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GOVERNMENT QUESTIONS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE TIME OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND 140
YEARS LATER

by

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COLONEL JORDAN'S REMARKS INTRODUCING
DOCTOR CHARLES E. HILL

The College is honored in having as its lecturer this morning Professor Charles E. Hill who is professor of political science at the George Washington University.

Dr. Hill's record is an outstanding one. He received his A.B. and A.M. from the University of Michigan, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1916. He was a teacher of American History and Government at the Kansas State Normal School for six years and supervising principal of Public Schools at Pasadena, Calif. for a year. Then he came to George Washington University as Assistant Professor of Political Science in 1916 and two years later was made Professor. He has been dean of the Columbian College at that University since 1928. He was a special expert for the U. S. Tariff Commission 1917-1918, and reviser for the Commission on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives in 1920. And this bit of information is for the benefit of our Navy students: he has been professor of political science at the United States Naval Academy since 1929.

Our Problem No. 18 is on the subject of "Government", and our purpose in studying it is to compare and determine the adaptability of our own and foreign governments to organize and mobilize effectively the nation in question for a war effort so we can profit by their examples in our plans and avoid the difficulties and problems they had. So our speaker this morning is going to discuss the constitutional background for Government control of industry. His subject is: "Governmental questions before the Supreme Court at the time of its establishment and 140 years later". It is my pleasure to introduce Doctor Charles E. Hill.

Colonel Jordan and Gentlemen:

Before me are three volumes of United States Reports, - Volume 1, and Volumes 282 and 283. Volume 1 covers the years from 1790 to 1806.

The Supreme Court met first in New York City in 1790. At this session no cases were filed for hearing. A good many persons were admitted to practice before the Court, mostly Senators and Representatives. Veniremen from the United States District Court in New York City were present; but not used. In no instance have I found that a jury has actually served in the Supreme Court. The only occasion for it would be in cases of original jurisdiction - cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and cases to which a state may be a party.

In 1790 there was no case before the Court. That does not mean that the judges were idle. The judges of the Supreme Court were traveling on circuits and with traveling conditions as they were, they led hard and busy lives.

In 1791 the Court met in Philadelphia and the first case to come before it was a case from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, *West v. Barnes* (1 Curtis 2). Apparently the clerk of that court had issued a writ of error for hearing before the Supreme Court and the point made by Barnes was that the writ of error would have to be issued by the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. He was sustained. In *Hayburn's* case, Attorney General Randolph asked for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of compelling the enforcement of an Act of Congress in behalf of a list of pensioners. The motion was not allowed because there was no interested party to the case. The Attorney General then inserted *Hayburn's* name; and while the Supreme Court held the motion under advisement, Congress changed the Pension Act. (1 Curtis 8)

The first case of major importance to come before the Court was *Chisholm v. Georgia* (1 Curtis 16). Before the Revolution, you know, the Americans were overwhelmingly

in debt to the British. That is always true in any pioneer country. Credit is needed for the development of resources. During the Revolution the United States did not set up an Alien Property Custodian; neither did the States. The States, however, collected these debts and after the war refused to pay the British creditors. Chisholm in South Carolina represented a British creditor and brought suit against the State of Georgia. Counsel for the State denied the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the State was sovereign and had succeeded to all the rights and immunities of the King of England, who could do no wrong and who could not be sued. The majority of the judges held the United States had sovereignty derived from the people and had jurisdiction as prescribed by the organic act. Since Article 3 of the Constitution provided that a state could be sued by a citizen of another state, the Court decided that Georgia could be sued and found the claim valid. The Court did, however, delay the order of the execution of the judgment until the first day of the next term. Meanwhile the Georgia delegation in Congress became extremely active. They persuaded the members of the other state delegations that their states were in exactly the same position as Georgia, which was true. Members of Congress decided, therefore, that the only way to prevent further action would be by proposing an amendment to the Constitution, which they did quickly and which the state legislatures speedily approved. This eleventh amendment provides that a state cannot be sued by a citizen of another state. Incidentally, this was the first recall of a decision by a constitutional amendment. The Dred Scott decision was recalled by the 13th amendment and the income tax case, Pollock v. The Farmers Loan and Trust Company, by the 16th amendment.

