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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

by

Professor Charles A. Beard

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COLONEL JORDAN'S REMARKS INTRODUCING

PROFESSOR BEARD

Gentlemen: Just two years ago our distinguished guest, Professor Charles A. Beard, stated on this platform: "I am now devoting two years to the study of a problem which bears directly upon the economic measures of our Government, and upon the services which our Army and Navy may be called upon to render in support of them. The subject is: "The National Interest" which, we are told by diplomats, must be upheld at all costs. What is National Interest?

There is no one better qualified to discuss this subject than Professor Beard. He has served as Professor of Politics, Columbia University, for ten years, 1907-1917; Director of the Training School for Public Service, N.Y.C. for five years, 1917-1922; he has been honored by degrees from DePauw, Columbia, Cornell, and Oxford. His experience and talents have been availed of by the Japanese Government in municipal research in Tokyo in 1922-1923, and as adviser to the Minister of Home Affairs after the earthquake in 1923.

He is a member of the American Historical Association, and American Political Science Association. Professor Beard is an author of note on modern history, Government, political science, and economics.

It is with great pleasure that I introduce Professor Charles A. Beard who will speak to you on his chosen subject; "The National Interest". Professor Beard.

Colonel Jordan and Gentlemen:

I propose to divide my subject, not like all Gaul - into three parts - but into two. As I was approaching the age of sixty I made a great discovery: I found that there is a distinction between what one knows and what one thinks. What one knows is susceptible of verification; you can reach a consensus of opinion on it. What one thinks is a matter of opinion, for debate, discussion and decision.

For example, we know that George Washington was the first president of the United States under the Constitution. When I say that, I say something that we can verify, and all of us can come to an agreement upon it. But, if I say George Washington was the greatest general the world has ever produced I express an opinion concerning which we cannot reach a common agreement.

So I propose to divide this subject of national interest into facts and opinions. In the first part I intend to deal with what I believe to be facts coming under the head of national interest and in the second part I intend to make my interpretation of the facts. Now the facts, if they are facts, are open to verification and authentication. Opinions are what? They are ideas offered to the judgment of our fellow men and to the long judgment of history. They cannot be verified, authenticated. Their validity is determined by the judgment of history that is to be made.

There is nothing in facts which tells us what to do about them. There is nothing in science or knowledge that tells us what to do with the things known and verified. What we do with our instruments of war does not come out of the nature of those instruments themselves, nor out of the science of warfare of which those instruments are an expression. What we do with any material object or any knowledge about a material object does not come out of the object but out of our thinking - what we do comes out of ourselves, not the things. It is true the things may determine the way in which we operate after we have reached a decision but the facts and the things do not make the decision. The decision lies deep in our minds in some intuitive judgment beyond the reach of any rational probe and mathematical expression.

Now we come to the consideration of facts under the head of national interest. What is the purpose of modern diplomacy - the armies and navies to support that diplomacy? Answer is made by the great diplomats of the world, by the official representatives of governments. The answer is to be found in thousands of state papers, diplomatic notes and documents. As I have been deaf for many years it has been one of my chief diversions to read state papers. If any of you suffer from insomnia it is one of the best remedies I can recommend. But as a result of reading thousands of state papers I was struck by the constant appearance of the words "national interest". As I went back in the history of the western world I found the words dropping out, and other words or formulas appearing.

The answer which the modern diplomat makes to this question respecting the purpose of diplomacy and armies is simple. The purpose of diplomacy, to be supported by arms, is the defense, protection, promotion and advancement of the national interest. That is an answer that is to be found not only in the state papers of the United States but of France, Germany, Italy, and even Soviet Russia. In the diplomatic notes and declarations of the Soviet government you will find that the formula runs somewhat as follows: "It is our intention to found our policy upon our state interest and to defend this interest at all costs."

When the German government in the summer of 1914 asked the French government what the latter would do in case of war between Germany and Russia the French government replied: "France will have a care for her interests." I could give you hundreds, literally thousands, of citations showing that this is the dominant formula expressing the purpose of contemporary diplomacy to be supported by arms. Von Clausewitz very accurately said in substance: "War is the transfer to the field of battle of conflicts of policy which are not resolved by diplomatic negotiation". Policy, then, is national interest. War is the transfer to the field of battle of conflicts arising out of the defense, promotion, advancement of the national interest.

