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THOUGHTS ON INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE
WITH THE WAR INDUSTRIALS BOARD DURING 1917-1918

by

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In requesting me to give you the benefit of my experience on the War Industries Board during the World War, I am afraid that Colonel Jordan was led to believe that I played a more important part than was actually the case. Mine was in fact a very small part. You who have been studying the problems of industrial mobilization have a much clearer picture of the functions of that board than I could possibly have had at the time. I was a young Major in the Marine Corps in charge of the Purchasing Division in the Quartermaster's Office. I was also in active charge of the construction of our cantonment at Quantico. The fact that I was the sole representative of the Marine Corps on the War Industries Board should have given me the opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with all its workings but my other duties prevented this. I did, however, try to be present as often as possible at the daily morning meetings of the Requirements Committee.

When the War Industries Board was first organized the industrial situation in the United States was chaotic. There had been a quick cancellation of civilian orders just before war was declared and industry then began to scramble for orders from the Government. The War and Navy Departments had no real programs. The Navy Department had its appropriation for the fiscal year 1918 available before war was declared which enabled them to place large contracts immediately, while the War Department had practically no funds available until after a special appropriation had been made. Therefore, the two services did not start on an equal basis. The Allies had immense orders under contract by the same firms which we desired to utilize for the manufacturing of our own war supplies. I am trying to portray for you the apparently hopeless confusion that existed at the time that Mr. Bauch was made the head of the War Industries Board. Slowly, and oh so slowly, the pieces of this puzzle were fitted into their proper places, but did they stay there? They did not.

The Allies submitted their requirements, the War and Navy Departments submitted theirs, and plans were laid to take care of them. Perhaps even before the orders could be placed with the industry for manufacturing and before priorities could be assigned, new requirements were received. Very often they were from the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force demanding delivery by certain dates. This would often require a rearrangement of priorities of all orders which had been allotted to a certain firm. Can you imagine the despair

of a firm that had raw material rolling into its mill for one order which had been given the highest priority when he was told to lay it aside and start on something else?

Because the situation in France was changing so rapidly in the late spring of 1918, orders were placed and countermanded as to priority so often that the situation became extremely critical. A member of one firm asked my advice as to what to do. He said he had sufficient orders from the Government to keep his plant running night and day for three years and all but one of the orders bore triple A priority. As purchasing officer for the Marine Corps I advised him to go ahead with the order he had for the Marine Corps.

The situation was so serious that it became necessary to resurvey practically the entire program and assign a new series of priorities that took precedent over all previous ones. If it had not been for the steadying leadership and the marvelous personality of Mr. Baruch I should not think of what the consequences might have been. Nerves were very taut at that time. The Allies insisting on their needs being met, caustic telegrams from the A.E.F., all branches of the Army insisting on their programs, the Navy determined that they should have what they needed, and finally one young Major trying to get a little for the Marine Corps, you may imagine the confusion.

The Requirements Committee, of which Mr. Alexander Legge was Chairman, had as members representatives of the War and Navy Departments, the Allies Purchasing Group, the head of the Steel Section, a representative of the Railroad Commission, and a number of others. It appeared to me that its functions were increased gradually until it assumed many of the functions of a Policy Committee. Mr. Baruch was present at many of the meetings, or would come in during the meeting to discuss questions that had arisen or to tell us of some decision the President had made. It was at one of these meetings that Admiral McGowen, who was Paymaster General of the Navy, made a statement that I believe vitally affected the success of the Selective Draft Act. Mr. Baruch had come in to the meeting and had stated that the Selective Draft Act would probably pass that day, that industry had begun to besiege him with requests for exemption of key men, that the situation was serious, and must be settled in the immediate future. After quite a discussion as to the formula to be issued defining the key positions which would be exempt from the draft, Admiral McGowen said, "Mr. Baruch, I recommend that you tell any firm claiming to have a man who is absolutely

indispensable that your advice is for them to take the man out and shoot him this afternoon at four o'clock. They will then have until eight o'clock tomorrow morning to find a man to replace him. Otherwise they may go to the office tomorrow morning and find that the man had died during the night and then they would be in a hell of a jam " Mr. Baruch said, "That's the answer, Sam " The discussion was dropped and we heard no more about the exemption of men in key positions. I presume there were a number of exceptions, but this incident stopped an avalanche