The case of Glass v. the Sloop Betsy (1 Curtis 74). The Betsy had been brought into Baltimore where the French Consul condemned the ship and cargo as lawful prize. The cargo was owned jointly by Swedes and Americans. One of the American owners brought suit for recovery of his property in the United States District Court of Baltimore. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the "Betsy" because it had taken on the character of a French war vessel and the matter would need to be settled through diplomatic channels. The case was taken to the Supreme Court where it was decided that France had no right to set up a Consular Court in the United States, that our courts had full jurisdiction over the "Betsy", and directed the District Court to proceed with the trial on its merits. This case laid the groundwork for our courts to pass on our neutral rights and obligations.

It was in this connection that President Washington asked the Supreme Court to give him advisory opinions on questions of international law. He was not a lawyer and was perplexed by the differences between Hamilton and Jefferson and Attorney General Randolph. The Court refused to comply with the President's request on the ground that such action would violate the checks and balances between the three departments of the government and on the ground that such action would be an extrajudicial proceeding, and that the Constitution specified the President might call on his heads of departments for advice. The question came up in an unfortunate manner. It was generally conceded at the time that the Court had the power to give advisory opinions. Charles Warren in his book "The Supreme Court in American History" reaches that conclusion.

The Constitutional Convention had before it the constitution of Massachusetts in 1781. This constitution provided for advisory opinions by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts on the question of the constitutionality of bills. If Washington had not submitted twenty-two questions pertaining mostly to international law and instead had asked for advice on the constitutionality of a bill, the Court might have responded favorably. If it had I see nothing that could have checked that power of the Court unless it would have been an amendment to the Constitution. As it now stands, the only way in which the Court can be given that power is by an amendment to the Constitution.

Bass v. Tingy (1 Curtis 322). The American ship "Eliza" had been taken on the high seas by a French privateer and had been recaptured by the United States vessel "The Ganges". The question came up as to whether war existed between the United States and France. That skirmish in 1798 marked the separation of the Navy Department from the War Department. Congress authorized the issue of letters of marque and reprisal; captures were made on both sides; yet in this case the Supreme Court decided that there was no war between the United States and France. Napoleon held likewise for France and President Adams held so for the United States. It is important for the United States to know when it is at war. If there is a declaration of Congress, that usually governs, not always, but usually. At the opening of the Civil War President Lincoln did not realize that the Proclamation of Blockade meant the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates. It was not until the courts pronounced upon it that the administration realized that this Proclamation of Blockade meant the establishment of war relations between the North and the South. Lincoln and Seward thought the proclamation of neutrality by Queen

Victoria's government meant the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates. Seward and even Sumner thought Great Britain should be held responsible for all expenses incurred in the Civil War as a consequence. (The Hiawatha in the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 1862; the Tropic Wind, 2 D.C. Reports 351, 1867.)

The right of a British subject to expatriate himself did not come before the Supreme Court in these early days, but before the judges on the circuit. It was held that an Englishman did not have this right without consent of the British Government. It was held also that an American could not expatriate himself without the consent of the United States Government. Even the Executive Department had no consistent policy on the subject of expatriation and naturalization until after 1848 - the year of the potato famine in Ireland and of the revolution in Germany, which caused large numbers of Europeans to come and be naturalized in this country. As a result, James Buchanan, then Secretary of State, announced that our Executive Department looked upon these naturalized citizens as having equal rights with natural-born citizens except with one slight modification and they were entitled to the same protection abroad as natural-born citizens. Even in the Dred Scott case in 1857 the judges did not have a clear conception of United States citizenship. It was not until the adoption of the 14th amendment that this question was fully cleared up. "Persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the states in which they reside." There has been very little misconception of what citizenship has meant since that time.

