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THE ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE
Washington, D. C.

Course 1936-1937

THE G-3 DIVISION, W.D.G.S.
by
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Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

IC 150 (2/8/37)E

February 4, 1937

THE G-3 DIVISION, W.D.G.S.

Being asked to talk to this audience is a compliment which I appreciate very much.

While you are all at the present time interested in the problems of industry and the war-time procurement of military supplies and materiel we in the War Department General Staff have many problems of peace as well as of war planning and mobilization with which to concern ourselves.

I sometimes feel that our peace problems are more difficult of solution than the others are, inasmuch as practically everything we do depends on the amount of money that can be made available. Many of our cherished plans for improving our national defense go by the board when the costs of such projects are determined.

It is sometimes intimated that the War Department General Staff is not always sufficiently conversant with problems of procurement. My answer to that is that we get pretty well indoctrinated by the supply services when any new major articles of equipment, such as airplanes, tanks and automatic rifles have to be brought into production for even our relatively small peace-time requirements. We may be a little too optimistic in our hopes of quick war-time production. We realize that no organization or machine can start out at full speed but we do know that the acceleration to full output of power can be attained quickly if the organization or machine is properly built.

As you all know, the War Department General Staff is organized into 5 divisions, namely

- a. Personnel Division
- b. Military Intelligence Division
- c. Operations and Training Division
- d. Supply Division
- e. War Plans Division

While the organization of the General Staff is broken into the aforementioned functional divisions, questions involved in coordination of National Defense cannot be so clearly differentiated. Very few important problems are acted on by one division alone. As a result there must be conferences and cooperation between various subordinate elements of these divisions.

A most important function of the General Staff as regards the Arms and Services is to coordinate the allotment of funds. This applies in such matters as ammunition expenditure, allotments of grades and ratings, procurement of equipment generally, transportation money for training purposes, and any other like questions. The General Staff function is primarily to coordinate the total amounts the Arms and Services are allotted. The distribution of expenditure within the Arm or Service is quite generally made in strict accordance with the wishes of the Chiefs of Arms and Services. The General Staff endeavors to maintain a uniform standard of expenditure among the Arms in accordance with the policies of the War Department.

Inasmuch as operations in peace-time can be fairly well standardized it becomes logically the most important peace-time problem of the General Staff to coordinate the planning for National Defense. This is particularly important in that fiscal and other restrictions prevent us even in peace-time from creating the type of army which we desire to use in any future emergency. The efficiency of our operation at that time will therefore depend in large measure upon the ability to foresee the probable use to which new inventions and new methods can be applied to strategical and tactical problems and to organization.

The procedure of the General Staff is quite similar to that of other offices in the War Department, however, a question for the decision of the Chief of Staff is generally presented to him in the form of a study which contains a thorough analysis of the problem from all functional viewpoints as well as from the viewpoints of the specialist arms, services or other agencies concerned. The division submitting the study makes its recommendation of the action to be taken.

I shall not attempt to go into the details of General Staff operation, other than to emphasize that the General Staff officer engaged in a particular study is not operating within a water-tight compartment but must make contact with all of the other agencies concerned in his problem. He must therefore have contact with the various divisions of the Offices of the Chiefs of Arms and Services, with The Adjutant General, and all other sources of information. The fact that we do not have one War Department building but are scattered all over the city of Washington makes the actual maintaining of contact extremely difficult, and constitutes a serious obstacle in the path of General Staff efficiency.

My talk today concerns itself in the main with the Operations and Training Division which is charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning -

a. Organization, including Tables of Organization, for all branches of the Army of the United States.

b. Assignment of units to higher organizations.

c. So much of Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment as relate to the allotment of major items of equipment to units and the distribution of such items within units.

d. Distribution and training, including educational and vocational training of the Army of the United States, including the National Guard and Organized Reserves, location of units of the Regular Army and Organized Reserves.

e. All training and tactical publications.

f. The United States Military Academy, special service schools, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and The Army War College.

g. Military training in civilian institutions and in civilian training camps.

h. Consultation with G-4 on types of equipment, and on major items such as guns, rifles, tanks, etc., consultation with WPD.

i. Priorities in assigning replacements and equipment, and important priorities affecting mobilization.

j. Movement of troops, to include those necessary in the execution of the approved plan of strategical deployment prepared by the War Plans Division (movements of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units to be made on request of G-4.)

k. Military police.

l. The system of military publications.

Of the duties just enumerated the 3d, 8th and 9th have to do particularly with questions of equipment and supply in which we work in close cooperation with the G-4 Division of the General Staff.