One morning a report came from the Army that a firm in New York had cornered a supply of Navy beans, not only those in the United States, but the total supply in sight for the near future This supply was on board three ships on their way to New York The Army felt that the firm was holding them up, and wanted to know what was the best method of handling the case Commander Hancock, one of the Navy representatives, said, "We will commandeer them and direct the ships' master by radio to turn the beans over to Navy representatives upon arrival in New York " This action secured the beans for the Army and the threat of similar action had a most salutary effect on firms that might be tempted to profiteer by purchasing more than their requirements, well knowing that a scarcity was in sight and that they could be able to re-sell later at a large profit

A need that was apparent from the first that became more vital every day and that was the cause of great delay and confusion is embodied in the word STATISTICS A hundred times a day information was necessary that no one could produce quickly Such questions as How many looms are there in the United States that can produce heavy duck? How many spindles can make the necessary yarn? Perhaps the trade association had to be requested to procure the answer Perhaps there was no trade association Shortly there arrived a small, sandy complexioned, unassuming man, whom Mr Baruch introduced to me as "Mr. Leonard Ayres, our Statistician " Mr Baruch asked me to find office space for him. I asked Mr Ayres how much space he needed and he replied to the effect that any office would do until he found out what he was to do. Knowing what a tremendous job was ahead of him, I wondered if he was another one of those to be tried and found wanting, but in a very short time we all began to realize that if we wanted any information which in its broadest sense could come under the heading of Statistics, that the quickest way to secure it was to ask Mr. Ayres He developed an uncanny sense of timing. He had compiled the information yesterday that we needed today. What a

tremendous advantage will accrue to those who handle the next industrial mobilization in having available at the beginning the statistics which have been accumulated and are being kept up to date in connection with the present Industrial Mobilization Plan

Perhaps you will be interested in two of the problems we encountered due to shortages of material. The solution of these problems took time and delayed procurement. Proper industrial mobilization planning would have obviated them.

A shortage of cotton duck and facilities to manufacture same was one of the earliest shortages that developed in the cotton section. The Navy had presented large requirements while the Army requirements were huge. Just at this time a representative of the Simmons Bed Company asked me to examine a folding steel cot that he felt was superior to the folding canvas cot and one that they were prepared to manufacture 10,000 per day and that they could sell at the same price as the Government was paying for the folding canvas cot. As a result of this examination the Marine Corps placed an order for 30,000 cots. I believe the Army's first order was for 500,000. The cotton section was therefore enabled to place a ban on all cotton duck for folding cots except for overseas shipments. The requirements for this heavy type of cotton duck were thus reduced by approximately 4,000,000 yards.

One of the shortages which developed in the first stages of the war was blankets. Men in cantonments could not get their proper rest if they could not be warm at night. It may not sound like a large problem but because of insistent demands from high ranking officers it took valuable time to explain that every effort was being made to procure a sufficient supply. Every effort was made to speed up the manufacturers, special handling was provided to deliver the finished product direct to the points where they were most needed. Word was passed to wholesalers of heavy woolen cloth to bring to Washington samples of any material they had which was sufficiently heavy to cut into blankets. A stream of these men came to Washington. Samples of the material were examined. If suitable, the wholesaler was told to have it cut into eight foot lengths bound on both ends. An informal contract was negotiated, and shipping instructions given. Contracts had to be written out. Care had to be taken that careful records were kept to insure that report could be made to the Army of the exact distribution ordered. The Army had to modify their regular distributing system. You who have

served as Supply Officers know how great a time special handling takes in a situation like the above

A point that is vital to industry and one which was neglected to a large extent during the last war is that steps must be taken to insure prompt payment for supplies. Industry has to meet payrolls with cash every week. Many cases of frantic contractors came to my attention. This situation became so serious that finally we were authorized to pay for supplies, using the bill of lading as evidence of delivery. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of this question of prompt payment, especially to the small business man who was not backed by unlimited millions in credit. The Marine Corps secured preferential treatment in many cases because I could say to a manufacturer, "Bring me your bill of lading and I will give you a check in fifteen minutes." The contractor would then frequently telegraph the money home to meet a payroll.

