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BRIEF HISTORY OF PLANNING FOR PROCUREMENT AND
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION SINCE
THE WORLD WAR

By

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BRIEF HISTORY OF PLANNING FOR PROCUREMENT AND INDUSTRIAL
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In preparing a synopsis of ten years' progress in procurement planning and preparation for industrial mobilization it is rather difficult to follow a rigid chronological sequence, or to demonstrate each event to be the logical result of a preceding cause.

While the record of what took place is usually available, a statement of reasons therefor is not often found in existing documents. At times it is even impossible to discover any exact account of significant incidents.

I - GENESIS OF
PRESENT
SYSTEM

Passage of
Section 5a
National
Defense Act

For the purposes of this discussion Section 5a of the National Defense Act of 1920 is taken as the genesis of our present system of procurement planning. That law contains an ambiguity. It charges the Assistant Secretary of War with responsibility for "the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and organizations essential to war-time needs", but it also directs the General Staff "to prepare plans for . . . the mobilization of the manhood of the Nation and its material resources in an emergency."

Harbord
Board
1921

With nothing but this law to guide him, a student of today would certainly be at a loss in determining a proper boundary between the functions of the General Staff and those of the Assistant Secretary of War. But, as you know, the Harbord Board was convened very soon after the passage of that act, and one of its tasks was the establishment of such a boundary line. General Orders No. 41, 1921, gave force to the conclusions of the board. That portion of the order dealing with the mobilization responsibilities of the General Staff omits the words "and of its material resources." This was done deliberately, as is evidenced by the fact that these words appear in the original drafts of the board's conclusions, but were omitted in the final document. Thus a question that might have become most vexing was settled administratively in such a way that the two principal sub-divisions in the War Department could be perfectly sure of the missions with which they were respectively charged.

In spite of this, the misunderstandings that have at times arisen with respect to the proper spheres of the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War form an interesting chapter in the history of procurement planning. Nevertheless, the provisions of G.O. No. 41 (which have been incorporated in Army Regulations) remain in force. Furthermore, there is an encouraging tendency among all officers, both in and out of the procurement services, to look upon Section 5a as furnishing a logical solution to

procurement problems, and not as an arbitrary directive to be grudgingly accepted simply because "it is the law".

One illustration of this changed attitude was afforded some months ago by the smooth collaboration between the Assistant Secretary of War and the General Staff in the preparation of a unified War Department planning policy to be enunciated before the War Policies Commission. Another is found in the substance of a recent talk by the Deputy Chief of Staff before the Army War College. I understand that he is to address this class at a later date, and I feel sure he will reiterate his opinion on this matter.

General
Council
1931

The creation of the General Council early in 1931 accelerated this tendency. Composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the heads of the General Staff sections, the chiefs of arms and services, a representative of the Assistant Secretary of War, and one or two others, it formulates advisory opinion as to War Department policies. This course of action has gone far to eliminate friction between the Assistant Secretary's office and the General Staff.

II - STUDYING
THE TASK

Period of
Conferences

With this dividing line once clearly defined, the first job of the Assistant Secretary in 1921 was to analyze his job, determine its principal parts, and set up an organization to aid him perform it. An appropriate name for this chapter in our history is the "period of conferences." The Assistant Secretary had been given a task without parallel or precedent in any peace-time army organization. His first move was to obtain opinions from all authoritative sources regarding organization and methods best adapted to the accomplishment of his mission.

Opinions
from
Prominent
Civilians

Numerous conferences were held with prominent civilians who had served on the War Industries Board. Liaison was maintained with engineering societies and trade associations. Opinions and recommendations from many sources are set forth in the early records of the office.

Scheme of
Civilian
Advisors

A staff of civilian advisors was appointed, composed largely of former War Industries Board personnel. The Chiefs of supply branches were directed to establish procurement planning sections in their respective offices. An early task of these sections was the study of strategic raw materials. Frequent meetings were held between the personnel of these sections and that of the Assistant Secretary's office. Indeed in October, 1922, apparently taking a page from the book of the Lion Tamer's Club, an office order was issued inaugurating a monthly luncheon schedule at the Army and Navy Club to be attended by all personnel on this duty.