This is a newcomer to the formulas of diplomacy. If you will go back to the Middle Ages you will find a different formula. The formula then dominant was "the will of the Prince." The will of the Prince was the supreme law. It needed no justification. The fact itself was indisputable; the law of the prince was to prevail and the business of the soldier was to carry out the will of the Prince, whatever it may have been.

Then we came down to the 16th or 17th Centuries when national states were rising out of chaos and feudalism, and we find another formula, the formula of dynastic interest. The purpose of diplomacy under this formula was the protection, promotion and advancement of dynastic interests, and diplomacy of the 17th and 18th Centuries was conducted under this principle. The diplomat was the representative of a dynasty and it was his business to advance the prestige, honor, and power of his ruler, monarch or prince. It was his business to get territory for his ruler, to effect happy marriages that would add to the family estate and to carry on other negotiations redounding to the dynastic interest. The dusk of that formula came in 1898.

On the eve of the Spanish-American war the Emperor William the Second of Germany, as we now know from official documents in the Die Grosse Politik, sought to intervene by developing a concert of monarchical powers to preserve what he called "the dynastic interest". He thought that, if republican United States destroyed monarchical Spain or diminished the power of the monarchy, then the dynastic interests of all monarchies in Europe would be in danger. Efforts were made to effect a combination of powers in Europe for the purpose of blocking the war between the United States and Spain. But even in these papers, however, it is evident that the new force is present in diplomacy, for the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs in answering the Kaiser's call for a concert to protect the dynastic interests, said in substance: "It is true that it is our policy to uphold and defend the interests of dynasties but I should like to call your Majesty's attention to the fact that our trade with the United States is so great that any disruption of this trade would be a great disturbance to the interests of the German Empire." He went on at great length with two or three pages of statistics on German-American trade; as contrasted with his few lines on the importance of conserving dynastic interests. That, I say, was the dusk of the conception, and the World War put an end to it.

Now as dynastic interest dropped out as a formula, another conception appeared, the conception of national honor. That was once a powerful formula of diplomacy, especially in the closing years of the 19th Century and opening years of the 20th. When treaties of arbitration were made, it was the practice to exclude from arbitration vital interests and questions of national honor, but the use of this phrase "national honor" gradually dropped out for some reason, perhaps because diplomats saw the difficulty of finding in it any precise guidance to

concrete issues of national honor. This formula dropped slowly out of diplomatic papers and finally in the Kellogg-Briand pact it was put out officially and the nations of the world bound themselves to seek peaceful methods for the adjustment of disputes of whatever character. Thus national honor declined as a formula of diplomacy. It is true that it is occasionally used but the emphasis on it has been greatly diminished.

So the situation left the conception of national interest as the dominant formula emphasized in contemporary diplomacy. Now what is it in the minds of the statesmen who use it? I have explored thousands of documents, official declarations, pages of Congressional debates and have derived the following elements as coming under the head of national interest: it is, of course, the primary consideration of national interest that the nation should be defended against invading and attacking foes. That is a conception which is universal in contemporary ideas of national interest. It is also in the national interest to promote foreign trade of whatever character in all articles of commerce that may be called legitimate. It is not permissible to engage in slave trade because it is outlawed by the nations of the World, but trade in so-called legitimate objects of commerce is in the national interest. It is in the national interest to acquire territories, etc. in various parts of the world with a view to promoting trade in legitimate objects of commerce. This is one of the more recent conceptions coming under the head of national interest. It is in the national interest to acquire territories, stores or properties which may aid in advancing and promoting commerce and providing points of support for commerce. It is in the national interest for individual Americans and corporations to acquire concessions abroad - timber concessions, mining concessions, charters, and privileges for the operation of corporations of one kind or another for various industrial and public purposes. It is in the national interest that American citizens should make investments abroad, should lend money to foreign corporations, merchants, bankers, individuals and governments. This is in the national interest because it promotes the export of American goods. It is in the national interest for American citizens to acquire property abroad and to construct branch factories, warehouses, docks, and other instrumentalities of commerce in foreign places, which may be advantageous in the promotion of our trade and commerce. These are objective things; things in existence or coming into existence.

