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PERSONNEL FOR PROCUREMENT

by

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PERSONNEL FOR PROCUREMENT

Since I speak as a member of the Planning Branch, I think I should at the very beginning point out briefly the position of that organization with reference to personnel affairs of the supply arms and services. In the early days of procurement planning, considerable attention was given in the Planning Branch to such matters, even to the extent of allocating funds for the training of Reserve officers. But now, with policies more or less shaken down, the current attitude is toward a minimum of action along personnel lines. The guiding motive is that each branch must solve its own personnel problem within the limits of established policy.

Before an audience of this character it is manifestly unnecessary to discuss the broad general phases of the problem, and so I shall confine my comments to facts which I hope will picture in outline the situation as it now exists. What I have to offer is based on Planning Branch records, on various mobilization plans, and on conferences with personnel and procurement planning officers of the supply arms and services. Much of the statistical information I have to give you is relatively exact, while a small part of it, if the truth be known, may place me in that bracket which encompasses both liars and statisticians. And, if statements are made which indicate that some branches have made further progress than others in personnel planning, it is certainly not done with the idea of invidious comparison. It must be remembered that personnel planning of necessity has had second priority, it could not logically be carried on with any degree of thoroughness until the materiel situation had been developed in reasonably complete outline.

To define the term "personnel for procurement" is simple, as understood in our office it denotes all military and civilian personnel who will be required in the event of war for the various manufacturing and purchasing activities of the supply arms and services (excluding local procurement at posts, camps, and stations), for the supervisory functions of the Office of The Assistant Secretary of War, and for the Army and Navy Munitions Board. But to apply the definition quantitatively is not so easy, there are instances when the line separating persons properly chargeable to procurement from those who are not becomes tenuous or fades out entirely. This is true chiefly because certain organizations have procurement functions mixed in with other responsibilities. Arbitrary decisions have to be made, and for that reason any two investigators probably would arrive at slightly divergent results.

Since consideration of personnel matters naturally involves knowing what procurement agencies are to be set up or expanded, I think we should review briefly the establishments involved. There are perhaps more than some of you may have imagined.

The Air Corps will procure aircraft and related materiel from Wright Field and six procurement district offices - New York, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles. It is expected that the

first contracts will be placed from Wright Field, with the district offices taking over most of the procurement load as soon as they are organized and capable of doing so (Chart appended)

The Coast Artillery Corps will procure submarine mines and equipment from the Submarine Mine Depot at Fort Morroe

The Corps of Engineers will purchase materiel through six district offices - New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Birmingham, Chicago, and San Francisco - except that anti-aircraft searchlights, aerial mapping equipment, and special types of locomotives will be purchased by the Supply Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers. It will also establish power district offices in Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Galveston, Mobile, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco, Seattle, and Wilmington, North Carolina. Although assisting in the mobilization of electric power is not really procurement, I have included the personnel therefor in tabulations which are to follow (Chart appended)

Chemical Warfare Service plans contemplate no purchasing from Washington, but entirely through six district offices - Boston, New York, Birmingham, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and San Francisco. They also provide for conducting certain chemical operations at Edgewood Arsenal, setting up two shell-filling plants elsewhere, and establishing four gas mask assembly plants. The first assembly plant for masks is to be at Edgewood Arsenal and will be operated by the government, the others are to be set up and operated by private companies. Chemical Warfare Service materiel is to be tested at Edgewood Arsenal, or at certain Ordnance Proving Grounds when expedient (Chart appended)

The Medical Department will purchase practically everything through seven district offices - Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, Chicago, and San Francisco. These purchasing offices are to be integral parts of Medical supply depots (Chart appended)

The Ordnance Department will purchase mostly through 14 district offices - Boston, Hartford, New York, Rochester, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Birmingham, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis and San Francisco. Additional procurement offices may be established in Richmond, Virginia, and Houston, Texas. Contracts for propellant powder, explosives, and cartridge cloth will be signed in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. The six existing manufacturing arsenals - Rock Island Picatinny, Frankford, Watervliet, Watertown, and Springfield Armory - will of course operate at maximum capacity. Three proving grounds for testing ammunition will be operated - Conneautville, Pennsylvania, Savanna, Illinois, and Nashville, Tennessee. Artillery ammunition will be loaded at 5 converted renovating plants (Delaware, Curtis Bay, Narsemond, Charleston, and Savanna Ordnance Depots), at 5 Government operated loading plants (Erie, Narsemond, Curtis Bay, and Delaware Ordnance Depots, and at Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania), and at 10 privately-operated loading plants (Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland--2 plants, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati--3 plants, Birmingham--2 plants). Chemical ammunition will be loaded in government operated plants at Edgewood Arsenal and at Columbia, Tenn (Chart appended)

The Quartermaster Corps plans call for setting up nine zone headquarters - Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Jeffersonville, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, San Antonio, and San Francisco - from which the bulk of the purchasing will be conducted. Procurement sub-offices will also be established at - Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Winston-Salem, Akron, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Dallas, Seattle, Portland, and Los Angeles. Horses and mules are to be purchased from Remount Purchasing and Breeding Headquarters at Front Royal, Lexington, Kansas City, Colorado Springs, Fort Douglas, Fort Worth, and San Mateo. A small fraction of the clothing and tentage required will be manufactured at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot. A small amount of equipment will be manufactured at the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot. Bear in mind that the foregoing enumeration does not include the quartermasters at posts, camps, and stations, who will do a certain amount of local procurement for purely local consumption. (Chart appended)

The Signal Corps will conduct all purchasing through four district offices - New York, Chicago, Birmingham, and San Francisco. It will operate a pigeon breeding and training center at Fort Monmouth, N. J. (Chart appended)

In five branches, procurement personnel will have little or nothing to do with storage and issue, while in three - the Coast Artillery Corps, the Medical Department, and Quartermaster Corps - there will be a certain amount of overlapping. The idea there is for experts on certain commodities to deal with them more or less from factory to troops.

Regular Army officers are to head the Medical Department, Quartermaster Corps and Signal Corps procurement districts. Reserve officers will be in charge of those of the Air Corps and Corps of Engineers. Chiefs of Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance Department Districts are to serve either as officers or civilians according to decisions made when war comes. At the moment, all of the Chemical Warfare Service district chiefs are civilians with no military status, as are nearly half of the Ordnance district chiefs.

It is felt in the Ordnance Department and Chemical Warfare Service that procurement of noncommercial items in large quantities will involve more activity than the placement of contracts and inspection of delivered products, that more or less follow-up work will be necessary, and that considerable organizing may have to be done within districts because so many plants which will produce major items must obtain some of the components and subassemblies elsewhere. With that in mind, it is thought that a civilian district chief could take short cuts and exert influence through channels and by methods which would be less accessible to him as an officer.

The feeling that Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service procurement will involve more or less industrial integration is further reflected by the existence of district advisory boards. Each district of those two services has such a board, the membership consisting of recognized leaders

in various lines of industrial activity. Under peacetime conditions, use is made of the boards chiefly by consultation with individual members rather than by formal board session. Most of the members reside fairly near district headquarters, although some may be in distant cities, for example, the San Francisco Chemical Warfare Service Board has members in Portland and Seattle. The number of members varies, averaging about ten or a dozen.

Very few warrant officers and enlisted men are required for procurement activities, as follows:

Installation	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men						Total
		FD	CAC	CWS	M D	O D	S C	
Submarine Mine Depot (1)			4					4
Orinance Arsenal (2)	1	12			41	57		110
Pigeon Breeding & Training Center (3)							82	82
Edgewood Arsenal (CWS) (4) (5)		25			248			273
Edgewood CWS Proving Ground (6)				157				157
Totals	1	37	4	157	289	57	82	626


Thus something over 600 enlisted men chargeable to procurement activities would be required, not including about 1,400 chemical plant employees at Edgewood Arsenal who might be put into uniform. Because some of the shell-filling and other chemical operations to be conducted there are extremely hazardous, it might be necessary to place the persons engaged thereon under full military control, and as detailed plans are developed, a military grade is assigned to each position along with the appropriate civil service job designation.

