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THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRY

by \

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The Colonel asked me some weeks ago to come down here, but we could not get together on dates. At the very last moment from my standpoint, after I had lost all opportunity to prepare an address, we got together by his meeting my original terms.

I have not had time to organize an address to you gentlemen today but I am going to ramble on about some of the things that are absorbing my own attention. You may think at first sight that they are a long way off from the problems that are absorbing your attention.

I want to talk about a conceptual scheme of administration, because I do not think there is any difference essentially and logically, although there are many differences in immediate techniques, between public administration, Army administration, Navy administration, and business administration. The core of them all is the same, and I believe there is a conceptual scheme, which many if not most of our faculty are now using in thinking out their attitude toward administrative problems, which is useful. At least it has had very great effect on our attitudes, on our concept of the problems of administration, and on our instruction.

I am going to read a paragraph that I wrote some time ago on the subject of administration: "Administration is the determination and execution of policies involving action. Such policies must be conceived by men. Such action must be effected by human organizations." And I would today add one more sentence: "Such action relates to human action, not only in but out of the organization." You do not find administration defined that way in the dictionaries. It is the result of nearly thirty years of sifting in the school of the elements of administration in the effort to get a definition, a conceptual scheme within which we could operate effectively. "Administration is the determination of policies." We add: "involving action." The reason we add to the sentence those words "involving action" is because we find from experience that it is only at the point where action is contemplated - and the aggressive refraining from action is included within my definition of action - that the elements of administration show up. Let me illustrate that. In the early 1920's, 1921 or 1922, the faculty of the Harvard Business School had a series of long discussions as to the scope and aim of the school and as to the policies which should control the school in its thinking. It was the

unanimous point of view of the faculty that, with some recognition of the necessity of studying the legal and engineering aspects of business, the school was fundamentally a school of applied economics, and we operated on that basic assumption for a number of years. It was an assumption in which I personally concurred heartily. I felt that we were a school of applied economics, and we started trying to teach applied economics in a great variety of ways in our different courses and in the courses organized for the purpose. But by happy accident at about the same time we began the development of the case system of instruction in the school. We started sending men out to gather the facts of concrete administrative situations. When those facts were brought back to the faculty they had a very awkward characteristic and that is, that the facts would not stay economic. In every case that came in, if you read at all between the lines, in spite of the fact that the man who was collecting the case was trying to collect a case in applied economics, a case that would develop the principles of applied economics, the facts as they came in did not fit into the abstractions from the total picture of things that are the customary abstractions of pure and applied economics. We gradually came to realize that economics had a value to us, that it was often a guide to the weighing of factors involved in situations, that it was often a great help in modes of thinking, but that it could never control policies. The same thing is true of politics, political science. We came to discover, because of the way the facts came in in these cases, that the problems would not stay those of economic and political science, that that was not a broad enough base. Indeed, we made the awkward discovery that if you treated a particular problem successively as a problem in applied economics and as a problem in practical political science, the conclusions were often in head-on collision; that as a matter of fact because political science had one set of abstractions, selected premises from the total situation, and because economics had another set of selections about which the economist was thinking from the total situation, the things were contradictory in conclusion. That is, the logical result of the selected premises, since the premises differed, was X in one case and not X in the other and there was no compromising between X and not X.

We found another awkward thing. We attempted to teach labor relations. This I did myself, having had a great deal of experience while I was in business in handling large