Study of
Strategic
& Critical
Materials

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III - ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPMENTS

From these early beginnings the office developed rapidly. The first heading under which we will examine our ten-year progress is that of organization. Just because I take this first, do not accuse me of worshipping too devoutly at the altar of the great god "Organization." So-called "correct organization" is, of course, no sure cure for every evil in operation. But in discussing other subjects it is necessary to refer by name to some of the agencies brought into being in response to the provisions of Section 5a. Accordingly, we will examine at once their origin and reasons for existence.

Mr. Wainwright, the first Assistant Secretary of War appointed following the passage of that act, took up his new duties in March, 1921. Colonel H. B. Ferguson was the first officer designated to act in an executive capacity for the Assistant Secretary in carrying out duties imposed by law. He was given the title "Director of Procurement", and gradually accumulated a group of assistants.

The "procurement planning sections" in the offices of the supply chiefs, which I have already referred to, were set up in May, 1921. Five months later was published the first order governing the organization of the office of the Assistant Secretary. The Planning Branch and the Current Supply Branch were established, the former being divided into ten sub-sections. The first reorganization took place the same year. Changes were frequent and some of them were drastic.

The Commodity Committees were added in 1922. The policy of allocating facilities was inaugurated that same year. The war Department Procurement Districts were set up in 1923. These frequent changes continued until 1925. This is perhaps only natural, since the period may be designated as one of "shaking down" during which personnel was becoming more intimately acquainted with the task in hand and adjusting the machinery better to carry out that task.

In the latter part of 1924 we find the first move was made to organize the Planning Branch into the four principal divisions that exist today. Since that time the organization has been relatively stable.

When compared to the experience of the General Staff, it would seem that the Assistant Secretary did remarkably well to approach stability in the organization of his planning staff in four years. The General Staff was established by law in 1903, but was not finally organized along its present lines until after the submission of the Harbord Board Report in 1921. During the seventeen intervening years reorganization was the rule rather than the exception. You understand I am not predicting there will be no further changes.

First Organ-
ization of
O.A.S.W. -
Oct. 1921

Commodity
Committees -
Procurement
Districts

OASW in 1924

General Staff
Experience

IV - ESTABLISH-
MENT OF ARMY
INDUSTRIAL
COLLEGE

Before leaving the subject of organization and growth I want to trace briefly the principal events in the formation of the Army Industrial College. It was organized initially in 1924 for the purpose of training personnel to carry on the various procurement activities in the office of the Assistant Secretary and in the procurement services. At first it operated under a rather informal arrangement between the Assistant Secretary and the various chiefs of services, and the course of instruction was limited to a few months. Students were assigned to the offices of their respective chiefs of branches and were simply placed on temporary duty in the school. From this beginning the school has gradually developed until today it is recognized as one of the important general service schools of the army.

In May, 1924, an Advisory Board, consisting of the chiefs of supply branches, was formed to assist in the determination of policies relating to curriculum and the qualifications of student personnel.

In 1930 the War Department established a policy of giving preference to supply branch graduates of the Army Industrial College for student detail to the Army War College. The Assistant Secretary of War usually also fills his two vacancies at that school from graduates of this.

In 1931 the Navy created a vacancy in the Naval War College to be filled each year by a selected graduate of the Army Industrial College.

Certainly in recent years at least, we can see the Assistant Secretary of War and his associates have taken an intense interest in the prestige and influence of this school. To bring the discussion absolutely up-to-date on this point, I shall read a short memorandum signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff this morning. (Read)

An unofficial, though most important, function of the school is that of providing a focal point for the discussion of principles, doctrine, and methods applying to the great subject of procurement in war. These come from the various branches of the Army, the Navy, other governmental departments, and from civilians. I know that the present Assistant Secretary and his three predecessors and their executives have often stated most emphatically that the free opportunity offered herefor the adjustment, coordination, and assimilation of divergent views is of the utmost importance to the student body, to the Army as a whole, and to the development of logical thought on the problems involved in industrial mobilization. Before leaving this subject I might remark that the Assistant Secretary of War is now

considering the advisability of establishing a "Munitions Staff Eligible List", to be comparable in its own field to that of the General Staff Eligible List in the tactical field.

V - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCUREMENT PLANNING AND CURRENT PROCUREMENT

One major aspect of our present organization is sufficiently interesting to absorb our attention for a moment. The division of the office into a Planning Branch and a Current Procurement Branch has been observed since the beginning, ^{but} the relationship between these two branches has undergone very distinct changes.

Colonel Ferguson head of all procurement

Both branches were originally organized as component parts of the Procurement Division of which Colonel Ferguson was the head. Current Procurement matters were handled initially by a single officer who served in an advisory capacity to Colonel Ferguson.

