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REMINISCENCES OF THE BATTLE OF WASHINGTON

by

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U S A , Retired

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REMINISCENCES OF THE BATTLE OF WASHINGTON

In the years just preceding the World War, the Supply Branches of the Army were busily engaged in purchasing a limited amount of supplies for the maintenance of a small army under a system where almost every detail in the process of purchase was the subject of a law.

During those years, the Army contained less than 6,000 officers and the number that would be assigned to Procurement and Supply duties was very small. If you will compare the number of officers on that duty then and now, you will be surprised. The job was then done by five Supply Branches instead of seven now. If you will consult the appropriation acts of that pre-war period, you will find that the funds appropriated for Procurement purposes were meager. If you will consider the strength of the Army then in widely scattered locations and the strength of the Army today, comparing the figures with the appropriations then and now, you will wonder how the Army was adequately equipped. It was adequately equipped and the credit is due to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Supply Branches. The daily job of these undermanned Branches was to cut the meager supply of cloth with the greatest dexterity and skill, to make it "go round". It required long hours and overtime on the part of the responsible officers.

During those years our General Staff was small and did not have the organization it now enjoys. There was no G-4. There was no "War Plans Division". In general, the General Staff was composed of outstanding officers of the line selected for their accomplishments and ability as soldiers. Few possessed any experience in the problems of Procurement and, in general, being busy with other routine duties, little or no supervision or attention was given to the industrial needs of the Army.

It must not be assumed, however, that during those pre-war days the Supply Branches were oblivious to the need for plans for Procurement and Supply in case of a future major emergency. Many efforts were made by the Branches in the preparation of branch plans, but it was a difficult, uphill job because the personnel in each branch was insufficient for the ordinary routine duties. There was no personnel for planning. But the Industrial College knows that any such plans made by a branch are of little value unless they fit into the plans of other branches. To make these branch plans useful there must be some agency to supervise and coordinate the plans of

all. That agency must take the branch plans and weave them into an Army Plan. That agency must have facts and figures and experience concerning raw materials, national resources and manufacturing facilities. At the entrance of the United States into the world war such a supervising and coordinating agency was not functioning. There was no Army plan for War Time Procurement.

It is proper to state, however, that there was an agency authorized by Congress to be of inestimable value to the Supply Branches on April 6, 1917. A word about that agency.

During the preceding summer of 1916, when it looked as if the United States would be drawn into the war, both the military committees of the Senate and of the House evidenced considerable concern over the preparedness or unpreparedness of our Army. Both committees knew the state of the Army and that it was unprepared to enter the great conflict in Europe. They foresaw some of the problems that would be encountered. They apparently foresaw the confusion and mistakes that would occur in the industrial operations of the Army, due to existing unpreparedness and the lack of a super-agency to grapple with industrial problems. These committees set about to provide an agency to prevent that confusion and those mistakes. Eight months before we entered the war, Congress provided that super-agency by an enactment creating the Council of National Defense.

This agency was created for the purpose of coordination in the use of our national resources and industries for the national security and welfare. The Act charged the Council with responsibility in the mobilization of military and naval resources for national defense and in increasing domestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of the armies and the people. It is evident from the hearings and discussion that Congress realized that the Army and the Navy would require immense quantities of steel and manganese and rubber and leather and nitrates and other commodities, and wisely created an agency to coordinate the distribution or allocation of those commodities to the various branches of the Army and Navy and for the use of the people. That was exactly what was needed on April 6, 1917 and that was exactly what Congress provided. The Act even specified that the Council appoint committees of specially qualified personnel - Captains of Industry, if you please - familiar with the problems involved in the industrial operations incident to a great war, committees familiar with the problems in steel, manganese, rubber, leather, nitrates and what not. Just what was needed on April 6, 1917 and just what the War Industries Board did later.

Just think of the great value of such committees on April 6, 1917, to whom the Supply Branches could go with their problems.

But these much needed committees on steel and manganese and rubber and leather and nitrates and other commodities were not ready and functioning when we entered the war - eight months after the Council was authorized. It is true that several committees had been appointed, but the time after their appointment was not sufficient to enable them to be prepared for the problems on "D" day. hy?

The record will show that the Council was not organized until March, 1917 - a month before we entered the war. The Council was not ready on "D" day. In saying this, I do not wish to be understood as condemning the Council. In my opinion, it never had a chance. On the contrary, it is my opinion that had the Council been organized promptly in August, 1916, and commenced to function actively, the Battle of Washington would not have been such a sanguinary engagement and there would have been no War Industries Board.

