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THE BASIC WAR DEPARTMENT MOBILIZATION PLAN
by
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THE BASIC WAR DEPARTMENT MOBILIZATION PLAN

The present basic War Department mobilization plan is the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. I understand that your student committees have already begun their study of this plan and consequently there is no need for me to attempt a lengthy explanation of it now. Furthermore, a detailed knowledge of the plan is not necessary for an understanding of what I am going to say today, but it might be of interest to show you at this time two slides giving an outline of mobilization as contemplated by this plan:

Army War College slide. No. 16993, Initial Mobilization.
No. 16994, Subsequent Mobilization.

Today I want to talk about some of the features of this plan and to mention the new plan that is being made to replace it.

The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, was designed to replace the War Department General Mobilization Plan of 1928 and to be used as a basis for the development of all war plans covering situations requiring an effort greater than that which the Regular Army could meet alone. In the lesser war plans, the use of only Regular Army units was foreseen and the War Department Mobilization Plan, as such, was not intended to be applicable.

As the major war plans were worked through, certain adjustments in the War Department Mobilization Plan became necessary, and these were either made at once or noted for inclusion in the plan later, the object being that ultimately the basic mobilization plan would include provision for all the requirements of any of the war plans. Mobilization was never to occur under the basic mobilization plan, for that plan envisaged no particular enemy. Mobilization was always to occur under a specific war plan, and the extent to which the provisions of the War Department Mobilization Plan were to be put into effect under a particular war plan, was stated in the Logistics Plan, the principal annex of the Army Strategic Plan. We may say that the War Department Mobilization Plan was designed to be the storehouse containing all the tools needed for any job that could be reasonably foreseen.

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When a particular job was to be done, we would take from the storehouse such of the tools as we believed would be needed therefor.

A revision of the basic War Department mobilization plan is a big piece of work in itself. And when we think also of the time and labor that must be spent by many individuals in revising the numerous mobilization plans and war plans based on that plan, and in refiguring supply requirements, the magnitude of the work involved is impressed upon us. It takes a long time for the mobilization plans of all echelons and the war plans developed therefor to be worked through to completion. No one expects to ever reach the point where such plans can be finished and put away in a pigeon-hole to wait for war. But it would be desirable if there could be a sufficient period between major revisions of the basic plan to permit the completion of the plans of the lower echelons. That has not been the case up to date. Judging from the past, new thoughts and new experiences demand a revision of the basic plan every four or five years.

The plan of 1924 centralized control of mobilization in the War Department, and fixed the rate of mobilization very largely on supply considerations. The plan of 1928 decentralized practically all control over mobilization to corps area commanders, and gave almost no consideration to supply matters. The plan of 1933 retained many of the features of the 1928 plan but adapted the mobilization to the so-called Four Army plan. Now in 1937 another revision is at hand.

In February, 1936, the present Chief of Staff sent a letter to all corps area commanders and others concerned, calling attention to the fact that the preparation of plans "for the mobilization of the manhood of the Nation" is proscribed in the National Defense Act as one of the major duties of the War Department General Staff and that, consequently, the preparation of subordinate plans based on the plans evolved by that Staff is one of the major duties of the commanders and chiefs of activities concerned therewith.

He also stated that it was apparent that the present War Department Mobilization Plan should be revised in the near future, and that the logical time to make the revision effective would be as soon as practicable after there were available the new tables of organization to be expected from the study, then (and now) under way in the

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operations and mobilization activities appropriate to such a time were intended to occur simultaneously. This exercise furnished valuable ideas with respect to the functions of the War Department and the arm, corps and corps area commanders during the early days of mobilization.

Several interesting problems related to mobilization and mobilization plans have been under consideration during the past year with a view to seeking solutions for incorporation in the next revision.