organizations and in handling one labor group; being interested in the handling of many labor groups but particularly in handling and being responsible for one group of 5,500 to 6,000 men widely scattered and difficult to get in touch with. I started teaching labor relations in the school. I was naïve enough to think there was time to do some teaching in addition to the other parts of my job and for five years I taught labor relations. The first thing that I did was to explore the literature of labor relations as it had then developed as the result of the work of the economists. I was forced to the conclusion that the literature bore no resemblance to my experience, that there was something that was not in the literature that really was of the utmost significance. As a result of that experience I recall sitting down and thinking about it repeatedly over a long period of time. The first experiment that I tried was getting a lot of people who had good labor experience to come up and tell how they did it. I tried to tell how I did it myself. I found that I had no language available that would define the intuitive grasp of situations that I had in fact had; that I could not tell anybody how I did it. I found that these men who came to us and developed systems of handling labor relations were all pretty attractive fellows in one way and another. It occurred to me to get some of the men whom they had influenced to copy their techniques. I found that those men were uniformly or virtually uniformly having very bad labor relations although they were applying in detail the rituals that had been laid down to our classes by the men who were having successful labor relations. I found that I was sorting out the subject of labor relations not into a question of wages and hours and the various economic factors but of wage incentives, etc., that are the controlling things in the thinking not only of the economist, but of business men. I found that there was something else that seemed to me very elusive. The way I defined it at that time, which was around 1925, was that it was the personality of the man who was doing the job. It is unfortunately true that a personality which will fit into labor situations is not necessarily the same personality that leads to promotion in industry or, I suspect, in the Army. I found that I was therefore up against the fact that the organization of industry and the methods of promotion in industry could only by accident put in the key labor positions men who had the requisite personality to handle them well; that the economic factors were obviously not the controlling factors although they had large importance; that you cannot make men happy laborers and contented laborers by high wages or short

hours, that those are far from the fundamentals, and that when we think in terms of economic remedies for human problems we have not got to the core of it. I decided that there were in that particular field two essentials to progress in a school. The first was the development of some techniques which could be well enough defined and thoroughly enough systematized, so that a man who believed in the techniques could, regardless of the question whether he was able to handle labor relations himself well or not, bring about a situation where those techniques could be taught to men who knew nothing whatever about the basis for the techniques and applied by them in ways that would ameliorate labor relations by making human beings happier. That was a large order and I did not know where to tackle it. I knew only that many of the troubles obviously grew out of the advance of science and the rapid changes that that was bringing about. I decided to see if anywhere in the range of science we could get some help. I picked psychology and found that 99 44/100% pure the university psychologists were taking men out of their social environment, putting them in the laboratory, and studying their reactions in the laboratory. I could not help feeling that a fellow who has been taken from all his surroundings and put under too many weird conditions in the psychological laboratory must be something different, from the standpoint of the future of labor relations, from the same man working under a foreman in a factory. By accident we got Dr. Mayo, whom many of you know, interested. He was the only psychologist I knew or could find at the time who combined an interest in the psychological problems of human action as a part of their social environment with a desire to apply that in industry and see what he could discover about labor relations.

We have been working from that start, but showing again the way action pulls in the whole concrete situation, we were obliged from that start to expand from psychology to physiology and from physiology to social anthropology because the psychologists came in and said they did not dare to go further because so many of the problems turned out to be organic in their origin, and so we started the physiological laboratory. Again they came in and said: "We cannot safely proceed further because so many of these labor problems come up out of the community, out of the surroundings of the factory, out of the disintegrated families, out of tension that is brought into the factory from outside, and we must know more about the structure

of the communities around the factories", and so we went into social anthropology. We have really made progress in that field just in so far as we have completed our integrations and taken a many sided point of view about the problem, and we have been fortunate enough to persuade bile chemists, physiologists, psychologists, social anthropologists, and a business group that they have a problem in common - to find out why human beings in the surroundings of business and of the community behave as they do, and to make an effort to discover techniques which will ameliorate the unhappiness of many men who are trouble makers simply because they are unhappy. Those techniques in rudimentary forms have been developed and as rapidly as the personnel can be trained to spread the techniques they are spreading. They are spreading not because of anything that we do, but because the men who are in charge of the factory where the efforts and experiments have been made are applying them themselves through men that they have taught, whom we have never seen, on a scale that involves many thousands of men, and are spreading the methods to other factories. Again appears the fact that at the point of action if you are going to get anywhere you must consider many things. You cannot fall back on the specialized narrow abstractions of any group of thinkers because it is only at that point that the limitations on the narrowness of thought show up. The emphasis on action is an essential, in my judgment, to real progress in handling administrative problems. Such policies must be conceived by men - that is entirely obvious. They do not just happen. They may not have anything like the active consideration that they ought to have but they must be conceived by men. The importance of that at the present moment is that today throughout the whole structure of our community, government or business, the policies involving action are not being conceived by men who have deeply rooted in their systems the importance of a general point of view of weighing all the factors that are involved in the situation. They are being conceived by specialists, by men who by their training and experience and interest stop thinking when they get to anything that they cannot see as directly bearing on their immediate problem, with the result that you find right through business and politics inconsistent policies adopted because no one has a sufficiently general point of view to realize the inconsistencies and you find things cancelling each other and mutually destroying each other because no one has stopped to look at the total situation. This civilization of ours has become a civilization dominated by narrow

specialists and we have almost no men whom it is legitimate to describe as specialists in general relationships; yet it is that coördination within a business, within a government, out of which the only hope of integrating a nation or a business really arises.