The twelve activities enumerated require the G-3 Division to handle many detailed functions in the four large fields of mobilization, organization, training and operations. Supervision of these details is insured by the grouping into three branches - Mobilization, Training, Operations (which includes organization). The chart shows you the important features of the organization and functions of each branch.

Speaking of the Operations Division as a unit, I would say that it has in front of it two broad problems

1st, the continuation of its current function of planning and supervision in respect to mobilization, training, organization, and operations.

2nd, to solve the G-3 problems concerned with the great project of reorganization and modernization of the Army as a whole.

This letter will occupy the Division for a long time to come.

MOBILIZATION BRANCH

The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, with its supporting tables, and supplemental data, has been prepared and issued to all concerned and mobilization regulations have been published.

Corps area mobilization plans and all other mobilization plans based directly upon the War Department plan are reviewed in G-3 and returned with appropriate comments. The comments include not only those resulting from a thorough check in the G-3 Division, but also those obtained from other divisions of the General Staff and from the Chiefs of Arms and Services concerned.

War plans are being revised to conform to the Four Army Organization and to the 1933 mobilization Plan. In this connection the Mobilization Branch prepares the G-3 section of the logistics plan of each color plan.

Each year the corps areas and the chiefs of supply arms and services conduct mobilization tests to instruct selected personnel in their mobilization duties, to review mobilization plans in order to determine their completeness,

workability, and defects, and to demonstrate the actual mobilization of selected inactive units or the expansion of existing facilities. The preparation of the directive for these tests is a function of G-3.

The Mobilization Branch collaborates with the Training Branch on features of mobilization which may be injected into army command post exercises and field exercises. This Branch also collaborates with the Operations Branch on questions of organization, particularly war-time organization, which affect mobilization.

The completion of the War Department Mobilization Plan 1933 has shown that it is defective in that it is built on a rate of mobilization of man power which cannot be realized. Studies have shown that the equipment for such a force cannot be procured.

We are now engaged in a study looking toward bringing the mobilization rate in harmony with the possibilities of procurement of equipment, using the 1935 Plan as a basis on which to build a more realizable plan. This will be discussed by Colonel Bryden, Chief of the Mobilization Branch.

TRAINING BRANCH

The problems confronting the Training Branch are many and varied. It prepares the War Department Annual Training Directive, together with the training policies governing the War Corps and Civilian Components.

Our school system now covers practically all arms, services and civilian components. The school programs must receive the approval of this Branch. Annually a program of field exercises and maneuvers is provided to supplement the training at home stations by concentrating units into larger formations at central points in the various corps areas. A five year cycle of command post exercises for a GHQ and the four armies in turn has been established. Funds are set up to hold GHQ Air Force maneuver and field exercises for one Army each year.

Training Branch calculates each year the cost of all training ammunition allowances, informs the procuring services of the money to be carried in their estimates for this purpose,

and amends Army Regulations governing allowances when necessary to keep expenditures within the limit of appropriated funds. Similar calculations are made for tactical gasoline and oil and for pay for qualification in arms. The resultant figures are furnished to the estimating agencies which defend the budget through its various stages. Training Branch then prepares the necessary instructions for an equitable distribution of appropriated funds. Minor adjustments must be made throughout the year to meet unforeseen contingencies.

An important problem of Training Branch is the revision of training texts and tactical doctrine. The Field Manual Project is nearing completion. Its revision to conform to the faster tempo and greater fire power in modern combat resulting from use of modern means is a task in itself. The motorization and modernization already accomplished, together with Air Corps reorganization and projected modernization of the Army will make this problem one of tremendous importance during the next few years. We expect to make rapid progress in the development of sound tactical doctrine for mechanized and motorized units and for anti-mechanized defense now that these vehicles are being furnished in quantity sufficient for field tests of units.

Mobilization training plans are under constant study and field test to find ways to reduce the time necessary for basic individual and unit training in an emergency.

The Army Extension Courses are prepared at the various service schools and administered by The Adjutant General. Controlling policies as well as supervising the periodic revision of the courses are duties of the Training Branch.

This Branch has many problems connected with the ROTC, among which are the establishment of new units, allocation of enrollments, programs of instruction and adequacy of credits allowed by institutions.

Other current problems in this Branch include the arrangements for the annual National Matches, the production of training films, conduct of ORC, ROTC and CMT Camps, the training of Reserve officers for one year with the Regular Army under the Thomson Act, policies governing the training of the National Guard and last but not least the adequacy of

terrain facilities for target and service practice. This last problem is acute due to increased danger space resulting from improved ammunition and material.

OPERATIONS BRANCH.

This Branch, the work of which also includes Organization has been very active in the past year. Air Corps reorganization problems are continuing ones and its organization is now under test.