Take first the question of the training of officer candidates after M day. The present plan decentralizes this work to the corps area commanders. As a result, the corps areas are planning to establish over 100 schools for the training of officer candidates for the several branches right after M day. It is believed that, by introducing into this work a considerable degree of War Department control in which the chiefs of arms and services will play important parts, the number of schools can be reduced by more than 50%, a big saving in overhead can be made, better instruction at the schools will obtain, and the number of stations exempt from corps area control will not be increased. That study has reached the stage where the interested chiefs of arms and services are submitting drafts of plans based on a modified system. This system contemplates that the War Department determine the number and location of the schools, their equipment, and the size and nature of the school detachments, designate the school faculties, prescribe the program of instruction and the flow of students to, through and from the schools, and supervise instruction thereat by inspections. On the other hand, the system contemplates that, except for schools located at exempted stations, the corps area commanders administer and control the schools in accordance with War Department instructions, and coordinate the school activities with those of other units and establishments at the same station. It is hoped that the study will result in a workable solution of this problem that has been up periodically ever since the 1928 plan was issued.

Another study which has reached the point where corps area commanders have submitted comments thereon, is one designed to find out whether or not mobilization plans of troop units are of any real value. Mobilization is a zone of the interior function, and every unit is mobilized in some corps area subdivision, such as a military area, mobilization center, post, camp or station. Cannot the mobilization plans of the corps area subdivisions provide adequately for the mobilization of units to be mobilized therein and thus permit the elimination of unit mobilization plans? A large majority of the corps area commanders indicated that such plans can be eliminated.

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War Department General Staff, on the reorganization of the division and higher units. This letter, until December, 1936, was considered our directive in the preparations being made for the next revision of the basic War Department mobilization plan.

The principal reasons why a revision appeared necessary at the time this letter was written, were as follows

a. There was considerable doubt as to whether the contemplated rate of personnel procurement could be realized in the early days of mobilization. Even if volunteers in the numbers apparently expected could be procured, it was questionable if the necessary reception agencies could be set up in time to handle them.

b. It was believed that the supply requirements resulting from the estimated personnel procurement rate were too great to be satisfied.

c. Modern ideas of combat, supply and transportation had caused so many changes in tables of organization, that the tables were sadly in need of revision.

Information of value in connection with the next revision has been accumulated from all available sources, such as official reports and letters, conferences, and personal letters and conversations. In his letter of February, 1936, the Chief of Staff asked for constructive criticism of the War Department Mobilization Plan. The reports received are on file and form a valuable source of information. The annual mobilization tests also have brought out interesting points of a practical nature. The work of student committees at the War College and the Industrial College have proved helpful. A series of conferences with the corps area G-1's, held last spring by the G-1 Division of the War Department General Staff in Washington gave an opportunity to get the points of view of the corps areas on many mobilization subjects. Another series of conferences with the corps area G-4's held last fall by the G-4 Division gave a similar opportunity. Visits of members of the War Department General Staff to the headquarters of corps areas and other activities are most informative. The Third Army Command Post Exercises held last year in the Fourth and Eighth Corps Areas, presented a situation beginning on M day under an imaginary Coalition Plan, Black. Tactical

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mobilization of units to be mobilized therein and thus permit the elimination of unit mobilization plans? A large majority of the corps area commanders indicated that such plans can be eliminated.

At present an active Regular Army unit is required to be ready for movement to a theater of operations on M day at existing strength with organizational equipment at peace strength. Under the conditions stated, the unit is mobilized when M day arrives. Such administrative instructions as are necessary to assure the prompt and orderly departure of the unit from its post, can be included in the post mobilization plan. If the unit is required to leave behind cadres for the mobilization of its inactive elements, the mobilization of these elements is the responsibility of the post commander and not of the unit commander who has departed from the post. If the active unit does not leave its home station on M day, it may have an opportunity to obtain such replacements in men and material as needed and to perfect its training. Strictly speaking, however, these are not processes of its mobilization but, rather, refinements which become possible under that particular situation.

