence as best we can.

The third pillar of our policy is economic, and this is perhaps the strongest potential means of influence in the area. We use it, obviously, to shore up our allies, provide them both military equipment and economic aid, which increases the chances of stability, and gives us bargaining power with those countries which are not our allies, such as Egypt. Economic aid thus has, really, a political motivation in our dealing with the neutralist countries in the area. Of course, some of the rationale for it is that we help them progress at a certain rate and to gain a certain amount of economic stability by the aid which we give them, but for the most part it has been a political motivation.

And, of course, this has also been the same motivation on the part of the Soviets. I'd like to show you a chart which contrasts Soviet and American economic aid; the military is not in this picture because they can't really get the figures on Soviet military aid. Soviet military aid has gone mostly to four countries - Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen - and those are the same four countries where most of the Soviet economic aid has gone.

Now, when you look at our allies you see that the Soviets have been pretty much out of the picture in Turkey and Iraq, for obvious reasons, although this is rather interesting in that they have begun just within the past year, to try to get better relations with Iran and to make some economic arrangements with them. Here in the U.A.R., in Egypt, for example, a year ago or two years ago, our figure was down here as opposed to where the Soviet figure was. And it's an indication of how much has gone into Egypt from the United States just in the past couple of years. The large figure for them is principally their contribution to building the high dam at Aswan.

The other figures here for Iraq and Syria, these are actually probably higher totals than most countries really got. What happens, the way the Soviet foreign aid system works, is that they make an agreement on a top figure for credit and then within that figure they have to negotiate all the specific projects when the money and equipment actually becomes available. And in almost no place do they really provide as much money as is indicated here. Nevertheless, there is a general commitment that this much has gone to those countries. So that, they have provided more to Syria and Iraq than we have.

On the other hand, this comparison of the sizes of the piles of coins here, as you can see, doesn't really indicate that there has been a correspondence of political influence related to that. And I think the Russians have been very disappointed with the political returns which they've had from this aid and they are having an agonizing reappraisal of their own about how much they're actually getting out of the foreign

aid which they are providing to Middle Eastern countries. Because, none of these countries has been softened up in a way in which they've been able to get a real foothold there.

On the other hand, like ourselves, they find it hard to break off; once they've established the relationship of foreign aid to these countries it's very hard without taking a political loss just to admit that it isn't worth it and give it up.

Finally, let's take a look at the political forces within the area itself. Because, these are the things which limit what we can do and what the Soviets can do in the Middle East. As I said, in the present conditions which we have there it is not so much the power positions and the potential military situation, but the political struggle and duel which is determining how we are making our influence felt and how we are holding our own in the area. And more and more power of decision has gone into the hands of the local governments themselves. It's ironic perhaps at a time where the gap between the big powers which have the most modern arms and the small powers, the gap in their power has been increasing greatly. At the same time, the ability of the big powers to use that power in a political sense in the area has been decreasing.

So that, what Middle Eastern governments and Middle Eastern people think and say is a very much more important part of the picture than it used to be in the past. Whereas the British before the first war and between the wars, for example, were dealing principally with the sheiks and the kings and could build a Middle Eastern system on that and their ability to handle by force, bribery, influence, military power; whatever

ways, directed toward a few people at the top of society, they could run a system in the Middle East. And where, later they could do it with a rising bourgeois elements of the new middle class, the so-called "Liberal Nationalists," who generally were pro-Western in their orientation, this still was a manageable situation. But now, where there is no stable factor, where we're dealing mainly with unpredictable movements, demagogues, changing governments, interventions, coups de etats and all the rest, it's hard to have anything grab hold of from outside, and we're very much dependent in our position there, on how these governments change and on who is running them; this political self-assertion taking the form of a nationalism which has been directed mostly against the West. And in the case of the Arabs, of course, the fact of Israel and the history of the way in which Israel came into being, and the support which we have given it since it came into being, has been another burden on our relations with the Arabs and has added to the fact of unpredictability, the fact of almost congenital anti-Westernism on the part of the new and loud nationalist forces which are making themselves felt in the area.

