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MY EXPERIENCES IN THE WORLD WAR  
AND ACTIVITIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE O.A.S.W.  
by  
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In the years just preceding the World War, the Supply Branches of the Army were busily engaged in purchasing a limited amount of supplies for the maintenance of a small army under a bad system where almost every detail in the process of purchase was the subject of a law. During that time, the markets of the country were abundant and practically no problems arose regarding raw materials or manufacturing facilities.

During those years the Army contained less than 6,000 officers and the number that would be assigned to Procurement and Supply duties was very small. If you will compare the number of officers on that duty then and now, you will be surprised. The job was then done by five Supply Branches instead of seven now. If you will consult the appropriation acts of that pre-war period, you will find that the funds appropriated for Procurement purposes were meager. If you will consider the strength of the Army then in widely scattered locations and the strength of the Army today, comparing the figures with the appropriations then and now, you will wonder how the Army was adequately equipped. It was adequately equipped and the credit is due to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Supply Branches. The daily job of these undermanned Branches was to cut the meager supply of cloth with the greatest dexterity and skill to make it "go round". It required long hours and overtime on the part of the responsible officers.

During these years our General Staff was small and did not have the organization it now enjoys. There were no "G's" and no "War Plans Division". In general, the General Staff was composed of outstanding officers of the line selected for their accomplishments and ability as soldiers. Few possessed any experience in the problems of Procurement and, in general, being busy with other routine duties, little or no supervision or attention was given to Procurement or the Industrial needs of the Army. Of course the Staff was interested in Supply and the distribution of supplies but Procurement, in a general way, was regarded as some kind of an easy routine job of no very great importance.

It is understood today that much of the confusion that occurred in the procurement operations of the Army at the beginning of the World War was due to lack of proper plans. It must not be assumed, however, that during those pre-war days the Supply Branches were oblivious to the need for plans for Procurement and Supply in case of a future major emergency. Many efforts were made by the Branches in the preparation of branch plans, but it was a difficult, up-hill job because the personnel in each branch was insufficient for the ordinary routine duties. There was no personnel for planning. There was no plan for planning. The branch plans were not uniform and often did not follow the same program. The Industrial College knows that any such plans made by a branch are of little value unless they fit into the plans of other branches. To make those Branch plans useful there must be some agency to supervise and coordinate the plans of all. That agency must take the branch plans and weave them into an Army Plan. That agency must have facts and figures and experience concerning raw materials, national resources and manufacturing facilities. At the entrance of the United States into the World War such a supervising and coordinating agency was not functioning. There was no Army plan for War Time Procurement. Today, you find in each Supply Branch activity concerning war time requirements and plans. You find an agency in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War charged with responsibilities as to Procurement. You find an Army and Navy Munitions Board and an Industrial Mobilization Plan. I am quite sure that it is difficult for you to visualize the conditions that existed in April, 1917. You must shut your eyes and realize that none of these agencies existed. You must picture the five Supply Branches embarking on a great undertaking on an uncharted sea with no beacons, lighthouses or buoys to guide them.

It is proper to state, however, that there was an agency authorized by Congress to be of inestimable value to the Supply Branches on April 6, 1917. A word about that agency.

During the preceding summer of 1916, when it looked as if the United States would be drawn into the war, both the military committees of the Senate and of the House evidenced considerable concern over the preparedness or unpreparedness of our Army.

Both committees knew the state of the Army and that it was unprepared to enter the great conflict in Europe. They foresaw some of the problems that would be encountered. They apparently foresaw the confusion and mistakes that would occur in the industrial operations of the Army, due to existing unpreparedness and the lack of a super-agency to grapple with industrial problems. It is quite evident now from a study of the hearings that these committees looked into the future and foresaw numerous things that actually happened some months later. The committees apparently visualized our markets utilized by our future Allies, that there would be a scarcity or shortage of certain raw materials, that on "D" day each of the five Army Supply Branches would jump into the market unrestrained, endeavoring to buy at once the entire existing supply of articles that branch needed, regardless of the needs of other branches, that branches would compete with each other, that they would represent five horses acting independently and pulling in different directions instead of acting as a team pulling together under a guiding hand. The committees set about to provide an agency to prevent that confusion and those mistakes. In August, 1916, eight months before our entry into the war, Congress provided that agency by an enactment creating the Council of National Defense.