I do not know what plans have been made to meet this situation, but it involves such a decided change from peace time methods that it warrants very serious consideration. Payment on delivery at a distant point from place of manufacture will not meet the situation. Unless the railroad situation is infinitely better than it was in the last war, the shipment may be lost for months in the traffic jam. It was almost impossible to get through from the New England States because of the railroad jam around New York, and the jam at the Potomac Yards here in Washington caused the Marine Corps great trouble. Even in the very first months of the War while I was superintending construction of our cantonment at Quantico, Virginia, the George A. Fuller Company maintained a large crew of men who did nothing but go to the places where shipment of material originated and ride the shipment through to Quantico. We also maintained a crew at the Potomac Yards who continually searched the yards for cars consigned to Quantico.

As a result of my experience I believe that the Administrator of the War Resources Administration and the heads of all divisions thereof should be drawn from civil life.

First - If we have officers of the regular services capable of filling these positions they will be desperately needed by their respective services in positions that no civilian can fill acceptably.

Second - The civilian source is so huge that men particularly equipped for each position can be selected.

Third - Many of these positions must be filled by men who are personally acceptable to the Administrator and in whom he has absolute trust

The fourth reason that I hate to touch upon but feel I must is - that any officer detailed to head any of the divisions may find himself very much hampered by pressure from officers senior to him

May I illustrate my second reason by a brief description of the one section that I considered the most efficient, the most difficult and one that functioned full blast from the day of its organization. That was the Steel Section headed by Mr. Peologie. He brought to Washington a group of men from the industry, each highly skilled in his particular branch, such as pig iron, light sheets, heavy steel, construction steel, etc. They were men who on their own knowledge knew every important man and facility in their line in the United States and what was just as important each of these men brought his personal secretary, who spoke the same language and knew the same people as his chief. In dealing with this section one immediately sensed that he was dealing with a group who knew what it all was about.

The War Resources Administration will become, as the War Industries Board finally became, the absolute dictator of the industrial life of the Nation. Such an extreme step may be glossed over in the early stages but it surely follows and I am firmly of the opinion that this super government should be controlled by the civilian element of the country

May I illustrate by an incident that came to my attention how far-reaching the powers of the War Industries Board became. A certain trade association connected with the hardware business came to Washington with blood in their eyes. They would not agree to certain policies that had been prescribed by the War Industries Board. They were given a hearing. After serious consideration the War Industries Board adhered to its previous decision. The Association Chairman informed Mr. Baruch that the association would not follow this decision. Mr. Baruch suggested they go home, talk the situation over with the firms involved and if at the end of another week they had any further recommendations to make he would be ready to listen. After the meeting had dissolved Mr. Baruch made the casual remark that he wondered how they could operate at all if they did not receive any coal for power or railroad cars to ship their finished product. The next week they were back and agreed to comply with the original policy as issued by the War Industries Board.

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The purpose of procurement planning as defined in the 1936 Revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan is to insure timely and orderly production, fabrication, and supply of material required by the Army and Navy during a national emergency. The principles on which all plans are based are then defined. I heartily agree with these principles and especially the embodiment in the plan of Allocating Industrial Facilities. I am fearful, however, that the principle as laid down is not sufficiently broad, and that allocations made in peace time will not be sufficiently comprehensive to avoid great confusion at the beginning of the next national emergency. In the light of my experience it appears to me that when consideration is given to power, labor, transportation and material that a critical problem will either exist or will develop in the procurement of practically all of our requirements and that the best plan would be to accept this view, allocating facilities as rapidly as requirements can be determined and that this same principle should be continued during the national emergency until it could be determined that a critical problem would not develop. It will be simple to discontinue allocations but it will be most difficult to impose them after a critical problem once begins to develop.

In view of my experience and my present duty you can readily imagine that I have been intensely interested in watching the plans for industrial mobilization being whipped gradually into shape. This planning will be the means of saving millions of dollars, but that is not so vital as the fact that months will be saved, and the next time we will not have Allies to hold the front lines for us for a year.

In spite of all the planning we can do, I cannot visualize a smoothly running machine. There will be great confusion, there will be constant change in requirements, but most confusing of all will be the rapid changes in priorities due to changes in the military situation. These situations will change over night, but when a great manufacturing program has been once started it is all hell to try to stop it and start something else.

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Discussion Following Lecture
"Thoughts on Industrial Mobilization
Based on Experiences with the W.I.B. During the World War
by
Brig. General Seth Williams, U.S.M.C.