His chief interest

It seems apparent that Colonel Ferguson's attention was concentrated principally on the great task of developing plans for use in the event of another emergency. The written record throws very little light upon the supervision of current activities during this period. However, decisions affecting them were rendered by Colonel Ferguson. He, above all others, was in position to see that such decisions were definitely coordinated with procurement plans.

Pressure of Current Matters on Assistant Secretary

It appears, however, that during these years the Assistant Secretary of War in person became increasingly interested in the problems constantly arising in connection with "current activities". These are the problems that demand immediate answers and the ones from which repercussions are most frequently felt. Human beings react more rapidly to the facts of today than to the probable consequences of next year. It was unquestionably this feeling that impelled Mr. Davis to select an officer to act as his immediate advisor in matters affecting current procurement.

Cleavage

An office memorandum written in 1925, apparently by Colonel Ferguson, indicates that as a result of this action a distinct cleavage between the Procurement Division and the Current Procurement Branch had occurred. This memorandum recites that, while the original order of 1921 had never been revoked, verbal instructions of the Assistant Secretary had operated to change relationships existing between Procurement Planning and Current Procurement. Each of these branches had been given a head office in the State, War, and Navy Building. While Colonel Ferguson apparently did not approve of the practice, his memorandum indicates that the chief of each branch was authorized to report directly to the Assistant Secretary of War. We know that this was the actual method of operation.

A memorandum of 1926, written by Assistant Secretary MacNider, confirms this arrangement and designates the Chief of the Current Procurement Branch, Lieut. Col. E. D. Peek, as "Director of Purchase" for the Army. Such an organization implies almost a total lack of relationship between current procurement and procurement planning, since there is no coordinating head provided short of the highest authority - the Assistant Secretary of War.

This sharp cleavage in the office existed until General Moseley became Executive to the Assistant Secretary in 1929. In this position he represented the Assistant Secretary of War in all matters coming within the jurisdiction of that official. He was thus in a position to effect a closer coordination between current and future operations. I may add here that succeeding executives, General Carr and Colonel McFarland, have had the same conception of their responsibilities. Even this organization, of course, does not bring the several sections of the Current Procurement and Planning Branches into direct and continuing contact.

This particular point in the organization of the Assistant Secretary's office has been frequently criticised. The most pertinent arguments against the present arrangement are: First, that it disregards the distinct relationship that should exist between current procurement activities and war-time procurement; second, that advantage should be taken of current procurement operations to train personnel for war activities; and third, that a reorganization and readjustment of the office of the Assistant Secretary at the beginning of an emergency will be required as its result. It has been held by many, however, that any reasonable amalgamation of the two offices is impossible because of their diverse viewpoints affecting procurement. Another reason in favor of observing such a sharp distinction is that of expediency. When any officer is compelled to work upon the details of both current and planning problems, the planning usually suffers. The critic's retort to this argument admitting the truth of the premise, is that groupings can be made along functional lines without having the same individual responsible for detailed work in both current and planning matters. I believe this particular point in the existing organization will come to your attention in studies this year. I want only to say without regard to the correctness or incorrectness of the present set-up that in my opinion it results, in part, from the personalities of two men who appeared on the stage at a critical period. Methods of operation adopted because of these personalities have left a lasting imprint upon the organization of the office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

Partial
Reunion

Arguments for
and against
Present
Organization

VI -CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS
REGARDING
CREATION OF
SUPER-
AGENCIES

Distinction
between
Procurement
Planning &
Industrial
Mobilization

Early
Conceptions of
responsibility

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We will now attempt to trace briefly the subject of the changing conception in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, or the mission given that official by law.

It has always been appreciated that the duty of planning for the procurement of army munitions in war was distinct from, although related to, that of providing for assurance of an adequate mobilization of industry to meet war-time needs. The first activity relates to the army alone; the second involves coordination of all material resources and agencies of the Nation. From the very first there has been a very definite accord respecting the responsibilities devolving upon the office in formulating complete procurement plans for the Army itself.

There is also evidence that as early as 1921 the Assistant Secretary believed that his duty with respect to preparing for industrial mobilization forced him to make plans for the establishment of governmental super-agencies over which the War Department could have no control in war. There is on file a memorandum of that year enumerating by name the men the Assistant Secretary of War expected to recommend to the President in emergency as suitable for occupying positions in the various super-agencies. There is no indication, however, that Colonel Ferguson or the Planning Branch believed it necessary to proceed further in this matter.