An active National Guard unit will need a mobilization plan to cover the processes of mobilization which occur up to the time when the unit is released from corps area control or until the mobilization plan of some territorial command, shall have picked up the unit, but from that point on, a unit mobilization plan is unnecessary.

As for an inactive unit, the mobilization plan of the station or mobilization center at which the unit is to be mobilized, can certainly provide adequately for its mobilization.

Considerable thought has been given to the arrangement of material in mobilization plans, and as to just how much detail with respect thereto should be prescribed by the War Department. Any one who has had occasion to look up a particular subject in the nine corps area mobilization plans, will appreciate the desirability of some degree of uniformity therein. Under the principle of decentralization, the War Department extended no guidance to subordinate commanders in this matter in connection with the 1935 plan, and furthermore did not set any too good an example in the preparation of its own plan, which unfortunately had to be made hurriedly. It is believed that considerable improvement can be made along this line.

The question of how to organize a corps area for mobilization is also interesting. Here again we find that initiative has been unrestrained. The First Corps Area decentralizes a large part of the work of mobilization to so-called mobilization areas, the Second Corps Area until recently has decentralized practically nothing, the Third Corps Area mobilizes at branch mobilization centers, a majority of the corps areas favor some sort of territorial subdivision of the corps area without as much decentralization as is apparently contemplated in the First Corps Area. Different conditions exist in the several corps areas and these must be recognized. The physical characteristics of the corps areas vary all the way from the small, crowded Second Corps Area to the sparsely populated wide open spaces of the Ninth. What degree of uniformity in the organization of corps areas for mobilization can and should be prescribed? Could all corps areas use a scheme such as the Fifth Corps Areas has, where the peace-time territorial organization for the administration and training of the Organized Reserves, is carried on after M day for purposes of mobilization?

We hope to have satisfactory solutions of the problems just mentioned, as well as of others of less importance, in time for inclusion in the next revision.

By December, 1936, the War Department's study of the procurement possibilities of American industry in relation to the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, had reached the point where it was indicated very clearly that in the first several months of a war, needed supplies could not be produced by industry in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the plan. As a result thereof, instructions were issued by the Chief of Staff to the effect that work would be commenced at once on a so-called "Protective Mobilization Plan" which, when completed, would replace the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, as a basis for mobilization.

It is contemplated that this plan will provide for the mobilization of a moderate but balanced force for the protection of Continental United States, including Panama and Panama, which force will be of such size and character as will permit of its being speedily and properly armed and equipped. Work on the Protective Mobilization Plan is now being pushed in the Mobilization Branch, with the assistance of representatives of other interested subdivisions of the General Staff.

At this point it might be of interest to mention how work of this nature is undertaken in the General Staff. All work on mobilization plans in the War Department General Staff is not done in the Mobilization Branch of the G-3 Division. As stated in the Chief of Staff's previously mentioned letter of February, 1936, "The duty of maintaining mobilization plans x x x is a continuous one and, in order that the necessary continuity may be present in this important work, it is essential, particularly in the corps areas, that the general and special staff sections participate appropriately therein". While this sentence was written for the particular benefit of any corps area headquarters where all work on mobilization plans might be handed to one or two luckless individuals while the real staff busied itself with the supposedly more important current work of peace-time, it expresses the idea carried out in the War Department General Staff where mobilization problems are handled in the appropriate divisions of the Staff and the Mobilization Branch of G-3 acts merely as a clearing house or coordinating agency in mobilization matters.

Now going back to the Protective Mobilization Plan, while it is too early to tell anything particularly definite about it, still I might mention in a general way how we are going about the work.

First, let me say that mobilization will start with what we actually have, and such additional forces as may be considered necessary, will be built up at a practicable and reasonable rate. A material slowing down of the rate of mobilization, as compared with that of the 1933 plan, will in itself solve many of the mobilization difficulties heretofore encountered.

The first step in the building of the plan is to determine the troops that could promptly be made available to the Commanding General of the Field Forces (GHQ).