Labor policies are adopted by industry thinking six weeks ahead when the real problem is to develop a situation in the industry under which for many years ahead men may live happily. Different departments in politics adopt absolutely inconsistent policies, one in substance raising tariffs and another in substance lowering tariffs without its ever being considered that a lot of things are being done that do in fact raise tariffs at the same time that another set of activities are in fact lowering tariffs. We are disturbed at the growth of great cities in this country and we adopt national policies that tend to develop the export of automobiles and to build up our Detroit, at the same time that we are disturbed by the destruction of small communities and adopt tariff policies that tend to destroy the small communities. Why? Not because people are vicious - very far from that. The men involved in it are men of the highest quality. It is because it is nobody's job to think generally and our universities have never trained men to take into account the essential things that have to be taken into account and into use, but not to be dominated by the specialized thinking of the engineer, of the lawyer, of the economist, of the political scientist, all the specialized attacks. We have developed certain things to a very high degree of narrow specialized effectiveness but we have not offset that development by anything that tends to train large groups of men to think generally and to consider the whole problem that is involved. Such problems must be effected by human organizations. No one experienced in business would think that you could shake an organization of a new business which involved a hundred thousand men, most of them laborers, with perhaps a thousand executives, into any kind of working order without the expenditure of years of time. The building of a human organization is a slow thing because the actual organization if it is a decent organization never bears any real resemblance to the official organization chart. There is no good organization, I think, in existence except that where exists the unconscious social organization, the automatic behavior of men because they are used to collaborating and working together in certain patterns, often very diverse from those shown on the organization chart that originates in the president's office. There is no

good organization that is not dominated by those unconscious types of thinking.

The organization chart has to be considered because it tends to interfere with the realities. It has also to be considered because there have to be some rituals in a large organization that must be carried out or confusion results. It is rarely true that in a factory the foreman is the real head of the room - it is some fellow who has developed spontaneously out of the social organization of the room who is the real head of it. I suspect, without knowing anything about it but I should be astounded if it were not true, that in well established troops in the Army, whatever your smallest unit is, there is a spontaneous organization underlying the official organization that in the last analysis has so much to do with the morale that if the officer in charge of that group goes counter to it he loses the morale and if he goes with it he gets a very high morale. That unconscious social organization in a well established group, if you really get the facts, is more important, even under Army conditions which require a more specific type of organization than can exist in industry and even than the quality of the subordinate officer in charge, and it is the dominating factor in the question of whether a particular troop, a particular group of troops, is more or less high in its morale, although by virtue of his position he can if he is foolish easily destroy the asset value of that unconscious organization. I have seen the morale in a small group go to pieces because the man in charge of the supervision changed the seating arrangement of the girls in the room. By so doing he destroyed the underlying spontaneous social organization. No community, no nation, no business, I believe no Army, can really be strong in its morale unless there is a strong underlying social organization.

I think the faculty of the Harvard Business School is probably the largest group that you will find in the world engaged in really complicated problems that has no formal authoritative organization whatever. We have deliberately in a group of seventy men (it is a small number but it is a very big number to do this particular thing) avoided the organization by any form of rituals. We have no departments, no formal organization except the fact that there exists a Dean who has no authority whatever, who gets all his authority from the faculty and they rarely give him any, but he and his associates

and assistants perform their function because the spontaneous social organization of the group constantly imposes more in the way of effective authority on us because the other men in the group would rather we did it than to do it themselves. We could easily reverse that process by setting up a formal organization. Within ten years we should have some heads of departments, in my opinion, quite unconsciously gunning for part of this authority that exists without right, without vote, without anything but the recognition that that is the way the thing is done. For fifteen years nobody has ever raised a question either on my side of the faculty or on the other side of the faculty, if it were fair to divide the two (which it is not) as to where that dividing line was, and for fifteen years the office has never done a single thing I think as to which there has been any feeling in the faculty that we had gone further than we were supposed to go although we have literally no power whatever that is required to run a school. The importance of that spontaneous social organization is very great.

