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THE G-4 DIVISION, W.D G.S.

By

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THE G-4 DIVISION, W.D G S

Colonel Jordan, Gentlemen of the College.

I am not going to read a very long lecture - as a matter of fact, just a few remarks - but I put it in print so that I would not wander too much

When your honored Director asked me to come over and talk to you he said, in his usual courteous, convincing, and persuasive manner, that I could talk on any subject I wanted to and come down any day I would like during this period After he told me that he went back to his office and wrote me a note in which he asked me a number of questions, said that he would like me specifically to answer two of them, and that he would like me to come on December 7 at 10 30 He said another thing in his note which I think is worth reading, because that had a great deal to do with persuading me to come down He said "We in The Assistant Secretary's Office desire to be in the closest contact with G-4 on any subject which relates to our work. What can we do to establish closer contact and a better consultative relationship?" Well, I presume he has already accomplished some of that contact business by getting me down

Just the other day, but subsequent to Colonel Jordan's visit to my office, I read a newspaper report of a lecture by a very eminent professor of business on "The Psychology of Salesmanship " The professor said that the proper approach to a hard case was not to tell him how you or your product could help him in his business That would probably nettle him - he knows his own business and needs no help from you in running that business If your stuff is any good he would know about it and be using it, but it is not any good Rather, the approach should be to ask his advice about your product or your service, assume that he knows all about it and perhaps that he has had some difficulty with it due to some characteristic that does not quite fit his needs Tell him you are trying to improve it, and that respecting him and knowing his great ability you want his advice. By such an approach you interest him so much that he will not only buy your stuff but he will probably help you develop it, help you sell it to others, and adopt it as his own, so to speak I have wondered since whether Colonel Jordan learned his technique from that lecturer or whether the lecturer got it from Colonel Jordan However that may be, it seems to work.

The first question is What is the dividing line between the activities of G-4 and The Assistant Secretary's Office, and what, if anything, can we do to wipe out any blank spots in that relationship? I like Colonel Jordan's term "dividing line" for that is all that separates the two functions - just a line. A line has no breadth, no thickness, it has direction only. One does not have to climb over it or raise a curtain to see through it. It does not separate really, it merely gives direction. The eyes of The Assistant Secretary's Office are in the direction of the business side, the industrial side. He looks toward industry. The eyes of the military, on the other hand, look toward the military side, and they meet together on that dividing line. The Assistant Secretary of War, quoting his own words, said "We have a civilian as the main contact between the Army and American industry. It is his function to prepare plans for the industrial effort of the nation, not only for the Army but for everybody else, and to supervise procurement in peace and war." Of course, The Assistant Secretary's Office does not operate any more than does G-4 operate. As to operating agencies, in procurement we have the great military supply services of the Army who in all matters of procurement have direct access to The Assistant Secretary's Office, who work with him in their problems of current procurement and in their planning for procurement in war. These several supply agencies, being operating agencies, do not in their inner organizations divide procurement from storage and issue. For them to do so would, I am sure you will all agree, make for delay, for confusion in supply, particularly in technical supply, and for a lack of responsiveness to the needs of troops. Realizing these things Congress, in its wisdom, after a very thorough post-war inquiry, placed upon them full responsibility for the complete cycle of supply for the categories for which they are responsible, all the way from research and development through requirement, procurement, and storage to issue, so that all the way a category of supply is in the hands of a responsible agency who presumably knows what and when to procure, how and where to get it, and how and where to store it, and when and where and how to issue it.

Well then, just where does G-4 come in? What has he to do if they all know their duties fully? I think Army Regulations 10-15, which have recently been revised, express the duties of G-4 very succinctly, and certainly they are the present views of the War Department. The supply division is charged, in coordination with other divisions of the Staff, with the determination and statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates for funds for military purposes, priorities pertaining thereto, and, when necessary, with a restatement of such priorities to meet the military situation or the difficulties of

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procurement or the limitations of appropriation. I am going to repeat part of that with the determination and statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates, priorities pertaining thereto, and, when necessary, with a restatement of such priorities, governing expenditure of all funds appropriated. In other words, we are required to get up in the G-4 Section a requirements program in peace in preparation for war and then when difficulties arise, when funds or other limitations are known, to restate that program in accordance with the limitations placed upon it by procurement possibilities - funds, or other elements which we did not foresee

To help G-4 and others concerned in this most important task, the Chief of Staff on June 8 issued a letter to all his commanders and to all the chiefs of arms and services, in which he announced certain policies to govern the management of national defense funds, the spirit of which, within limitation of law, is to be adhered to by us all. The purpose of the letter, as announced by the Chief of Staff, is to encourage a thoughtful and wise management of the public funds and property available to the Army to the end that the people of the United States may get their money's worth in sound national defense for every dollar expended. That is the purpose. In closing the letter, which is too long to read here, General Craig said "It is appreciated that as we proceed toward a more modern national defense some features may be temporarily overlooked and allowed to fall behind while others may be temporarily overstressed. I hope to shift the emphasis as may be necessary from time to time to keep the line straight." As a result of this letter, G-4 has instituted (not G-4 alone but other sections of the Staff likewise) a number of exhaustive studies as to the comparative cost and comparative value to national defense of a number of Army activities. All cannot be studied at once, of course. Progress is, however, being made step by step.

As a matter of interest to the Class, one of the studies instituted covers the question of war reserves. Of course, you are all interested in that question. As you have already found here at the College, or as you will find in your later studies, to bridge the gap between present mobilization requirements and production would require an investment of some two billion dollars or more, and I do not think that covers all things by any means, plus a large annual cost for upkeep and replacement. You have doubtless already learned that in our mobilization plans amendments are under way which look toward a somewhat slower and more orderly procedure in the early days.