Disregarding the overseas garrisons, our peace-time organization provides for nine Regular Army and eighteen National Guard divisions, together with certain corps, army, GHQ Reserve and harbor defense troops. These units vary considerably as to their strength, their proportion of inactive elements, and the completeness and suitability of their equipment.

In order to determine the relative availability of these units for field duty, we are preparing a visible filing system, on the cards of which will be data with respect to the location, actual strength, completeness of the organization, and status of the equipment of the units down to regiments and smaller separate organizations. From the information on these cards, we will make up a list of units which, we believe, will have on M day, or can have by 30 M, the qualifications essential to make them available for field service.

Having such a list of units and arranging them appropriately in larger units, we will obtain what may be called the initial protective or covering force. This will include active Regular Army and National Guard units at existing strength with satisfactory equipment, and also certain inactive headquarters and service units which are essential for the functioning of the force in the field, and which are of such a character that they can be organized hastily and made ready to function within two or three weeks. The active Regular Army units can be made available to GHQ on M day, the active National Guard units soon thereafter, and all units of the force by 30 M.

When the list of units to comprise the initial protective force has been prepared, certain deficiencies in the peace-time military establishment with respect to the requirements of the force in personnel, organization and materiel, will be found to exist. These deficiencies will then form the basis of the War Department's program for necessary organizational changes, for rearmament and reequipment, and for war reserves.

The list will be revised annually, and it is to be hoped that after a few years, the force will have become better balanced and more nearly adequate in every way than we fear it will be found when made up for the first time.

Following the determination of the initial protective force, work on the remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan will be continued with the object of providing for the mobilization successively of other balanced increments until such forces as are considered necessary for the protection of the Nation under any probable circumstances, shall have been produced.

The Regular Army and National Guard units not included in the initial protective force will be available for incorporation in the earliest of the succeeding increments, while the units of the Organized Reserves will be available for those that come later.

I can not guarantee that what has been outlined here will appear in the final plan, but I can assure you that, as far as the Mobilization Branch is concerned, every effort will be made, in the preparation of the plan, to conform to the terms and procedures used in the 1933 plan, to the end that as much as possible of the time and effort spent on that work in the corps areas and elsewhere will not have been wasted. The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, and the mobilization plans subordinate to it, constitute a comprehensive survey of mobilization possibilities and procedures, and as such, they will be found very valuable to those who may be called upon to work on the new Protective Mobilization Plan and mobilization plans based thereon.

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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING LECTURE
"THE WAR DEPARTMENT MOBILIZATION PLAN"

By
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The Army Industrial College
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Q. Colonel Bryden, recently we had rather an animated discussion on delay in supply; difficulties of procurement, and it was accepted by everybody that expensive, non-commercial articles would take a long time to procure and deliver. I selected an item which is not expensive, which is more commercial in character than such things as anti-aircraft guns, artillery, airplanes. I selected that article because I believe it is one of the utmost importance from the morale and health factor - overcoats. Production schedules show that not every man mobilized will receive an overcoat and there is no guarantee that warfare will always happen in the summer time. To my mind the supplying of every man with an overcoat is a "must" proposition and the adoption of a secret, shabby substitute is incompatible with the wealth of this country. Where is the responsibility for acceptance of the situation that every man mobilized will not have an overcoat, or the responsibility for change to a more satisfactory situation?

A. Well, if you look over our history all our wars have begun in April. Another point we hope to put in the next plan which might help that situation is that the Southern Corps Areas will provide extra mobilization centers where troops from the North can be sent for training.

When it comes to the particular thing that you ask, the way we are going to work that out in this particular mobilization plan is by making up a list of these units; have the people who are working on that, and remember there is a representative of war plans working on it, ^{state} /how they are going to use the troops. G-4 gives us the status of supply and our contact with the procurement people; G-1 gets the men, and we all sit around the table together and decide, to the best of our ability, whether that unit goes into the initial protective force or whether it does not. Of course, if we are without overcoats we settle it to the best of our ability and we do it with our eyes open. We get the information on such articles through G-4, who I assume will keep in contact with the procurement people.