Probably the most important case in Volume 1 is Marbury v. Madison (1 Curtis 368). There is considerable basis for believing that although the Convention of 1787 established the three coordinate departments of government, the delegates looked upon Congress as the most important department of the three. They had the Parliament as prototype before them and I think that is the reason they describe the legislative branch in Article 1 of the Constitution. A hundred years later, Woodrow Wilson published his book on Congressional Government. In that book he states that Congress is the most influential and powerful branch of the United States government. Later when he became President he certainly must have modified his conception on that point.

Down through the years the executive powers have grown at the expense of the legislative, but in Marbury v. Madison, John Marshall laid the foundation for judicial supremacy and the power of the courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional and even to check the President when he goes beyond his constitutional powers.

In this case Marbury was one of the midnight appointments of John Adams. Marbury's appointment as Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia was confirmed by the Senate, the seal affixed by the Secretary of State, and left in the pigeon-hole of the secretary's desk, Jefferson came in as President the next day; Madison came later as Secretary of State. Madison examined the correspondence left in his desk and found the commission for Marbury. He reported it to President Jefferson who advised him to hold it. Marbury sued under original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to compel Secretary Madison to deliver the commission. Several questions arose before the court. One: Was Marbury entitled to the commission? The Court examined into the various circumstances and legal requirements and found that he was. Two: Could a writ of mandamus be issued under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? The judiciary act of 1789 conferred upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in mandamus cases. Marbury knew that. He thought he knew also that as a friend and a Federalist John Marshall would see eye to eye with him on this point. Marshall examined into this question and came to the conclusion that if Congress could confer additional original jurisdiction to that prescribed in the Constitution, Article 5 of the Constitution would become unnecessary. (Article 5 describes the method by which it can be amended.) The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court relates to ambassadors, ministers, consuls and to cases to which a State may be a party. Marshall held that this part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was rendered null and void.

He raised another question which he does not answer directly: Would a writ of mandamus lie against the Secretary of State? He proceeds to discuss the discretionary powers and the ministerial powers of an officer. I have since thought about it a good many times and I am unable to find that the Secretary of State has any clerical powers. Some cabinet officers have. Writs of mandamus have been brought against the Secretary of the Interior in homestead cases. If the

homesteader has complied with the various requirements of law, the Secretary of Interior can be ordered to issue title to the land. I am unable to find that the President has any ministerial powers; they seem all to be discretionary. One phase of this question came up in *Mississippi v. Johnson* (4 Wallace 475) President Johnson vetoed the Reconstruction Act, providing for military government in the state. The officers of Mississippi said "We will assist President Johnson". So Mississippi asked for an injunction against the President to restrain him from enforcing the Reconstruction Act. The Supreme Court held that the enforcement of the law was a discretionary act and that an injunction would not lie against the President.

Many other cases appear in the first volume involving procedure, public lands, condemnation of vessels seized in the quasi war with France. The parties were mostly individuals and partnerships. The corporations were mostly insurance companies. Even so, the most noteworthy insurance case of *Church v. Hubbart* (1 Curtis 470) involved the old practice of individuals underwriting the risk.

The last case from this volume that I shall mention is *Little v. Barreme* (1 Curtis 465). During the quasi war with France Congress authorized the President to instruct seagoing vessels to stop and examine any vessels on the high seas bound to any port in the French Republic. This act was transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to Naval officers as part of their orders. The Secretary added:

"A proper discharge of the important duties enjoined on you, arising out of this act, will require the exercise of a sound and impartial judgment. You are not only to do all that in you lies to prevent all intercourse, whether direct or circuitous, between the ports of the United States and those of France and her dependencies, in cases where the vessels or cargoes are apparently, as well as really, American, and protected by American papers only; but you are to be vigilant that vessels or cargoes really American, but covered by Danish or other foreign papers, and bound to or from French ports, do not escape you. Whenever, on just suspicion, you send a vessel into port to be dealt with according to the afore-mentioned law, besides sending with her all her papers, send all the evidence you can

obtain to support your suspicions, and effect her condemnation. At the same time that you are thus attentive to fulfil the objects of the law, you are to be extremely careful not to harass or injure the trade of foreign nations with whom you are at peace, nor the fair trade of our own citizens."