Now, the old situation having broken down and no real basis having been established, no firm basis for a new kind of society; after all, the Middle East was under a more or less static society for centuries, and this broke down only very recently - and as I said, there are no strong institutions which have taken its place - and in this great variety of situations we have to attempt to find some kind of a policy which preserves our position in the area as a whole and not just an individual part of it.

Looking over the political situation in the different countries, we obviously can't tarry on any one of them. But even in Turkey, which has been considered stable and relatively democratic, we have a lot of question marks in the picture there. We had an Army intervention; the Army has gotten out again, but it is a situation where they are ready to intervene again if there is a necessity for doing so. You have a government more or less held together just by the personality of one old man who is a hangover from the Kemal regime of a generation ago, and without him we're not quite sure of what we would have.

In Iran we have a situation where we depend almost wholly on the ruler to keep the country in shape and progressing in an orderly way. A large part of the urban population, the middle class and the intelligentsia, is against them, is tempted to by-pass them by building up political strength in the peasantry through a land reform, the results of which are very much a question mark. We don't really know, the ~~re~~turns aren't in, as to how well this is going to work at all. But, at any rate it is quite a gamble and the possibilities of unrest and revolution in Iran are still very great.

We have a commitment, as I say, to the country, and also to the Shah himself, a situation which obviously has some dangers of its own. In the Arab World we've seen a rash of revolutions which have brought the military into power in many of these countries. Now, the difficulty here is that there is no apparent uniform pattern that we can predict from one country to another; and that the military in power in one country acts differently and has different policies and different methods than they

do in another country.

Let's say a pattern was set in Egypt; that pattern is not the same in the other countries. The Egyptian military regime is now more or less civilianized and is not just a military element running a civilian society. Whereas, in Syria and Iraq we have quite different conditions. You have military officers going in and out of power, in and out of politics, in a way which creates no political stability whatsoever and we don't know how it's going to come out.

Again, in a more primitive country like Libya or Saudi Arabia, you have, again, possibilities of some kind of military takeover, when you get a succession crisis with the present ruling sovereigns and still no strong enough political structure to provide the kind of stability which the countries need, and no ideology which holds the military officers if they take power and which holds them together.

Now let me turn to one specific problem which is Middle Eastern oil, which I'm going to do in a rather cursory way. But, I think it is important, because when we're looking at interests which you can call the most vital or the most significant - vital has no comparative - but most significant and even vital interests of the West, they are in Middle Eastern oil.

This first chart will give you an idea of the extent of the oil reserves of the world which are in the Middle East. On the right-hand side here where you see the reserves, the Middle East is way up - 2/3 - some estimates put it even more than that, of the world's oil reserves. And obviously, this is going to be important for many years to come for the

West. On the other side you see that production for the Middle East is at a much lower level, only 20% of world production, but this is very much bound to come up in the future. And any way you look at the worldwide picture, the Middle East is going to be at the center of it and therefore at the center of Western interest for some time to come.

The next chart gives you an idea of how this apportioned among the Middle Eastern countries. You see the biggest one here is Kuwait and the next one Saudi Arabia; then Iran and Iraq. It's interesting that these two also are the ones with the biggest oil reserves. So, from the point of view of the West, as you look at the map, it's on the shore of the Gulf itself that the real concentration of oil is, and it's also that part of the Middle East where Naval power can project itself if this becomes a necessary part of the picture.

Now, this oil is not vital because the United States needs it, but because Western Europe does. What is important is not so much the specific existing arrangements about how this oil comes to Western Europe; how it is produced; what are the arrangements between the governments and the companies, etc., the main thing is that the oil continue to be available to the industrial countries of the West which are our allies, because the industrial life of that part of the world - Western Europe - depends upon it.

The Suez crisis was a prime example of the kind of big scare which we have of the vulnerability of the West when this oil might be stopped or cut off. You recall Nasser blocked the canal then; Syria blew up the pipelines, so this oil was coming to the West only by the round-about way

of the Cape of Good Hope.