Under the current conception of national interest are also included things not yet in existence but things that may be brought into existence - potential rights of trade, or investment, of economic operation which may be realized, such as the

right to the Open Door and participation with other powers in the development and exploitation of the resources of other countries, particularly backward places. Thus the Open Door, the Monroe Doctrine, and various other formulas of diplomacy that contemplate future objects of value which may be brought into being come under the head of national interests; also unrealized rights under treaties. For example, some citizens of the U. S. once had an agreement with a foreign government that the government would allow so many thousand cans of lard to be imported and sold per year for a period of time. After making the agreement that foreign government abrogated it and reduced the number of cans of lard which could be exported in a given time, and the American citizens engaged in the business contended that this deprived them of a right coming under the doctrine of national interest.

These are the things: rights, real and potential, which come under the head of national interest as we conceive it today. The whole doctrine was summed up by President Coolidge when he said in effect: "Every American citizen abroad and every dollar invested abroad is as much a part of the national domain as if in the territory of the U. S. itself". And Mr. Curtis Wilbur summed up the doctrine when, in a speech before the Chamber of Commerce in Connecticut a few years ago, he enumerated the pieces of property belonging to American citizens on the high seas, the ships, the bonds held by American citizens, the docks, branch factories, warehouses, stores, ships owned by American citizens in foreign countries, listed them all, and assigned them value, and then said that the assets of the U. S. abroad today measured in dollars was about equal to all the wealth of the U. S. in 1870 and it was the business of the Navy to defend these rights, titles and property in foreign countries in peace and war. That is one conception of national interest that is dominant, or has been until recently, in American diplomacy. That conception I have called "Hamiltonian".

It is to be distinguished from the conception of national interest which may be characterized as "Jeffersonian". Jefferson had a different conception of the national interest. This conception which I have just described lays emphasis on interest rather than the nation. Jefferson emphasized the nation rather than interest. He started out by formulating first the conception of the nation, and his conception was that it was to the interest of this Republic to remain an agricultural economy. Jefferson believed that only a freehold system of agriculture could sustain the democratic and republican form of government. He was willing

to take territory which could be occupied as agricultural land by American citizens but he was unwilling, as he said, to take distant territory which could not be occupied by American citizens and required the defensive power of the Navy. His idea of the American nation then was a continental power with an economy primarily agricultural and that an economy of free-ownership. The land was to be held by individual farmers and developed by the farmers and their families. He said that only the man who looks to the soil at his feet, to the sun in heaven, to the labor of his own hands can furnish the support that is necessary for the maintenance of a republican government and for the defense of that nation against other powers. This, I say, was the Jeffersonian conception - America as a continental power, agricultural power, not an industrial power depending theoretically, and to some extent practically, upon the constant promotion of trade in manufactures in different parts of the world.

But the Hamiltonian conception was victorious, and above are listed the things and the rights which are presumed to come under the head of national interest. According to this theory it is the business of the Army and Navy to promote, protect and defend all these objects, claims, rights, potential or real, wherever they are in the world, under whatever flag they may be, against other powers or combination of powers which may challenge the flag or the assertion of American rights.

Finding these two conceptions of national interest under the same head I tried to find out what is the real national interest. I asked myself this question: Is the national interest either the Jeffersonian or the Hamiltonian, or if it is the Hamiltonian conception expounded by Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Wilbur is the national interest then just the sum total of all the investments, branch factories, mines, claims, rights, concessions, and commercial operations? That would seem to be an easy way of making an answer; but on further inquiry I found that a great many of the operations included under the head of national interest were self-canceling. For example, it is in the national interest to sell cigarettes to China. It is also in the national interest to sell cigarette making machinery, which cigarette making machinery destroys the market for American cigarettes. It is in the national interest to export automobiles and machinery to foreign countries and it is also in the national interest to build branch factories in those foreign countries which employ foreign labor for the purpose of manufacturing American automobiles and machines thus destroying the American market there for goods manufactured in this country.

The growth of the branch factory movement is one of the most striking things in the last twenty years. There are American branch factories in Canada which are manufacturing typewriters that are being sold in Europe and Latin America to the injury of the export trade of factories in the U. S. employing American labor.