The Army Industrial College
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Q. General, there is one point on the War Service Committees I would like to have cleared up, if I may. The Council of National Defense committees were formed to represent both industry and the Government and they were criticized because they represented both buyer and seller. To clear that point, the War Resources Administration, at least the War Industries Board, was formed and these committees were formed; and then, I believe, reorganized as commodity committees; and the War Service committees were organized by industry, using the trade associations to represent industry. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct. A good many of the different trades had no trade association, and they were all urged to form one. We did not see a great deal of ~~it~~. ^{the association members} ~~The men~~ ^{representatives of the ass} ~~who came down~~ ^{to Washington} might have been the president of the association or the secretary, and he kept in close touch with the head of the commodity section in the War Industries Board. The officers who represented the services, ~~you~~ ~~might say~~, were begging on one end; the trade associations were on the other end; and the commodity committee made the decisions.

Q. Did the Government get a great deal of valuable information

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from the trade associations during the war?

A. They were practically our only source of statistics until long after great confusion had developed. *Oh yes,*^a tremendous amount, ~~tremendous amount.~~

Q. General, how far do you think we should carry allocations in peace time?

A. I would say just as far as you know^o your requirements. I would allocate everything. That is my own personal opinion. I can not conceive of there not being great confusion and overloading of industry in every way after war once starts. If you allocate in peace time you have the possibility of a study of the requirements; a fair distribution of manufacturing facilities. Perhaps in another war the situation might be the other way around *from what it was in the last war* - the Army may have their money and the Navy not have theirs. You would think with all the notice we had that we could have anticipated the placing of contracts. It seemed to me most extraordinary that the President would ^{not} authorize the Army to create a deficiency. The Navy appropriation bill for ^{the fiscal year} ~~(part)~~ 1918 passed in March of 1917, and so much of that money ^{was} they just slapped into contracts and awarded, well, perhaps ^{to the extent of} hundreds of millions of dollars. What chance did the Army have? If you allocate in peace time, I think a fair division can be made. You have to take care of the civilian population at the same time. In the last war a good many of the allocations were allocations for specific contracts. I do not like that in a continuing source of supply. For instance, we would have a contract

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for twenty ~~thousand blankets~~ or fifty thousand blankets awarded to one firm. The next time we went into the market for blankets we might go to somebody else. It seems to me it would have been much simpler to have picked out some small firm that could have made enough blankets for the Marine Corps; put our inspectors in that factory and kept them there for the duration of the war. The Army spread contracts for blankets in forty different firms and tried to buy ~~ten~~ million\$ of them the first six months of the war. To spread contracts, you would have to develop a tremendous supply of inspectors for blankets; and then when you got through with that contract you, ^{perhaps} would not have any further use, ~~perhaps~~, for them. I am taking some of these simpler things. I know my personal opinion does not coincide with many of the people who are working on this, and I am only giving it to you as my personal experience.

Major Gano. General Williams, I was interested in the incident you related about the hardwaremen and their contact with Mr. Baruch. In studying priorities, I have come to the conclusion that the Preferential Shipments Act of August 10, 1917, which was the basis for handling transportation, was the pivot around which the War Industries Board worked in controlling priorities. That is, they were enabled to handle the transportation situation and say that shipments could or could not be made. Will you give me the benefit of your experience in confirming that?

A. On the War Industries Board, Mr. Powell, of the Southern Road, represented the Railroad Commission. He handled a great deal

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of the allocation of freight cars, and we went to him all the time. In fact, we brought him a list every day of where we had to have cars to help our manufacturers out. When Mr. Baruch made this casual remark Mr. Powell was sitting there; a representative of the Coal Commission was sitting there, ^{with} ~~on~~ this trade association; and they just did not get any cars all the next week; none of their coal cars got through. No matter how much help we got from the railroad, no matter how anxious they were to help us, there was the lack of freight cars and this absolute bottleneck around New York. Everything was shipped to New York to go overseas and there were no bottoms to take it. They had every yard between Philadelphia and New York full and many cars stayed on the same sidings for six months and never moved, ~~and they could not get into them.~~ But just think of the power that that railroad commission had! No one could carry it to the courts and say "I am entitled to two cars for Monday." They just did not get them - that is all. So that was used to bring tremendous pressure

to bear on it. However there was another equally powerful method of handling similar conditions and that was by refusing allocations of raw material.

Commander Dunham* I was interested, General, in your opinion as to the extent we should go in allocation. Wouldn't it be an almost interminable task to try to keep allocations on everything up to date with the changing picture in industry, firms going out of business, mergers, and the like?