Computation of the requirements for civilian employees for the district offices and for procurement activities in the Washington offices has been completed, including with a few exceptions the occupations and rates of pay. In many cases civil service job designations have been used. They are as follows:

Agency	Employees		Total
	washington	Districts	
War Resources Administration	131		131
Army & Navy Munitions Board	128		128
Office of The Asst Secy of War	316		316
Air Corps	419*	1,719	2,138
Corps of Engineers, less Power Dists	30	382	412
Corps of Engineers, Power Districts		113	113
Chemical Warfare Service	51	465	516
Medical Department	44	274	318
Orinance Department	1,049	11,487	12,536
Quartermaster Corps	603	**7,823	8,426
Signal Corps	41	1,124	1,165
Totals	2,812	23,387	26,199

(1) Mob Plan, CAC (3) Mob Plan, Sig C (5) Mob Plan, M. D
 (2) Personnel Office, O C Ord (4) Mob Plan, F D. (6) Proc. Pl Office, O C. CWS
 *Procurement Section, Materiel Division, O C A S, is at Wright Field
 **Includes Remount Purchasing and Breeding Headquarters.

Expressed graphically, the totals are



That total of 26,129 represents about 90 separate classes of occupations. The Ordnance Department plans show the greatest variety, over 50 groupings. Time will not permit delving into each category, but the main classifications are these:

Inspectors	9,831	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clerks	4,434	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clerk-Stenographers)	3,170	<input type="checkbox"/>
Stenographers		
Clerk-Typists)	1,686	<input type="checkbox"/>
Typists		
Laborers	1,108	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engineers	734	<input type="checkbox"/>
Draftsmen	715	<input type="checkbox"/>
Messengers	524	<input type="checkbox"/>
Admn Assts.	341	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chauffeurs	293	<input type="checkbox"/>
Accountants)	290	<input type="checkbox"/>
Auditors (
Bookkeepers)		
Technical Assistants	275	<input type="checkbox"/>
Guards & Watchmen	191	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clerical, Admin & Fiscal	*1,667	<input type="checkbox"/>
All others	840	<input type="checkbox"/>

Among the "all others" are 41 classifications, comprising among them telephone and telegraph operators, blueprint and photostat operators, mimeograph operators, clerks, janitors, attorneys, gage checkers, statisticians, nurses and social service workers, librarians, historians, metallurgists, and so on. The requirements in this latter miscellaneous group of 840 vary in number from 74 guards and watchmen on down to one electrician.

Thus we see that inspectors constitute by far the largest group, approximately 37% of the total. Their recruitment and training will probably be one of the larger personnel problems. Conversely, a sizable percentage of the total, comprising many of the clerks, stenographers, typists, laborers, messengers, chauffeurs, guards and watchmen should not be especially difficult to obtain and organize.

*Occupations not stated

It may interest you to know the comparative requirements for civilian employes by geographical distribution. Adding up the figures contained in the various mobilization plans gives these results

City	Total Number Employes Required*
New York	3516
Chicago	2780
Hartford	2594
Washington	2393
Jeffersonville	2154
Cleveland	1850
St. Louis	1404
Pittsburgh	1138
San Francisco	1126
Philadelphia	1102
Detroit	1101
Boston	535
Atlanta	606
Cincinnati	605
Rochester	400
Dayton**	419
Los Angeles	369
Buffalo	318
San Antonio	295
Baltimore	293
Birmingham	244
Akron	224
Seattle	140
Winston-Salem	76
Kansas City	73
Portland, Ore	58
Minneapolis	49
Fort Douglas	47
Leavington	47
Colorado Springs	33
Fort Reno	33
Dallas	16
Galveston	7
Mobile	7
Wilmington, N C	7

As you might have supposed, the greatest number of employes would be required by the New York District offices, the second largest number in Chicago, and so on. But not all the persons charged to each city would be employed therein, many would be inspectors at factories elsewhere in the area under jurisdiction of the district office. Incidentally, the requirements for each of those 35 cities have been computed in terms of occupations and supply arm or service.

*Bear in mind that these figures do not include manufacturing establishments

**Procurement Section, Materiel Division, O C A. C., at Wright Field

The 26,000-odd employes we have been considering are a sizable group, but they are only about one-fourth of the total required for procurement. Manufacturing establishments and loading plants will take at least 70,000 more. Work on compiling the requirements for manufacturing activities is incomplete, but it is possible to give a preliminary summary as follows:

Quartermaster Manufacturing Activities	- 1,784
Chemical Warfare Service Manufacturing Activities	- 8,160 (Est.)
Ordnance Department Arsenals	- 42,615 (Approx.)
Ordnance Department Loading Plants, Govt. Operated-	<u>18,000 (Est.)</u>
Total for manufacturing	- 70,559

Because compilations are not complete, it is impossible to state the total requirement for manufacturing activities in terms of occupations. However, the following table gives some of the trades shown in the mobilization plans for the Ordnance Department arsenals

ORDNANCE ARSENALS (LESS PICATINNY ARSENAL)


<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No. Employes Required</u>
Machinists	5,231
Operators, Machine tool	5,212
Inspectors	2,346
Operators, Machine, Small arms ammunition	1,797
Tool designers, makers, and dressers	1,776
Bench hands	1,651
Helpers	1,467
Laborers	1,441
Clerks	1,251
Assemblers	978
Foremen and Assistant Foremen - Various	506
Stenographers and Typists	481
Welders	479
Instrument Makers and Assemblers	473
Engineers, Production - and Assistants	463
Tool and material keepers	423
Movemen	386
Police, guards, and watchmen	369
Machine Adjusters	367
Checkers, computers, estimators	354
Carpenters and Box makers	323
Draftsmen	294
Blacksmiths and drop forgers	286
Electricians and linemen	262
Gang bosses	247
Other categories	4,752 (Approx.)


It is not practicable at the current stage in planning to make an estimate of the proportion of skilled labor required. Nevertheless, an indication may be given by the experience of Rock Island

Arsenal during the World War, where the classification was about as follows


Supervisory, clerical, and draftsmen - - - - -	13%
Skilled labor - - - - -	18%
Unskilled labor, including persons (specialists)	
skilled in one thing only - - - - -	48%
Laborers, janitors, sweepers, etc - - - - -	<u>21%</u>
	100%


Comparing the total number of employees required for procurement (including manufacturing) with those already on hand who are engaged on manufacturing, purchasing activities, and procurement planning shows the degree of expansion contemplated: *


 O.A.S.W.)
 A.N.M.B.) 36/575 - (1/16)
 W.R.A.)





Quarter-)
 master) **3000/9174
 Corps) (1/3)

 Medical)
 Dept.) 21/318 - (1/15)

 Corps of)
 Engineers) 11/525 - (1/44)

 Signal)
 Corps) 30/1165 - (1/39)

 Air)
 Corps) 240/2137 - (1/9)



Ordnance)
 Dept) 8442/73,150 - (1/9)

 Chemical)
 Warfare) 575/8160 - (1/14)
 Service)

*Small black square = on hand.
 Unshaded square = total requirements.

**1800 now on C.C.C. work.

Thus the greatest expansion is to be in the Corps of Engineers, 11 to 525, or a ratio of 44 to 1. The Quartermaster Corps will have the least expansion, while the Ordnance Department will account for 78% of the total (97,054) civilian employes required. The total number on hand is 12,355.