✓ Of course, if we are attacked suddenly by overwhelming forces which we cannot now foresee or even imagine we might have to arise en masse without much order, but that is not desirable unless it is necessary and we are proceeding, all of us working together, to a somewhat more orderly and somewhat more modest mobilization program. This, of course, will decrease war reserve needs - not the mobilization program itself but the estimate of the early needs of the troops. With this in view, the Chief of Staff has directed a report, in coordination with other divisions of the Staff, on what he termed "the most critical items" - that is, the most essential of the essential items - the report to take the form of a tabular statement of the facilities or articles most desirable to be procured assuring an authorized investment of one, two, three, four, or five hundred million dollars. As a help to the interested arms and services, after consultation with other divisions of the Staff, G-4 determined upon tentative percentages - tentative percentages - of each total to be allotted to each service and asked each service to determine how best for national defense they could invest the several sums if allotted. The responses to these requests are now coming in. As a matter of fact, they are all in now. The work being done by the services in this matter is most gratifying and shortly it is hoped that we can present to the Chief of Staff a well-studied war reserve program for his consideration. You will understand that when those come in they are not going to be sent up to the Chief of Staff immediately. You will understand, and I repeated the word "tentative," that we set up tentative percentages and we sent them out to the various services and they, consulting with the using arms, set up what they thought were the most essential things to be procured in time of peace and put in war reserve under those several allotments. Now, we have to examine their study and they have to re-examine it and doubtless there will be many changes, perhaps also changes in the percentages among services, before final recommendation is made, but we have in our office now a statement just completed, I think it was Saturday, which is worth something.

Other most important problems in which G-4 has great responsibility, not alone of course but as part of the Staff, are the research and development program, and the requirements program for new arms, such as aircraft, anti-aircraft, combat cars, tanks, radio, and all that stuff that we are now procuring in rather large quantities - large for us. These, as I said, are all relatively new arms. We do not any of us know their full powers, though we are aware of some of those powers and some of the present limitations. Because they are new and because their powers may be much greater than we can now foresee, we feel that

we must explore fully into possibilities, but - I would like to repeat that "but" - if we are to have any of them for use in training and to develop the technique and tactics of their use and if we are to have any of them to meet emergencies, we must, from time to time, temporarily shut our eyes to further progress and go out and get some equipment, the best available at the time, something realizable, something from which to advance - maybe not the ideal but something practical.

In aircraft and radio, particularly, development is proceeding at such a great speed that before a procurement cycle is complete new models are presented which are held to be so much better than the old that to continue the old would be just horse-and-buggyishness I guess I put too many syllables in there - sounds all right though Some of these cases, of course, are awfully difficult to decide, but decision must be made if we are to have any equipment, and we must recommend I feel that in these matters our judgment is improving - it needs it - because our experience is enlarging and our knowledge of values increasing Of course, we will make mistakes as the course at times is uncharted, but they will be honest mistakes and you who follow will benefit by them. It will not make any difference if you laugh at us a bit for having made them, if you have learned the lesson why maybe it is worth the money.

In the studies and particularly in arriving at recommendations we of G-4 are in the closest possible touch with the Office of The Assistant Secretary. No major recommendations on requirements or on military characteristics are made until the feasibility and wisdom thereof have been thoroughly threshed out in advance with the Office of The Assistant Secretary Of course, we do not go up and talk it all over with Mr Woodring himself, our relationship to him is not quite as intimate as that, but we talk it over with his subordinates This does not mean that either my office or his must submerge its judgments or its principles and simply go along because that is the easiest way - not at all - but it does mean that judgments when made are based upon the best available knowledge as to military needs and as to procurement possibilities It means that the judgments finally presented are real judgments and not pre-judgments based on prejudice or on a too narrow military predilection It means, I hope, that the principles governing our actions are real principles and not mere slogans based on over-enthusiasm or over-conservatism or, as Jackson used to say, "The mean of a single isolated experience."

In his recent lecture Secretary Woodring described in some detail the method instituted by him when he was Assistant Secretary, which enables us to have competition in aircraft procurement and yet secure for the United States the craft best suited to our needs, as determined by carefully considered characteristics and a pre-determined schedule of a valuation based thereon. Before final decision is made on awards, however, the price factor also enters, and as that affects the approved expenditure program the matter comes over again to G-4, who is required to submit a definite recommendation as to any needed amendment to that program. Thus again G-4, and other interested General Staff Sections are always consulted, is required to submit a definite recommendation. Before this is made, as I say, The Assistant Secretary's Office is consulted and by that cooperative action we find, as you might expect, that the matter that is finally left up to The Assistant Secretary or the Chief of Staff, as the case may be, to decide, is a single one. Maybe the decision is difficult, but the details have been threshed out and decision is necessary.

While the matter has not had the full consideration I intend to give it, I wonder if a somewhat similar system, that is, the valuation system of procurement, would not be wise for say our motor vehicles or some other items of supply or equipment which we might get from civil sources? This matter is somewhat beyond my province but you asked, Colonel Jordan, how you could help us. Perhaps an investigation of such a subject by the College would be worth while.

I think our difficulties in developing things other than aircraft have been quite great. In some cases perhaps we do not take industry in with us quite enough, as we do in aircraft. Perhaps we get in a corner sometimes and decide what the thing we want is without deciding what the tailor has on his shelf.