The Act states that this agency was created for the purpose of coordination in the use of our national resources and industries for the national security and welfare. Among other responsibilities, the Act charged the Council with responsibility in the mobilization of military and naval resources for national defense and in increasing domestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of the armies and the people. It is evident from the hearings and discussion that Congress realized that the Army and the Navy would require immense quantities of steel and manganese and rubber and leather and nitrates and other commodities, and wisely created an agency to coordinate the distribution or allocation of those commodities to the various branches of the Army and Navy and for the use of the people. That was exactly what was needed on April 6, 1917, and that was exactly what Congress provided. The Act even specified that the Council appoint committees of specially qualified personnel - Captains of Industry, if you please - familiar with the problems involved in the industrial operations incident to a great war, committees familiar with the problems in

steel, manganese, rubber, leather, nitrates and what not. Just what was needed on April 6, 1917, and just what the War Industries Board did later.

Just think of the great value of such committees on April 6, 1917, to whom the Supply Branches could go with their problems.

Put these much needed committees on steel and manganese and rubber and leather and nitrates and other commodities were not ready and functioning when we entered the war - eight months after the Council was authorized. The Council had quite naturally and logically first appointed important committees dealing with the bigger aspects of the problem before the nation, committees looking toward general cooperation between Industry, Labor and the National Defense, had done much to organize local councils in the states and to arouse the nation to a realization of the immensity of the job before it. The Council had not yet been able to organize commodity committees or other smaller committees which were to grapple with the specific problems of the Army and Navy. The whole problem was new to the country. No one knew exactly what we wanted ready on "D" day. Now we know, having learned this at great expense. The Council of National Defense was not ready on "D" day to take charge of the specific problems of the Army and Navy. Why? The record will show that although several general committees were appointed in advance, the Council was not formally organized until March, 1917 - a month before we entered the war but seven months after the agency was created by Congress. In saying this, I do not wish to be understood as condemning the Council. In my opinion, it never had a chance in the few days available to meet the specific needs of the Army. On the contrary, it is my opinion that had the Council been organized promptly in August, 1916, and commenced to function actively, the Battle of Washington would not have been such a sanguinary engagement and there would have been no War Industries Board.

So April 6, 1917, found the five small Supply Branches undermanned, with little or nothing in the way of reserves, with little or nothing in the way of plans, and with no coordinating or control superagency operating. It found the Supply Branch chief rather bewildered at the stupendous task before him. For some years he had been making small purchases in our abundant markets and had encountered few difficulties. During those pre-war years it had not been necessary for him to study our national resources, raw

materials, or manufacturing facilities. He had little data on these subjects. He was not even on speaking terms with such words as "amortization", "allocation", "priority", "quantity production" and other phrases that filled every day conversation a few weeks later when the Captains of Industry and the War Industries Board arrived on the scene.

There were other things that the Chief did not know that April morning. He did not know that within a few weeks his small Supply Branch would suddenly expand until the number of workers in it would far exceed, many times over, the combined personnel of all the Supply Branches before the war. He did not know that this large force would be scattered all over Washington, wherever he could obtain buildings. The Chief Signal Officer, for example, whose branch then included aviation, did not know that in a few short weeks that his branch, which normally received a small appropriation and occupied 7597 square feet of office space, would receive as the first war appropriation the sum of 640 millions of dollars - much more than the whole Army received prior to the war - and that his office force would soon be occupying sixteen buildings widely scattered over Washington. The Chief of Ordnance did not know that April morning that within the next eighteen months his branch would spend four billion dollars. It is not an easy task to spend a billion dollars wisely. The Panama Canal cost only a paltry 375 million and it took ten years to do the job. Four billion dollars would buy ten Panama Canals with several hundred millions left over. But with a very small organization to start with, with three great European powers utilizing the resources and markets of the country, with the probability that two million workers would shortly leave their jobs and thus deplete the supply of labor, and with much of the new equipment he was to buy yet to be designed - under such circumstances - the task of spending four billion dollars, in a year and a half, was a stupendous undertaking.