All that sounds almost commonplace, but it is not commonplace. We see Congress passing a bill involving an organization that may comprise a hundred thousand people and assuming that because the bill is passed the act can be administered. Policies have to be executed by and through human organizations and until human organizations have seasoned to the point where that spontaneous belief in each other exists, you cannot have good administration. Good administration that involved more than ten or fifteen men, to say nothing of thousands of men, to the best of my belief has never in the history of the world been attained, except under the pressure of emergencies actual or impending in the large sense, to the point where it could function smoothly until it had a chance to live within itself and develop the little spontaneous modes of collaboration which in any smooth running type of organization are the core of effectiveness and efficiency. The Army and Navy may or may not come within this category. I do not know them well enough, but I suspect that they do. I am talking about a delicate thing. I have seen good feeling destroyed in an organization that I knew intimately in a period of six months because the man in charge of the organization, a new man, approached the problem on the assumption that an organization chart was the real thing and that changes could be made in the organization chart to its betterment. He made the changes without realizing that by so doing he had affected the morale of hundreds of men indirectly - literally without knowing he was doing it. I have seen the thing reversed. I have seen the growth of

spontaneous collaboration come very quickly, very quickly indeed, when a man who knew what he was about either intellectually or by intuition came into the situation, reversed the current, and acted on the only basically sound assumption that in organization authority starts at the bottom and is lent to the top instead of starting at the top and being imposed on the bottom. It starts at the bottom spontaneously or it does not start at all. Social organization will start spontaneously anyway. The question is whether in building up the administrative organization that spontaneous organization is in conflict with the objectives of the organization as a whole or in harmony with those objectives. All that can be done from the top down is to get sufficient understanding of the cross currents of human behavior down below so that the administrative leadership, which is delegated to it in fact regardless of any legal theory or any other theory, retains leadership by the spontaneous support of the men on the firing line.

So I say that in the scope of our activities in studying administration we have been forced to the recognition gradually - I say "forced to the recognition", I rather rephrase it - at the end of 25 or 30 years of earnest seeking after some definition of what we are trying to do that would be useful, new elements dropped into position instead of forcing the reconstruction of all our thinking as a result of that 20 or 25 years of real effort on our part. I know that after I went to the school it took eleven years before I personally felt that I had anything approaching an essential definition of what we were trying to accomplish and the logical and human problems that grew out of the job we were trying to accomplish. As a result of that long period of study, for what it is worth to the Army Industrial College I suggest the possibility that the conceptual scheme in these few sentences with the type of implication that I have been trying to outline here in these few minutes, plus the other implications that will inevitably occur to you as they have occurred to us as we tried to work the concept and work under the concept, may be useful: "Administration is the determination and execution of policies involving action." That does not cut out planning for the future; it does not cut out the study of the past. It does mean that when your actual administrative problem occurs, with all your preparation it is coming up in some form different from anything that you plan, in some form different from anything that you can find in history, and you must train yourselves in the

light of history and with your best estimate of the future to be ready for the implications of the moment as they affect the problem of the moment which is the problem of action. Such policies must be conceived by men, which involves developing a group of men who can think in general rather than in specialized terms. Such action must be effected by human organizations, which involves a better understanding of the social currents in and out of any administrative organization and a real appreciation of the importance of the underlying spontaneous organization which never gets on to the charts which define authority. And last, we should never in administrative decisions forget the fact that the actions that we take as administrators in carrying out these policies through human organizations are important because they affect human beings; not because they introduce a better machine, not because they grow more or less of a crop, but because in the last analysis they affect human beings, social human beings, organized society, and the stability or the weakness of this and any other nation.

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Colonel Jordan: Gentlemen, Dean Donham likes questions, so he has promised to answer any questions that the class may ask. Are there any questions? Dean, this is one of the greatest compliments that has been paid a speaker so you certainly have covered the subject.

Q. What do you think about the final outcome of this present labor situation, that is, the C.I.O.; is it at its peak now, still going up, or on the way down?