Colonel Jordan's next question is: What consideration does G-4 give to the work done each year from an industrial viewpoint on the Test of Mobilization Plan by the student body here and by the Planning Branch, and what does he do with these studies? What actual value are they to you anyway? You see, he assumes I know all about them. I cannot speak for past years, but for this particular year I can speak with emphasis. I came to the job of G-4 in May. My predecessor, because of illness, was unable to give me much orientation on the job. Almost immediately I was compelled to meet with the chiefs of the arms and services in consideration of the expenditure program for this year, and a short time later another meeting for the preparation of the estimates for next year. Of

course I had the help of a fine, loyal, well-trained body of officers, and from them I had a report of the mobilization test I know of no method by which I could have more quickly gained an insight into your work here and my own job. As one glanced through the test one could see the sore points pretty quickly. They presented the test to me in one single document. The major facts which made up the picture of the situation which would face us is the matter of supply in the event we were obliged to mobilize in accordance with the rather speedy mobilization contemplated in the plan of 1933 before it was amended. G-4, of course, is vitally interested in this, for AR 10-15 charges him with the duty of preparing the basic supply plan in such detail as will enable supply services to prepare their detail plans for the accomplishment of their several missions, and with the adjustment of such basic plans to meet the changing military needs and limitations of appropriation or procurement possibilities.

I read an article in the Saturday Evening Post the other night written by General Hagood. He said "There isn't anybody designated in the War Department to watch expenditures and see that the Army does not buy too much." Well, I guess he had not met me. I might say in passing that he was Chief of Staff of the Supply Services during the war - maybe he had some such responsibility himself. Under this responsibility, I feel that working together we still have much to do. Under our present scheme of mobilization the various supply arms and services have determined their requirements as set up by the mobilization needs, and to a less complete extent the corps areas have done so also, but we have only now started a careful analysis of these requirements and of the possibilities of meeting them on time and in an orderly manner. These requirements, you will understand, have for the most part been computed from tables of basic allowances. The existing tables, in our opinion, are too generous. As Colonel Cooper expresses it, "Every man is apparently to be equipped with a plank for every mud hole which might conceivably be encountered and every unit with vehicles enough to carry all the planks." These basic tables are now under re-study by the various using arms, and we on the Staff must study them also with a view to equipment suitable for movement - the supply of planks, if you will, to be held in the rear in depots or parks out of the way, to be moved up as the need requires.

While on this subject, I want to speak particularly of organizational equipment. In that I think we have got to differentiate between our peace-time units and those which will be created to meet the emergency of war. Our regular Army units and some,

at least, of the National Guard must, of course, be ready in peace to act quickly and forcibly in a local emergency. Of course, they have to have their tentage, they have to have everything necessary for their peace-time training, they have to train in all kinds of warfare in peace, so they have stuff for all kinds of warfare and they undoubtedly need, or will need in the early days of a war if they are to act as a covering force, a good deal more of some things than they will later because they must act in the early days of the war before the Corps and Army and G. H. Q. establishments come into being. However, this would not be true of new units, which may well be given only the minimum of transport, depending for their supply on a well-organized Army or G. H. Q. group of transport companies, and a minimum of other supporting arms and services depending for these upon Corps or Army establishments, because they will not come in until those establishments are in existence.

The matter of organization of equipment, and it is a matter of distribution, is of great importance. It caused us trouble in the last war and will do so again unless we come clearly to the principle that if we attempt to give each unit everything which it may need under any and all conditions there just will not be enough to go around. There will be congestion in the forward areas, there will be a failure in supply because of that congestion and a loss of the battle because freedom of movement is denied because of congested roads.

Those of us who worked on the roads during the war I think realize that very frequently the shortage of the necessary stuff at the front was not due to any shortage in the stuff, it was due to the fact that there were wheels, trucks and automobiles and everything else ahead of that stuff that ought not to have been there, that did not have stuff in them that was essential to the fight. I want to just go a little further into that. The other day a responsible officer and one whom I admire very much came in to discuss the matter of requirements for motor transportation in the case of an outbreak, if we needed something right now. He said others were embarrassed who were responsible to him because the tables of organization and the tables of equipment had not yet been prepared upon which he could base his requirements, nor had the basic allowances been determined. He and I both agreed, I do not know who suggested it first, that there are two ways to get at requirements: one is from the part to the whole, and the other is from the whole to the part. You gentlemen who have had experience in all things military as well as business know that some times it is unsafe to proceed from one way without thinking of the other. In other words, if you set up a divisional

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basic allowance table or organization, I do not care what you call it, and you figure on one division - well, you are only thinking of one division now - I guess you put down a rifle for every man in the division, you probably put down a pistol for every man in the division, too, and you are pretty liberal - you only have one division to play with Well, the Infantry regimental commanders, etc , all want their little things. Perhaps you figure out in one case that they only need two - you give them three after argument - and then you begin to multiply that by a hundred to get a hundred divisions, which you would have if the war is big enough It is just the same as trying to find the distance between here and San Francisco by using a foot rule You would probably miss it by quite a little However, that is not the way to get the accurate determination of that distance That seems like a simple thing to say and perhaps I am offending your intelligence by speaking of it I hope not It took me a long time to learn that, and I do not know that I have learned it thoroughly yet. I think of the boys that I saw marching in France carrying saddle bags over their shoulders We had with each division at the outbreak of the war a little troop of cavalry that formed what was called "The Headquarters Troop" and they were to be mounted The organization table said so. They were to have saddles and saddle pockets and pistols and sabres - I don't think they had lances but they had all those things that cavalrymen have, including spurs That was fine for a division operating in decentralized warfare, they needed it, but we did not have the ships to get the horses over and yet every one of those poor fellows had to carry a saddle bag over his shoulder almost all during the war instead of having the Infantry pack because he did not have the horse and he ought to have had it That is nobody's fault. It is just one of those mistakes that everybody makes when we expand from nothing to tremendous force, just as we did then Starting with a hundred thousand men or so we organized four million and had our aim at five

On the other hand, we have got to keep our balance. For Heaven's sake, don't let's go to war the way the British went into Crimea The fellow that ran the Crimean war in London was the Secretary of the Treasury and the only instructions he gave were that they would make it as cheap as they could They started out that way and then came sickness and a general shortage - you all know the story and know also that it cost England a hell of a lot more money than it would have had they gone at it right in the first place.