Under these circumstances, what did the Supply Branch Chief do? He did exactly what you would have done. He started every bit of machinery in his branch full speed ahead, under forced draft, day and night, to carry out his mission. It must not be assumed that the Supply Branch Chief wanted to proceed full speed ahead on his own responsibility without coordination. Quite the reverse was true. He knew that when his branch entered the market for certain commodities, he would meet the chiefs of other branches and of the Navy, who required the same commodities.

In reaching out for manufacturing facilities, he knew that he would meet other chiefs and possibly the Navy, who wanted to use those same facilities. As an example, I remember that the Signal Corps secured a fine, well equipped factory in Connecticut for the manufacture of certain aviation equipment. The Signal Corps was well pleased with its energy and luck at obtaining this fine factory. A few days later, an irate colonel of the Ordnance Department visited my office, expressing unbounded admiration at the unmitigated nerve of the Signal Corps in practically commandeering a factory which had been serving the Ordnance Department and on which the Ordnance Department was depending for the manufacture of machine guns. My recollection is that it was the factory of Smith and Wesson. Of course, the Signal Corps gave up the factory. The Supply Branch Chief knew such things would happen but what could he do? The Chief could not stop his work each morning and call a meeting of all the other Supply Branch Chiefs, the Navy, England, France and Italy. The trouble was, of course, the lack of a superagency coordinating operations. Under the circumstances, he went full speed ahead on his program and started the first skirmishing in the Battle of Washington.

I have been asked if it would not have been advantageous for the Supply Branch Chiefs to have held meetings for comparing notes. It certainly would have been most advantageous, but I do not believe it was practicable at the time. It would have been extremely difficult at the time when we were all working 12, 13, 14 hours a day under forced draft. To understand why it was impracticable - one must have been there - in the battle - and know the conditions. If you had been in Washington at the time and had known the burdens that fell on the shoulders of the Supply Branch Chief; if you had known of the number of people that waited one, two or three days to be able to see him; if you had known of the decisions he had to make daily and sometimes hourly, you would have realized that the time for such meetings had passed. They should have been held months before. Such meetings can be of great value. Some years ago after the Office of the Assistant Secretary had been organized to carry out the provisions of Sec. 5a and when Procurement Planning was getting into its stride, such meetings of the Supply Branch Chiefs were held weekly in the Assistant Secretary's office. For a time, these meetings were very interesting, useful, and speeded up the work. After a time, they

became dull and uninteresting and were discontinued. They grew dull and uninteresting because there was no program and no preparation for the meeting in advance. The meeting waited for each or any chief to bring up some question or problem, which he generally did not do because he was thinking of some other work in his office and was anxious to get back to the job in that office. To make such meetings useful, there must be a program and some advance preparation by some person who is thoroughly acquainted with the work.

Washington, at the time, was a seething maelstrom of people seeking to get into the war. Every hotel, every apartment house, every boarding house, was congested. Hundreds and thousands could not be accommodated. Many coming to Washington on business had to go to Baltimore or other nearby towns to spend the night. The Supply Branch offices were inundated each day by crowds seeking to enter the service, seeking to obtain contracts, or seeking to win the war with foolish inventions. Under such circumstances, the Supply Branch Chief operated under the most unfavorable conditions.