Then obviously, we cannot discover what the national interest is by just adding together all these several rights, titles, objects, claims, etc. covered under the head of national interest. How could it be in the national interest to promote the export of typewriters and promote the export of capital which destroys the export of typewriters? That seems to me to be a contradictory set of facts which cannot be brought under a common head. Then I asked myself, is it possible to make a balance sheet of these several commercial operations, to put those that redound to the advantage of the country in one column and those that diminish the opulence of the country in another, and then to strike a balance sheet of the net advantage or loss arising from the operations coming under the head of national interest. I could make no such balance sheet; nor could I find in the writings of the diplomats who defended this conception of national interest any balance sheet showing conclusively that branch factories, for instance, were to the advantage of the United States or to the disadvantage. The Senate of the U. S. called upon the Secretary of Commerce to make such a balance sheet and his report was a confession of inability to do it. He could not state statistically, mathematically, realistically, whether branch factories were advantageous or disadvantageous.

So now we come to the second part - my opinions about this matter. We might divide the meeting into two parts and those who were only interested in facts could walk out when the expression of opinion begins. I began to ask myself what is this national interest that everybody talks about, that diplomats continually use, that soldiers and sailors are called upon to defend and die for. It is an important question and I could not find the answer in the facts, declarations, histories, or statistics of trade. Out of the facts arose no inexorable picture of this nation and this interest which we are to defend, promote, and if necessary, sacrifice our lives for. So I began to make a conception of national interest for myself. Being old in years and having laid aside most of the ambitions, or all of them, that had caused tempests in life, being of old American stock whose ancestors have been on this continent for about three hundred years, having before me a vast amount

of assembled facts which you will find in my "Idea of National Interest" (and if there are not enough there I will tell you that I have three thousand pages of additional facts I did not put in the book), having in front of me no fear and no favor, having no ambitions that I wish personally to achieve at the expense of anybody else, interested primarily in this great nation here on this continental domain, I asked myself: What is this nation and what is its interest? I said to myself, and this is a point of view, clearly it is to the interest of this nation to defend itself on its continental domain against all powers that might try to break in upon our domestic discord. Surely, that will be conceded. I admit there are those who take a universal view of this and who place the human race above national unities. I confess I am unable to rise to that great height of moral disinterestedness. It may be a weakness; I admit it. It largely is in the interest of this nation to defend itself against any foreign power that might break in upon its domestic security and peace.

But what is the nation? Well, of course, there are the people, so many people, but a nation is more than so many heads. It is a configuration of people who are able to cooperate together more or less successfully, who are able to cohere, can govern themselves, able to manage a great system of regional economy and finance. Then I said it is the interest of this nation to have here only people who can cooperate and form a part of this body politic called the American nation. That means restriction of immigration. I do not want any of you to think I am indulging in so-called Nordic nonsense. If you look at the composition of the American nation you will see that even here there is a mixture of peoples. You will see that the tradition that we were all originally Nordic English, whatever that may mean, is a false tradition. Statistical analysis will show a number of Germans, Welch, Irish and Scotch and other nationalities mingled in our people; but in the main they are of European stocks and European stocks are an agglomeration of different races and nationalities. That still remains a fact - we are a nation of European stocks mainly. Therefore, it is contrary to the national interest to have an immigration of peoples, who, even if they are superior to us in the arts, sciences, letters and practical arts, who, even if superior, would break in upon the cohesion of our society and make it more difficult for us to govern ourselves. So we arrive at the conception of immigration control, with reference to the composition of American society now actually existing; and I would apply that system of control to areas not yet covered by it. I would then modify the immigration law in such a way as not to offend Oriental peoples but in modifying the law I would not surrender any of the substance of the law.

Then, given this nation and this endowment, what is its interest? Here is my conception - (It may not be yours) - My conception is that the fundamental interest of the American nation is the establishment of the highest possible standard of living for the whole people in ways of industry conducive to virtue and within the framework of national, defensive security. That is my definition. You can make yours and we will submit our definitions to the judgment of mankind. Mine is no better than yours; yours no better than mine intrinsically. Such is my conception of the nation and its interest.