A. The Colonel omitted one part of my answer to his question whether I was willing to answer questions. I said I was, but that one of the answers would be, "I don't know." The labor situation in this country bothers me a great deal. I happen to be one of the men who has been urging Mr. Green for nearly ten years now to develop an industrial type of organization for organized labor because I have felt that the A. F. of L. was unfortunately weak and that it was very important that some of our great industries should be organized, but that they shouldn't be organized except industrially. The inclusion of a great many crafts into a complex situation is so absurd on its face that the employers

were forced to fight. On the other hand, if you want to know my real views on the current labor situation I have the very great advantage of being able to refer you to my testimony before the Senate Committee on the Wagner Bill. What I said was going to happen has happened. I felt then and I feel now that the support given by politics to the labor movement in the Wagner Act was a calamity, not, as I have just said, because I didn't want to see the labor movement strengthened, but because of the things that I have been talking about, the impossibility of training rapidly responsible leaders in a period of very rapid growth. The labor movement today is to me in a wholly unpredictable position because it is manned of necessity by men without experience and background in their problems and men who don't know how much harm they can do to labor if they behave irresponsibly, men who are apt to think that they have done their whole duty by man and labor if they can get 15¢ an hour increase in wages although that 15¢ an hour may be the 15¢ that breaks the camel's back and brings on a vast amount of unemployment in the particular industry. We are suffering from the too rapid growth of essentially sound ideas of social reform. Social reform, since it must rest on the spontaneous collaboration and behavior of a multitude of men, has to have time to take roots and you don't get social reform by imposing a complex reform from above on organized labor or any other group. This answer is general rather than specific. Your labor question I am using as an illustration because it covers all sorts of areas. The concept that you can get social reform rapidly ignores the fact that just as authority in an organization, if it is sound authority, must be spontaneous, work from the bottom up and be lent to the people at the top, so in social reform if it is going to be lasting. You have to get the time some way or other for the thing to develop to the point where the collaborative behavior of millions of people is in the new patterns, and changing the patterns of the behavior of millions of people quickly is an exceedingly dangerous thing to do, no matter how idealistic the concept toward which you are aiming.

Q. Dean Donham, isn't it so that there is a sort of caste system among the higher grade crafts of labor that would sort of inhibit their joining as a vertically organized union?

A. Yes, I think there are many obstacles to it. There are caste systems right through society. As a matter of fact, what you are referring to as a caste is nothing but a social group. If you look at your neighborhood or anywhere you have got a great intrusion of social groups. What you had was the historic fact that certain social groupings had developed in the form of craft unions and the historic fact that you have superimposed on that were these great industries that involved thirty or forty craft unions. The two were inconsistent. I am sorry to see the effort changed, the situation coming like that instead of slower effort on the part of the labor movement itself to peck away at the situation. You see, it had been done in the shipbuilding field during the war. They worked out an effective compromise in that industry. They worked out an effective compromise between the interests of crafts and a union of the crafts for general purposes. It was not an impossible problem, as some individual experiments had proved. I do feel that it is a critically dangerous type of experiment to, in substance, do it under the force of Governmental authority without reference to these castes that you speak of or to the history of the labor movement, and to the motions that are aroused or, more especially, to the fact that a body which involved perhaps 2,000,000 people well organized is suddenly forced into a mushroom growth to the point where it involves three or four times as many as that without giving time for the development of leadership in the group. I don't know anything about it, but if Mr. Lewis isn't seriously disturbed by the leadership under him I shall be very much astounded. I say that with no knowledge of the facts except that I know organization.

Q. What do you think of the idea of incorporating labor unions?

A. Well, I am old fashioned enough to believe that it doesn't do any harm to put publicity and responsibility on a group which is using the savings of multitudes of people. Whether the exact mechanism of doing it is the old fashioned corporation or not I don't know. I should certainly like to see publicity, which has been applied so effectively in the last few years in other areas, experimented with in that area.

Q. We have, of course, in the Army a military higher Army, but we recognize the desirability of leaders securing

the willing cooperation of their subordinates and for lack perhaps of a better term we state that that is one of the attributes of leadership. In the matter of terminology, could you give us a better term or phrase than leadership as implying the quality in a superior that does secure the willing cooperation of his subordinates?