There is little to say about plans for recruiting the additional civilian employes. Practically all the mobilization plans specify that civil service channels and methods will be employed initially, but add the thought that other and more direct means may have to be invoked. There is an almost unanimous feeling of pessimism as to the effectiveness after M-Day of the customary peace-time routine of obtaining employes. The Corps of Engineers, however, is in a singularly fortunate position because the Rivers and Harbors District employes may be considered a reservoir from which practically all those needed for war procurement could be drawn. The office employes for example number about 5,500, and among the inspectors are many who are already familiar with equipment which the Corps of Engineers would purchase. Indeed, at least one District executive has already selected by name from Rivers and Harbors rolls about half the employes his procurement district would need. Engineer officers who have considered the matter feel that their procurement district rolls could be filled almost 100% by transfers.

Plans for training employes are few, and are apparently not considered necessary except for inspectors, key men in Ordnance loading plants, and for certain C & S activities. The Air Corps intends to set up a school in each of its procurement districts for training inspectors, the duration of study being from 10 days to 3 months according to the prior experience of the trainees. The Signal Corps scheme of District organization provides for a training section in the inspection division. Ordnance Department plans contemplate training inspectors and inspector instructors at the arsenals, and there is in existence a very elaborate plan for training key men for loading plants. Unfortunately that particular plan is considered obsolescent due to age. In the Quartermaster Corps, work is now under way on a comprehensive scheme for inspector training. In the Chemical Warfare Service the ground work is now being laid for development of inspection manuals and training courses. To sum up for the five branches just mentioned, the need for training inspectors and a few other employes is fully recognized and has provoked much thought, but there is still very little on paper. The press of other work has interfered. In the Corps of Engineers and Medical Department no formal training for any of the employes is contemplated.

Turning now to Reserve officers the total requirements are

O A S W	150	C D	2,295
A C	477	Q M C	820
C. A. C	2,	S C	114
C E.	272.	F D *	6
C W.S.	706	M C **	6
M D	40	V C **	?


* For Ordnance arsenals.

**For Remount Purchasing Boards

Disregarding the last 3 groups (Finance, M C , & V C), the aggregate is 4,874. Expressed in terms of percentage of the aggregate

The Ordnance Department represents	47 1% (approx)
The Quartermaster Corps represents	16 8% "
The Chemical Warfare Service represents	14 5% "
The Air Corps represents	9 8% "
The Corps of Engineers represents	5 5% "
The O A S W. represents	3 1% "
The Signal Corps represents	2 3% "
The Medical Department represents	8% "

In terms of grades, the pyramid of rank is broad at the base and not very steep, captains and lieutenants comprise 75% of the total.



Written job specifications for about 44% of the required officers of the Reserve Corps have been prepared. They are somewhat general in nature, referring briefly to the work to be performed, and the knowledge and experience the prospective officer should possess. There is no uniformity among the supply arms and services as to the form and content of those specifications, and while less than half of the positions have been covered, what has been accomplished represents a great advance. In the early years of procurement planning before such specifications were in existence many officers were commissioned without definite assignments in view, or without close analysis of the work they would have to perform. Naturally, some mistakes were made - and in the slow movement of personnel affairs, errors are not promptly corrected.

There are now enrolled and assigned to procurement some 2,347 Reserve officers, or 48% of the total required.

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No Enrolled</u>	<u>% of branch requirement</u>
O A S.W	40	27%
A C	215	43%
C E	17	54%
C W S	54	77%
M D	44	110%
O D	92	43%
Q M C	305	37%
S C	60	52%

Branch	Average elapsed time between 2-week tours		No active duty	
	Fiscal Year 1937 Basis	1919-1937 Average	Number	Per Cent
O A S. W	3 6 years	3 6 years	4	10%
A C	*16 5 "	3 4 "	13	6%
C E	7 5 "	3 6 "	13	9%
C W S	6 7 "	5 4 "	147	27%
M D	6 3 "	7 1 "	19	43%
O D	7 4 "	4.2 "	197	20%
Q M C	7 0 "	4 5 "	58	19%
S C	4 0 "	3.2 "	10	16%
Total- -			461	Ave 19 6%

Those long intervals between active duty period emphasize with significant clarity the importance of matching the various procurement positions not only with Reserve officers whose general ability is of high grade, but also whose occupations in civil life correspond very closely to their prospective war-time assignments

And right here is a good place to answer the unspoken question some of you doubtless have in mind. How many of the officers have civil occupations corresponding to their assignments? The answer is that about 50% have work reasonably similar. That condition is due to a variety of causes - non-existence of job specifications until recently, the now passing business depression, and the fact that you cannot commission a young man as Second Lieutenant and predict what his work in civil life will be years hence. An added reason of course is the fact that some of the positions have no counterpart in the business world.

The infrequency of active duty also emphasizes the importance of inactive duty. Current War Department policy requires at least 100 hours of inactive duty per 5-year appointment, although exemptions are granted in a few instances on the basis of suitable civil occupation. However, there is a rapidly accelerating feeling that all officers should have at least one active duty tour per 5-year appointment and should give at least 100 additional hours of their own time. That is an average of 20 inactive hours a year - not quite two a month. Surely such a modest requirement is not unreasonable.

What then is to be done in order to earn inactive credits? The first thought naturally is correspondence courses. But although the supply arms and services have many of such courses, few relate directly to procurement. Those given this year (1937-1938 course) are as follows

(See next page)

*On Fiscal Year 1936 basis, about 5 years

650

Title of Course	Using Arm or Service and Number of Hours in Course									
	SEC	AC	CE	CWS	MD	OD	QMC	SC	FD	
Industrial Mobilization	48	48	18	48		48	48	48	48	
Commercial Law - Contracts	22	22	22	22		22	22	22	22	
Supply Div , O C. of Engineers			15							
The Engineer Procurement Dist			16							
Production Div , Edgewood Arsenal					6					
Chemical Warfare Procurement					14					
Arsenal Organization & Admin						38				
Orl. Dist Organization & Admin						15				
Inspection Principles & Methods						28				
Gages, jigs, & fixtures						24				
Proving Ground Org & Admin						18				
Principles of Proof Work						24				
Current Procurement & Distribution							18			
Mass Procurement							27			
Signal Corps Procurement								10		
TOTALS	70	70	101	90		217	115	110	70	

Remembering that planning for procurement and industrial mobilization is a recent innovation in military preparedness, and since thought on the subject has been far from crystallized, it is not surprising that so few have been developed. As time goes on, there will doubtless be more.

Means of solving the inactive duty problem varies with each branch. In our own office we are giving individual assignments corresponding as closely as possible to each officer's occupation. To cite one example, a steel man is keeping up for us a running study on the steel scrap situation in the United States. As to the supply arms and services (using last year's figures) in four districts there are weekly meetings where the officers get down to serious study, in about ten there are bi-weekly meetings, in about ten there are occasional meetings, in about fifteen there are almost no meetings, and in the remainder instructional meetings are held about once a month. Probably about half the officers assigned are reached by such instruction in the district offices. But when all is said and done, unless each reserve officer is a competent business man whose talents fit him for his potential task, all the instruction he can be given will be wasted. It is his everyday occupation and position which must furnish his fundamental training.

Recruitment of additional officers for procurement immediately before or after M-Day is to be handled by each branch individually, operating through such channels as are prescribed at the time. Procurement planning officers in the districts feel that they can locate promptly candidates of the desired qualifications by consulting business leaders in their districts, and about half of those district executives have a list of prospective candidates by name either in mind or actually on paper.