We have had the conception that the mechanics of our mobilization is to be standardized That is all right. The corps of commanders and chiefs of arms are to carry on in a standardized manner for any major effort so far as organization of equipment is concerned This may not be the best solution For instance, if our greatest threat is from the West we mobilize to meet it. I can well imagine that the broad acres of the West may lead us to set up training areas in the West and to move new units at least to such locations with their individual equipment only, the organizational equipment to be issued in training areas.

I have just looked over a little test of mobilization plan, and one little sentence buried in the report called to my attention some of our difficulties in France. It said that the requisition for the organizational equipment got to the depot late - which is usual - and as a result the articles would have reached the place where the unit was mobilized after the unit had left. That is just exactly what is going to happen if you try to get organizational equipment to units which may have to move out quickly We do it in time of peace, of course, because they are more or less stable then, but if you keep chasing a unit around with a particular article of equipment that they asked for you will never find the unit and they will either be without that particular item all the rest of the war or they will get it somewhere else. That kind of thing cannot be done. Napoleon Third tried it, and we tried it to an extent in France in the last war. You just cannot issue organizational equipment that way.

In the matter of construction for mobilization, there is still much concentrated study necessary and a more complete understanding between corps area staffs and the War Department Of course, procurement enters this too if we are to have speed in the early days of mobilization. If we are to hold corps area commanders and chiefs of supply branches responsible for results a rather complete decentralization for the execution of such work would appear to be necessary if speed is required. But as the effort grows, a wise central control will be absolutely necessary if we are to avoid conflicts in the exhaustion of local supply of labor and materials That central control has got to begin to operate pretty early unless the plans are all thoroughly and correctly worked out in time of peace, which, desirable as it is, I am afraid may not have been done It would seem to me that in our planning we can best proceed by steps - plan first and in all detail for that construction needed to meet the first objective and then proceed to subsequent steps. Planning too largely at

first may defeat the orderliness and the effectiveness of the first step. Of course, in all our planning we should have constantly in mind the greatest probable demand, but the steps to meet them may be sketched out. What we need to have definitely known is what are the details of the first step.

In conclusion, I would like to leave one thought with you - General Embick left it with us in his talk at the War College in September. You cannot work these things out by somebody just deciding things. Somebody has to get the data together, upon which the decision can be based. That is our job, and it will be yours. It is that of the General Staff, and that applies equally to The Assistant Secretary's organization. They should work together and in that work individual credit and individual reward should not be sought. The individual has his reward in the success of the group, in the success of national defense as a whole.

This is an old maxim (I cannot quote it exactly but I have remembered it for a long time), it runs about as follows. "There can be a good deal of good done in this world if men are not too jealous of where the credit falls." Another one just as important to our work is "There is one fault which is a bar to all cooperative effort, it is a block also to progress, and that is the very grievous fault of contempt before examination."

I thank you all, and if I can I will be glad to answer any questions.

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Q General, you touched on the subject of war plans. I would like to ask the present feeling with regard to one point we have now, as I understand our general set-up, a general mobilization plan which is for a maximum effort. We have also the individual color plans for specific situations. In the industrial or economic part of the war effort we have only at the present time the general plan. I have heard a number of officers in whom I have a great deal of confidence, whose judgment I have a great deal of respect for, express the feeling that the general mobilization plan idea is not sound or effective, that it would be better to go back to the old idea of having a specific mobilization plan for each color situation.

A I am glad you asked that question. It is like research of all kinds, perhaps - we set up the maximum We have studied and determined requirements The corps area is now studying and determining their requirements, and because of the largeness of it we find some tremendous gaps, because of the speed of it we realize that there would be a good deal of confusion Now it isn't, and never was in my opinion, the intention that we would ever mobilize in accordance with that plan, but that we would mobilize for a particular war plan and take such part of the general plan as fitted into that war plan, pick up such units, use such depots, etc , as were set up in a big plan and fitted that smaller plan I think that you sort of arrive at somewhat the same thing you are talking about - you have a mobilization plan for each color plan - but as far as possible it will follow the principles which are discovered, if they are discovered, to be sound that were a result of the study of the big mobilization plan I think we cannot be too inflexible in the United States in any of our plans We haven't the same problem that military nations in Europe have. We do not know where our enemy is coming from, we do not know where we may have to go, we do not know whether we are going to fight at home, whether the other fellow is coming over here and hit us on the nose, as somebody said, or whether we have got to go and meet him somewhere We do not know whether we are going to have to fight a highly industrialized country with good roads or whether we are going to a place where there are not any roads. I look at the big mobilization plan as I would at a general survey of possible maximum needs and possible abilities of supplying those needs, and from that getting down to something more orderly and something more modest and then sort of deciding on that for a general plan and taking such parts of that general plan that are fitting to each war plan For instance I, in my talk, indicated some little disagreement with the general mobilization plan, to this extent we have nine corps areas, and we have all kinds of climates in those areas This is a terribly big country, and if our threat was in the West and only in the West I doubt if we would train the troops that were mobilized in the first corps area, I doubt if we would train them in Maine and Massachusetts I think we would probably issue to them there, the new units anyway, only their individual equipment and move them out to the West some where where they would receive their organizational equipment and their collective training.

Q. Could you tell us what the objection is from the Army's viewpoint of the completely centralized supply system, such as the Navy has?