These orders, given by the executive under the construction of the act of Congress made by the department to which its execution was assigned, enjoin the seizure of American vessels sailing from a French port. Is the officer who obeys them liable for damages sustained by this misconstruction of the act, or will his orders excuse him? If his instructions afford him no protection, then the law must take its course, and he must pay such damages as are legally awarded against him; if they excuse an act not otherwise excusable, it would then be necessary to inquire whether this is a case in which the probable cause which existed to induce a suspicion that the vessel was American, would excuse the captor from damages when the vessel appeared in fact to be neutral.

Captain Little of the United States Frigate "Boston" captured the vessel, "The Flying Fish", which carried Danish papers. Captain Little suspected the papers were fraudulent, and thought the "Flying Fish" was really American and brought her in. The papers revealed that the vessel was bound from a French port for St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies. The United States District Court released the ship as being Danish and refused to award damages in favor of the owner against Captain Little. The Circuit Court reversed the decree and awarded damages on the ground that the "Flying Fish" as on a voyage from and not to a French port and would not have been liable under the law to capture. Captain Little appealed to the Supreme Court and there Chief Justice Marshall gave the decision. I would like to read that part of his decision to give you a sample of his power of reasoning and of his skill in using the English language, as well as his courtesy in giving an adverse decision.

"I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages. I was much inclined to think that a distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of military officers; and between proceedings within the body of the country and those on the high seas. That

implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared to me strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them. I was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention, the claim of the injured party for damages would be against the government from which the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass. It becomes therefore, unnecessary to inquire whether the probable cause afforded by the conduct of The Flying Fish to suspect her of being an American would excuse Captain Little from damages for having seized and sent her into port, since, had she been an American, the seizure would have been unlawful.

Captain Little, then, must be answerable in damages to the owner of this neutral vessel, and as the account taken by order of the circuit court is not objectionable on its face, and has not been excepted to by counsel before the proper tribunal, this court can receive no objection to it.

There appears, then, to be no error in the judgment of the circuit court, and it must be affirmed, with costs."

I realized that Army and Navy officers were responsible for their action in carrying into effect unlawful orders but I did not realize until I went through the first volume that it had been passed upon as early as that in our history. That is the situation in the United States. It is the situation in Great Britain and in Belgium as I understand it. It is not the situation elsewhere on the continent where they have a special kind of law for civilian and military officers

separate and apart from the law for the citizen. There an order from a superior officer covers the action of the subordinate to whom the order is given, and if any question of law arises it goes against the one who gave the order. The suit is not brought in the ordinary courts of the country. It comes before the administrative courts with administrative law governing the situation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians tell me they have a better system than we have. I find it difficult to refute that conclusion.

These other two volumes were published 140 years later,- 1930. Instead of one volume for sixteen years, we have two volumes for one year, and the judges do not seem to have the amount of leisure that the judges in the earlier volume had. The opinions are not as long. Especially, they do not give as much space to dissenting opinions.

The first case involves the inheritance tax, a subject that was not mentioned 140 years before. There followed cases affecting railroads, radio, moving pictures, and meat packers. In one case a Mr. Colts exceeded the speed limit for an automobile in the District of Columbia. The legal question was whether this was a petty offense triable without a jury or by a jury within the meaning of the bill of rights. The Court held that violation of the traffic laws of the District of Columbia was an offense of serious character and triable within the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury. (282 U.S. 63)

Numerous cases affecting stocks and bonds came up; the employers' liability law, fixing the rates on common carriers, insurance rates, and the police power were involved in several cases.