Perhaps as time goes on it may be practicable to develop some comprehensive data on potential officer candidates by enlisting the cooperation of trade and technical societies, the way being pointed out by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, The Secretary of that agency,

Colonel Davies, proposes to catalog the membership according to knowledge of matters which have a potential bearing on war procurement and industrial mobilization, and to make that information available to the War and Navy Departments when an emergency arises.

Plans for training officers newly commissioned after M-Day are not comprehensive, the feeling being that most of the training must be obtained on the job. However, in a few cases the actual details of proposed training courses have been drawn up and included in district mobilization plans. Two weeks seems to be about the maximum time allowed although in the Mobilization Plan for our office (O.A.S.W.) you will find a one-month training course outlined. The plans now under preparation for training inspectors, which I mentioned in connection with civilian employes, will include officers also.

Before leaving the subject of reserve officers, two matters in connection with the Civilian Conservation Corps may be mentioned. About 92 of the 2,347 assigned to procurement have been on duty with the CCC, as follows:

RESERVE OFFICERS - SERVICE WITH CCC, to 10-1-37									
Duration of duty	Number of Officers								Total
	OAS	AG	CE	CWS	MD	OD	QMC	SC	
Less than 6 months			1	2	4		3		10
6 - 12 months			3	4			8	7	22
12 - 18 months			1		2		6	2	11
18 - 24 months			1	1			4	2	8
24 - 36 months			1		5		5	14	25
36 - 48 months			2		3		2	6	13
48 months or over				2	1				3
			9	9	15		25	34	92

One inference to be drawn from that table is that at least 4% have had intermittent civil employment during recent years.

Another item of interest is the number of reserve officers who have had experience for 6 months or more in purchasing supplies for the CCC. According to data furnished by Corps Area Commanders, the numbers are

(1933 to 1937)

Branch	No. Officers	Branch	No. Officers
A.C.	9	Inf.	74
C.E.	23	Cav.	16
C.W.S.	1	F.A.	30
M.D.	11	C.A.C.	23
O.D.	2	A.G.D.	1
Q.M.C.	181	J.A.G.D.	1
S.C.	6	F.D.	3
		M.I.D.	3
		Total	384

The names of those officers are recorded They can be considered a valuable reservoir of officers somewhat familiar with purchasing standard commercial articles.

Regular Army officers would constitute only about 5% of the total procurement officer complement Requirements by branch, and numbers of Army Industrial College graduates are shown by this table

REGULAR ARMY GRADUATES OF ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE
INCLUDING CLASS OF 1937 (as of June, 1937)

Branch	Graduates (c)		Required for War Proc			% Grad. vs. Req.
	Active List	% of Branch	For Branch	For OASW	Total	
A.C.	69	4.8%	21	6	27	255%
C.E	50	8.0%	11(b)	6	17	294%
C.W S	26	28.2%	21	2	23	113%
M.D.	30	2.1%	8	3	11	272%
O.D.	97	30.1%	89	10	99	98%
Q.M.C.	98	12.5%	58	8	66	148%
S.C.	31	12.0%	4	4	8	387%
C.A.C	14	1.4%	3		3	466%
Cav.	11	1.2%				
F.A.	8	.5%				
Inf	15	.4%				
F.D.	16	12.5%		2	2	800%
A.G.D.	3	2.8%				
J.A.G.D	4	3.8%		2	2	200%
(a),				14	14	
Totals	472		215	57	272(d)	173%


- (a) Any arm or service.
- (b) Includes 4 retired colonels.
- (c) Navy graduates on the active list 61.
- (c) Marine Corps graduates active list 17.
- (d) About 254 now on current procurement, procurement planning, or manufacturing

Note that in some branches there is a much wider field of choice in selection of Industrial College graduates for assignment to war procurement posts than in others Note also the percentage of graduates each supply arm or service has on its rolls

In connection with the Industrial College, it may be of interest to forecast the probable number of graduates in future years Based on rates of attrition estimated by the Statistics Branch of the War Department General Staff and on the assumption that current policies regarding selection of students will continue, the number of Army graduates on the active list should rise to at least 700 by 1947, and then remain about constant The prediction for several years is shown herewith

GRADUATES OF ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE - ALL BRANCHES

PROBABLE NUMBER ON "CTIV" LIST



Very little definite consideration has been given to use of retired regular army officers for procurement activities. It is true that the plan for the Corps of Engineers calls for four retired Colonels to head their power zones, but in no other tables I have examined are retired officers included. Undoubtedly a few could be used, but most officers who have considered the matter feel that the field of selection would be drastically limited. Disregarding how many may or may not have

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had applicable experience, an estimate of the group which might be combed to find suitable men may be formed from this chart

RETIRED REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS OF THE SAS
 Less than 64 years of age Jan. 1, 1937


Branch	Disability, line of duty	Reason for Retirement			Other Reasons	Total
		Over 30 yrs. Service	Act. of July 31, '35	Sec. 24b, Act 6-4-20		
A.C.	73	5		5	2	85
C.E.	30	7	2	1	5	45
C.W.S.	7		1			8
M.D.	255	15	4	9	11	294
O.D.	19	1		3	2	25
Q M.C.	173	39	9	12	11	244
S.C.	21	4		2	1	28
Total	578	71	16	32	32	729

How many of those retired for disability in line of duty would be suitable for procurement work it is impossible to say. Based on retirements made during the period April, 1935, to October, 1936, at least 56% would be incapable of performing even limited service such as garrison duty or office work. Moreover, among the remaining 44% fit for limited service would be found certain individuals who were retired for physical disability while in Class B. Thus, if we take 44% of those retired for physical disability, and add to it those retired for other reasons (except the 32 retired as a result of Class B proceedings) we find that about 350 might be considered. However, among them are practically no Industrial College graduates. Note also that the Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service have very few retired officers under 64.

One other matter must be mentioned in closing, and that is personnel for the superagencies contemplated by the Industrial Mobilization Plan. No definite personnel plans have been made for any of them except the War Resources Administration, and for it there has been estimated the number of initially required office employees by occupation and Civil Service grade. There also has been prepared a plan for furnishing it with Army and Navy officers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board during the period of organization. Those officers are not to be in charge, but are expected to assist the civilian heads of the various divisions, and how long they would remain with the Administration would of course depend on circumstances. The contemplated flow of personnel is shown on this chart.

*Comment from office of the Surgeon General.

FLOW AND ADDITIONS OF PERSONNEL
(O A S , A N B , W R A)




* Less students

Dotted lines indicate civilian employes
Solid lines indicate officers.

AIR CORPS

Location of Procurement Installations




PROCUREMENT SECTION, MATERIEL DIV.,
AIR CORPS, WRIGHT FIELD, DAYTON, O.

Procurement District Offices:

- Buffalo, N.Y.
- Chicago, Ill.
- Cleveland, O.
- Detroit, Mich.
- Los Angeles, Cal.
- New York, N.Y.


CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Location of Procurement Installations



CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Location of Procurement Installations




SUPPLY DIVISION, OFF. CH. OF ENGINEERS.

Procurement District Offices:
Birmingham, Ala.
Chicago, Ill.
New York, N.Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
San Francisco, Cal.

Power District Offices:
Birmingham, Ala.
Boston, Mass.
Chicago, Ill.
Detroit, Mich.
Galveston, Tex.
Mobile, Ala.
New York, N.Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
St. Louis, Mo.
San Francisco, Cal.
Seattle, Wash.
Wilmington, N.C.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

Location of Procurement Installations



PROCUREMENT DISTRICT OFFICES

- Baltimore, Md.
- Boston, Mass.
- Chicago, Ill.
- New York, N.Y.
- Philadelphia, Pa.
- St. Louis, Mo.
- San Francisco, Cal.