The new personnel which soon crowded the Supply Branch offices were, in general, high grade men and women all patriotically anxious to help; untrained, but willing to work without regard to hours, day or night or both. In this new personnel there appeared a new actor on the War Department stage, the Captain of Industry, the "dollar a year man", who contributed so much in valuable service. He brought to the Supply Branch a wealth of business experience, initiative and pep. It is true that he knew nothing about governmental procedure, laws, or tradition. He wanted to get things done quickly and cared little for the red tape imposed by the Revised Statutes. I remember one morning early in the war one of these Captains of Industry came to my office with a harmless looking letter asking for authorization to spend a million dollars in the construction of an aviation field at Dayton, Ohio - now Wright Field, I believe. I approved it as the representative of the Chief Signal Officer but did not give the letter back to him. He asked if my signature completed that authority and if he could immediately commence work at Dayton. This was in the very early days of the war and I explained to him that under the rules of the War Department that paper must be passed on to several offices, where it would be recorded, indorsed, and that it would finally reach the office of the Secretary of War. He

asked me if he could take the paper and endeavor to facilitate its progress. I gave it to him. In about fifteen minutes, he returned smiling and handed me back the letter. In the lower left hand corner was written, "Approved, Newton D. Baker". I commended him for his enterprise in finding this short cut by short circuiting the Adjutant General and the General Staff but told him that he would probably only be able to pull that stunt but once. That was the Captain of Industry's way of doing things.

But in considering the personnel in the Battle of Washington, don't overlook the Regular officer. Notwithstanding the great ability of the Captain of Industry, the "dollar a year man", the Regular officer was a good thing to have around. Often times, he was the responsible officer and the one who remembered there would always come a day of reckoning. Often he was a valuable balance wheel for the enthusiasm and driving force of the Captain of Industry. In general, the Captain of Industry found that the Regular officer possessed something valuable through long years of service and was glad to have him around. In your planning, don't overlook the Regular officer.

If there was a lack of control and coordination on April 6, 1917; that defect was corrected in a short time. Control and supervisory agencies commenced to appear early and often. First the General Staff became very active and asked for much data. Then, as I remember at this late date, came the Kernan Board, the Treat Board, the Machine Gun Board, the Committees on Supplies and Labor, the Munitions Standards Board, the Commercial Economy Board, the General Munitions Board, the Purchasing Board, the Committees on Shipping, Coal Production, Emergency Construction, Aircraft, the War Industries Board and many others.

I hope that you can shut your eyes for a moment and visualize the great amount of statistics and data required by these boards from the Supply Branches and the great amount of time required to dig it out, just at a time when the branches were feverishly expanding with new and untrained personnel and endeavoring by the use of every precious second and bit of ingenuity to acquire supplies and equipment.

Naturally, as the battle developed, there was a tendency for new boards to absorb functions of old boards or to entirely absorb them. About the time that a branch became acquainted with a board, its procedure and requirements, it might be absorbed by another board and a new New Deal established. For example, the War Industry Board of July, 1917 created by the Council of National Defense, entirely absorbed the Munitions Standards Board and the General Munitions Board. In March of 1918, eight months later, the War Industry Board was reconstituted as a separate administrative agency, as was done in the case of the Railroad Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Food Administration and others. The new War Industries Board was then given Presidential authority, as were other Administrations, by the President under the provisions of the Overmann Act. So far as the Supply Branches were concerned, control and coordination finally united in the reorganized War Industries Board under Mr. Baruch. It did a wonderful work. It would be unwise for me to attempt to tell of its reorganization or operations, for you have already heard or will later hear from those who served on it.

In reading the annual reports of the various administrations and boards that single handed and alone won the war, one is apt to get the impression that everything proceeded in the most successful and harmonious manner and that a good time was had by all. The men who rendered these reports held high positions of great responsibility, and from their high position looked below on many operating agencies. Sometimes the picture did not look so good when the view was upward from the operating agency. An anvil chorus of inharmonious melody often arose. The Supply Branch Chief was constantly under pressure emanating from the A.E.F. for more supplies and greater speed. The cry was, "More, more, more" and "Hurry, hurry, hurry". Sometimes the Supply Branch Chief thought delays were brought about in the control agencies, that there was too much control, or that the control machinery was too complicated.