A. No, because I don't think it is a bad word, you know. But I do think that in our researches in the field of human relations we are approaching the point now where we are coming to know some things that the Army ought to know. That's an egotistic and egocentric point of view, isn't it? There are some techniques to know in the handling of men, some of which I personally knew intuitively without realizing that I knew them but find that our researches define them, others that have enabled me to effect substantially my intuitive methods of handling men. Those techniques are at the point where they can and are being defined, can and are being taught. They are based on the thinking of men trained in psychology and psychiatry and physiology and social anthropology, trying to use the types of thinking pertinent to those areas in the study of human behavior in industry. They are, in my judgment, based on experience just as applicable to my problem in handling students and we are now at the point where our Assistant Deans are trained in these techniques to help them in the handling of students, some of them very specially trained in it. Where I apply some of the techniques consciously as an aid to my own handling of men I can't help thinking that they would be just as useful to Army officers as they are to me. But that's another story. I can't go on and give you a lecture on that because it would run to a couple of hours or more, and then I wouldn't do it as well as other people could do it.

Colonel Jordan: Admiral Conard, would you like to say something?

Admiral Conard: Well, sir, I am very much impressed with the lecture that the Dean has given us and my first reaction is that he has apparently outlined opinions that we have not exactly focused ourselves in our own minds but which are unconsciously the principles that we endeavor to operate under. It seems to me extremely valuable that we should recognize definitely that the elements that the Dean has pointed out are fundamental and take very complete

cognizance in our leadership or our planning of that human element and the very important effect of its inter-relations on the organizations under us.

Colonel Jordan: For the benefit of The Army Industrial College class I want to give you this information. We have here today a group of officers who are studying under the Planning Branch and I want to ask one of those officers to say something. Colonel Jardine had some connection with the Department of Agriculture at one time, we understand, and I know he might perhaps ask the Dean some embarrassing question about the cotton crop or something of that kind.

Colonel Jardine: I am very glad to have been privileged to listen to this address by Dean Donham. I certainly agree with what he had to say. With respect to the Department of Agriculture, why most folks are trying to forget that I was ever identified with that. We'll pass that over for the time being. I started out to be a scientist. I wasn't able to get very far in that field because I was always edged over into an administrative job, and so it has been going on now since 1904. Dean Donham has brought up a matter here today that I have been harping on for a good many years as a consequence of my experience in building organizations and handling human beings. It is a matter that I am constantly bringing to the attention of the faculty now. I have a faculty with psychologists in it and with sociologists in it and with various specialists in it. If I have a problem to solve with the students — and there are problems occasionally with students — I never ask the psychologists to tell me how they are going to react and how to handle the situation. They are the last ones in the world I would ever ask. I am in charge of a municipal university and they have many problems common to municipal universities because the constituency is right on your front dooryard. I would never send our sociologists to straighten them out — they would be the last ones I would send. Sociologists ought to know human reactions, how folks work together in groups, etc. I admit that we have got to have a certain amount of technique but I don't care how perfect the technique is. Unless it is handled by the right man you are very likely not to get the cooperation of the ones down below. You have just simply got to feel it; it is a characteristic of leadership. Any man that is going to work with inanimate things perhaps does not need to possess that leadership, but you do if you are going to be a great teacher or leader. We are all here from captains to colonels and we are being brought

in to Washington to be advised, to get further training because chances are we are going to be in charge of men either as an executive, with a construction crew, or with the troops in the field, etc., and we need to possess some of the qualities the Dean has just pointed out. I need to have them in a faculty to have good teachers. Now I have to have Ph.D.'s in a faculty because we have the crediting institutions which won't recognize you if you don't have a Ph.D. Not having as much money as Harvard and Yale to get Ph.D.'s I have to take these youngsters that they turn out. Every one of these universities says, "We have Ph.D.'s and they are great teachers. Take them. If you fill up your faculty with them we will credit you." This is what I run into. I discover that the kind of a Ph.D. that I have to take with my \$3,000 or \$3,500 is a youngster that has never been out of school. He has been in school all the time. It doesn't make any difference about his age. I don't find him often to be a great teacher. He doesn't possess some of the characteristics, although you do get them occasionally. I am trying to find human beings that have Ph.D.'s. I am trying to refuse to bring anyone into the faculty that isn't a normal human being. He must know how to laugh and play and even curse, and also be educated. He is the most likely man to be developed into a great leader, a great teacher. I am after leaders, teachers. It applies to a faculty just as it does to the handling of men in field or factory. I don't know just what it is -- the Dean has explained it better than I have ever heard it before. I have had that feeling out of my experience as an administrative officer. That has been about all I have been doing for the last thirty-five years, handling men, building up organizations, keeping them happy, working together, team work, -- and also letting them do most of the work. To know how to handle human beings is the hardest job, much harder than it is to handle inanimate things. I have often said to engineers that they gave altogether too much attention to training men to handle concrete and steel, etc., and not enough attention to handling human beings. If engineering courses took that into account much more than they do today or did five years ago -- they are beginning to do more of it -- we would have more engineers as our great leaders and not just experts. They haven't understood or been taught the importance of knowing how to handle human beings, the reactions of human beings, which is a very, very important matter; and you must have it if you know how to handle men and are going to get on with organizations and groups. This is about all.

