

ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE

(Courses, 1927 - 1928)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY AIR DIVISION, G.A.C.

Certified by [Signature]

Lecture by

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PLASSMILL DIVISION, G-1.

Colonel Cary and Gentlemen:

To get a brief line-up of our subject we will have to consider the War Department as a pretty big institution. There are questions continually coming up for decision and it is evident that even in a peace time army one man cannot decide all those questions, both major and minor.

We have under the War Department organization the General Staff to handle the military questions. According to law they are required to give professional aid and assistance to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, and prepare plans for the National Defense. The line of those duties naturally falls along the four divisions of the General Staff - Personnel, Supply, Intelligence, Operations and Training, and, of course, the War Plans Division.

When anybody speaks of G-1 they always think of Personnel, and that Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the Army as individuals. In the broadest sense we are concerned with the personnel of the whole United States, race, color; condition of servitude, classification before a war, during the war, and after the war - with the transition from a war status to a peace status.

In order to carry out its duties the Division is organized along certain functional lines. There is the Officers Branch, the Officers Promotion and Assignment Branch, the Regulations Branch, the Welfare Branch, the Enlisted Branch, and the Air Corps Branch. The last named is required by law and handles all questions primarily concerned with the Air Corps and has a say on all questions which may have a secondary interest to the Air Corps in the G-1 Division. This is working very well - an Air Corps officer handles all the work, consults other interested branches - and I think it is a very good thing to have.

I might say right here that all these branches are so organized that they can be expanded indefinitely in case of necessity. The duties will be very similar in peace and in war.

The Officers Branch handles the questions of procurement, appropriations and classification. In the Procurement Section, so far as the Regular Army is concerned, procurement is routine, fixed by law. We obtain our procurement from cadets at West Point, from

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enlisted men of two or more years' service who are properly qualified, and from graduates of technical schools and colleges. It might seem that that is a very simple problem, that there is no special work connected with it. To illustrate one of the functions and some of the trouble involved, take a case that has come up right now for solution. The number of vacancies last year was approximately 230 officers. The West Point class turned out about 30 short of the number required to fill those vacancies and examinations were held to fill the remaining vacancies. The Air Corps Act authorized the increase of the Army by 403 second lieutenants on the promotion list, and increased the Air Corps by 403 officers distributed from second lieutenants to colonels. The Air Corps is very anxious to carry out its program - 80 officers being allotted to it a year. The President authorized the creation of these 80 new vacancies. Say we fill these new vacancies with 80 fliers and the next West Point class will leave 260 grantees cadets. If the separation rate continues in the future as in the past you can see our problem. The President has said that although he has authorized those 80 fliers for the Air Corps there must never be more than 12,000 officers in the Army. I mention this to show you that although procurement in peace time is controlled by law some very intricate problems arise. The one I have just mentioned has not been settled yet.

Separations in time of peace are fixed by law. Ordinarily they are by death, resignation, retirement, etc., including Class B none. The Classification Section is working all the time on efficiency reports and on certain disciplinary cases coming up to the General Staff for review for the Secretary of War - and on Class B cases. When the Corps Area commanders were here last summer they were agreed that the Efficiency Report form was not satisfactory, and we have been working on that for some time with a view to changing the form so it will have two results - the first, that a study of a given efficiency report will give a fairly accurate estimate of the capability and efficiency of an officer as well as determine his general usefulness; the second, that it will show that the officer making the efficiency report has been as nearly as possible required to make a fair and clear statement as to the capacity of the officer without being able to "hedge".

The Officers Promotion and Assignments Branch has to do with such duties as its name indicates. Promotion for the Regular Army is fixed by law and is not a particularly hard question - being more or less routine. It is a different thing, however, with the Reserve Corps upon which I will touch later. The assignment question is a hard one. When you consider that there are some 12,000 officers in the Army and so many different duties to consider in addition to branch duties the officers are assigned to, National

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Guard, R.O.T.C., C.R.C., C.S.T.C., and other assignments, you will find they are widely distributed. In making out the annual distribution list for the Army the chiefs of branches all forward their requirements to the Personnel Division and when the total is consolidated it is always greater than the number of officers available. An agreement has to be reached but no one is ever entirely satisfied although all realize that eventually the best interests of the service as a whole is the decisive factor.

The Enlisted Branch operates in peace time as two sections. One handles the question of Enlisted men, plans, policies, etc., and has a good deal to do with the questions bearing on Warrant Officers, commutation of quarters, rations, etc. The Corps Area commanders usually call for more funds than are available due to the limitations of the appropriations at the present time, and those on hand have to be apportioned in order to secure the best results. In war time the Enlisted Branch would have a good many more men to consider - questions to settle covering such subjects as procurement, assignments, shelter, prisoners of war, and other miscellaneous subjects. There is a Mobilization Section of the Enlisted Branch working on the general mobilization subjects.