(These will be integral parts of Medical Department depots located in those cities.)

ORDNANCE DEPT.

Location of Procurement Installations

Mfg. Service, Off., Ch. of Ord.
Procurement District Offices:

Baltimore, Md.
Birmingham, Ala.
Boston, Mass.
Chicago, Ill.
Cincinnati, O.
Cleveland, O.
Detroit, Mich.
Hartford, Conn.
New York, N. Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Rochester, N. Y.
St. Louis, Mo.
San Francisco, Calif.
Richmond, Va. (Tentative)
Houston, Tex. (Tentative)

Mfg. Arsenals

Frankford, Philadelphia, Pa.
Picatinny, Dover, N.J.
Rock Island, Rock Island, Ill.
Springfield Armory,
Springfield, Mass.
Watervliet, Watervliet, N.Y.
Watertown, Watertown, Mass.
(Boston)

Ammunition Proving Grounds


Conneautville, Pa.
Savanna, Ill.
Nashville, Tenn.

Artillery Ammun. Loading
Plants (Govt. Operated)

Tobyhanna, Pa.
Columbia, Tenn.
Nansemond Ord. Depot,
Portsmouth, Va.
Erie Ordnance Depot,
Port Clinton, O.
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
Delaware Ord. Depot,
Pedricktown, N.J.
Curtis Bay Ord. Depot,
Curtis Bay, Md.


Artillery Ammun. Loading
Plants (Privately Operated)

Birmingham, Ala. (2 plants)
Chicago, Ill.
Cincinnati (3 plants)
Cleveland, O.
Philadelphia, Pa.
St. Louis, Mo.
Pittsburgh, Pa.




SIGNAL CORPS

Location of Procurement Installations



QUARTERMASTER CORPS

Location of Procurement Installations



<u>QM ZONE HEADQUARTERS</u>	<u>REMOUNT PURCHASING & BREEDING HDQ. S.</u>
Boston, Mass.	Front Royal, Va.
New York, N.Y.	Lexington, Ky.
Philadelphia, Pa.	Kansas City, Kans.
Atlanta, Ga.	Colorado Springs, Colo.
Jeffersonville, Ind.	Fort Douglas, Utah.
Chicago, Ill.	Fort Worth, Tex.
St. Louis, Mo.	San Mateo, Cal.
San Antonio, Tex.	
San Francisco, Cal.	
<u>PROCUREMENT SUB-OFFICES</u>	<u>FACTORIES</u>
Akron, O.	Mfg. Division, Philadelphia, Pa.
Baltimore, Md.	Mfg. Department, Jeffersonville
Buffalo, N.Y.	Q.M. Depot.
Cleveland, O.	
Dallas, Tex.	
Detroit, Mich.	
Kansas City, Kans.	
Los Angeles, Cal.	
Minneapolis, Minn.	
Pittsburgh, Pa.	
Portland, Ore.	
Seattle, Wash.	
Winston-Salem, N.C.	

Discussion Following Lecture
"Personnel for Procurement"

by
Captain Wallace E. Niles, O. D.

The Army Industrial College
January 12, 1938

Colonel Scowden: Gentlemen, we have most certainly heard a very comprehensive talk on the personnel problem, the most comprehensive I have heard since I have been at this school. Captain Niles is now ready to extend his remarks, clarify any particular point, or answer any questions that you wish to bring up. The personnel situation has many angles and many phases to it and now is your opportunity to get further information.

Q. I have two questions I would like to ask and I do not quite know which to ask first. I will start out with this chart. It is an official chart, taken off the bulletin board of this College. It is the organization of the Planning Branch, Office of The Assistant Secretary of War. I am on the committee trying to investigate this personnel situation a little bit and I see here that civilian personnel and military personnel are classed with office supplies and mail and records. I would like to know how Captain Niles justifies that from the standpoint of the importance of personnel. I would like to read in connection with that this statement, quoted on numerous occasions by a number of general officers instated down at the Army War College: "Men, materials, and money constitute the science of war but the greatest of these is men." Down at the

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War College they teach that idea and we find here in our charts that officers and civilian personnel are classed with mail and records.

A. The chart to which Colonel Sawyer refers is the chart showing the war organization of The Assistant Secretary of War's office and he read from the administration division. In the administration division they have a mail and record section, a supply section, and two personnel sections: military personnel and civilian personnel. It is true that the personnel people are under the chief of the administration division but they are in a separate section. We did not quite feel that we could make a personnel division on a par with the requirements and priorities division headed by a general officer, or with the procurement plans division headed by a general officer, or with the commodities division headed by a Colonel and having some 35 officers in it. We thought we would probably get away by calling it a section. That is the situation.

Q. Of course it is very obvious to the class that I disagree with the idea of classing selection, classification, and assignment of personnel along with mail and records.

I have one other question, and I want to be fair both to myself and to Captain Niles because I have asked him one question and I am afraid I have not been fair with the question. I would like to be more fair this time. I have asked what the principles and policies were or are or should be which govern selection and classification of personnel. I must admit that I have asked instructors and others that same question; I have asked over at the

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War College and down at the General Staff, and I have not been able to get a very good answer. Down at the General Staff numerous officers in G-1 made the statement that there were no personnel specifications for G-1; that is, when it comes to the War Department to select a G-1 officer they have no specifications down there that they set up and check to see whether that officer meets those specifications. That is a very peculiar situation to me. Apparently we do not have any specifications, there are no specifications set up that I can find, for the officer personnel in the office of The Assistant Secretary of War. Maybe that is one reason that they class the selection of officers and civilian personnel and all this tremendous personnel problem along with mail and records. The only way to get it out of that kind of classification that I can see is to set up a specification for a personnel office. I would like to ask, and Captain Miles has not had a chance to think about it because I just thought of all this a minute ago, if off hand, with the privilege of correcting it, he could tell the class what he thinks the officer in charge of personnel selection and classification on this chart (designating War Organization, O.A.S.W. chart) ought to know, what he ought to be able to do. It is true that in the specifications for personnel officers it is stated that they shall have personnel experience in a large corporation. I think we ought to have on the record what at the present time the viewpoint is as to what such an officer ought to know and what he ought to be able to do.

A. You put me between a rock and a hard place, Colonel.

Are you speaking of peace time or time of war?

Q. Both.

A. We have considered preparing job specifications for regular Army officers for the Planning Branch, and we may do it. So far as the war time proposition is concerned, in our Mobilization Plan a job specification for the reserve officer to be in the military personnel section is written up and a job specification for the officer to be in charge of the civilian personnel section is written up. That we feel is sufficient for the time being. Perhaps we might develop the very voluminous and comprehensive specification that would be virtually an examination to cover the reserve officer who would be in charge of civilian personnel, but we feel that as time goes on that men in charge of civilian personnel for large corporations will probably have a pretty good knowledge of civilian personnel problems. The people for our office number about 316 and they are all office workers. The occupations are covered by Civil Service job specifications and we feel that we could make a start with that. If you want to get some very comprehensive intelligence tests and schemes of classification after that, we will just have to leave that to some high powered and highly educated civilian personnel man to do. I haven't the experience to do it and I doubt if there is more than one or two individuals in this class that have the experience to do it.

Q. I consider this thing important. I think you people, the class, have the right to put me as much on the spot as any one

else. I admitted that I had not thought of this question beforehand and I tried to get at it from the standpoint of personnel specification. It seems to me that an officer in charge of personnel in the office of The Assistant Secretary of War, whether he is classed along with mail and records or not, ought to know something about how personnel is selected for our colleges; he ought to know how personnel is selected by our great industrial establishments; he ought to know how personnel is selected in the various branches of the Government, what the agencies are that select that personnel, what the methods they use are; he ought to know something, I think, of the actual personnel problems that exist in our peace time army; what the problems were that existed in connection with personnel in our late war, and there were terrible problems; and he ought to have some idea of the solution of some of those problems. I have not mentioned in this discussion anything about intelligence tests or anything else.