Now I want to show you another chart which indicates the import of Middle Eastern oil into Western Europe. And you'll see that it has been a very large part of Western Europe's oil supply. This is the Middle Eastern part and this is the rest. The effects of the Suez thing are obvious here in '56 and '57. But it has begun coming up again here as you can see. The interesting thing is that while the import of Middle Eastern oil has been, in absolute terms, been going up or holding even in the last few years, the percentage has been going down. And in this way, the bargaining power of the West has increased, as opposed to the bargaining power of the oil-producing states. So that, there is not the same feeling that Nasser has his finger on the jugular vein of Europe, as there was in 1956.

There are availabilities of oil now from other parts of the world west of Suez - North Africa and elsewhere - and the situation is perhaps not as dangerous as it used to be. Nevertheless, I don't think this is going to be going down any more. I think that with Europe's increasing demands, that the Middle East will not have a less and less share in it, but will level off somewhere about where it is at the present time.

Now, going back to my opening remark about collapsibility at the conclusion, I'm going to leave the Israel affair and Yemen to the question period if any of you want to bring them up there.

I do want to mention one word about the Middle East; what we might call the period of the so-called detente between the East and West, because this is very much in our minds today; Senator Fullbright's speech,

talking about a new atmosphere and new conditions, I think requires us to look at this whether we go along with what he says or not. There certainly has been some loosening of the alliances by virtue of the fact that the pressures are not so great between ourselves and the Soviet in the area as they have been. There may be some danger that Iran will tend more toward neutralism than close alliance with the West. There has even been some talk of the common U.S. and Soviet interest in preventing conflict in the area, which might lead to some cooperation between ourselves and the Soviet to do something about that.

I must say that there hasn't been anything on the Soviet side, nothing that they have indicated in the way of evidence that they want to negotiate any kind of detente or new relationship in the Middle East. Certainly, we haven't had the same kind of crises with them that we had before - the old type - but nevertheless they're still pounding away on the theme of national liberation from Western influence, of these countries, and what it means is, bringing them more toward the path of socialism of the kind that the Soviets themselves have within the Soviet Bloc.

The Russians, nevertheless, have continued to be very cautious without, it seems to me, any basic change in their overall aim which is to gain a dominant position. Now, whether their aims now in the Middle East are directed as much against the Chinese as against us, it's hard to say. There are some who hold to this theory. It seems to me the Chinese have not made very much impact on the Middle East either on the governments or on the communist movements of the Middle East yet; they're certainly trying; or whether it's aimed primarily against us. The cold war, so far as

we are concerned, in the Middle East, is still going on and we can't ignore that fact.

Perhaps the main point to be stressed today is that it's in the field of political and economic relations that this struggle is going to be decided; that the key question is not merely the negative one of building barriers, but the more positive one of understanding the conditions and forces at work that I've been talking about, and strengthening the chances that these countries themselves can and will stand firm. Because, their basic interests really are compatible in the long run, I think, with ours, but they probably are not compatible with those of the Soviet Union and the Communist World.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Dr. Campbell, would you elaborate on the kind of aid that Russia gave Turkey? You had several million dollars up there on the chart.

DR. CAMPBELL: I think that was just a loan for a textile mill some years back, in the early period after the death of Stalin, when the new regime in Moscow was attempting to prove to the Turks and to the Iranians that the Soviet Union wasn't threatening them anymore and wanted to have a cooperative relationship; hinting that the way to get this is to establish more economic relations and break some of the ties with the West. And the Turks did go along to that extent. I think there was also some Soviet help in road-building. But it was all very small; the total was something like \$10 million.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you discuss the Yemen situation?