All officers who participated in the general confusion in the early days of the Battle of Washington were greatly impressed with the importance of pre-war plans for the industrial operations of the Army in a major emergency. During the war, there was a restaurant

in a temporary building across the street from the Munitions Building. It was a good place to get a hasty lunch if you were fortunate enough to find time for lunch. After the war I ate lunch there many times with General Pierce, an outstanding officer of the Ordnance Department, whose untimely death robbed the Army of a most valuable officer. General Pierce and I often discussed the unfortunate conditions surrounding the Procurement operations of the Army in the early days of the war, and discussed possible ways of preventing such conditions in the future. We were of the opinion that the most fundamental and important preventative was the preparation of plans in time of peace for the Industrial operations of the Army in time of war. We were of the opinion that to absolutely insure the preparation of such plans, the requirement must be a matter of law rather than of regulations. It is a difficult matter to obtain Federal legislation which prescribes preparations for war. Congress and the people are quite generally opposed to anything that looks like preparation for war. We were therefore of the opinion that if any legislation were attempted to require this procurement planning in time of peace, the provision must be very brief and very harmless looking. The question as to what office or what officer should have this responsibility was often discussed. At first, we favored the creation of the office of a Director of Munitions, in the thought that in each administration some experienced Captain of Industry would be willing to give his ability and experience to his government for a period of four years and supervise this work. On account of the possibility of the political aspect of such an appointment, the idea was discarded.

Prior to the World War, the Assistant Secretary of War had few duties assigned to his office by law or regulation. We thought that he should take this duty, and, in a way, become the head of all the Supply Branches.

What should the law consist of? How should the law read? One day in one of our discussions I wrote in lead pencil on a piece of scratch paper a brief draft charging the Assistant Secretary of War with the duty of supervising the procurement operations of all the Supply Branches and other industrial business pertaining thereto, and also making him responsible for adequate planning in time of peace for the war-time needs of the Army.

Mr. Crowell, who was the Assistant Secretary during the war, at the time, and who also had the title of Director of Munitions during the war, had an assistant in his office named Mr. Dorr. Mr. Dorr was a New York lawyer and a man of great ability. He had seen much of the Battle of Washington. Knowing his relation with Mr. Crowell, I went to see Mr. Dorr, later in the day, to get his reactions on the matter and the wording of the draft. It was impossible to see Mr. Dorr that afternoon as he was leaving for New York. I wrote him a brief note as to what General Pierce and I had been discussing and inclosed the lead pencil draft of a proposed law. Several days later, I was summoned to the office of Mr. Crowell and saw on his desk my note to Mr. Dorr and the draft, which Mr. Dorr had mailed to Mr. Crowell from New York. Mr. Crowell, after discussing the matter for some time, was of the opinion that the proposed project was meritorious but doubted as to whether it could be enacted into law. I told him that a certain General Staff officer was at that time serving with the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in connection with the preparation of the 1920 National Defense Act. I told him that I thought he ought to have this officer come to his office and discuss the matter with a view to having the provisions made a part of the National Defense Act.

The legislation appeared as Section 5a of the National Defense Act but not exactly as we had prepared the draft. As nearly as I can remember, our draft simply charged the Assistant Secretary with the duty of supervising the procurement of military supplies and with responsibility for adequate planning in time of peace for the war time needs of the Army. In the Act, the planning was covered by making the Assistant Secretary responsible for "the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war time needs." Whoever rewrote the provision also struck out the words "of the Army". If I understand the English language, this omission makes the Assistant Secretary responsible for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to the war time needs not only of the Army but of the wide, wide world. Quite a job.