A Yes, it would be, but it is a bigger task when war is declared to try to put them all into a picture that you do not know anything about. If the Army should lose the money to continue

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industrial mobilization planning for one year the situation would be
 frightful. I visualize that you ^{will} save millions of dollars if
 the Army ^{can} could not only continue ^{planning} it but ^{can} could spend more money ^{each year.} on it. ^{illustrate -}
 You have the problem there; why not solve what you can of it? [^] There
 was a little firm in San Francisco that made boat compasses for the
 Navy all during the last war - a simple thing that any tinsmith shop,
 with one good mechanic who had one to look at, could have made. I
 was very much interested, ^{in mobilization planning} As far back as 1923 when Major Pingree was
 stationed in San Francisco and I was Depot Quartermaster, ^{he} was sur-
 veying ^{the} that situation out there. That firm is now slated to make
 panoramic sights for artillery. That is what that firm ought to have
 made during the last war, not boat compasses. We had some work to ^{do done}
 there and I got the picture from the manufacturer. He made levels and
 transits, and that class of ^{material} thing. He had been anxious for a long
 time to obtain a new machine for cutting the degrees around the
azimuth circle but had not really felt that he did enough of
 that work to afford it. However, when the Army secured his interest in
 panoramic sights for the next war he went right out and bought this
 machine. It was just a baby to him - he was so delighted with it.
 As you know, we got artillery before we got panoramic sights last
 time, we got the guns before we got the sights. I do not see how you
 are going to take care of it without allocation.

Colonel Jordan: Would you allocate the food supply?

A. I do not think so, no, Colonel. I do not think any
 real shortage will develop.

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Colonel Jordan: On supplies concerning which there was an ample amount visible you would not allocate - is that the point?

A. Food is all right, but I do not know of much else. Of course, you will have to have control over food, but we had less trouble on that; and, it will probably be under a separate food administration. The services had no trouble getting food, as far as I know. We had first choice on everything and I had no trouble whatsoever on the ration business.

Major McPike: In view of your experience in the last war and in connection with allocations, do you think it probable in another major emergency that as between allocated facilities themselves we can do away with competition? Also, as between allocated facilities and those which are not allocated, do you think we would be able to give negotiated contracts without the benefit of competition?

A. Competition went by the board in the last war. There was no competition (I am not sure but I would say) by September or October of 1917. It may appear from some of the contracts that there was competition but it did not amount to much, it was not actual. People came to my office and if they had something that I wanted I bought it right then and made a negotiated contract with them. They picked up the telephone and told their factories to ship it and send a man with a bill of lading to my office. The man would stay here in Washington and get his money the next morning. I remember a particular case, the Mills Horen Cartridge Belt ^{co} people. The ^{President} man came into my office one day. He was making rifle belts and pack carriers and things

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that we needed very much He said: "I have this order from you but I have a lot of others that are dated previous for this same priority. The Army owes me two million dollars and I haven't a cent to meet my payroll on Saturday"- this was on Thursday. I said: "How many will you give me?" He said: "I have three carloads" ^{included ship} - one to Quantico, one to Philadelphia, and one to Paris Island He got his check the next day. I think with the negotiation of contracts you have got to have commandeering. If a man tries to hold you up (and it happened many times in the last war) slap a commandeering order on him, or whatever you may call it in the next war, and then let the committee which handles that decide what the fair price is. I know Mr. Baruch is advocating (he does not call it price fixing) that a ceiling be put on prices. It sounds all right to me but I do not know how any purchasing officer would know what the ceiling was on that ^{article} price, and I conceive that the war would be six months old before you could make a list of what a fair ceiling was on all these different articles on the date fixed. What is a fair price to one firm is not a fair price to another firm It is either too big or too little.

Q. I would like to ask if you can visualize a group of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers operating in the same capacity as the War Industries Board operated in the last war?

A. No.

Q. Can not do it?

A. No.

~~Q. Thank you.~~

Q. You pointed out one method of Mr. Baruch controlling

industry indirectly through failing to give them fuel, etc. The food and fuel administrations control them by a method of licensing. One method is an indirect method; the other is a direct method. Which one do you consider best to be used in the next emergency, or are both necessary?