Experimentation and development of the Mechanized Cavalry and Artillery are being continued. An additional horse regiment of cavalry has recently been mechanized.

Last year the strength of the Army was increased by 46,250 privates. The allotment of men from this increase to the various Arms and Services, together with additional grades and ratings was a function of Operations Branch.

The reorganization of the Quartermaster Corps has been effected. Plans for the yearly increase of 5,000 men in the National Guard in four increments have been approved contingent on appropriations from Congress which has already provided for two increments.

Under my direction a committee representing all divisions of the War Department General Staff has for more than a year been making a detailed and extensive study of the problem of Modernization of the Army. The next fiscal year should see an extensive field test of a tentative new Infantry Division. We are now studying the question of reorganizing the Cavalry Division.

In close cooperation with the Supply Division the Operations Branch is continually engaged in adjusting the equipment and reequipment program with the funds which become available. By establishing priorities a constant effort is being made to balance desirable ends with that may be practically attainable. A tank program, covering both production and distribution to the Infantry, Cavalry and National Guard units has recently been approved. This program will be of much assistance in the solution of this old and vexatious problem.

CCC SECTION.

The time of two officers is fully taken up with the administration of the CCC, and this is now a separate Section of the office. The Chief of this Section is also the Liaison Officer of the War Department with the Director, Emergency Conservation Work.

If I were to try to cover the work of the G-3 Division in more detail it would take more time than you and I have at our disposal. I have tried to give you a general outline of the important subjects which we handle and would be glad to answer any questions which may have occurred to you as a result of this talk.

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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING LECTURE
"THE G-3 DIVISION, W.D.G.S."

by
Major General John H. Hughes
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

The Army Industrial College
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Colonel Jordan. Before we commence the discussion I want to say that the Class down here each year tests one hundred items of supply which are needed under the mobilization plan. These items are selected by the services. We figure the requirements, figure the proposed rate of production, and a report of our studies goes to the Planning Branch and I know later gets up into G-4. I am wondering, sir, if G-3 ever gets a chance to see any of that very valuable work, because we regard it as such?

A. I do not know whether they do or not - I know I do not. Do you see any of it, Colonel Bryden?

Colonel Bryden. A little, but through G-4.

Colonel Jordan. I do want to recommend some of it for your consideration in case any one item comes up for discussion because the studies made here are really worthwhile

A. When we go into anything like that we always ask G-4 as to what the status of supply is and what we can expect to get, and the man who is taking care of that particular problem does familiarize himself with what can be expected to be furnished in time of war.

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Colonel Jordan. The other thing I wanted to say, sir, is about the training of officers at schools. There is one function of the Planning Branch which needs a bunch of trained officers to fill and they are from the Judge Advocate General's Department. We want one Judge Advocate General always kept at this school so that there will be a slight reservoir of officers available for use in the Planning Branch. This year there was a move, I understand, to remove the Judge Advocate General's Department from the list of students next year. We seriously objected to it and I think rightly, sir. There is no more important job that the Planning Branch has with the contractual relations with industry, they have got to have trained men in it, and the only place they are going to get that training is right here, so I do hope you will bear that in mind if anybody proposes to cut down the Judge Advocate General's Department.

A. That is something I do not have anything to do with. I am going to pass the buck right now. The Industrial College is not under the supervision of the General Staff and as far as the detail of men to schools is concerned, that is a matter for G-1.

Colonel Jordan. I want to spread the news abroad, sir, because you may be talking to G-1 or some one else on that subject later.

Q. General, you mentioned schools several times. I have been reading in the Service papers a very pertinent comment on the fact that some of the General Service Schools are not large enough to afford qualified officers to attend and it intimated that something

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was to be done about it - the schools enlarged, or something to afford an opportunity for more officers to become eligible for General Staff duty. Would you care to say something about that, sir?

A. That is a matter that has been under study for a long time and they are making a study up in the War Department now in regard to it. As far as the G-3 Division is concerned, we endeavored to ameliorate that condition somewhat a couple of years ago by cutting out the second year course at the Command and General Staff School so that now instead of producing a hundred officers from the General Staff School we produce two hundred a year. Formerly under the two year course we only produced a hundred officers. We have increased that fifty per cent and still it does not meet the requirements or the desires of the Services, but even if we did at the present time want to increase the number of people that are attending the General Service Schools we could not do it because we just haven't got the officers to send. We have the competent officers to be assigned there but we cannot release them from the duties they are on. In other words, there are so many jobs to be done by the Army today and we have a deficiency of officers to meet those jobs right now. We cannot decrease that deficiency by sending more officers to school. In fact, some years ago we had to reduce the schools in order to get officers on duty with troops. I think the thing that most officers do not realize is that everybody cannot be going to school - somebody has to do the work outside.