My next contact with the work came in 1921. After graduation at the War College that year I was ordered to duty in the Canal Zone. One day while assisting in packing the Saltzman plunder for transportation to Panama, the telephone bell rang and I was informed that my Panama orders had been revoked and that I was ordered to duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, with the hope expressed that I report for duty as soon as possible to a certain numbered room in the Munitions Building, the room now occupied by your library, but which at that time consisted of several small rooms. Coming to that room, I found it occupied by Colonel Fife of the Medical Department, Major Pettis of the Engineers, and Major Norman Ramsey of the Ordnance Department, all classmates of mine in the Army War College, Class of 1921, who had already reported for this new duty. Asking these officers of the nature of the duty we were to perform, I was unanimously informed that they hadn't the slightest idea. I happened to be the senior officer of the group and it was decided, after talking over the general and special situation, that I go to the office of the Assistant Secretary and find out what it was all about. Returning from that office after about two hours, I told the group that I had no idea as to what we were to do but that we formed a nucleus to start something to enable the Assistant Secretary to carry out the provisions of Section 5a of the National Defense Act, just referred to. How we were to proceed or what we were to do appeared to be an unknown quantity. It appeared to me that we were to create our own duties. We were shortly afterward joined by Colonel Hunt of the Quartermaster Corps and Captain Koenig of the Chemical Warfare Service. Archie Miller, a valuable officer of the Air Service, was designated to join our group but was unfortunately killed in an airplane accident before reporting. He was replaced by Major Mars of that service, the group then having a representative of each of the supply branches.

In a room across the hall from this room were stored the old records of the Council of National Defense and in another room were the records of George Creel's Committee on Public Information. As the senior officer, I became the custodian of these records. The group decided that this new department of the Assistant Secretary's office ought to have a name. Although we were not asked to do the christening, we started something by writing a letter on some routine subject,

heading it as from the Planning Branch, Procurement Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. These names stuck during my service here. I do not know whether they still survive.

We obtained copies of the reports of the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board and other administrations that won the war in the Battle of Washington and commenced to study them. At this time, Congress was preparing a Tariff Bill and we were called upon to produce some statistics and charts concerning certain strategic minerals essential in munitions making. This was the first duty assigned the group.

We decided, however, that the most important duty before us was to start the planning for war time Procurement and that the important thing in such planning was to have it instituted in the Supply Branches as a part of their regular routine duty. How to do this was a problem. How would the branches respond? After some discussion, it was decided to inaugurate this new duty by giving each branch a task or problem to be solved. I cannot remember the details of this first problem but I do remember that it was an easy task concerning certain raw materials involved in the manufacture of certain equipment used by them. For the first time the Branches were directed to do some procurement planning. The effect was quite interesting. Several branches showed interest and responded promptly. Several were reactionary. On the whole, the result was not particularly satisfactory or encouraging. We then decided to follow this problem up with a harder one which would require the branches to compute requirements in equipment, raw materials and manufacturing facilities, requiring them to do some real planning. This second problem was met with a general murmur from the Branches that they had no personnel to do this work. Their personnel was only sufficient for their other routine work. If this planning work was to be done regularly, additional personnel must be provided. The office of the Assistant Secretary considered this as reasonable and each branch was authorized one or more additional officers for Procurement Planning. Then it soon developed that this work could not be done solely in Washington, that contact must be made with manufacturers throughout

the country and that branch planning offices must be established in New York, Chicago and other large commercial cities. And so the work expanded and developed.