Q. Colonel, has the War Department given any thought to getting out a typed form of mobilization plan that can be handed on down to the subordinate units and have them fill in principally dates and numbers, etc? We tried that in the Fourth Corps Area with a great deal of success. We found that a lot of the subordinate units did not know what it was all about and the only way we could get any uniformity was to put the stuff on paper and make it simple for them to fill in the proper numbers, dates, and other data. In that way we got uniform and quick results, and it would seem to me as though possibly that could be used by the higher echelons, that is, in the War Department on down so that you get absolute uniformity, or as nearly so as possible.

A. You are speaking of the unit mobilization plan?

Q. That is what I had in mind principally, but I thought

perhaps the same idea could be applied further up.

A. We hope in the first place to get some uniformity by turning out a War Department plan which is arranged in logical manner, telling the Corps Areas to follow that as far as practicable, and giving them certain information as to what they should have in their plan. It is a question of just how much detail you can go into without cramping their style because the corps areas differ in many respects. However, we are seeking to impose a certain degree of uniformity in the next plans to be made. When it comes to the unit mobilization plans, I know that several of the corps areas have done as you said, given an outline for the unit to fill in, and that was the plan. In view of the fact that the plan was so sketchy was one of the reasons why we thought they might be eliminated.

Q. Colonel Bryden, in addition to these overcoats that Colonel Hauser mentioned, at night the man has to have some place to sleep. I have been on two construction committees since I have been a student at this school. The last one was very edifying when we began to study command construction, which will be under the jurisdiction of the corps area commanders. I remember in the last war the rate of mobilization had to be deferred in order to fit the rate to the rate of construction at the various cantonments. I was later on stationed at a Southern camp where we put up tents for fifty-five thousand men. We still could not use the tents until complete water and sewer systems and many of those things were put in. You mentioned the rate of mobilization as compared to supply, do they also consider it as compared

to the rate of construction of these concentration of mobilization centers?

A. The question of construction, as I understand, has not been handled satisfactorily in the plans up to the present time. I understand that G-4 is revising the mobilization regulations on that and we will get something on it later. What will come out of it I do not know. That is being handled in G-4. I think that lessening the rate of mobilization will help a lot on that problem.

Q. We found in our studies that the corps areas had been directed to attempt to use fairgrounds and school buildings, etc. for mobilization centers. Upon surveys of many of these things they were found to be wholly inadequate, which meant they would have to go back to large construction as they did in 1917.

A. I would not be surprised, especially when you come to using public used buildings. Public buildings are still going to be busy; you cannot use schools because they are going to be busy, children are not going to stop going to school, and also in one corps area mobilization plan we found where one outfit was planning to use a particular fairground and another outfit was planning on using the same fairground. Well, that would not do, but it was all in the same plan. There has to be something done on the construction end of it, but, as I say, the lowering of the rate of mobilization will help that a whole lot and that regulation is under revision now.

Q. In your committees apparently all the parts of the General Staff are included, but I wonder if you also have a member of industry

in general? You are changing your plans each year; manufacturers set up their factories and after they are once tooled up they cannot very easily change the rate. You cannot increase the rate each year, so to speak, or decrease it very easily. Has any thought or study been put on that particular phase?