So April 6, 1917 found the five small Supply Branches undermanned, with little or nothing in the way of reserves, with little or nothing in the way of plans, and with no coordinating or control superagency operating. It found the Supply Branch chief rather bewildered at the stupendous task before him. For some years he had been making small purchases in our abundant markets and had encountered few difficulties. During those pre-war years it had not been necessary for him to study our national resources, raw materials, or manufacturing facilities. He had little data on these subjects. He was not even on speaking terms with such words as "amortization", "allocation", "priority", "Quantity production" and other phrases that filled every day conversation a few weeks later when the Captains of Industry and the War Industries Board arrived on the scene.

There were other things that the Chief did not know that April morning. He did not know that within a few weeks his small Supply Branch would suddenly expand until the number of workers in it would far exceed, many times over, the combined personnel of all the Supply Branches before the war. He did not know that this large force would be scattered all over Washington, wherever he could obtain buildings. The Signal Corps, for example, at one time was occupying sixteen different buildings, these buildings being widely separated. The Chief of Ordnance, for example, did not know that April morning that within the next eighteen months his branch would spend four billion dollars. It is not an easy task to spend a billion dollars wisely. The Panama Canal cost only a paltry 375 million and it took ten years to do the job. Four billion dollars would buy eight Panama Canals with several hundred millions left over. But with a very small organization to start with, with three great European powers

utilizing the resources and markets of the country, with the probability that two million workers would shortly leave their jobs and thus deplete the supply of labor, and with much of the new equipment he was to buy yet to be designed - under such circumstances - the task of spending four billion dollars, in a year and a half, was a stupendous undertaking.

Under these circumstances, what did the Supply Branch Chief do? He did exactly what you would have done. He started every bit of machinery in his branch full speed ahead, under forced draft, day and night, to carry out his mission. It must not be assumed that the Supply Branch Chief intended to proceed full speed ahead on his own responsibility without coordination. Quite the reverse was true. He knew that when his branch entered the market for certain commodities, he would meet the chiefs of other branches and of the Navy, who required the same commodities. In reaching out for manufacturing facilities, he knew that he would meet other chiefs and possibly the Navy, who wanted to use those same facilities. As an example, I remember that the Signal Corps secured a fine, well equipped factory in Connecticut for the manufacture of certain aviation equipment. The Signal Corps was well pleased with its energy and luck at obtaining this fine factory. A few days later, an aide Colonel of the Ordnance Department visited my office, expressing unbounded admiration at the unmitigated nerve of the Signal Corps in practically commandeering a factory which had been serving the Ordnance Department and on which the Ordnance Department was depending for the manufacture of machine guns. My recollection is that it was the factory of Smith and Wesson. Of course, the Signal Corps gave up the factory. The Supply Branch Chief knew such things could happen but what could he do? The Chief could not stop his work each morning and call a meeting of all the other Supply Branch Chiefs, the Navy, England, France and Italy. The trouble was, of course, the lack of a superagency coordinating operations. Under the circumstances, he went full speed ahead on his program and started the first skirmishing in the Battle of Washington.

Washington, at the time, was a swarming maelstrom of people seeking to get into the war. Every hotel, every apartment house, every boarding house, was congested. Hundreds and thousands could not be accommodated. Many coming to Washington on business had to go to Baltimore or other nearby towns to spend the night. The Supply Branch offices were inundated each day by crowds seeking to enter the service, seeking to obtain contracts, or seeking to join the war with foolish inventions. Under such circumstances, the Supply Branch Chief operated under the most unfavorable conditions.

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The new personnel which soon crowded the Supply Branch offices were, in general, high grade men and women all patriotically anxious to help, untrained, but willing to work without regard to hours, day or night or both. In this new personnel there appeared a new actor on the War Department stage, the Captain of Industry, the "dollar a year man", who contributed so much in valuable service. He brought to the Supply Branch a wealth of business experience, initiative and pep. It is true that he knew nothing about governmental procedure, laws, or tradition. He wanted to get things done quickly and cared little for the red tape imposed by the Revised Statutes. I remember one morning early in the war one of these Captains of Industry came to my office with a harmless looking letter asking for authorization to spend a million dollars in the construction of an aviation field at Dayton, Ohio - now Wright Field, I believe. I approved it as the representative of the Chief Signal Officer but did not give the letter back to him. He asked if my signature completed the authority and if he could immediately commence work at Dayton. This was in the very early days of the war and I explained to him that under the rules of the War Department that paper must be passed on to several offices, where it would be recorded, indorsed, and that it would finally reach the office of the Secretary of War. He asked me if he could take the paper and endeavor to facilitate its progress. I gave it to him. In about fifteen minutes, he returned smiling and handed me back the letter. In the lower left hand corner was written, "Approved, Newton D. Baker". I commended him for his enterprise in finding this short cut but told him that he would probably only be able to pull that stunt but once. That was the Captain of Industry's way of doing things.