Q. I notice on this chart (designating) that The Army Industrial College personnel goes into the personnel pool. I think practically all of us have other mobilization assignments.

A. Thank you for bringing that up. On the small version of this chart it shows: "Army Industrial College less students" - I am sorry that I did not get that on this chart. That was the case two years ago. Up until last year about this time we were required to draw our additional officers from the incoming class at The Army Industrial College. That narrowed the field of choice down to rather

narrow limits. Now we can go to the Industrial College graduates as well as the incoming class.

Q. One of the bugbears of industry in general is the old well known machine tool industry. In this Ordnance requirement for personnel are 1776 tool makers, designers, and dressers. Is there any plan as to how we will get them, where we might get them? Of course these are additional to what they have on hand now?

A. It includes what they have on hand now. The number on hand now is not very large. I should say the arsenal expansion (this is just a guess) is now about 5%. They probably have a fifth. That is a guess - not far wrong.

Q. Couldn't they train some some time?

A. Yes, I expect they could. They are doing a little apprentice training; in fact they have a requirement for apprentices in the mobilization plans, apprentices and instructors. They realize they have got to do some training. They have got to get the bulk of these men from industry. Where are they going to get them? It is known that there is a shortage of highly skilled people now, but what can you do about it? I do not know.

Captain Burgess: From that chart on the blackboard referring to the graduates of The Army Industrial College it might appear that there was no purpose in sending line officers to The Army Industrial College. As you recall, Colonel Jordan has repeatedly stated the purpose of having them here is so we can have a pool of officers qualified to participate in war planning on the War Department General

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Staff, men who are familiar with the problems of procurement and mobilization planning and prepared to give due consideration to those problems. I am just wondering if you have the figures available to show The Army Industrial College graduates of line officers and those who are also graduates of the War College. Unless that pool is built up we will fail in the effort we are trying to accomplish.

A. Figures as of a year ago, not including the 1937 class of the War College -

Captain Burgess: Just purely line branches which truly form the nucleus of people who would be available for such planning.

A. As of a year ago, including the class of 1936 at the War College and the Industrial College, the Air Corps had 6 graduates of both the Industrial College and the War College; Engineers 2; Chemical Warfare Service 1; Medical Corps 3; Ordnance 14; Quartermaster Corps 4; Signal Corps 2; and Infantry 1. Graduates of the Industrial College, the War College, and the Command and General Staff School: Cavalry 4; Field Artillery 2; Infantry 4; Coast Artillery 1; Signal Corps 6; Quartermaster Corps 10; Ordnance 5; Medical Corps 3; Chemical Warfare Service 5; Engineers 5; and Air Corps 2. Total officers last year who had gone to all three schools: War College, Industrial College, and Leavenworth, is 47.

Captain Burgess: There were 13 in last year's class, which added to the total you have there would make a total of approximately 60 line officers who are available for selection for that type of work.

Q. Referring to that chart on reserve officer requirements, there is a question I would like to ask. It may be obvious but it puzzled me. You say in the Ordnance Department, for example, the district chief should be a civilian for certain reasons, yet we give him a large number of officer assistants. The question arises: why do we put apparently so many officers, nearly 5,000, I mean men in uniform, on procurement work? We do not rely upon officers all the way through; we do get civilians - why so many? The next question is: How about the relations between the number of officers required in the different branches? For example, Ordnance has about three times as many reserve officers as the Quartermaster Corps and yet purchases may be less, and similarly through the others. What determines it, sir?

A. I will take the last question first, if you please.

I had hoped that your committee on personnel would make a study of that to see if there is an appropriate demand by each supply arm and service. The figures given are a consolidation of estimates made in the lower echelons. Each Ordnance district, as you know, prepared its own mobilization plan and stated its own personnel requirements. In the Quartermaster Corps that is true to a certain extent, although there is a great deal more similarity and standardization between districts and sub-procurement offices than in the Ordnance Department. It would be interesting to compare the number of officers, civilian employees, and certainly inspectors, required to the money load and the number of items that have been procured. We will get to it in the

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Planning Branch some time, I hope. There is a statistical study on personnel going on right now, as you may have imagined after seeing these figures. However, that is one of the things we hope to take up when we get to it. There are some very interesting things to be developed. For example, one glaring inconsistency, perhaps, in one little agency of 33 civilian employees, is that they list 8 messengers. I do not know why in the name of peace they want 8 messengers for 33 employees but it is in there. As another example, one district having a very large money load, the largest money load of its branch, lists something less than 100 inspectors; another district having only about half that money load lists about 1,000 inspectors. Do not ask me why - I do not know.

Q. To get to the other point, just what consideration determines the number of people to be put in uniform? Why must a man be in uniform in procurement district work?

A. We get into a long discussion if we go into the proposition of uniforms for procurement. Do you want me to take time for that, Colonel Scowden?

Colonel Scowden: Yes, go ahead.

Captain Niles: I thought I might dodge some of these broad phrases. There have been four attempts at solving the problem of key personnel for procurement, only one of them has ever gone beyond the blueprint stage. One attempt was to set up a so-called procurement corps with the idea that the farther back you got from the front line the less you needed of the military type and the more

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you needed of the business men type. The people who devised the scheme said that procurement is strictly a business operation, therefore you used business men to do it but in order to let them be recognized as doing their bit in the war effort call them a procurement corps and give them some kind of a quasi military status and give them some kind of distinctive uniform - not the uniform of the Army but still a uniform. That did not get very far. I am not familiar with the details. It originated, I believe, in one San Francisco procurement district. Part of that was to have a commanding general in procurement, I believe. Another attempt was a project for a munitions battalion, which was originated during Colonel Ferguson's regime. The idea there was to have an R.O.T.C. unit or units composed of young men who would study the munitions problem while they were in the R.O.T.C., who would grow up into a munitions corps after they got out into business and would be available for procuring supplies. That, I believe, got as far as some hearings before Congress or at least before some Congressional committees. I am not quite sure about just how far it did get but at least nothing was done about it. I wish Colonel Kelton were here. He could give you the full story on it because he had something to do with it when it originated. One obvious difficulty of a thing of that kind is that you simply can not grade a young man from college and know what his job is going to be twenty years later when he may be a Major or Lieutenant Colonel and not have the right kind of job at all. I think most of you will agree with me that it is civil experience just

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before a war that would do the man the most good. There is another thing in a bill introduced in Congress and commented upon favorably by a committee of the House and three Senate committees, which is in the Industrial Mobilization Plan, Appendix on Legislation, if any of you want to read it. That bill provides for drafting of industrial management by the President. I will read a little bit of it:

"The President is hereby authorized, when in his opinion the successful prosecution of war so requires or renders advisable, to require, under such rules and regulations as he may establish, the registration of all or any class of persons engaged in the management or control of any technical, industrial, or manufacturing plant or establishment of any kind whatsoever, whatever the form of ownership thereof, corporate or otherwise, or who have been engaged in such capacity within six months prior to any declaration of war."