Q. General, referring to the matter that Colonel Jordan mentioned, the test of these mobilization plans, (this is rather a difficult question to frame) there has been considerable discussion here with regard to the proper policy that should be followed with reference to mobilization in this respect. We take the 1933 plan, test it here, and find it is impossible to meet it. That has been tested time and time again and it always comes out that way.

A. We get the same answer.

Q. The first reaction would be. "Well, let's not mobilize as fast" - decrease the rate of mobilization until it matches up with the supply possibility. One of the objections to that is that it is not the soundest procedure because it is perfectly possible to bring men in faster than we can actually equip them with the proper supplies, particularly these difficult articles of equipment such as tanks, guns, etc., because in the meantime, while those things are being produced, they can be training.

A. It is just a question of how long to bring them in before the stuff is ready. How much can you train them - can you do that training in two months or will it take you six months to do it before they get their equipment? Now there are certain things that you cannot train a man in before he gets his equipment, there is no doubt about that and we realize it. However, I do not mean that we would not bring a man into the service until the equipment is actually there to give him. For example, take the Infantry recruit, you can give him a lot of training before he ever gets a gun in his hand.

Q. There was one question raised which I had not heard before particularly: there is apt to be a very decided unfavorable effect on morale if you bring troops in, hand them dummy guns or nothing, and just have them march around - if that is continued too long they just lose all interest. That was actually the case during the war.

A. Yes, that was the case during the war. The Artillery were given wooden guns for training. It is a matter of working out how long before the equipment becomes available you want to call for the men to man that equipment and how much intensive training you can give them and keep up their interest until that equipment becomes available.

Q. General, you said at first that one of the important duties of G-3 was the apportionment of funds among the various Services. What relationship does G-3 have with the Budget Division of the Chief of Staff? On your plan I noticed the Budget Division was up above and I wondered what relation it has?

A. When the budget comes out, the way the budget is built up they first of all call on the Arms and Services and the General Staff Division to put in what they think they ought to have. Well, of course that goes pretty well up to the sky. Then the Deputy Chief of Staff has a meeting and goes over all this thing. There may be a requirement for six hundred million dollars; he knows that he can only expect about three or four hundred million. Something has to come out of that and he begins to squeeze it down, take out

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these things that he does not think we can afford to have at this time, and eventually he will give you a figure. Then you revise your estimates on that particular figure. For example, let us take field exercises - I may put in for an amount of money for field exercises and put in a program for that amount. He will say. "Instead of three hundred thousand dollars you are only going to get two hundred thousand." Then I have to make a priority on my field exercises and cut out this one here and that one there and chop it down to agree with the funds. Eventually when the War Department budget goes over to the Bureau of the Budget they chop it down still more, it comes back and you have to revise your plans again, so in almost everything you have to have established priorities within your estimates. Does that clear it up?

Q. Yes sir.

Q. General, you mentioned the program of mechanization and modernization of the Army. I would like to ask the question as to what that program is based on, whether it is the Baker Board or just what program they are working on, and what degree of completeness has been attained or which is in sight?

A. That is a pretty big program. You are talking about the Air Corps end of it? Of course the Baker Board was all Air Corps. They also mentioned mechanization.

Q. That is what I had in mind. Is it contemplated that all of the Cavalry will be mechanized or just how broad is this program?

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A. We do not make a program too many years in advance.

For example, our present program with regard to semi-automatic rifles is to replace all 1903 rifles with semi-automatic rifles in the Infantry. That is the program, how long it will take to get it is altogether a matter of funds. We put in our budget every year to get so many automatic rifles, at the present time I think we have an authorization for probably three or four thousand, but that is just the beginning. The same is true of our present program in regard to tanks - to equip all regular Army active units and all regular National Guard units with tanks. How long that will take will depend altogether on the amount of funds you get.

Q. What is the degree of completeness now? Is it five or ten per cent? Just about how far has it gotten along?

A. The degree of completeness is different for every particular thing. For example, the program for our mechanized Cavalry is, I would say, roughly sixty or seventy per cent complete, and with this year's money, if we get it, in 1938 the Cavalry Brigade should be completely mechanized. We haven't any further ideas about mechanizing Cavalry at this time. In tanks that will probably go up. Our tank program probably will not be completed until 1940 or '41. I would not put that down as Gospel truth - it is just a guess.

Colonel Jordan: General, I want to express my appreciation, sir, for your coming down here, and I know it voices what the College feels. Thank you very much.