DR. CAMPBELL: Well, it seems to me what we have here is another phase of the conflict between the forces which Nasser likes to consider himself the head, namely the forward-looking nationalist-socialistic Arab forces - progressive forces of the future - and the reactionary forces represented by Saudi Arabia, the old regime rulers in the Gulf area and the Kingdom of Jordan, etc. And having suffered a defeat in Syria in 1961, Nasser was just ready to find hope for any kind of an opportunity to recreate the image of the nationalist who was going forward to lead in the direction of Arab unity, and that he was the instrument of history in that regard.

And the Yemen thing seemed to be set up for him in that respect. Now, the degree to which he shared in planning and plotting that revolution, I don't know. But it doesn't make much difference at any rate; he was in there right at the beginning, to take advantage of it. The difficulty, it seemed to me, objectively, was that Nasser was attempting to implant a 20th Century revolution in the most backward country in the world. It's said by some, to be rushing headlong into the 12th Century. And he just created an impossible situation where a nice, shiny, brand new, officer-controlled republic was set up with no real basis in the country.

It couldn't govern and it couldn't maintain itself except with the support of a great number of Egyptian Armed Forces. So, those Egyptian troops - some 30,000 or even more as some estimate - are there in Yemen. And when some come home others go out there; it's a good training exercise, maybe, for some of them. But actually it takes about 1/3 of Nasser's

Armed Forces and keeps them immobilized there in Yemen.

From our point of view the real danger of this situation was not so much what happened to the Yemenis; we can let the Yemenis have civil wars, chaos and all kinds of things which they've been enjoying for many centuries without disturbing the rest of the world. The difficulty in this case was that it appeared to be a threat to other parts of the area and that if Nasser somehow pulled off this thing and established a satellite government of his own in Yemen, a part of this process would be moving on against Saudi Arabia and challenging important positions and American interests, particularly in oil and in our close relations with the Saudi Arabian regime, which we weren't quite prepared to see happen.

On the other hand, the British felt even more threatened because Aden here, which is about the only one remaining big British base in the Middle East and from their point of view it is essential to the maintenance of the British position which remains here on the Persian Gulf, even including Kuwait, which, though it is now independent, is Britain's most important source of oil, and Britain has the treaty for the defense of Kuwait should there be an attack on it.

And Aden is an essential military point from that standpoint, as well as being a part of the world communications system of the British Commonwealth, and important to their global strategic commitments. So that, Yemen, through Nasser's intervention and the possible establishment of an Egyptian setup there, caused a good deal of concern in the West.

Now, the reason the thing has become such a headache to everybody

is that the proposed solution which we helped to devise a couple of months after the revolution broke out, which was that Nasser should get his troops out and he should recognize the new Republic of Yemen regime, and the Saudi Arabians should cease sending support to the other side - the Royalists, you might call them, and to the tribes - and this whole thing hasn't worked, for a number of reasons. Nasser has not gotten out; the civil war has not stopped; the Saudis did stop sending supplies for awhile, but I think one can assume that some things are still going in as the war goes on. And there's no way, apparently, for anybody to find a way out of it.

So that, in a way, we seem to be stuck with a policy of having recognized a government which now is wholly dependent upon foreign support. Apparently it wouldn't last a day if the Egyptians just all went home all of a sudden. So that, it is an unsolved and perhaps insoluble problem except by the processes of time.

I don't want to take too much time on just this one question but I would like to touch on one point of Soviet penetration. Because, this is of much more concern to us than any other part of the picture. The Soviet worried Yemen before the revolution, and they're in there a bit more strongly now. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that at one time they had over a thousand technicians there and that they have built an airfield in the country, I don't know to what degree the United States Government is concerned - I'm not very much concerned - about the possibility that they could somehow take over Yemen.

It seems to me that first there are basic conflicts between their

position and the Egyptian position; that Nasser is certainly not trying to act as a stalking horse for Khrushchev in helping to take over Yemen for the Russians. And I don't think the Russians, on the other hand, are particularly anxious to contribute to Nasser's position there. I think the same basic disagreement between them exists there as it exists in Egypt regarding Egypt's own destiny itself; in spite of the fact that the Russians helped the Egyptians in arms, transport and various other ways to maintain the campaign there in Yemen, I do think there is a basic incompatibility there. And I do think also that Yemen is far enough away from the Soviet Union that it isn't the kind of thing that they could easily bring under their permanent control.