What does this mean? It means the least possible dependence on the vicissitudes of foreign trade, foreign relations and foreign revolutions. This nation is insecure just to the extent that its fundamental standard of living depends upon the conduct of nations and peoples beyond the control of the government of the U. S. I say it is insecure in its standard of living just in proportion as it is dependent for that standard on the conduct of peoples and regions beyond our effective control. My conception of national interest would require us to surrender the belief that we could or should defend every American dollar invested everywhere and every American citizen everywhere engaged in promoting his private interests. It is my conception that it is the business of the Army and Navy, if you will allow me to say so, to defend public interests - interests that are clearly public and national, as distinguished from interests that are purely private and cannot be demonstrated to redound to the advantage of the nation. It is impossible to defend all so-called American interests everywhere even if we wanted to. It is inconceivable that the great imperial powers of the world would allow us to build a Navy, even if we decided to do it, large enough to impose our will upon all other powers - anywhere, any time. It is inconceivable. It is my conception that the contemporary idea of sea power is a British idea, borrowed from the British, that fitted the peculiar position in which Great Britain found herself at the opening of the 19th Century. It was possible for her to be unconditionally supreme upon the sea, and she was, but now she has lost it and it is my thought that no nation will be allowed by other nations to acquire the unconditional supremacy upon the sea which is necessary to the enforcement of all private interests, assertions, or claims against all other governments. My policy under the head of national interest is continental rather than insular. It assumes that this is a continent, not an island. Some of my friends tell me it is an island. Well, we have water on the east and west but if we use the word with any sense of exactness our country is a continental power.

My conception then, of national interest, is a nation capable of self-government, cooperation, cohesion, and defense, a nation which is making the most efficient use of its natural

endowments for the development of the standard of living for all its people, a nation with the least possible dependence for its security, economic, military and naval, upon the operations of other powers. I believe, furthermore, that this conception is being forced upon us by the economic crisis in which we find ourselves and by the action of other nations. I believe it is the one choice, Hobson's choice, before us. I believe that the Hamiltonian conception of national interest, with all due respect to the great men who have brought forward in recent times and imposed it upon our minds - Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge - that this conception, however logical and charming and attractive it may be in itself, now lies amid ruins of its own making. It did not find markets for American goods which it promised. The so-called surpluses that we must sell are only in a few cases real surpluses; they are surpluses, not because we do not have need for these things but because we have a system of economy which in operation prevents American people from using them. So in my conception our coming foreign policy turns on domestic policy. Foreign policy is, indeed, a part of domestic policy. It is not separate, but rests upon it. Nations are now driven back to the consideration of the utmost efficient use of their domestic resources, and I believe this is the only choice before us. Hobson's choice, as I have said. This is, however, nothing but an expression of my opinions submitted to your judgment. It is an interpretation of history, as all proposals of policy are and the truth of it cannot be known until history to come has submitted its verdict.

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Q - What, in your opinion, makes a nation?

A - A nation is a combination of people, territory, culture, and economy, all woven together. That, in my opinion, is a nation. I should add, of course, that the people should be sufficiently homogenous to hold the body politic together.

Q - Please elaborate upon your statement regarding immigration.

A - I should keep the present selective law. I would fix the date of the so-called national origins rule for about 1890 instead of 1920. I should apply it to all places in the western

hemisphere to which it is not now applied. I would modify the immigration law applicable to Orientals but fix a quota which would curtail that immigration to the diminishing point. I think it would be possible to have an immigration law that would admit not more than 100 Japanese and not more than 125 Chinese. That would materially limit Oriental immigration. I do not wish to be interpreted as expressing any hatred for these people but we know the conflicts that have arisen. We have enough race problems at home without taking on others. I am convinced it is possible to reach an agreement with the several governments concerned to the effect that they will not even issue passports to people under the quota.

Q - What effect would a relinquishment of the freedom of the seas have on the U. S.?

A - That is an important issue, but I would question that word "relinquishment". Was it enforced from 1914 to 1917, and what did the U. S. do to the picture of the freedom of the seas after it got into the war? The allied powers defined the law of the seas in their own cases and destroyed practically all historical neutral rights. In my conception, the distinction between contraband of war and free goods claimed under neutral rights, has disappeared, just as it is impossible to draw a sharp line between industries making munitions and those that are not. It has disappeared as a matter of operating fact in the law of war as fact and our so-called relinquishment will correspond with the fact. It will also put the government in a position not to be dominated by the interests that derive advantage from those neutral rights; it will put the U. S. in a position to decide whether or not to enter any particular conflict on grounds of national instead of aggravated private interests.

Q - What system of distribution would enable us to use our so-called surplus?

A - That is a large order of domestic economy. I am convinced that the central factor in our unbalance which makes it impossible to us to use our surpluses, is the unbalance between the wealth that goes to ownership and wealth that goes to labor and production. In a balanced economy the amount of capital drawn from annual income wealth would be the amount necessary to keep capital equipment up. Under our system of the ownership of industrial property by comparatively few individuals gives to those individuals incomes which they cannot possible use to buy goods for consumption so they must pour this surplus

into capital goods and this increases the unbalance between production and consumption. I am inclined to think we shall now face a problem of some drastic modification of private property and distribution of wealth. It is a matter of opinion what is going to be done. You gentlemen do not remember, but I can remember when anyone who believed in an income tax was called a communist. If you will read Choate's speech before the Supreme Court in 1895 against the income tax you will find he called it socialistic and communistic.