It is clear from many of the documents left by Colonel Ferguson that he personally believed super-agencies would be necessary in a great war. Aside from the record of his expressed opinions on the matter, we find in the War Department Handbook of 1923 the following quotation:

"The Assistant Secretary of War is the custodian of the records of the Council of National Defense and of the War Industries Board. The only peace-time existence of these war-time super-agencies is in his office, and it devolves upon him to draw plans for their operation in war.

"There are certain other super-agencies of the business of war that existed in the last war and which must exist again in the next. * * * * * The Assistant Secretary of War cannot give 'the assurance of adequate provision' for industrial mobilization unless he plans for the recreation of these agencies."

This was, of course, inserted with the entire approval of the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. In spite of this recognition of responsibility in the matter, there is no evidence that any definite steps were taken at that time for meeting that responsibility. It is easy

to see why this should have been so. At that time the many civilians who had occupied positions in the super-agencies during the World War were still in the prime of life. It was a foregone conclusion that if any emergency should occur in the near future many of the same men would be called back and placed on jobs similar to those they had left a few years previously. These men needed no organizational or operational plans. They did not need to be told how to work with other governmental agencies, nor where to secure the technical and administrative help that would be necessary.

Consequently, the great task facing the Army at that time was to find out exactly what the Army would require; to prepare specifications for the articles needed; to find out where these articles could be purchased; and to evolve an organization that could execute that portion of a war program for which the Army itself would necessarily be responsible. Too much emphasis placed upon super-agencies at that time might easily have induced Army personnel to pin its faith in them, and caused a neglect of those procurement plans whose existence will be vital to us in any major war. Because of all these reasons, there appears very little in the records of the whole period 1921-1929 concerning super-agencies or the control of national industry in war. It is true advisory committees of civilians were formed, and to a certain extent used, but their attention, like that of Army personnel, was directed more toward the Army's munitions plans, than toward the broad aspects of industrial mobilization.

As a consequence it became the fashion, both in and out of the Army, to say that the War Department disapproved of the idea of having super-agencies in war. Former members of the Planning Branch and civilians who then came in contact with Colonel Ferguson, have informed me that this was his attitude, but the record gives indisputable proof that these impressions were erroneous. It seems to be a fact, however, that this impression became so general as to be an accepted belief in the Army. Colonel Ferguson has rightly been honored with the name of "Father of Procurement Planning". The widespread belief that he was opposed to this particular idea influenced to a marked degree the thoughts and actions of his contemporaries in the Planning Branch, and probably of his successor as Director of Procurement. That successor was Colonel Wooten, now retired.

Colonel Wooten definitely stated that the initial formation of industrial super-agencies in war should not be contemplated, and gave as his opinion that they would not be organized until such time, if ever, that the course of events in the war became so unfavorable as to alarm the people and compel the organization of such bodies. In other words, we see that by this time -

Emphasis upon
Army Supply
Plans

Period of
"No-Super-
Agencies"

late 1928 - such faith was placed in the efficacy of detail procurement plans made up in the Army and Navy respectively that a general supervisory control over industrial activity was considered to be unnecessary, and even objectionable.

As we noted before, General Moseley became Executive to the Assistant Secretary in 1929. His views concerning the necessity for providing for a strong administrative control of all the national resources in war were diametrically opposed to those of Colonel Wooten. He not only believed with Colonel Ferguson that super-agencies would be necessary, but insisted that the time was ripe for developing plans to govern their organization and operation. He insisted that no matter how carefully and exactly were the various procurement plans of the Army and Navy prepared, the absence of a national control body would be quickly felt in war and would tend to lead the Nation toward chaotic conditions.

At that time General Moseley went even further than this. He was of the belief that the actual procurement of munitions in war should be removed from the Army and Navy and put into a separate "Department of Munitions". He thought this could be easily accomplished by detaching from the Army and Navy those officers engaged in these activities, giving them the plans already prepared within the two departments, and permitting them to function under a separate department head set up for the purpose.

Early views of General Moseley

Further, he believed it was the duty of the Assistant Secretary to prepare, in as great detail as practicable, the necessary operational and organizational plans for the industrial super-agency and for the department of munitions, and to accumulate data and statistics in time of peace to assist the early functioning of those organizations.