One more factor; I don't think anybody can control Yemen for any length of time. This is an impossible country, really, to establish any kind of position for anybody. I haven't been there, and this is mostly second-hand, but my guess would be that the way this is going to come out is that anybody from the outside, whether it's another Arab country or whether it's an outside power, is not going to get out of the attempt to establish a position there what it thought it was going to get, and that the Yemenis somehow are going to be the ones who have the last word.

QUESTION: Doctor, you mentioned that one of our major national interests in the Middle East was to maintain the flow of oil from there to Europe. Would you enumerate some of the other U.S. national interests in the Middle Eastern region and then give us your feeling as to how these interests should effect our policy toward Israel on the one hand and Arab nationalism on the other?

DR. CAMPBELL: Well, one can make a list of our interests in the Middle East. This has been done; I'm sure it's done in some NSC papers; it has been done by people who write on the outside. These are usually the denial of the area to the Russians; the maintenance of communications and transit facilities in the area; the establishment of regimes which are not unfriendly to us; the maintenance of a maximum degree of stability in the area; the avoidance of local conflicts which could grow into unmanageable situations; the settlement, or attempts to settle, some of the outstanding disputes which keep us at odds with our allies and with certain of the countries in the area, such as the Arab-Israel dispute. That's about as far as it would go, I think.

It's not often the best guide to the selection and decision on policies merely to have a catalog or list of national interests. In other words, there is an important interest of ours in keeping in mind a general strategy and general attitude toward the area, which will keep it in the kind of conditions which will damage us the least, so to speak, and to have a minimum of conflict within the area, which can be turned to advantage by the Russians; to avoid the kind of situation where a country in the Middle East, as Egypt did in the 1950s, is able to call in the Soviet Union, more or less, and establish it in a position which it hasn't had before.

This is an interest which has to be pursued, as I mentioned before, in a kind of pragmatic way and as you go along. And you can't often find a ready-made policy in order to do it.

Now, the way in which the Arab-Israel conflict affects this, it

seems to me, from our point of view, are two; first, that it's just an unsolved problem which takes the concentration of the people on the two sides who are entirely concentrated on the conflict against each other and are therefore more concerned with that than they are with what we think is the broader problem threatening the security of the whole area. There is a possibility of an actual outbreak of war there which carries dangers of a wider war. And thirdly, there is the fact that the existence of the conflict in its present form makes it almost impossible for us to establish reasonable and tolerable relations with many of the Arab states.

We are, in a sense, associated with Israel in their minds and in actuality, in a way in which we have two strikes on us in anything we want to try to do diplomatically, militarily, or however, with the Arab states.

So that, we have felt that we had a national interest in pushing this problem toward some kind of settlement. And the record of the past 15 years on this is a record of small success and a lot of frustration and failure. And you come up with the conclusion, I think, that this is an insoluble problem for the present; maybe for this generation; we don't know. But, the conflict is there, and I think what we are devoting ourselves to doing now are two things; first, trying to keep it from breaking out. And this may require something more definite in the way of commitments to the preservation of the status quo. And we are on record now as having given - the President did make a statement; President Kennedy last May which went quite a way in warning both sides that if there were aggression of any kind that we would be in the picture to

prevent it.

Secondly, that we could perhaps move some of the individual problems a bit closer to solution; not that you could get the two sides to sit down and negotiate anything, but by our own diplomacy with both sides, that we might be able to move some of these things like the refugee problem or the waters distribution problem in directions where they might be less volatile and less inflammable than they are at the present time.

Our role in the Arab-Israel question for the last ten years has been a series of attempts of that nature; the Eric Johnson plan back in the mid-'50s for the sharing of the Jordan waters, right up through the Johnson plan for refugees.