A. I think we controlled by license; then we controlled still further by allocation of material. If a firm were manufacturing a certain item that required steel and we did not want that to be manufactured we told the steel section "No steel to that man for that purpose". I do not know that I can answer your question exactly, but we used every method available

Q. And you feel that every method available will be needed in the next emergency?

A. Yes, and used.

Major Gano: General Williams, in connection with the matter of traffic congestion, what influence do you think storage facilities would have?

A. It would mean all the difference between life and death. Of course, not having any ships to take the things over to France that were moving toward New York caused a terrible jam. They tried to accommodate that later on by using Norfolk and Savannah, but if they had had a sorting yard such as they had over in Guinea later on where that material could have been sorted, that of itself would have cleaned those New York yards. They just did not have anything comparable to what the Army eventually put in at Guinea. Perhaps

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in the next mobilization, with all the planning you have done, you can visualize the storage warehouses that you may need and at the points that you may need them. As I look back on it I am astounded at the lack of vision we all had. With all the notice we had that we would probably go into the war after Mr. Wilson broke off diplomatic relations, I do not know of any branch of the service whose estimate of its requirements were twenty-five per cent of what it needed within the next six ^{months} weeks. If you start to allocate requirements and find that your program has doubled in size, it is a tremendous job to fill that other fifty per cent in. I do not know how you are going to cover in the next war what happened in the last war in the spring of 1918. Of course, you all know that the situation changed ^{in Europe} over there, that the decision was finally made that men were what they wanted; the French and British would furnish artillery. But, we had these tremendous artillery programs that were actually under way and then General Pershing would telegraph ^{home} back and say: "Stop it. I want so and so." I left the War Industries Board in September of 1918. That is how much I served with the Eleventh Regiment during the war. I had two weeks before the Armistice was declared. I had two very delightful months there afterward. You just break your whole program. It is a terrible thing to do but ^{How can it be avoided?} ~~what can you~~ do? You have to meet the tactical situation. The telegrams that used to come from General Pershing's headquarters were scorching, there was no question about that. I went south for a little ^{leave last January} while, and there was a man and his wife staying at the same place I was staying ~~at~~, a Colonel ^{Wilmets} Wilmets,

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who went over to France with General Pershing. He was Vice-President of the New York Central when war was declared and he took over the job ^{at} ~~with~~ the G.H.Q., ^{of procuring the necessary} ~~re.~~ the railroad facilities, and he and I had some amusing talks down there. He told me how he burned us up with telegrams. Well, so he did, but after the war was over he still had not gotten the locomotives and freight cars that they wanted; never did get them, and he is very much disturbed over the railroad situation as it will affect national defense in the next mobilization. He thinks that if we had a mobilization tomorrow the jam in the railroads would be infinitely worse than it was during the last war on account of the railroads letting their rolling stock run down.

Major McPike: General, I would like to ask you one more question about price control - you mentioned that. Do you think that price control over basic commodities, basic raw materials and wages, might be an answer to this problem of price control?

A. I do not know. It is a question that was beyond me during the war and it is still beyond me. Of course, we fixed prices on basic material; later on, prices became more stabilized on labor, but there was a terrible situation of course in labor. In building Camp Humphreys fifty people were taken away from us ^{at Quantico}. They were offered five cents an hour more pay. We had them back next day by giving them five cents an hour more. The President finally issued the order which practically amounted to the fact that anybody who took a civilian employee away from another Government agency would have to take the consequences. Fortunately we had the men when the

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order was issued.

Colonel Jones: I would like to ask General Williams whether he would care to comment a little further on a point that is to me very vital in the carrying out of any war plan which we might have made. We have a condition in the Army in which the bureau chiefs are required to procure their munitions but at the present time they have no control over the finance officer who pays for them. It has always been my opinion that that is most vital, based upon my war experience and upon the very things which you have cited here. I wonder if you would care to comment on that sort of thing?

A. I do not know what the answer is ^{for} ~~to~~ the Army but the answer has got to be found before the next war or there will be tremendous confusion. We did not have that trouble. I will not say we did not have it - we had an obvious means of helping it out in both the Navy and the Marine Corps. In my particular case, our disbursing officer at headquarters was one number junior to me and if I wanted a check in fifteen minutes I told him to give it to me. He was in the next office and it was a very simple proposition. I think, if it is possible, that everything should be inspected at the factory and paid for when it leaves. That may be ideal.

Colonel Jordan: And your advice, sir, is to have the money on hand and a finance officer there whom you rank and whom you can make pay?

A. Right.