A Yes, I think I can answer that, although you probably will not agree with the answer. Quite a few of our supply services are responsible not for supplies alone but for getting things done. In other words, the Ordnance Department is a big manufacturing establishment, it also has the responsibility of maintenance of weapons and stuff in the field. The Signal Corps is responsible for establishing lines of communication in the field. Let's consider the difference between the Navy and the Army. The Army, in these operations, plows through the mud and the individual soldier has on him all he can carry - too much usually but that is all he has. The telegraph poles have all been destroyed by the enemy and they have to be re-established. The Signal officer is responsible for getting that line up and he gets his telegraph poles right out of the woods near at hand if there are any, or he gets them a little further back if they are there, and pulls them up by truck, or he gets them all the way from the United States if he has to. Unfortunately, he does not carry his depot with him as you do in the Navy. He has to get his stuff where he can and frequently he is in a country where none of it seems to exist except as he extemporizes it. The Engineers have the same kind of job. They have to build roads and do construction, repair railroads, and fix up stuff. We had an example (I am not being critical now, I am just telling you the facts) in France. People who went over there and saw the conditions locally in France asked that a certain number of French cars be sent them. They gave the drawing of a certain type of French locomotive. Somebody here at home who was an awful good purchasing agent, and he also was a good railroad man, said "They do not want ten-ton cars over there - that is extravagant. We can get thirty-ton cars through those clearances and they will be a lot better, we can haul a lot more stuff in them." well, that is what they sent. It took longer to make them. The French car was just a simple two axles with a platform on it, and that is all there was to it. We had to wait longer for them, we never did get as many as we wanted, and they were heavier individually. If they got off the track they were awfully hard to get back on. In other words, the response to the need in the field was not what one wanted it to be. As near as we can possibly have it, the procurement ought to be done by the fellow who has his nose in the mud and knows what he wants. It may be possible that some day we may have a human nature chain so that a central bureau will know all those needs, but I do not believe it. As a result of our experience in the war (did General Wood give you a talk this year? Colonel Jordan. Last year ) they centralized it on paper during the last

days of the war, in the United States, in what they called the P.S. & T - Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. Fortunately, they never were able to get it into execution, but they did interfere a lot in trying to get it into execution. General Hagood says they did the same thing in France, but they didn't. They may have put it on paper, but I wish you would read General Dawes' statement about that some day. General Dawes is not an Army man, he is a business man, a banker, and he was our purchasing agent in France. He had the idea that we ought to have a central purchasing agent to buy all this stuff. We bought a lot of stuff in France, you understand, but finally he had a representative from each service sitting around a council table, the necessity for purchase would come up before them and he as chairman of that board would discuss it with them and then allot it to one person, saying "As long as you are buying it you may as well buy it for all the other fellows too." If it was watches - the Engineers bought watches. They had never bought watches before but they knew what they wanted in the way of a watch, the Artillery accepted the same thing, but they never really centralized. They centralized supervision and management but they did not take the guts out of the services and put them in this central non-responsive bureau.

Colonel Jordan: General Spalding, I want to thank you very much on behalf of the College, and certainly myself, sir.

General Spalding: I do not ordinarily talk this long. I want to say that I am awfully glad of the opportunity to come out here, but if you do not look out I will talk you to death. You people can do an awful lot to help us down here. Of course, you know there are two kinds of criticism - one is constructive and the other is destructive. The destructive one I used when I said "we have too many planks and too many units." The solution is not always just to cut them down, the solution may be to get something else, to get a substitute, the solution may be to change the organization a little, as I suggested. Some of that stuff can be put in the rear, in depots and in parks, and not with units. We have, for instance, and it is absolutely essential, a regiment of Engineers stationed at Belvoir, and they have their tentage. The regiment is, therefore, able to go out in the field in the early days of a war. This is tremendously valuable because it could vacate the post right away. But, suppose you are organizing a regiment of Engineers which is number three hundred on the list - would you give it all its tentage? By that time the construction of shelter would have taken place, they would have rest camps

Undoubtedly they ought to have them, and they would have them in the zone of the interior. The organizational equipment should now be the same for all. You could help us a lot if you would look at it from that point of view. You will find great gaps in the mobilization program and you may say that it ought to be cut down, but don't let's cut it down too darn much. We want to have enough troops to do something with, and perhaps we can get them if we do the job in a little better way.

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Discussion following Brig. General Spalding's Lecture

Q General Spalding, you mentioned the matter of study towards getting sufficient war reserves for the <sup>Initial p</sup> munitions <sup>Force (D.P.F.)</sup> protective boards

Do you have any hope at the present time to get a sufficient appropriation to get those items which are not immediately available?

A. Yes, I always have hope. I know we <sup>wice</sup> never get <sup>anything</sup> ~~any~~ if we don't know what we want. I think there are times in the past when we could have gotten ~~it~~ <sup>a reasonable war reserve</sup> if we had known what we wanted. (This ~~is~~ in confidence of course)-- There is quite a bit of hope that if there has to be any more pump priming that the international situation and the need for work for the unemployed <sup>Considered together</sup> may bring about a fair appropriation for war reserves, both in the Army and Navy, if we know what we want.

Q I would like to ask you, sir, about the preparation of the budget, as to the relation between G-4 and the various chiefs of the Supply, Arms and Services.

A. I am glad you brought that up. The budget <sup>and legislation branch of the G.S.</sup> is a part of the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. The annual budget is looked after and arranged for, the basic plan and all the details worked out, by Colonel Chaffee, the Budget <sup>Chief of</sup> and <sup>and legislation branches under</sup> the Deputy Chief of Staff. G-4 has nothing directly to do with the budget, the annual budget. G-4's job is a longer ranged job than that, trying perhaps to see what ought to be in the budget three years from now or four or five years from now. Of course frequently those studies of G-4 have a direct influence on the immediate budget, but G-4 has no direct influence except that

we are consulted by Colonel Chaffee or by the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff in a particular case. We make the studies, make our recommendations, what we think should be included this year and next and next, get up the <sup>program or proposals</sup> ~~proposition~~ from which the budget flows perhaps, ~~but in our form of government~~ the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff are very close together and they are never going to delegate to an assistant Chief of Staff in another building the making of the budget or decisions on the budget. It is just not human to do it.