I am just glad I have been here and heard the Dean. We all know about the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard, and occasionally we have a man who is worthy of going there. When they go there they do know how to handle jobs when they get out. Most students are lost. The Dean has pointed out some very practical, genuine things that we need to consider here in this school and in universities and elsewhere among men who are going to handle people.

Colonel Jordan: Thank you, sir. Colonel Harris, would you care to say anything?

Colonel Harris: I would like to ask the Dean one question. The War Department has always opposed the draft of labor in war, believing it to be unnecessary and that it would confuse rather than help. Our industrial plans are based on the premise that both labor and capital will cooperate fully in the unfortunate event of war. Do you consider that a sound premise or not?

A. Things can be done in a national emergency that are impossible under any other conditions, quite obviously. Many of the ordinary rules break down in the face of fear of invasion. I believe, nevertheless, that for a long war -- I don't know why I am answering your question because I don't consider I have any competence to answer -- the War Department and the Navy Department and the other organizations which will so completely dominate our living and thinking should restrict that domination to the essential minimum and do it there without the slightest hesitation. Restrict that domination to the essential minimum rather than blanketwise on some social theory, going ahead and uprooting all our roots simultaneously. Now, that is on the assumption which, if we have a long war, may be an assumption contrary to the fact that we hope to emerge from that long war with a democracy. I personally believe that if your social theory is that you want to emerge from a long war with a dictatorship that a sure way to bring it about is to start by regimenting everybody in war. If you want to leave any shred of hope that we will emerge from another long war with a democracy I think you had better go pretty slow in destroying any more of the little ways of men than you have to. Does that answer your question?

Colonel Harris: The real question I wanted the answer to is, do you believe that labor and capital will willingly

cooperate in an emergency and not have to have these controls imposed upon them?

A. I do. I should certainly approach it on the assumption that it would and see if it worked, and I think it would. But I think you will find arguments the other way, based on all the kinds of mythical injustices, etc., some actual injustices, just as your draft which you will have and which you did have in the last war, is unjust; that is, it is a pretty attenuated form of justice that makes the question of whether a man leaves his family and goes to the front. It is justice in one sense, but it is pretty attenuated. We don't ordinarily like to see our justice go on the flip of a coin. I believe in the draft, but I don't believe in it on any theory of justice, I am afraid. It doesn't work out that way, as a matter of fact, because a lot of fellows volunteer, as we all know, whether they are drafted or not. You are asking me a question about a point to which I haven't given a lot of thought. I am answering it on the general philosophy that I hold, that the stability of organized society depends on the little ways of men and their spontaneous collaboration and that you monkey with those little ways at your peril. It doesn't mean that you never should monkey with it at all. In war you have got to. But in the first place, with all the pacifism which is rampant in this country today I think it would change overnight if you had a real emergency. It is unintelligent in its form of expression. It is the expression of a national desire to keep out of war which I suppose is unquestionably shared fully by every man in this room although you are devoting your lives to training yourselves, most of you, for war. Some of us believe that the way to keep out of war is to be sufficiently ready that we don't have to go into war. Other people feel that being ready means we are going to get into one. The Boston police strikes seem to me to have some illuminating sidelights on that problem. It was a fairly dramatic demonstration of the fact that while police are fairly inconspicuous in a community they are very necessary. Without them the forces of evil go on a spree. I watched them go on that spree, so I don't like sprees of that kind. I can imagine conditions under which in a war everything was regimented. I believe that you get better results without it than you would with it, but I can imagine conditions under which everything had to be regimented.

Colonel Jordan: Captain Allen, would you say something?