The question of the police power did not come before the Supreme Court until after the Dartmouth College case. In this case you recall that the charter of a private corporation was held to be a contract and the state could not impair the obligation of a contract. As a result, the state felt they could not go on issuing charters for 99 years or 999 years. They shortened the term to 20 years, and 10 years, and they found that was not sufficient to control the corporations so they developed the police power, by which they could restrict corporations. In some instances the states have been able to curtail the business of the corporation entirely even though they did not cancel the charter. That was done in connection with lotteries and with the production and sale of liquor under prohibition in the states.

The question of the state guarantee of bank deposits came before the Supreme Court; so did the pure food and drug laws. I shall select a few cases that came up in 1930. Could Russians, being citizens of an unrecognized country, sue in our courts? A Russian corporation had two vessels under construction by contract with the Standard Shipping Corporation of New York. In August 1917 the United States requisitioned these contracts and took over the vessels. The Russian corporation sued in the Court of Claims and it was thrown out because the United States had not recognized Russia. The Supreme Court reversed that decision and permitted the Russian corporation to sue. (Russian Volunteer Fleet v. U.S. 282 U.S. 481)

Arizona filed a petition for an injunction in the Supreme Court against Mr. Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior and the states of California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming, who had formed the Colorado River Compact for the distribution of water as a result of a dam to be built at Black Canyon under the authority of the Government of the United States. The hearing in the Supreme Court came on the motion to dismiss the petition.

The Act of Congress of December 21, 1928, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct Boulder Dam at Black Canyon for the purpose of controlling floods, improving the navigation, and regulating the flow of the Colorado River. It was also for the purpose of providing water for the public lands and for the generation of power as a means of making the project self-sustaining.

Arizona alleged that the river has never been and is not now navigable. The Court, Justice Brandeis giving the decision, took judicial notice that the river south of Black Canyon was formerly navigable and cited annual reports of the Chief of Engineers and various histories and other reports. Whether the proposed dam was necessary did not fall within the province of the Court to determine. The Act of Congress being related to the "control of navigation" was sufficient. That the structure would serve to prevent floods and to irrigate the public lands would add to its validity. The Arizona petition was dismissed (283 U.S. 423)

New Jersey v. New York City (283 U.S. 473). For years the city of New York had loaded barges with garbage and towed them out to sea, twelve to twenty-two miles from shore, and dumped the contents. Wind and tide would then float the garbage to the New Jersey shore to the injury of bathing beaches, fishing nets, and navigation. At times as much as fifty truck loads were deposited daily on a single bathing beach with

menace to public health, which had to be removed by the New Jersey authorities. The Court held that the situs of the act creating the nuisance was immaterial. New York City claimed that when they went out twelve to twenty-two miles, it was on the high seas and they were free; that they were not under the jurisdiction of the United States; there was no law to prevent them from dumping garbage at that distance, and, furthermore, the barges went out under permit from the United States port authorities. The Court held that it did not matter where the act took place, the fact that a nuisance was created was sufficient, and the Court gave New York City a reasonable time in which to erect incinerators and stop the nuisance. I understand these incinerators have been completed and dumping the garbage in the sea has ceased.

The United States v. McIntosh (283 U.S. 607). McIntosh was and is professor of divinity in Yale University. He came to the United States in 1916 and 1925 declared his intention of becoming a citizen. When he applied for final papers it was agreed by counsel that he had resided in the United States for five years and had behaved as a man of good moral character. The only hitch was in regard to Question No. 22 - "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?" McIntosh replied: "Yes, but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity". I shall read part of his answer:

"I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my country, but only in so far as I can believe that this is not going to be against the best interests of humanity in the long run. I do not undertake to support 'my country, right or wrong' in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to promise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not 'take up arms in defense of this country' however 'necessary' the war may seem to be to the Government of the day.

"It is only in a sense consistent with these statements that I am willing to promise to 'support and defend' the Government of the United States 'against all enemies, foreign and domestic.' But, just because I am not certain that the language of questions 20 and 22 will bear the construction I should have to put upon it in order to be able to answer them in the affirmative, I have to say that I do not know that I can say 'Yes' in answer to these two questions."