During the World War, very few Regular officers were available for the Procurement work of the Branches, the great bulk of the work being carried on by workers who came in from the outside. By 1921, these Regular officers who had participated in the Battle of Washington, and who were conversant with the problems involved, were widely scattered. The outsiders had all returned to their own businesses. So there were few people in Washington in 1921 who had any experience with the Procurement problems of the Battle of Washington or who appreciated the importance of pre-war planning. Many officers on duty in the Supply Branches, not realizing the difficulties encountered in the early days of the war or the great importance of planning, were not interested in the work. It was a discouraging, up hill job to be continually explaining it all to Supply Branch officers and to be continually trying to "sell" the idea. It soon became evident that something must be done to instruct officers in the importance of the work and to train them to do it. How could this be done? There was but one answer. I am now speaking to that answer. The Army Industrial College.

Every veteran of the Battle of Washington is amazed--very agreeably amazed--at what has been accomplished in the way of Industrial Preparedness since the provisions of Section 5a entered the National Defense Act. With active agencies in each of the Supply Branches, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary charged with responsibilities and supervision over the Procurement activities of the Branches, with the Army and Navy Munitions Board organized, with the Industrial Mobilization Plan prepared and with this college training specially selected officers in the problems of Procurement, it would seem that the confusion of 1917 would be avoided in the next war.

The veterans of the Battle of Washington are greatly pleased with the Industrial Mobilization Plan. It is a remarkable instrument reflecting great credit on Colonel Jordan and Colonel Harris and whoever else had a hand in its making. Any veteran of the Battle cannot but moralize as to the immense value the plan

would have had on April 6, 1917. Even though no legislation had been enacted to make the plan completely effective, the very existence of such a plan as a guide would have brought about the saving of much time and many millions.

Every veteran of the battle is deeply impressed with the existence of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, realizing that it paves the way in time of peace for co-ordination and control in time of war and that it can be admirably fitted into any super-agency authorized by Congress. There are great possibilities ahead for this board.

Put suppose that no legislation is enacted by Congress before "D" day to make the Industrial Mobilization Plan effective. What would be the effect? Would we be back in the uncertainty and confusion of April, 1917? I think not. So much has been accomplished through the provisions of Section 5a of the National Defense Act that most of the mistakes of 1917 could be avoided.

However, if we study those mistakes of 1917, I am quite sure that there should be a War Resources Administration or some similar agency ready to function on "D" day. I don't think there is any doubt about that. Coordination and Control are specially important in the first weeks of the War. If there is no such body ready to function, an opportunity for uncertainty and delay is presented.

We are not certain that Congress will authorize the War Resources Administration in advance of War. In time of peace, Congress and the people are averse to legislation preparing for War. After War comes upon us, the situation is greatly changed. When war comes upon us, our people are deeply moved by the war spirit. Leaders spring up on all sides with plans for winning the war. Industrial leaders appear with plans for the control of Industry during the war. One impassioned war speech in Congress endorsing a plan put forth by some industrial leader may result in legislation which might wreck your best plans. No matter how carefully you have planned--no matter what a fine gilt edge plan with draft of all necessary legislation needed to make it effective, you may have in the lower right hand drawer of your desk all ready for submission

on "D" day--you may be grievously disappointed. Your plan and draft of legislation will be submitted to committees, hearings will be held and amendments offered. You cannot tell how many changes will be made. The resulting legislation may bring back to you the child of your brain, unrecognizable.

We want a War Resources Administration or some similar agency ready to function on "D" day. Why not make our plans such that if the War Resources Administration is not authorized for "D" day, the Army and Navy Munitions Board can step into the Council of National Defense ready to function at once. The active operation of the Council of National Defense needs no legislation. It is authorized by legislation already enacted. One word from the President and it becomes active. Under such conditions why not make use of this agency? Why not?

Colonel Jordan, when I look back at the Procurement troubles of 1917 and the discouraging days of launching Procurement Planning and today consider the splendid activities in preparing for the Industrial problems of War, I cannot but think that much that has been brought about has been due to this College and the work of its graduates. I congratulate you and wish to say that it is my belief that had this College been instituted fifteen years earlier, there would have been no Battle of Washington and that the members of this class would not have had to endure the discomfort of listening to these reminiscences.