Q General, in making a study of current airplane procurement I find that military characteristics of airplanes are passed on by G-4. In other words, they are looked at from a supply standpoint. Now it strikes me that G-3 is better able to handle that function as studied from a tactical standpoint.

A Of course that's true <sup>There</sup> ~~That~~ is a funny thing, about this G-4 and G-3 business. None of them are complete <sup>in</sup> ~~by~~ themselves. The only fellow that passes on those characteristics is the Chief of Staff. That paper, <sup>A.R. 10-15</sup> ~~ASIOS~~, <sup>Read it carefully</sup> is worth reading. <sup>^</sup> G-4 is the responsible doorway to the Chief of the Air Corps for military characteristics. Military characteristics have to be prepared in advance and approved by the Secretary of War in advance of procurement. They determine the types of planes that will be procured. <sup>where</sup> Some ~~place~~ there has to be a record of those standards and that is in G-4. Now the way G-4 proceeds is to take the suggestion either from the Chief of the Air Corps or from the Chief of Staff, wherever it may come from, and he <sup>set up</sup> ~~sets up~~ what you might call the start. He sketches out the start of the thing. Then

after consultation with the other members of the Staff, G-3 and War Plans -  
 they are very much interested - <sup>he</sup> tries to bring all of them into accord  
 He is responsible that they do get into accord, not all agree, but that  
 the story is put down so that the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of  
 War have it. In other words, he is responsible for the pick and shovel  
 work. We get confused on that, when we think that G-4 ~~designs~~ <sup>decides</sup> these  
 things. He just doesn't do it.

Q. The regulations provide that the Corps Area Commander will  
 perform his own ~~command instruction~~ <sup>construction</sup> and report directly and only to the  
 Chief of Staff, yet the regulations also provide that the Assistant  
 Secretary of War shall control all procurement of building materials  
 and mobilization of the construction industry Is this not ambiguous  
 and does it not lead to a division of authority?



A No, I don't think so. Of course everything is ambiguous  
 There all sorts of construction in war, all sorts of different kinds  
 of construction The Army needs certain kinds of construction for  
 shelter of troops. Factories need construction for enlarging their  
 facilities to meet the contracts that they may have Our own military  
 establishments, like the Ordnance arsenals, need enlargements perhaps  
 There are all sorts of construction. I will go back to the military  
 program. The Chief of Staff is responsible for the military program,  
 its planning and its execution. That sets up certain needs for shelter  
 for troops in certain areas. That shelter, of course, might be tents,  
 it might be <sup>upsting buildings</sup> anything, it might get into big construction. I don't see

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any difficulty there between the Assistant Secretary's office and the Chief of Staff's office. After all, the General Staff does not do any construction It might be done by the Construction Division of

*that the Quartermaster General if he gets into*  
the Quartermaster Corps for the Army. *A.R. 10-15 you find*  
If you go back to ~~195~~, ~~1956~~, *he asks* *to decide it*  
get in a difficulty on a military question, the Chief of Staff, and on an industrial or business question, the Assistant Secretary of War.

On some of those questions it may be hard to determine whether it is a military question or an industrial or business question Well, it isn't impossible for G-4 to talk to the Office of The Assistant Secretary of War and kind of straighten it out when those things arise One thing I would like to say and that is, it is a difficult job to be an assistant. It is much easier to be boss, but you are never boss after you get above the rank of corporal That's the only time when you are boss.

Colonel Jordan I know what was in his mind He was thinking of the proposition where there was a shortage of material. Say that was in the Second Corps Area and there was command construction and the Second Corps Area commander took that for his corps area and didn't give anything to the other corps areas

A. Well, that has got to be centralized in a major war The corps areas aren't going to go around and build everything they think is necessary in a major emergency.

Colonel Jordan That was one thought that was in the mind of the class, I am sure, sir.

A Gentlemen -- this is in the family now -- there has been a kind of an idea abroad that when this war comes it will come so suddenly that the War Department won't know what to do any place, so they give it all to the Corps Areas, nine of them, and they can bear the responsibility and we just wash our hands of it and hope it doesn't get too mixed up That isn't the present thought. The present thought is that there will be a basic plan <sup>a military Program so to speak</sup> which will expect corps areas to do certain work, mostly executive, mostly operations, but the plan will be centralized sufficiently to keep <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ thing from getting all mixed up. Of course if we had an emergency which was so terrible that all our communications were cut the corps areas would have to be on their own, but I don't anticipate such an emergency right now, that kind of an emergency.

Q. General, in discussing war reserves you used the term "fair appropriation " Would you object to telling us what, in your opinion, would be fair appropriation?

A We figured up the essential items for such a force as we thought was about the minimum we would organize in a major war and we found that the non-commercial essential items ran well into figures if we got everything we wanted. It would run to about \$1,000 00 to a man, for a million men a billion dollars. Then analyzing that down to the absolutely critical items we got down to lower figures and a hundred and fifty million would take care of our initial protective force nicely. And if I got fifty million of that I would feel pretty happy We have broken that first fifty million down into five million pieces, and if

I got the first five million this year I'd be pretty happy and I'd hope ~~you~~ <sup>you would get</sup> get the next five million. But I believe that the more nearly we know our needs and can prove them the more apt we are to get them Heretofore I think we have said a ~~million~~ <sup>two billions</sup>. That was so big that everybody said, "Well, it would be fine if we had it It is too big, can't think of it " But we have tried to analyze it all the way down to the first million so that if they say it is too big we can say, "Let's take the next sheet Maybe we can do that "

Q I don't know if this is a fair question to ask of G-4 I noticed last night in the Star that Mr <sup>Altop</sup> had quite a little ~~write-up~~ <sup>article on the subject.</sup> Is that the beginning of the education of the public with respect to the Protective Mobilization Plan?