Incidentally, the Arabs must somehow have the idea that American policy is in the hands of some tribe named Johnson. Because, every time you come into court or diplomatic contact with them with some proposal for a solution of some kind with Israel, there is somebody with the name of Johnson in back of it. Eric Johnson was the fellow who devised the Jordan Plan. It was Joe Johnson who went out and made the last attempt that was made to get some kind of progress going on the refugee question. And then a fellow named Alexis Johnson made a speech which roused the Arab press just about a month or so ago. Then, there's another fellow named Lyndon Johnson who <sup>has</sup> certainly begun to make his name in the Middle East, even to appearing in cartoons with a fez on his head.

So, this must seem, perhaps, like some kind of tribal explanation to the Arabs.

At any rate, there has been a discouraging lack of progress, and this is quite understandable, after all, because the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is not just what you might call an international dispute that could be sent to a court or a solution found for it in the U.N. It is a whole complex of different disputes over territories; over the status of refugees; over the capital of the State of Israel; what its international status is supposed to be - Jerusalem; over the sharing of waters which are so important to all these people because the nature of their geography and the absence of any diplomatic or other relations - the trade boycott and blockade and the denial of the Suez Canal - all this thing makes a whole package of problems.

You can't deal with the whole package and you can't really deal with any one of them because it involves the other. And behind all this is this emotionally-held hatred of the other side; a deep nationalism on both sides; of Jewish nationalism, or Zionists, or whatever you want to call it, on the one hand, and an Arab nationalism on the other. Their objectives and their modes of thinking; their whole being, is so much in conflict and so different, that you don't see any compromise possible.

I got a line from Colonel T. E. Lawrence in speaking of Semites - and, of course, Semites includes both the Arabs and the Jews - and he says, "Semites have no half-tones in their register of vision. They exclude compromise and pursue the logic of their ideas to its absurd end." And this is what is actually the case. Each one has his eye on his own objective and completely reads out any consideration of the *point* of view of the other fellow.

And, as long as that is so, as long as nobody on either side can make a concession without losing his political head or his physical head at home, then from our point of view this is something maybe you can contain; maybe you can handle it and maybe you can deal with it in some way; but it's nothing you can cut through and find a solution to.

QUESTION: Is there any political reaction in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, to Russia's efforts for separate sale of oil to the West?

DR. CAMPBELL: No. They are obviously concerned and unhappy about it, but it's hard to find any way in which it has directly effected their relations with the Soviet Union. I think it's part of the picture that they have felt, I think, in the past few years more than ever, their dependence on Western Europe as opposed to the picture a few years before where everything seemed to be pointing to Western Europe's dependence on them.

It has certainly been shown, the fact of a change in the price, for example, of oil on the world price, can have such an effect on their whole national income and their economies, a thing which they don't really control, themselves. And the fact of Russia taking, in effect, part of the Western European market has not been a particularly happy event for the Middle Eastern countries for whom that has been the market, any more than it has been for the international oil companies themselves.

But it is a rather interesting commentary, it seems to me, on what some of the fears were about Russia and Middle Eastern oil at the time of Suez and before, when we somehow thought that maybe the Russians and

the Middle Eastern nationalists somehow could cook up an arrangement which would cut off the oil from the West, and that somehow the oil question would be one in which they themselves could cooperate against the West. Well, actually, it works the other way around; that the real common interest is between the market which is in the West, and the production which is in the Middle Eastern countries and which involves the Middle Eastern governments; and that their best interest is served by being able to continue to sell oil in that market at prices which are the best prices they can get, in effect.

And, in a relationship with the Soviet Union there is nothing in it for them. They can't sell oil to the Soviet Union because the Soviets don't need it. Communist China in the future may be something different on that score. But insofar as the Soviet entry into the European oil market, it has certainly effected Middle East oil markets adversely in the sense that the markets which the Russians moved into, principally Italy, are ones which depended previously on Middle East oil. And, of course, they still do take oil from the Middle East to some extent.

DR. SANDERS: Well, I think you've answered all their questions. Thank you very much, Dr. Campbell, for a very informative lecture.