But in considering the personnel in the Battle of Washington, don't overlook the Regular officer. Notwithstanding the great ability of the Captain of Industry, the "dollar a year man", the Regular officer was a good thing to have around. Often times, he was the responsible officer and the one who remembered there would always come a day of reckoning. Often he was a valuable balance wheel for the enthusiasm and driving force of the Captain of Industry. In general, the Captain of Industry found that the Regular officer possessed something valuable through long years of service and was glad to have him around. In your planning, don't overlook the Regular officer.

If there was a lack of control and coordination on April 6, 1917, that defect was corrected in a short time. Control and supervisory agencies commenced to appear early and often. At this late date, I remember that, first the General Staff became much

interested and asked for such data. Then came a board which I remember as the German Board, the Munitions Standards Board, the General Munitions Board, and later the War Industries Board. So far as the Supply Branches were concerned, control and coordination finally united in the reorganized War Industries Board under Mr. Baruch. It did a wonderful work. It would be unwise for me to attempt to tell of its reorganization or operations, for you have already heard or will later hear from those who served on it.

In reading the annual reports of the various administrations and boards that single handed and alone won the war, one is apt to get the impression that everything proceeded in the most successful and harmonious manner and that a good time was had by all. The men who rendered these reports held high positions of great responsibility and from their high position looked down on many operating agencies. Sometimes the picture did not look so good when the view was upward from the operating agency. An awful chorus of unharmonious melody often arose. The Supply Branch Chief was constantly under pressure emanating from the A.E.F. for more supplies and greater speed. The cry was "more", "more", "more", and "hurry", "hurry", "hurry". Sometimes the Supply Branch Chief thought delays were brought about in the control agencies, that there was too much control, or that the control machinery was too complicated.

All officers who participated in the general confusion in the early days of the Battle of Washington were greatly impressed with the importance of pre-war plans for the industrial operations of the Army in a major emergency. During the war, there was a restaurant in a temporary building across the street from the Munitions Building. It was a good place to get a hasty lunch if you were fortunate enough to find time for lunch. After the war I ate lunch there many times with General Pierce, an outstanding officer of the Ordnance Department, whose untimely death robbed the Army of a most valuable officer. General Pierce and I often discussed the unfortunate conditions surrounding the Procurement operations of the Army in the early days of the war, and discussed possible ways of preventing such conditions in the future. We were of the opinion that the most fundamental and important preventative was the preparation of plans in time of peace for the industrial operations of the Army in time of war. We were of the opinion that to absolutely insure the preparation of such plans, the requirement must be a matter of law rather than of regulations. It is a difficult matter to obtain Federal legislation which prescribes preparations for war. Congress and the people are quite generally opposed to anything that looks like preparation for war. We were therefore of the opinion that if

any legislation was attempted to require this procurement planning in time of peace, the provision must be very brief and very harmless looking. The question as to what office or what officer should have this responsibility was often discussed. At first, we favored the creation of the office of a Director of Munitions, in the thought that in each administration some experienced Captain of Industry would be willing to give his ability and experience to his government for a period of four years and supervise this work. On account of the possibility of the political aspect of such an appointment, the idea was discarded.

Prior to the world war, the Assistant Secretary of War had few duties assigned to his office by law or regulation. We thought that he should take this duty and, in a way, become the head of all the Supply Branches.

What should the law consist of? How should the law read? One day in one of our discussions I wrote in lead pencil on a piece of scratch paper, a brief draft charging the Assistant Secretary of War with the duty of supervising the procurement operations of all the Supply Branches and other industrial business pertaining thereto, and also making him responsible for the assurance of adequate planning for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs of the Army.