The Regulations Branch does not make regulations. Their work is to examine and scrutinize regulations but rarely to initiate them, some times they make necessary or advisable changes in them. Regulations are initiated by the interested agencies, prepared and sent to the Regulations Branch which goes over them, sees that they do not conflict with existing regulations, War Department policies, and the law. After that is done they are marked approved for publication if considered desirable. Of course it is understood that when I say G-1 does this or that, the action, after approval, is meant to be that of the Chief of Staff or Secretary of War and becomes the policy of the War Department. G-1 only prepares such action, subject to approval of course. If the chief of a division believes that the question is one that he is fully authorized to settle, he makes the decision and directs the Adjutant General's office to take the necessary steps. The chief of the division makes such decisions and in border-line cases always takes them to the Chief of Staff who can make such changes as he desires.

In connection with the work of the Procurement and Assignment Division, the questions that are relatively simple for the Regular Army are not so simple for the Reserve Corps. When the World War was over there was a very popular feeling that something should be done so we could be better prepared along the defense lines in a future emergency. Bills were introduced in Congress having for their basis a universal Service Law. Those bills did not pass, however.

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The National Defense Act of 1920 provided for various components of the Army, one an Organized Reserves - including the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. In organizing the Officers' Reserve Corps it was, in a way, kept in step with the General Mobilization Plan - 6 Field Armies - and the troops of these Armies were allocated to the various Corps Areas and Departments; officers were procured to fill the requirements of this plan. In the beginning the work went along very rapidly and, as I heard it stated by a Reserve officer, it was done with most reckless abandon in many respects. The idea of obtaining a large percentage of the emergency officers who had been in the World War and who knew the desirability of having some satisfactory plan of defense prepared was a good one. The recruiting continued until the Corps grew to a big size and promotions were exceedingly rapid. It began to look as if we were getting something that might be too unwieldy to be of the very best use in case of emergency.

The question was studied for a considerable time and finally certain policies were proposed covering the questions of promotion, assignment, separation, etc. The question of promotion was one that caused a good deal of discussion. I think perhaps that most of the officers of the Reserve Corps felt that it was getting away from a sound military basis and something should be done. In fact resolutions were introduced in a great many associations of the Reserve indicating that they desired some sort of limitation placed upon promotions. The result of this was that the old regulations were changed and certain limitations and restrictions proposed. There was, of course, a good deal of objection made to this. The proposition was to make the promotion, generally, parallel to promotion in the Regular Army. As organized at first, the whole scheme would eventually result in an unwieldy mass, the number of officers running up to approximately 280,000. Our funds would not permit training approximately such a number as this and you can see that an unsatisfactory situation would finally develop.

G-1 always wanted to have a procurement objective, a fixed limitation dictated by the funds available for training. In these policies there was proposed a procurement limitation which was based on the requirements of the Regular Army, active and inactive, organizations and the installations that would be made in the first phase (120 days), branch assignments, overhead, and, in addition, the requirements necessary to keep up certain organizations of the second phase (27 divisions already organized and in being). In that respect, this limitation has been approved.

All the Reserve Officers are allocated to different sections (equivalent to branches), with the exception of one that is peculiar to the Reserve - the Specialists Section. That Section is one you

gentlemen will be most interested in. The original idea was to place in it men who would be necessary and very desirable in a war, but whose duties were not essentially military. This Section as now organized has in it about four hundred officers of different grades. It has no corresponding activity in the Regular Army. There are men in that Section whose forte is publicity, some who are G-3 men, and so on.

It is the idea of the Personnel Division that this Section, under present plans, belongs to the Assistant Secretary of War in connection with industrial mobilization, the appointments therein so far as the War Department or Personnel Division are concerned, to be determined by him. If he deems it necessary to appoint certain officers in that Section, G-1 will have no objection. These officers are on a little different status as to promotion; they are not required to go in at the lowest grades. I imagine you gentlemen could pick out men, certain individuals, whom whose record you could readily see the nature of the work to be performed by them in war time, and my idea is that it would be very similar to the work they are doing in time of peace. Referring to the question of promotion, if it is the viewpoint of the Assistant Secretary of War that the work those men do now or would be called upon to do in time of war would be such as to warrant promotion; if the standing and prestige they carry rates a higher grade; or if their current activities in the War Department are such as to deserve recognition, there would be no objection on the part of the Personnel Division. As I have stated before, the Specialists Section pertains particularly to the Assistant Secretary of War in connection with industrial mobilization. Aside from the foregoing I do not know that this College would be particularly interested any further in the question of the Reserve Corps.