General Moseley immediately initiated a new series of conferences with the Planning Branch, with the chiefs of all procurement services, with the General Staff, and with many civilians whose war experiences were such as to make their opinions of value. As a result he abandoned the idea of establishing a department of munitions. The controlling argument that caused his change of view in this regard was that to regroup all operating organizations in new relationships upon the outbreak of war would only enhance the confusion, doubt, and uncertainty which to some extent must occur in any transitory period of this nature.

Later view of General Moseley

It is of course axiomatic that any plan developed for the control of industry in war, and which will have a direct bearing on the activities of the Army and Navy in war, must reflect the views of all three of these groups. A plan of this nature, to be of any value, must be a joint Army-Navy-Business Man's plan.

The conception, then, of the Assistant Secretary of War's mission that was finally adopted during the winter of 1929-1930 was that in addition to his duty of supervising the preparation of all plans for the procurement of army munitions, he is responsible for cooperating with the Navy, with Industry, and with all other interested agencies in developing plans for the control of industry in war. It has also been adopted as basic doctrine that war-time industrial control will be exercised through emergency organizations specially set up to assist the President. The acceptance of this doctrine by the Assistant Secretary of War and the General Staff was not accomplished without a struggle. If anyone is particularly interested I will be glad to take up this matter further during the question period. The Assistant Secretary of War has the further responsibility of seeing that these broad plans are in suitable form for placing before the President in case of war. Since that date the fundamental conception of the job of the Assistant Secretary of War with respect to his war-planning duties has remained about as I have given it.

An early agency set up to promote cooperative action was the Army-Navy Munitions Board, consisting of an Assistant Secretary from each department. It was organized in 1922. There was set up under it many committees, each of which was given the task of coordinating the procurement programs of the two services in a particular direction. That progress in such coordination has not been entirely satisfactory has long been recognized in the two services. Neither the Army-Navy Munitions Board nor its subsidiary committees have been particularly active during the last nine years, nor have they always been able to settle controversial questions placed before them.

In view of this lack of progress both services began to devote much thought to the matter some two or three years ago and through a series of conferences and conversations have gradually smoothed out many of their difficulties.

During the current year, by mutual action of the two services, the Board was completely reorganized and is undoubtedly better suited now to carry on its functions than it previously was. More important than this, however, is the growth of a mutual understanding between the two services that will make possible some solution to the many problems that heretofore have defied our efforts. Correspondence between the two services,

Army-Navy
Munitions
Board

referring to the presentation of an industrial mobilization plan to the War Policies Commission, of which I shall speak presently, gives indisputable proof of this growing accord. Captain Gage and Captain Pence, to mention only two of the Naval officers engaged in this work have never hesitated to meet us more than half-way.

VIII - WAR POLICIES
COMMISSION

Having discussed origin and growth - inter-office relationships - and changing conceptions of responsibility - I wish finally to draw your attention to relatively recent events - principally to the formation and activities of the War Policies Commission. Ever since the war there has been a continuous effort made by various veterans organizations to secure legislation generally known as the "Universal Draft". The battle-cry of these advocates has been "The Nation must not require one man to give his life in defense of his Country while another is permitted to make a huge profit at the expense of his Country." No one, of course, has ever disagreed with this generalization in principle, but it has been difficult to secure any unanimity of opinion concerning methods for putting it into practical effect. Various bills have been introduced into Congress, some of which were referred to the War Department for comment and criticism.

Finally, since there seemed to be no concerted opinion as to what was needful, Congress determined in its past session to appoint a commission to investigate the whole subject of profiteering and the use of property in war. This implies an investigation of all industrial activity in war. The first hearings of the commission were held in March, 1931. It seems almost unnecessary to point out that the subjects it was forced to consider are identical with many that present themselves to the Assistant Secretary of War.

War Department
Interest

As a consequence, the War Department prepared a statement of its opinions and beliefs concerning these matters and presented them to the commission when called upon to do so in June of this year. As a further instance of the complete accord between the office of the Assistant Secretary of War and that of the Chief of Staff, I digress here long enough to say that at Colonel Payne's request General MacArthur presented the industrial plans of the Department, as well as the munitions plans. Our great interest in the commission's activities is occasioned by two things; first, it became a sort of forum before which all the conflicting views of the Country bearing upon industrial activity in war could be heard and digested;

Widespread
Indorsement
of War
Department
Activities

and second, no matter what recommendations are finally made to Congress, the mission and operation of the office of the Assistant Secretary are likely to be directly affected.