Mr. Crowell, who was the Assistant Secretary during the war, at the time, and who also had the title of Director of Munitions during the war, had an assistant in his office named Mr. Dorr. Mr. Dorr was a New York lawyer and a man of great ability. He had seen much of the Battle of Washington. Knowing his relation with Mr. Crowell, I went to see Mr. Dorr, later in the day, to get his reactions on the matter and the wording of the draft. It was impossible to see Mr. Dorr that afternoon as he was leaving for New York. I wrote him a brief note as to what General Pierce and I had been discussing and inclosed the lead pencil draft of a proposed law. Several days later, I was summoned to the office of Mr. Crowell and saw on his desk by rote to Mr. Dorr and the draft, which Mr. Dorr had mailed to Mr. Crowell from New York. Mr. Crowell, after discussing the matter for some time, was of the opinion that the proposed project was meritorious but doubted as to whether it could be enacted into law. I told him that a certain General Staff officer was at that time serving with the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in connection with the preparation of the 1920 National Defense Act. I told him that I thought he ought to have this officer come to his office and discuss the matter with a view to having the

provision made a part of the National Defense Act.

The provision appeared as Section 5a of the National Defense Act, but not as we prepared it. As well as I can now remember, our draft prescribed that the Assistant Secretary be charged with the duty of supervising the procurement of all the military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and also with the assurance of adequate planning in time of peace for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to the war-time needs of the Army. That is my recollection now and was such at the time the act was passed. But the wording was changed. Probably my handwriting was so bad that the word "planning" looked like the word "provision". At any rate, the Act charged the Assistant Secretary with "the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations" instead of adequate planning for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations. Hoover rewrote the provision also struck out the words "of the Army". If I understand the English language, this omission makes the Assistant Secretary responsible for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to the war-time needs not only of the Army but of the wide, wide world. Quite a job.

My next contact with the work came in 1921. After graduation at the War College that year I was ordered to duty in the Canal Zone. One day while assisting in packing the Sultzman plunder for transportation to Panama, the telephone bell rang and I was informed that my Panama orders had been revoked and that I was ordered to duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, with the hope expressed that I report for duty as soon as possible to a certain numbered room in the Munitions Building, the room now occupied by your library, but which at that time consisted of several small rooms. Coming to that room, I found it occupied by Colonel Fife of the Medical Department, Major Pettis of the Engineers, and Major Norman Ramsey of the Ordnance Department, all classmates of mine in the Army War College, Class of 1921, who had already reported for this new duty. Asking these officers of the nature of the duty we were to perform, I was unanimously informed that they hadn't the slightest idea. I happened to be the senior officer of the group and it was decided, after talking over the general and special situation, that I go to the office of the Assistant Secretary and find out what it was all about. Returning from that office after about two hours, I told the group that I had no idea as to what we were to do but that we formed a nucleus to start something to enable the Assistant Secretary to carry out the provisions of Section 5a of the National Defense Act, just referred to. How we were to proceed or what we were to do appeared to be an unknown quantity. It appeared to me that we were to

create our own duties. We were shortly afterward joined by Colonel Hunt of the Quartermaster Corps and Captain Aoenig of the Chemical Warfare Service. Archie Miller, a valuable officer of the Air Service was designated to join our group but was unfortunately killed in an airplane accident before reporting. He was replaced by Major Mars of that service, the group then having a representative of each of the seven supply branches.

In a room across the hall from this room were stored the old records of the Council of National Defense and in another room were the records of George Creel's Committee on Public Information. As the senior officer, I became the custodian of these records. The group decided that this new department of the Assistant Secretary's office ought to have a name. Although we were not asked to do the christening, we started something by writing a letter on some routine subject, heading it as from the Planning Branch, Procurement Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. These names stuck during my service here. I do not know whether they still survive.

We obtained copies of the reports of the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board and other administrations that won the war in the Battle of Washington and commenced to study them. At this time, Congress was preparing a Tariff Bill and we were called upon to produce some statistics and charts concerning certain strategic minerals essential in munitions making. This was the first duty assigned the group.