A. As I say, we look to G-4 for our contact with industry in procurement and we should get information of that kind from them. In the recent report of The Assistant Secretary's Office with reference to what could be properly supplied of essential items it is interesting to note that the mobilization rates they arrived at by working backwards and which lead to okaying the procurement of one hundred thirty-three thousand men per month for a period of nine months, I think it was. Looking back to the '24 plan, I find that for the first sixty days the rate of mobilization which they had in The Assistant Secretary's report and the '24 plan were practically coincident. That gives us, you might say, one bracket on what we can get in the way of personnel in the next plan. A tentative study by G-1 leads them to believe that instead of the rate of personnel procurement laid down in the mobilization regulations of about three thousand men per corps area per day, which gave numbers we could not possibly reach, they now want to say that the maximum would be three hundred thousand for the first thirty days and two hundred thousand for the next thirty days, which gives us, we might say, an upper bracket for our rate of personnel for procurement. It will simplify the work considerably to have those two limits. In answer to your question, we look to G-4 for any contact with industry.

Q. How much slower is the rate of mobilization to be in the new plan contemplated as against the old one? Before that question is answered I suppose I should make plain what I mean. I understand that in the World War the choke point was training, particularly training of leaders, and if we look at a big job, mobilization for a maximum effort, we want to defeat or hold off an enemy, who if it is one who would cause us to make a maximum effort is probably one of those countries that is more advanced in preparation than we are in peace time. I appreciate the difficulty of getting funds due to our inherent characteristics of being opposed to a large standing army, but it seems to me if we are going to greatly slow up the rate of mobilization we endanger our defense. It appears that if we are to be licked at all by a large invading force they would strive to do it quickly, because if we ever get this preponderous machine into operation they would have a tough job. If you slow up that rate of mobilization too severely, don't you have to compensate for it in other things, such as a stronger navy or a stronger air force that would be an M-Day agency ready to go, and possibly a larger peace time standing army? I am sure the General Staff has thought of all those things and we have every confidence in them but it is nice for us in the field to have the assurance that they have thought of them and to know what the possibilities are of getting balancing agencies to compensate for the slower rate of mobilization, if that does affect it very much.

A. Right now the idea seems to be protection. The name for the new plan was given us by higher authorities: "Protective Mobilization

Plan". As far as I can see there is nobody visualizing the immediate descent upon our shores of any force that could not be held off by an adequate protective force such as I attempted to describe. Of course, as General Hughes said, we never have enough, and the more we have in time of peace the more we will be prepared to protect, but your question is rather a difficult one to answer. I think all those things are being thought of but some of them are only thoughts.

Q. The question of organization occurs to me in this fashion: if I understand the present policy, the corps areas become small war departments in the event of a major emergency or mobilization. Is that assumption correct?

A. Practically so. I think a great deal has been decentralized to them but we must have more control from the War Department in certain respects, as I indicated with reference to the training of officer candidates. I think there also could be more control with reference to the raising of replacements. Replacements for the Infantry, we will say, could probably be handled in three or four places at the most instead of having them handled by each corps area. Another thing in which we could have centralized control with advantage would be in the selection of firing centers where Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Artillery could fire with more or less safety. It is very difficult for some of the corps areas to find suitable localities and various things of that kind in which, instead of being just decentralized to the corps areas without giving them any advice how to do it, by exercising a certain amount of control it will be helpful to them.

Q. If I understand it, the responsibility will come back to the War Department and the General Staff.

A. They are responsible in any case, I think.

Q. I thought it was the policy that they would announce the general policies which would be executed by the corps areas.

A. Yes, but they will supervise the execution and if they do not work it is their responsibility. In some cases I think they have attempted to decentralize things without providing the subordinate commander with the means of carrying it out and that should be avoided.

Q. But if the principle is sound for decentralization, then the central War Department, or the Washington people, should provide the corps area with the means. I have in mind, for example, the corps area service command which was one of the items you spoke of (the control of the schools there) and if it is a minor effort I think the plan that you suggested for that control is probably essentially correct and necessary but in a major mobilization wouldn't the old idea of the corps area service command and the schools under that command be sounder -- more rapid mobilization?

A. I do not know whether you can draw a line between a minor or major emergency. They all start out minor emergencies and perhaps grow into major ones. I think that whatever mobilization we have has got to start with what you have actually got. There is no getting away from that, and there isn't any use of taking what you have and spreading it around so thin starting things for a big emergency that you haven't got anything to stop a minor emergency.