Upon the hearing before the district court on the petition, he explained his position more in detail. He said that he was not a pacifist; that if allowed to interpret the oath himself he would interpret it as not inconsistent with his position and would take it. He then proceeded to say that he would answer question 22 in the affirmative only on the understanding that he would have to believe that the war was morally justified before he would take up arms in it or give it his moral support. He was ready to give to the United States all the allegiance he ever had given or ever could give to any country, but he could not put allegiance to the government of any country before allegiance to the will of God. He did not anticipate engaging in any propaganda against the prosecution of a war which the government had already declared and which it considered to be justified; but he preferred not to make any absolute promise at the time of the hearing, because of his ignorance of all the circumstances which might affect his judgment with reference to such a war. He did not question that the government under certain conditions could regulate and restrain the conduct of the individual citizen, even to the extent of imprisonment. He recognized the principle of the submission of the individual citizen to the opinion of the majority in a democratic country; but he did not believe in having his own moral problems solved for him by the majority. The position thus taken was the only one he could take consistently with his moral principles and with what he understood to be the moral principles of Christianity. He recognized, in short, the right of the government to restrain the freedom of the individual for the good of the social whole; but was convinced, on the other hand, that the individual citizen should have the right respectfully to withhold from the government military services (involving, as they probably would, the taking of human life), when his best moral judgment would compel him to do so. He was willing to support his country, even to the extent of bearing arms, if asked to do so by the government, in any war which he could regard as morally justified.

It may be worth while to mention that when the great war broke out he resigned his professorship, asked for leave of absence and was given leave to join the Canadian forces, and was rather impatient with the United States for not declaring war at that time. He served honorably with the Canadian forces in France. Some of you may have listened to him a few weeks ago at the First Baptist Church here in town. He mentioned then that the reason for making a reservation was because he wanted to obey the dictates of his conscience and examine into the justice of a war. He did not throughout his speech indicate any criteria that might be used as to the justice of a war.

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The Court held that his oath of allegiance would be taken with qualifications, that Congress had the right and had required absolute and unconditional allegiance. Consequently his application for final papers was denied. The Court in giving the decision mentioned that, constructively at least, this would give a foreigner applying for citizenship an advantage over natural born American citizens. In his lecture on this subject he mentioned that that was not his intent. Nevertheless, we can hardly escape the conclusion that it would put a naturalized citizen on a preferred basis. You and I are permitted to have no reservations whatsoever. Why should a naturalized citizen have any?

Gentlemen, I have indicated to you some of the fundamental constitutional questions that came before the Supreme Court in the early years of its history and by comparison some of the questions that came before it in 1930.

Q - You stated that the powers of the President were discretionary and that a writ of mandamus could not be issued against him. Suppose he exceeded his authority, what limitations or what means could be used to limit his powers?

A - Probably the procedure would not be through mandamus or injunction. You no doubt have the case of *ex parte Merryman* more clearly in mind than I do. In the Constitution it is mentioned as a restriction upon the powers of Congress that it cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus except in a period of imminent danger. President Lincoln thought this power was conferred upon the President and he proceeded to suspend the writ during the early part of the Civil War. A man by the name of Merryman was accordingly arrested and held without the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus - in Fort McHenry near Baltimore. The case came before Chief Justice Taney while sitting on the bench of the Circuit Court of the United States for Maryland. The Chief Justice granted the petition and directed that it be served upon the the commandant of the fort. The civil officer, of course, gained no admission to the fort. Nevertheless, Taney passed upon the right of the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declared that he had acted outside of his powers. Lincoln for a while refused to comply with the view of the court but even in war-time he found it advisable to heed public opinion that had been set in motion by the decision of the Court, and asked Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I think that answers your question. (Taney's Reports, 246, 1861.)

Colonel Jordan: Doctor Hill, I want to express the appreciation of the Class and faculty of the College for this very excellent address.