We decided, however, that the most important duty before us was to start the planning for war time Procurement and that the important thing in such planning was to have it instituted in the Supply Branches as a part of their regular routine duty. How to do this was a problem. How would the branches respond? After some discussion, it was decided to inaugurate this new duty by giving each branch a task or problem to be solved. I cannot remember the details of this first problem but I do remember that it was an easy task concerning certain raw materials involved in the manufacture of equipment used by them. For the first time the Branches were directed to do some procurement planning. The effect was quite interesting. Several branches showed interest and responded promptly. Several were reactionary. On the whole, the result was not particularly satisfactory or encouraging. We then decided to follow this problem up with a harder one which would require the branches to compute requirements in equipment, raw materials and manufacturing facilities, requiring them to do some real planning. This second problem was met with a general murmur from the Branches that they had no personnel to do this work. Their personnel was only sufficient for their other routine work. If this planning work was to be done regularly, additional personnel must be provided. The office of the Assistant Secretary considered this as reasonable and each branch was

authorized one or more additional officers for Procurement Planning. Then it soon developed that this work could not be done solely in Washington, that contact must be made with manufacturers throughout the country and that branch planning offices must be established in New York, Chicago and other large commercial cities. And so the work expanded and developed.

During the World War, very few Regular officers were available for the Procurement work of the Branches, the great bulk of the work being carried on by workers who came in from the outside. By 1921, these Regular officers who had participated in the Battle of Washington, and who were conversant with the problems involved, were widely scattered. The outsiders had all returned to their own businesses. So there were few people in Washington in 1921 who had any experience with the Procurement problems of the Battle of Washington or who appreciated the importance of pre-war planning. Many officers on duty in the Supply Branches, not realizing the difficulties encountered in the early days of the war or the great importance of planning, were not interested in the work. It was a discouraging up hill job to be continually explaining it all to Supply Branch officers - to be continually trying to "sell" the idea. It soon became evident that something must be done to instruct officers in the importance of the work and to train them to do it. How could this be done? There was but one answer. I am now speaking to that answer. The Army Industrial College.

And I must say that as I look back at the confusing pictures of the early days of the war, at the efforts that were made to require regular, systematic planning to be done in the Branches, the up hill job that was encountered when it was proposed to start an Industrial College - when I look back at all those discouraging pictures - it is with some little emotion that I look at this splendid body of instructors, headed by Colonel Jordan, and at this body of officers gathered here to study these industrial problems. Had this college been established 25 years ago, the story of our participation in the World War would have been differently written. There would have been no Battle of Washington.

In closing, let me make one suggestion or observation which I think is very important.

No matter what preparation you make, no matter how carefully the Branches plan, no matter how much data you collect concerning the national resources and manufacturing facilities, you must have a control agency - a coordinating body ready to function on "D" day.

Much depends on control and coordination in the first weeks of the war. If you make plans for the creation of such a body after we have entered the war, you may experience deep disappointment in the matter. At the outbreak of war, the nation becomes very patriotic.

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Many leaders spring up with plans for winning the war. Economic leaders, from patriotic motives, advance plans and theories for the control of industrial operations. One highly patriotic speech by a silver tongued orator in Congress may entirely wreck your plans and create a coordinating administration into which your plans do not fit. You cannot tell what Congress will do in such a matter. You cannot tell how much delay will ensue at a time when time is so precious.

There is a law on the statute books today authorizing a control agency - a coordinating body, the Council of National Defense. That law authorizes the Council to do the very things you want done. Someone says "That is all very well, but the Council of National Defense has no power to enforce. There are no teeth in the law." That is quite true, but neither did the War Industries Board have any power to enforce until after the Overman Act gave war powers to the President, who delegated power to the Board.

In every war, Congress gives plenary powers to the President. He can delegate power to the Council of National Defense as well as he did to the War Industries Board or any other body.

But some one will say "Although the law provides for the Council today, it is not organized and functioning. That is true. No administration in our country, Democratic or Republican, desires to make a warlike gesture in time of peace - even if that gesture be only to organize the Council of National Defense. But we know the Council is authorized by law and can be called into being on a moment's notice. Why not build our plans around that authorized body rather than build them around some imaginary body which may never exist and which can only be authorized after some delay.

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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING LECTURE BY

GENERAL SALTZMAN

11/26/35

Q - In a study of General March's discussion and the report of the Chief of Staff of 1919 covering the P.S.& T., one is lead to believe that the P.S. & T. was a child of the General Staff and it was supreme, but in reading Crowell & Wilson one is lead to believe that the P. S.& T. went to the General Staff as a tool and the supreme power in back of it was The Assistant Secretary of War. I would like to know just who was back of it.

A - We were all pretty busy and could not look behind the scenes but the report we generally had was that the P.S.& T. was General Goethal's child and that is all I know, I only know what was the current report and that was the report we had.

Q - Functioning from the General Staff?

A - Yes, it was the P.S. & T. Division of the General Staff.