I want to touch on the War Department General Mobilization Plan and show our connections with the other Divisions of the General Staff and our tie-in with the work of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. The work was originally started with the idea of having a scheme for the prompt mobilization of the power of the country for national defense. At the very start it was rather difficult to decide how to go about it - the idea not being as clear as it should be. The General Staff started out with the plan of the 6 Field Armies. G-3 carried that idea out for the War Plan, making the G-3 Appendix with all the organizations, allocations, etc., required. Of course this is all done in step with the other divisions of the General Staff, not separately. Then came the distinctive G-1 part of the plan, the determination of numbers of officers and men from the Tables of Organization, by branches and grades, how rapidly these officers and men could be procured, with plans for their procurement, etc. That took a long time and before the revision of the 1924 Plan was brought up to date we saw a good many weaknesses and these were corrected so far as practicable in the 1924 Revision. The work done

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by the Personnel Division, when finally completed, consisted in the G-1 Appendix, a tabulation of assignments to Corps Areas, the numbers of men to be sent to schools to procure officers insofar as the estimates showed they would be needed at the front lines. That was the G-1 problem, the question of procurement and incidentally separations, assignments, etc.

The real plan of the procurement is shown in the G-1 Appendix. If any of your officers desire to see the tabulations I will be very glad to show them to the students if they will stop at my office. It might be interesting to see those in connection with the procurement of manpower, which is as essential as the procurement of munitions, equipment, etc. The information tabulated in the G-1 Appendix runs to considerable detail, not absolutely accurate at the present time however. There is a table of total numbers of recommended personnel for War Department overhead by branch and grade; the recommendations of commissioned personnel for Corps Areas, installations by branch and grade, reception centers, recruitment centers, etc.; recommendations for General officers and General Staff officers by phases, Corps Area Headquarters staff, and faculties of the Military Academy and General Service Schools; number of officers Corps Areas may send to General Service Schools, touching on the replacement of officers; numbers of officers to be trained subsequent to the initiation of the draft; numbers required from the various Corps Areas based on the total population and distribution through the various Corps Areas. Then there are tables of monthly losses; in these we have to base the computations of the future on our knowledge of the past. All of the above information is tabulated and, in addition to that, there is also involved the question of certain laws which may have to be passed covering the Selective Service Act.

The procurement of personnel, which does not come under the work of the Industrial College, is a rather difficult question to determine as there are so many factors entering into it. There are two general methods - voluntary and draft. Voluntary enlistment must take into consideration how fast the man will come into the service. Probably the National Guard will fill up faster than the Regular Army; it depends on certain features we do not know about in advance and cannot determine. For the Regular Army, the questions are - whether the approaching war is a popular war - are we confronted by a probable invasion - is there an impending draft law? All that is going to affect voluntary procurement. i.e. have to make our decisions and estimates for the future based on what happened in the past.

It would be desirable, undoubtedly, from many points of view if a Selective Service law was now on the Statute Books. Then no one would feel that we were threatening any particular nation. Whether or not that can be done is another question. If it is not done, then a study of the time that is necessary before we can get action on the draft law after it is passed by Congress must be

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to be taken care of by G-3; but the equipment, the supply proposition, was a limiting feature emphasized so strongly that it was decided to take this up on a different basis in the 1927 Revision. We were going to have as a target the limiting force of troops available that we could supply, taken in 15 day periods; for instance, how many men we could get, the training of same (G-3), the equipping (G-4), and so on by 15-day steps. That has not proceeded very far because it is the desire of the Chief of Staff to use the maximum number of men that can be rapidly procured as a basis. He has stated that we have never yet fought with trained men nor with fully equipped men, and probably never will.

The question of manpower is one we are studying in G-1. We think that in a rush we can get out about 750,000 men, Regular Army and National Guard, in the estimated period before the Draft Act will become operative, and filling up to the limit can produce about 150,000 officers. They will not all be trained; they never have been and we cannot expect it in the future.

As another example of how the Personnel Division works in with the other divisions, I will mentally follow the steps involved when it comes to the G-1 part of the organization of a Specific War Plan.

The first thing in the War Plan itself. That, with the estimate of the situation, obtained from G-2, produces the strategic War Plan, giving the mission and generally the troops and methods. From that information G-3 makes a basic war plan more in detail. In that plan you would cover such points as the extent of the Theater of Operations, the Zone of Interior, units to be mobilized, the place of mobilization, the Regular Army, active and inactive, quotations of troop movement, who will authorize them, the establishing of ports of embarkation and who will operate and organize them, when the plan becomes effective, etc. All of the points mentioned are covered in separate, two paragraphs in the basic plan. Then you get the G-3 Appendix which will consist of a series of tables naming the units included in this plan, by whom mobilized, where, whom, strength of units under Tables of Organization, when they will expect to move and by whom the orders will be issued, destination and force to which assigned. Then G-1 can prepare its Appendix covering questions of replacement, procurement, the number of officers that may be required, a statement that where there is a shortage of officers, Reserve Officers announcing their willingness to serve may be called in, National Guard questions of procurement, etc., covered. The Adjutant General's office will be directed to take steps to procure these officers and a statement is also included in the Appendix that foreign service is cancelled for the period of the emergency. Another question covered therein is that of cutting out the schools altogether during the period of the emergency. After the foregoing has been outlined, policies and plans are laid down for the assembling of certain percentages of