A A little It was inaccurate, and perhaps it is well that it was inaccurate For instance, he indicated that we were going to have a lot of motor transports put in storage Of course we are not going to do that There are so many <sup>motor cars</sup> on the street that if there were any more we wouldn't be able to have a war

Q. Has any consideration been given to taking the 165 pound load off the 110 pound soldier, that we went through? What items have been cut out of that?

A Well, they have been cutting it down all the time I don't believe I can give that accurately, but General Lynch is a bug on that He doesn't like to carry stuff on his back and I don't either We just had a big fight the other day on a little thing they wanted to tack on

to a soldier's belt and I bucked and I think it went out temporarily  
 It only weighed a half a pound, but it was a half a pound on about  
 forty pounds, I think it is now. You have to fight all the time the  
 tendency to put ~~it~~ <sup>stuff</sup> on the soldier's back and on the soldier's vehicle  
 Everyone wants to have on the soldier everything he might need anywhere  
 in the world. Everything that isn't on his back they want to put on  
 his wagon or on his truck and we overload the soldier and the truck  
 Then we are surprised when they get stuck in the mud The result is  
 they empty it all in the mud and then they don't have it and neither  
 do we. Keep it in the storehouse until you find out when they need  
 it and where.

Q I didn't have in mind so much the humanitarian side I had  
 in mind the fact that industry would be better able to handle it if  
 we reduced the initial requirement of the soldier

A. We have done that and to do it, as I indicated, we had to go  
 down to the beginning, the basic allowance, and cut the stuff on the  
 soldier's back and the stuff everywhere in order to get them down within  
 reason. I don't think the last word on that has been done When you  
~~get on one of these jobs~~ <sup>come along, Howard, to take my place,</sup> you will have to cut it some more

Q Another question on construction, sir. On this corps area  
 the Quartermaster General may have a construction zone where he is  
 doing construction for other branches in that same area. What co-  
 ordinating agency would there be to stop confusion in that locality  
 of construction with the Corps Area Commander reporting to G-4  
 direct and the construction zone reporting to the Assistant Secretary  
 of War?

A. Of course the Corps Area Commanders do not report to G-4

I don't blame you for getting mixed up because in our mobilization plan there was a mix-up. The reason there was a mix-up is because the War Department didn't make a basic plan. It just said, "There is a war. You corps area fellows please build anything you need." You just can't do that kind of thing. You have to have a basic plan and in that plan you have to fix responsibilities and keep these confusions from arising. Now in a minor affair it is all right for corps areas to go ahead and do some little building. In a major war that is really going to test our industrial system. You must have central control, otherwise you get nowhere. And that centralization ought to start from the beginning.

Q I would like to ask another question on this construction business. The Corps Area Commander is to organize on M-Day a Construction Division to perform the command construction in that corps area. Now in the time of peace, as I understand it, he hasn't any organization set up for that work. Now on M-Day do you think there is going to be any likelihood of trouble in it becoming an efficient organization?

A I don't think the Corps Air Commander is going to be charged with any such thing in a major war. He certainly isn't under the present plan. The Chief of Staff is responsible for the planning, development, execution of the military program. The War Department General Staff makes the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilizing, organizing supplies, equipping and training. He is the agent and in the name of the Secretary he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all the agencies of the military establishments and that the military program

is carried out steadily and efficiently. To do that he just can't give his job to the corps area, he has to do it right here in Washington where he can coordinate with the Quartermaster General and all the heads of the Department. The basic plan must be here. The corps area commanders will have certain duties probably delegated to them, having to do particularly with rather minor construction in camps, but certainly not in construction in a big war. The corps area commander is a military commander of troops. He is not going out and organize industry in his corps area. If he does he will do his own job poorly and the other job poorly.

Q General, the school issued a problem here to the student body and among the requirements in that problem was a question of the principles and characteristics of procurement.

A. I don't know anything about procurement.

Q. Well, G-4 tied up in the question I had to ask. I am going to take a particular case of the Signal Corps in raising the question because they buy such a small amount of stuff in a major emergency that it doesn't matter in the other branches. One of the principles of procurement, as I understand it, is that it must be economical. There was mentioned just a minute ago about the load on industry. I notice that Colonel Harris in a lecture last year stated the difficulty connected with this question of trying to get specifications so that they were capable of mass production. Now we have in the Signal Corps a lot of specifications. They have them over in the Navy and they are for the same items and different and all that sort of

thing. There is a board, as I understand it, in the Assistant Secretary's Office for approving these specifications, whether they are suitable for industry. Some of us know that they are made by engineers in laboratories. On the other hand, G-4 is responsible for this development program and setting up the military characteristics and probably has something to do with those specifications before they are finally approved in the Assistant Secretary's office. I would like to obtain, if it is possible or practicable, your opinion as to whether there shouldn't be civilian experts, perhaps under some section of G-4, and some method whereby civilian experts, people who have handled the question of specifications and mass production, might be in both the Assistant Secretary's Office and in G-4 and pass on these?