Then it goes on to state that he can draft under the service, fix salaries, fine them \$10,000.00 for failure to comply or put them in jail for ten years. That was insisted upon by certain members of the Nye Committee in their investigation to determine why war is profitable for some people and in their efforts to take the profits out of war. In another bill now before Congress there is a similar provision making it permissive for the President to draft industrial management in connection with procurement of munitions and other supplies connected with industrial mobilization. Those are the three that are now just in the blueprint stage. The Specialist Reserve is the fourth. In going over the 201 file of one of our officers, his name is Lieutenant Colonel Spurgeon Bell, statistician

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for the Brookings Institution, I found a general order appointing him. It said in substance: "This officer is appointed for statistical work solely and will not command troops under any circumstances." So I consider him one of the original specialists. In 1921 the Adjutant General came out with a general order stating that in the Specialist Reserve would be commissioned those officers who were needed for war activities but who were not commissioned in any other branch of the Reserve Corps. They apparently did not want to use the word "miscellaneous" in connection with officers but that is what they meant. The Specialist Reserve went along and they began to wonder about people for procurement in industrial mobilization. Realizing that they had to get business men and realizing that most business men of the desired type would not take commissions as Second Lieutenants, they kept changing the definition of "specialist", kept rewriting the Army Regulations on it, and in 1933 they finally came out with the statement that a specialist was a business man, was an individual whose attainments fitted him especially for procurement of supplies in industrial mobilization. That is not the definition but that is the content of it. They had a lot of people commissioned as specialists - at the present time there are something less than 600 - but the Specialist Reserve has failed because of political abuse. It is a beautiful theory to say you will go out and find a man who knows just what you would like him to know for a specific job in one of your procurement districts and commission him as a Captain or Major or something else. They all want to be Colonels!

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some of them will take it as Captains. That is alright if the Army is left alone and the officer in the district exercises sound judgment and picks the right man, but when you get a flood of appeals from Capitol Hill to have so and so appointed and the man has no qualifications other than his political connections it is pretty bad. In 1932 The Assistant Secretary of War put the lid on on additional appointments in the Specialist Reserve, and it has been on since. There have been a few appointed, about half a dozen I guess, but in those cases the pressure was just too strong to resist. The thing is gradually petering out. I do not know what will be done with it. Some people want to abolish it entirely. There is a strong sentiment in the War Department for abolishing the Specialist Reserve. At any rate, at the present time there are no new appointments being made. That puts The Assistant Secretary of War's office in a particularly hot spot because our only source of new officers is from the Specialist Reserve or by getting assignments from the branches. You have seen that the branches are way under strength; it is not fair to rob them of their best men, and we do not want the others.

Q. I notice under the list of Army Industrial College graduates eight Signal Corps officers and only four required, and the percentage varies, as you have pointed out in your discussion, down to where you require as many Ordnance officers, one more, than there are actual graduates. I am not sure whether this question follows the line of Colonel Waldmann's or not. As to the adequacy of these tables of the number of personnel required, both reserve

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officers and civilians, is it not true that the planning takes into account largely only military requirements, that it does not take into account requirements in the shape of munitions and supplies that will be needed for a communication zone in the event that there is a war in this country? Also in that connection, isn't it true that the military plans do not contemplate a communication zone? It was mentioned in a lecture the other day and I think Colonel Best, or one of the instructors, raised the question about what would happen in connection with the supply of an army where the theater of a war was down in the southeast section of the United States if there were no plan for a communication zone in the military side; if there were no requirements being studied for that and there should be such a situation? Wouldn't there be some additional officers and civilians required in order to handle the supplies for that communication zone?

Colonel Scowden: We have here at the College, Colonel, confined our studies of personnel and all other studies to the zone of the interior. That is one of the missions of the College. The requirements in personnel or other requirements for the theater of operations we have never studied. That is the job of the theater commander and the plan should be worked up by some other agency in the War Department, by G-1 of the General Staff, for example. We have always confined our activities here to the zone of the interior.

Q. I do not quite understand another point. In your planning you can not touch requirements for anything except what the military already specifies, is that the idea?

Colonel Scowden: I did not quite get that.

Q. You can not plan for requirements except those specified by the military authorities?

Colonel Scowden: Why yes - if you mean by the War Department Mobilization Plan. We base all our studies here on the mobilization plans and war plans of the War Department insofar as they affect only the interior.

Q. But you are planning to purchase equipment and have specifications for it for the fighting troops, are you not?

Colonel Scowden: That is right, but I understood your question of Captain Niles was: what are we doing about obtaining personnel for use in the communication zone -

Q. No sir.

Colonel Scowden: I am sorry, I misunderstood your question.

Q. The point has been raised here in previous conferences that we might have a communication zone required in the United States. As I understand it, there is no material being planned for for such a communication zone and the purchase of such material would present a larger problem than is presented there (indicating).

Colonel Scowden: There are the requisitions of the commanding general. Naturally we would procure what the commanding general of the zone of the interior requisitioned for on us. If you have a theater that commanding general is going to make his requisitions on the zone of the interior for supplies, and naturally we are going to supply it.

Captain Miles: I do not believe, no matter how big the load was on industry, that you would get more regular Army officers assigned to procurement than they have now set up; if anything probably regulars will be drawn away. These figures are for M-day and shortly thereafter. A great many people feel that as soon as reserve officers can come in, get settled and take over, that some officers of the regular Army will be withdrawn and sent to the combat zone. I think, if you have to have more people, you have got to look for business men and reserve officers.

Q. Captain Miles, you referred to a chart showing the progress of training. It varies with the different branches, some doing apparently very little and some doing considerable. Sometime ago I talked to an officer over in the Quartermaster General's office and he said the CGC had one definite value - it proved that every possible mistake that could be made in procurement methods was made during the CGC. I can agree with that from my own personal point of view. What I am getting at is this: Paper work of course is not going to win the war but it is going to cause a lot of trouble if we do not know some of the details of making a contract, etc. Procurement purchasing is one phase, and purchasing procedure is common to all branches. Do you think it is possible or advisable that The Assistant Secretary of War's office publish a manual of some standardized procedure as to the purchasing procedure work?

A. It might be practicable if you could put people to

studying it and then applying it. Major Matejka, in charge of the Procurement Control Section of the Current Procurement Branch, feels very strongly about regular Army officers needing more detailed knowledge of the actual machinery and operations of peace time procurement. He feels that we will have some officers in charge of procurement activities in time of war that do not have a very clear grasp of ordinary procurement methods, and he is probably right - there will be some who will not.

Q. The point that I make there is that the Quartermaster Corps at the present time has a sort of purchasing guide which tells somewhat in detail, not about the big picture but about the small details, and it is helpful in time of peace. In war time we go to a different kind of contract and I doubt if many of us know just what those contracts are.

A. That thing has caused considerable speculation and some anxiety. It has been suggested time and time again that The Assistant Secretary's office get up a war time contracts manual and it has been handed to every lawyer who has been in the Planning Branch. Some work has been done on it but there is yet one to be published. If you talk with the procurement planning officers in the districts practically every one will tell you that he would like to have such a thing, he feels the need of it, but it is awfully hard to guess just what is going to be done in the way of eliminating competitive bidding, just how far you are going. It would be swell if we had it, and I imagine there will be one some time.

Captain Burgess: With reference to Colonel Sawyer's question: "Do we confine our planning to military requirements", it is a basic principle that we do just the contrary. Our system of allocations is one in which all war orders are allocated to a firm or corporation, with fifty per cent of the production reserved for civilian needs, so that the corporation or firm may continue its peace time activity and at the end of the war resume its normal peace time practice. We deliberately avoid allocating total production, and that is a basic principle of our allocation system.

Q. My question is with reference to this chart about the office of The Assistant Secretary of War. What is the reason for turning over the peace time personnel of the office of The Assistant Secretary of War into a pool and from that pool take out the brand new war organization? In other words, why does every man apparently change his job on H-day? Will not this change at least tend to disorganize the setup?