Q - I have heard it said that the Army started at the War College to make some plans prior to the war and that they were stopped by order of the President. Is that correct?

A - I don't know, but someone might ask why the Council of National Defense was not ready at the outbreak of the war. It was not organized; it was created eight months before the war but not organized until March 1917 and we went to war in April. Why wasn't it ready? I think you will remember there was a presidential election just before the war in which the administration then in power was upheld on the general understanding that it had kept us out of war. That administration could not then make its first act one of preparation for war.

Q - In regard to this coordinating agency - if we do wait until war starts, civilians will be brought in and they may be good or bad. Would it be feasible to have an Army or Navy man put on that job and exercise this function?

A - Yes, but that is pretty hard to do. As I said, any administration hates to take any steps that look like preparation for war - I don't care whether it is democratic, republican, Sinclair or Townsend - they won't take any step that looks like preparation for war. Some of you might say that the Council of National Defense is not organized; no, and it probably won't be in peace. I think the regular officer is very wonderful in time of war in this country and if you could organize that council and put officers in the responsible positions I think it would be ^{very wise} ~~perfectly wonderful~~.

Q - Under the present set-up aren't we apt to have another P.S.& T. in war?

A - I can't answer that. If there is anybody in authority who served in the last war I don't think you will.

Q - In 1915 the War College submitted a comprehensive statement on a military policy which called for one million men. Did the General Staff submit that to the Supply Branches at that time?

A - It is seventeen years since the war, I can only say I can't remember, ~~that~~.

Q - One of the points that is stressed in reports of the heads of the different superagencies in command of the Council of National Defense was that it was limited to an advisory function and I believe that the statute still in force so limits it. If we rely on the Council

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would not those advisory functions have to be extended?

A - That is a very good question. When the War Industries Board was formed there were no teeth in the act but in every war Congress always gives the President what are termed "war powers" and in the last war he delegated power to Mr. Baruch, head of the War Industries Board. Then the War Industries Board had the power to enforce its decisions but ^{I heard} Mr. Baruch ^{say} ~~has said many times~~ that he did not use it - that we did not need it. It is practically sure that in any war the President will be given powers by Congress and he can, of course, delegate these powers to the Council of National Defense just as well as he could to the War Industries Board or the Coal Administration or any other. You are right; it is an advisory body, but that is what will happen - he will delegate the power.

Q - I am a marine officer and not entirely familiar with the procurement program. Do you think it would be an effective step in anticipation of getting quick action out of the Council to have prepared at this school or some other agency a critical study of the operation of the War Industries Board and Council of National Defense ready to be mailed or otherwise sent to the captains of industry who might function under it and the people that the Council might like to contact early? I am just trying to find some way to eliminate this delay, even if there is a national election.

A I think that is a good question. I think you could go further than that; you need more than a study. (This is my own personal thought) You ought to consider a way in which to make the council the ^{most efficient} coordinating agency, you ought to make plans and put them in your desk drawer - plans as to what committees we will have and who will be on them and if a man

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dies, change them and keep them up to date. You can go further than a study ; you should have plans so they can~~nt~~ be brought out promptly.

Colonel Harris: These studies have been made. They are all ready. We have an industrial mobilization plan which has had wide distribution and which has been inspected by senate committees. We are not in the position of not having done these things. With reference to the Council of National Defense we don't regard that as an effective agency and in that degree we differ with the distinguished gentleman on the stand. It is a five-headed organization composed of cabinet officers, all of whom have something else to do. They have no authority between themselves and they have a responsible job to carry out. I am on a planning committee of the mineral industry and the chairman is Mr. Ickes. e have had some twenty meetings and written a voluminous report but we have never seen Mr. Ickes. That is what would happen in the Council of National Defense. We prefer a one man administration and our plans are built around that. There is another statute on the books - Section 120 of the National Defense Act which authorizes the President to appoint a board and gives drastic though limited powers. We think we can start off with that Section 120 and the war-time powers which will be given the President. Also, there is the so-called Nye bill which is supported by the Army and Navy.

General Saltzman: I am in the minority in my view about the Council of National Defense but I wanted you to know how one soldier in the battle of Washington feels about it. I was just waiting to hear from Colonel Harris on that.

Colonel Harris: There is no one for whom we have greater

admiration than General Saltzman -

Colonel Jordan. - in which the Director of the College concurs.

Q - What about this organization of Federal purchasing under the Treasury Department?

Colonel Harris. We propose to have that wiped off the map - and I hope we can do it.