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Colonel Jordan: We here in the school feel that there has to be centralized control of construction exercised from Washington. We do not believe that can be left under the corps area commanders because the supply of construction material is not superabundant in this country and due to transportation difficulties we feel it has to be supervised by somebody here. If the Quartermaster General is the man to do it under General Staff control - we feel that should be something that should be very carefully studied.

Q. The contemplated mobilization plan slows down mobilization in order to meet supplies. Is it planned to mobilize some men in excess of the supplies for them in view of the fact that that excess number probably could be used to advantage? There is always the possibility of production exceeding expectations and it would be rather unfortunate to have a supply of material on hand with no trained men to use it. Therefore, is there a safety factor contemplated?

A. Certainly the procurement of personnel would proceed at a more rapid rate than you could get by telling what you could supply in the way of units. We can always get these men in replacement centers and give them a considerable amount of training without a lot of the equipment which would be essential for organization. The question of replacement is a most important one. Every time you start the organization of a unit you have to think of where replacements for that unit are going to come from and make provisions for it right away. We have a tentative bracket on the procurement of personnel, the lower bracket being what the procurement people say could be adequately supplied; the

upper bracket being what G-1 says we can get in the way of individuals. There is no use making a plan which contemplates getting more individuals than the persons who have given that the most study say we can get, but between that one hundred thirty-three thousand per month and three hundred thousand for the first month there is considerable leeway for just the idea that you expressed.

Colonel Jordan: Major Spann, do you have a question?

Major Spann: The only question I might ask, sir, is why in the Zone of Interior the Army has mattresses? Why not bed sacks instead of mattresses? (laughter)

A. It would be perfectly satisfactory to have bed sacks as far as I know as long as there is something in them. I do not know the import of that question, possibly.

Colonel Jordan: Major Spann is in the Quartermaster Corps and is very much interested in mattresses. My calling upon him has aroused some laughter, so, Major Collins, I would like to hear from you, sir.

Major Collins: I am thoroughly in accord with what Colonel Bryden has outlined.

Colonel Jordan: We haven't heard from the Air Corps. I would like to hear from Major Magee.

Major Magee: The question of schools is what interested me. I notice that under the 1933 Mobilization Plan the schools are decentralized to the corps commanders. It is the function of the Ninth Corps to train balloon observers, and they had a very ambitious plan for this training. I think they got up at one point in their training

to twenty-nine hundred and some odd balloon observers. Well, the situation is whether they would need that many and whether the G-3 Section is going to tone that down and try to tie it up with what the Army will actually need in this new plan?

A. I think they had a large number to train and nobody to train them, was that not right?

Q. Yes sir.

A. With reference to the plans for training of officer candidates, they just got the Air Corps plan a few days ago and I just had a chance to look it over hastily - it seems to be fairly good. We have got to wait and see what some of the other divisions of the Staff think of it. The idea they had was to expand the training center at Randolph Field, not just by pushing out the border of that particular reservation but after the facilities at Randolph Field itself had been utilized to the utmost they would pick localities in the vicinity of the Eighth Corps Area, and in one case went over to Barksdale Field in the Fourth in which additional primary training schools would be established, the idea being, however, that all of those little schools are subsidiary to Randolph Field, that Randolph Field Commander would be the Commandant of the schools and each of these little schools would have an Assistant Commandant and whenever the requirements came along that another school was needed it would be established. They had, I think, planned up to a total of seventeen primary schools, but I cannot see that there would be need for more than five or six of them under the mobilization that we now contemplate. They built the plan as per requirements on the '33 plan.

In connection with the balloon work, they established the one school, I think, for that. Those schools would be taken out of the corps areas, if this thing goes into effect under the old allotment, and would be located by the War Department at suitable places and the programs of instruction prescribed by the chief of the arm or service, and the corps area commanders, if the schools were not at an excepted station, would carry on the instruction in accordance with War Department orders, so I think that school business is going to be straightened out. However, I just got the plan the other day and have not had a chance to go into it. None of the other divisions have either.