I understand that a complete set of the hearings of the commission form part of the desk library of each student. Consequently, I do not intend to discuss at any length the evidence presented. From our standpoint, however, a very pertinent fact is the almost universal approval given by conservative thinkers to the activities now being carried on under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War. Such people as Howard Coffin, R. H. Aishton, Daniel Williard, and Walter Gifford insisted that this work was necessary, and at least some of them have expressed the opinion that it was being satisfactorily performed.

In this connection I would like to call your attention to the testimony of Mr. Baruch. Most people have seemed to think that Mr. Baruch is antagonistic to the work of the office of the Assistant Secretary. Reference to some of his past lectures would appear to substantiate this belief. It must be remembered, however, that he made those statements at a time when he was laboring under the impression that the Army intended to resist the formation in war of a body similar to the War Industries Board. This, above all other things, was anathema to Mr. Baruch. There are on file, however, letters from Mr. Baruch written during the past two years in which he heartily indorses the work being done in this office.

It has also been erroneously believed that Mr. Baruch's complete plan for industrial mobilization in war consists in freezing prices by law, and then setting up a War Industries Board to run the Country. A careful reading of his testimony shows that this is not his belief at all. Before the War Policies Commission he stressed the necessity for exact preparation in the field of munitions procurement. In many conversations with General Moseley and with other high officials of the War Department he has elaborated on these views much more than he did before the commission.

Attitude of
Mr. Baruch

It must be remembered that Mr. Baruch's so-called "price-freezing" scheme is simply a measure that he advocates as an additional means for preventing inflation in war. His initial suggestions in this field were opposed by the War Department, but these suggestions were somewhat modified later. In this connection I invite your attention to a letter to Mr. Baruch signed by General Moseley, found on page 830 of the commission's hearings.

Development of
Mutual agree-
ment Army-Navy-
Industry

(One of the most encouraging impressions to be gained by a reading of the hearings is that there seems to be developing a general agreement among the Army, the Navy, and Industry as to the broad outline of the system that will finally be invoked in war to assist the President in controlling national resources. Without such agreement it would be practically impossible to make any real progress in these broader planning questions. Under the law the Assistant Secretary of War believed that it is his responsibility to be able at any moment to present such a plan to the President. But he is aware also of the fact that if the broad plan so presented were objected to in principle by the Navy or by the principal figures in Industry the whole plan would be absolutely useless. Army and Navy officials have agreed that, since no other agencies of government are charged with direct planning responsibility with respect to war, it is their common duty to have on hand at all times a broad plan that meets their own specific needs and is in entire consonance with the views of the men who will have to execute the industrial program in war.)

Industrial
Mobilization
Plan - 1930

There are several very obvious comments to make concerning the plan known as the "Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930". First of all, in form it is rather a study containing a tentative plan than it is a concise plan itself. This is because the document was expected to have a certain educational value among people not intimately acquainted with the problem at hand, and it was thought best that the first edition should be more a narrative than a strict directive. Second, the plan indicates that many subsidiary plans must be prepared before the general scheme proposed can come into full effect. On some of these subsidiary plans very little has so far been accomplished, but on others a great deal has been done. These include the Army and Navy procurement programs; the plans prepared by the American Railway Association in cooperation with the War Department for the operation and control of rail-ways; and a labor plan, in whose preparation the representative of this office had the advice and assistance of the Department of Labor, the Federation of Labor, and others. There are other plans under development. There have also been accumulated and analyzed many vital statistics and data that would be essential to the intelligent operation of any national industrial program in war.

IX - SUMMARY

To summarize all of the above in brief fashion I may say that the period 1921-1925 was one of shaking down, both with respect to organization and to an analysis of the job to be performed. In 1925 practical stabilization in organization took place, and the Army's procurement plan has developed in this office and in the procurement services steadily and without interruption since that date. The period 1929-1931 has been one in which the

Assistant Secretary of War has attacked with renewed vigor the job of preparing for industrial mobilization. This period has also witnessed great progress in developing unanimity of opinion among the Army, Navy, Industry, and possibly also legislative and executive departments of the government respecting the scope and nature of the task.

Finally, there has been prepared an Industrial Mobilization Plan which expresses, at least approximately, the composite views of these several agencies. Such a plan, no matter how incomplete it may be at present, is absolutely essential to the further development of a unified program for industrial mobilization.

I shall be glad to attempt the answer to questions with which I may have some acquaintance.