In my book "The Open Door" I have gone more fully into the attack on the distribution of wealth with a view to bringing enough into salaries and wages to enable the people to buy goods produced by our capital set-up and thus keep it going. Some day I may talk a year with you on the details of how I would do it.

Q - What effect would a self-contained economy extended to the countries of Europe have upon world stabilization?

A - That is an important question but difficult to answer. In dealing in history I must confess we are not dealing with a science. The hydraulic engineer can say: "If you take this waterfall and make this water pipe and set up this plant you will produce ten thousand horsepower" and he can prove it. But in history you never can say what will be the effect of any particular action.

Q - Will you say something regarding the education of the masses for the purpose of understanding the government?

A - I think the mass of people will have to have a more realistic education than ever before - I mean an actual description of our economy, government, finance, agriculture and business. If we are going to make this nation work on a large scale we have got to give the boys and girls a more realistic picture of how wealth is distributed than ever before. That is a big job, but it will have to be done.

Q - Do you think Germany as it exists today could and would subscribe to your definition of national policy?

A - No. As I understand it from Hitler's "Mein Kampf" present Germany is actuated by the same conception of Pan-Germanism as the old government - that means acquiring more territory in southwestern Europe by arms. That is a different policy from mine.

Q - D Do you recommend withdrawal from the Philippines and Hawaii?

A - The Philippines yes; Hawaii, no, I do not think we can defend the Philippines and if we could, would it be worth the cost?

Q - Do you favor a complete policy of the Monroe Doctrine?

A - My friend Dexter Perkins has written three or four volumes on the Monroe Doctrine but after reading them I can't make out what it is.

Colonel Jordan: Professor Beard, I desire to express our appreciation for this fine talk. I can't tell you how much we have enjoyed it.

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Colonel Jordan:

The Army Industrial College is now in its 11th year. During its history one woman only has spoken from our rostrum. She is present with us today. When all of us who study and read history think of Charles Beard we naturally think of his collaborator, Mary Ritter Beard.

I want to invite the attention of the student officers of the class to Mrs. Beard's latest book, which is on a subject no mere man could ever hope to discuss intelligently. The title is "On Understanding Women".

Mrs. Beard.

Mrs. Beard:

You will remember that I did not call the book "Understanding Women"; but called it "On Understanding Women." I do not know much about women. I am still studying them. I am collecting thousands of facts about women in history with a view to establishing some corollaries in the future. Women are a sex lost to history, to political science, to the social sciences, to philosophy. When you honored me two years ago by inviting me to come to the College with my husband and likewise speak to you, I harangued you at considerable length on the subject of

women in war. You sat most patiently through my talk. Now with every passing year that theme grows increasingly important-- on account of the new implements for fighting and the extension of warfare to the homes of non-combatants; such phenomena as the soldier revolution in Germany and the Mannerbund, with its harsh attitude toward my sex; and the speculation of your Major General Ely about ~~women~~ power in war which no doubt includes our power to produce soldiers. All such things compel any woman capable of thought to think about woman and war.

I don't know much about women, as I say. And all I know about men is their essential combativeness. For several years I have kept one eye on my watch as all types of men have come through my home, butchers, bakers, candlestick makers, rich men, poor men, professors, and perhaps some "thieves", and I have found that within the space of a minute or a minute and a half, every man has begun to talk about the next war.

I am not going to speak at length today on the theme of women and war. For if the problems arising from arms and force are to be solved, they must be dealt with in some such way as you have been discussing this morning. This I too believe. A few years ago Americanization and feminization, linked together, were breaking on all the shores of thought with their concepts of life and labor. Today the tide is running the other way. In the circumstances the liberties of American women, such as I enjoy today here on your invitation, are all imperilled. We face the prospect of being driven to the wall with respect to liberties. In this connection the attitude of the Army toward women is of fundamental importance and the policy of the nation may underlie the attitude of the Army.

Thank you so much for letting me come to the College again and permitting me to direct your attention to what I might call "the other side of the college."