Q. One of the plans calls for Air Corps units to go into this initial covering force or regular Army National Guard, and the airplanes are practically nil as far as the peace time organization is concerned, but in the Navy organization we find the troops are going to go into the field, say, at the end of one hundred twenty days and they will not get any equipment until two hundred ten days. We find that all the way through. I was wondering if any thought had been given in your new plans to bringing the Air Corps up to the present allotted number of aircraft so as to cut down this requirement?

A. Thought has been given along this line: in making up this plan for the schools they based it on the number of planes that would be coming to them after M-Day from industry, the idea being that by the time the planes were ready at the Air Corps Acceptance Park they would be met there by a group of men to make up the organization, the officers having been trained in the officer candidate schools; enlisted men having

been obtained from the corps area, and those who required it having been trained at a technical school so that the plan would meet the group and the group would not be organized and trained so far in advance of the expected arrival of the planes as to have them sitting around and waiting. There is a certain amount of training that they can do while waiting for the planes but we hope to get them in step. The procurement of personnel is several steps ahead of the plane procurement but not so far ahead that they lose sight of each other.

Q. I should like to reiterate the question that you asked, Colonel, about the hats and helmets and caps.

Colonel Jordan: That is one thing that has worried the Quartermaster Corps officers here particularly: why provide a man with three kinds of head covering when one is enough?

A. I have often wondered about that. When I was a Second Lieutenant I think I had six different kinds of caps that I had to carry around. I do not know why.

Colonel Hauser: That has been pursued to quite an extent. I have heard nothing in the new plan about the equivalent of the subsequent mobilization of the 1933 plan. You have guaranteed war will always commence in April---

A. No.

Q. Will the new plan include the subsequent mobilization features of the '33 plan or what will be the nature of the substitute?

A. What we get after the initial protective force remains to be determined, but it will undoubtedly go on to the units of the Organized Reserve. We cannot throw away the whole reserve project even

if somebody thought it was not needed for the proper protection of the nation. Whether it will be called "Subsequent Mobilization" or by some other name I cannot say.

Q. I was thinking of the mass of data gathered for the operation of procurement of material not personnel. The volume of maximum effort must still be considered to advise industry as to what steps it should take.

A. I think I was told that for proper planning purposes along that line that the mobilization should be carried on about a year, eighteen months, or something of that kind, so undoubtedly it will be carried on that far. We could not stop short of that. We have got to give the people who are working on procurement planning enough data to start their work on.

Colonel Jordan: You have got to be considerate of industry, sir. You have got to let them know what their problem is going to be.

Commander Dunham: I think the same thing holds true with regard to war reserve in the case of tin, that you could recover enough secondary used tin to meet the requirements of your protective force, but what are you going to do about the general mobilization if you have to go to it?

A. The plan will be made so it can be carried on to any extent necessary. Just how far that will be carried on I cannot say now. That will depend upon consideration of what they consider the proper force for the protection of the nation, which is our directive, but undoubtedly it will go on to include units of the Organized Reserve such as we have

now. Just how far I cannot say.

Q. I think a good many of us have a feeling that the possible mobilization plan has reduced the emphasis of mobilization on the number of privates. With the reduced mobilization rate, do you plan to emphasize the training of leaders? In other words, not decrease the rate of officer and specialist training but decrease the rate of induction of privates?

A. That is one I ought to slip to General Hughes. I do not know about the training of leaders definitely; I have not heard that mentioned, but I do know that I have asked the training branch to revise their mobilization regulations on training.

Colonel Jordan: I think the question that Colonel Lewis brought up is a very vital one and if you would bear that in mind we would certainly appreciate it down here.

I want to thank you, Colonel Bryden, on behalf of the school for giving us just the kind of talk we wanted.