A. I would hate to see them invading G-4 very much because if G-4 will attend to his military requirements he will keep from interfering with the Assistant Secretary's office. I would like to see them in the Assistant Secretary's office and in war they will be there. Of course that question isn't easy, but G-4 has got to be darned careful. You might say that he protects the Assistant Secretary's office in a way from the rest of the Staff if he can. In other words, sometimes one of the military sections tries to provide a thing that just simply can't be done. That is all right for research. We have found lots of things that can be done that ten years ago we knew couldn't be done. In research we want to be ~~careful~~ <sup>Saving</sup> -- if there is money to dream all right. But when it comes to actual procurement we have to have our specifications, our military characteristics, which should be very brief but should put a ceiling and a floor on

the article There should be reasonable flexibility, this is desired, this is the minimum that will suit; in there you can buy anything that the market will afford. That ceiling and that floor can't be established unless G-4 knows something about procurement possibilities He can't possibly do his work without talking to the Assistant Secretary of War all the time. ~~How~~ <sup>How</sup> he doesn't always talk to the Assistant Secretary of War directly, very seldom does he do it. But each of our departments, like the Quartermaster or the Signal Corps have, you might say, two bosses, the civilian and the military For instance, the Chief Signal Officer may say, "This military characteristic, you just can't do it it is tying our hands Can't we get it changed? We can't procure it " That is the way we get our information. If we are too arbitrary he can go to the Assistant Secretary and say that G-4 is crazy. Then the Assistant Secretary of War rings a bell and Burns calls me up and we get together and get sensible That's the way it works really.

Colonel Jordan Major McPike is handling the problem down here, General, in which we are going to take a number of test items and we are going to go through and find out as to whether or not it is possible for industry to meet the program which has been laid down The results of the work of the class are going to come up to you for your information, and I hope that Colonel Corlett will get in very close touch with Major McPike and the two will work together in harmonious consultation

General Spalding. I am sure we would love to have any of you come up Our doors are open all the time If Corlett isn't there, I will be

Colonel Jordan I want to express the appreciation of the College for your coming down here and talking to us. Thank you very much

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In your study of the results and I know you will wish to study them, please be patient with inaccuracies, omissions or what from your point of view may be considered ~~as~~ unsound conclusions. Remember the job had to be done by December 1st, and remember that it is distributed for your criticism and for use for this year.

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Rearmament and Reequipment Program.

The War Reserve study is an honest effort to determine the very minimum requirements for the <sup>minimum</sup> force <sup>in 5</sup> believed to be essential for our defense. It could not have been reduced to the relatively small quantities had we not kept it low by the omission of many articles which we feel could be secured quickly because they are produced commercially, and also by the substitution of articles which, while not as good as the standard articles they replace, are on hand and will have to serve if an emergency should occur this year. For example, no provision was made therein for the semi-automatic rifle. This weapon is very desirable, but as we have a good substitute, it was not included as essential. The manufacture of the semi-automatic is, however, not to stop - rather it is to continue at present rate and a fair sum is to be expended in "tooling up" for a more rapid and more economical production. Perhaps also the

final decision will be to include the semi-automatic for the Army and War Guard in place of some other item which is now included. See note

2/15

Also in the Planning and Equipment Branch there is maintained under Colonel Sparks' direction and in immediate charge of Major Harmon, a Research and Development Program and a Rearmament and Reequipment Program and, naturally, a record of approved military characteristics and standards

The procedure followed by Major Harmon in the preparation of these programs is not unlike that followed by Colonel Corlett for War Reserves.

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Tentative directives are prepared and approved and, within the spirit of these, the set-up of the Requirements Program for the year is made. Understand we always maintain a record of what is desired and one also of what we would have to use were an emergency to come suddenly. There is nothing more apt to bring misunderstandings, confusion and delay than argument arising from lack of a clear cut line between what is attainable now and what is desired. Let there be progress, let there be research and development, but always know definitely what articles are to be used tomorrow if the emergency comes tomorrow.

For many years after the World War, little thought was given to rearmament or even to replacement. We had so much stuff on hand, some of it pretty bad, true, but so much in all that it was difficult to find out what to do with it

But today the situation is different. <sup>2nd</sup> Not only has there been

a great increase in scientific knowledge, but the wars in Spain and China have concentrated thought on ~~tactical~~ <sup>modern armament</sup> as well as strategic principles, and brought home once more that coordinated effort is necessary to success and that no nation will admit defeat until its foot troops have been defeated by the foot troops of the enemy. Individual arms and services all have their place, but in defense as well as in attack it is coordinated effort alone which gives success and final success remains ~~in the hands of the men on foot~~

G-4, of course, does not alone determine what researches will be undertaken, what new means will be developed, or the use to be made of these, but he is responsible directly to the Chief of Staff for the "pick and shovel work" necessary to bring about a proper balance between possibilities of supply and expressed needs

This pick and shovel work requires, as I have said before, but it will bear repeating, - requires patience, understanding and persistence as a solution of the problem must be reached and under present world conditions there must be no long delay in the search for the ideal or perfect solution. What is sought is a practicable, workable, flexible solution, which recognizes the fact that production must begin as soon as practicable in reasonable quantities, <sup>The</sup> ~~and then~~ <sup>to be</sup> bugs worked out and improvements made month by month and year by year as we proceed.

~~no 4~~

Nothing is perfect at first - but perfection never will come without trial.

Those of you who, here at the Industrial College, or later on the Staff become engrossed in this character of work will do well, I think, to recognize that differences of opinion, when they are honest, and they usually are honest, arise most frequently because of different points of view. Such differences must not be arbitrarily cast aside, but rather opportunity should always be given to all responsible agencies to present their views in their own language, and these views in the original words should be made known by G-4 to the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and to the Chief of Staff himself particularly when they differ from recommended action in order that the Chief of Staff may know in advance of decision that he is going contrary to the considered opinion of one or more of his advisors.

This procedure makes the "pick and shovel" work harder, but it makes the task of the Chief of Staff easier, and that is our objective - always.

Please understand that there should be no attempt made to force a reconciliation of honest, and real, differences of opinion, as to force a reconciliation may cause the Chief of Staff<sup>to</sup> to act without the facts, and our job is to do everything we can to so present the matter to him in a way as to insure a considered and sound decision.