Captain Allen: I am very much interested in what the Dean had to say. I would like very much to have him come aboard a well organized Navy ship. It is probably the best illustration of what he has been driving at today that you could possibly find.

Dean Donham: I was in the shipbuilding business once. Then your ships weren't well organized?

Captain Allen: I want you to see the organization and the men, not the ship's structure. They are still the old iron and wooden ships. In that connection we have tried at the Naval Academy to put into young men the ideas that you were expressing here today. One of our ablest leaders as an Admiral was asked to write a book that could be used by these young men, and he turned the thing down. Admiral Sellers himself, who is now the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, wrote a great deal of material that went into the first book on leadership, but he would not allow his name to be placed with that material. We have a book on leadership at the Naval Academy now, and we are trying to put into young men the ideals in some form or other that Dean Donham talks about, how successful is hard to tell. I believe that there has to be in every man a certain essential something to make a leader out of him before you can mold it in such a way as to make a good leader out of him. But I would like to ask the Dean -- I don't know about this anthropology. It didn't strike a very responsive chord in my ideas of teaching leadership. Perhaps it is ethics; perhaps it is religion. I don't know exactly what it has that we haven't got in our ability to teach leadership. Perhaps it is the social anthropology that he was telling us about.

Dean Donham: Well, I know that sounds weird to a bunch of highbrows like you. But I had struggled for quite a number of years to get what seemed to me to be an intelligent perception of the forces that work in America with the handicap that when you are studying America you are studying 120,000,000 people in an exceedingly complex situation. The suggestion of one of my young associates to those he is tutoring is always that they shall pick out a subject that is old and dead enough to stay still while they study it. Now, America won't stay still while you are studying it. Yet it is essential, if you happen to have the irritating type of intellectual curiosity that makes me unhappy if it

is a subject I can't get any leads into whatever. It is an annoying thing to be afflicted with. I deliberately decided that perhaps if I would go back and really study second-hand some primitive society that would stay still while I studied it, that was small enough so that I could see the forces at work second-hand, because a man like Malinowski is a great interpreter, perhaps out of that study I would get some conception that would help me to feel and think about America. And I did. Without my inadequate background in social anthropology I would be unable, for example, to have made the address I made last evening or the address I made this morning. Now I find it useful, that is all I can say. I find it useful because those little Islands are small enough to think about, and I can look at America and find every one of these same types of social situations in America. I begin to think that perhaps they have the same kind of significance in America that they have among the Trobriand Islanders. There may be nothing to it. Because I was afraid there was nothing to it, we used the same methods in studying two American communities. One was Newburyport, a New England town in process of transition, where we went in with a group of social anthropologists and really picked the community to pieces, with the cooperation of the community, to see how that tied together. It tied together similarly to the Island. Then we went back to the black belt in the Mississippi and picked Natchez to pieces in the same way and there were curious similarities again with the Trobriand Islands. Then another group of men from the University closely related to the other studies went to the West Coast of Ireland and studied the West Coast Irish peasants and again there were curious similarities in the way the things tied together. We are now trying to get money to go into India and study a slow moving civilization to see if we can learn more about it. What we have now is the dead civilization, the primitive type of civilization which, until the white man touches it, goes on constantly changing but at a pace so slowly that you don't see the change, and the fast moving civilization that won't stay still long enough even in Natchez or Newburyport to tie it together. We have men ready and we are trying to get the money to make some studies in India where the communities are in motion but moving more slowly than the primitive societies that a few of these social anthropologists have studied. My interest is not, frankly, because I have any great interest in preserving the historic understanding of these vanishing primitive

tribes. I never got awfully "het up" on that. My interest arises out of the fact that it orders my thinking as nothing else ever has done in some areas. That is why we go in for social anthropology. I find that over and over again I have been able to give men who are puzzled an interpretation that seemed to them to add to their understanding which was in fact based on psychology, not in the laboratory but in the sense of social psychology and social anthropology. Does that answer your question?

Captain Allen: Yes.

Colonel Jordan: Dean, I want to tell you how much we appreciate your coming here.

Dean Donham: I always like to come here, you know.

Colonel Jordan: I do wish the class could have heard the Dean's talk last night. It was one of the most outstanding talks I have ever listened to. It was not quite as good as the one he has given us this morning, but almost.