A. That brings up the question: does the Current Procurement Branch absorb the Planning Branch or vice versa? The allotment of officers for The Assistant Secretary's office in time of peace is 57. We have 35 now, including the staff and faculty of The Army Industrial College. As you know, The Army Industrial College closes. That makes the faculty available for assignment to this war organization of The Assistant Secretary's office. The Current Procurement Branch

has only 5 officers; the Planning Branch has 18. When war comes The Assistant Secretary has one major responsibility - supervision of procurement - and the whole bunch just goes into that war organization. It is true that many officers would have entirely different jobs. The faculty of The Army Industrial College would be no longer instructing students. Perhaps one would take charge of the training of new recruited officers; in fact, we consider that is a logical assignment for one, but the remainder will do something else. The planning officers stop planning and start helping supervise current procurement. Does that answer your question?

Q. No sir. With the committee, I have gone up and consulted some of the people in the office of The Assistant Secretary of War and they almost invariably say: "Well, I will not be here when war breaks out; I will be two rooms up on another job." That is the thing I can not get through my needle.

A. Every one of those officers who told you that do not know because the mobilization assignments are locked up in the Colonel's safe. Here is the scheme we have, roughly. The ideal situation would be for one officer in each division to stay with it and one to go to the corresponding division on the Munitions Board, and we are working toward that ideal as fast as we can. If you examine the peace time organization chart for the Planning Branch and the war time chart for the Assistant Secretary's office you will find that they are identical as far as names and divisions are concerned; you will find that on the Munitions Board there are corresponding

blocks. It is probable that most of the current procurement people would go into the procurement progress division of the war organization because they are following up peace time procurement now and they would know more about following up procurement than perhaps some of the others, but I do not think you would find that wide variation in duties that some may perhaps envisage. You can not possibly have the same things in the Current Procurement Branch and the Planning Branch because their functions are different.

Q. It is the understanding of the committee studying the subject of coordination that in these four zones there will be a certain coordination group, at least at the beginning of hostilities, and I wonder if your personnel requirements there this morning include the personnel for the proper coordination in the zones?

A. The mobilization plan for The Assistant Secretary of War's office does not include a statement of personnel required for the so-called zone headquarters.

Q. The whole thing is just a little nebulous to the committee and we would like to know more about the concrete plans for the organization.

A. (Stricken from record).

Q. I notice that you have broken down the labor requirements for the manufacture of ordnance in the Government arsenals in time of war. The committee finds that apparently no effort has been made to break down the labor requirements for the procurement districts and I was wondering if you could apply what you have done in connection

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with the manufacture of ordnance in the Government arsenals as a key to the solution of the labor requirement by trades, by technical qualifications, in these civilian manufacturing plants?

A. That has been given some concern but the people who have worked on it have not gone very far. Right now Colonel Sadler of the Contributory Division of the Planning Branch and the corresponding officer in the Navy Department are concerned with trying to arrive at an estimate of what the labor demands will be by occupation, but they have not started the thing yet and I do not know how far they will get. Last year Major Ritchie and myself went out to most of the procurement districts and talked with the procurement planning officers; we asked several of them that question - what could they find out - and they all seemed very pessimistic about it. We did ask if they could find out the number of people in draft ages employed by plants allocated to the Government and most of them said that they would try to do so. Major Minton mentioned it the other day. He is the one who took that hint to heart and is really finding out; several others are doing the same thing. I think we can probably find out roughly what the number of men in the draft are but I doubt if you will get the number in skilled trades. It is too much work for the facility and the procurement planning officer just can not do it.

Q. Setting back to Commander Michael's question, I believe that we can learn a lot from the Navy system. I think there is too large a gap between current procurement and planning procurement.

I believe that our planning unit should be a part of the current operating unit so that in time of war we would lessen that gap from peace to war basis and we would have a more natural expansion, as the Navy did in the last war; as the Navy is doing today in their procurement districts. I have heard that criticism before and I believe it is justified to some extent. I believe that our current operating unit and our planning unit should be one. I know that changes are taking place in the industrial world every day. We make a planning scheme today; it may be fine if war breaks out tomorrow, but it may not be any good five or ten years from now. I feel that the people who are doing the work today are the ones that should plan for tomorrow. I would like to know what you think about that?

A. What has caused concern to quite a number of people.

There is one thing sure: if you give a planning officer any peace time responsibility he is going to neglect planning because he will have more peace time current work than he can do if he does it properly, so there is very sound reason for separating the planning people from those doing current operations. I do not believe I can give you much more on it than that. Of course from the point of view of our own office, there are so many things that just do not fit into current procurement that you just could not have the one man doing the same things. For example, we have no allocation system in time of peace. You buy on competitive bidding. You have no materials problem in time of peace but we have to have a commodities division to deal with the materials. We have no industrial mobilization in time of peace but

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we have to have officers devising plans and methods to mobilize industry. That is all apart from current procurement. There are very few people in The Assistant Secretary's office who do have anything to do with current procurement. There is one officer only who really follows up current procurement - Major Katesjka up in the Procurement Control Division. The others who deal with current procurement - one is just a liaison agent with Congress. That is all he does, journey back and forth there. One deals mostly with legal questions. And yet we have 18 in the Planning Branch, planning. Major Minton mentioned to you that the Ordnance district executives are inspectors now for material purchased in the districts. In the Quartermaster Corps you will find probably a little closer coordination between the current procurement people and the planning people because the depot commander directs his planning people and his current procurement people. It would be fine if you could get the two closer together but it will be a long time coming.

Q. You have a big problem in obtaining inspectors. I understand the Navy has sort of developed the solution for that, using the men who are retired on 15 and 20 service. Of course the Army does not have such a setup but I wonder if any thought has been given to using these men? It looks to me as though it is a good field for obtaining inspectors. This way it looks like you are going to delay your production and everything if you have to train inspectors first.

A. Are you referring to officers and civilians?

Q. C.R.O's - retiring enlisted men on the same basis.

A. But how many of our enlisted men over thirty years' service would you like to have as inspectors under you in a plant? We do not have any requirement under sixteen and twenty years.

A. That is the question I make: Why not provide for a setup like that on the basis that it would furnish your inspectors; in fact, you have a good point for doing it.

A. It might be considered. It is perfectly true that the recruitment of inspectors is a big problem. It is going to be a ticklish problem, and with all due respect to the enlisted personnel we have in the Army I believe that industry offers a more fruitful field for exploitation than retired enlisted men. I doubt if you would find more than a hand full on the retired list right now that you would really want. I may be doing those men an injustice.

Colonel Jordan: I would like to make one remark and that is that I firmly feel and I hope that the time is coming when nobody is going to be on current procurement in one of these districts who is not a graduate of The Army Industrial College. I can not see how the selection of anybody else could be properly defended. A man is sent here to get the viewpoint of the College, which is approved by The Assistant Secretary of War. He is trained. He is given an insight into the problems which arise, and why he should be side tracked and somebody else who has not had the training at this College put on current procurement work is utterly beyond my means of analyzing the proposition. It is wrong. I hope the time is coming when we will

not have a single man in any of our procurement districts in any of the services that is not a graduate of this College.

About the line officers at the College - I hope that no line officer who is a graduate of this College will ever be on procurement work. We of the services can do that job. That is our livelihood; what we have been trained in. We are proud of what we can do in connection with it, but we want line officers on the War Department General Staff and the corps area staffs who have been trained in the viewpoint of industry so that they are not going to make impossible demands. I hope that every line officer in this class goes on the War Department General Staff and that he gets in G-3, G-4, or War Plans; then we are not going to have impossibilities asked of us in the supply services.

I want to say one other thing. If there is anybody in this class now who has any reason to doubt why the speaker came out number one in his class I would like to see that person in my office.